Charging pile information tamper-proofing method, system and device based on zero-knowledge proof and medium

Abstract

The invention provides a charging pile information tamper-proofing method and device based on zero knowledge proof and a medium, and belongs to the technical field of charging piles. The method comprises the following steps: a server deploys a charging pile information acquisition module to acquire information in real time, encrypts the information and sends the information to a zero-knowledge proof module; after receiving the data, the zero-knowledge proof module performs hash calculation on the data to generate a hash value and proof; the charging pile information management module is responsible for providing an information retrieval query function and a verification initiation function for a system administrator; a system administrator uses the module to check operation information and maintenance information of the charging pile, or manually initiates verification on a certain piece of information so as to check whether data is tampered or not; and when the data needs to be verified, the proof is input into the data verification module for verification. According to the method, the zero-knowledge proof technology is introduced, so that the data security is enhanced, and the sensitive information is prevented from being illegally acquired or tampered in the transmission and storage process.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to a charging pile information tamper-proof method, system, device and medium based on zero-knowledge proof, belonging to the technical field of charging piles. Background Art

[0002] With the development of economy and the booming of new energy industry, charging piles, as important supporting facilities for electric vehicles, are increasing in number and their distribution range is becoming increasingly wide. However, the traditional charging pile information management system has obvious deficiencies in ensuring data security. Since key information such as charging pile operation data and maintenance records are directly related to the safe operation and supervision effect of charging piles, once this information is tampered with or forged, it will bring great troubles and risks to the operation and maintenance management of charging piles.

[0003] Traditional information management systems often rely on simple encryption or signature mechanisms to ensure data security, but these methods are powerless in the face of advanced attack methods. Attackers may tamper with data by cracking encryption algorithms or forging signatures, thereby bypassing the system's security line. In addition, traditional verification mechanisms usually require access to original data or specific verification information, which not only increases the risk of data leakage, but also reduces the efficiency and convenience of verification.

[0004] Therefore, it is particularly important to develop a management system that can effectively prevent charging pile information from being tampered with. This system needs to be able to efficiently verify the integrity and authenticity of data without leaking the original data content. Zero-knowledge proof technology, as an advanced cryptographic tool, makes it possible to achieve this goal. By introducing zero-knowledge proof technology, it is possible to verify whether the information has been tampered with without leaking the original information of the charging pile, thereby ensuring the security and reliability of the charging pile information. Summary of the invention

[0005] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a charging pile information tamper-proof method, system, device and medium based on zero-knowledge proof, so as to solve the deficiencies of traditional charging pile information management system in data security and improve the operation and maintenance management efficiency and safety of charging piles.

[0006] In order to achieve the above object, the present invention is implemented through the following technical solutions: A charging pile information tamper-proof method based on zero-knowledge proof comprises the following steps: Step 1: The server deploys the charging pile information collection module to collect the operation data and maintenance record information of the charging pile in real time, and encrypts this information and sends it to the zero-knowledge proof module; Step 2: After receiving the data, the zero-knowledge proof module performs hash calculation on the data to generate a hash value, uses the zero-knowledge proof protocol zk-SNARKs and this hash value to generate a proof, and stores the original data and the proof in the database; Step 3: The charging pile information management module is responsible for providing information retrieval and query functions and initiating verification functions to the system administrator; the system administrator uses this module to view the charging pile operation information and maintenance information, or manually initiates verification of a piece of information to check whether the data has been tampered with; Step 4: When the data needs to be verified, the proof is input into the data verification module. The verification module can determine whether the proof is valid based on the proof information without accessing the original data or knowing the specific content of the hash value. If the proof is valid, the verifier can be sure that the data has not been tampered with after the proof is generated.

[0007] Preferably, step 1 is specifically as follows: the charging pile information collection module generates a unique identification number id for each piece of information, and packages the charging pile ID, the plain text data of the information corresponding to the charging pile ID, and the hash value of the information corresponding to the charging pile ID into one piece of data, encrypts the data and sends it to the zero-knowledge proof module.

[0008] Preferably, in step 1, the server deploys a charging pile information collection module to collect the operation data and maintenance record information of the charging pile in real time, and encrypts the information and sends it to the zero-knowledge proof module; the specific steps are: Step 1.1: The charging pile information collection module generates a unique identification number id for each piece of information, and packages the charging pile ID, the information plain text data corresponding to the charging pile ID, and the hash value of the information corresponding to the charging pile ID into one piece of data; the plain text data includes: the geographical coordinates of the charging pile, the charging time period, and the maintenance time; Step 1.2: Encrypt the packaged data using a symmetric encryption algorithm; Step 1.3: Send the encrypted data to the zero-knowledge proof module.

[0009] Preferably, the specific steps of step 2 are: Step 2.1: After receiving the data, the zero-knowledge proof module performs hash calculation on the data to generate a hash value. The hash algorithm is SHA256. Step 2.2: Generate a proof using the zero-knowledge proof protocol zk-SNARKs and this hash value. The public key SKV_p is the private key of the zero-knowledge proof module. Step 2.3: Store the original data and proof in the database.

[0010] Preferably, the specific steps of step 3 are: Step 3.1: The charging pile information management module retrieves the charging pile information from the database server and displays it to the administrator; Step 3.2: The charging pile information management module receives the verification request from the administrator and sends the plain text data of the information corresponding to the charging pile ID and the hash value of the information corresponding to the charging pile ID to the information verification module.

[0011] A charging pile information tamper-proof system based on zero-knowledge proof, comprising: The data collection module is configured to collect the operation data and maintenance record information of the charging pile in real time, and encrypt the information and send it to the zero-knowledge proof module; The zero-knowledge proof module is configured to perform hash calculation on the data, generate a hash value, generate a proof using the zero-knowledge proof protocol zk-SNARKs and the hash value, and store the original data and the proof in a database; The information management module is configured to provide the system administrator with information retrieval and query functions and verification initiation functions; the system administrator uses this module to view the operation information and maintenance information of the charging pile, or manually initiates verification of a piece of information to check whether the data has been tampered with; When the verification module is configured to verify the data, the proof is input into the data verification module, and the verification module can determine whether the proof is valid based on the proof information without accessing the original data or knowing the specific content of the hash value; if the proof is valid, the verifier can be sure that the data has not been tampered with after the proof is generated.

[0012] A charging pile information tamper-proof device based on zero-knowledge proof comprises a processor and a memory storing program instructions, wherein the processor is configured to execute the charging pile information tamper-proof method based on zero-knowledge proof when running the program instructions.

[0013] A computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the charging pile information tamper-proof method based on zero-knowledge proof.

[0014] The advantages of the present invention are: by introducing zero-knowledge proof technology, the present invention realizes effective verification of the authenticity and integrity of information without leaking the original information of the charging pile. This feature greatly enhances the security of data and prevents sensitive information from being illegally obtained or tampered with during transmission and storage, thereby ensuring the normal operation of the charging pile and the legitimate rights and interests of users. The use of non-interactive zero-knowledge proof protocols (such as zk-SNARKs) makes the verification process unnecessary for both parties to interact, greatly improving the verification efficiency. This not only reduces the burden on the system, but also shortens the verification time and improves the user experience.

[0015] In addition, it also has strong anti-tampering capabilities. If the charging pile information is tampered with, a valid zero-knowledge proof cannot be generated because tampering will destroy the original structure or attributes of the data, causing the hash value to change. This mechanism makes tampering behavior easy to detect and identify, thereby effectively curbing the risk of data tampering.

[0016] In summary, the charging pile information tamper-proof management system based on zero-knowledge proof proposed in the present invention has shown significant beneficial effects in ensuring the security of charging pile information, improving verification efficiency and enhancing anti-tampering capabilities, and is of great significance for promoting the healthy development of the new energy industry. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0017] The accompanying drawings are used to provide further understanding of the present invention and constitute a part of the specification. They are used to explain the present invention together with the embodiments of the present invention and do not constitute a limitation of the present invention.

[0018] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of the process of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0019] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0020] Example 1 like Figure 1 As shown, a charging pile information tamper-proof method based on zero-knowledge proof includes the following steps: Step 1: The server deploys the charging pile information collection module to collect the operation data and maintenance record information of the charging pile in real time, and encrypts this information and sends it to the zero-knowledge proof module; Step 2: After receiving the data, the zero-knowledge proof module performs hash calculation on the data to generate a hash value, uses the zero-knowledge proof protocol zk-SNARKs and this hash value to generate a proof, and stores the original data and the proof in the database; Step 3: The charging pile information management module is responsible for providing information retrieval and query functions and initiating verification functions to the system administrator; the system administrator uses this module to view the charging pile operation information and maintenance information, or manually initiates verification of a piece of information to check whether the data has been tampered with; Step 4: When the data needs to be verified, the proof is input into the data verification module. The verification module can determine whether the proof is valid based on the proof information without accessing the original data or knowing the specific content of the hash value. If the proof is valid, the verifier can be sure that the data has not been tampered with after the proof is generated.

[0021] As a refinement of the above embodiment, step 1 is specifically as follows: the charging pile information collection module generates a unique identification number id for each piece of information, and packages the charging pile ID, the plain text data of the information corresponding to the charging pile ID, and the hash value of the information corresponding to the charging pile ID into one piece of data, encrypts the data and sends it to the zero-knowledge proof module.

[0022] As a refinement of the above embodiment, in step 1, the server deploys a charging pile information collection module to collect the operation data and maintenance record information of the charging pile in real time, and encrypts this information and sends it to the zero-knowledge proof module; the specific steps are: Step 1.1: The charging pile information collection module generates a unique identification number id for each piece of information, and packages the charging pile ID, the information plain text data corresponding to the charging pile ID, and the hash value of the information corresponding to the charging pile ID into one piece of data; the plain text data includes: the geographical coordinates of the charging pile, the charging time period, and the maintenance time; Step 1.2: Encrypt the packaged data using a symmetric encryption algorithm; Step 1.3: Send the encrypted data to the zero-knowledge proof module.

[0023] As a refinement of the above embodiment, the specific steps of step 2 are: Step 2.1: After receiving the data, the zero-knowledge proof module performs hash calculation on the data to generate a hash value. The hash algorithm is SHA256. Step 2.2: Generate a proof using the zero-knowledge proof protocol zk-SNARKs and this hash value. The public key SKV_p is the private key of the zero-knowledge proof module. Step 2.3: Store the original data and proof in the database.

[0024] As a refinement of the above embodiment, the specific steps of step 3 are: Step 3.1: The charging pile information management module retrieves the charging pile information from the database server and displays it to the administrator; Step 3.2: The charging pile information management module receives the verification request from the administrator and sends the plain text data of the information corresponding to the charging pile ID and the hash value of the information corresponding to the charging pile ID to the information verification module.

[0025] Example 2 A charging pile information tamper-proof system based on zero-knowledge proof, comprising: The data collection module is configured to collect the operation data and maintenance record information of the charging pile in real time, and encrypt the information and send it to the zero-knowledge proof module; The zero-knowledge proof module is configured to perform hash calculation on the data, generate a hash value, generate a proof using the zero-knowledge proof protocol zk-SNARKs and the hash value, and store the original data and the proof in a database; The information management module is configured to provide the system administrator with information retrieval and query functions and verification initiation functions; the system administrator uses this module to view the operation information and maintenance information of the charging pile, or manually initiates verification of a piece of information to check whether the data has been tampered with; When the verification module is configured to verify the data, the proof is input into the data verification module, and the verification module can determine whether the proof is valid based on the proof information without accessing the original data or knowing the specific content of the hash value; if the proof is valid, the verifier can be sure that the data has not been tampered with after the proof is generated.

[0026] The embodiment of the present disclosure also provides a charging pile information tamper-proof device based on zero-knowledge proof, including a processor and a memory. Optionally, the device may also include a communication interface and a bus. Among them, the processor, the communication interface, and the memory can communicate with each other through the bus. The communication interface can be used for information transmission. The processor can call the logic instructions in the memory to execute the charging pile information tamper-proof method based on zero-knowledge proof of the above embodiment.

[0027] In addition, the logic instructions in the above-mentioned memory can be implemented in the form of software functional units and can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium when sold or used as an independent product.

[0028] The memory, as a computer-readable storage medium, can be used to store software programs and computer executable programs, such as program instructions / modules corresponding to the method in the embodiment of the present disclosure. The processor executes functional applications and data processing by running the program instructions / modules stored in the memory, that is, the charging pile information tamper-proof method based on zero-knowledge proof in the above embodiment is implemented.

[0029] The memory may include a program storage area and a data storage area, wherein the program storage area may store an operating system and an application required for at least one function; the data storage area may store data created according to the use of the terminal device, etc. In addition, the memory may include a high-speed random access memory and may also include a non-volatile memory.

[0030] An embodiment of the present disclosure provides a computer-readable storage medium storing computer-executable instructions, wherein the computer-executable instructions are configured to execute the above-mentioned charging pile information tamper-proof method based on zero-knowledge proof.

[0031] The computer-readable storage medium mentioned above may be a transient computer-readable storage medium or a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium.

[0032] The technical solution of the embodiment of the present disclosure can be embodied in the form of a software product, which is stored in a storage medium and includes one or more instructions for enabling a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the method described in the embodiment of the present disclosure. The aforementioned storage medium may be a non-transient storage medium, including: a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory), a random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), a disk or an optical disk, and other media that can store program codes, or a transient storage medium.

[0033] Finally, it should be noted that the above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art can still modify the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments or replace some of the technical features therein by equivalents. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present invention shall be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A charging pile information tamper-proof method based on zero-knowledge proof, characterized in that: The steps include: Step 1: The server deploys the charging pile information collection module to collect the operation data and maintenance record information of the charging pile in real time, and encrypts this information and sends it to the zero-knowledge proof module; Step 2: After receiving the data, the zero-knowledge proof module performs hash calculation on the data to generate a hash value, uses the zero-knowledge proof protocol zk-SNARKs and this hash value to generate a proof, and stores the original data and the proof in the database; Step 3: The charging pile information management module is responsible for providing information retrieval and query functions and initiating verification functions to the system administrator; the system administrator uses this module to view the charging pile operation information and maintenance information, or manually initiates verification of a piece of information to check whether the data has been tampered with; Step 4: When the data needs to be verified, the proof is input into the data verification module. The verification module can determine whether the proof is valid based on the proof information without accessing the original data or knowing the specific content of the hash value. If the proof is valid, the verifier can be sure that the data has not been tampered with after the proof is generated.

2. The charging pile information tamper-proof method based on zero-knowledge proof according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The specific step 1 is as follows: the charging pile information collection module generates a unique identification number ID for each piece of information, and packages the charging pile ID, the plain text data of the information corresponding to the charging pile ID, and the hash value of the information corresponding to the charging pile ID into one piece of data, encrypts the data and sends it to the zero-knowledge proof module.

3. The charging pile information tamper-proof method based on zero-knowledge proof according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step 1, the server deploys a charging pile information collection module to collect the operation data and maintenance record information of the charging pile in real time, and encrypts this information and sends it to the zero-knowledge proof module; the specific steps are: Step 1.1: The charging pile information collection module generates a unique identification number id for each piece of information, and packages the charging pile ID, the information plaintext data corresponding to the charging pile ID, and the hash value of the information corresponding to the charging pile ID into one piece of data; Plain text data includes: geographical coordinates of the charging pile, charging time period, and maintenance time; Step 1.2: Encrypt the packaged data using a symmetric encryption algorithm; Step 1.3: Send the encrypted data to the zero-knowledge proof module.

4. The charging pile information tamper-proof method based on zero-knowledge proof according to claim 1, characterized in that: The specific steps of step 2 are: Step 2.1: After receiving the data, the zero-knowledge proof module performs hash calculation on the data to generate a hash value. The hash algorithm is SHA256. Step 2.2: Generate a proof using the zero-knowledge proof protocol zk-SNARKs and this hash value. The public key SKV_p is the private key of the zero-knowledge proof module. Step 2.3: Store the original data and proof in the database.

5. The charging pile information tamper-proof method based on zero-knowledge proof according to claim 1, characterized in that: The specific steps of step 3 are: Step 3.1: The charging pile information management module retrieves the charging pile information from the database server and displays it to the administrator; Step 3.2: The charging pile information management module receives the verification request from the administrator and sends the plain text data of the information corresponding to the charging pile ID and the hash value of the information corresponding to the charging pile ID to the information verification module.

6. A charging pile information tamper-proof system based on zero-knowledge proof for executing any of the methods described in claims 1-5, characterized in that: include: The data collection module is configured to collect the operation data and maintenance record information of the charging pile in real time, and encrypt the information and send it to the zero-knowledge proof module; The zero-knowledge proof module is configured to perform hash calculation on the data, generate a hash value, generate a proof using the zero-knowledge proof protocol zk-SNARKs and the hash value, and store the original data and the proof in a database; The information management module is configured to provide the system administrator with information retrieval and query functions and verification initiation functions; the system administrator uses this module to view the operation information and maintenance information of the charging pile, or manually initiates verification of a piece of information to check whether the data has been tampered with; When the verification module is configured to verify the data, the proof is input into the data verification module, and the verification module can determine whether the proof is valid based on the proof information without accessing the original data or knowing the specific content of the hash value; if the proof is valid, the verifier can be sure that the data has not been tampered with after the proof is generated.

7. A charging pile information tamper-proof device based on zero-knowledge proof, comprising a processor and a memory storing program instructions, characterized in that: The processor is configured to execute the charging pile information tamper-proof method based on zero-knowledge proof as described in any one of claims 1-6 when running the program instructions.

8. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: A computer program is stored thereon, and when the program is executed by a processor, the method described in any one of claims 1 to 6 is implemented.

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