Torque control method for automatic parking, electronic equipment and vehicle

Abstract

The invention provides a torque control method for automatic parking, electronic equipment and a vehicle, and the method comprises the steps: carrying out the safety verification of a request control signal and a parking control signal according to a current operation signal, and obtaining a verification result; and whether parking safety risks exist or not is determined according to the verification result, and torque reduction control is carried out when the parking safety risks exist. The control requirement of the automatic parking control system during automatic parking can be determined by monitoring the parking control signal in real time, the control request of the chassis braking system can be determined by monitoring the request control signal in real time, and the current actual control condition of the vehicle can be determined by obtaining the current operation signal. The control demand and the control request are verified according to the actual control condition of the vehicle so as to determine whether the error signal causing the parking safety risk exists or not, and when the error signal exists, the danger degree of the actual danger caused by the parking safety risk is reduced through torque reduction control so that the safety of the vehicle and users in the vehicle can be guaranteed.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of vehicle technology, and in particular to a torque control method, electronic equipment and vehicle for automatic parking. Background Art

[0002] When the automatic parking function is activated, the driver does not need to control the vehicle at all, which results in the vehicle being driven completely by the output torque of the automatic parking function during the automatic parking process. The vehicle and users in the vehicle may experience unexpected control due to abnormal motor torque output, which may cause damage to the user and the vehicle. Summary of the invention

[0003] In view of this, the purpose of the present application is to propose a torque control method, electronic equipment and vehicle for automatic parking, so as to avoid the safety risks caused by unexpected control during the automatic parking process.

[0004] Based on the above purpose, the present application provides a torque control method for automatic parking, comprising:

[0005] monitoring a parking control signal corresponding to an automatic parking control system and a request control signal corresponding to a chassis braking system;

[0006] Performing a safety check on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the current operation signal to obtain a check result;

[0007] Determine whether there is a parking safety risk based on the verification result, and perform torque reduction control when there is the parking safety risk.

[0008] Based on the same inventive concept, the present disclosure also provides an electronic device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable by the processor, wherein the processor implements the method as described above when executing the computer program.

[0009] Based on the same inventive concept, the present disclosure also provides a vehicle, comprising the electronic device as described above.

[0010] As can be seen from the above, the torque control method, electronic device and vehicle for automatic parking provided by the present application can monitor the parking control signal corresponding to the automatic parking control system and the request control signal corresponding to the chassis braking system; perform safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the current operation signal to obtain the verification result; determine whether there is a parking safety risk according to the verification result, and perform torque reduction control when there is a parking safety risk. By real-time monitoring of the parking control signal, the control requirement of the automatic parking control system during automatic parking can be determined; by real-time monitoring of the request control signal, the control request of the chassis braking system can be determined; by obtaining the current operation signal, the current actual control situation of the vehicle can be determined; the process of performing safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the current operation signal is to verify the control requirement and the control request according to the actual control situation of the vehicle to determine whether there is an error signal causing the parking safety risk in the request control signal and the parking control signal during the automatic parking control process, and when it is determined according to the verification result that there is a corresponding error signal, it is determined that there is a parking safety risk, and at this time, the degree of danger caused by the actual danger of the parking safety risk is reduced by performing torque reduction control to ensure the safety of the vehicle and the user in the vehicle. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0011] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the present application or related technologies, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or related technical descriptions are briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative work.

[0012] Figure 1 This is a flow chart of the torque control method for automatic parking according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0013] Figure 2 This is a flow chart of performing safety verification on a request control signal and a parking control signal according to a current operation signal in an embodiment of the present application;

[0014] Figure 3 This is a flow chart of an embodiment of the present application for determining whether there is a parking safety risk according to the verification result;

[0015] Figure 4 This is a flow chart of a torque reduction control according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0016] Figure 5 This is a flow chart of another torque reduction control according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0017] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the torque control device for automatic parking according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0018] Figure 7 It is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0019] In order to make the objectives, technical solutions and advantages of the present application more clearly understood, the present application is further described in detail below in combination with specific embodiments and with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0020] It should be noted that, unless otherwise defined, the technical terms or scientific terms used in the embodiments of the present application should be the usual meanings understood by people with ordinary skills in the field to which the present application belongs. The "first", "second" and similar words used in the embodiments of the present application do not represent any order, quantity or importance, but are only used to distinguish different components. "Including" or "comprising" and similar words mean that the elements or objects appearing in front of the word cover the elements or objects listed after the word and their equivalents, without excluding other elements or objects. "Connect" or "connected" and similar words are not limited to physical or mechanical connections, but can include electrical connections, whether direct or indirect. "Up", "down", "left", "right" and the like are only used to indicate relative positional relationships. When the absolute position of the described object changes, the relative positional relationship may also change accordingly.

[0021] It should be understood herein that any number of elements in the drawings is for illustration rather than limitation, and any naming is only for distinction rather than having any limiting meaning.

[0022] Based on the description of the above background technology, the related technology also has the following situations:

[0023] Currently, new energy vehicles are generally equipped with automatic parking functions. The function of the automatic parking function is that the automatic parking assist system (APA) uses ultrasonic sensors and cameras to scan the parking spaces on both sides of the vehicle and the obstacles around the vehicle. When a suitable parking space is scanned, APA automatically plans the parking path through an internal algorithm, and the vehicle automatically parks in place. The driver does not need to intervene during the entire parking process. APA interacts with the electronic power steering system (EPS), the vehicle control unit (VCU), and the chassis braking system to achieve automatic parking. APA controls vehicle steering through EPS, controls vehicle shifting and vehicle driving through VCU, and controls vehicle deceleration and parking through chassis braking systems, such as the electronic stability program (ESP).

[0024] Therefore, when the automatic parking function is activated, the driver does not need to control the vehicle throughout the process, which results in the vehicle being driven completely by the output torque of the automatic parking function during the automatic parking process. The vehicle and users in the vehicle may experience unexpected control due to abnormal motor torque output, which may cause damage to the user and the vehicle.

[0025] The torque control method, electronic device and vehicle for automatic parking provided by the present application can monitor the parking control signal corresponding to the automatic parking control system and the request control signal corresponding to the chassis braking system; perform safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the current operation signal to obtain the verification result; determine whether there is a parking safety risk according to the verification result, and perform torque reduction control when there is a parking safety risk. The control requirements of the automatic parking control system when performing automatic parking can be determined by real-time monitoring of the parking control signal, the control request of the chassis braking system can be determined by real-time monitoring of the request control signal, and the current actual control situation of the vehicle can be determined by obtaining the current operation signal. The process of performing safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the current operation signal is to verify the control requirements and control requests according to the actual control situation of the vehicle to determine whether there are error signals that cause parking safety risks in the request control signal and the parking control signal during the automatic parking control process, and when it is determined according to the verification result that there are corresponding error signals, it is determined that there is a parking safety risk, and at this time, the degree of danger caused by the actual danger of the parking safety risk is reduced by performing torque reduction control to ensure the safety of the vehicle and the user in the vehicle.

[0026] The torque control method for automatic parking provided by the embodiments of the present application is described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0027] In some embodiments, Figure 1 As shown, a torque control method for automatic parking includes:

[0028] Step 101: Monitor a parking control signal corresponding to an automatic parking control system and a request control signal corresponding to a chassis braking system.

[0029] In specific implementation, the control process of automatic parking is as follows: after APA receives the signal from the driver requesting the activation of the automatic parking function, it activates the automatic parking function and sends the automatic parking activation status a to the chassis braking system and VCU. At the same time, APA will send the longitudinal acceleration activation status b, the longitudinal acceleration request value c, and the target parking gear d1 to the chassis braking system in real time according to the vehicle status during the parking process. At the same time, during the parking process, APA will send the vehicle steering requirements (such as steering direction and parking steering angle) to EPS. When EPS receives the steering requirement signal, it first determines whether the steering requirement signal meets the requirements and executes the steering requirement signal that meets the requirements.

[0030] The chassis braking system receives the longitudinal acceleration activation state b and the longitudinal acceleration request value c sent by APA, and converts them into the requested driving torque state e and the requested driving torque f. When the vehicle needs to be driven, the chassis braking system activates the requested driving torque state e, that is, sets the requested driving torque state e, and sends the requested driving torque f to the VCU at the same time.

[0031] When the vehicle needs to slow down or park, the chassis braking system will inactivate the requested driving torque state e, that is, the requested driving torque state e will not be set, and the requested driving torque f will be replaced by an alternative value (for example, -1000Nm) to the VCU. At this time, the chassis braking system will control the vehicle to slow down or park through braking force.

[0032] The chassis braking system receives the target parking gear position d1 sent from the APA, converts it into the requested gear activation state g and the target requested gear position d2, and sends a signal to the VCU.

[0033] When the VCU receives the automatic parking activation status a from the APA and the set state of the requested driving torque status e sent by the chassis braking system, when the current vehicle speed ≤ the vehicle speed threshold h, the VCU functional layer determines that the automatic parking function under the torque request is normal (indicated by the torque function status i being in the set state), and can send the requested driving torque f sent by the chassis braking system to the motor controller (Micro Controller Unit, MCU), and the motor controller controls the motor to output the corresponding requested driving torque f; if the VCU detects that any of the conditions in the automatic parking activation status a / requested driving torque status e / current vehicle speed comparison result is not met, the VCU functional layer determines that the parking torque control function is abnormal (indicated by the torque function status i being in the unset state), and the VCU will not execute the requested torque f sent by the chassis braking system.

[0034] The VCU receives the automatic parking activation status a from the APA, and at the same time receives the set state of the requested gear activation status g and the target requested gear d2 of the chassis braking system, and determines that the current vehicle speed is ≤ the vehicle speed threshold h. Then the VCU functional layer determines that the parking function under the gear request is normal (indicated by the gear function status j being the set state). At this time, the target requested gear d2 sent by the chassis braking system can be sent to the APA, the chassis braking system and the MCU, indicating that the gear has been updated according to the target requested gear d2; if the VCU detects that any of the conditions in the automatic parking activation status a / requested gear activation status g / current vehicle speed comparison result is not met, then the VCU functional layer determines that the parking gear control function is abnormal (indicated by the gear function status j being the non-set state), then the VCU will not execute the target requested gear d2 sent by the chassis braking system, and maintain the original gear state unchanged.

[0035] The control of vehicle automatic parking is achieved by VCU through separate control of the functional layer and the monitoring layer. The functional layer can be understood as VCU normally receiving signals from APA and chassis braking systems and executing corresponding requests to ensure the realization of the automatic parking function.

[0036] The monitoring layer can be understood as the VCU conducting rationality monitoring based on the relevant signals sent by the APA and chassis braking system, as well as the results of the VCU functional layer's judgment, to determine whether there are corresponding parking safety risks during the automatic parking process.

[0037] Therefore, the monitoring layer needs to monitor the parking control signal corresponding to the automatic parking control system and the request control signal corresponding to the chassis braking system (such as the electronic stability system) in real time, wherein the parking control signal includes the automatic parking activation state a, the longitudinal acceleration activation state b, the longitudinal acceleration request value c and the target parking gear d1. The request control signal includes the request driving torque state e, the request driving torque f, the request gear activation state g and the target requested gear d2.

[0038] Monitoring the automatic parking activation state a can determine whether APA has turned on the automatic parking function, and monitoring the longitudinal acceleration activation state b, the longitudinal acceleration request value c, and the target parking gear d1 can determine the parking control requirements of APA. Monitoring the driving torque state e, the requested driving torque f, the requested gear activation state g, and the target requested gear d2 can determine whether the chassis braking system has a corresponding gear or torque request, and the corresponding request control requirements.

[0039] It is able to determine in real time whether there is an erroneous signal by monitoring the request control signal and the parking control signal, and reduce the output torque by activating the functional safety state when an erroneous signal exists, so as to reduce the actual degree of danger caused by the parking safety risk caused by the erroneous signal and ensure the safety of the vehicle and the users in the vehicle.

[0040] Step 102: Perform safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the current operation signal to obtain a verification result.

[0041] In specific implementation, when judging whether there is an error signal in the request control signal and the parking control signal, it is necessary to combine the current operation signal synchronized with the functional layer to make a judgment. The current operation signal includes the current vehicle speed, the current output torque, the master cylinder pressure value, the gear function state and the torque function state. According to the current operation signal, it can be determined whether the execution conditions of the corresponding request are met, and the actual operation state of the vehicle during the automatic parking process can be determined according to the current operation signal to determine whether the request control signal and the parking control signal are reasonable, and then determine whether there is a fault signal. Therefore, according to the current operation signal, the request control signal and the parking control signal are checked for safety, and the verification results including whether there is a fault signal and the specific content of the corresponding fault signal can be determined, and the corresponding parking safety risk can be judged according to the verification results.

[0042] Among them, the safety check includes state safety check, motion safety check and consistency safety check. The check process can be summarized as follows: perform state safety check on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the parking function state and the current vehicle speed in the current operation signal; perform motion safety check on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the master cylinder pressure value in the current operation signal; perform consistency safety check by comparing the request control signal and the parking control signal. Among them, the check process of the three check items is carried out simultaneously.

[0043] Step 103: Determine whether there is a parking safety risk based on the verification result, and perform torque reduction control when there is a parking safety risk.

[0044] In specific implementation, since the verification process of the three verification items of state safety verification, motion safety verification and consistency safety verification is carried out simultaneously, any failure of any verification item can be determined to have a corresponding parking safety risk, and only when all three verification items pass the inspection can it be determined that there is no parking safety risk. When there is a parking safety risk, the actual danger caused by the parking safety risk is reduced by performing torque reduction control. Reducing the current output torque can reduce the speed at which the vehicle state changes, leaving sufficient reaction time for the users in the vehicle to correct the wrong operation or fault, and ensure the safety of the vehicle and the users in the vehicle.

[0045] In summary, the torque control method for automatic parking provided by the present application can monitor the parking control signal corresponding to the automatic parking control system and the request control signal corresponding to the chassis braking system; perform safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the current operation signal to obtain the verification result; determine whether there is a parking safety risk according to the verification result, and perform torque reduction control when there is a parking safety risk. By real-time monitoring of the parking control signal, the control requirements of the automatic parking control system during automatic parking can be determined; by real-time monitoring of the request control signal, the control request of the chassis braking system can be determined; the current actual control situation of the vehicle can be determined by acquiring the current operation signal; the process of performing safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the current operation signal is to verify the control requirements and control requests according to the actual control situation of the vehicle to determine whether there are error signals that cause parking safety risks in the request control signal and the parking control signal during the automatic parking control process, and when it is determined according to the verification result that there are corresponding error signals, it is determined that there is a parking safety risk, and at this time, the degree of danger caused by the actual danger of the parking safety risk is reduced by performing torque reduction control to ensure the safety of the vehicle and the users in the vehicle.

[0046] In some embodiments, the safety check includes a state safety check, a motion safety check, and a consistency safety check; Figure 2 As shown, the request control signal and the parking control signal are safety checked according to the current operation signal, including:

[0047] Step 201: Performing a status safety check on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the parking function status in the current operation signal and the current vehicle speed.

[0048] In specific implementation, the state safety check is to determine whether there are erroneous state signals in the request control signal and the parking control signal, and it is necessary to check from two dimensions: torque and gear position.

[0049] In some embodiments, the state safety check includes a torque safety check and a gear safety check; performing a state safety check on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the parking function state in the current operation signal and the current vehicle speed includes:

[0050] Step 2011: In response to the torque function state in the parking function state being the set state, determining the automatic parking activation state in the parking control signal and the requested driving torque state in the request control signal.

[0051] In specific implementation, it is necessary to monitor the torque function state i in the function layer vehicle function state to determine whether the function layer has sent the requested drive torque f to the MCU. When the torque function state i is in the set state, i.e., i=1, it can be determined that the function layer has sent the requested drive torque f to the MCU. At this time, the theoretical control is to drive the vehicle forward to perform automatic parking.

[0052] At this time, it is necessary to verify whether the functional layer correctly sends the requested drive torque f to the MCU. The premise for the functional layer to send the requested drive torque f to the MCU is to receive the set automatic parking activation state a sent by the APA, that is, a=1, and at the same time receive the set requested drive torque state e sent by the chassis braking system, that is, e=1. At the same time, the vehicle speed limit condition for sending the requested drive torque f to the MCU needs to be met, that is, the current vehicle speed is less than or equal to the preset vehicle speed threshold before the requested drive torque f is allowed to be sent to the MCU. Therefore, it is necessary to determine the automatic parking activation state in the monitored parking control signal and the requested drive torque state in the request control signal to determine the actual torque control requirements of the APA and the chassis braking system.

[0053] Step 2012: In response to the automatic parking activation state and the requested driving torque state both being in the set state, and the current vehicle speed being less than or equal to a preset vehicle speed threshold, determining that the torque safety check has passed.

[0054] In specific implementation, if the automatic parking activation state a is in the set state, that is, a=1, it means that APA has activated the automatic parking activation state a, and it is determined that the actual control demand of APA is to perform automatic parking. The functional layer can send a request for driving torque f to the MCU. If the requested driving torque state e is in the set state, that is, e=1, it means that the chassis braking system has activated the requested driving torque state e, and sent e=1 to the functional layer, and it is determined that the actual control demand of the chassis braking system is to request to drive the vehicle for automatic parking. The functional layer can send a request for driving torque f to the MCU. If the current vehicle speed is less than or equal to the preset vehicle speed threshold, it means that the automatic parking function is allowed to be executed, and the functional layer is allowed to send a request for driving torque f to the MCU. Therefore, when the three signals of a=1, e=1, and the current vehicle speed is less than or equal to the vehicle speed threshold are monitored at the same time, it is determined that the functional layer torque function state i=1 is normally activated, there is no abnormal request for torque, and it is determined that the torque safety check has passed.

[0055] If the automatic parking activation state a is not set, that is, a=0, it means that APA has not activated the automatic parking function. The function layer sends a request for drive torque f to the MCU, which indicates an error judgment failure and determines that the torque safety check has not passed.

[0056] If the requested driving torque state e is not set, that is, e=0, it means that the chassis braking system does not request the functional layer to send a requested driving torque f. The functional layer sends a requested driving torque f to the MCU, which indicates that an error has occurred in the fault judgment, and it is determined that the torque safety check has not passed.

[0057] If the current vehicle speed is greater than the vehicle speed threshold, it is determined that the speed limit condition for the functional layer to send a request for drive torque f to the MCU is not met, and the functional layer is not allowed to send a request for drive torque f to the MCU. The functional layer sending a request for drive torque f to the MCU indicates an erroneous judgment fault, and it is determined that the torque safety check has not passed.

[0058] Step 2013: In response to the gear function state in the parking function state being the set state, determining the automatic parking activation state in the parking control signal and the requested gear activation state in the request control signal.

[0059] In specific implementation, it is necessary to monitor the gear function state j in the functional layer vehicle function state to determine whether the functional layer has sent the requested drive torque f to the MCU. When the gear function state j is in the set state, i.e., i=1, it can be determined that the functional layer has sent the target requested gear d2 to the MCU. At this time, the theoretical control of automatic parking is to control the vehicle to switch to the target requested gear d2.

[0060] At this time, it is necessary to verify whether the functional layer correctly sends the target request gear position d2 to the MCU. The premise for the functional layer to send the target request gear position d2 to the MCU is to receive the set automatic parking activation state a sent by the APA, that is, a=1, and at the same time receive the set request gear activation state g sent by the chassis braking system, that is, g=1. At the same time, it is necessary to meet the vehicle speed limit condition for sending the target request gear position d2 to the MCU, that is, the current vehicle speed is less than or equal to the preset vehicle speed threshold before sending the target request gear position d2 to the MCU. Therefore, it is necessary to determine the automatic parking activation state in the monitored parking control signal and the request gear activation state in the request control signal to determine the actual gear control requirements of the APA and the chassis braking system.

[0061] Step 2014: In response to the automatic parking activation state and the requested gear activation state both being in the set state, and the current vehicle speed being less than or equal to a preset vehicle speed threshold, determining that the gear safety check has passed.

[0062] In specific implementation, if the automatic parking activation state a is in the set state, that is, a=1, it means that APA has activated the automatic parking activation state a, and it is determined that the real control demand of APA is to perform automatic parking. The functional layer can send the target request gear d2 to the MCU. If the requested gear activation state g is in the set state, that is, g=1, it means that the chassis braking system has activated the requested gear activation state g, and sent g=1 to the functional layer, and it is determined that the real control demand of the chassis braking system is to request to drive the vehicle to shift gears, and the functional layer can send the target request gear d2 to the MCU. If the current vehicle speed is less than or equal to the preset vehicle speed threshold, it means that the automatic parking function is allowed to execute, and the functional layer is allowed to send the target request gear d2 to the MCU. Therefore, when the three signals of a=1, g=1, and the current vehicle speed is less than or equal to the vehicle speed threshold are monitored at the same time, it is determined that the functional layer gear function state j=1 is normally activated, there is no abnormal shift control, and it is determined that the gear safety check has passed.

[0063] If the automatic parking activation state a is not set, that is, a=0, it means that APA has not activated the automatic parking function. The function layer sends the target request gear d2 to the MCU, which is an error judgment failure and determines that the gear safety check has not passed.

[0064] If the requested gear activation state g is not set, that is, g=0, it means that the chassis braking system has not requested the functional layer to send the target requested gear d2. The functional layer sending the target requested gear d2 to the MCU indicates an error in judgment and it is determined that the gear safety check has not passed.

[0065] If the current vehicle speed is greater than the vehicle speed threshold, it is determined that the speed limit condition for the functional layer to send the target requested gear position d2 to the MCU is not met, and the functional layer is not allowed to send the target requested gear position d2 to the MCU. The functional layer sending the target requested gear position d2 to the MCU indicates that an error judgment fault has occurred, and it is determined that the gear safety check has not passed.

[0066] Step 2015: In response to passing the gear safety check and passing the torque safety check, determining that the state safety check is passed.

[0067] In specific implementation, if both the gear safety check and the torque safety check are passed, it means that there are no faults in the torque control and gear control of the VCU functional layer, and there are no wrong judgments in the requested drive torque state e and the requested gear activation state g of the VCU functional layer, and it is determined that the state safety check has been passed. Unexpected torque output and unexpected gear shift control are avoided, protecting the safety of the vehicle and the users in the vehicle.

[0068] Step 202: Perform motion safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the master cylinder pressure value in the current operation signal.

[0069] In specific implementation, the motion safety check is to determine whether there are erroneous motion signals in the request control signal and the parking control signal, and it is necessary to check from two dimensions: the driving direction and the running direction.

[0070] In some embodiments, the motion safety check includes a same-direction driving check and a same-direction operation check; the motion safety check of the request control signal and the parking control signal is performed according to the master cylinder pressure value in the current operation signal, including:

[0071] Step 2021 : In response to the master cylinder pressure value being greater than or equal to a preset pressure threshold, determining a requested driving torque state in the requested control signal.

[0072] In specific implementation, if the master cylinder pressure value is greater than or equal to the preset pressure threshold, it means that the actual control type is to request vehicle braking. At this time, it is necessary to monitor the requested drive torque state e in the request control signal to determine whether there is a drive control conflict. If the requested drive torque state e is in the set state, it means that the chassis brake system requests driving, but the actual response result of the functional layer is braking, which means that a drive control conflict has occurred at this time. If the requested drive torque state e is not in the set state, it means that the chassis brake system does not request driving, and the functional layer can brake, which means that there is no drive control conflict at this time.

[0073] Step 2022: In response to the requested drive torque state being a non-set state, determining that the same-direction drive check has been passed.

[0074] In specific implementation, if the requested drive torque state e is not set, that is, e=0 is monitored, it means that the chassis braking system has no request for driving, and the functional layer can brake, which means that the braking of the functional layer at this time does not conflict with the driving control of the chassis braking system, and it is determined that the same-direction drive check has passed.

[0075] Step 2023: In response to the requested driving torque state being the set state, determining that there is a reverse driving risk, and determining that the same-direction driving check has not been passed.

[0076] In specific implementation, if the requested drive torque state e is in the set state, that is, e=1 is monitored, it means that the chassis braking system requests driving, that is, the request function layer controls the motor to drive the vehicle with the requested drive torque f. If the master cylinder pressure value at this time is greater than or equal to the preset pressure threshold, the vehicle is in a braking state, which is contrary to the chassis braking system request, indicating that there are requests for vehicle braking and vehicle driving at the same time. Since the master cylinder pressure value is a reflection of the real control, it is determined that there is an erroneous request to the chassis braking system at this time, which may cause abnormal driving torque of the vehicle and lead to unexpected acceleration. At this time, it is determined that there is a reverse drive conflict and the same-direction drive check has not passed.

[0077] Step 2024: In response to the master cylinder pressure value being less than a preset pressure threshold and the requested driving torque state in the request control signal being in a set state, determining a longitudinal acceleration request value in the parking control signal.

[0078] In specific implementation, if the master cylinder pressure value is less than the preset pressure threshold, it means that the actual control type is to request vehicle drive. If the requested drive torque state e in the request control signal is in the set state, it means that the chassis braking system requests to drive the vehicle, and there is no drive control conflict (if e=0, the chassis braking system will not limit how the VCU functional layer controls the torque, so there is no need to consider the drive control conflict when the master cylinder pressure value is less than the preset pressure threshold), and both the chassis braking system and the VCU functional layer control to accelerate the drive vehicle. At this time, it is necessary to monitor the longitudinal acceleration request value in the parking control signal to determine the original control requirements of APA when performing automatic parking.

[0079] Step 2025: In response to the longitudinal acceleration request value being a negative value, it is determined that there is a risk of reverse operation, and it is determined that the same-direction operation check has not been passed.

[0080] In specific implementation, the longitudinal acceleration request value is negative, indicating that the original control demand of APA during automatic parking is to request braking deceleration, but the chassis braking system sets the requested drive torque state e, resulting in the functional layer incorrectly executing the request for drive acceleration. It is determined that APA requests the vehicle to decelerate at this time, but the chassis braking system does request the vehicle to accelerate, and there is a risk of reverse operation. It is determined that the same-direction operation verification has not been passed. If the VCU functional layer responds to the drive request of the chassis braking system at this time, it may cause the motor to output abnormal automatic parking torque, which in turn causes unexpected acceleration of the vehicle. Therefore, VCU needs to activate the functional safety state of the monitoring layer and perform torque reduction control to reduce the corresponding degree of danger.

[0081] Step 2026: In response to the longitudinal acceleration request value being a positive value, determine that the same-direction running check has been passed.

[0082] During specific implementation, the longitudinal acceleration request value is a positive value, indicating that the original control demand of APA during automatic parking is to request driving acceleration, which is consistent with the request of the chassis braking system and the control of VCU, and is determined to pass the same-direction operation verification.

[0083] Step 203: Perform a consistency safety check by comparing the request control signal and the parking control signal.

[0084] During specific implementation, since APA will not directly send a request control signal to VCU, the chassis braking system and the electronic power steering system are required to parse and convert the parking control signal of APA to obtain the request control signal requested by VCU. In order to avoid incorrect parsing and conversion by the chassis braking system and the electronic power steering system, a consistency safety check can be performed by comparing the request control signal and the parking control signal to ensure that the original request of APA is consistent with the actual request of the chassis braking system or the electronic power steering system, to ensure that there will be no parking safety risks due to the transmission of the signal.

[0085] In some embodiments, the consistency safety check includes a gear consistency check and a steering consistency check; the consistency safety check is performed by comparing the request control signal and the parking control signal, including:

[0086] Step 2031: Determine the target parking gear, parking steering direction and parking steering angle according to the parking control signal.

[0087] In specific implementation, the original request of APA for automatic parking is determined according to the target parking gear position d1, the parking steering direction and the parking steering angle in the parking control signal, that is, the original request is to switch to the target parking gear position d1 and turn the parking steering angle in the parking steering direction.

[0088] Step 2032: Determine the target requested gear position, requested steering direction and requested steering angle according to the requested control signal.

[0089] In specific implementation, the actual gear request after the chassis brake system converts the original request is determined according to the target requested gear d2 in the request control signal. The actual steering request after the electronic power steering system converts the original request is determined according to the requested steering direction and the requested steering angle. That is, the actual request is to switch to the target requested gear d2 and turn the requested steering angle in the requested steering direction.

[0090] Step 2033: In response to the target parking gear being inconsistent with the target requested gear, determining that the gear consistency check has failed.

[0091] In specific implementation, if the target parking gear d1 in the original request is inconsistent with the target requested gear d2 in the actual request, it means that the chassis braking system has performed an incorrect gear signal conversion, which will lead to unexpected gear output and determine that the gear consistency check has not passed.

[0092] Step 2034: In response to the target parking gear being consistent with the target requested gear, determining that the gear consistency check has passed.

[0093] In specific implementation, if the target parking gear position d1 in the original request is consistent with the target requested gear position d2 in the actual request, it means that there is no error in the gear position signal conversion of the chassis brake system, and it is determined that the gear position consistency check has passed.

[0094] Step 2035: In response to the parking steering direction being inconsistent with the requested steering direction, determining that the steering consistency check has failed.

[0095] In specific implementation, if the parking steering direction is inconsistent with the requested steering direction, it means that the electronic power steering system has performed an incorrect steering signal conversion, which will lead to unexpected steering output and determine that the steering consistency check has not passed.

[0096] Step 2036: In response to the parking steering direction being consistent with the requested steering direction, determining the absolute value of the difference between the parking steering angle and the requested steering angle to obtain an angle difference.

[0097] In specific implementation, if the parking steering direction is consistent with the requested steering direction, it means that there is no error in the steering signal conversion of the electronic power steering system, and it is further determined whether the steering angle meets the original request. It is necessary to determine the absolute value of the difference between the parking steering angle and the requested steering angle. The obtained angle difference represents the error between the original request and the actual request. The larger the angle difference, the larger the angle signal conversion error of the electronic power steering system.

[0098] Step 2037: In response to the angle difference being greater than or equal to a preset angle threshold, determining that the steering consistency check has failed.

[0099] In specific implementation, if the angle difference is greater than or equal to the preset angle threshold, it means that the error between the original request and the actual request is large, exceeding the allowable error range, which will cause unexpected oversteering or understeering output, and it is determined that the steering consistency check has not passed.

[0100] Step 2038: In response to the angle difference being less than a preset angle threshold, determining that the steering consistency check has passed.

[0101] In specific implementation, if the angle difference is greater than or equal to the preset angle threshold, it means that the error between the original request and the actual request is small and does not exceed the allowable error range, and will not cause unexpected oversteering or understeering output, and it is determined that the steering consistency check has passed.

[0102] At the same time, the three check items of state safety check, motion safety check and consistency safety check are carried out. As long as any check item fails the check, it can be determined that there is a corresponding parking safety risk. The monitoring layer will take over the control of the vehicle and perform torque reduction control to reduce the degree of danger that may occur, so as to ensure that the vehicle is in a safe state in the automatic parking state, so as to ensure the safety of the vehicle and the user.

[0103] During the intelligent automatic parking process, the power system is the only driving source, and the VCU, as the final arbitration and coordination requester of the power system torque output, needs to improve vehicle safety while outputting power. Through the monitoring and control of the monitoring layer in the VCU, the torque output results in various situations when the automatic parking function is activated are monitored to avoid unexpected acceleration, unexpected gear changes, and unexpected steering, so as to ensure the driver's safety when using the intelligent automatic parking function. While improving the driving experience, the vehicle is safely controlled through the VCU monitoring layer.

[0104] In some embodiments, Figure 3 As shown, whether there is a parking safety risk is determined based on the verification results, including:

[0105] Step 301: In response to the verification result that the state safety verification, the motion safety verification and the consistency safety verification are all passed, it is determined that there is no parking safety risk.

[0106] During the specific implementation, if the verification results show that the state safety check, motion safety check and consistency safety check are all passed, it means that there is no danger of state control conflict, no danger of operation conflict control, and no danger of inconsistent signal conversion control. At this time, it can be determined that the actual control during the automatic parking process is consistent with the original request of APA, and it is determined that there is no parking safety risk.

[0107] Step 302: In response to the verification result that there are verification items that fail in the state safety verification, the motion safety verification, and the consistency safety verification, it is determined that there is a parking safety risk.

[0108] During specific implementation, if the verification results show that there are failed verification items in the state safety verification, motion safety verification and consistency safety verification, it means that there is at least one control conflict, and an unexpected control output inconsistent with the original request will appear. It is determined that there is a parking safety risk and torque reduction control is required.

[0109] In some embodiments, Figure 4 As shown, the torque reduction control includes:

[0110] Step 401: Determine a torque adjustment coefficient corresponding to the current output torque and the current vehicle speed according to a preset coefficient relationship.

[0111] In specific implementation, the preset coefficient relationship is a three-dimensional function relationship or a three-dimensional map relationship between the output torque, the vehicle speed, and the torque adjustment coefficient. When determining the torque adjustment coefficient, the current output torque and the current vehicle speed are used as input data for coefficient retrieval, and the retrieved coefficient is the torque adjustment coefficient.

[0112] Step 402: Determine the product of the current output torque and the torque adjustment coefficient as the modified requested torque, and control the motor output according to the modified requested torque.

[0113] In specific implementation, when the output torque is constant, the vehicle speed is inversely proportional to the torque adjustment coefficient. The greater the vehicle speed, the smaller the torque adjustment coefficient; when the vehicle speed is constant, the output torque is inversely proportional to the torque adjustment coefficient. The greater the output torque, the smaller the torque adjustment coefficient. By determining the product of the current output torque and the torque adjustment coefficient as the corrected request torque, it is ensured that the more intense the current motion state of the vehicle, the more the torque is reduced, and that the motor output can be controlled according to the corrected request torque after the torque reduction to achieve the corresponding protection effect, so as to protect the safety of the vehicle and the user. Torque reduction control based on the current output torque and the current vehicle speed has a higher torque reduction accuracy.

[0114] In some embodiments, Figure 5 As shown, the torque reduction control includes:

[0115] Step 501: Determine the risk level of parking safety risk according to the verification result, and determine the correction torque according to the risk level and a preset risk torque relationship.

[0116] In specific implementation, illustratively, the motion safety check corresponds to the danger of unexpected acceleration, and the risk score of the situation that fails the motion safety check is determined to be 1 point. The state safety check corresponds to the danger of unexpected acceleration and unexpected gear shifting, and the risk score of the situation that fails the state safety check is determined to be 2 points. The consistency safety check corresponds to the two dangers of unexpected gear changes and unexpected steering, and the risk score of the situation that fails the consistency safety check is determined to be 2 points. Then, the total risk score of the failed check items in the check results determines the final risk level, and the higher the risk score, the higher the risk level. Optionally, the number of failed check items can also be directly used as the corresponding risk level.

[0117] The risk torque relationship is a two-dimensional relationship between the risk level and the correction torque, which can be a two-dimensional functional relationship or a two-dimensional table relationship. The risk level is used as an input to query the risk torque relationship, and the corresponding correction torque can be obtained.

[0118] Step 502: Determine the difference between the current output torque and the corrected torque as the corrected requested torque, and control the motor output according to the corrected requested torque.

[0119] In specific implementation, the higher the danger level, the greater the correction torque. By determining the difference between the current output torque and the correction torque as the smaller the correction request torque, it is ensured that the danger level of unexpected parking safety risks that may occur can be successfully reduced by the correction request torque after torque reduction at a high danger level, so as to protect the safety of the vehicle and the users in the vehicle. Torque reduction control according to the danger level can ensure the effect of reducing the danger level.

[0120] It should be noted that the method of the embodiment of the present application can be performed by a single device, such as a computer or server. The method of this embodiment can also be applied to a distributed scenario and completed by multiple devices cooperating with each other. In the case of such a distributed scenario, one of the multiple devices can only perform one or more steps in the method of the embodiment of the present application, and the multiple devices will interact with each other to complete the described method.

[0121] It should be noted that the above describes some embodiments of the present application. Other embodiments are within the scope of the appended claims. In some cases, the actions or steps recorded in the claims can be performed in an order different from that in the above embodiments and still achieve the desired results. In addition, the processes depicted in the accompanying drawings do not necessarily require the specific order or continuous order shown to achieve the desired results. In some embodiments, multitasking and parallel processing are also possible or may be advantageous.

[0122] Based on the same inventive concept, corresponding to any of the above-mentioned embodiment methods, the present application also provides a torque control device for automatic parking.

[0123] refer to Figure 6 , the torque control device for automatic parking comprises:

[0124] The signal monitoring module 10 is configured to: monitor a parking control signal corresponding to the automatic parking control system and a request control signal corresponding to the chassis braking system;

[0125] The signal verification module 20 is configured to: perform safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the current operation signal to obtain a verification result;

[0126] The torque reduction control module 30 is configured to determine whether there is a parking safety risk according to the verification result, and perform torque reduction control when there is a parking safety risk.

[0127] For the convenience of description, the above device is described in terms of functions divided into various modules. Of course, when implementing the present application, the functions of each module can be implemented in the same or multiple software and / or hardware.

[0128] The device of the above embodiment is used to implement the corresponding torque control method for automatic parking in any of the above embodiments, and has the beneficial effects of the corresponding method embodiment, which will not be repeated here.

[0129] Based on the same inventive concept, corresponding to any of the above-mentioned embodiments and methods, the present application also provides an electronic device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein when the processor executes the program, the torque control method for automatic parking described in any of the above embodiments is implemented.

[0130] Figure 7 A more specific schematic diagram of the hardware structure of an electronic device provided in this embodiment is shown, and the device may include: a processor 1010, a memory 1020, an input / output interface 1030, a communication interface 1040, and a bus 1050. The processor 1010, the memory 1020, the input / output interface 1030, and the communication interface 1040 are connected to each other through the bus 1050 in the device.

[0131] The processor 1010 can be implemented by a general-purpose CPU (Central Processing Unit), a microprocessor, an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or one or more integrated circuits, and is used to execute relevant programs to implement the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of this specification.

[0132] The memory 1020 may be implemented in the form of ROM (Read Only Memory), RAM (Random Access Memory), static storage device, dynamic storage device, etc. The memory 1020 may store an operating system and other application programs. When the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of this specification are implemented by software or firmware, the relevant program codes are stored in the memory 1020 and are called and executed by the processor 1010.

[0133] The input / output interface 1030 is used to connect the input / output module to realize information input and output. The input / output module can be configured in the device as a component (not shown in the figure), or it can be externally connected to the device to provide corresponding functions. The input device may include a keyboard, a mouse, a touch screen, a microphone, various sensors, etc., and the output device may include a display, a speaker, a vibrator, an indicator light, etc.

[0134] The communication interface 1040 is used to connect a communication module (not shown) to realize communication interaction between the device and other devices. The communication module can realize communication through a wired mode (such as USB, network cable, etc.) or a wireless mode (such as mobile network, WIFI, Bluetooth, etc.).

[0135] The bus 1050 includes a path that transmits information between the various components of the device (eg, the processor 1010, the memory 1020, the input / output interface 1030, and the communication interface 1040).

[0136] It should be noted that, although the above device only shows the processor 1010, the memory 1020, the input / output interface 1030, the communication interface 1040 and the bus 1050, in the specific implementation process, the device may also include other components necessary for normal operation. In addition, it can be understood by those skilled in the art that the above device may also only include the components necessary for implementing the embodiments of the present specification, and does not necessarily include all the components shown in the figure.

[0137] The electronic device of the above embodiment is used to implement the corresponding torque control method for automatic parking in any of the above embodiments, and has the beneficial effects of the corresponding method embodiment, which will not be described in detail here.

[0138] Based on the same inventive concept, corresponding to any of the above-mentioned embodiment methods, the present application also provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, wherein the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium stores computer instructions, and the computer instructions are used to enable the computer to execute the torque control method for automatic parking as described in any of the above embodiments.

[0139] The computer-readable medium of this embodiment includes permanent and non-permanent, removable and non-removable media, and information storage can be implemented by any method or technology. Information can be computer-readable instructions, data structures, modules of programs, or other data. Examples of computer storage media include, but are not limited to, phase change memory (PRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), other types of random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technology, read-only compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), digital versatile disk (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic cassettes, tape disk storage or other magnetic storage devices or any other non-transmission media that can be used to store information that can be accessed by a computing device.

[0140] The computer instructions stored in the storage medium of the above embodiment are used to enable the computer to execute the torque control method for automatic parking as described in any of the above embodiments, and have the beneficial effects of the corresponding method embodiments, which will not be repeated here.

[0141] Based on the same inventive concept, corresponding to any of the above-mentioned embodiments and methods, the present application also provides a vehicle, including the electronic device or the torque control device for automatic parking of the above-mentioned embodiments, and the torque control method for automatic parking as described in any of the above-mentioned embodiments is executed through the electronic device or the torque control device for automatic parking of the above-mentioned embodiments, and has the beneficial effects of the corresponding method embodiments, which will not be repeated here.

[0142] It is understandable that before using the technical solutions of each embodiment of the present disclosure, the type, scope of use, usage scenarios, etc. of the personal information involved will be informed to the user in an appropriate manner, and the user's authorization will be obtained.

[0143] For example, in response to receiving an active request from a user, a prompt message is sent to the user to clearly remind the user that the operation requested to be performed will require obtaining and using the user's personal information. Thus, the user can independently choose whether to provide personal information to software or hardware such as an electronic device, application, server, or storage medium that performs the operation of the technical solution of the present disclosure according to the prompt message.

[0144] As an optional but non-limiting implementation, in response to receiving the user's active request, the prompt information may be sent to the user in the form of a pop-up window, in which the prompt information may be presented in text form. In addition, the pop-up window may also carry a selection control for the user to choose "agree" or "disagree" to provide personal information to the electronic device.

[0145] It is understandable that the above notification and the process of obtaining user authorization are merely illustrative and do not constitute a limitation on the implementation of the present disclosure. Other methods that meet relevant laws and regulations may also be applied to the implementation of the present disclosure.

[0146] A person skilled in the art should understand that the discussion of any of the above embodiments is merely illustrative and is not intended to imply that the scope of the present application is limited to these examples. In line with the concept of the present application, the technical features in the above embodiments or different embodiments may be combined, the steps may be implemented in any order, and there are many other variations of the different aspects of the embodiments of the present application as described above, which are not provided in detail for the sake of simplicity.

[0147] In addition, to simplify the description and discussion, and in order not to make the embodiments of the present application difficult to understand, the known power supply / ground connection with the integrated circuit (IC) chip and other components may or may not be shown in the provided drawings. In addition, the device can be shown in the form of a block diagram to avoid making the embodiments of the present application difficult to understand, and this also takes into account the fact that the details of the implementation of these block diagram devices are highly dependent on the platform to be implemented in the embodiments of the present application (that is, these details should be fully within the scope of understanding of those skilled in the art). In the case of elaborating specific details (e.g., circuits) to describe exemplary embodiments of the present application, it is obvious to those skilled in the art that the embodiments of the present application can be implemented without these specific details or when these specific details are changed. Therefore, these descriptions should be considered to be illustrative rather than restrictive.

[0148] Although the present application has been described in conjunction with specific embodiments of the present application, many replacements, modifications and variations of these embodiments will be apparent to those skilled in the art from the foregoing description. For example, other memory architectures (e.g., dynamic RAM (DRAM)) may use the embodiments discussed.

[0149] The embodiments of the present application are intended to cover all such substitutions, modifications and variations that fall within the broad scope of the present application. Therefore, any omissions, modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principles of the embodiments of the present application should be included in the protection scope of the present application.

Claims

1. A torque control method for automatic parking, characterized in that: include: monitoring a parking control signal corresponding to an automatic parking control system and a request control signal corresponding to a chassis braking system; Performing a safety check on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the current operation signal to obtain a check result; Determine whether there is a parking safety risk based on the verification result, and perform torque reduction control when there is the parking safety risk.

2. The torque control method for automatic parking according to claim 1, characterized in that: The safety check includes state safety check, motion safety check and consistency safety check; The performing safety verification on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the current operation signal includes: performing the state safety check on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the parking function state in the current operation signal and the current vehicle speed; performing the motion safety check on the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the master cylinder pressure value in the current operation signal; The consistency safety check is performed by comparing the request control signal with the parking control signal.

3. The torque control method for automatic parking according to claim 2, characterized in that: The state safety check includes a torque safety check and a gear safety check; the state safety check of the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the parking function state in the current operation signal and the current vehicle speed includes: In response to the torque function state in the parking function state being a set state, determining an automatic parking activation state in the parking control signal and a requested driving torque state in the request control signal; In response to the automatic parking activation state and the requested driving torque state being both in the set state, and the current vehicle speed being less than or equal to a preset vehicle speed threshold, determining that the torque safety check is passed; In response to a gear function state in the parking function state being a set state, determining an automatic parking activation state in the parking control signal and a requested gear activation state in the request control signal; In response to the automatic parking activation state and the requested gear activation state being both in the set state, and the current vehicle speed being less than or equal to a preset vehicle speed threshold, determining that the gear safety check is passed; In response to passing the gear safety check and passing the torque safety check, it is determined that the state safety check has passed.

4. The torque control method for automatic parking according to claim 2, characterized in that: The motion safety check includes a same-direction driving check and a same-direction operation check; the motion safety check of the request control signal and the parking control signal according to the master cylinder pressure value in the current operation signal includes: In response to the master cylinder pressure value being greater than or equal to a preset pressure threshold, determining a requested drive torque state in the requested control signal; In response to the requested drive torque state being a non-set state, determining that the same-direction drive check is passed; In response to the requested driving torque state being a set state, determining that there is a reverse driving risk, and determining that a same-direction driving check has not been passed; In response to the master cylinder pressure value being less than a preset pressure threshold and the requested drive torque state in the request control signal being a set state, determining a longitudinal acceleration request value in the parking control signal; In response to the longitudinal acceleration request value being a negative value, determining that there is a risk of reverse operation, and determining that the same-direction operation check has not been passed; In response to the longitudinal acceleration request value being a positive value, it is determined that the same-direction running check is passed.

5. The torque control method for automatic parking according to claim 2, characterized in that: The consistency safety check includes a gear consistency check and a steering consistency check; The performing the consistency safety check by comparing the request control signal and the parking control signal includes: determining a target parking gear position, a parking steering direction, and a parking steering angle according to the parking control signal; determining a target requested gear position, a requested steering direction, and a requested steering angle according to the requested control signal; In response to the target parking gear being inconsistent with the target requested gear, determining that the gear consistency check has failed; In response to the target parking gear being consistent with the target requested gear, determining that the gear consistency check is passed; In response to the parking steering direction being inconsistent with the requested steering direction, determining that the steering consistency check has failed; In response to the parking steering direction being consistent with the requested steering direction, determining an absolute value of a difference between the parking steering angle and the requested steering angle to obtain an angle difference; In response to the angle difference being greater than or equal to a preset angle threshold, determining that the steering consistency check fails; In response to the angle difference being less than a preset angle threshold, it is determined that the steering consistency check is passed.

6. The torque control method for automatic parking according to claim 1, characterized in that: The determining whether there is a parking safety risk according to the verification result includes: In response to the verification result that the state safety verification, the motion safety verification, and the consistency safety verification are all passed, it is determined that there is no parking safety risk; In response to the verification result indicating that there are failed verification items in the state safety verification, the motion safety verification, and the consistency safety verification, it is determined that there is a parking safety risk.

7. The torque control method for automatic parking according to claim 1, characterized in that: The torque reduction control comprises: Determining a torque adjustment coefficient corresponding to the current output torque and the current vehicle speed according to a preset coefficient relationship; The product of the current output torque and the torque adjustment coefficient is determined as a modified requested torque, and the motor output is controlled according to the modified requested torque.

8. The torque control method for automatic parking according to claim 1, characterized in that: The torque reduction control comprises: Determining the risk level of the parking safety risk according to the verification result, and determining the correction torque according to the risk level and a preset risk torque relationship; The difference between the current output torque and the correction torque is determined as the correction request torque, and the motor output is controlled according to the correction request torque.

9. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and running on the processor, characterized in that: When the processor executes the program, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 8 is implemented.

10. A vehicle, characterized in that: Comprising the electronic device as claimed in claim 9.

Images