Ship NMEA protocol-based penetration test method and apparatus, and method and apparatus for controlling connection of CBS inside ship

The ship NMEA protocol-based penetration testing method and device address the vulnerability of maritime systems by performing targeted penetration tests and authenticating access, ensuring secure navigation and operation management systems are protected from cyber threats.

WO2024248526A1PCT designated stage expired Publication Date: 2024-12-05HANWHA OCEAN CO LTD (KR) +1
View PDF 7 Cites 0 Cited by

Patent Information

Application Number
PCT/KR2024/007450
Authority / Receiving Office
WO · WO
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2023-06-07
Filing Date
2024-05-31
Publication Date
2024-12-05

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Current penetration testing methods for ships lack specificity, as they do not account for the unique network environment and cybersecurity requirements of maritime systems, particularly the NMEA protocol, leaving ships vulnerable to cyber attacks through unauthenticated access to navigation, communication, and control devices.

Method used

A ship NMEA protocol-based penetration testing method and device that connects to the ship's control network, captures and analyzes NMEA sentence structures, selects and performs attack methods such as forged data transmission, replay attacks, and denial-of-service attacks, and controls CBS access by authenticating devices through ID and password verification using beacon management and AIS databases.

Benefits of technology

Enables efficient and secure penetration testing of the NMEA protocol within ships, preventing remote cyber attacks by ensuring only authorized access to critical systems like navigation and operation management.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

Smart Images

  • Figure KR2024007450_05122024_PF_FP_ABST
    Figure KR2024007450_05122024_PF_FP_ABST
Patent Text Reader

Abstract

The present invention relates to a penetration test method and apparatus for an NMEA protocol used in a ship in consideration of distinct characteristics of the ship, and presents: a ship NMEA protocol-based penetration test method and apparatus, the method comprising performing an penetration test for the NMEA protocol in a ship and simply and quickly performing the NMEA penetration test through the apparatus; and a method and an apparatus for controlling connection of a CBS in the ship.
Need to check novelty before this filing date? Find Prior Art

Description

Method and device for penetration testing based on the NMEA protocol of a ship, and method and device for controlling access to CBS inside a ship

[0001] The present invention relates to a penetration test method and device based on the ship NMEA protocol, which can perform a penetration test for the NMEA (National Marine Electronics Association) protocol used in a ship in consideration of the special characteristics of the ship, and can authenticate multiple ship devices by utilizing wireless communication functions such as Bluetooth, GPS, and WiFi of CBS that connect to control systems such as navigation, communication, and propulsion inside the ship, and a method and device for controlling the connection of CBS inside the ship.

[0002] As ICT technology integrates into the shipbuilding and maritime industries, cyber risks to ships have also increased. Accordingly, international organizations have established cybersecurity requirements, and among them, IACS requires testing for these security requirements. However, no specific testing methods have been provided.

[0003] A penetration test is a simulated cyberattack to assess the security of a system. On land, penetration tests target ICT systems such as the web, information systems, and mobile devices, as well as OT systems such as smart factories. In the automotive industry, penetration tests are available for the CAN protocol, a specialized protocol used in automobiles.

[0004] However, currently, there is no penetration testing method specifically for ships. Conducting penetration testing on ships requires considering the unique network environment used onboard. Therefore, land-based penetration testing methods are limited in that they fail to reflect the unique characteristics of ships.

[0005] Additionally, ship CBS is defined as a computer-based system used / installed within a ship.

[0006] Generally, CBS includes terminals such as mobile apps, tablet PCs, laptops, and PCs used by the captain and crew on board, as well as navigation and communication systems such as electronic chart systems and integrated navigation systems installed on ships.

[0007] CBS verifies that you are an authorized user by entering your ID and password and checking both pieces of information against a predefined database of authenticators.

[0008] However, there was a problem in that there was no way to prevent access to navigation, communication, and control devices used inside the ship if the ID and password were exposed through hacking, malware, or other means.

[0009] Related prior literature includes Korean Patent No. 10-0694248 (March 27, 2007) and Korean Patent No. 10-2328275 (November 17, 2021).

[0010] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a ship NMEA protocol-based penetration test method and device capable of performing a penetration test for the NMEA protocol inside a ship and performing the NMEA penetration test simply and quickly through the device.

[0011] Another object of the present invention is to provide a method and device for controlling access to CBS within a ship, so as to prevent cyberattacks from remote locations by identifying important systems that should be accessed only by authorized crew members and systems within the ship, such as ship operation management and navigation management.

[0012] According to an aspect of the present invention for achieving the above technical task, a penetration test method based on the NMEA protocol for a ship, comprises: a network connection step of connecting a penetration test device to a ship control network among a ship network; and a verification step of extracting NMEA sentence structure formats and features through packet capture and packet analysis in a verification unit of the penetration test device to determine whether the network connected through the network connection step is an NMEA communication section; an attack method selection step of selecting an attack method in an attack method selection unit of the penetration test device if the network connected through the network connection step is an NMEA communication section; an attack data generation step of generating attack data selected through the attack method selection step; an attack data storage step of storing the attack data generated through the attack data generation step and network packets during a time period during which an attack is performed; an attack data transmission step of transmitting the attack data stored through the attack data storage step and the network packets during a time period during which an attack is performed to the ship network; and an attack data analysis step of analyzing the attack data transmitted through the attack data transmission step.

[0013] In addition, in a ship NMEA protocol-based penetration test method according to one aspect of the present invention, in the attack method selection step, the attack method may be selected from among forged NMEA data transmission, replay attack, and denial of service attack.

[0014] According to one aspect of the present invention, a ship NMEA protocol-based penetration test method is such that, in the attack method selection step, the attack method can be updated to a new attack method.

[0015] In addition, in a ship NMEA protocol-based penetration test method according to one aspect of the present invention, the attack data analysis step can analyze the amount and transmission time of transmitted NMEA attack data and obtain a test result.

[0016] In addition, a ship NMEA protocol-based penetration test device according to another aspect of the present invention is a penetration test device that performs a penetration test by connecting to a ship control network, the penetration test device comprising: a verification unit that extracts NMEA sentence structure formats and features through packet capture and packet analysis to verify whether the network is an NMEA communication section; an attack method selection unit that, if it is an NMEA communication section through the verification unit, selects an attack method through the penetration test device; an attack data generation unit that generates attack data selected through the attack method selection unit; an attack data storage unit that stores the attack data generated through the attack data generation step and network packets during the time when the attack is performed; an attack data transmission unit that transmits the attack data stored through the attack data storage unit and the network packets during the time when the attack is performed to the ship network; and an attack data analysis unit that analyzes the attack data transmitted through the attack data transmission unit, the penetration test can be performed.

[0017] In addition, the ship NMEA protocol-based penetration test device according to one aspect of the present invention can select, in the attack method selection unit, any one of forged NMEA data transmission, replay attack, and denial of service attack as the attack method.

[0018] In addition, in a ship NMEA protocol-based penetration test device according to one aspect of the present invention, in the attack method selection unit, the attack method can be updated to a new attack method.

[0019] In addition, the ship NMEA protocol-based penetration test device according to one aspect of the present invention, the attack data analysis unit can analyze the amount and transmission time of transmitted NMEA attack data and obtain test results.

[0020] In addition, according to another aspect of the present invention for achieving the above technical task, a device for controlling access to a CBS inside a ship includes a CBS (Computer Based System) for authenticating an ID and password to a control system for navigation, communication, propulsion, etc. inside a ship and logging in through a communication unit; a beacon transmitter for transmitting location information when the CBS is logged in or running; a beacon management server for receiving location information from the beacon transmitter and checking whether the device information of the CBS matches the registered information; a navigation information confirmation unit for comparing the GPS information received from the location confirmation unit with an AIS database when the CBS is located in a blind spot of the beacon information upon confirmation by the beacon management server; and an authentication unit for controlling connection to a system inside the ship when information matches through the beacon management server or the navigation information confirmation unit.

[0021] In addition, in a device for controlling connection of a CBS inside a ship according to another aspect of the present invention, the authentication unit is characterized in that it controls the connection to a system inside the ship when the CBS receives a beacon message installed inside the ship or when the location information of the CBS matches the navigation route.

[0022] In addition, according to another aspect of the present invention, a method for controlling access to a CBS inside a ship includes a login step for authenticating an ID and password to a control system for navigation, communication, propulsion, etc. inside the ship and logging in to a CBS (Computer Based System) through a communication unit; a location information transmission step for transmitting location information through a beacon transmitter when logging in or operating the CBS through the login step; a comparison and determination step for receiving location information from the beacon transmitter through the location information transmission step and determining whether the device information of the CBS matches the information registered in a beacon management server; a navigation information confirmation step for comparing the GPS information received from the location confirmation unit and the AIS database in the navigation information confirmation unit when the beacon information is located in a blind spot of the beacon information in the comparison and determination step; and an authentication step for controlling, through an authentication unit, to connect to a system inside the main ship if the information matches through the comparison and determination step or the navigation information confirmation step.

[0023] In addition, in a method for controlling access to a CBS inside a ship according to another aspect of the present invention, the authentication step is characterized in that it controls the connection to a system inside the ship when the CBS receives a beacon message installed inside the ship or when the location information of the CBS matches the navigation route.

[0024] According to the present invention, it is possible to perform a penetration test for the NMEA protocol inside a ship, and it has the effect of performing the NMEA penetration test simply and quickly through the device.

[0025] In addition, according to the present invention, it has the effect of preventing cyber attacks from remote locations by identifying important systems that must be connected only to authorized crew terminals and systems within the ship, such as ship operation management and navigation management.

[0026] Figure 1 is a block diagram showing a network classification in which a ship NMEA protocol-based penetration test device according to the present invention is used.

[0027] Figure 2 is a flowchart showing the flow of a ship NMEA protocol-based penetration test method according to the present invention.

[0028] FIG. 3 is a drawing showing the configuration of a device for controlling the connection of CBS inside a ship according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0029] FIG. 4 is a flowchart showing the flow of a method for controlling the connection of CBS inside a ship according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0030] The purpose and technical configuration of the present invention and the resulting operation and effects will be more clearly understood through a detailed description based on the drawings attached to the specification of the present invention.

[0031] The terminology used herein is merely used to describe specific embodiments and is not intended to limit the present invention. For example, terms such as "consist of" or "include" used herein should not necessarily be construed to include all of the various components or various steps described in the invention, but should be construed to mean that some of the components or some steps may not be included, or that additional components or steps may be included. Furthermore, the singular expression "a" or "an" as used herein includes the plural expression unless the context clearly dictates otherwise.

[0032] Hereinafter, the present invention will be described in detail by describing preferred embodiments thereof with reference to the attached drawings. The embodiments described below are provided to facilitate the technical concept of the present invention for those skilled in the art to understand, and should not be construed as limiting the present invention. It should be understood that the embodiments of the present invention will have various applications to those skilled in the art.

[0033] The ship NMEA (National Marine Electronics Association) protocol-based penetration test device (20) according to the present invention can be connected to a ship network (10), referring to FIG. 1, and the ship network (10) can include a management network (11), a ship control network (12), an instrument network (13), and a dedicated connection (14).

[0034] At this time, a penetration test device (20) can be connected to the ship control network (12) to check whether the network used within the ship is an NMEA communication section.

[0035] The NMEA protocol, commonly referred to as NMEA, is a standard for transmitting information such as time, location, and direction.

[0036] The NMEA protocol was defined by the National Marine Electronics Association in the United States, and the data used are mainly gyrocompass, GPS, compass, and inertial navigation system (INS).

[0037] In addition, a ship NMEA protocol-based penetration test device (20) according to another aspect of the present invention is a penetration test device that performs a penetration test by connecting to a ship control network, and may include a verification unit (21) that extracts the format and features of the NMEA sentence structure through packet capture and packet analysis to verify whether the connected network is an NMEA communication section, an attack method selection unit (22) that selects an attack method by the penetration test device (20) if it is an NMEA communication section through the verification unit (21), an attack data generation unit (23) that generates attack data selected through the attack method selection unit (22), an attack data storage unit (24) that stores the attack data generated through the attack data generation unit (23) and network packets during the time when the attack is performed, an attack data transmission unit (25) that transmits the attack data and network packets stored through the attack data storage unit (24) to the ship network, and an attack data analysis unit (26) that analyzes the attack data transmitted through the attack data transmission unit (25).

[0038] In addition, the penetration test device (20) can select one of the following attack methods in the attack method selection unit (22): forged NMEA data transmission, replay attack, and denial of service attack.

[0039] In addition, the penetration test device (20) can update the attack method to a new attack method in the attack method selection unit (22).

[0040] By this, various penetration tests can be performed through the attack method selection section (22) by selecting the attack method the user wants to test or updating a new attack method.

[0041] Additionally, the attack data analysis unit (26) of the penetration test device (20) can analyze the amount and transmission time of transmitted NMEA attack data and obtain penetration test results.

[0042] Therefore, a simple and quick NMEA penetration test can be performed through the penetration test device (20).

[0043] In addition, a ship NMEA protocol-based penetration test method according to another aspect of the present invention includes a network connection step (S10) of connecting a penetration test device (20) to a ship control network (12) through NMEA communication; and a confirmation step (S20) of extracting the format and features of the NMEA sentence structure through packet capture and packet analysis in a confirmation unit (21) of the ship network connected through the network connection step (S10) to confirm that it is an NMEA communication section.

[0044] The verification step (S20) verifies whether it is an NMEA communication section, and if it is not an NMEA communication section, the penetration test is terminated.

[0045] In addition, if it is an NMEA communication section through the confirmation step (S20), it proceeds to an attack method selection step (S31) in which an attack method is selected in the attack method selection unit (22) of the penetration test device (20), and then proceeds to an attack data generation step (S32) in which the attack data selected through the attack method selection step (S31) is generated in the attack data generation unit (23), and then proceeds to an attack data storage step (S33) in which the attack data generated through the attack data generation step (S32) is stored in the attack data storage unit (24), and then proceeds to an attack data transmission step (S34) in which the attack data stored through the attack data storage step (S33) is transmitted to the ship network through the attack data transmission unit (25), and then proceeds to an attack data analysis step (S36) in which the attack data transmitted through the attack data transmission step (S35) is analyzed in the attack data analysis unit (26).

[0046] In addition, the ship NMEA protocol-based penetration test method can select any one of a forged NMEA data transmission, a replay attack, and a denial of service attack in the attack method selection step (S31).

[0047] In addition, in the ship NMEA protocol-based penetration test method, in the attack method selection step (S31), the attack method can be updated to a new attack method.

[0048] Additionally, in the ship NMEA protocol-based penetration test method, the attack data analysis step (S35) can analyze the amount and transmission time of transmitted NMEA attack data and obtain test results.

[0049] Therefore, according to the present invention, it is possible to perform a penetration test for the NMEA protocol inside a ship, and it has the effect of performing the NMEA penetration test simply and quickly through the device.

[0050] FIG. 3 is a drawing showing the configuration of a device for controlling the connection of CBS inside a ship according to an embodiment of the present invention, and FIG. 4 is a flowchart showing the flow of a method for controlling the connection of CBS inside a ship according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0051] Referring to FIGS. 3 and 4, a device for controlling access to a CBS inside a ship according to the present invention relates to an authentication device and method for controlling access using device information of a CBS used inside a ship in addition to an ID and password.

[0052] As illustrated in FIG. 3, a device for controlling access to CBS inside a ship according to the present invention may include a communication unit (100), a beacon transmitter (140), a beacon management server unit (150), a location confirmation unit (160), a navigation information confirmation unit (170), an authentication unit (180), and an AIS (Automatic Identification System) database (200).

[0053] At this time, the beacon management server unit (150) may mean a database registered in the beacon management server.

[0054] In addition, CBS (Computer Based System) refers to a computer-based system that authenticates an ID and password to the control system of navigation, communication, propulsion, etc. inside a ship and logs in through the communication unit (100).

[0055] The communication unit (100) may include Bluetooth (110), GPS (120), and WiFi (130).

[0056] In addition, the beacon transmitter (140) transmits location information when CBS is logged in or running, and the beacon management server (150) can check whether the location information received from the beacon transmitter (140) matches the registered information of the CBS device.

[0057] In addition, when the beacon management server unit (150) confirms that the beacon information is located in a blind spot, the CBS transmits GPS information to the location confirmation unit (160), and the GPS information received from the location confirmation unit (160) and the AIS database (200) are compared in the navigation information confirmation unit (170).

[0058] In addition, it includes an authentication unit (180) that controls connection to a system inside the main ship when the information compared through the beacon management server unit (140) or the navigation information confirmation unit (170) matches, and the connection to the CBS inside the ship can be controlled through the authentication unit (180).

[0059] That is, if the beacon management server unit (140) cannot confirm any of the comparison information, the comparison information is compared through the navigation information confirmation unit (170).

[0060] In addition, the authentication unit (180) can control the CBS to be connected to the system inside the main ship when it receives a beacon message installed inside the ship or when the location information of the CBS matches the navigation route.

[0061] This has the effect of preventing cyberattacks from remote locations by identifying critical systems that should only be accessed by authorized crew terminals and systems within the ship, such as operation management and navigation management.

[0062] In addition, a method for controlling access to CBS inside a ship according to another aspect of the present invention may include a login step (S110), a location information transmission step (S120), a comparison judgment step (S130), a navigation information confirmation step (S140), and an authentication step (S150).

[0063] More specifically, the method for controlling access to a CBS inside a ship according to the present invention comprises: a login step (S110) of authenticating an ID and password to a control system for navigation, communication, propulsion, etc. inside a ship and logging in to a CBS (Computer Based System) through a communication unit; a location information transmission step (S120) of transmitting location information through a beacon transmitter when the CBS is logged in or operated through the login step (S110); and a comparison judgment step (S130) of receiving location information from the beacon transmitter through the location information transmission step (S120) and checking whether the device information of the CBS matches the information registered in the beacon management server. In the above comparison judgment step (S130), if the beacon information is located in a blind spot of the beacon information where the beacon information is not confirmed, the CBS transmits GPS information to the position confirmation unit, and includes a navigation information confirmation step (S140) in which the GPS information received from the position confirmation unit and the AIS database are compared in the navigation information confirmation unit, and an authentication step (S150) in which the authentication unit controls the connection to the system inside the main ship if the information matches through the comparison judgment step (S130) or the navigation information confirmation step (S140), thereby controlling the connection of the CBS inside the ship.

[0064] In addition, the authentication step (S150) is characterized by controlling the connection to the system inside the main ship when the CBS receives a beacon message installed inside the ship or when the location information of the CBS matches the navigation route.

[0065] Accordingly, according to the present invention, it has the effect of preventing cyberattacks from remote locations by identifying important systems that must be connected only to authorized crew terminals and systems within the ship, such as ship operation management and navigation management.

[0066] The embodiments of the present invention described above may be implemented in the form of program commands that can be executed through various computer components and recorded on a computer-readable recording medium. The computer-readable recording medium may include program commands, data files, data structures, etc., either singly or in combination. The program commands recorded on the computer-readable recording medium may be specially designed and configured for the present invention or may be known and available to those skilled in the art of computer software. Examples of computer-readable recording media include magnetic media such as hard disks, floppy disks, and magnetic tapes, optical recording media such as CD-ROMs and DVDs, magneto-optical media such as floptical disks, and hardware devices specifically configured to store and execute program commands, such as ROMs, RAMs, and flash memories. Examples of program commands include not only machine language codes generated by a compiler, but also high-level language codes that can be executed by a computer using an interpreter, etc. Hardware devices may be changed into one or more software modules to perform processing according to the present invention, and vice versa.

[0067] The embodiments described above are provided to enable those skilled in the art to easily understand the technical concept of the present invention, and should not be construed as limiting the present invention thereby. It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that the embodiments of the present invention can be variously modified and altered without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. Accordingly, such modifications or variations should be considered to fall within the scope of the claims of the present invention.

[0068] 10: Network

[0069] 11: Administrative Networks

[0070] 12: Shipboard Control Networks

[0071] 13: Instrument Networks

[0072] 14: Dedicated Connections

[0073] 20: Penetration testing device

[0074] 21: Confirmation Department

[0075] 22: Attack method selection section

[0076] 23: Attack data generation unit

[0077] 24: Attack data storage

[0078] 25: Attack data transmission unit

[0079] 26: Attack Data Analysis Department

[0080] 100: Communications Department

[0081] 110: Bluetooth

[0082] 120: GPS (Global Positioning System)

[0083] 130: WiFi

[0084] 140: Beacon Transmitter

[0085] 150: Beacon Management Server

[0086] 160: Location confirmation unit

[0087] 170: Navigation Information Confirmation Department

[0088] 180: Authentication Department

[0089] 200: AIS (Automatic Identification System)

Claims

1. Network connection step for connecting the penetration test device to the ship control network among the ship networks; and It includes a verification step of extracting the NMEA sentence structure format and features through packet capture and packet analysis in the verification section of the penetration test device to confirm whether the network connected through the above network connection step is an NMEA communication section; If it is an NMEA communication section through the above verification steps, An attack method selection step for selecting an attack method in the attack method selection section of a penetration testing device; An attack data generation step for generating attack data selected through the above attack method selection step; An attack data storage step for storing attack data generated through the above attack data generation step and network packets during the time the attack is performed; An attack data transmission step for transmitting the attack data stored through the above attack data storage step and the network packets during the time when the attack is performed to the ship network; and A penetration test method based on a ship NMEA protocol, which performs a penetration test, including an attack data analysis step for analyzing attack data transmitted through the above attack data transmission step.

2. In claim 1, In the above attack method selection step, The above attack method is a penetration test method based on the ship NMEA protocol, which can select any one of forged NMEA data transmission, replay attack, and denial of service attack.

3. In claim 2, In the above attack method selection step, The above attack method is a penetration testing method based on the ship's NMEA protocol, which allows for updates to new attack methods.

4. In claim 1, The above attack data analysis step is: A penetration test method based on ship NMEA protocol, which analyzes the amount and transmission time of transmitted NMEA attack data and obtains test results.

5. In a penetration test device that performs a penetration test by connecting to a ship control network, A verification unit that extracts the NMEA sentence structure format and features through packet capture and packet analysis to confirm whether the network is an NMEA communication section; An attack method selection section in which the penetration test device selects an attack method if it is an NMEA communication section through the above verification section; An attack data generation unit that generates attack data selected through the above attack method selection unit; An attack data storage unit that stores attack data generated through the above attack data generation step and network packets during the time the attack is performed; An attack data transmission unit that transmits the attack data stored through the above attack data storage unit and the network packets during the time when the attack is performed to the ship network; and A ship NMEA protocol-based penetration test device, comprising an attack data analysis unit that analyzes attack data transmitted through the above attack data transmission unit.

6. In claim 5, In the above attack method selection section, A penetration testing device based on the ship's NMEA protocol, where the attack method can be selected from among forged NMEA data transmission, replay attack, and denial of service attack.

7. In claim 6, In the above attack method selection section, The attack method is a penetration testing device based on the ship's NMEA protocol, which can be updated with new attack methods.

8. In claim 5, The above attack data analysis unit, A shipboard NMEA protocol-based penetration testing device that analyzes the amount and transmission time of transmitted NMEA attack data and obtains test results.

9. CBS (Computer Based System) that authenticates ID and password to control navigation, communication, propulsion, etc. inside the ship and logs in through the communication department; A beacon transmitter that transmits location information when the above CBS is logged in or operated; A beacon management server unit that receives location information from the beacon transmitter and checks whether the device information of the CBS matches the registered information; When the beacon management server confirms that the location is in a blind spot of the beacon information, CBS transmits GPS information to the location confirmation unit, and the navigation information confirmation unit compares the GPS information received from the location confirmation unit with the AIS database; and A device that controls access to the CBS inside a ship, including an authentication unit that controls connection to a system inside the ship when information matches through the above beacon management server or navigation information verification unit.

10. In claim 9, The above authentication unit is a device for controlling access to the CBS inside a ship, characterized in that it controls connection to the system inside the ship when the CBS receives a beacon message installed inside the ship or when the location information of the CBS matches the navigation route.

11. Login step for authenticating ID and password to control navigation, communication, propulsion, etc. inside the ship and logging in to CBS (Computer Based System) through the communication section; A location information transmission step that transmits location information through a beacon transmitter when CBS is logged in or operated through the above login step; A comparison judgment step for receiving location information from a beacon transmitter through the above location information transmission step and confirming whether the device information of the CBS matches the information registered in the beacon management server; In the above comparison judgment step, if the beacon information is located in a blind spot of the beacon information where the beacon information is not confirmed, the CBS transmits the GPS information to the position confirmation unit, and the navigation information confirmation step compares the GPS information received from the position confirmation unit with the AIS database in the navigation information confirmation unit; and A method for controlling access to CBS within a ship, comprising an authentication step for controlling, through an authentication unit, connection to a system within the ship if the information matches through the above comparison judgment step or navigation information confirmation step.

12. In claim 11, The above authentication steps are: A method for controlling access to a CBS within a ship, characterized in that it controls the connection to a system within the main ship when the CBS receives a beacon message installed within the ship or when the location information of the CBS matches the navigation route.

Citation Information

Patent Citations

  • Apparatus for testing security policies in network security system and its method

    KR100694248B1

  • Bridge system for unmanned vessel and control method thereof

    KR102328275B1

  • Beacon process method of electronic apparatus and electronic apparatus thereof

    KR1020160009378A

  • System and method for managing and evaluating security in industry control network

    KR1020170091989A

  • Recycling and water quality purification treatment system of livestock manure

    KR1020200099646A