Unmanned aerial vehicle management method and system, nonvolatile storage medium and electronic equipment

Abstract

The invention discloses an unmanned aerial vehicle management method and system, a nonvolatile storage medium and electronic equipment. The method comprises the steps that a base station sends a first public key stored in the base station to an unmanned aerial vehicle management object, and a second private key is stored in the unmanned aerial vehicle management object; a first certificate and a second certificate sent by the unmanned aerial vehicle management object are received, the first certificate is obtained by performing digital signature on the first public key by using a second private key, and the second certificate is obtained by performing digital signature on the unmanned aerial vehicle identification information by using a third private key; receiving the encrypted flight data generated by the unmanned aerial vehicle; and verifying the flight data generated by the unmanned aerial vehicle after encryption processing by using the second certificate, and sending a verification result and the first certificate to the unmanned aerial vehicle management object. According to the invention, the technical problem that the unmanned aerial vehicle flies irregularly due to the fact that the base station cannot accurately identify and manage the unmanned aerial vehicle is solved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of communication security technology, and specifically, to a drone management method and system, a non-volatile storage medium, and an electronic device. Background Art

[0002] With the continuous coverage of 3.5G and 2.1G NR in the air-ground 5G network, 5G network can not only provide large-bandwidth, high-reliability and low-latency data communication services for people, objects and connected vehicles on the ground, but also gradually expand 5G airspace coverage to low-altitude areas, and provide communication services for unmanned aerial vehicles flying at low altitudes.

[0003] The tele-sensing module in the 5G base station has strong computing and storage capabilities, and can cooperate with low-altitude supervision and transportation departments to realize the identification of low-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles, the collection, analysis and processing of flight data, and achieve effective communication, identification and supervision of them.

[0004] In the related technology, the synesthesia module cannot accurately identify and monitor the drone, which may lead to the drone's irregular flight.

[0005] To address the above-mentioned problems, no effective solution has been proposed yet. Summary of the invention

[0006] The embodiments of the present application provide a drone management method and system, a non-volatile storage medium, and an electronic device to at least solve the technical problem that the drone may not fly properly due to the inability of the base station to accurately identify and manage the drone.

[0007] According to one aspect of an embodiment of the present application, a drone management method is provided, including: a base station sends a first public key stored in the base station to a drone management object, wherein a second private key is stored in the drone management object; receiving a first certificate and a second certificate sent by the drone management object, wherein the first certificate is obtained by digitally signing the first public key using the second private key, and the second certificate is obtained by digitally signing drone identification information using a third private key; receiving flight data generated by the drone after encryption; verifying the flight data generated by the drone after encryption using the second certificate, and sending the verification result and the first certificate to the drone management object.

[0008] Optionally, the base station sends the first public key stored in the base station to the drone management object, including: the base station determines the first random number as the first private key, and uses preset global parameters to calculate the first public key corresponding to the first private key; receives the second public key corresponding to the second private key sent by the drone management object, wherein the second private key is a second random number; and sends the first public key and the base station identification information to the drone management object.

[0009] Optionally, the method also includes: receiving drone identification information, a third public key and a target key sent by the drone management object, wherein the third private key is a third random number, the third public key is obtained by calculating the third random number using preset global parameters, the target key is obtained by the drone management object encrypting the symmetric key using the first public key, and the symmetric key is determined based on the fourth random number and the effective flight time of the drone.

[0010] Optionally, receiving flight data generated by the drone after encryption processing includes: receiving drone identification information and target data sent by the drone, wherein the target data is obtained by encrypting the flight data generated by the drone using a symmetric key and digitally signing the encrypted flight data using a third private key.

[0011] Optionally, the second certificate is that the drone management object uses the third private key to digitally sign the drone identification information to obtain the second certificate parameters, and is determined based on the second certificate parameters and the validity period of the second certificate; the flight data generated by the encrypted drone is verified using the second certificate, including: decrypting the second certificate using the third public key to obtain the validity period of the second certificate, and determining whether the current time is within the validity period of the second certificate; if the current time is not within the validity period of the second certificate, generating a first message indicating that the current time is not within the validity period of the second certificate, and sending the first message to the drone management object.

[0012] Optionally, the target key is decrypted using the first private key to obtain a symmetric key; it is determined whether the target data can be decrypted using the third public key and the symmetric key. If the target data cannot be decrypted using the third public key and the symmetric key, a second message is generated indicating that the target data is illegal, and the second message is sent to the drone management object.

[0013] Optionally, determine the effective flight time of the UAV in the symmetric key, and judge whether the current moment is within the effective flight time of the UAV; if the current moment is not within the effective flight time of the UAV, generate a third message indicating that the current moment is not within the effective flight time of the UAV, and send the third message to the UAV management object.

[0014] Optionally, after receiving the first certificate and the second certificate sent by the drone management object, the method also includes: decrypting the first certificate using the second public key to obtain the first public key; determining whether the first public key obtained by decryption is consistent with the first public key stored in the base station; and storing the first certificate when the first public key obtained by decryption is consistent with the first public key stored in the base station.

[0015] Optionally, sending the verification result and the first certificate to the drone management object includes: digitally signing the verification result using the first private key to obtain a target verification result; and sending the target verification result and the first certificate to the drone management object.

[0016] According to another aspect of the embodiment of the present application, a drone management method is also provided, including: the drone management object receives a first public key sent by a base station; uses a second private key to digitally sign the first public key to obtain a first certificate, and uses a third private key to digitally sign the drone identification information to obtain a second certificate; sends the first certificate and the second certificate to the base station, wherein the base station is used to receive flight data generated by the drone after encryption, and uses the second certificate to verify the flight data generated by the drone after encryption to generate a verification result; receives the verification result and the first certificate sent by the base station.

[0017] Optionally, the drone management object receives the first public key sent by the base station, including: sending a second public key corresponding to the second private key to the base station, wherein the base station is used to determine the first random number as the first private key, and calculate the first public key corresponding to the first private key using preset global parameters, and the second private key is the second random number; receiving the first public key sent by the base station and the base station identification information.

[0018] Optionally, the third private key is calculated using preset global parameters to obtain a third public key, wherein the third private key is a third random number; the symmetric key is determined based on the fourth random number and the effective flight time of the UAV; the symmetric key is encrypted using the first public key to obtain a target key; and the UAV identification information, the third public key and the target key are sent to the base station.

[0019] Optionally, the first certificate is a first certificate parameter obtained by digitally signing the first public key with the second private key, and is determined according to the first certificate parameter and the validity period of the first certificate; receiving the verification result and the first certificate sent by the base station, including: decrypting the first certificate with the second public key to obtain the validity period of the first certificate, and determining whether the current moment is within the validity period of the first certificate; if the current moment is within the validity period of the first certificate, determining whether the target verification result is legal according to the first public key, wherein the target verification result is obtained by the base station digitally signing the verification result with the first private key; if the target verification result is determined to be legal according to the first public key, receiving the target verification result, wherein the target verification result includes: target data, the target data is obtained by encrypting the flight data generated by the drone using a symmetric key, and digitally signing the encrypted flight data using a third private key; decrypting the target data using the third public key and the symmetric key to obtain the flight data generated by the drone, and parsing the flight data generated by the drone.

[0020] Optionally, after receiving the verification result and the first certificate sent by the base station, the method also includes: if the verification result is a preset situation, adding the drone identification information to a preset database, wherein the preset situation includes at least one of the following: the current time is not within the validity period of the first certificate, the current time is not within the valid flight time of the drone, and the location of the drone is not within the scope of the drone registered in the drone management object.

[0021] According to another aspect of the embodiment of the present application, a drone management system is also provided, including: a base station, a drone management object and a drone, wherein the base station is used to send a first public key stored in the base station to the drone management object, and the drone management object stores a second private key; the drone management object is used to digitally sign the first public key using the second private key to obtain a first certificate, digitally sign the drone identification information using a third private key to obtain a second certificate, and send the first certificate and the second certificate to the base station; the drone is used to send encrypted flight data generated by the drone to the base station; the base station uses the second certificate to verify the encrypted flight data generated by the drone, and sends the verification result and the first certificate to the drone management object.

[0022] According to another aspect of the embodiment of the present application, a non-volatile storage medium is also provided, and the storage medium includes a stored program, wherein when the program is running, the device where the storage medium is located is controlled to execute the above drone management method.

[0023] According to another aspect of the embodiments of the present application, there is also provided an electronic device, including: a memory and a processor, the processor being used to run a program stored in the memory, wherein the above drone management method is executed when the program is running.

[0024] According to another aspect of the embodiments of the present application, a computer program is also provided, wherein the above drone management method is implemented when the computer program is executed by a processor.

[0025] According to another aspect of the embodiments of the present application, a computer program product is also provided, the computer program product comprising a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium, wherein the non-volatile computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the above drone management method is implemented.

[0026] In an embodiment of the present application, a base station is used to send a first public key stored in the base station to a drone management object, wherein a second private key is stored in the drone management object; a first certificate and a second certificate sent by the drone management object are received, wherein the first certificate is obtained by digitally signing the first public key using the second private key, and the second certificate is obtained by digitally signing the drone identification information using the third private key; flight data generated by the encrypted drone is received; the flight data generated by the encrypted drone is verified using the second certificate, and the verification result and the first certificate are sent to the drone management object, thereby achieving the purpose of accurately identifying and managing drones, thereby achieving the technical effect of reducing the probability of possible irregular drone flights, and further solving the technical problem of possible irregular drone flights caused by the inability of the base station to accurately identify and manage drones. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0027] The drawings described herein are used to provide a further understanding of the present application and constitute a part of the present application. The illustrative embodiments of the present application and their descriptions are used to explain the present application and do not constitute an improper limitation on the present application. In the drawings:

[0028] Figure 1 is a flow chart of a drone management method according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0029] Figure 2 is a flow chart of another drone management method according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0030] Figure 3 is a structural diagram of a drone management system according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0031] Figure 4 is a flowchart of an implementation method of a drone management method according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0032] Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of network nodes of a drone management method according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0033] Figure 6 It is a hardware structure block diagram of a computer terminal of a drone management method according to an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0034] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the solution of the present application, the technical solution in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present application, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work should fall within the scope of protection of the present application.

[0035] It should be noted that the terms "first", "second", etc. in the specification and claims of the present application and the above-mentioned drawings are used to distinguish similar objects, and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that the data used in this way can be interchangeable where appropriate, so that the embodiments of the present application described herein can be implemented in an order other than those illustrated or described herein. In addition, the terms "including" and "having" and any of their variations are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions, for example, a process, method, system, product or device comprising a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to those steps or units clearly listed, but may include other steps or units that are not clearly listed or inherent to these processes, methods, products or devices.

[0036] In order to better understand the embodiments of the present application, the technical terms involved in the embodiments of the present application are explained as follows:

[0037] According to an embodiment of the present application, a method embodiment of a drone management method is provided. It should be noted that the steps shown in the flowchart of the accompanying drawings can be executed in a computer system such as a set of computer executable instructions, and although a logical order is shown in the flowchart, in some cases, the steps shown or described can be executed in an order different from that shown here.

[0038] Figure 1 is a flow chart of a drone management method according to an embodiment of the present application. Figure 1 As shown, the method comprises the following steps:

[0039] In step S102, the base station sends the first public key stored in the base station to the drone management object, wherein the drone management object stores the second private key.

[0040] The drone management object is, for example, a low-altitude flight service management agency. The drone management object selects a random number s as the system key (second private key), and uses the preset global parameters to calculate the second public key PK corresponding to the second private key sys , where PK sys=sP, the preset global parameter is GP, the preset global parameter is public, G is a cyclic group, such as an additive group or a multiplicative group, P is a generator of the cyclic group G, and the preset global parameter includes the second public key PK sys and generator P.

[0041] Base stations, for example: 5G base stations, 5G base stations have built-in interawareness modules, have strong local data computing and storage capabilities, and are responsible for drone broadcast recognition, identity authentication, flight data decryption and encrypted transmission. The 5G base station selects a random number u as its first private key SK g =u, and use the preset global parameter GP to calculate the first public key PK of the base station g =uP, the 5G base station will use the first public key PK g And the base station unique ID g Sent to the drone management object.

[0042] Step S104, receiving a first certificate and a second certificate sent by the drone management object, wherein the first certificate is obtained by digitally signing the first public key using the second private key, and the second certificate is obtained by digitally signing the drone identification information using the third private key.

[0043] When the drone flies into the communication coverage of a 5G base station, the base station's telepathic module transmits the base station's first public key PK to the g Sent to the drone management object. The drone management object stores the second private key s required for interacting with the base station in advance. The second private key s is used to g Sign and generate the first certificate Cert g (base station's public key certificate) to ensure that the first public key PK g authenticity and immutability.

[0044] It is worth noting that drones have built-in secure communication modules and certain computing and processing capabilities. According to the safety requirements of civil unmanned aerial vehicle systems, each drone must support broadcast or network ID remote identification capabilities, and its unique identity RID must be registered before leaving the factory. V .

[0045] The drone management object calls the drone manufacturer authentication server, and after confirming that the drone identity is legitimate, selects the third random number a as the drone private key SK V =a (third private key), and use the preset global parameter GP to calculate its public key PK V = aP (third public key), using the third private key SK V Its identity RID V Perform digital signature and generate drone certificate parameter SV =SK V H2(RID V ), and then generate the drone public key certificate Cert V =(PK V ,S V ,T V ), i.e. the second certificate, where T V It is the validity period of the public key certificate. The specific validity period is determined according to the actual strategy and can be one month, two months or half a year.

[0046] Step S106, receiving the encrypted flight data generated by the UAV.

[0047] During its flight, the drone uses the symmetric key shared with the base station to encrypt the flight data, and then uses the drone's private key (the third private key SK V ) signs the encrypted flight data to generate digitally signed flight data. These data are sent to base stations within the coverage area in the form of broadcast.

[0048] Specifically, the drone uses a symmetric key to encrypt flight data, including the drone's latitude and longitude, altitude, timestamp, and other information. The drone uses its private key to sign the encrypted flight data, creating a digital signature to ensure the integrity of the data and the identity of the sender. The drone broadcasts the encrypted flight data and the digital signature to base stations within the base station coverage area.

[0049] Step S108: Use the second certificate to verify the flight data generated by the encrypted drone, and send the verification result and the first certificate to the drone management object.

[0050] Specifically, the base station uses the drone public key (third public key PK V ) decrypts the digital signature of the received flight data and verifies the true identity of the drone and the integrity of the flight data. The base station checks whether the flight data is within the valid time and space range, and whether the flight status of the drone is legal, and decrypts and verifies it through the public keys of the first certificate and the second certificate. The base station uses its private key (the first private key SK g ) signs the verification result, and then sends the signed verification result together with the first certificate back to the drone management object for further analysis and supervision by the management object.

[0051] The following Figure 1 The steps shown are exemplary and explanatory.

[0052] According to some optional embodiments of the present application, the base station sends the first public key stored in the base station to the drone management object, which can be achieved by the following method: the base station determines the first random number as the first private key, and uses preset global parameters to calculate the first public key corresponding to the first private key; receives the second public key corresponding to the second private key sent by the drone management object, wherein the second private key is a second random number; and sends the first public key and the base station identification information to the drone management object.

[0053] Specifically, the base station selects a first random number u as its private key SK g (first private key), and use the preset global parameter GP to calculate its public key PK g =uP (first public key), 5G base station will PK g And the base station unique ID g The base station receives the second public key PK from the drone management object. sys , the second public key PK sys It is calculated by the drone management object using the second random number s through the same global parameters and is used for secure communication between the drone and the base station. The base station calculates the first public key PK g and the base station's own identification information ID g (such as base station ID, location, etc.) is encapsulated into a message and sent to the drone management object through a secure communication channel.

[0054] Preferably, the drone management method also includes: the base station receives the drone identification information, the third public key and the target key sent by the drone management object, wherein the third private key is a third random number, the third public key is obtained by calculating the third random number using preset global parameters, the target key is obtained by the drone management object encrypting the symmetric key using the first public key, and the symmetric key is determined based on the fourth random number and the effective flight time of the drone.

[0055] Specifically, it has a unique identifier RID V The valid time for a drone to apply for a certain area is T f The drone management object selects a fourth random number r and calculates a symmetric key K for the drone with a certain validity period. V = rH1(RID V )||T f . And use the base station's public key (first public key PK g ) The drone’s symmetric key K v Encrypt and get the target key PK g ·K v . Then the drone will be marked with RID V , Public key certificate (first certificate Cert g), the third public key PK V and the target key (PK g ·K v ):(RID V ||Cert V ||PK V ||(PK g ·K v )) and sent to the 5G base station in the form of a list.

[0056] According to other optional embodiments of the present application, receiving flight data generated by a drone after encryption can be achieved by the following method: receiving drone identification information and target data sent by the drone, wherein the target data is obtained by encrypting the flight data generated by the drone using a symmetric key and digitally signing the encrypted flight data using a third private key.

[0057] It should be noted that when the drone flies to the base station coverage area of ​​a certain area, the symmetric key K v Encrypt the flight data m generated by the drone to obtain the encrypted data sm=Enc(K V ,m). Then, use the third private key SK V Sign the encrypted flight data sm to obtain the target data Sig(sm)=SK V H2(sm|T1), where T1 represents the first timestamp of the message. Finally, the drone sends its uniquely identified, encrypted and signed target data (RID V ,sm,Sig(sm),T1) is broadcast in real time to the 5G base stations within the coverage area.

[0058] The interawareness module in the 5G base station can be based on the identity identifier RID broadcast by the drone V , extract the symmetric key K of the drone from the local v You can also request the drone's certificate information (RID V ||Cert V ||PK V ||(PK g ·K v )), using the first private key SK of the base station g For the target key PK g ·K v Decryption can obtain the communication symmetric key K of a certain drone v .

[0059] Receive the first certificate Cert sent by the drone management object g And the second certificate Cert VAfterwards, the following steps can be performed: using the second public key PK sys For the first certificate Cert g Decrypt and get the first public key PK g ; Determine whether the first public key obtained by decryption is consistent with the first public key stored in the base station; if the first public key obtained by decryption is consistent with the first public key stored in the base station, store the first certificate. In other words, the synesthesia module of the 5G base station uses the private key SK g Yes (RID V ||Cert V ||PK V ||(PK g ·K v PK in )) g ·K v After decryption, we can get the secure communication symmetric key K of a certain drone. v , will be stored in the 5G base station and updated regularly according to the low-altitude flight service management agency. f It is the validity period of the drone flight registration. The specific validity period is determined according to the actual strategy and can be one month, two months or half a year.

[0060] Furthermore, the 5G base station verifies the drone identification RID V The public key certificate (second certificate Cert V ) is within the validity period, for the second certificate Cert V Drones that are no longer valid still require high-level real-time monitoring, including the second certificate Cert V Utilize the third key SK for drone management objects V Digitally sign the drone identification information to obtain the second certificate parameter S V =SK V H2(RID V ), and according to the second certificate parameters and the validity period T of the second certificate V Determined.

[0061] Specifically, using the third public key PK V For the second certificate Cert V Decrypt and get the validity time T of the second certificate V , determine whether the current time is within the validity period T of the second certificate V If the current time is not within the validity period T of the second certificate V Within, generate a first message to indicate that the current moment is not within the validity period of the second certificate, and send the first message to the drone management object.

[0062] Further, using the public key of the drone (the third public key PKV ) verifies the legitimacy of the real-time broadcast message. If the verification is valid, it indicates that the flight data is legal and valid. Specifically, the first private key SK g For the target key PK g ·K v Decrypt and get the symmetric key K v ; Determine whether the third public key PK can be used V and the symmetric key K v Decrypt the target data. If the third public key PK cannot be used V and the symmetric key K v The target data is decrypted, a second message is generated indicating that the target data is illegal, and the second message is sent to the drone management object.

[0063] Furthermore, the symmetric key K is verified v If the verification is not within the valid time, the drone is judged to be an unregistered flight or an overtime flight, and will be monitored in real time at a high level. Specifically, determine the symmetric key K v The effective flight time of the UAV in the image is calculated, and it is determined whether the current moment is within the effective flight time T of the UAV. f if the current time is not within the effective flight time of the drone, a third message is generated to indicate that the current time is not within the effective flight time of the drone, and the third message is sent to the drone management object.

[0064] After identifying each low-altitude flying drone, the flight data must be analyzed and processed in the specified format and reported to the low-altitude flight service management agency. The flight data mainly includes the latitude and longitude, altitude, timestamp and other information of the drone flight.

[0065] Furthermore, the intersensory module in the 5G base station performs the above-mentioned local processing and calculation on the drone broadcast data sm received within the coverage area, and generates corresponding identification and supervision information in real time, such as key information Message such as certificate validity, legal registered flight, legal registered flight crossing the boundary, legal registered flight timeout, and unregistered flight.

[0066] Finally, the 5G base station uses the first private key SK g Sign the message Message and get Sig(Message) = SK g ·H2(Message∥T s ).

[0067] Set Mes = (Message, Cert g ,Sig(Message),T s )、(RID V,sm,Sig(sm),T1) is transmitted to the drone management object. This information includes the local identification parsing plaintext and signature of the 5G base station, the base station public key certificate, and the base station message timestamp T s , drone unique identity, drone flight data ciphertext and signature, drone flight data reporting timestamp, etc.

[0068] When the drone management object receives the 5G base station transmission message Mes = (sm, Cert g ,Sig(sm),T s ) and then, through the public key certificate Cert of the base station g =(PK g ,S g ,T g ), first verify the Cert of the 5G base station g Medium T g If the 5G base station public key certificate is valid within the validity period, the 5G base station public key verification equation Ver(Sig(sm), sm) = True is used to confirm whether the signature Sig(sm) of the shared message is legal. If it is illegal, the message sm is discarded. If the verification is legal and valid, the received message sm is used to analyze and process the current drone flight situation, providing safe and reliable drone data security communication for drone identification and supervision.

[0069] In the drone flight data reported by 5G base stations, there are problems such as public key certificates exceeding the validity period, unregistered flights, registered flight timeouts, and areas exceeding the range. The drone information in the database and the list of malicious flying drones will be queried and compared. By reminding, restricting or punishing the relevant drone registration organizations or individuals, malicious flying drones can be identified and supervised.

[0070] According to the above steps, this application can solve the following problems: 1. Malicious illegal drone flights are difficult to identify and supervise: The existing regulatory system lacks effective means to identify and supervise the malicious flight behavior of low-altitude drones, resulting in safety hazards. 2. Broadcast messages are easily eavesdropped and tampered with: The identity identification and flight data broadcast by drones during flight can be easily intercepted and tampered with by third parties, posing information security risks. 3. Data security communication and privacy protection are difficult to achieve: Data transmission between drones and ground base stations lacks sufficient encryption measures, and data security communication and user privacy protection cannot be ensured.

[0071] This application has the following advantages: 1. Strict authentication and filing of the identity and location of drones, combined with real-time monitoring of 5G base stations, to achieve efficient identification and supervision of malicious flights. 2. Using symmetric encryption and signature technology, drone flight data is encrypted and signed before broadcasting, effectively preventing messages from being eavesdropped and tampered with. 3. Using system public and private key pairs, security parameters and other mechanisms to ensure that the data transmission between drones and 5G base stations has high-intensity encryption protection, and realize data security communication and user privacy protection. 4. Combining 5G communication technology with the interawareness integrated module to achieve identity authentication, data security communication and identification supervision of drones flying at low altitudes, improving the security and reliability of the overall system. 5. The technical solution is simple, realizing intelligent driving in 5G Internet of Vehicles scenarios, improving the utilization value of 5G base stations, with high practical value, can achieve cost reduction and efficiency improvement, strong scalability, and easy to be deployed on a large scale in the air-ground integrated network of 5G base stations, while providing data services for users, Internet of Vehicles, Internet of Things, and low-altitude drones.

[0072] Figure 2 is a flow chart of another drone management method according to an embodiment of the present application. Figure 2 As shown, the method comprises the following steps:

[0073] Step S202: The drone management object receives the first public key sent by the base station.

[0074] The drone management object is, for example, a low-altitude flight service management agency. The drone management object selects a random number s as the system key (second private key), and uses the preset global parameters to calculate the second public key PK corresponding to the second private key sys , where PK sys =sP, the preset global parameter is GP, the preset global parameter is public, G is a cyclic group, such as an additive group or a multiplicative group, P is a generator of the cyclic group G, and the preset global parameter includes the second public key PK sys and generator P.

[0075] Base stations, for example: 5G base stations, 5G base stations have built-in interawareness modules, have strong local data computing and storage capabilities, and are responsible for drone broadcast recognition, identity authentication, flight data decryption and encrypted transmission. The 5G base station selects a random number u as its first private key SK g =u, and use the preset global parameter GP to calculate the first public key PK of the base station g =uP, the 5G base station will use the first public key PK g And the base station unique ID g Sent to the drone management object.

[0076] Step S204: Use the second private key to digitally sign the first public key to obtain a first certificate, and use the third private key to digitally sign the drone identification information to obtain a second certificate.

[0077] When the drone flies into the communication coverage of a 5G base station, the base station's telepathic module transmits the base station's first public key PK to the g Sent to the drone management object. The drone management object stores the second private key s required for interacting with the base station in advance. The second private key s is used to g Sign and generate the first certificate Cert g (base station's public key certificate) to ensure that the first public key PK g authenticity and immutability.

[0078] It is worth noting that drones have built-in secure communication modules and certain computing and processing capabilities. According to the safety requirements of civil unmanned aerial vehicle systems, each drone must support broadcast or network ID remote identification capabilities, and its unique identity RID must be registered before leaving the factory. V .

[0079] The drone management object calls the drone manufacturer authentication server, and after confirming that the drone identity is legitimate, selects the third random number a as the drone private key SK V =a (third private key), and use the preset global parameter GP to calculate its public key PK V = aP (third public key), using the third private key SK V Its identity RID V Perform digital signature and generate drone certificate parameter S V =SK V H2(RID V ), and then generate the drone public key certificate Cert V =(PK V ,S V ,T V ), i.e. the second certificate, where T V It is the validity period of the public key certificate. The specific validity period is determined according to the actual strategy and can be one month, two months or half a year.

[0080] Step S206, sending the first certificate and the second certificate to a base station, wherein the base station is used to receive the flight data generated by the encrypted drone, and use the second certificate to verify the flight data generated by the encrypted drone to generate a verification result.

[0081] During its flight, the drone uses the symmetric key shared with the base station to encrypt the flight data, and then uses the drone's private key (the third private key SK V ) signs the encrypted flight data to generate digitally signed flight data. These data are sent to base stations within the coverage area in the form of broadcast.

[0082] Specifically, the drone uses a symmetric key to encrypt flight data, including the drone's latitude and longitude, altitude, timestamp, and other information. The drone uses its private key to sign the encrypted flight data, creating a digital signature to ensure the integrity of the data and the identity of the sender. The drone broadcasts the encrypted flight data and the digital signature to base stations within the base station coverage area.

[0083] Step S208: receiving the verification result and the first certificate sent by the base station.

[0084] Specifically, the base station uses the drone public key (third public key PK V ) decrypts the digital signature of the received flight data and verifies the true identity of the drone and the integrity of the flight data. The base station checks whether the flight data is within the valid time and space range, and whether the flight status of the drone is legal, and decrypts and verifies it through the public keys of the first certificate and the second certificate. The drone management object receives the verification result and the first certificate sent by the base station.

[0085] In some optional embodiments of the present application, the drone management object receives the first public key sent by the base station, which can be achieved by the following method: sending the second public key corresponding to the second private key to the base station, wherein the base station is used to determine the first random number as the first private key, and calculate the first public key corresponding to the first private key using preset global parameters, and the second private key is the second random number; receiving the first public key and base station identification information sent by the base station.

[0086] The base station selects the first random number u as its private key SK g (first private key), and use the preset global parameter GP to calculate its public key PK g =uP (first public key), 5G base station will PK g And the base station unique ID g The base station receives the second public key PK from the drone management object. sys , the second public key PK sys It is calculated by the drone management object using the second random number s through the same global parameters and is used for secure communication between the drone and the base station. The base station calculates the first public key PK g and the base station's own identification information ID g(such as base station ID, location, etc.) is encapsulated into a message and sent to the drone management object through a secure communication channel.

[0087] Furthermore, the third private key is calculated using preset global parameters to obtain a third public key, wherein the third private key is a third random number; the symmetric key is determined based on the fourth random number and the effective flight time of the drone; the symmetric key is encrypted using the first public key to obtain a target key; the drone identification information, the third public key and the target key are sent to the base station.

[0088] Has a unique identifier RID V The valid time for a drone to apply for a certain area is T f The drone management object selects a fourth random number r and calculates a symmetric key K for the drone with a certain validity period. V = rH1(RID V )||T f . And use the base station's public key (first public key PK g ) The drone’s symmetric key K v Encrypt and get the target key PK g ·K v . Then the drone will be marked with RID V , Public key certificate (first certificate Cert g ), the third public key PK V and the target key (PK g ·K v ):(RID V ||Cert V ||PK V ||(PK g ·K v )) and sent to the 5G base station in the form of a list.

[0089] When the drone flies to a certain area within the coverage of the base station, the symmetric key K v Encrypt the flight data m generated by the drone to obtain the encrypted data sm=Enc(K V ,m). Then, use the third private key SK V Sign the encrypted flight data sm to obtain the target data Sig(sm)=SK V H2(sm|T1), where T1 represents the first timestamp of the message. Finally, the drone sends its uniquely identified, encrypted and signed target data (RID V ,sm,Sig(sm),T1) is broadcast in real time to the 5G base stations within the coverage area.

[0090] The interawareness module in the 5G base station can be based on the identity identifier RID broadcast by the droneV , extract the symmetric key K of the drone from the local v You can also request the drone's certificate information (RID V ||Cert V ||PK V ||(PK g ·K v )), using the first private key SK of the base station g For the target key PK g ·K v Decryption can obtain the communication symmetric key K of a certain drone v .

[0091] 5G base station inspection drone identification RID V The public key certificate (second certificate Cert V ) is within the validity period, for the second certificate Cert V Drones that are no longer valid still require high-level real-time monitoring. Then, the 5G base station uses the drone’s public key (the third public key PK V ) verifies the legitimacy of the real-time broadcast message. If the verification is valid, it means that the flight data is legal and valid. Then, the 5G base station verifies the symmetric key K v If the verification is not within the valid time, the drone is considered to be unregistered or exceeded the flight time and will be monitored in real time at a high level.

[0092] Furthermore, the intersensory module in the 5G base station performs the above-mentioned local processing and calculation on the drone broadcast data sm received within the coverage area, and generates corresponding identification and supervision information in real time, such as key information Message such as certificate validity, legal registered flight, legal registered flight crossing the boundary, legal registered flight timeout, and unregistered flight.

[0093] 5G base station uses the first private key SK g Sign the message Message and get Sig(Message) = SK g ·H2(Message∥T s ).

[0094] The drone management object receives the verification result and the first certificate sent by the 5G base station. It should be noted that the first certificate is obtained by digitally signing the first public key with the second private key, and the first certificate parameters are obtained, and are determined according to the first certificate parameters and the validity period of the first certificate.

[0095] Therefore, the verification result and the first certificate sent by the base station can be received by the following method: g =(PK g ,Sg ,T g ), first verify the Cert of the 5G base station g Medium T g If the 5G base station public key certificate is valid within the validity period, the 5G base station public key verification equation Ver(Sig(sm), sm) = True is used to confirm whether the signature Sig(sm) of the shared message is legal. If it is illegal, the message sm is discarded. If the verification is legal and valid, the received message sm is used to analyze and process the current drone flight situation, providing safe and reliable drone data security communication for drone identification and supervision.

[0096] Specifically, the drone management object uses the second public key to decrypt the first certificate, obtains the validity time of the first certificate, and determines whether the current time is within the validity time of the first certificate; if the current time is within the validity time of the first certificate, determines whether the target verification result is legal according to the first public key, wherein the target verification result is obtained by the base station digitally signing the verification result using the first private key; if the target verification result is determined to be legal according to the first public key, receives the target verification result, wherein the target verification result includes: target data, the target data is the flight data generated by the drone using a symmetric key, and the encrypted flight data is digitally signed using the third private key; the target data is decrypted using the third public key and the symmetric key to obtain the flight data generated by the drone, and the flight data generated by the drone is parsed.

[0097] Preferably, after receiving the verification result and the first certificate sent by the base station, the following steps can also be performed: if the verification result is a preset situation, the drone identification information is added to a preset database, wherein the preset situation includes at least one of the following: the current time is not within the validity period of the first certificate, the current time is not within the valid flight time of the drone, and the location of the drone is not within the scope of the drone registered in the drone management object.

[0098] That is to say, in the drone flight data reported by the 5G base station, if there are problems such as the public key certificate has expired, unregistered flight, registered flight time has expired, or the area has exceeded the range, the drone information in the database and the list of malicious flying drones will be queried and compared. By reminding, restricting or punishing the relevant drone registration organizations or individuals, the identification and supervision of malicious flying drones can be achieved.

[0099] Figure 3 is a structural diagram of a drone management system according to an embodiment of the present application, such as Figure 3 As shown, the system includes: a base station 31, a drone management object 32 and a drone 33, wherein:

[0100] The base station 31 is used to send the first public key stored in the base station 31 to the drone management object 32, and the drone management object 32 stores the second private key.

[0101] The drone management object 32 is used to digitally sign the first public key using the second private key to obtain a first certificate, digitally sign the drone 33 identification information using the third private key to obtain a second certificate, and send the first certificate and the second certificate to the base station 31.

[0102] The drone 33 is used to send encrypted flight data generated by the drone 33 to the base station 31 .

[0103] The base station 31 uses the second certificate to verify the flight data generated by the encrypted drone 33, and sends the verification result and the first certificate to the drone management object 32.

[0104] According to some optional embodiments of the present application, the base station 31 sends the first public key stored in the base station 31 to the drone management object 32, which can be achieved by the following method: the base station 31 determines the first random number as the first private key, and uses the preset global parameters to calculate the first public key corresponding to the first private key; receives the second public key corresponding to the second private key sent by the drone management object 32, wherein the second private key is the second random number; and sends the first public key and the base station 31 identification information to the drone management object 32.

[0105] Specifically, the base station 31 selects a first random number u as its private key SK g (first private key), and use the preset global parameter GP to calculate its public key PK g =uP (first public key), 5G base station 31 will PK g And the unique identification ID of base station 31 g The base station 31 receives the second public key PK from the drone management object 32. sys , the second public key PK sys The first public key PK is calculated by the drone management object 32 using the second random number s through the same global parameters and is used for secure communication between the drone 33 and the base station 31. The base station 31 calculates the first public key PK g and the identification information ID of the base station 31 itself g (such as base station 31ID, location, etc.) are encapsulated into a message and sent to the drone management object 32 through a secure communication channel.

[0106] Preferably, the drone 33 management method also includes: the base station 31 receives the drone 33 identification information, the third public key and the target key sent by the drone management object 32, wherein the third private key is a third random number, the third public key is obtained by calculating the third random number using preset global parameters, the target key is obtained by the drone management object 32 using the first public key to encrypt the symmetric key, and the symmetric key is determined based on the fourth random number and the effective flight time of the drone 33.

[0107] Specifically, it has a unique identifier RID V The valid time for drone 33 to apply for a certain area is T f The drone management object 32 selects a fourth random number r and calculates a symmetric key K of a certain validity period for the drone 33. V = rH1(RID V )||T f . And use the public key of base station 31 (first public key PK g ) The symmetric key K of drone 33 v Encrypt and get the target key PK g ·K v Then the drone 33 is marked with RID V , Public key certificate (first certificate Cert g ), the third public key PK V and the target key (PK g ·K v ):(RID V ||Cert V ||PK V ||(PK g ·K v )) and sent to the 5G base station 31 in the form of a list.

[0108] According to other optional embodiments of the present application, receiving the flight data generated by the drone 33 after encryption can be achieved by the following method: receiving the drone 33 identification information and target data sent by the drone 33, wherein the target data is obtained by encrypting the flight data generated by the drone 33 using a symmetric key by the drone 33, and digitally signing the encrypted flight data using a third private key.

[0109] It should be noted that when the drone 33 flies to the coverage area of ​​the base station 31 in a certain area, the symmetric key K v The flight data m generated by the drone 33 is encrypted to obtain the encrypted data sm=Enc(K V ,m). Then, use the third private key SK VSign the encrypted flight data sm to obtain the target data Sig(sm)=SK V H2(sm||T1), where T1 represents the first timestamp of the message. Finally, the drone 33 sends its uniquely identified, encrypted and signed target data (RID V ,sm,Sig(sm),T1) is broadcast in real time to the 5G base station 31 within the coverage area.

[0110] The interawareness module in the 5G base station 31 can be based on the identity identifier RID broadcast by the drone 33 V , extract the symmetric key K of the drone 33 from the local v , you can also request the drone management object 32 for the certificate information (RID V ||Cert V ||PK V ||(PK g ·K v )), using the first private key SK of the base station 31 g For the target key PK g ·K v Decryption can obtain the communication symmetric key K of a certain drone 33 v .

[0111] Receive the first certificate Cert sent by drone management object 32 g And the second certificate Cert V Afterwards, the following steps can be performed: using the second public key PK sys For the first certificate Cert g Decrypt and get the first public key PK g ; Determine whether the first public key obtained by decryption is consistent with the first public key stored in the base station 31; if the first public key obtained by decryption is consistent with the first public key stored in the base station 31, store the first certificate. In other words, the synesthesia module of the 5G base station 31 uses the private key SK g Yes (RID V ||Cert V ||PK V ||(PK g ·K v PK in )) g ·K v After decryption, the secure communication symmetric key K of a certain drone 33 can be obtained. v , will be stored in the 5G base station 31 and updated regularly according to the low-altitude flight service management agency. f It is the validity period of the drone 33 flight registration. The specific validity period is determined according to the actual strategy and can be one month, two months or half a year.

[0112] Furthermore, the 5G base station 31 checks the identification RID of the drone 33 V The public key certificate (second certificate Cert V ) is within the validity period, for the second certificate Cert V Drones 33 that are no longer valid still require high-level real-time monitoring, among which the second certificate Cert V Using the third key SK for the drone management object 32 V Digitally sign the identification information of drone 33 to obtain the second certificate parameter S V =SK V H2(RID V ), and according to the second certificate parameters and the validity period T of the second certificate V Determined.

[0113] Specifically, using the third public key PK V For the second certificate Cert V Decrypt and get the validity time T of the second certificate V , determine whether the current time is within the validity period T of the second certificate V If the current time is not within the validity period T of the second certificate V Within, a first message is generated to indicate that the current moment is not within the validity period of the second certificate, and the first message is sent to the drone management object 32.

[0114] Further, using the public key of the drone 33 (third public key PK V ) verifies the legitimacy of the real-time broadcast message. If the verification is valid, it indicates that the flight data is legal and valid. Specifically, the first private key SK g For the target key PK g ·K v Decrypt and get the symmetric key K v ; Determine whether the third public key PK can be used V and the symmetric key K v Decrypt the target data. If the third public key PK cannot be used V and the symmetric key K v The target data is decrypted, a second message is generated indicating that the target data is illegal, and the second message is sent to the drone management object 32.

[0115] Furthermore, the symmetric key K is verified v If the verification is not within the valid time, the drone 33 is judged to be an unregistered flight or an overtime flight, and will be monitored in real time at a high level. vThe effective flight time of the UAV 33 in the image is determined, and it is determined whether the current moment is within the effective flight time T of the UAV 33. f if the current time is not within the effective flight time of the drone 33, a third message is generated to indicate that the current time is not within the effective flight time of the drone 33, and the third message is sent to the drone management object 32.

[0116] After identifying each drone 33 with an identification mark flying at low altitude, the flight data must be analyzed and processed in a specified format and reported to the low altitude flight service management agency. The flight data mainly includes the latitude and longitude, altitude, timestamp and other information of the drone 33 flight.

[0117] Furthermore, the intersensory module in the 5G base station 31 performs the above-mentioned local processing and calculation on the broadcast data sm of the drone 33 received within the coverage area, and generates corresponding identification and supervision information in real time, such as key information such as certificate validity, legally registered flight, legally registered flight crossing the boundary, legally registered flight timeout, and unregistered flight.

[0118] Finally, the 5G base station 31 uses the first private key SK g Sign the message Message and get Sig(Message) = SK g ·H2(Message∥T s ).

[0119] Set Mes = (Message, Cert g ,Sig(Message),T s )、(RID V ,sm,Sig(sm),T1) is transmitted to the drone management object 32. This information includes the local identification parsing plaintext and signature of the 5G base station 31, the base station 31 public key certificate, and the base station 31 message timestamp T s , drone 33 unique identity, drone flight data ciphertext and signature, drone flight data reporting timestamp, etc.

[0120] When the drone management object 32 receives the message Mes=(sm, Cert g ,Sig(sm),T s ) and then, through the public key certificate Cert of the base station 31 g =(PK g ,S g ,T g ), first verify the Cert of 5G base station 31 g Medium T gWhether it is within the validity period, if the 5G base station 31 public key certificate is valid, then use the 5G base station 31 public key verification equation Ver(Sig(sm), sm) = True to confirm whether the signature Sig(sm) of the shared message is legal, if not, the message sm is discarded. If the verification is legal and valid, the received message sm is used to analyze and process the current flight status of the drone 33, providing safe and reliable drone 33 data security communication for the identification and supervision of the drone 33.

[0121] In the drone flight data reported by the 5G base station 31, if there are problems such as the public key certificate expires, unregistered flight, registered flight timeout, and area out of range, the drone 33 information in the comparison database and the list of malicious flying drones 33 will be queried, and the identification and supervision of malicious flying drones 33 will be achieved by reminding, restricting or punishing the relevant drone 33 registration organizations or individuals.

[0122] It should be noted that Figure 3 The preferred implementation of the illustrated embodiment can be found in Figure 1 and Figure 2 The relevant description of the illustrated embodiment will not be repeated here.

[0123] Figure 4 is a flowchart of an implementation method of a drone management method according to an embodiment of the present application. Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of network nodes of a drone management method according to an embodiment of the present application, such as Figure 4 and Figure 5 As shown,

[0124] This embodiment considers the efficient use of the synesthesia communication and perception computing capabilities of the 5G base station on the edge side, and combines the fact that the drone needs to be registered with the low-altitude flight service management agency before flight, to build a low-altitude service platform operated and maintained by the low-altitude flight service management agency, the traffic management department and other regulatory departments, and the synesthesia module of the operator's 5G base station. The drone is the producer of low-altitude flight data, and the synesthesia module of the 5G base station is the producer and sharer of data. By designing identity authentication, public key encryption, digital signature, and public key certificate, the flight data of low-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles is securely transmitted to the low-altitude flight service management agency, so that the low-altitude flight service management agency or regulatory departments such as the transportation department can identify and supervise the drone, effectively utilizing the synesthesia value of the 5G base station on the edge side, and assisting the regulatory department in providing certain drone low-altitude flight data as a basis for decision-making.

[0125] To achieve the above purpose, the specific steps of this embodiment are as follows:

[0126] Step S401, system initialization.

[0127] The low-altitude flight service management agency selects a random number s as the system key and uses the preset global parameters to calculate the public key PK corresponding to the system key sys , where PK sys =sP, the preset global parameter is GP, the preset global parameter is public, G is a cyclic group, such as an additive group or a multiplicative group, P is a generator of the cyclic group G, and the preset global parameter includes a public key PK sys and generator P.

[0128] Step S402: base station authentication.

[0129] The 5G base station has a built-in interawareness module with strong local data computing and storage capabilities, which is responsible for the drone's broadcast recognition, identity authentication, flight data decryption and encrypted transmission. The 5G base station selects a random number u as its private key SK g =u, and use the preset global parameter GP to calculate the public key PK of the base station g =uP, 5G base station will use the public key PK g And the base station unique ID g Sent to the low-altitude flight service management agency.

[0130] The low-altitude flight service management agency receives the public key PK of the 5G base station g After confirming that the base station is legitimate, use its private key s to sign the public key of the 5G base station to generate the first parameter S of the base station public key certificate g =SK V ·H2(PK g ), and then generate the public key certificate Cert of the 5G base station g =(PK g ,S g ,T g ), and the public key certificate parameter Cert g Sent to the 5G base station, the 5G base station receives the certificate and uses the system public key PK sys Verify the certificate g After decrypting the certificate, check whether the base station public key is correct to prevent tampering after eavesdropping by a third-party attacker. After verifying the legitimacy, save the public key certificate. Otherwise, terminate the contract. g It is the validity period of the public key certificate. The specific validity period is determined according to the actual strategy and can be one month, two months or half a year.

[0131] Step S403: drone authentication.

[0132] The drone has a built-in secure communication module and a certain computing and processing capability. According to the safety requirements of civil unmanned aerial vehicle systems, each drone must support broadcast or network ID remote identification capabilities, and its unique identity RID must be registered before leaving the factory. V .

[0133] The low-altitude flight service management agency calls the drone manufacturer's authentication server, and after confirming that the drone's identity is legitimate, selects a random number a as the drone's private key SK V = a, and use the global parameter GP to calculate its public key PK V = aP, using its private key SK V Its identity RID V Perform digital signature and generate the first parameter S of the drone certificate V =SK V H2(RID V ), and then generate the drone public key certificate Cert V =(PK V ,S V ,T V ). Among them, T V It is the validity period of the public key certificate. The specific validity period is determined according to the actual strategy and can be one month, two months or half a year.

[0134] Has a unique identifier RID V The valid time for a drone to apply for a certain area is T f The low-altitude flight service management agency selects a random number r and calculates a symmetric key K for the drone with a certain validity period. V = rH1(RID V )||T f . And use the public key of the 5G base station to encrypt the drone's symmetric key PK g ·K v , and then the drone identification, public key certificate, public key and symmetric key (RID V ||Cert V ||PK V ||(PK g ·K v )) is sent to the 5G base station in the form of a list.

[0135] The synesthesia module of the 5G base station uses the private key SK g Yes (RID V ||Cert V ||PK V ||(PK g ·K v PK in )) g ·Kv After decryption, we can get the secure communication symmetric key K of a certain drone. v , will be stored in the 5G base station and updated regularly according to the low-altitude flight service management agency. f It is the validity period of the drone flight registration. The specific validity period is determined according to the actual strategy and can be one month, two months or half a year.

[0136] Step S404: the UAV broadcasts flight data.

[0137] When the drone flies to the base station coverage area of ​​a certain area, its flight data m is encrypted by the symmetric key sm=Enc(K V ,m), then use the private key SK V Sign the encrypted flight data sm and calculate Sig(sm)=SK V H2(sm|T1), where T1 represents the first timestamp of the message. The drone then sends its uniquely identified, encrypted and signed flight data (RID V ,sm,Sig(sm),T1) is broadcast in real time to the 5G base stations within the coverage area.

[0138] Step S405: data processing and secure transmission.

[0139] The interawareness module in the 5G base station is based on the identity identifier RID broadcast by the drone V , extract the symmetric key K of the drone from the local v You can also request the drone’s certificate information (RID V ||Cert V ||PK V ||(PK g ·K v )), using the base station's private key SK g PK g ·K v Decryption can obtain the communication symmetric key K of a certain drone v .

[0140] First, check the drone identification RID V First, check whether the public key certificate is valid. UAVs that are not valid still need high-level real-time monitoring. Secondly, use the public key of the drone to verify the legitimacy of the real-time broadcast message. If the verification is valid, it indicates that the flight data is legal and valid. Then, check the validity period of its symmetric key. If the verification is not within the validity period, it is judged that the drone is an unregistered flight or an overtime flight, and it will be monitored at a high level in real time.

[0141] After identifying each low-altitude flying drone, the flight data must be analyzed and processed in the specified format and reported to the low-altitude flight service management agency. The flight data mainly includes the latitude and longitude, altitude, timestamp and other information of the drone flight.

[0142] The inter-sensory module in the 5G base station performs the above-mentioned local processing and calculation on the drone broadcast data sm received within the coverage area, and generates corresponding identification and supervision information in real time, such as key information Message such as certificate validity, legal registered flight, legal registered flight crossing the boundary, legal registered flight timeout, and unregistered flight, and transmits it through the 5G base station private key SK g Sign the message Message and calculate Sig(Message) = SK g ·H2(Message∥T s ),

[0143] 5G base station will Mes = (Message, Cert g ,Sig(Message),T s ) and (RID V ,sm,Sig(sm),T1) is transmitted to the low-altitude flight service management agency. This information includes the local identification and parsing plain text and signature of the 5G base station, the base station public key certificate, and the base station message timestamp T s , drone unique identity, drone flight data ciphertext and signature, drone flight data reporting timestamp, etc.

[0144] Step S406: drone data verification and supervision.

[0145] When the low-altitude flight service management agency receives the 5G base station transmission message Mes = (sm, Cert g ,Sig(sm),T s ) and then pass the base station's public key certificate Cert g =(PK g ,S g ,T g ), first verify the Cert of the 5G base station g Medium T g Whether it is within the validity period, if the 5G base station public key certificate is valid, then use the 5G base station public key verification equation Ver(Sig(sm), sm) = True to confirm whether the signature Sig(sm) of the shared message is legal. If it is illegal, the message sm will be discarded.

[0146] If the verification is legal and valid, the received message sm is used to analyze and process the current drone flight situation, providing safe and reliable drone data security communication for drone identification and supervision.

[0147] In the drone flight data reported by 5G base stations, there are problems such as public key certificates exceeding the validity period, unregistered flights, registered flight timeouts, and areas exceeding the range. The drone information in the database and the list of malicious flying drones will be queried and compared. By reminding, restricting or punishing the relevant drone registration organizations or individuals, malicious flying drones can be identified and supervised.

[0148] Figure 6 The hardware structure block diagram of a computer terminal for implementing the drone management method is shown. Figure 6 As shown, the computer terminal 60 may include one or more (602a, 602b, ..., 602n are used to illustrate) processors 602 (the processor 602 may include but is not limited to a processing device such as a microprocessor MCU or a programmable logic device FPGA), a memory 604 for storing data, and a transmission module 606 for communication functions. In addition, it may also include: a display, an input / output interface (I / O interface), a universal serial bus (USB) port (which may be included as one of the ports of the BUS bus), a network interface, a power supply and / or a camera. It can be understood by those skilled in the art that Figure 6 The structure shown is only for illustration and does not limit the structure of the above electronic device. Figure 6 More or fewer components as shown, or with Figure 6 Different configurations are shown.

[0149] It should be noted that the one or more processors 602 and / or other data processing circuits described above may generally be referred to herein as "data processing circuits". The data processing circuits may be embodied in whole or in part as software, hardware, firmware, or any other combination thereof. In addition, the data processing circuit may be a single independent processing module, or may be incorporated in whole or in part into any of the other components in the computer terminal 60. As involved in the embodiments of the present application, the data processing circuit acts as a processor control (e.g., selection of a variable resistor terminal path connected to an interface).

[0150] The memory 604 can be used to store software programs and modules of application software, such as the program instructions / data storage device corresponding to the drone management method in the embodiment of the present application. The processor 602 executes various functional applications and data processing by running the software programs and modules stored in the memory 604, that is, the above-mentioned drone management method is realized. The memory 604 may include a high-speed random access memory, and may also include a non-volatile memory, such as one or more magnetic storage devices, flash memory, or other non-volatile solid-state memory. In some examples, the memory 604 may further include a memory remotely arranged relative to the processor 602, and these remote memories may be connected to the computer terminal 60 via a network. Examples of the above-mentioned network include, but are not limited to, the Internet, an intranet, a local area network, a mobile communication network, and combinations thereof.

[0151] The transmission module 606 is used to receive or send data via a network. The specific example of the above network may include a wireless network provided by a communication provider of the computer terminal 60. In one example, the transmission module 606 includes a network adapter (Network Interface Controller, NIC), which can be connected to other network devices through a base station so as to communicate with the Internet. In one example, the transmission module 606 can be a radio frequency (RF) module, which is used to communicate with the Internet wirelessly.

[0152] The display may be, for example, a touch screen liquid crystal display (LCD) that enables a user to interact with a user interface of the computer terminal 60 .

[0153] It should be noted that, in some optional embodiments, the above Figure 6 The computer terminal shown may include hardware elements (including circuits), software elements (including computer code stored on a computer-readable medium), or a combination of hardware elements and software elements. It should be noted that Figure 6 This is merely one example of a particular embodiment and is intended to illustrate the types of components that may be present in the computer terminal described above.

[0154] It should be noted that Figure 6 The computer terminal shown is used to execute Figure 1 The drone management method shown in the figure, therefore the relevant explanations and instructions in the execution method of the above command are also applicable to the electronic device and will not be repeated here.

[0155] An embodiment of the present application further provides a non-volatile storage medium, which includes a stored program, wherein when the program is running, the device where the storage medium is located is controlled to execute the above drone management method.

[0156] A program for executing the following functions on a non-volatile storage medium: a base station sends a first public key stored in the base station to a drone management object, wherein a second private key is stored in the drone management object; a first certificate and a second certificate sent by the drone management object are received, wherein the first certificate is obtained by digitally signing the first public key using the second private key, and the second certificate is obtained by digitally signing the drone identification information using the third private key; flight data generated by the drone after encryption is received; the flight data generated by the drone after encryption is verified using the second certificate, and the verification result and the first certificate are sent to the drone management object.

[0157] An embodiment of the present application also provides an electronic device, including: a memory and a processor, the processor is used to run a program stored in the memory, wherein the above drone management method is executed when the program is running.

[0158] The processor is used to run a program that performs the following functions: the base station sends the first public key stored in the base station to the drone management object, wherein the drone management object stores the second private key; receives the first certificate and the second certificate sent by the drone management object, wherein the first certificate is obtained by digitally signing the first public key using the second private key, and the second certificate is obtained by digitally signing the drone identification information using the third private key; receives the flight data generated by the drone after encryption; verifies the flight data generated by the drone after encryption using the second certificate, and sends the verification result and the first certificate to the drone management object.

[0159] The serial numbers of the above-mentioned embodiments of the present application are for description only and do not represent the advantages or disadvantages of the embodiments.

[0160] In the above embodiments of the present application, the description of each embodiment has its own emphasis. For parts that are not described in detail in a certain embodiment, please refer to the relevant description of other embodiments.

[0161] In the above-mentioned embodiments of the present application, the collected information is information and data authorized by the user or fully authorized by all parties, and the collection, storage, use, processing, transmission, provision, disclosure and application of the relevant data comply with relevant laws, regulations and standards, take necessary protection measures, do not violate public order and good morals, and provide corresponding operation entrances for users to choose to authorize or refuse.

[0162] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed technical content can be implemented in other ways. Among them, the device embodiments described above are only schematic. For example, the division of the units can be a logical function division. There may be other division methods in actual implementation. For example, multiple units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. Another point is that the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed can be through some interfaces, indirect coupling or communication connection of units or modules, which can be electrical or other forms.

[0163] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed on multiple units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the present embodiment.

[0164] In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit. The above-mentioned integrated unit may be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of software functional units.

[0165] If the integrated unit is implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present application, or the part that contributes to the relevant technology or all or part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product, which is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions for a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server or a network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the method described in each embodiment of the present application. The aforementioned storage medium includes: U disk, read-only memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory), random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), mobile hard disk, disk or optical disk, etc. Various media that can store program codes.

[0166] The above is only a preferred implementation of the present application. It should be pointed out that for ordinary technicians in this technical field, several improvements and modifications can be made without departing from the principles of the present application. These improvements and modifications should also be regarded as the scope of protection of the present application.

Claims

1. A drone management method, characterized in that: include: The base station sends the first public key stored in the base station to the drone management object, wherein the drone management object stores the second private key; Receive a first certificate and a second certificate sent by the drone management object, wherein the first certificate is obtained by digitally signing the first public key using the second private key, and the second certificate is obtained by digitally signing drone identification information using a third private key; Receive encrypted flight data generated by the drone; The flight data generated by the encrypted drone is verified using the second certificate, and the verification result and the first certificate are sent to the drone management object.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The base station sends the first public key stored in the base station to the drone management object, including: The base station determines the first random number as a first private key, and calculates a first public key corresponding to the first private key using a preset global parameter; Receive a second public key corresponding to the second private key sent by the drone management object, wherein the second private key is a second random number; The first public key and base station identification information are sent to the drone management object.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The method further comprises: Receive the drone identification information, the third public key and the target key sent by the drone management object, wherein the third private key is a third random number, the third public key is obtained by calculating the third random number using the preset global parameters, and the target key is obtained by the drone management object encrypting the symmetric key using the first public key, and the symmetric key is determined according to the fourth random number and the effective flight time of the drone.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that Receive encrypted flight data generated by the drone, including: Receive the drone identification information and target data sent by the drone, wherein the target data is obtained by the drone using the symmetric key to encrypt the flight data generated by the drone and using the third private key to digitally sign the encrypted flight data.

5. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that: The second certificate is obtained by the drone management object using the third private key to digitally sign the drone identification information, and is determined according to the second certificate parameters and the validity period of the second certificate; Using the second certificate to verify the flight data generated by the encrypted drone includes: Decrypting the second certificate using the third public key to obtain the validity period of the second certificate, and determining whether the current time is within the validity period of the second certificate; If the current time is not within the validity period of the second certificate, a first message is generated to indicate that the current time is not within the validity period of the second certificate, and the first message is sent to the drone management object.

6. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The method further comprises: Decrypting the target key using the first private key to obtain the symmetric key; Determine whether the target data can be decrypted using the third public key and the symmetric key. If the target data cannot be decrypted using the third public key and the symmetric key, generate a second message indicating that the target data is illegal, and send the second message to the drone management object.

7. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that After obtaining the symmetric key, the method further includes: Determine the effective flight time of the UAV in the symmetric key, and judge whether the current moment is within the effective flight time of the UAV; If the current moment is not within the effective flight time of the drone, a third message is generated to indicate that the current moment is not within the effective flight time of the drone, and the third message is sent to the drone management object.

8. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that: After receiving the first certificate and the second certificate sent by the drone management object, the method further includes: Decrypting the first certificate using the second public key to obtain the first public key; Determining whether the first public key obtained by decryption is consistent with the first public key stored in the base station; When the first public key obtained by decryption is consistent with the first public key stored in the base station, the first certificate is stored.

9. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that: Sending the verification result and the first certificate to the drone management object includes: Digitally signing the verification result using the first private key to obtain a target verification result; The target verification result and the first certificate are sent to the drone management object.

10. A drone management method, characterized in that: include: The drone management object receives the first public key sent by the base station; The first public key is digitally signed using the second private key to obtain a first certificate, and the drone identification information is digitally signed using the third private key to obtain a second certificate; Sending the first certificate and the second certificate to the base station, wherein the base station is used to receive the flight data generated by the encrypted drone, and use the second certificate to verify the flight data generated by the encrypted drone to generate a verification result; The verification result and the first certificate are received.

11. The method according to claim 10, characterized in that The drone management object receives the first public key sent by the base station, including: Sending a second public key corresponding to the second private key to the base station, wherein the base station is used to determine the first random number as the first private key, calculate the first public key corresponding to the first private key using preset global parameters, and the second private key is the second random number; Receive the first public key and base station identification information sent by the base station.

12. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that The method further comprises: Calculate a third private key using the preset global parameter to obtain a third public key, wherein the third private key is a third random number; Determining a symmetric key according to a fourth random number and the effective flight time of the drone; Encrypting the symmetric key using the first public key to obtain a target key; The drone identification information, the third public key and the target key are sent to the base station.

13. The method according to claim 12, characterized in that The first certificate is obtained by digitally signing the first public key with the second private key to obtain first certificate parameters, and is determined according to the first certificate parameters and the validity period of the first certificate; Receiving the verification result and the first certificate sent by the base station includes: Decrypting the first certificate using the second public key to obtain the validity period of the first certificate, and determining whether the current time is within the validity period of the first certificate; If the current moment is within the validity period of the first certificate, determining whether a target verification result is legal according to the first public key, wherein the target verification result is obtained by the base station digitally signing the verification result using the first private key; If the target verification result is determined to be legal according to the first public key, the target verification result is received, wherein the target verification result includes: target data, the target data is obtained by encrypting the flight data generated by the drone using the symmetric key, and digitally signing the encrypted flight data using the third private key; The target data is decrypted using the third public key and the symmetric key to obtain the flight data generated by the drone, and the flight data generated by the drone is parsed.

14. The method according to claim 13, characterized in that After receiving the verification result and the first certificate sent by the base station, the method further includes: If the verification result is a preset situation, the drone identification information is added to a preset database, wherein the preset situation includes at least one of the following: the current time is not within the validity period of the first certificate, the current time is not within the valid flight time of the drone, and the location of the drone is not within the scope of the drone registered in the drone management object.

15. A drone management system, characterized in that: include: Base stations, drone management objects, and drones, among which, The base station is used to send a first public key stored in the base station to a drone management object, in which a second private key is stored; The drone management object is used to digitally sign the first public key using the second private key to obtain a first certificate, digitally sign the drone identification information using the third private key to obtain a second certificate, and send the first certificate and the second certificate to the base station; The UAV is used to send encrypted flight data generated by the UAV to the base station; The base station uses the second certificate to verify the flight data generated by the encrypted drone, and sends the verification result and the first certificate to the drone management object.

16. A non-volatile storage medium, characterized in that: The non-volatile storage medium includes a stored program, wherein when the program is running, the device where the non-volatile storage medium is located is controlled to execute the drone management method described in any one of claims 1 to 14.

17. An electronic device, characterized in that: include: A memory and a processor, wherein the processor is used to run a program stored in the memory, wherein the program executes the drone management method described in any one of claims 1 to 14 when running.

18. A computer program product, comprising a computer program, characterized in that When the computer program is executed by a processor, the drone management method described in any one of claims 1 to 14 is implemented.

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