Quantum relay method and system for enhancing power grid safety

Abstract

The invention discloses a quantum relay method and system for enhancing power grid security, and relates to the technical field of power grid security, and the method comprises the steps: a relay node receives a first secret key from a sending node; the relay node generates a first dynamic password with the same length as the first key, the first key is symmetrically encrypted through the dynamic password to obtain a second key, and the first dynamic password is generated through a timestamp of the relay node; the relay node sends the second secret key to the receiving node; the receiving node generates a second dynamic password through the timestamp synchronized by the Beidou satellite, the second dynamic password is used as a decryption key to decrypt the second key to obtain the first key, and the initial time and the generation rule of the second dynamic password and the first dynamic password are the same. According to the invention, by using a dynamic password generation and verification mechanism based on the timestamp, the security of the key is improved, and the application range and transmission distance of the key can be effectively expanded.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of power grid security technology, and in particular to a quantum relay method and system for enhancing power grid security. Background Art

[0002] In the current field of power grid security, especially in quantum key distribution (QKD) technology, ensuring the security of communication has become a vital task. Quantum key distribution technology uses the principles of quantum mechanics to provide a secure communication method that is theoretically unbreakable. However, in the actual network environment, how to effectively and securely transmit quantum keys from one node to another, especially in long-distance communications, still faces many challenges.

[0003] Traditional QKD systems usually involve two nodes communicating directly, which limits their application in a wider network. In addition, due to the fragility of quantum states, the distance of direct quantum communication is severely limited. Therefore, the introduction of relay nodes has become a solution to extend the distance of quantum communication. However, how to ensure that the operations performed in the relay nodes can maintain the security of the key while not reducing the security of the entire system due to information leakage during the operation is the main problem facing the current technology. Summary of the invention

[0004] In view of the above-mentioned problems, the present invention is proposed.

[0005] Therefore, the problem to be solved by the present invention is: how to ensure that the operations performed in the relay node can maintain the security of the key and will not reduce the security of the entire system due to information leakage during the operation.

[0006] In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention provides the following technical solutions: A quantum relay method for enhancing power grid security, comprising: a relay node receiving a first key k from a sending node A ; The relay node generates the first key k A The first dynamic password k of the same length D1 , and through the dynamic password k D1 For the first key k A Perform symmetric encryption to obtain the second key k B , the first dynamic password k D1 The relay node generates the second key k B Send to the receiving node; the receiving node generates a second dynamic password k through the Beidou satellite synchronized timestamp D2 , through the second dynamic password k D2 The second key k is used as the decryption key B Decrypt to obtain the first key k A , the second dynamic password kD2 With the first dynamic password k D1 The initial moment of generation is the same as the generation rule.

[0007] As a preferred solution of the quantum relay method for enhancing power grid security described in the present invention, wherein: the first dynamic password k D1 The generation method includes: using a hash function to obtain a hash value of the timestamp, and using the hash value as the first dynamic password k D1 , the formula is expressed as,

[0008]

[0009] Among them, k Dz It is represented as the zth dynamic password, z∈1,2, H(t) is represented as a hash function, t is represented as the current timestamp, G is represented as the gain coefficient of the environmental variable, S(x) is represented as the influence function of the historical hash value, f is represented as the information filtering function, and N is represented as the normalization function.

[0010] As a preferred solution of the quantum relay method for enhancing power grid security described in the present invention, the influence function S(x) of the historical hash value is a complex summation based on past hash values, and the formula is expressed as follows:

[0011]

[0012] Among them, t i represents the timestamp of the i-th time point, n represents the total number of time points, and w i Represented as t i The corresponding weights are adjusted over time, and the formula is expressed as:

[0013]

[0014] Among them, α is the coefficient that controls the weight decay rate.

[0015] As a preferred solution of the quantum relay method for enhancing power grid security described in the present invention, the information filtering function f is expressed as follows:

[0016] f(x)=tanh(β·(x-μ))+sin(γ·x)

[0017] Among them, β represents the sensitivity of the adjustment transformation, μ represents the central value of the input data, and γ represents the frequency coefficient.

[0018] As a preferred solution of the quantum relay method for enhancing power grid security described in the present invention, wherein: the second dynamic password k D2 The method for generating the second key k includes: the receiving node records the received second key kB The receiving node local timestamp T'; the relay node periodically sends the first synchronization message with the relay node timestamp T1 to the receiving node; the receiving node records the receiving node local timestamp of the first synchronization message as T2; the receiving node sends the second synchronization message containing the current receiving node local timestamp T3 to the relay node; the relay node immediately responds after receiving the second synchronization message, and the response message also contains the current timestamp T4 of the relay node; the receiving node calculates the relay node timestamp T corresponding to the receiving node local timestamp T', and the calculation formula is expressed as,

[0019]

[0020] The receiving node generates the second dynamic password k using the hash function through the relay node timestamp T D2 .

[0021] As a preferred solution of the quantum relay method for enhancing power grid security described in the present invention, wherein: the relay nodes include a plurality of relay nodes, which are distributed in a mesh structure, and the relay nodes include a single photon detector, a polarization collector, a polarization beam splitter, a timestamp interceptor, a first time slot, and a second time slot;

[0022] When the photon hits the first time slot, the code is 0, and when the photon hits the second time slot, the code is 1. The sending node sends the photon to the relay node according to the time difference. The relay node obtains a string of 01 codes according to the state of the photon hitting the time slot, and compares the current 01 code with the preset code. If the codes are different, it is determined that the action is attacked and the key distribution process is stopped;

[0023] If the encoding is the same, the single-photon detector detects the photon state and sends a first signal to the polarization collector, the polarization collector processes the first signal and sends a second signal to the polarization beam splitter, the polarization beam splitter expands and splits the second signal to obtain a third signal, and a dynamic password is set based on the third signal and the timestamp intercepted by the timestamp interceptor; the first signal contains the energy state information of the photon; the second signal contains the polarization state and direction information of the photon; the third signal is a light beam in different directions obtained based on the vibration direction; the first key information can be obtained by analyzing the third signal.

[0024] As a preferred solution of the quantum relay method for enhancing power grid security described in the present invention, the receiving node receives the second keys sent by all relay nodes, decrypts the second keys to obtain the first keys corresponding to all relay nodes, performs cluster analysis on all the first keys, and takes the first key corresponding to the largest cluster as the final first key.

[0025] Another object of the present invention is to provide an anti-wrong interval system based on near field communication technology, which can realize long-distance transmission of quantum keys.

[0026] In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention provides the following technical solutions: A system for a quantum relay method for enhancing power grid security, comprising: a sending point, a relay node and a receiving node; the sending point is used to send a first key k A ; The relay node is used to receive the first key k from the sending node A , and generate the first key k A The first dynamic password k of the same length D1 , through the dynamic password k D1 For the first key k A Perform symmetric encryption to obtain the second key k B , the second key k B Sent to the receiving node, the first dynamic password k D1 The receiving node generates a second dynamic password k through the timestamp synchronized by the Beidou satellite D2 , through the second dynamic password k D2 The second key k is used as the decryption key B Decrypt to obtain the first key k A .

[0027] A computer device includes a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and when the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the quantum relay method for enhancing power grid security as described above are implemented.

[0028] A computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of a quantum relay method for enhancing power grid security as described above.

[0029] The beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows: by using a dynamic password generation and verification mechanism based on timestamps, the present invention not only improves the security of the key, but also effectively expands the application scope and transmission distance of the key. The introduction of this method, especially the dynamic password generated by combining timestamps and hash functions, provides a more secure and reliable solution for quantum key transmission in power grids. In addition, by introducing relay nodes, this method can overcome the limitations of traditional QKD systems in terms of distance and network complexity, and promote the practical deployment of quantum communication technology in a wider range of power grid applications. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0030] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for describing the embodiments. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative work. Among them:

[0031] Figure 1 This is a flow chart of a quantum relay method for enhancing power grid security in Example 1. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0032] In order to make the above-mentioned objects, features and advantages of the present invention more obvious and easy to understand, the specific implementation methods of the present invention are described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0033] In the following description, many specific details are set forth to facilitate a full understanding of the present invention, but the present invention may also be implemented in other ways different from those described herein, and those skilled in the art may make similar generalizations without violating the connotation of the present invention. Therefore, the present invention is not limited to the specific embodiments disclosed below.

[0034] Example 1, reference Figure 1 , which is the first embodiment of the present invention, and which provides a quantum relay method for enhancing power grid security, including: Figure 1 As shown:

[0035] Step 1: The relay node receives the first key k from the sending node A .

[0036] The relay nodes include a plurality of relay nodes, which are distributed in a mesh structure. The relay nodes include a single photon detector, a polarization collector, a polarization beam splitter, a timestamp interceptor, a first time slot, and a second time slot. The present invention adopts a double verification method, firstly using time binary coding to determine whether the transmission is attacked. If not, the photon beam splitting technology is used to parse the key.

[0037] When the photon hits the first time slot, it is encoded as 0, and when the photon hits the second time slot, it is encoded as 1. The sending node sends the photon to the relay node according to the time difference. The relay node obtains a string of 01 codes based on the state of the photon hitting the time slot, and compares the current 01 code with the preset code. If the codes are different, it is judged that the action is attacked and the key distribution process is stopped.

[0038] If the encoding is the same, the single-photon detector detects the photon state and sends a first signal to the polarization collector. The polarization collector processes the first signal and sends a second signal to the polarization beam splitter. The polarization beam splitter expands and splits the second signal to obtain a third signal. A dynamic password is set based on the third signal and the timestamp intercepted by the timestamp interceptor.

[0039] The first signal contains energy state information of the photons.

[0040] The second signal contains the polarization state and direction information of the photon.

[0041] The third signal is a light beam in a different direction obtained based on the vibration direction.

[0042] The first key information can be obtained by parsing the third signal.

[0043] Step 2: The relay node generates the first key k A The first dynamic password k of the same length D1 , and through the dynamic password k D1 For the first key k A Perform symmetric encryption to obtain the second key k B , the first dynamic password k D1 Timestamp generated by relay nodes.

[0044] The first dynamic password k D1 The generation method is to use a hash function to obtain a hash value of the timestamp and use the hash value as the first dynamic password k D1 , the formula is expressed as,

[0045]

[0046] Among them, k Dz is represented by the zth dynamic password, z∈1,2, H(t) is represented by the hash function, t is represented by the current timestamp, G is represented by the gain coefficient of the environment variable, S(x) is represented by the influence function of the historical hash value, f is represented by the information filtering function, and N is represented by the normalization function to ensure k Dz In the valid password range, log(H(t)) is the logarithm of the hash value, which is used to increase the complexity of the formula and prevent simple linear dependencies.

[0047] The gain coefficient of the environmental variable is adjusted according to the specific environmental conditions and system requirements, and usually depends on the following factors: Environmental stability: If the system is deployed in a scenario with large environmental changes (for example, places with frequent changes in temperature, humidity, electromagnetic interference, etc.), the gain coefficient G can be set higher to reflect the impact of environmental factors on system performance.

[0048] Data availability: In some applications, the value of G can be adjusted based on the quality and quantity of available data. For example, if there is sufficient historical data to support model training, a lower value of G may be chosen to reduce computational complexity and increase system response speed.

[0049] Real-time requirements: For systems that require fast response, such as real-time communication systems, the value of G needs to be optimized to ensure fast data processing and transmission. The specific value is determined according to the specific working conditions.

[0050] The influence function S(x) of the historical hash value is a complex summation based on the past hash values, and the formula is expressed as:

[0051]

[0052] Among them, t i represents the timestamp of the i-th time point, n represents the total number of time points, and w i Represented as t i The corresponding weights are adjusted over time, and the formula is expressed as:

[0053]

[0054] Among them, α represents the coefficient that controls the weight decay rate, |xt i | represents x and t i The absolute value of the time difference is used to adjust the weight so that the hash value at a time point closer to x has a higher weight.

[0055] The information filtering function f formula is expressed as:

[0056] f(x)=tanh(β·(x-μ))+sin(γ·x)

[0057] Among them, β represents the sensitivity of the adjustment transformation, μ represents the central value of the input data, and γ represents the frequency coefficient.

[0058] Step 3: The relay node sends the second key k B Sent to the receiving node.

[0059] Step 4: The receiving node generates the second dynamic password k through the timestamp synchronized by the Beidou satellite D2 , through the second dynamic password k D2 The second key k is used as the decryption key B Decrypt to obtain the first key k A , the second dynamic password k D2 With the first dynamic password k D1 The initial moment of generation is the same as the generation rule.

[0060] The second dynamic password kD2 The method for generating the second key k includes: the receiving node records the received second key k B The receiving node’s local timestamp T’.

[0061] The relay node periodically sends a first synchronization message with a relay node timestamp T1 to the receiving node.

[0062] The receiving node records the local timestamp of the receiving node receiving the first synchronization message as T2.

[0063] The receiving node sends a second synchronization message including the current receiving node local timestamp T3 to the relay node.

[0064] After receiving the second synchronization information, the relay node immediately responds, and the response information also includes the current timestamp T4 of the relay node.

[0065] The receiving node calculates the relay node timestamp T corresponding to the receiving node local timestamp T'. The calculation formula is expressed as:

[0066]

[0067] The receiving node generates the second dynamic password k using the hash function through the relay node timestamp T D2 .

[0068] The receiving node receives the second key sent by all relay nodes, decrypts the second key to obtain the first key corresponding to all relay nodes, performs cluster analysis on all first keys, and uses the first key corresponding to the largest cluster as the final first key. In a quantum communication network, the communication nodes are distributed in a mesh. Some nodes may send the second key to the receiving node that is not a real message due to an attack, which may cause the receiving node to be deceived. Here, the second keys of multiple relay nodes are counted. Since the probability of an attacker wanting to attack multiple nodes at the same time is very low, the second keys of the receiving nodes are counted here, and the first key corresponding to the second key with the largest number of similarity clusters is selected as the final first key, thereby reducing the probability of being attacked.

[0069] Embodiment 2, the second embodiment of the present invention, is different from the first embodiment in that: a quantum relay method for enhancing power grid security also includes, in order to verify and illustrate the technical effects adopted in this method, this embodiment adopts a traditional technical solution and the method of the present invention for comparative testing, and compares the test results by means of scientific demonstration to verify the real effect of this method.

[0070] We loaded the existing method (direct connection between the sending point and the receiving point) and the method of the present invention into the system for simulation experiments. The experiments focused on verifying the following aspects:

[0071] Security of the key: by analyzing the complexity and randomness of the key.

[0072] The application scope and transmission distance of the key: by simulating the key transmission success rate at different distances.

[0073] Ability to cope with network complexity: by simulating communication efficiency under different network topologies and complexities.

[0074] The specific test data are shown in Table 1:

[0075] Table 1: Test comparison table

[0076]

[0077] Key transmission time: The key transmission time of the present invention is higher than that of the prior art. This is because the present invention introduces a relay point, which does increase the transmission time compared to the traditional direct connection. In addition, the present invention uses double verification to further improve the transmission time. However, the security and longer transmission distance are gained at the cost of time loss, which is completely reasonable and acceptable.

[0078] Successful transmission distance: Through the use of relay nodes, the present invention can effectively extend the transmission distance of the key, exceeding the direct communication limitation of the existing QKD system.

[0079] Network topology adaptability: The method of the present invention can better adapt to complex power grid network structures by dynamically adjusting the strategy of relay nodes.

[0080] Anti-interference: Since the present invention adopts a dynamic password based on a timestamp and a hash function, the randomness and security of the key are enhanced, thereby improving the anti-interference.

[0081] Embodiment 3 is the third embodiment of the present invention, which is different from the first two embodiments in that: a system for a quantum relay method for enhancing power grid security, comprising a sending point, a relay node and a receiving node; the sending point is used to send a first key k A ; The relay node is used to receive the first key k from the sending node A , and generate the first key k A The first dynamic password k of the same length D1 , through the dynamic password k D1 For the first key k A Perform symmetric encryption to obtain the second key k B , the second key k B Sent to the receiving node, the first dynamic password k D1 The receiving node generates a second dynamic password k through the timestamp synchronized by the Beidou satellite. D2 , through the second dynamic password k D2The second key k is used as the decryption key B Decrypt to obtain the first key k A .

[0082] If the functions are implemented in the form of software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, or the part that contributes to the prior art or the part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. The computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including several instructions for a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the methods described in each embodiment of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory), random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), disk or optical disk, etc., which can store program codes.

[0083] The logic and / or steps represented in the flowchart or otherwise described herein, for example, can be considered as an ordered list of executable instructions for implementing logical functions, and can be embodied in any computer-readable medium for use by an instruction execution system, device or apparatus (such as a computer-based system, a system including a processor, or other system that can fetch instructions from an instruction execution system, device or apparatus and execute instructions), or in conjunction with such instruction execution systems, devices or apparatuses. For the purposes of this specification, "computer-readable medium" can be any device that can contain, store, communicate, propagate or transmit a program for use by an instruction execution system, device or apparatus, or in conjunction with such instruction execution systems, devices or apparatuses.

[0084] More specific examples of computer-readable media (a non-exhaustive list) include the following: an electrical connection with one or more wires (electronic device), a portable computer disk case (magnetic device), a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable and programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), an optical fiber device, and a portable compact disk read-only memory (CDROM). In addition, the computer-readable medium may even be a paper or other suitable medium on which the program is printed, since the program may be obtained electronically, for example, by optically scanning the paper or other medium, followed by editing, deciphering or, if necessary, processing in another suitable manner, and then stored in a computer memory.

[0085] It should be understood that the various parts of the present invention can be implemented by hardware, software, firmware or a combination thereof. In the above-mentioned embodiments, a plurality of steps or methods can be implemented by software or firmware stored in a memory and executed by a suitable instruction execution system. For example, if implemented by hardware, as in another embodiment, it can be implemented by any one of the following technologies known in the art or their combination: a discrete logic circuit having a logic gate circuit for implementing a logic function for a data signal, a dedicated integrated circuit having a suitable combination of logic gate circuits, a programmable gate array (PGA), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), etc.

[0086] It should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention rather than to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the preferred embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that the technical solutions of the present invention may be modified or replaced by equivalents without departing from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the present invention, which should all be included in the scope of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. A quantum relay method for enhancing power grid security, characterized in that: include, The relay node receives the first key k from the sending node A ; The relay node generates the first key k A The first dynamic password k of the same length D1 , and through the dynamic password k D1 For the first key k A Perform symmetric encryption to obtain the second key k B , the first dynamic password k D1 Generated by relay node timestamp; The relay node sends the second key k B Send to the receiving node; The receiving node generates the second dynamic password k through the timestamp synchronized by Beidou satellite D2 , through the second dynamic password k D2 The second key k is used as the decryption key B Decrypt to obtain the first key k A , the second dynamic password k D2 With the first dynamic password k D1 The initial moment of generation is the same as the generation rule.

2. A quantum relay method for enhancing power grid security as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: The first dynamic password k D1 The generation method includes: using a hash function to obtain a hash value of the timestamp, and using the hash value as the first dynamic password k D1 , the formula is expressed as, Among them, k Dz It is represented as the zth dynamic password, z∈1,2, H(t) is represented as a hash function, t is represented as the current timestamp, G is represented as the gain coefficient of the environmental variable, S(x) is represented as the influence function of the historical hash value, f is represented as the information filtering function, and N is represented as the normalization function.

3. A quantum relay method for enhancing power grid security as claimed in claim 2, characterized in that: The influence function S(x) of the historical hash value is a complex summation based on the past hash values, and the formula is expressed as: Among them, t i represents the timestamp of the i-th time point, n represents the total number of time points, and w i Represented as t i The corresponding weights are adjusted over time, and the formula is expressed as: Among them, α is the coefficient that controls the weight decay rate.

4. A quantum relay method for enhancing power grid security as claimed in claim 3, characterized in that: The information filtering function f is expressed as: f(x)=tanh(β·(x-μ))+sin(γ·x) Among them, β represents the sensitivity of the adjustment transformation, μ represents the central value of the input data, and γ represents the frequency coefficient.

5. A quantum relay method for enhancing power grid security as claimed in claim 4, characterized in that: The second dynamic password k D2 The method for generating the second key k includes: the receiving node records the received second key k B The receiving node local timestamp T'; The relay node periodically sends a first synchronization message with a relay node timestamp T1 to the receiving node; The receiving node records the local timestamp of the receiving node receiving the first synchronization message as T2; The receiving node sends a second synchronization message including the current receiving node local timestamp T3 to the relay node; After receiving the second synchronization information, the relay node immediately responds, and the response information also includes the current timestamp T4 of the relay node; The receiving node calculates the relay node timestamp T corresponding to the receiving node local timestamp T'. The calculation formula is expressed as: The receiving node generates the second dynamic password k using the hash function through the relay node timestamp T D2 .

6. A quantum relay method for enhancing power grid security as claimed in claim 5, characterized in that: The relay nodes include a plurality of relay nodes, which are distributed in a mesh structure. The relay nodes include a single photon detector, a polarization collector, a polarization beam splitter, a timestamp interceptor, a first time slot, and a second time slot. When the photon hits the first time slot, the code is 0, and when the photon hits the second time slot, the code is 1. The sending node sends the photon to the relay node according to the time difference. The relay node obtains a string of 01 codes according to the state of the photon hitting the time slot, and compares the current 01 code with the preset code. If the codes are different, it is determined that the action is attacked and the key distribution process is stopped; If the codes are the same, the single-photon detector detects the photon state and sends a first signal to the polarization collector, the polarization collector processes the first signal and sends a second signal to the polarization beam splitter, the polarization beam splitter expands and splits the second signal to obtain a third signal, and a dynamic password is set based on the third signal and the timestamp intercepted by the timestamp interceptor; The first signal includes energy state information of the photon; The second signal contains polarization state and direction information of the photon; The third signal is a light beam in different directions obtained based on the vibration direction; The first key information can be obtained by parsing the third signal.

7. A quantum relay method for enhancing power grid security as claimed in claim 6, characterized in that: The receiving node receives the second keys sent by all relay nodes, decrypts the second keys to obtain the first keys corresponding to all relay nodes, performs cluster analysis on all the first keys, and uses the first key corresponding to the largest cluster as the final first key.

8. A system using a quantum relay method for enhancing power grid security as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 7, characterized in that: Includes sending points, relay nodes and receiving nodes; The sending point is used to send the first key k A ; The relay node is used to receive the first key k from the sending node A , and generate the first key k A The first dynamic password k of the same length D1 , through the dynamic password k D1 For the first key k A Perform symmetric encryption to obtain the second key k B , the second key k B Sent to the receiving node, the first dynamic password k D1 Generated by relay node timestamp; The receiving node generates a second dynamic password k through the timestamp synchronized by the Beidou satellite D2 , through the second dynamic password k D2 The second key k is used as the decryption key B Decrypt to obtain the first key k A .

9. A computer device comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, wherein: When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of a quantum relay method for enhancing power grid security according to any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

10. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of a quantum relay method for enhancing power grid security according to any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

Images