DCS (Distributed Control System) upper computer startup credibility guarantee method and related device

Abstract

The invention belongs to a startup method, and provides a DCS (Distributed Control System) upper computer startup credibility guarantee method and a related device aiming at the technical problems that security threats exist and the system credibility is influenced in the startup process of a traditional DCS upper computer, a credible computing chip is arranged in the DCS upper computer, and information security associated contents are loaded; and then carrying out integrity verification on the code and the configuration file, and monitoring system behaviors in the whole startup process. The trusted computing technology is introduced in the startup process, and it is ensured that the system has high safety in the startup stage. The trusted computing chip is arranged in the upper computer of the DCS, so that key information can be prevented from being tampered or leaked in the startup process. In addition, integrity verification is carried out on codes and configuration files, and it is ensured that each step in the system startup process conforms to a preset security strategy. Moreover, system behaviors are continuously monitored, related faults can be found in time, and hidden dangers can be eliminated as soon as possible.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to a power-on startup method, and relates to a DCS host computer power-on startup trustworthy guarantee method and related devices. Background Art

[0002] In the field of industrial automation, Distributed Control System (DCS) is an important equipment monitoring and management system. DCS is mainly composed of field controllers, communication networks and host computers. Among them, the host computer, as a monitoring center, is responsible for monitoring the operating status of field equipment and displaying these status data to operators in a visual form.

[0003] With the development of industrial automation, DCS plays an increasingly important role in industrial production. As the core of the entire system, the security and stability of the DCS host computer are directly related to the safety and efficiency of the entire production process. However, during the startup process, the host computer of traditional DCS often faces various security threats, such as malware intrusion, system vulnerability exploitation, etc. These problems seriously threaten the credibility of the system. Summary of the invention

[0004] The present application aims to solve the technical problem that during the startup process of a traditional DCS host computer, there are security threats that affect the system credibility, and provides a DCS host computer startup credibility assurance method and related devices.

[0005] In order to achieve the above objectives, this application adopts the following technical solutions:

[0006] In the first aspect, the present application proposes a DCS host computer startup trustworthy assurance method, comprising:

[0007] Initialize the trusted computing chip and load the information security related content; the trusted computing chip is set in the host computer of the DCS, the information security related content is pre-stored in the trusted computing chip, and the trusted computing chip is pre-stored with code and configuration file comparison standard information;

[0008] According to the information security related content, determine the code and configuration file that need to be checked for integrity, and perform integrity check based on the comparison standard information, if the integrity check passes, load the operating system and application program, otherwise, stop booting;

[0009] During the boot process, system behavior is continuously monitored.

[0010] Furthermore, the information security-related content includes security policies, keys and certificates.

[0011] Furthermore, the integrity check includes:

[0012] The hash values ​​of the code and configuration files are compared with the hash values ​​pre-stored on the trusted computing chip. If the hash values ​​match, the code and configuration files meet the integrity verification requirements. Otherwise, the configuration files and / or codes have been tampered with, the system refuses to load and execute, and stops booting.

[0013] Furthermore, the integrity check further includes:

[0014] Perform signature verification on code and configuration files.

[0015] Furthermore, the continuous monitoring of system behavior includes: real-time monitoring of whether malicious code or process is loaded in the system, if so, stopping the booting, otherwise, continuing the booting.

[0016] Furthermore, it also includes: recording the verification results, system status changes and real-time monitoring results during the startup process through a startup log.

[0017] Furthermore, the method further comprises: after the stopping of the startup, the method further comprises:

[0018] Locate the corresponding abnormal behavior based on the information in the startup log.

[0019] In the second aspect, the present application proposes a DCS host computer startup trusted assurance system, including:

[0020] An initialization module is used to initialize the trusted computing chip and load information security related content; the trusted computing chip is set in the host computer of the DCS, the information security related content is pre-stored in the trusted computing chip, and the trusted computing chip is pre-stored with code and configuration file comparison standard information;

[0021] A verification module, used to determine the code and configuration file that need to be checked for integrity according to the information security related content, and to perform integrity verification based on the comparison standard information; if the integrity verification passes, the operating system and application program are loaded; otherwise, the booting is stopped;

[0022] The monitoring module is used to continuously monitor system behavior during the boot process.

[0023] In a third aspect, the present application provides an electronic device, comprising:

[0024] Memory for storing computer programs;

[0025] The processor is used to implement the steps of the above-mentioned DCS host computer startup trust assurance method when executing the computer program.

[0026] In a fourth aspect, the present application proposes a computer-readable storage medium, wherein a computer program is stored in the computer-readable storage medium, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the above-mentioned DCS host computer startup trust assurance method are implemented. Compared with the prior art, the present application has the following beneficial effects:

[0027] The present application proposes a trusted assurance method for the startup of a DCS host computer, in which a trusted computing chip is set in the host computer of the DCS, and information security-related content is loaded, and then the integrity of the code and configuration files is checked, and the system behavior is monitored during the entire startup process. By introducing trusted computing technology during the startup process, it is ensured that the system has a high degree of security during the startup phase. Setting a trusted computing chip in the host computer of the DCS can ensure that key information is not tampered with or leaked during the startup process. In addition, the integrity of the code and configuration files is checked to ensure that each step in the system startup process complies with the preset security policy. Furthermore, continuous monitoring of system behavior can promptly detect related faults and eliminate hidden dangers as soon as possible. The present application is of great significance to improving the overall security of the DCS.

[0028] The present application also proposes a DCS host computer startup trusted assurance system, electronic equipment and computer storage medium, which have all the advantages of the above-mentioned DCS host computer startup trusted assurance method. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0029] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, the drawings required for use in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. It should be understood that the following drawings only show certain embodiments of the present application and therefore should not be regarded as limiting the scope. For ordinary technicians in this field, other related drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative work.

[0030] Figure 1 This is a first flow chart of the DCS host computer startup trust assurance method for this application;

[0031] Figure 2 This is a second flow chart of the DCS host computer startup trust assurance method for this application;

[0032] Figure 3 This is a connection diagram of the DCS host computer startup trusted protection system for this application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0033] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the embodiments of the present application clearer, the technical solution in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present application, rather than all the embodiments. The components of the embodiments of the present application described and shown in the drawings here can be arranged and designed in various different configurations.

[0034] Therefore, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the present application provided in the accompanying drawings is not intended to limit the scope of the present application for which protection is sought, but merely represents selected embodiments of the present application. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in the field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present application.

[0035] It should be noted that similar reference numerals and letters denote similar items in the following drawings, and therefore, once an item is defined in one drawing, further definition and explanation thereof is not required in subsequent drawings.

[0036] In the description of the embodiments of the present application, it should be noted that if the terms "upper", "lower", "horizontal", "inner", etc. appear, the orientation or position relationship indicated is based on the orientation or position relationship shown in the drawings, or the orientation or position relationship in which the invented product is usually placed when used. It is only for the convenience of describing the present application and simplifying the description, and does not indicate or imply that the device or element referred to must have a specific orientation, be constructed and operated in a specific orientation, and therefore cannot be understood as a limitation on the present application. In addition, the terms "first", "second", etc. are only used to distinguish the description, and cannot be understood as indicating or implying relative importance.

[0037] In addition, if the term "horizontal" appears, it does not mean that the component must be absolutely horizontal, but can be slightly tilted. For example, "horizontal" only means that its direction is more horizontal than "vertical", which does not mean that the structure must be completely horizontal, but can be slightly tilted.

[0038] In the description of the embodiments of the present application, it is also necessary to explain that, unless otherwise clearly specified and limited, the terms "set", "install", "connect", and "connect" should be understood in a broad sense. For example, it can be a fixed connection, a detachable connection, or an integral connection; it can be a mechanical connection or an electrical connection; it can be a direct connection, or it can be indirectly connected through an intermediate medium, or it can be the internal connection of two components. For ordinary technicians in this field, the specific meanings of the above terms in this application can be understood according to specific circumstances.

[0039] Distributed Control System (DCS), also known as a distributed control system, is a computer control system that centrally manages and decentralized controls the production process. This system integrates computer technology, network technology, communication technology, and automatic control technology, and has been widely used in various fields, such as factory production lines, building intelligent control, and energy management systems. In industrial production automation, DCS can be used to synchronously control multiple machines and equipment to complete production tasks; in the field of building intelligence, DCS can realize centralized and intelligent management of various equipment inside the building; in the field of energy management, DCS can monitor and regulate the stability and load balance of the power grid to ensure the reliability and efficiency of power supply.

[0040] The host computer of the DCS will face a variety of network security threats during the startup process. Based on this situation, the present application proposes a DCS host computer startup trustworthy guarantee method and related devices, which are described in detail below in conjunction with the embodiments and drawings.

[0041] like Figure 1 As shown, it is a first flow chart of a DCS host computer startup trust assurance method of the present application, which may include:

[0042] S101, initialize the trusted computing chip and load information security related content; the trusted computing chip is set in the host computer of the DCS, the information security related content is pre-stored in the trusted computing chip, and the trusted computing chip is pre-stored with code and configuration file comparison standard information.

[0043] It should be noted that a trusted computing chip is a chip that integrates trusted computing related technologies to provide higher security and protect user data. It usually includes key components such as a trusted computing module (TCM) and a key management module (KMM). By using hardware and software technologies, the security of various components in a computer system is ensured. Information security-related content includes content that is closely related to information security, such as keys, certificates, identity authentication, encryption information, etc., which can be selected according to needs.

[0044] In practical applications, the comparison standard information is applicable to the judgment criteria of subsequent integrity verification and can be set according to the boot-up trusted assurance requirements.

[0045] S102, according to the information security related content, determine the code and configuration file that need to be checked for integrity, and perform integrity check based on the comparison standard information. If the integrity check passes, load the operating system and application program, otherwise, stop booting.

[0046] It should be noted that integrity checking is a means of verifying whether electronic data has been tampered with or destroyed. A specific algorithm is used to calculate the electronic data to obtain a data value for verifying the integrity of the data.

[0047] S103, during the boot process, continuously monitor the system behavior.

[0048] In addition to the above-mentioned loading and verification, this application also continuously monitors system behavior, and even if an abnormal situation occurs in the system, it can be discovered and warned in time.

[0049] This application can improve system security by introducing trusted computing technology to ensure that the system has a high degree of security during the startup phase and can effectively resist various security threats. It can also improve system stability by ensuring the stability and reliability of the system during startup and operation through integrity verification and real-time monitoring.

[0050] like Figure 2 As shown, it is a second flow chart of a DCS host computer startup trust assurance method of the present application, which may include:

[0051] S201, system startup preparation.

[0052] (1.1) Bootloader is executed.

[0053] When the DCS host computer is powered on, the boot loader begins to execute, which is the initial stage of the entire boot process.

[0054] It should be noted that the host computer of DCS usually refers to the running computer program, which realizes the functions of process monitoring, data acquisition, control and debugging by communicating with the lower computers (including PLC, DCS, etc.). Bootloader is the first code that runs after the embedded system is powered on, which is equivalent to the BIOS of the host computer. It is mainly used to bring the system's software and hardware environment into a suitable state after the system is stored or reset, and prepare the correct environment for the final call of the application.

[0055] (1.2) Trusted computing chip initialization.

[0056] In the Bootloader stage, the trusted computing chip is initialized and loaded with key information such as pre-stored security policies, keys, and certificates. In this embodiment, the trusted computing chip uses TPM (Trusted Platform Module), which is a security component that can be integrated in a computer system or inserted into a motherboard, embedded in a computer or server hardware, and used to implement encryption, identity authentication, and authorization functions. TPM usually includes an internal memory, an authentication number generator, and a key hierarchy, wherein the internal memory is used to store security codes and data, the authentication number generator is used to generate various certificates and authentication tokens, and the key hierarchy is used to manage and store keys.

[0057] It should be noted that security policy refers to a set of rules for all security-related activities in a certain security zone. These rules are established by a security authority established in the security zone and described, implemented or realized by the security control agency. The security policy defines which files or codes need to be checked for integrity at startup, which operations are allowed, and which operations are prohibited.

[0058] A key is a tool used to encrypt and decrypt data. A certificate is a document issued by a trusted third party to prove the identity of the public key owner. A certificate usually contains information such as the public key, the identity information of the public key owner, and the signature of the certificate authority.

[0059] S202, integrity check of key codes and configuration files.

[0060] (2.1) Verification list generation.

[0061] Based on the loaded security policy, a configuration file and a list of key codes that need to be verified are generated.

[0062] It should be noted that configuration files usually contain system or application settings and parameters that affect the operation and security of the system. Key codes usually involve the core functions, data processing or security control of the system. According to the security policy, the configuration files and key codes that need to be checked for integrity are determined, and the integrity check of the key information related to security in the system can further improve the security and stability of the boot process.

[0063] (2.2) File hash value comparison.

[0064] Use the hash value stored in the trusted computing chip (usually pre-calculated and stored) to compare with the hash value of the current configuration file and / or key code. If the hash value does not match, it indicates that the configuration file and / or key code has been tampered with, and the system will refuse to load and execute it.

[0065] It should be noted that the hash value is a fixed-length output value that is converted into input data of any length through a hash function. This output value is usually an integer. For different input data, the hash function can generate different hash values ​​for verifying the integrity of the data.

[0066] (2.3) Signature Verification: For certain key files and / or key codes, in addition to hash value comparison, signature verification can also be performed to ensure that these configuration files and / or key codes are indeed from a trusted publisher.

[0067] In practical applications, hash value comparison and signature verification are performed on specific data, which can be selected and combined according to the actual situation of the data, and this application does not impose any specific restrictions.

[0068] S203, system startup and real-time monitoring.

[0069] (3.1) The system starts up normally.

[0070] If the integrity check of all critical codes and configuration files passes, the system will continue the boot process and load the operating system and other applications.

[0071] (3.2) Real-time monitoring of the boot process.

[0072] During the system startup process, the mechanism monitors the system behavior in real time to ensure that no malicious code or process is loaded.

[0073] In actual applications, you can ensure that no malicious code or process is loaded by using appropriate endpoint security solutions, configuring monitoring agents, and using behavioral analysis technology.

[0074] (3.3) Record the boot log.

[0075] All verification results, system status changes, and other important events during the startup process will be recorded in log files for subsequent analysis and auditing.

[0076] S204, exception handling and response.

[0077] (4.1) Anomaly Detection: If the system monitors any abnormal behavior or detects possible malicious activities, the mechanism will immediately trigger an alarm.

[0078] (4.2) Record exception information: The system status, timestamp, exception type and other information when the exception occurs will be recorded in detail for subsequent analysis.

[0079] (4.3) Response processing: After receiving an abnormal alarm, the system administrator can quickly locate the problem based on the information in the log and take appropriate measures.

[0080] The DCS host computer startup trusted assurance method of the present application can effectively ensure the security of the system startup process and provide a continuous monitoring and exception handling mechanism during system operation.

[0081] This application introduces a trusted computing chip, which is integrated into the host computer of the DCS to store key information of the system, such as keys, certificates, etc., to ensure that this information is not tampered with or leaked during the boot process. Through the trusted computing chip, the integrity of the key code and configuration files in the system boot process is checked to ensure that each step of the system startup complies with the preset security policy, thus achieving a safe startup. It can also simplify management and maintenance, have automated monitoring and recording functions, reduce the workload of system administrators, and improve management efficiency.

[0082] Based on the above DCS host computer startup trustworthy assurance method, Figure 3 As shown, the present application also proposes a DCS host computer startup trusted assurance system, which may include:

[0083] An initialization module is used to initialize the trusted computing chip and load information security related content; the trusted computing chip is set in the host computer of the DCS, the information security related content is pre-stored in the trusted computing chip, and the trusted computing chip is pre-stored with code and configuration file comparison standard information;

[0084] A verification module, used to determine the code and configuration file that need to be checked for integrity according to the information security related content, and to perform integrity verification based on the comparison standard information; if the integrity verification passes, the operating system and application program are loaded; otherwise, the booting is stopped;

[0085] The monitoring module is used to continuously monitor system behavior during the boot process.

[0086] It should be noted that in other embodiments of the DCS host computer startup trusted assurance system of the present application, the specific functions in each module can also adopt the embodiments of the aforementioned DCS host computer startup trusted assurance method, which will not be repeated here.

[0087] It should be noted that in the several embodiments provided in the present application, it should be understood that the disclosed devices and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device embodiments described above are only schematic. For example, the division of each module is only a logical function division. There may be other division methods in actual implementation. For example, multiple modules can be combined or integrated into another device, or some features can be ignored or not executed. The module described as a separate component may or may not be physically separated. The component displayed as a module may be a physical unit or multiple physical units, that is, it may be located in one place, or it may be distributed in multiple different places. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the scheme of this embodiment.

[0088] In addition, each module in each embodiment of the present invention may be integrated into a processing unit, each module may exist physically separately, or two or more modules may be integrated into one unit. The above-mentioned integrated unit may be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of a software functional unit.

[0089] An electronic device provided in an embodiment of the present application includes a memory and a processor. The memory stores a computer program. When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the DCS host computer startup trusted assurance method described in any of the above embodiments are implemented.

[0090] Another electronic device provided in the embodiment of the present application may also include: an input port connected to the processor, used to transmit multimodal data collected by an external acquisition device to the processor; and a display unit connected to the processor, used to display the processing results of the processor to the outside world; a communication module connected to the processor, used to realize communication between the electronic device and the outside world. The display unit can be a display panel, a laser scanning display, etc.; the communication mode adopted by the communication module includes but is not limited to mobile high-definition link technology (HML), universal serial bus (USB), high-definition multimedia interface (HDMI), wireless connection: wireless fidelity technology (WiFi), Bluetooth communication technology, low-power Bluetooth communication technology, and communication technology based on IEEE802.11s.

[0091] An embodiment of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, in which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the DCS host computer startup trusted assurance method described in any of the above embodiments are implemented.

[0092] The computer-readable storage medium involved in the present application includes random access memory (RAM), internal memory, read-only memory (ROM), electrically programmable ROM, electrically erasable programmable ROM, registers, hard disks, removable disks, CD-ROMs, or any other form of storage medium known in the technical field.

[0093] For the description of the relevant parts of the DCS host computer startup trusted assurance system, electronic device and computer-readable storage medium provided in the embodiment of the present application, please refer to the detailed description of the corresponding parts in the DCS host computer startup trusted assurance method provided in the embodiment of the present application, which will not be repeated here. In addition, the parts of the above technical solutions provided in the embodiment of the present application that are consistent with the implementation principles of the corresponding technical solutions in the prior art are not described in detail to avoid excessive elaboration.

[0094] The above are only preferred embodiments of the present application and are not intended to limit the present application. For those skilled in the art, the present application may have various modifications and variations. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present application shall be included in the protection scope of the present application.

Claims

1. A DCS host computer startup trustworthy assurance method, characterized in that: include: Initialize the trusted computing chip and load information security related content; The trusted computing chip is arranged in the host computer of the DCS, the information security related content is pre-stored in the trusted computing chip, and the trusted computing chip is pre-stored with code and configuration file comparison standard information; According to the information security related content, determine the code and configuration file that need to be checked for integrity, and perform integrity check based on the comparison standard information, if the integrity check passes, load the operating system and application program, otherwise, stop booting; During the boot process, system behavior is continuously monitored.

2. According to claim 1, the DCS host computer startup trustworthy assurance method is characterized in that: The information security related content includes security policy, key and certificate.

3. According to claim 2, the DCS host computer startup trustworthy assurance method is characterized by: The integrity check comprises: The hash values ​​of the code and configuration files are compared with the hash values ​​pre-stored on the trusted computing chip. If the hash values ​​match, the code and configuration files meet the integrity verification requirements. Otherwise, the configuration files and / or codes have been tampered with, the system refuses to load and execute, and stops booting.

4. According to claim 3, the DCS host computer startup trustworthy assurance method is characterized in that: The integrity check further includes: Perform signature verification on code and configuration files.

5. According to claim 4, the DCS host computer startup trustworthy assurance method is characterized in that: It also includes that the continuous monitoring of system behavior includes: real-time monitoring of whether there is malicious code or process loaded in the system, if so, stopping the startup, otherwise, continuing the startup.

6. According to claim 5, the DCS host computer startup trustworthy assurance method is characterized in that: Also includes: The startup log records the verification results, system status changes and real-time monitoring results during the startup process.

7. The DCS host computer startup trustworthy assurance method according to claim 6 is characterized in that: Also includes: After the stopping and starting, the method further includes: Locate the corresponding abnormal behavior based on the information in the startup log.

8. A DCS host computer startup trusted guarantee system, characterized in that: include: An initialization module is used to initialize the trusted computing chip and load information security related content; The trusted computing chip is arranged in the host computer of the DCS, the information security related content is pre-stored in the trusted computing chip, and the trusted computing chip is pre-stored with code and configuration file comparison standard information; A verification module, used to determine the code and configuration file that need to be checked for integrity according to the information security related content, and to perform integrity verification based on the comparison standard information; if the integrity verification passes, the operating system and application program are loaded; otherwise, the booting is stopped; The monitoring module is used to continuously monitor system behavior during the boot process.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that: include: Memory for storing computer programs; A processor is used to implement the steps of the DCS host computer startup trust assurance method as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 7 when executing the computer program.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the DCS host computer startup trust assurance method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

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