Vulnerability analysis system, vulnerability analysis method, and program

The vulnerability analysis system enhances accuracy by employing in-vehicle specific and general security classifications to identify and prioritize vulnerabilities, addressing the low accuracy of existing systems and ensuring effective countermeasure implementation.

JP7594144B1Active Publication Date: 2024-12-03PANASONIC AUTOMOTIVE SYST CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
JP2024039485
Authority / Receiving Office
JP · JP
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-03-13
Publication Date
2024-12-03
Estimated Expiration
2044-03-13

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing vulnerability evaluation devices have low accuracy in analyzing vulnerabilities, particularly in the context of in-vehicle security.

Method used

A vulnerability analysis system that utilizes classification information specific to in-vehicle security, along with general security perspectives, to identify and prioritize countermeasures for identified vulnerabilities, considering factors like impact on vehicle operations and past occurrences.

Benefits of technology

Improves the accuracy of vulnerability analysis by specifically addressing in-vehicle security concerns and prioritizing countermeasures based on impact and historical data, ensuring timely and appropriate responses to potential threats.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

A vulnerability analysis system capable of improving the accuracy of vulnerability analysis is provided. [Solution] A vulnerability analysis system 10 includes a classification storage unit 12 that stores classification information indicating the type of an asset for each asset owned by a vehicle, a classification identification unit 11 that acquires design information d1 indicating assets owned by an analysis target item and identifies the type of asset indicated by the design information d1 by referring to the classification information, a pertinent determination unit 13 that determines whether or not each of one or more first vulnerabilities previously associated with the identified type corresponds to the analysis target item, and an output unit 17 that outputs an analysis result report d2 indicating the determination result by the pertinent determination unit 13. The multiple types indicated by the classification information include a type related to in-vehicle security.
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Description

[Technical field]

[0001] The present disclosure relates to a vulnerability analysis system that analyzes vulnerabilities of an item to be analyzed. [Background technology]

[0002] For example, Patent Document 1 discloses a vulnerability assessment device as a vulnerability analysis system. This vulnerability assessment device calculates a threat level for a security hole for each component of a product based on an asset value, and determines the priority order of security measures to be taken. Information indicating the asset value and the security hole is stored in a storage unit for each component of the product. The vulnerability assessment device also includes an attack map storage unit in which an attack map is stored that links the element names forming an attack path with the vulnerability information corresponding to the element names. The vulnerability assessment device also includes a security countermeasure classification storage unit in which, for each security measure, the component to be defended and a coefficient that quantifies the effect of the measure are stored in association with each other. The vulnerability assessment device also sets an assessment value for the vulnerability based on the result of multiplying the difficulty of attacking the security hole by the asset value. [Prior art documents] [Patent documents]

[0003] [Patent Document 1] Patent No. 6995726 Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]

[0004] However, the vulnerability assessment device of Patent Document 1 has a problem in that the accuracy of vulnerability analysis is low.

[0005] Therefore, the present disclosure provides a vulnerability analysis system and the like that can improve the accuracy of vulnerability analysis. [Means for solving the problem]

[0006] A vulnerability analysis system according to one embodiment of the present disclosure includes a classification storage unit that stores classification information indicating a type of asset for each asset owned by a vehicle, a classification identification unit that acquires design information indicating assets owned by an item to be analyzed and identifies the type of asset indicated by the design information by referring to the classification information, a non-determination unit that determines whether or not each of one or more first vulnerabilities pre-associated with the identified type applies to the item to be analyzed, and an output unit that outputs an analysis result report indicating a determination result by the non-determination unit, wherein the multiple types indicated by the classification information include a type related to in-vehicle security.

[0007] The comprehensive or specific aspects may be realized by an apparatus, a method, an integrated circuit, a computer program, or a computer-readable recording medium such as a CD-ROM, or may be realized by any combination of the apparatus, the method, the integrated circuit, the computer program, and the recording medium. The recording medium may be a non-transitory recording medium. Effect of the Invention

[0008] The vulnerability analysis system of the present disclosure can improve the accuracy of vulnerability analysis.

[0009] Further advantages and effects of one aspect of the present disclosure will become apparent from the specification and drawings. Such advantages and / or effects are provided by the configurations described in the embodiments and the specification and drawings, but all configurations are not necessarily required. [Brief description of the drawings]

[0010] [Figure 1] FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating an example of a configuration of a vulnerability analysis system according to an embodiment. [Diagram 2] FIG. 2 is a diagram showing an example of a screen for generating design information according to the embodiment. [Diagram 3]FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating an example of the processing performed by the category specifying unit and the non-determining unit in the embodiment. [Figure 4] FIG. 4 is a diagram for explaining an example of processing performed by the determination unit in the embodiment. [Diagram 5] FIG. 5 is a diagram illustrating an example of a configuration of a priority derivation unit according to the embodiment. [Figure 6] FIG. 6 is a diagram for explaining the process of the first priority derivation unit in the embodiment. [Figure 7] FIG. 7 is a diagram for explaining the process of the second priority derivation unit in the embodiment. [Figure 8] FIG. 8 is a diagram for explaining the process of the third priority derivation unit in the embodiment. [Figure 9] FIG. 9 is a diagram for explaining an example of the determination of a risk value by the threat analysis system. [Figure 10] FIG. 10 is a diagram showing an example of an analysis result report output from an output unit in the embodiment. [Figure 11] FIG. 11 is a flowchart showing an example of a series of processing operations of the category specifying unit, the pertinent determining unit, and the reason deriving unit in the embodiment. [Figure 12] FIG. 12 is a flowchart illustrating an example of a processing operation of the priority derivation unit in the embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0011] A vulnerability analysis system according to a first aspect of the present disclosure includes a classification storage unit that stores classification information indicating a type of an asset for each asset owned by a vehicle, a classification identification unit that acquires design information indicating an asset owned by an analysis target item and identifies the type of the asset indicated by the design information by referring to the classification information, a corresponding / non-corresponding determination unit that determines whether or not each of one or more first vulnerabilities previously associated with the identified types corresponds to the analysis target item, and an output unit that outputs an analysis result report indicating a determination result by the corresponding / non-corresponding determination unit, where the multiple types indicated by the classification information include a type related to vehicle security. The first vulnerability is, for example, a vulnerability identified by a Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)-ID, and is also called a vulnerability type.

[0012] As a result, since the multiple types indicated by the classification information include a type related to in-vehicle security, a type specific to in-vehicle security may be identified as the type of asset. In such a case, it is determined whether or not a first vulnerability specific to in-vehicle security corresponds to the analysis target item. Therefore, the first vulnerability can be determined from a viewpoint specific to in-vehicle security. This makes it possible to improve the accuracy of vulnerability analysis.

[0013] In addition, in the vulnerability analysis system according to the second aspect, the classification storage unit may include a first classification storage unit storing first classification information indicating, in association with each of the one or more types of in-vehicle security and one or more assets classified into the type, and a second classification storage unit storing second classification information indicating, in association with each of the one or more types of security not limited to the in-vehicle security and one or more assets classified into the type. Note that the second aspect may be subordinate to the first aspect.

[0014] This allows the first vulnerability to be determined based on a viewpoint specific to in-vehicle security and a viewpoint of general security, thereby making it possible to more effectively improve the accuracy of vulnerability analysis.

[0015] The vulnerability analysis system according to the third aspect may further include a priority derivation unit that derives, for each of the first vulnerabilities determined to correspond to the analysis target item, a priority of a countermeasure against the corresponding vulnerability as a countermeasure priority. Note that the third aspect may be subordinate to the first or second aspect.

[0016] As a result, a countermeasure priority is derived for each of the first vulnerabilities determined to correspond to the analysis target item, i.e., the multiple relevant vulnerabilities. The multiple relevant vulnerabilities may include a relevant vulnerability specific to in-vehicle security. In such a case, a countermeasure priority higher than that of the other relevant vulnerabilities can be derived for the relevant vulnerability specific to in-vehicle security. Alternatively, a countermeasure priority can be derived for the relevant vulnerability specific to in-vehicle security by a method specific to in-vehicle security. As a result, appropriate countermeasure priorities can be derived for the multiple relevant vulnerabilities, and insufficient or delayed countermeasures for the relevant vulnerabilities can be suppressed. Even if there are a large number of relevant vulnerabilities, the countermeasure priorities can be appropriately derived, so that the countermeasures for the relevant vulnerabilities can be taken in an appropriate order.

[0017] In addition, in the vulnerability analysis system according to the fourth aspect, the priority derivation unit may derive the countermeasure priority of the corresponding vulnerability using at least one of (a) the effect of the corresponding vulnerability on the running of a vehicle having the analysis target item, (b) the number of times that a second vulnerability belonging to the corresponding vulnerability has been found in a plurality of vehicles in the past, and (c) the actual amount of work required to take a countermeasure against the corresponding vulnerability in the past. The fourth aspect may be subordinate to a third aspect that is subordinate to the first or second aspect. The running of a vehicle corresponds to functions such as running, turning, and stopping of the vehicle. The second vulnerability is, for example, a vulnerability identified by a CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures)-ID.

[0018] This makes it possible to derive with a high degree of accuracy the priority of countermeasures from the standpoint of the impact that the vulnerability has on vehicle operation, the number of instances of secondary vulnerabilities, and the actual labor required to counter the vulnerability.

[0019] In the vulnerability analysis system according to a fifth aspect, the priority deriving unit may derive the countermeasure priority of the vulnerability by using an impact level, which is the magnitude of the impact of the asset of the analysis target item on an architecture. The fifth aspect may be dependent on a third aspect dependent on the first or second aspect, or a fourth aspect.

[0020] This makes it possible to derive the countermeasure priority with high accuracy from the viewpoint of the magnitude of the impact on the architecture.

[0021] In addition, in a vulnerability analysis system according to a sixth aspect, the priority derivation unit may derive the countermeasure priority of the vulnerability using a level of impact on the analysis target item caused by an attack on the asset, a level of possibility of attacking the asset, and a number of attack paths to the asset. Note that the sixth aspect may be subordinate to a third aspect, a fourth aspect, or a fifth aspect which is subordinate to the first aspect or the second aspect. Note that an attack path is also called an attack path.

[0022] This makes it possible to derive countermeasure priorities with a high degree of accuracy from the standpoint of the level of impact, the level of attack probability, and the number of attack paths.

[0023] The vulnerability analysis system according to the seventh aspect may further include a reason deriving unit for deriving a reason why the first vulnerability determined not to correspond to the analysis target item does not correspond to the analysis target item. Note that the seventh aspect may be subordinate to any one of the first aspect to the sixth aspect.

[0024] This allows the reason for non-application to be derived, thereby ensuring the reliability of the determination result by the pertinent / non-application determining unit.

[0025] Hereinafter, the embodiment will be specifically described with reference to the drawings.

[0026] The embodiments described below are all comprehensive or specific examples. The numerical values, shapes, materials, components, component arrangement and connection forms, steps, and order of steps shown in the following embodiments are merely examples and are not intended to limit the present disclosure. Furthermore, among the components in the following embodiments, components that are not described in an independent claim showing a top concept are described as optional components.

[0027] In addition, each drawing is a schematic diagram and is not necessarily a precise illustration. In addition, in each drawing, the same components are denoted by the same reference numerals.

[0028] (Embodiment) FIG. 1 is a diagram showing an example of a configuration of a vulnerability analysis system according to the present embodiment.

[0029] The vulnerability analysis system 10 in this embodiment is a system that analyzes information security vulnerabilities in an analysis target item included in, for example, a vehicle. That is, the vulnerability analysis system 10 acquires design information d1 of the analysis target item, and analyzes the vulnerability of each of one or more assets indicated in the design information d1. Then, the vulnerability analysis system 10 outputs an analysis result report d2 as information indicating the analysis result of the vulnerability.

[0030] The analysis target item and the asset may be, for example, a function realized by a program. The analysis target item may be an ECU (Electronic Control Unit) mounted on a vehicle. The vulnerability analysis system 10 may be, for example, a system that complies with the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) / Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) 21434 regulations.

[0031] Such a vulnerability analysis system 10 includes a classification specifying unit 11 , a classification storage unit 12 , a vulnerability determination unit 13 , a vulnerability management storage unit 14 , a reason deriving unit 15 , a priority deriving unit 16 , and an output unit 17 .

[0032] The classification storage unit 12 is a recording medium that stores classification information indicating the type of assets for each asset owned by the vehicle. The classification information can also be said to be information indicating the results of classifying the assets. In this embodiment, the classification storage unit 12 has a first classification storage unit 12a and a second classification storage unit 12b.

[0033] The first classification storage unit 12a is a recording medium storing first classification information indicating the result of classifying a plurality of assets from a viewpoint specific to a vehicle. Specifically, the first classification information indicates one or more types related to in-vehicle security in association with one or more assets classified into the type. In other words, in the first classification information, a plurality of assets are classified from the viewpoints of vehicle specific, in-vehicle specific, or in-vehicle security specific.

[0034] The second classification storage unit 12b is a recording medium that stores second classification information indicating a result of classifying a plurality of assets from a general security viewpoint. Specifically, the second classification information indicates one or more types of security, not limited to in-vehicle security, in association with one or more assets classified into the types.

[0035] That is, the classification information in this embodiment includes the first classification information and the second classification information. The types indicated by the classification information include a type related to vehicle security. Note that the vehicle security is, for example, security in an information processing system or a program mounted on a vehicle.

[0036] The vulnerability management storage unit 14 is a recording medium that stores vulnerability management information indicating each of a plurality of types in association with one or more first vulnerabilities corresponding to each type.

[0037] In this embodiment, the first vulnerability is a vulnerability identified by a CWE-ID. A CWE-ID is identification information for a category or type of vulnerability. That is, in this embodiment, the first vulnerability is a highly abstract vulnerability, and is also called a vulnerability type. More specifically, CWE is a common standard for identifying types of security vulnerabilities in software, which is published by the MITRE Corporation. CWE-IDs are classified by view, category, or the like.

[0038] The recording media of the first classification storage unit 12a, the second classification storage unit 12b, the vulnerability management storage unit 14, etc. are, for example, a hard disk drive, a RAM (Random Access Memory), a ROM (Read Only Memory), a semiconductor memory, etc. Furthermore, such recording media may be volatile or non-volatile.

[0039] The category identification unit 11 acquires design information d1 indicating assets held by the analysis target item. Then, the category identification unit 11 identifies the type of assets indicated by the design information d1 by referring to the above-mentioned classification information (i.e., the first classification information and the second classification information). Note that the category identification unit 11 may identify multiple types for one asset.

[0040] The non-determination unit 13 determines whether or not each of the one or more first vulnerabilities previously associated with the type identified by the category identification unit 11 corresponds to the analysis target item. That is, the non-determination unit 13 searches for each of the one or more first vulnerabilities previously associated with the type identified by the category identification unit 11 in the vulnerability management information by referring to the vulnerability management information in the vulnerability management storage unit 14. Then, the non-determination unit 13 determines whether or not each of the searched one or more first vulnerabilities corresponds to the analysis target item. The non-determination unit 13 outputs determination result information indicating the determination result to the reason derivation unit 15, the priority derivation unit 16, and the output unit 17.

[0041] When the reason derivation unit 15 acquires the judgment result information from the pertinent / non-pertinent judgment unit 13, the reason derivation unit 15 derives, for a first vulnerability judged not to correspond to an analysis target item, a reason why the first vulnerability does not correspond to an analysis target item based on the judgment result information. Note that a first vulnerability judged to correspond to an analysis target item is hereinafter also referred to as a pertinent vulnerability. Then, the reason derivation unit 15 outputs reason information indicating the derived reason to the output unit 17.

[0042] The priority derivation unit 16 derives, for each first vulnerability determined to correspond to the analysis target item, i.e., each relevant vulnerability, a priority of a countermeasure against the relevant vulnerability as a countermeasure priority. Then, the priority derivation unit 16 outputs priority information indicating the derived countermeasure priority to the output unit 17. The priority derivation unit 16 in this embodiment derives countermeasure priorities for the relevant vulnerabilities even when the analysis target item has a large number of assets and each of the assets has a large number of relevant vulnerabilities.

[0043] The output unit 17 acquires the determination result information from the pertinent determination unit 13, the reason information from the reason derivation unit 15, and the priority information from the priority derivation unit 16. Then, the output unit 17 outputs an analysis result report d2 including the determination result information, the reason information, and the priority information. In other words, the analysis result report d2 shows the determination result by the pertinent determination unit 13.

[0044] FIG. 2 is a diagram showing an example of a screen for generating design information d1.

[0045] For example, the computer displays the screen shown in Fig. 2 on a display. This screen is for asking a question to the user and receiving an answer to the question from the user. The question is about the item to be analyzed. By receiving an answer from the user via the screen, the computer generates design information d1 indicating one or more assets according to the answer and outputs the design information d1 to the classification specification unit 11.

[0046] Specifically, the screen includes question 1-1, "Is this a program that communicates with an external device?" Furthermore, if the answer to that question is "Yes," the screen includes another question, 1-2, "Please list all combinations of the external interface to be used, the device to which the program connects, the protocol to be used, and the authentication method for the connected device." The external interface is also written as "external I / F."

[0047] The computer accepts the answer "Yes" to question 1-1 in response to the input operation by the user, and further accepts the answer to question 1-2. When answering question 1-2, the user selects one option from multiple options as an answer for each item. The items are "external I / F used", "external device to be connected", "protocol", "authentication method for device to be connected", "network defense function", "validity verification method", etc. The user selects an answer for each of these items. For example, the user selects "in-vehicle CAN" as an answer for the item "external I / F used", selects "control ECU / device inside GW" as an answer for the item "external device to be connected", and selects "CAN-FD" as an answer for the item "protocol". Furthermore, the user selects "none" as an answer for the item "authentication method for device to be connected", selects "IDS / IPS" as an answer for the item "network defense function", and selects "none" as an answer for the item "validity verification method". As a result, one combination including "in-vehicle CAN", "control ECU / device inside GW", "CAN-FD", "none", "IDS / IPS", and "none" is accepted as an answer to question 1-2. In other words, the answer indicated by answer number "1-2-2" is accepted.

[0048] The computer generates design information d1 based on the answers received in this manner.

[0049] FIG. 3 is a diagram for explaining an example of the processing of the category specifying unit 11 and the non-determining unit 13. As shown in FIG.

[0050] The classification specification unit 11 acquires the above-mentioned design information d1. For example, as shown in (a) of FIG. 3, the design information d1 indicates "CAN protocol" and "password authentication function" as assets. Note that CAN stands for Controller Area Network. Also, "CAN protocol" and "password authentication function" are examples of assets based on the answers indicated by answer numbers "1-2-2" and "1-2-4" shown in FIG. 2, respectively.

[0051] The classification specification unit 11 searches for the asset "CAN protocol" from the first classification information 12ad of the first classification storage unit 12a and the second classification information 12bd of the second classification storage unit 12b. In this case, the asset "CAN protocol" is shown in the first classification information 12ad. Therefore, the classification specification unit 11 specifies a type associated with the asset "CAN protocol" in the first classification information 12ad, as shown in (b) of FIG. 3. The type is a type related to vehicle security or a type specific to vehicle security. The type includes, for example, a first type and a second type. The second type may be a type obtained by further classifying the first type. Alternatively, the second type may be a type independent of the first type. In the example of FIG. 3, the classification specification unit 11 specifies "CAN" as the first type and "-" as the second type associated with the asset "CAN protocol". Note that "-" indicates that there is no second type, and is also written as "(none)".

[0052] Similarly, the category identification unit 11 searches for the asset "password authentication" from the first category information 12ad in the first category storage unit 12a and the second category information 12bd in the second category storage unit 12b. In this case, the asset "password" is shown in the second category information 12bd. Therefore, the category identification unit 11 identifies a type associated with the asset "password authentication" in the second category information 12bd, as shown in (b) of FIG. 3. The type is a type related to security that is not limited to in-vehicle security, that is, general security. In the example of FIG. 3, the category identification unit 11 identifies "authentication" as the first type and "password" as the second type associated with the asset "password authentication".

[0053] As a result, as shown in (c) of Figure 3, for the asset "CAN protocol", a combination of the first type "CAN" and the second type "(none)" is obtained as an identification result. Furthermore, for the asset "password authentication", a combination of the first type "authentication" and the second type "password" is obtained as an identification result.

[0054] Then, as shown in (d) of FIG. 3, the pertinence determination unit 13 searches for one or more first vulnerabilities associated with the identified combination of the first type and the second type by referring to the vulnerability management information 14d in the vulnerability management storage unit 14. That is, the pertinence determination unit searches for one or more CWE-IDs. Specifically, in the vulnerability management information 14d, CWE-IDs "300" and "419" are associated with the combination of the first type "CAN" and the second type "-". Furthermore, in the vulnerability management information 14d, CWE-IDs "258" and "259" are associated with the combination of the first type "authentication" and the second type "password". Therefore, the pertinence determination unit 13 searches for CWE-IDs "300" and "419" with respect to the combination of the first type "CAN" and the second type "-". Furthermore, the pertinent determination unit 13 searches for CWE-IDs such as "258" and "259" for the combination of the first type "authentication" and the second type "password."

[0055] In addition, in the vulnerability management information 14d, one or more CWE-IDs may be associated with each of the first type and the second type. In this case, the non-determination unit 13 refers to the vulnerability management information 14d to search for one or more CWE-IDs associated with the first type, and further search for one or more CWE-IDs associated with the second type.

[0056] FIG. 4 is a diagram for explaining an example of the process of the non-determining unit 13. In FIG.

[0057] When the relevant determination unit 13 searches for one or more CWE-IDs as shown in (a) of Fig. 4, it determines whether or not each of the one or more CWE-IDs corresponds to an analysis target item as shown in (b) of Fig. 4. For example, the relevant determination unit 13 may make the determination by referring to a predetermined table, or may make the determination in response to an input operation by a user. The relevant determination unit 13 then generates and outputs determination result information d3 indicating the determination result for each of the one or more CWE-IDs. Note that the determination result information d3 may indicate the title of the CWE-ID for each CWE-ID.

[0058] In this manner, in the present embodiment, the types indicated by the classification information consisting of the first classification information 12ad and the second classification information 12bd include types related to vehicle security. Therefore, a type specific to vehicle security may be identified as the type of asset. In such a case, it is determined whether or not the first vulnerability specific to vehicle security corresponds to the analysis target item. Therefore, the first vulnerability can be determined from a viewpoint specific to vehicle security. This can improve the accuracy of vulnerability analysis.

[0059] In addition, in this embodiment, since the classification information is composed of the first classification information 12ad and the second classification information 12bd, the first vulnerability can be determined based on a viewpoint specific to in-vehicle security and a viewpoint of general security. This makes it possible to more effectively improve the analysis accuracy of the vulnerability.

[0060] FIG. 5 is a diagram showing an example of the configuration of the priority derivation unit 16. As shown in FIG.

[0061] The priority derivation unit 16 in this embodiment includes a first priority derivation unit 21, a second priority derivation unit 22, a third priority derivation unit 23, a CWE result storage unit 24, an result effort storage unit 25, and an architecture storage unit .

[0062] The CWE performance storage unit 24 is a recording medium that stores CWE performance information. The CWE performance information indicates, for each CWE-ID, the performance number, which is the number of CVE-IDs that belong to the CWE-ID and have been assigned as in-vehicle CVEs in the past year. Note that vulnerabilities identified by CVE-IDs are also called secondary vulnerabilities.

[0063] The actual effort storage unit 25 is a recording medium that stores actual effort information. The actual effort information indicates, for each CWE-ID, the actual effort required to take measures against the vulnerability (i.e., the first vulnerability) identified by that CWE-ID.

[0064] The architecture storage unit 26 is a recording medium that stores architecture information. The architecture information indicates, for each type of architecture, the magnitude of the influence on the architecture of that type as the degree of influence.

[0065] The recording media for the CWE performance record storage unit 24, the performance man-hours storage unit 25, the architecture storage unit 26, etc. are, for example, a hard disk drive, a RAM, a ROM, or a semiconductor memory. Moreover, such recording media may be volatile or non-volatile.

[0066] The first priority derivation unit 21 acquires determination result information d3 indicating the determination result by the relevant / non-relevant determination unit 13. The determination result information d3 indicates, for example, one or more CWE-IDs and a determination result as to whether each CWE-ID is relevant or not, as shown in (b) of Fig. 4. Note that a CWE-ID determined to be relevant will hereinafter be referred to as a relevant CWE-ID, and a vulnerability identified by the relevant CWE-ID (i.e., a first vulnerability) will hereinafter be referred to as a relevant vulnerability.

[0067] Then, first priority derivation unit 21 derives, for each relevant CWE-ID, i.e., for each relevant vulnerability identified by the relevant CWE-ID, a priority of a countermeasure for that vulnerability as a first priority. At this time, first priority derivation unit 21 derives the first priority for each relevant CWE-ID based on the CWE performance information in CWE performance storage unit 24 and the actual effort information in actual effort storage unit 25. In addition, first priority derivation unit 21 outputs first priority information indicating the first priority derived for each relevant CWE-ID to second priority derivation unit 22.

[0068] The second priority derivation unit 22 derives, for each relevant CWE-ID, i.e., for each relevant vulnerability identified by the relevant CWE-ID, the priority of a countermeasure against the relevant vulnerability as a second priority. For example, when the second priority derivation unit 22 acquires the first priority information from the first priority derivation unit 21, the second priority derivation unit 22 identifies the first priority of each relevant CWE-ID indicated in the first priority information. Furthermore, the second priority derivation unit 22 derives the second priority of each relevant CWE-ID using each relevant CWE-ID, the first priority of each relevant CWE-ID, and the architecture information of the architecture storage unit 26. Then, the second priority derivation unit 22 outputs the second priority information indicating the second priority derived for each relevant CWE-ID to the third priority derivation unit 23.

[0069] The third priority derivation unit 23 derives, for each relevant CWE-ID, i.e., for each relevant vulnerability identified by the relevant CWE-ID, the priority of the countermeasure for the relevant vulnerability as the third priority. For example, when the third priority derivation unit 23 acquires the second priority information from the second priority derivation unit 22, it identifies the second priority of each relevant CWE-ID indicated in the second priority information. Furthermore, the third priority derivation unit 23 derives the third priority of each relevant CWE-ID using the risk value of the asset, the second priority of each relevant CWE-ID, and the number of attack paths to the asset. Then, the third priority derivation unit 23 outputs priority information d4 indicating the third priority derived for each relevant CWE-ID as the countermeasure priority.

[0070] FIG. 6 is a diagram for explaining the process of the first priority derivation unit 21. As shown in FIG.

[0071] For example, the analysis target item is a remote parking function of a vehicle, as shown in FIG. 6. The analysis target item includes a Bluetooth (registered trademark) communication function, a first function, a second function, and a CAN communication function as assets. Among those assets, the asset "CAN communication function" has a first vulnerability (specifically, a vulnerability type) identified by the CWE-ID "CWE-b." Note that "CWE-b" is the relevant CWE-ID, and the above-mentioned first vulnerability is the relevant vulnerability.

[0072] The first priority derivation unit 21 receives the impact of the vulnerability identified by the CWE-ID on the vehicle, for example, in response to an input operation by a user. The impact is expressed, for example, by a safety (S) level, a property (F) level, an operational performance (O) level, and a privacy (P) level. In other words, the impact is expressed by SFOP. The levels are expressed in four stages. For example, the levels, in order of decreasing level, include "Severe," "Major," "Moderate," and "Negligible."

[0073] For example, as shown in FIG. 6(a), the first priority derivation unit 21 accepts "Severe" as the level of safety (S) and "Moderate" as the level of property (F). Furthermore, the first priority derivation unit 21 accepts "Major" as the level of operation performance (O) and "Negligible" as the level of privacy (F). The "Severe" level of safety (S) is a level at which a life-threatening injury or fatal injury occurs. The "Moderate" level of property (F) is a level at which minor losses less than the price of the vehicle occur. The "Major" level of operation performance (O) is a level at which important vehicle functions are lost. The "Negligible" level of privacy (P) is a level at which there is no impact on the functions or performance of the vehicle.

[0074] In the above example, first priority derivation unit 21 accepts the SFOP for the CWE-ID in response to an input operation by the user, but it may also accept the SFOP by referring to a predetermined table, in which an SFOP is defined for each CWE-ID.

[0075] When the first priority derivation unit 21 receives such an SFOP, it derives a first coefficient for the relevant vulnerability based on the impact of the vulnerability identified by the CWE-ID "CWE-b" among the SFOP on the safety and running of the vehicle. The impact on the safety of the vehicle is expressed by the level of safety (S). The impact on the running of the vehicle is the impact on the running function, turning function, and stopping function of the vehicle, and is expressed by the level of operation performance (O). Therefore, the first priority derivation unit 21 derives the first coefficient "3.5" from the level of safety (Severe) and the level of operation performance (O) "Major". Note that the combination of the level of safety (S) and the level of operation performance (O) may be associated with the first coefficient in advance. That is, the first priority derivation unit 21 searches for a first coefficient corresponding to the combination of the level of safety (S) and the level of operation performance (O) received from a table indicating each of a plurality of combinations and the first coefficient associated with the combination. This results in the first coefficient.

[0076] In the above example, the first priority derivation unit 21 derives the first coefficient based on a combination of the level of safety (S) and the level of operational performance (O), but the first coefficient may be derived based on only one of the level of safety (S) and the level of operational performance (O). For example, the first priority derivation unit 21 may derive the first coefficient based on only the level of safety (S). Alternatively, the first priority derivation unit 21 may derive the first coefficient using all levels of SFOP.

[0077] Next, as shown in FIG. 6B, the first priority derivation unit 21 refers to the CWE performance information 24d stored in the CWE performance storage unit 24. As described above, the CWE performance information 24d indicates, for each CWE-ID, the performance number, which is the number of times that a CVE-ID belonging to the CWE-ID has been assigned as an in-vehicle CVE in the past year. That is, the CWE performance information 24d indicates the number of times that a vulnerability identified by each of a plurality of in-vehicle CVEs belonging to a CWE-ID (i.e., a second vulnerability) has been found in the most recent past year in the in-vehicle industry or the vehicle industry. When the corresponding vulnerability is a first vulnerability identified by a CWE-ID "CWE-b", the first priority derivation unit 21 searches for the CWE-ID "CWE-b" from the CWE performance information 24d. Then, the first priority derivation unit 21 specifies the performance number "200" associated with the CWE-ID "CWE-b" in the CWE performance information 24d. Furthermore, the first priority derivation unit 21 derives a larger second coefficient as the number of achievements increases. For example, the first priority derivation unit 21 derives a second coefficient of "4" from the number of achievements "200". The relationship between the number of achievements and the second coefficient may be expressed by a function or in a table format.

[0078] Next, the first priority derivation unit 21 refers to the actual man-hour information 25d stored in the actual man-hour storage unit 25, as shown in (c) of FIG. 6. As described above, the actual man-hour information 25d indicates, for each CWE-ID, the actual man-hours required to take measures against the first vulnerability identified by the CWE-ID. When the vulnerability is the first vulnerability identified by the CWE-ID "CWE-b", the first priority derivation unit 21 searches for the CWE-ID "CWE-b" from the actual man-hour information 25d. Then, the first priority derivation unit 21 identifies the actual man-hour "1" associated with the CWE-ID "CWE-b" in the actual man-hour information 25d. Furthermore, the first priority derivation unit 21 derives a larger third coefficient as the actual man-hours increase. For example, the first priority derivation unit 21 derives the third coefficient "2" from the actual man-hour "1". The relationship between the actual man-hours and the third coefficient may be expressed by a function or in a table format.

[0079] Then, the first priority derivation unit 21 derives the first priority based on the first coefficient, the second coefficient, and the third coefficient. For example, the first priority derivation unit 21 derives the first priority by multiplying the first coefficient, the second coefficient, and the third coefficient. In the above example, the first priority derivation unit 21 derives the first priority "28" by multiplying the first coefficient "3.5", the second coefficient "4", and the third coefficient "2". Note that, in the above example, multiplication is used to derive the first priority, but other operations or formulas other than multiplication, such as the average of the above three coefficients, may be used.

[0080] In this manner, the first priority derivation unit 21 in this embodiment derives the first priority of the countermeasure against the vulnerability based on the first coefficient, the second coefficient, and the third coefficient. Furthermore, the priority derivation unit 16 in this embodiment derives the countermeasure priority using the first priority. Therefore, the priority derivation unit 16 in this embodiment derives the countermeasure priority of the vulnerability using (a) the impact of the vulnerability on the running of a vehicle having the analysis target item, (b) the number of cases in which a second vulnerability belonging to the vulnerability was found in a plurality of vehicles in the past, and (c) the actual man-hours required for the countermeasure against the vulnerability in the past. Note that the impact of (a) is the level of safety (S) and the level of operational performance (O) described above, the number of cases in (b) is the number of cases identified from the CWE performance information 24d, and the actual man-hours in (c) is the actual man-hours identified from the actual man-hours information 25d.

[0081] In this manner, in the present embodiment, a countermeasure priority is derived for each of a plurality of first vulnerabilities determined to correspond to the analysis target item, i.e., a plurality of relevant vulnerabilities. The plurality of relevant vulnerabilities may include a relevant vulnerability specific to in-vehicle security. In such a case, a countermeasure priority higher than that of the other relevant vulnerabilities can be derived for the relevant vulnerability specific to in-vehicle security. Alternatively, a countermeasure priority can be derived for the relevant vulnerability specific to in-vehicle security by a method specific to in-vehicle security. This makes it possible to derive appropriate countermeasure priorities for a plurality of relevant vulnerabilities, and to suppress insufficient or delayed countermeasures against the relevant vulnerabilities. In addition, even if there are a large number of relevant vulnerabilities, the countermeasure priorities are appropriately derived, so that countermeasures against the relevant vulnerabilities can be taken in an appropriate order.

[0082] In this embodiment, the countermeasure priority of the vulnerability is derived using the above (a), (b), and (c). Therefore, the countermeasure priority can be derived with high accuracy from the viewpoint of the impact of the vulnerability on the running of the vehicle, the actual number of second vulnerabilities, the actual man-hours of countermeasures against the vulnerability, etc.

[0083] FIG. 7 is a diagram for explaining the process of the second priority derivation unit 22. As shown in FIG.

[0084] The second priority derivation unit 22 refers to the architecture information 26d stored in the architecture storage unit 26, as shown in Fig. 7. As described above, the architecture information 26d indicates, for each type of architecture, the magnitude of the influence of that type on the architecture as the degree of influence. For example, in the architecture information 26d, the types of architecture are classified into a plurality of higher classes, and each higher class is further classified into a plurality of lower classes. That is, the types of architecture are made up of a combination of higher classes and lower classes. In other words, the types of architecture are made up of a major class and a minor class. Furthermore, in the architecture information 26d, each higher class is associated with a CWE-View.

[0085] If the vulnerability is a first vulnerability identified by CWE-ID "CWE-b", the second priority derivation unit 22 identifies the type of architecture corresponding to the CWE-ID "CWE-b". The asset corresponding to the CWE-ID "CWE-b" is a CAN communication function, and is related to system and software as the type of architecture. Therefore, the second priority derivation unit 22 identifies system and software as the type of architecture corresponding to the CWE-ID "CWE-b". Then, the second priority derivation unit 22 identifies the impact level "4" associated with the higher class "system" and the impact levels "3, 2, 1" associated with the higher class "software" in the architecture information 26d. Furthermore, the second priority derivation unit 22 selects the largest impact level "4" from among the identified impact levels.

[0086] Next, the second priority derivation unit 22 derives the second priority based on the first priority of the corresponding CWE-ID "CWE-b" indicated in the first priority information and the impact level "4" identified and selected for the corresponding CWE-ID "CWE-b". For example, the second priority derivation unit 22 derives the second priority by multiplying the first priority by the impact level. In the above example, the second priority derivation unit 22 derives the second priority "112" by multiplying the first priority "28" by the impact level "4". Note that, although multiplication is used to derive the second priority in the above example, an operation or formula other than multiplication may be used.

[0087] In this way, the second priority derivation unit 22 in this embodiment derives the second priority of the countermeasure against the vulnerability based on the impact on the architecture. Furthermore, the priority derivation unit 16 in this embodiment derives the countermeasure priority using the second priority. Therefore, the priority derivation unit 16 in this embodiment derives the countermeasure priority for the vulnerability using the impact, which is the magnitude of the impact on the architecture of the assets held by the analysis target item.

[0088] This makes it possible to derive the countermeasure priority with high accuracy from the viewpoint of the magnitude of the impact on the architecture.

[0089] FIG. 8 is a diagram for explaining the process of the third priority derivation unit 23. As shown in FIG.

[0090] As shown in FIG. 8, when the vulnerability is a first vulnerability identified by the CWE-ID "CWE-b", the third priority derivation unit 23 determines the CWE-ID "CWE-b", that is, a risk value of the asset corresponding to the CWE-ID "CWE-b". Furthermore, the third priority derivation unit 23 derives a fourth coefficient based on the risk value and the number of attack paths, which is the number of attack paths to the asset. The attack path is also called an attack route. Then, the third priority derivation unit 23 derives a third priority as a countermeasure priority based on the fourth coefficient and the second priority derived by the second priority derivation unit 22.

[0091] Specifically, the third priority derivation unit 23 first derives a DFD (Data Flow Diagram) of the analysis target item based on the design information d1, etc. The third priority derivation unit 23 may derive the DFD using other information, may acquire the DFD from another system or device, or may derive the DFD based on an input operation by a user. The DFD is a diagram showing the flow of data between external devices such as a smartphone, a GW (Gateway), and a sensor ECU, and each component included in the remote parking function, which is the analysis target item.

[0092] Next, the third priority derivation unit 23 identifies an attack path to an asset corresponding to the CWE-ID "CWE-b" based on the DFD. In the example of FIG. 8, the asset is a CAN communication function. There are a first attack path, a second attack path, and a third attack path for the attack path to the CAN communication function. As shown in FIG. 8, the first attack path is a path from a smartphone outside the remote parking function to the CAN communication function. The second attack path is a path from a GW connected to a vehicle control ECU outside the remote parking function to the CAN communication function. The third attack path is a path from a sensor ECU outside the remote parking function to the CAN communication function. Therefore, the number of attack paths from the outside of the remote parking function to the CAN communication function, that is, the number of attack paths, is "3". Therefore, the third priority derivation unit 23 identifies "3" as the number of attack paths.

[0093] Next, the third priority derivation unit 23 determines a risk value for each attack path to an asset (CAN communication function in the example of FIG. 8) corresponding to the CWE-ID "CWE-b". When determining the risk value of an asset, the third priority derivation unit 23 uses the level of the impact on the analysis target item caused by an attack on the asset, the level of the possibility of an attack via the attack path to the asset, and a risk matrix table. The impact level, the attack possibility level, and the risk matrix table are defined by, for example, ISO21434. For example, when the impact level is "Severe" and the attack possibility level is "Low", the third priority derivation unit 23 searches the risk matrix table for a risk value associated with the impact level "Severe" and the attack possibility level "Low". Through such a search, the third priority derivation unit 23 determines a risk value "3". After determining the risk value for each attack path, the third priority derivation unit 23 selects the maximum risk value from the risk values. In the example of FIG. 8, "3" is selected as the maximum risk value.

[0094] Next, the third priority derivation unit 23 derives a fourth coefficient "9" by, for example, multiplying the maximum risk value "3" selected as described above by the number of identified attack paths "3". Furthermore, the third priority derivation unit 23 derives a third priority "1108" by, for example, multiplying the fourth coefficient "9" by the second priority "112". This third priority "1108" is treated as the countermeasure priority. Note that, in the above example, multiplication is used to derive the third priority, but an operation or formula other than multiplication may be used.

[0095] In this manner, the third priority derivation unit 23 in this embodiment derives the third priority of the countermeasure against the vulnerability based on the risk value and the number of attack paths. The risk value is determined based on the level of the impact on the analysis target item caused by the attack on the asset and the level of the possibility of the attack on the asset. In this embodiment, the third priority is treated as the countermeasure priority. Therefore, the priority derivation unit 16 in this embodiment derives the countermeasure priority for the vulnerability based on the level of the impact on the analysis target item caused by the attack on the asset, the level of the possibility of the attack on the asset, and the number of attack paths on the asset.

[0096] This makes it possible to derive countermeasure priorities with a high degree of accuracy from the standpoint of the level of impact, the level of attack probability, and the number of attack paths.

[0097] The third priority derivation unit 23 may determine the risk value and select the maximum risk value in the threat analysis system. For example, the threat analysis is first performed on the analysis target item by the threat analysis system, and then the vulnerability analysis is performed by the vulnerability analysis system 10. In the threat analysis by the threat analysis system, the risk value is determined and the maximum risk value is selected, and in the vulnerability analysis by the vulnerability analysis system 10, the third priority derivation unit 23 determines the risk value and selects the maximum risk value. That is, the third priority derivation unit 23 in this embodiment determines the risk value and selects the maximum risk value by performing the same processing as that of the threat analysis system. Alternatively, when the risk value is determined and the maximum risk value is selected in the threat analysis by the threat analysis system, the third priority derivation unit 23 may obtain the maximum risk value obtained as a processing result by the threat analysis system from the threat analysis system without determining the risk value and selecting the maximum risk value.

[0098] FIG. 9 is a diagram for explaining an example of the determination of a risk value by the threat analysis system.

[0099] As shown in FIG. 9(a), the threat analysis system evaluates the risk values ​​of assets A, B, and C owned by the analysis target item 80. The assets A, B, and C are data or functions to be protected in the analysis target item 80. The analysis target item 80 is configured as an ECU mounted on a vehicle, and communicates with external devices such as a smartphone 91 and a Diag 92 wirelessly or via wires. The smartphone 91 is a smartphone, and the Diag 92 is a device that diagnoses defects and malfunctions of the vehicle, that is, a diagnosis. The analysis target item 80 includes a BT interface 81, a USB interface 82, a CAN interface 83, a Main microcomputer 84, and a CAN microcomputer 85, which are physical components. The BT interface 81 is also written as a BT I / F and is an interface for Bluetooth. The USB interface 82 is also written as a USB I / F and is an interface for USB (Universal Serial Bus). The CAN interface 83 is also written as a CAN I / F and is an interface for CAN. The main microcomputer 84 is a microcomputer that controls the analysis target item 80. The main microcomputer 84 has the above-mentioned assets A, B, and C. The CAN microcomputer 85 is a microcomputer that performs control related to the CAN of the analysis target item 80. Note that the physical components are hardware components.

[0100] Here, there are physical paths between the Main microcomputer 84 and each of the BT interface 81, the USB interface 82, and the CAN microcomputer 85. There is also a physical path between the BT interface 81 and the smartphone 91. There is also a physical path between the CAN microcomputer 85 and the CAN interface 83, and there is also a physical path between the CAN interface 83 and the Diag 92. Note that the physical paths are physical connection paths.

[0101] Also, physical components may be assigned a level of attack probability. For example, the BT interface 81 is assigned a level of attack probability of "Medium." The USB interface 82 is assigned a level of attack probability of "Very Low."

[0102] Furthermore, for each asset, a level of impact that an attack on the asset will have on the analysis target item 80 is set. For example, the impact level is set to "Moderate" for asset A, the impact level is set to "Severe" for asset B, and the impact level is set to "Major" for asset C. The impact level is also called the impact degree.

[0103] The threat analysis system determines, for each of assets A, B, and C, one or more attack paths to the asset. That is, for each of assets A, B, and C, the threat analysis system determines one or more physical paths consisting of an arrangement of one or more physical components from an external device to the asset.

[0104] For example, when the smartphone 91 attacks assets A, B, and C, the smartphone 91 may access the main microcomputer 84 via the BT interface 81, which is assigned an attack possibility level of "Medium." Alternatively, the smartphone 91 may access the main microcomputer 84 via the USB interface 82, which is assigned an attack possibility level of "Very Low." In other words, the attack paths to assets A, B, and C include an attack path via the BT interface 81 and an attack path via the USB interface 82. Therefore, the threat analysis system determines two attack paths for each of assets A, B, and C.

[0105] The threat analysis system determines a risk value for each of the determined attack paths for assets A, B, and C by referring to the risk matrix table shown in (b) of Fig. 9 using the level of attack probability corresponding to the attack path and the level of impact of the asset. In other words, the threat analysis system determines a risk value for each of the two attack paths to asset A, determines a risk value for each of the two attack paths to asset B, and determines a risk value for each of the two attack paths to asset C.

[0106] As shown in FIG. 9(b), the risk matrix table indicates the risk value corresponding to each combination of the attack possibility level and the impact level. The attack possibility levels are classified as "Very Low", "Low", "Medium", and "High". These levels are arranged in ascending order. The impact levels are classified as "Severe", "Major", "Moderate", and "Negligible". These levels are arranged in ascending order.

[0107] In the above example, the impact level of asset A is "Moderate", the impact level of asset B is "Severe", and the impact level of asset C is "Major". In addition, the attack probability level corresponding to one of the two attack paths is "Medium", and the attack probability level corresponding to the other is "Very Low".

[0108] Therefore, by referring to the risk matrix table, the threat analysis system determines, as the risk value of asset A, a risk value of "2" corresponding to the combination of the attack probability level "Medium" and the impact level of asset A "Moderate". Furthermore, the threat analysis system determines, as the risk value of asset A, a risk value of "1" corresponding to the combination of the attack probability level "Very Low" and the impact level of asset A "Moderate". Then, from the risk values ​​"2" and "1", the threat analysis system selects the maximum risk value "2".

[0109] Similarly, by referring to the risk matrix table, the threat analysis system determines, as the risk value of asset B, a risk value of "4" corresponding to the combination of the attack probability level "Medium" and the impact level "Severe" of asset B. Furthermore, the threat analysis system determines, as the risk value of asset B, a risk value of "2" corresponding to the combination of the attack probability level "Very Low" and the impact level "Severe" of asset B. Then, from the risk values ​​"4" and "2", the threat analysis system selects the maximum risk value "4".

[0110] Similarly, by referring to the risk matrix table, the threat analysis system determines, as the risk value of asset C, a risk value of "3" corresponding to the combination of the attack probability level "Medium" and the impact level "Major" of asset C. Furthermore, the threat analysis system determines, as the risk value of asset C, a risk value of "1" corresponding to the combination of the attack probability level "Very Low" and the impact level "Major" of asset C. Then, from the risk values ​​"3" and "1", the threat analysis system selects the maximum risk value "3".

[0111] FIG. 10 is a diagram showing an example of the analysis result report d2 outputted from the output unit 17. As shown in FIG.

[0112] The output unit 17 outputs an analysis result report d2 including the determination result information d3 acquired from the relevant determination unit 13, the reason information d5 acquired from the reason derivation unit 15, and the priority information d4 acquired from the priority derivation unit 16. That is, as shown in FIG. 10, the analysis result report d2 indicates, for each CWE-ID, the title of the first vulnerability identified by the CWE-ID and the determination result as to whether or not the first vulnerability corresponds to the analysis target item. Such a title and the determination result are indicated in the determination result information d3. In addition, in the example of FIG. 10, the analysis result report d2 indicates, for each CWE-ID, the placement destination of the first vulnerability identified by the CWE-ID. The placement destination is, for example, a function having the first vulnerability among the functions included in the analysis target item (for example, a remote parking function). Such a placement destination may also be indicated in the determination result information d3.

[0113] Furthermore, when the first vulnerability identified by the CWE-ID is not a corresponding vulnerability, the analysis result report d2 indicates, for each CWE-ID, the reason why the first vulnerability does not correspond to the analysis target item as a judgment reason. This judgment reason is indicated in the reason information d5. For example, when the reason derivation unit 15 acquires the judgment result information d3 from the pertinence determination unit 13, the reason derivation unit 15 identifies the characteristic "password" of the first vulnerability based on the contents such as the title of the first vulnerability indicated in the judgment result information d3. Then, the reason derivation unit 15 derives, as the above-mentioned judgment reason, that the characteristic "password" is not used in the placement destination "CAN communication function" of the first vulnerability, and outputs the reason information d5 indicating the judgment reason. The judgment reason indicated by such reason information d5 is included in the analysis result report d2. As a result, the reason why the first vulnerability does not correspond to the analysis target item, that is, the reason for non-applicability, is derived as the judgment reason, so that the reliability of the judgment result by the pertinence determination unit 13 can be guaranteed.

[0114] Furthermore, for each CWE-ID, the analysis result report d2 indicates the priority of the countermeasure against the first vulnerability identified by the CWE-ID as the countermeasure priority, if the first vulnerability is the relevant vulnerability. This countermeasure priority is indicated in the priority information d4.

[0115] FIG. 11 is a flowchart showing an example of a series of processing operations of the category specifying unit 11, the pertinent determination unit 13, and the reason deriving unit 15.

[0116] First, the category specifying unit 11 specifies one or more assets indicated in the design information d1 of the analysis target item (step S1). Then, the category specifying unit 11 selects one asset from the one or more assets (step S2).

[0117] Next, the category specification unit 11 specifies one or more categories to which the selected assets belong by referring to the first category information 12ad and the second category information 12bd (step S3). Note that the one or more categories may be the first and second categories described above.

[0118] Next, the pertinent / non-pertinent determination unit 13 selects one type from the one or more types identified in step S3 (step S4).Then, the pertinent / non-pertinent determination unit 13 searches for all first vulnerabilities associated with the selected type by referring to the vulnerability management information 14d, and determines whether each of the first vulnerabilities corresponds to the analysis target item (step S5).Furthermore, the pertinent / non-pertinent determination unit 13 outputs determination result information d3 indicating the determination result of step S5 (step S6).

[0119] Next, the pertinent / non-pertinent determination unit 13 determines whether or not there is another type that has not been selected in step S4 among the one or more types identified in step S3 (step S7). Here, if the pertinent / non-pertinent determination unit 13 determines that there is another type (Yes in step S7), it repeats the process from step S4 for the other types. On the other hand, if the pertinent / non-pertinent determination unit 13 determines that there is no other type (No in step S7), the reason deriving unit 15 outputs the reason for non-pertinent for each non-pertinent first vulnerability indicated in all the determination result information d3 output in step S6 (step S8). That is, the reason deriving unit 15 outputs reason information d5.

[0120] After the process of step S8 is performed, the category identification unit 11 determines whether or not there are other assets that have not been selected in step S2 among the one or more assets indicated in the design information d1 of the analysis target item (step S9). If the category identification unit 11 determines that there are other assets (Yes in step S9), it repeats the process from step S2 on the other assets. On the other hand, if the category identification unit 11 determines that there are no other assets (No in step S9), it ends the process related to the assets.

[0121] FIG. 12 is a flowchart showing an example of the processing operation of the priority derivation unit 16.

[0122] First, the priority derivation unit 16 selects one asset from one or more assets indicated in the design information d1 (step S11). Then, the priority derivation unit 16 executes a loop process of step S12 for each of all the vulnerabilities corresponding to the asset selected in step S11.

[0123] Specifically, the first priority derivation unit 21 derives a first coefficient for the vulnerability based on the SFOP (step S13). Furthermore, the first priority derivation unit 21 derives a second coefficient for the vulnerability based on the actual number of in-vehicle CVEs assigned (step S14). Furthermore, the first priority derivation unit 21 derives a third coefficient for the vulnerability based on the actual man-hours of measures for the vulnerability (step S15). Then, the first priority derivation unit 21 derives a first priority of measures for the vulnerability based on the first coefficient, second coefficient, and third coefficient derived in steps S13 to S15 (step S16).

[0124] Next, the second priority derivation unit 22 derives a second priority of a measure against the vulnerability based on the first priority derived in step S16 and the degree of impact on the architecture (step S17).

[0125] Next, the third priority derivation unit 23 derives a DFD of the analysis target item based on, for example, the design information d1 (step S18). Then, the third priority derivation unit 23 identifies one or more attack paths to the asset selected in step S11 based on the DFD (step S19). Furthermore, the third priority derivation unit 23 determines a risk value of the asset in each attack path identified in step S19 (step S20). After that, the third priority derivation unit 23 selects the maximum risk value from the risk values ​​for each attack path determined in step S20 (step S21). Then, the third priority derivation unit 23 derives the third priority of the countermeasure against the vulnerability as a countermeasure priority using the risk value selected in step S21 and the number of attack paths, which is the number of attack paths identified in step S19 (step S22). Such a countermeasure priority is derived for each of all the vulnerabilities corresponding to the assets selected in step S11.

[0126] After the loop process of step S12 is performed, the priority derivation unit 16 determines whether or not there is another asset that has not been selected in step S11 from the one or more assets indicated in the design information d1 (step S23). If the priority derivation unit 16 determines that there is another asset (Yes in step S23), it repeatedly executes the process from step S11. In step S11, another asset is selected, and in the loop process of step S12, the third priority of the countermeasures for each of all the relevant vulnerabilities corresponding to the other assets, that is, the countermeasure priority, is derived. On the other hand, if the priority derivation unit 16 determines that there is no other asset (No in step S23), it ends the process for deriving the countermeasure priority.

[0127] Although the vulnerability analysis system 10 and the vulnerability analysis method according to one or more aspects of the present disclosure have been described based on the embodiments, the present disclosure is not limited to the embodiments. As long as the modifications do not deviate from the spirit of the present disclosure, modifications that a person skilled in the art may make to the above-mentioned embodiments may also be included in the present disclosure.

[0128] For example, in the above embodiment, the vulnerability analysis system 10 may determine whether the first vulnerability corresponds to an analysis target item or not, and may derive a countermeasure priority for the vulnerability, according to the granularity of the asset indicated in the design information d1. In other words, the granularity of the asset may be a software configuration unit, a detailed module unit included in the software, or a function unit.

[0129] In addition, in the CWE performance information 24d in the above embodiment, the number of vulnerabilities identified by CVE-ID is indicated as the number of second vulnerabilities found in the past, but the second vulnerabilities may be vulnerabilities other than those identified by CVE-ID. Furthermore, the CWE performance information 24d stored in the CWE performance storage unit 24 may be updated periodically. For example, the first priority derivation unit 21 may update the CWE performance information 24d by communicating with a computer outside the vulnerability analysis system 10 via a communication network. Similarly, the first priority derivation unit 21 may update the actual effort information 25d stored in the actual effort storage unit 25 by communicating with the computer via a communication network.

[0130] Furthermore, the reason deriving unit 15 in the above embodiment derives the reason why the first vulnerability does not correspond to the analysis target item, i.e., the reason of non-applicability, but is not limited thereto and may derive other matters. For example, the reason deriving unit 15 may derive that a measure against the first vulnerability has already been taken, that there is a requirement that takes priority over a measure against the first vulnerability, that a measure against the first vulnerability will be taken in a later process, and the like, and may derive these reasons. The derivation by the reason deriving unit 15 may be performed by referring to a predetermined database.

[0131] In the above embodiment, each component included in the vulnerability analysis system 10 may perform a process corresponding to the component in response to a human input operation, or may perform the process automatically without receiving the input operation. In addition, a machine learning model showing the correlation between input and output may be used for the automatically performed process.

[0132] In the above-mentioned embodiment, each component may be configured with dedicated hardware, or may be realized by executing a software program suitable for each component. Each component may be realized by a program execution unit such as a CPU (Central Processing Unit) or a processor reading and executing a software program recorded on a recording medium such as a hard disk or a semiconductor memory. Here, the software for realizing the evaluation support system of the above-mentioned embodiment is a computer program that causes a computer to execute each step of the flowchart shown in FIG. 11 or FIG. 12.

[0133] The following cases are also included in this disclosure:

[0134] (1) The at least one system or device is specifically a computer system comprising a microprocessor, a ROM, a RAM, a hard disk unit, a display unit, a keyboard, a mouse, etc. A computer program is stored in the RAM or hard disk unit. The at least one device achieves its function by the microprocessor operating according to the computer program. Here, the computer program is composed of a combination of multiple instruction codes that indicate commands for a computer to achieve a specified function.

[0135] (2) Some or all of the components constituting at least one of the above systems or devices may be composed of one system LSI (Large Scale Integration). The system LSI is an ultra-multifunctional LSI manufactured by integrating multiple components on a single chip, and specifically, is a computer system composed of a microprocessor, ROM, RAM, etc. A computer program is stored in the RAM. The system LSI achieves its functions by the microprocessor operating in accordance with the computer program.

[0136] (3) A part or all of the components constituting at least one of the above systems or devices may be composed of an IC card or a standalone module that is detachable from the device. The IC card or module is a computer system composed of a microprocessor, ROM, RAM, etc. The IC card or module may include the above-mentioned ultra-multifunction LSI. The IC card or module achieves its functions by the microprocessor operating according to a computer program. This IC card or module may be tamper-resistant.

[0137] (4) The present disclosure may be embodied as any of the methods described above, a computer program for implementing these methods on a computer, or a digital signal comprising a computer program.

[0138] The present disclosure may also be a computer program or a digital signal recorded on a computer-readable recording medium, such as a flexible disk, a hard disk, a CD (Compact Disc)-ROM, a DVD, a DVD-ROM, a DVD-RAM, a BD (Blu-ray (registered trademark) Disc), a semiconductor memory, etc. Also, the present disclosure may be a digital signal recorded on such a recording medium.

[0139] The present disclosure may also involve transmitting a computer program or a digital signal via a telecommunications line, a wireless or wired communication line, a network such as the Internet, data broadcasting, or the like.

[0140] Furthermore, the program or digital signal may be recorded on a recording medium and transferred, or the program or digital signal may be transferred via a network or the like, so that the program or digital signal may be implemented by another independent computer system. [Industrial Applicability]

[0141] The vulnerability analysis system of the present disclosure can be applied to, for example, an apparatus or system for analyzing vulnerabilities of programs, etc., installed in vehicles, etc. [Explanation of symbols]

[0142] 10 Vulnerability Analysis System 11 Classification Specification Section 12 Classification Storage Unit 12a Class 1 Storage Unit 12ad 1st classification information 12b Class 2 Storage Unit 12bd 2nd classification information 13 Applicability determination section 14 Vulnerability Management Repository 14d Vulnerability management information 15 Reason derivation part 16 Priority derivation part 17 Output section 21 First priority derivation part 22 Second priority derivation part 23 Third priority derivation part 24 CWE Achievement Storage 24d CWE performance information 25 Actual man-hours storage section 25d Actual man-hour information 26 Architecture Storage Unit 26d Architecture Information d1 Design information d2 Analysis results report d3 Judgment result information d4 Priority information d5 Reason information

Claims

1. a classification storage unit that stores classification information indicating the type of asset for each asset owned by the vehicle; a classification identification unit that acquires design information indicating assets held by the analysis target item, and identifies the type of asset indicated by the design information by referring to the classification information; a vulnerability determination unit that determines whether or not each of one or more first vulnerabilities that are pre-associated with the identified type corresponds to the analysis target item; an output unit that outputs an analysis result report indicating the determination result by the non-determination unit, The multiple types indicated by the classification information include a type related to in-vehicle security and a type related to security not limited to the in-vehicle security. Vulnerability analysis system.

2. The classification storage unit a first classification storage unit that stores first classification information that indicates each of one or more types related to the in-vehicle security in association with one or more assets classified into the type; and a second classification storage unit that stores second classification information that indicates, in association with each of one or more types of security not limited to the in-vehicle security, one or more assets classified into the type. The vulnerability analysis system according to claim 1 .

3. The vulnerability analysis system further comprises: a priority derivation unit that derives, for each of the first vulnerabilities determined to correspond to the analysis target item, a priority of a countermeasure against the vulnerability as a countermeasure priority; The vulnerability analysis system according to claim 1 .

4. The priority derivation unit (a) the impact of the vulnerability on the operation of a vehicle having the item being analyzed; (b) the number of times that a second vulnerability belonging to the vulnerability has been found in multiple vehicles in the past; and (c) the actual number of man-hours required to take measures against the vulnerability in the past; deriving the countermeasure priority for the vulnerability using at least one of the following: The vulnerability analysis system according to claim 3 .

5. The priority derivation unit deriving the countermeasure priority of the vulnerability using an impact level, which is the magnitude of the impact on the architecture of the asset that the analysis target item has; The vulnerability analysis system according to claim 3 .

6. The priority derivation unit deriving the countermeasure priority for the vulnerability using the level of impact that the analysis target item will have due to an attack on the asset, the level of possibility of an attack on the asset, and the number of attack paths on the asset; The vulnerability analysis system according to claim 3 .

7. The vulnerability analysis system further comprises: a reason deriving unit configured to derive a reason why the first vulnerability determined not to correspond to the analysis target item is not the analysis target item, The vulnerability analysis system according to claim 1 .

8. 1. A computer-implemented vulnerability analysis method, comprising: Acquire design information indicating the assets possessed by the item to be analyzed; Identifying the type of asset indicated by the design information by referring to classification information indicating the type of asset for each asset owned by the vehicle; determining whether or not each of one or more first vulnerabilities previously associated with the identified type corresponds to the item to be analyzed; outputting an analysis result report indicating a determination result for each of the one or more first vulnerabilities; The multiple types indicated by the classification information include a type related to in-vehicle security and a type related to security not limited to the in-vehicle security. Vulnerability analysis method.

9. Acquire design information indicating the assets possessed by the item to be analyzed; Identifying the type of asset indicated by the design information by referring to classification information indicating the type of asset for each asset owned by the vehicle; determining whether or not each of one or more first vulnerabilities previously associated with the identified type corresponds to the item to be analyzed; outputting an analysis result report indicating a determination result for each of the one or more first vulnerabilities; Let the computer run The multiple types indicated by the classification information include a type related to in-vehicle security and a type related to security not limited to the in-vehicle security. program.

Citation Information

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