Vehicle formation anonymous authentication method and system, storage medium and vehicle

Abstract

The invention discloses a vehicle formation anonymous authentication method and system, a storage medium and a vehicle, and relates to the technical field of wireless network security communication. According to the method, the public key certificate and the authentication scheme based on the identity signature are combined, only the formation leader vehicle needs to be equipped with the public key certificate, other common vehicles use the identity signature to initiate the encryption authentication request to the formation leader vehicle, the dependence of the formation authentication system on the traditional digital certificate is effectively reduced, and the authentication efficiency is improved. According to the method, the complexity of public key certificate management is obviously reduced, the calculation and communication overhead is low, and a portable, efficient, high-safety and high-reliability identity authentication scheme is provided for a vehicle formation system with limited calculation and cruising ability.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of wireless network security communication, and in particular to a vehicle formation anonymous authentication method, system, storage medium and vehicle. Background Art

[0002] Since wireless signals are easily intercepted and tampered, vehicle platooning technology that relies on 5G wireless communication technology and beacon broadcasting faces many security threats, such as interference attacks, witch attacks, ghost attacks, etc. These security threats may lead to the leakage of relevant information of the vehicle. If the identity of the vehicle is not fully verified, it may become the starting point of system security vulnerabilities. Therefore, the identity authentication mechanism of the vehicle platoon plays a vital role in preventing unauthorized access and improving the security of the entire vehicle platoon system.

[0003] The existing authentication mechanism based on public key infrastructure (PKI) can provide a unique certificate for each vehicle in the fleet, thereby effectively verifying and confirming the identity of each vehicle. However, with the increasing number of vehicles, the management of public key certificates has become more and more complex, the cost is getting higher and higher, and the scalability is getting lower and lower. Therefore, many researchers have explored authentication mechanisms that do not rely on PKI. For example, by adopting cryptographic technologies such as elliptic curve digital signature algorithm and elliptic curve (ECDSA), elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), bilinear mapping, private set intersection (PSI), group key agreement, etc. to replace public key certificate technology, and using decentralized technology such as blockchain to reduce dependence on trusted institutions or public key infrastructure and reduce system complexity.

[0004] The above technologies can effectively protect the security of vehicle platooning systems to a certain extent, reduce the risk of system attacks, and ensure the confidentiality and privacy of data. However, the following problems still exist: (1) High computing cost: These technologies rely on resource-constrained vehicles to perform a large number of time-consuming operations, which significantly increases the system's latency and resource consumption. These additional computing tasks will occupy valuable resources, resulting in the vehicle's inability to efficiently complete its main functions; (2) Reduced real-time performance: These time-consuming computing operations that rely on vehicle execution will increase the system response time and significantly reduce the overall real-time performance of the vehicle; (3) Unreasonable system architecture: In applications using blockchain, the blockchain stores a large amount of periodically changing data, which means that every time the data changes, new data will be added to the blockchain, causing the chain to grow rapidly. Over time, the size of the blockchain will become larger and larger, which not only increases the burden of storage and processing, but may also significantly reduce the efficiency of querying and retrieving data. In addition, since the blockchain is immutable, each update requires the addition of a new block, which further increases the complexity and management difficulty of the system.

[0005] In order to overcome the above problems, there is an urgent need for a lightweight and efficient identity authentication solution that can operate efficiently under limited computing power and battery life while ensuring the security and reliability of the vehicle platooning system. Summary of the invention

[0006] The present invention provides a vehicle formation anonymous authentication method, system, storage medium and vehicle to solve the above problems.

[0007] The present invention is achieved through the following technical solutions:

[0008] A first aspect of the present invention provides a vehicle formation anonymous authentication method, which is applied to a formation leader vehicle, comprising:

[0009] Broadcasting a team-joining invitation to surrounding ordinary vehicles, wherein the team-joining invitation includes a public key certificate of the team-leading vehicle;

[0010] Receiving a registration request sent by an ordinary vehicle, wherein the registration request is obtained by encrypting registration parameters using the public key of the formation leader vehicle;

[0011] Decrypting the registration request using the private key of the formation leader vehicle to obtain the registration parameters;

[0012] The legitimacy of the ordinary vehicle is verified according to the registration parameters. If it is legitimate, an authentication key is sent to the ordinary vehicle, and the ordinary vehicle is registered as a formation member vehicle.

[0013] The vehicle formation authentication scheme of the present invention combines the public key certificate and the identity signature-based authentication scheme. Only the formation leader vehicle needs to be equipped with a public key certificate, while other ordinary vehicles use the identity-based signature to initiate an encrypted authentication request to the formation leader vehicle. This method reduces the reliance on traditional digital certificates and significantly reduces the complexity of public key certificate management, providing a lightweight, efficient, highly secure and reliable identity authentication scheme for vehicle formation systems with limited computing and endurance capabilities.

[0014] Furthermore, the method for generating the authentication key includes: generating authentication key parameters:

[0015] A i =CP i +P;

[0016] C i =R i +μ i ·P;

[0017]

[0018] Among them, R i =βi ·A i , β i =H(CP i ), μ i =H(PID i ||R i ||PK RTA ), CP i is a public parameter, PK RTA , P, q are the system public encryption parameters, which are issued by the system to all vehicles. P is the generator of the elliptic curve additive group, q is the prime order of the elliptic curve additive group, PK RTA is the public key of the regional authority, PID i is the pseudonym information of the ordinary vehicle, H(·) represents a hash function;

[0019] Through the public key of the common vehicle Encrypt {{Ci,xi},Ai,tj} to get the ciphertext message CMsg2, where t j is the generation timestamp of the ciphertext message CMsg2, And generate a digital signature Get the authenticated ciphertext {CMsg2, σ i},in, Indicates the use of public key The encryption algorithm, Indicates the digital signature algorithm.

[0020] Furthermore, the method further includes: before the formation leader vehicle goes on the road, completing offline registration to obtain system public encryption parameters; the offline registration method is:

[0021] Submitting the vehicle's real identity information to a regional authority in an offline manner, the real identity information including the license plate number and vehicle identification number;

[0022] The public key certificate, public parameters and authentication parameters returned by the regional authority are received, and the authentication parameters are used to verify the legitimacy of the ordinary vehicle.

[0023] Furthermore, the method further comprises:

[0024] Receiving a platoon member authentication request sent by a formation member vehicle, wherein the platoon member authentication request is obtained by encrypting a platoon entry request parameter using a public key of the formation leader vehicle;

[0025] Decrypting the platoon member authentication request using the private key of the platoon leader vehicle to obtain the platoon entry request parameters;

[0026] The legitimacy of the formation member vehicle is verified according to the entry request parameters. If it is legal, a response message is generated and sent to the formation member vehicle to complete the platoon member authentication of the formation member vehicle.

[0027] A second aspect of the present invention provides a vehicle formation anonymous authentication method, which is applied to ordinary vehicles and includes:

[0028] receiving a team-joining invitation broadcasted by a formation leader vehicle, wherein the team-joining invitation includes a public key certificate of the formation leader vehicle;

[0029] Verify the validity of the public key certificate. If it is valid, send a registration request to the formation leader vehicle, wherein the registration request is obtained by encrypting registration parameters with the public key of the formation leader vehicle, and is used to register as a formation member vehicle;

[0030] Receiving the authentication key returned by the formation leader vehicle, wherein the authentication key is obtained by encrypting the public key of the ordinary vehicle;

[0031] The authentication key is decrypted by the private key of the ordinary vehicle, and the decrypted information is stored to complete the registration.

[0032] Furthermore, the method for generating the registration request includes:

[0033] From the set of hash functions Select a random number as the private key of the ordinary vehicle And calculate the public key The calculation formula is: According to the formula Among them, P is the system public encryption parameter, which is issued by the system to all vehicles and represents the generator of the elliptic curve additive group;

[0034] According to the private key of ordinary vehicles and the public key Generate registration parameters {m i , l i , U i}:

[0035]

[0036] U i =O i ·ξ i ;

[0037] in, ξ i =H(PID i ||m i ||Γ i ||O i ||PK RTA ), PKRTA , q is the system public encryption parameter, PK RTA is the public key of the regional authority, q is the prime order of the elliptic curve additive group, PID i is the pseudonym information of the ordinary vehicle, Γ i is the registration response parameter, t i is the parameter m i The timestamp of its generation;

[0038] The registration parameter {m i , l i , U i}, generate a ciphertext message CMsg1, and generate a message authentication code MAC1, and obtain a registration request {CMsg1, MAC1}, where MAC1 = H(CMsg1), and H(·) represents a hash function.

[0039] Furthermore, the method further includes, before the vehicle goes on the road, completing vehicle initialization to obtain system public encryption parameters, the initialization step including:

[0040] Submitting private information to regional authorities offline, including vehicle identification numbers, ID numbers, phone numbers, email addresses, and addresses;

[0041] The registration response parameters returned by the receiving regional authority according to the private information are stored locally to complete the initialization. The private information is also used by the regional authority to generate authentication parameters to be issued to the formation leader vehicle.

[0042] In a third aspect of the present invention, a vehicle formation anonymous authentication system is provided, including an identity authentication server functional unit of a 5G core network, a regional authority, a formation leader vehicle, and ordinary vehicles;

[0043] The identity authentication server functional unit and the regional authority are used to generate system common encryption parameters and publish them to other entities in the system;

[0044] The regional authority is also used for initializing ordinary vehicles and generating authentication parameters for ordinary vehicles, wherein the authentication parameters are used to verify the legitimacy of the ordinary vehicles; and

[0045] The regional authority is also used to register the formation leader vehicle, generate a public key certificate for the formation leader vehicle and provide authentication parameters for the ordinary vehicle;

[0046] The formation leader vehicle is used to execute the anonymous authentication method for vehicle formations according to any one of the first aspects of the present invention;

[0047] The ordinary vehicle is used to execute the anonymous authentication method for vehicle formation described in any one of the second aspects of the present invention.

[0048] According to a fourth aspect of the present invention, a storage medium is provided on which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the anonymous authentication method for a vehicle formation described in any one of the first aspect of the present invention or the anonymous authentication method for a vehicle formation described in any one of the second aspect of the present invention is implemented.

[0049] In a fifth aspect of the present invention, a vehicle is provided, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein when the processor executes the computer program, the anonymous authentication method for a vehicle formation as described in any one of the first aspect of the present invention or the anonymous authentication method for a vehicle formation as described in any one of the second aspect of the present invention is implemented.

[0050] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following advantages and beneficial effects: The present invention designs an authentication scheme that combines public key certificates and identity-based signatures. Through this scheme, only the formation leader vehicle is equipped with a public key certificate, while other vehicles use identity-based signatures to authenticate to the formation leader vehicle. This method significantly reduces the complexity of public key certificate management. In addition, the signature can be recognized by the leader vehicles of other formations, thereby significantly improving the adaptability and flexibility of the vehicle platoon. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0051] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the exemplary embodiments of the present invention, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the embodiments. It should be understood that the following drawings only illustrate certain embodiments of the present invention and should not be regarded as limiting the scope. For those of ordinary skill in the art, other relevant drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative work. In the drawings:

[0052] Figure 1 is a structural diagram of an anonymous authentication system for a vehicle formation according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0053] Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of a method for initializing a common vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0054] Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of a registration method for a formation leader vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0055] Figure 4 It is a schematic diagram of a mutual authentication method between a formation leader vehicle and formation member vehicles according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0056] Figure 5Schematic diagram of a method for platoon member vehicle entry authentication according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0057] Figure 6 It is a schematic diagram of a mutual authentication method between a formation leader vehicle and a roadside unit according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0058] Figure 7 It is the computational overhead simulation experiment result of an authentication method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0059] Figure 8 This is a measurement result of a signal overhead simulation experiment of an authentication method according to an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0060] In order to make the objectives, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more clearly understood, the present invention is further described in detail below in conjunction with embodiments and drawings. The exemplary embodiments of the present invention and their description are only used to explain the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention.

[0061] It should be noted that the terms "including" and "having" and any variations thereof in the specification and claims of the present invention and the above-mentioned drawings are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions. For example, a process, method, system, product or device that includes a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to or inherent to other steps or units of the device.

[0062] The terms used in the various embodiments of the application are only used to describe the purpose of specific embodiments and are not intended to limit the various embodiments of the application. As used herein, the singular form is intended to also include the plural form, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. Unless otherwise limited, all terms used here (including technical terms and scientific terms) have the same meaning as the meanings commonly understood by ordinary technicians in the field of the various embodiments of the application. The terms (such as the terms defined in the dictionary generally used) will be interpreted as having the same meaning as the contextual meaning in the relevant technical field and will not be interpreted as having an idealized meaning or an overly formal meaning, unless clearly defined in the various embodiments of the application.

[0063] The embodiments of the present invention provide a vehicle formation anonymous authentication method, system, storage medium and vehicle, which are suitable for vehicle formation in a 5G wireless communication environment, and can be applied to application scenarios such as unmanned driving and intelligent traffic management, which is beneficial to reducing the overhead of vehicle authentication and communication and improving the security of the vehicle queue system.

[0064] See also Figure 1 , Figure 1The figure shows a structural diagram of an anonymous authentication system for a vehicle formation according to an embodiment of the present invention, including an authentication server function unit (AUSF) of a 5G core network, a regional authority (RTA), a road side unit (RSU), a formation leader vehicle and formation member vehicles. The formation leader vehicle obtains authentication from the regional authority and can form a formation. After the formation member vehicles complete the system registration, they can join its formation after being authenticated by the formation leader vehicle, and the formation member vehicles can establish communication with the formation leader vehicle to achieve data intercommunication and sharing. The formation leader vehicle can communicate with the roadside unit through V21 to obtain information such as current road conditions and traffic conditions. The roadside unit, the regional authority and the authentication server function unit communicate wirelessly through 5G. Formation vehicles can also communicate with each other through V2V communication terminals in a direct communication mode, such as a short-range direct communication mode, to achieve fast and reliable information exchange among members in the queue and ensure the stability of the overall queue operation.

[0065] Based on the above authentication system, the anonymous authentication method for vehicle formation of the present invention includes the following parts.

[0066] 1. System initialization.

[0067] First, the anonymous authentication system for the vehicle platoon is initialized, and the authentication server function unit AUSF performs the initialization operation to generate system parameters, which include the system private key and the system public key. The authentication server function unit publishes the parameters except the system private key to all entities in the system, such as regional authorities, roadside units, platoon leader vehicles, and platoon member vehicles. The regional authorities will then generate the public and private keys for protecting the vehicle platoon authentication based on these system parameters.

[0068] Specifically, the identity authentication server functional unit AUSF initializes system parameters through the following method.

[0069] S1-1, AUSF first selects the elliptic curve E and the secure prime number q, uses q to generate the elliptic curve additive cyclic group G of order q, and selects the base point P that satisfies security, uniqueness and randomness as the generator of the elliptic curve additive cyclic group G to generate the encrypted hash function set Zq * .

[0070] S1-2, AUSF randomly selects Zq * A number in the set is used as the system private key SK core , and according to the system private key SK core Calculate the system public key PK with base point P core , the calculation formula is: PK core =SKcor ·P.

[0071] AUSF will secretly save the system private key SK core , system public key PK core Will be stored in the Unified Data Management (UDM) server.

[0072] S1-3, AUSF publishes system public encryption parameters {E, G, q, H, PK core}.

[0073] Similarly, the regional authority RTA selects a random number SK RTA As its private key, and calculate PK RTA =SK RTA P as its public key, and PK RTA Issued to all vehicles.

[0074] 2. Initialization of ordinary vehicles and registration of platoon leader vehicles.

[0075] After the system is initialized, the vehicle can register with the system before going on the road to obtain identity authentication information. Vehicle registration is divided into fleet leader vehicle registration and ordinary vehicle registration.

[0076] Before ordinary vehicles go on the road, they need to complete offline initialization at the regional authority RTA and obtain the system's public encryption parameters and authentication parameters. This stage is to prove the legal identity of the vehicle so that it can communicate securely with the formation leader vehicle (platoon leader) later. When the formation leader vehicle is registered, the system sends the authentication parameters of the ordinary registered vehicle to the formation leader vehicle for local storage, so that the formation leader vehicle can authenticate member vehicles when forming a formation. The authentication process is all based on the public encryption parameters released by the system. The member vehicles and the leader vehicle will not leak their own real information, completing the anonymous authentication process, thereby protecting the safety of the formation vehicles.

[0077] like Figure 2 Shown is a schematic diagram of a method for initializing a normal vehicle, and the steps are as follows.

[0078] S2-1, ordinary vehicles submit private information to regional authorities in an offline manner.

[0079] The owner of an ordinary vehicle needs to submit necessary private information to the offline model of the regional authority. This private information is set by the system, such as the vehicle identification code VID, ID number, telephone number, email account and address. After submitting the complete private information, the regional authority will return the response parameters to the vehicle and store the relevant information of the ordinary vehicle to complete the registration of the ordinary vehicle in the system.

[0080] S2-2, receiving the parameters returned by the regional authority based on the private information and storing them locally, thereby completing the initialization of the ordinary vehicle.

[0081] Once the regional authority receives the complete private information, it will extract the private information from the hash function set Zq * Choose a random number S from i , and calculate the registration response parameters and the authentication parameters of ordinary vehicles:

[0082] K i =S i ·PK RTA ;

[0083]

[0084] Among them, SK RTA is the private key of the regional authority, PK RTA is the public key of the regional authority, VID i represents the vehicle identification code of ordinary vehicle i, represents XOR operation, H(·) represents hash function, || represents OR operation?, ||·|| represents elliptic curve point multiplication operation, P is the generator of elliptic curve addition group, PID i This is the pseudonym information for ordinary vehicles.

[0085] When the vehicle is initialized, the regional authority will register the response parameters (o i ,Γ i ), Pseudonym Information PID i The random number S is placed in the vehicle's on-board unit OBU, and the regional authority keeps the secret random number S i , the random number will be sent to the formation leader vehicle as the authentication parameter of ordinary vehicle i.

[0086] Before deploying the platoon leader vehicle on the road, it needs to be registered offline with the regional authority RTA to obtain the platoon leader vehicle identity and the authentication parameters of ordinary vehicles. Figure 3 Shown is a schematic diagram of the registration method for the formation leader vehicle, and the process is as follows.

[0087] S3-1, the vehicle owner submits the real identity information of the vehicle to the regional authority in an offline manner.

[0088] The real identity information is set by the system, such as license plate number, vehicle identification number After the formation leader vehicle submits complete real identity information, the regional authority receives the information and will provide the formation leader vehicle with a public key certificate, public parameters, and authentication parameters of ordinary vehicles.

[0089] S3-2, receiving the public key certificate, public parameters and authentication parameters returned by the regional authority, and storing them locally.

[0090] Specifically, the method for a regional authority to generate a public key certificate and public parameters is as follows.

[0091] First, the regional authority selects a set of hash functions Zq * A random number is selected as the formation leader vehicle PL i Private key And calculate As the leader vehicle of the formation PL i The public key of

[0092] Then, according to the public key PL is the leader vehicle of the formation i Generate a public key certificate And the common parameter CP i Among them, t vp Is the validity period of the public key certificate.

[0093] Finally, regional authorities will PLi , PK PLi}、Public key certificate Sign SK (PK PLi , t VP ), public parameters CP i and the certification parameters S of ordinary vehicles i Loaded into the formation leader vehicle PL i The smart card stores the platoon leader vehicle PL i Public key certificate Sign SK (PK PLi , t VP ) and Vehicle Identification Number Complete the registration of the formation leader vehicle.

[0094] 3. The formation leader vehicle and formation member vehicles authenticate each other.

[0095] After the platoon leader vehicle is registered and on the road, it can regularly broadcast invitations to the surrounding ordinary vehicles. The invitations include the public key certificate and public parameters of the platoon leader vehicle. i ) receives the invitation to join the formation from the formation leader vehicle. If it wants to join the formation, it will verify the validity of the formation leader vehicle's public key certificate. After the verification is passed, it submits a registration request to the formation leader vehicle. Once the registration is successful, the vehicle becomes a formation member vehicle of the formation and can join the platoon deployed by the regional authority and controlled by the formation leader vehicle. See Figure 4 The schematic diagram of the mutual authentication method between the formation leader vehicle and the formation member vehicle shown in FIG.i )The process of registering to become a platoon member vehicle is as follows.

[0096] The registration of an ordinary vehicle as a platoon member vehicle includes the following steps.

[0097] S4-1, ordinary vehicles receive the invitation to join the formation broadcast by the formation leader vehicle;

[0098] S4-2, verify the validity of the public key certificate of the formation leader vehicle carried in the team joining invitation. If it is valid, encrypt the registration parameters by the public key of the formation leader vehicle, generate a registration request and send it to the formation leader vehicle;

[0099] S4-3, receiving the authentication key returned by the formation leader vehicle, the authentication key being the authentication key parameter {{C i , x i}, A i , t j )}get;

[0100] S4-4, use the private key of the ordinary vehicle to decrypt the authentication key and obtain the decryption parameter {{C i , x i}, A i , t j )}.

[0101] Furthermore, check the generation timestamp t in the decryption parameter j , if fresh, store the authentication key {{C i , x i}, A i}, complete the registration of the fleet member vehicles.

[0102] Before the above step S4-4, the ordinary vehicle first verifies whether the authentication key is valid. If it is valid, it will decrypt it. Otherwise, the authentication key will be discarded and the platoon leader vehicle will have a conversation.

[0103] The invitation to join the team contains the public key certificate Sign of the team leader vehicle SK (PK PLi , t VP ), when an ordinary vehicle wants to join the formation, the certificate validity period t vp It is determined whether the public key certificate is within the validity period. If it is valid, the ordinary vehicle generates a registration request and sends it to the formation leader vehicle.

[0104] Specifically, ordinary vehicles OV i The method to generate a registration request is:

[0105] S4-2-1, Ordinary Vehicle OV i from Select a random number from the set as its private key And calculate the public key based on the private key The calculation formula is

[0106] S4-2-2, according to the private key and the public key Generate registration parameters {m i , l i , U i},in:

[0107]

[0108]

[0109] U i =O i ·ξ i ;

[0110] In the above formula, Among them, q is the system public encryption parameter, PK RTA is the public key of the regional authority, q is the prime order of the elliptic curve additive group, and the pseudonym information PID i , o i , Γ i is the registration response parameter, obtained during offline registration, t i is the parameter m i The timestamp of the generation.

[0111] S4-2-3, use the public key of the formation leader vehicle to encrypt the registration parameter {m i , l i , U i}, generate the ciphertext message CMsg1, and generate the message authentication code MAC1, and finally send the ciphertext message and the message authentication code {CMsg1, MAC1} to the formation leader vehicle.

[0112] The ciphertext message CMsg1 is represented as: Represents the public key Encryption algorithm.

[0113] The message authentication code MAC1 is expressed as: MAC1=H(CMsg1), where H(·) represents a hash function.

[0114] The platoon leader certifies a normal vehicle as a platoon member vehicle, including the following steps:

[0115] S5-1, formation leader vehicle PL i Broadcast a team-joining invitation to surrounding ordinary vehicles, which includes the public key certificate and public parameters of the team leader vehicle.

[0116] S5-2, formation leader vehicle PL i A registration request {CMsg1, MAC1} from an ordinary vehicle is received, where the registration request includes a ciphertext message CMsg1 and a message authentication code MAC1.

[0117] S5-3, use the formation leader vehicle PL i The private key SK PLi Decrypt the ciphertext message CMsg1 and obtain the registration parameters {m i , l i , U i}, check m i The generation timestamp t i , if not fresh, will be discarded i And terminate the session, otherwise, verify the normal vehicle OV according to the registration parameters i If the verification is successful, the vehicle will be issued a valid OV i Send the authentication key.

[0118] In the above step S5-2, the formation leader vehicle first checks the validity of the information verification code MAC1. If it is valid, it decrypts the registration request. If it is invalid, it discards the registration request and terminates the session with the ordinary vehicle.

[0119] In one embodiment, the platoon leader vehicle PL i Verify the legality of ordinary vehicles through the following methods.

[0120] S5-3-1, by ordinary vehicle OV i The authentication parameter S i The following parameters are calculated:

[0121]

[0122] Among them, PK RTA is the public key of the regional authority, PID i is the pseudonym information, P is the generator of the elliptic curve additive group, and H(·) represents the hash function. i When registering, the authentication parameter S i is securely stored in the PL i smart card.

[0123] S5-3-2, Verification i ·PK RTA and Are they equal? i and U i Derived from the encrypted registration parameter {m i , l i , U iIf they are not equal, authentication fails and the platoon leader PL i will discard m i and terminate the session;

[0124] If they are equal, the platoon leader vehicle PL i Generate authentication key CMsg2 and send it to ordinary vehicle OV i .

[0125] In one embodiment, the platoon leader vehicle PL i The method of generating the authentication key CMsg2 is as follows.

[0126] First, generate the authentication key parameters according to the following formula:

[0127] A i =CP i +P;

[0128] C i =R i +μ i ·P;

[0129]

[0130] Among them, R i =β i ·A i , β i =H(CP i ), μ i =H(PID i ||R i ||PK RTA ), CP i is a public parameter, PK RTA , P, q are the system public encryption parameters, which are issued by the system to all vehicles. P is the generator of the elliptic curve additive group, q is the prime order of the elliptic curve additive group, PK RTA is the public key of the regional authority, PID i is pseudonym information, H(·) represents hash function;

[0131] PL Leader Vehicle i By ordinary vehicle OV i The public key Encryption authentication key parameters {{C i , x i}, A i , t j}, CMsg2, where t j is the generation timestamp of the ciphertext message CMsg2, And generate a digital signature Composition of authentication ciphertext {CMsg2, σi}.

[0132] in, Indicates the use of public key The encryption algorithm can be selected according to different scenarios, such as elliptic curve encryption algorithm ECC or RSA algorithm, Indicates the digital signature algorithm, which is also selected according to the scenario, for example, it can be the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm ECDSA.

[0133] Finally, the formation leader vehicle PL i The authentication ciphertext {CMsg2, σ i}Sent to ordinary vehicle OV i .

[0134] 4. Team member vehicles apply for certification to join the team.

[0135] After the ordinary vehicle completes the registration, it becomes a team member vehicle PM i , you can initiate a formation member authentication request to join the platoon. Formation leader vehicle PL i After receiving the authentication request, it will verify whether the vehicle is a legitimate member. After the authentication is passed, the formation leader vehicle will become the PM of the formation member vehicle. i Provides queue services. Figure 5 The schematic diagram of the platoon member vehicle entry authentication method is shown in FIG. 1 , and the process is as follows.

[0136] Step 1: Team Member Vehicle PM i To the formation leader vehicle PL i Send a platoon authentication request {CMsg3, MAC3}.

[0137] Specifically, the formation member vehicles PM i First generate an entry request message And calculate:

[0138] B i =SK PMi ·A i ;

[0139] η i =H(m1||C i ||B i ||A i );

[0140] σ i =(x i +η i ·SK PMi )mod q;

[0141] Among them, Ai, Ci, xi come from the authentication key parameters {{Ci ,x i}, A i ,t j}, is the private key of the platoon member vehicle, and q is the prime order of the elliptic curve addition group. Thus, the platoon member vehicle initiates an authentication request to the platoon leader vehicle based on the identity signature obtained from the platoon leader vehicle.

[0142] Next, the formation member vehicle PM i Leading vehicle PL through formation i The public key Encrypt the queue request parameters to get the ciphertext And calculate the message authentication code MAC3=H(CMsg3).

[0143] Finally, the formation member vehicle PM i Send a platoon member authentication request {CMsg3, MAC3} to the formation leader vehicle.

[0144] Step 2: Formation Leader Vehicle PL i Upon receiving the platoon member authentication request {CMsg3, MAC3}, first check the validity of MAC3. If valid, use the platoon leader vehicle PL i Private key Decrypt CMsg3 to obtain the queue entry request parameters {m1, σ i , t i Otherwise, discard CMsg3 and terminate the session.

[0145] Furthermore, check the generation timestamp t i , if it is fresh, then verify the formation member vehicle PM according to the entry request parameters i If it is legal, a response message is generated and sent to the formation member vehicle to complete the platoon member authentication of the formation member vehicle. If it is illegal, m1 is discarded and the session is terminated.

[0146] Verifying that a platoon member's vehicle is legal consists of the following steps.

[0147] First calculate the verification parameters:

[0148] β i =H(CP i );

[0149]

[0150] Among them, CP i is a public parameter, Ai comes from the authentication key parameter {{C i , x i}, A i , t j}, PID i For pseudonym information, PK RTA is the public key of the regional authority, The public key of the platoon leader vehicle.

[0151] Next, the formation leader vehicle PL i Verification i ·A i and Are they equal? ​​If not, authentication fails and the platoon leader PL i Discard m1 and terminate the session. If they are equal, the authentication is successful and the platoon leader vehicle PL i Generate response information and send it to the formation member vehicles to complete the platoon member authentication of the formation member vehicles.

[0152] Specifically, the platoon leader vehicle PL i Pick a random number And calculate Derive the formation communication key PLK i ,PLM i =KDF(λ i ||SK PLi ·PK PMi ), where KDF is used to generate the key Q1 = H(PLK i ||PLM i )’s key derivation function.

[0153] In addition, the formation leader vehicle PL i Store in the team member list <PID i , PK PMi ,PLK i ,PLM i >.

[0154] Then, the formation leader vehicle PL i Generate authentication response parameter m2 = {Q1, a i , t j} and generate a digital signature Through the public key PK of the formation member vehicle PMi Encrypt the authentication response parameter m2 and digital signature to get the response information And send it to the formation member vehicle PM i .

[0155] 5. Mutual authentication between the platoon leader vehicle and the roadside unit.

[0156] When the platoon leader is driving on the road, it can use the parameters stored in the 5G Universal User Identity Module (USIM) to authenticate with the roadside unit (RSU). These parameters include the 5G network subscription permanent identifier SUPI, the one-time hash key Y, and the 5GC's public key PK core When the platoon leader vehicle needs to communicate with the roadside unit RSU, it initiates a mutual authentication request to the RSU. Assume that the ASUF has saved the permanent identifier SUPI of the platoon leader vehicle and the hash value H(Y) of the first one-time hash key Y. Figure 6 The schematic diagram of the mutual authentication method between the platoon leader vehicle and the roadside unit shown in the figure includes the following steps.

[0157] Step 1: Formation leader vehicle generates PL i A new random key K for the HMAC algorithm hmac , random numbers Timestamp i , and the public key is calculated by a·P, where P is the generator of the elliptic curve addition group. i Generate the system public key PK core Encrypted authentication request

[0158] Then, the formation leader vehicle PL i Generate the next one-time hash secret Y2 and calculate its hash value H(Y2)), update the hash secret Y in the local storage to Y2, and the updated hash secret Y2 will become Y for the next authentication.

[0159] Next, the formation leader vehicle PL i Calculate the message verification code:

[0160] MAC1=HMAC({ID RSUi ,SUPI,Y,H(Y2),t i ,a·P}K hmac );

[0161] Where HMAC(·) represents the HAMC algorithm, K hmac is the key of the HAMC algorithm, Roadside Unit RSU i The identity number, t i Indicates the generation timestamp.

[0162] Step 2: Once the roadside unit RSU i Upon receiving the message, it checks the time t i The validity of the system private key SK core Decrypt SUCI to obtain {SUPI, Y, K hmac}.

[0163] Then, the roadside unit RSU i Use the HMAC algorithm to verify MAC1. The verification formula is MAC1? =HMAC({ID RSUi ,SUPI,Y,H(Y2),t i ,a·P}K hmac ). If verification fails, the roadside unit RSU i The session is terminated. Otherwise, H(Y) is calculated and a comparison request {H(Y), H(Y2)} is securely sent to the authentication server function AUSF.

[0164] Step 3: After receiving the comparison request {H(Y), H(Y2)}, AUSF compares H(Y) with the locally stored H(Y). If the comparison fails, AUSF discards {H(Y), H(Y2)} and notifies the roadside unit RSU. i The comparison fails. Otherwise, AUSF updates the local storage of H(Y) to H(Y2) and sends a message to the RSU. i Send a comparison response.

[0165] Step 4: Once the roadside unit RSU i If a comparison failure response is received from AUSF, the session will be terminated. i Generate a new random number And calculate b·P. Then, calculate MAC2=HMAC({SUPI,t j , b·P}K hmac ), where t j is the received timestamp. Finally, RSU i To the formation leadership unit PL i Send authentication response {t j ,σ2,b·P}, where σ2 is MAC2.

[0166] Step 5: Formation Leadership Unit PL i Received Roadside Unit (RSU) i After sending the message, calculate If σ2 is equal to The public ECDH session key will be obtained by using the formula a·b·P. Similarly, RSU i The communication session key is also calculated using the formula a·bP. Since a·bP=ba·P, the public session key is derived and both parties have now authenticated each other.

[0167] Through the above mutual authentication method, the present invention provides a lightweight and efficient identity authentication scheme. Through the present invention, the authentication of the formation leader vehicle and member vehicles can be completed with the participation of the roadside unit (RSU).

[0168] Furthermore, the present invention also provides a vehicle formation anonymous authentication system, including an identity authentication server functional unit of a 5G core network, a regional authority, a formation leader vehicle, and ordinary vehicles;

[0169] The identity authentication server functional unit and the regional authority are used to generate system public encryption parameters and publish them to other entities in the system.

[0170] The regional authority is also used to initialize ordinary vehicles and generate authentication parameters for ordinary vehicles, which are used to subsequently verify the legitimacy of the ordinary vehicles; and the regional authority is also used to register the formation leader vehicle, generate a public key certificate for the formation leader vehicle, and provide authentication parameters for ordinary vehicles.

[0171] The formation leader vehicle and the ordinary vehicles are used to execute the vehicle formation anonymous authentication method described in any of the above embodiments of the present invention.

[0172] Furthermore, the vehicle formation anonymous authentication system also includes a roadside unit RSU, which is used to complete mutual authentication with the formation leader vehicle and provide road conditions and traffic information to the formation leader vehicle.

[0173] The embodiment of the present invention further provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the anonymous authentication method for a vehicle formation for a formation leader vehicle, an ordinary vehicle, an identity authentication server functional unit, a regional authority, or a roadside unit according to any of the above embodiments of the present invention is implemented. The storage medium may be a ROM / RAM, a magnetic disk, an optical disk, etc.

[0174] An embodiment of the present invention provides a computer program product. When the computer program product runs on a computer, it enables the computer to execute the anonymous authentication method for a vehicle formation for a formation leader vehicle, an ordinary vehicle, an identity authentication server functional unit, a regional authority or a roadside unit according to any of the above-mentioned embodiments of the present invention.

[0175] An embodiment of the present invention also provides a vehicle, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor. The vehicle may be a formation leader vehicle or an ordinary vehicle. When the processor executes the computer program, the anonymous authentication method for a vehicle formation for a formation leader vehicle or for an ordinary vehicle according to any of the above embodiments of the present invention is implemented.

[0176] Furthermore, the Scyther tool was used for formal verification, and the simulation experiment was conducted on a Lenovo Legion R9000X2021 laptop equipped with an AMD R7 5800H octa-core processor, a base frequency of 3.40GHz, and 16GB RAM. The experiment was conducted using Visual Studio 2022 as the development environment, the C++ programming language, and the open source OpenSSL encryption library.

[0177] The computational overhead and communication overhead were simulated on the experimental platform. In the computational overhead experiment, the average execution time was measured by running each encryption function 10,000 times. In the comparison of different indicators, the scheme of the present invention is referred to as ELAAS; the comparison schemes are SPMSA (reference: "Secure Vehicular Platoon Management against Sybil Attacks", DR Junaidi, Sensors, vol. 22, no. 22, p. 9000, 2022) and SPSC (reference: "A Secure and Privacy-Preserving Autonomous Platoon Setup and Communication Scheme", C. Lai, Transactions on Emerging Telecommunications Technologies, vol. 32, no. 9, p. e3982, 2021).

[0178] like Figure 7 The figure shows the result of the computational overhead simulation experiment of the authentication method. The result of the computational overhead simulation experiment is as follows: The scale multiplication operation time T in ECC em Take 0.084ms; elliptic curve digital signature operation time T es Take 1.1326ms; the time for one elliptic curve digital signature verification operation is T ev Take 0.0807ms; one hash operation time T H Take 0.047ms; find the exponentiation time T EXP Take 3.85ms; the time for one integrated encryption elliptic curve variant operation is T ECIES Take 4.35ms; encryption operation time T er Take 1.342ms; decryption operation time T dr Take 0.11ms; bilinear pairing operation time T BP Take 5.811ms; operations such as XOR and arithmetic can be ignored.

[0179] In the communication overhead simulation experiment, the bilinear pairing encryption environment with an 80-bit security level was set. The data size generated by the bilinear pairing operation was 128 bytes, the data size generated by the elliptic curve encryption operation was 40 bytes, and the communication data sizes of the timestamp, the output of the hash function, and the elements in the group were 4 bytes, 20 bytes, and 20 bytes, respectively. Each ECDSA signature uses up to 64 bytes. In addition, only transmission and propagation delays are considered in terms of delay. The transmission delay is determined by the size and transmission rate of the transmitted data packet. Assume that the transmission rate of 5G-V2V is 59.1Mbps. Propagation delay is the time it takes for a data packet to reach its destination through the physical medium. Since each vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) link covers a wireless propagation distance of 50 meters, the propagation speed is the speed of light, which is approximately 3×108m / s. The measurement results of the final communication overhead simulation experiment are as follows Figure 8 shown.

[0180] The verification results show that the proposed method can resist common attacks while meeting confidentiality and authentication requirements. In addition, it has low computational and communication overheads and is particularly suitable for highly dynamic in-vehicle network environments with limited computing resources.

[0181] The specific implementation methods described above further illustrate the objectives, technical solutions and beneficial effects of the present invention in detail. It should be understood that the above description is only a specific implementation method of the present invention and is not intended to limit the scope of protection of the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included in the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A vehicle formation anonymous authentication method, applied to the formation leader vehicle, characterized in that: include: Broadcasting a team-joining invitation to surrounding ordinary vehicles, wherein the team-joining invitation includes a public key certificate of the team-leading vehicle; Receiving a registration request sent by an ordinary vehicle, wherein the registration request is obtained by encrypting registration parameters using the public key of the formation leader vehicle; Decrypting the registration request by using the private key of the formation leader vehicle to obtain the registration parameters; The legitimacy of the ordinary vehicle is verified according to the registration parameters. If it is legitimate, an authentication key is sent to the ordinary vehicle, and the ordinary vehicle is registered as a formation member vehicle.

2. The anonymous authentication method for vehicle formation according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method for generating the authentication key comprises: generating authentication key parameters: TO i =CP i +P; C i =R i +m i ·P; Among them, R i =β i ·A i , β i =H(CP i ), μ i =H(PID i ||R i ||PK RTA ), CP i is a public parameter, PK RTA , P, q are the system public encryption parameters, which are issued by the system to all vehicles. P is the generator of the elliptic curve additive group, q is the prime order of the elliptic curve additive group, PK RTA PID is the public key of the regional authority i is the pseudonym information of the ordinary vehicle, H(·) represents a hash function; Through the public key of the common vehicle Encrypt {{Ci,xi},Ai,tj} to get the ciphertext message CMsg2, where t j is the generation timestamp of the ciphertext message CMsg2, And generate a digital signature Get the authenticated ciphertext {CMsg2, σ i },in, Indicates the use of public key The encryption algorithm, Indicates the digital signature algorithm.

3. The anonymous authentication method for vehicle formation according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method further includes: before the formation leader vehicle goes on the road, completing offline registration to obtain system public encryption parameters; the offline registration method is: Submitting the vehicle's real identity information to a regional authority in an offline manner, the real identity information including the license plate number and vehicle identification number; The public key certificate, public parameters and authentication parameters returned by the regional authority are received, and the authentication parameters are used to verify the legitimacy of the ordinary vehicle.

4. The anonymous authentication method for vehicle formation according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method further comprises: Receiving a platoon member authentication request sent by a formation member vehicle, wherein the platoon member authentication request is obtained by encrypting a platoon entry request parameter using a public key of the formation leader vehicle; Decrypting the platoon member authentication request using the private key of the platoon leader vehicle to obtain the platoon entry request parameters; The legitimacy of the formation member vehicle is verified according to the entry request parameters. If it is legal, a response message is generated and sent to the formation member vehicle to complete the platoon member authentication of the formation member vehicle.

5. A vehicle formation anonymous authentication method, applied to ordinary vehicles, characterized in that: include: receiving a team-joining invitation broadcasted by a formation leader vehicle, wherein the team-joining invitation includes a public key certificate of the formation leader vehicle; Verify the validity of the public key certificate. If it is valid, send a registration request to the formation leader vehicle, wherein the registration request is obtained by encrypting registration parameters with the public key of the formation leader vehicle, and is used to register as a formation member vehicle; Receiving the authentication key returned by the formation leader vehicle, wherein the authentication key is obtained by encrypting the public key of the ordinary vehicle; The authentication key is decrypted by the private key of the ordinary vehicle, and the decrypted information is stored to complete the registration.

6. The anonymous authentication method for vehicle formation according to claim 5, characterized in that: The method for generating the registration request includes: From the set of hash functions Select a random number as the private key of the ordinary vehicle And calculate the public key The calculation formula is: Among them, P is the system public encryption parameter, which is issued by the system to all vehicles and represents the generator of the elliptic curve additive group; According to the private key of ordinary vehicles and the public key Generate registration parameters {m i , l i , U i }: U i =O i ·x i ; in, ξ i =H(PID i ||m i ||Γ i ||O i ||PK RTA ), PK RTA , q is the system public encryption parameter, PK RTA is the public key of the regional authority, q is the prime order of the elliptic curve additive group, PID i is the pseudonym information of the ordinary vehicle, Γ i is the registration response parameter, t i is the parameter m i The timestamp of its generation; The registration parameter {m i , l i , U i }, generate a ciphertext message CMsg1, and generate a message authentication code MAC1, and obtain a registration request {CMsg1, MAC1}, where MAC1 = H(CMsg1), and H(·) represents a hash function.

7. The anonymous authentication method for vehicle formation according to claim 5, characterized in that: The method further includes, before the vehicle goes on the road, completing vehicle initialization to obtain system public encryption parameters, the initialization step comprising: Submitting private information to regional authorities offline, including vehicle identification numbers, ID numbers, phone numbers, email accounts, and addresses; The registration response parameters returned by the receiving regional authority according to the private information are stored locally to complete the initialization. The private information is also used by the regional authority to generate authentication parameters to be issued to the formation leader vehicle.

8. A vehicle formation anonymous authentication system, characterized in that: It includes the identity authentication server functional unit of the 5G core network, regional authorities, formation leader vehicles and ordinary vehicles; The identity authentication server functional unit and the regional authority are used to generate system common encryption parameters and publish them to other entities in the system; The regional authority is also used for initializing ordinary vehicles and generating authentication parameters for ordinary vehicles, wherein the authentication parameters are used to verify the legitimacy of the ordinary vehicles; and The regional authority is also used to register the formation leader vehicle, generate a public key certificate for the formation leader vehicle, and provide authentication parameters for the ordinary vehicle; The formation leader vehicle is used to execute the vehicle formation anonymous authentication method according to any one of claims 1 to 4; The ordinary vehicle is used to execute the vehicle formation anonymous authentication method described in any one of claims 5-7.

9. A storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the anonymous authentication method for a vehicle formation according to any one of claims 1 to 4 or the anonymous authentication method for a vehicle formation according to any one of claims 5 to 7 is implemented.

10. A vehicle comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that: When the processor executes the computer program, the anonymous authentication method for a vehicle formation according to any one of claims 1 to 4 or the anonymous authentication method for a vehicle formation according to any one of claims 5 to 7 is implemented.

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