Anti-quantum computing HTTPS communication method and system based on CA and national encryption algorithm

Abstract

The present invention discloses a quantum computing-resistant HTTPS communication method and system based on CA and national secret algorithm. It does not adopt a symmetric key scheme with many defects, does not need to use a pre-issued asymmetric key pool, and only needs to pre-issue a small number of keys to achieve quantum computing-resistant secure communication; the key amount of each member of the HTTPS system is small, and the keys are stored in the security chip of each member, which cannot be stolen, and does not occupy the storage space required by the key pool, does not increase the key amount maintained by CA, does not need to deploy additional key management servers based on ID cryptography, and does not introduce new uncertainties or increase system complexity. The present invention uses the national secret algorithm to symmetrically encrypt the encryption result of the SM2 encryption algorithm again, adds the challenge response authentication of the server to the client in HTTPS, and uses the authentication response value as the key, so that the authentication response value does not need to be transmitted separately, the process and data volume of HTTPS are not increased, and the quantum computing resistance of the SM2 algorithm is realized.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of quantum computing resistance, and in particular to a quantum computing resistance HTTPS communication method and system based on CA and national secret algorithm. Background Art

[0002] HTTPS refers to the Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Secure Sockets Layer, which is used to solve the defects of HTTP protocol in transmitting information in plain text. For the security of data transmission, HTTPS adds the SSL protocol on the basis of HTTP. SSL relies on certificates to verify the identity of the server and encrypt the communication between the browser and the server. The HTTPS protocol requires applying to the CA for a certificate to prove the type of server use. The certificate contains a pair of public and private keys. The client will only trust this host when the certificate is used for the corresponding server. All communications between the server and the client are encrypted.

[0003] At present, traditional communication encryption and transmission security all rely on complex mathematical algorithms. That is, due to the limitations of the current computing power of computers, there is no time to calculate the results within the time period required, so it can be said that the current digital cryptographic system is safe. However, this security status has been increasingly threatened by quantum computers. For example, there are dedicated quantum computer algorithms (such as Shor's algorithm) to crack the asymmetric key algorithm in classical cryptography. In the face of powerful quantum computers, even the most advanced confidential communications, as long as they are through current communication methods, will face the possibility of being deciphered and eavesdropped. Therefore, it is an urgent need to establish a complete set of practical quantum communication network solutions.

[0004] Problems with existing technologies:

[0005] In the existing CA-based HTTPS system, the CA issues a digital certificate to the HTTPS server, and the HTTPS client communicates with the HTTPS server through the digital certificate, but the system cannot realize the function of anti-quantum computing. In the prior art, in order to counter the attack of quantum computers, there are two ways to use anti-quantum computing for the HTTPS system. One way is to use the quantum key obtained by QKD or the quantum random number key in the quantum key card to protect the HTTPS system, but the disadvantages are that the symmetric key management is complex, the storage volume is large, it needs to be updated regularly, and digital signatures cannot be performed. Another way is to issue an asymmetric key pool (patent with application number "201910034536.8") to each member of the HTTPS system, and realize confidential communication based on the pre-issued key pool, but the disadvantage is that the key pool issuance process is cumbersome, the key pool occupies a large storage space, and it is easy to be stolen by the enemy; in another way (patent with application number "202020815697.9"), it is necessary to deploy an additional key management server based on ID cryptography, which changes the deployment method of traditional CA. Since ID cryptography involves more complex bilinear pairing operations, new uncertainties are introduced, which increases the complexity of the system.

[0006] The Shor algorithm, which is tailor-made for quantum computers, can perform integer factorization or discrete logarithm calculations in polynomial time (that is, the cracking time increases at a rate of k as the length of the public key increases, where k is a constant independent of the length of the public key). Therefore, SM2 in the existing national secret algorithm cannot resist quantum computing.

[0007] In the existing technology, the quantum computing-resistant HTTPS communication system mainly adopts the RSA algorithm, which does not meet the regulatory requirements of the National Cryptography Administration. Summary of the invention

[0008] In response to the problems in the related technology, the present invention proposes a quantum computing-resistant HTTPS communication method and system based on CA and national secret algorithm to overcome the above-mentioned technical problems existing in the existing related technology.

[0009] To this end, the specific technical solution adopted by the present invention is as follows:

[0010] A quantum computing-resistant HTTPS communication method based on CA and national secret algorithm, the method comprising the following steps:

[0011] S1. The server transmits its public key and identity information to the certificate authority CA in a secure way;

[0012] S2. CA generates and issues a digital certificate for the server;

[0013] S3, the client initiates a communication request;

[0014] S4, the server sends a digital certificate and authentication challenge value;

[0015] S5. The client verifies the digital certificate using the CA's public key.

[0016] S6. After verification, the client generates an authentication response value and a random key and encrypts them using the national encryption algorithm and sends them to the server;

[0017] S7, the server obtains a random key, and uses the random key and random number encryption to perform Hypertext Transfer Protocol Security HTTPS communication;

[0018] The authentication challenge value is a random number generated by the server;

[0019] The content of the digital certificate includes certificate information, issuer information, holder information, the first ciphertext obtained by encrypting the server public key using the national secret algorithm and the CA's symmetric key, and the CA signature;

[0020] The digital certificate is a quantum computing resistant digital certificate;

[0021] The symmetric key of the CA can be calculated using the public key of the CA and the validity time of the digital certificate using the national secret algorithm;

[0022] The authentication response value is calculated using the server public key and the authentication challenge value through a national encryption algorithm.

[0023] The CA signature uses the CA's public key and the digital certificate's effective time to symmetrically encrypt signature information one using the fourth national secret algorithm to obtain signature information two. The signature information one can be obtained by using the CA's private key to perform a second national secret signature algorithm on the message. The message is calculated using the certificate information, issuer information, and holder information using the third national secret algorithm.

[0024] The signature information 1 includes a first signature component and a second signature component, and the signature information 2 includes a second signature component and a third signature component, and the third signature component is the value obtained by symmetrically encrypting the first signature component with the CA's symmetric key using the fourth national secret algorithm.

[0025] Optionally, the verification method in S5 includes CA signature verification and validity period verification, and the CA signature verification is to decrypt the third signature component according to the CA's symmetric key to obtain the first signature component to obtain signature information one, and then use the CA's public key to verify signature information one.

[0026] The client uses the CA's symmetric key to decrypt the first ciphertext to obtain the server public key, uses the matching quantum computing-resistant key card to generate a random key, uses the server public key to encrypt the random key using the second national secret encryption algorithm to obtain the second ciphertext, uses the fourth national secret algorithm and the authentication response value to symmetric encrypt the second ciphertext to obtain the third ciphertext, and the client in S6 sends the third ciphertext to the server.

[0027] The second ciphertext includes a first ciphertext component, a second ciphertext component and a third ciphertext component. The third ciphertext includes a fourth ciphertext component, a second ciphertext component and a third ciphertext component. The fourth ciphertext component is the value obtained by symmetric encryption of the first ciphertext component using a fourth national secret algorithm using the authentication response value.

[0028] Preferably, the way in which the server in S7 obtains the random key can be to calculate an authentication response value based on the server public key and the authentication challenge value, use the authentication response value to decrypt the fourth ciphertext component to obtain the first ciphertext component, obtain the second ciphertext through the first ciphertext component, the second ciphertext component and the third ciphertext component, and use the server private key to decrypt the second ciphertext to obtain the random key.

[0029] Preferably, the third national secret algorithm may be an SM3 algorithm, the fourth national secret algorithm may be an SM4 algorithm, the second national secret encryption algorithm is an SM2 encryption algorithm using a public key, and the second national secret signature algorithm is an SM2 signature algorithm using a private key.

[0030] A quantum computing-resistant HTTPS communication system based on CA and national secret algorithm, used to implement the above-mentioned quantum computing-resistant HTTPS communication method based on CA and national secret algorithm, the system includes a certificate authority, a server and a client, the certificate authority, the server and the client have a quantum computing-resistant key card;

[0031] The certificate authority's quantum computing-resistant key card stores its own public and private keys;

[0032] The server's quantum computing resistant key card stores the public key of the certificate authority, its own public and private keys, and its own digital certificate;

[0033] The client's quantum computing resistant key card stores a public key of a certificate authority;

[0034] The quantum computing-resistant key card has the characteristic of being non-disassembled and can be self-destructed upon disassembly.

[0035] The beneficial effects of the invention are:

[0036] This patent implements a quantum computing-resistant HTTPS system based on CA. This system avoids the use of symmetric key schemes with many defects. It does not need to use a pre-issued asymmetric key pool. It only needs to pre-issue a small number of keys to achieve quantum computing-resistant secure communication. The issuance and update process is simple. The number of keys of each member of the HTTPS system is small, so the keys are stored in the security chip of each member and cannot be stolen. It does not occupy the storage space required for the key pool, and does not increase the number of keys maintained by the CA. There is no need to deploy additional key management servers based on ID cryptography, and the deployment method of traditional CA has not changed. The deployment of additional key management servers based on ID cryptography will not introduce new uncertainties or increase system complexity.

[0037] This patent uses the national secret algorithm to symmetrically encrypt the encryption result of the SM2 encryption algorithm again, and adds a server-to-client challenge response authentication in HTTPS. By using the authentication response value as the key, there is no need to transmit the authentication response value separately, and the HTTPS process and data volume are not increased, while the SM2 algorithm's anti-quantum computing is realized.

[0038] This patent does not use the RSA algorithm, but uses the domestic cryptographic algorithms SM2, SM3, SM4, etc. approved by the State Cryptography Administration to achieve anti-quantum computing, which meets the requirements of the State Cryptography Administration. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0039] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0040] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a quantum computing-resistant HTTPS communication method based on CA and national encryption algorithm according to an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0041] To further illustrate each embodiment, the present invention provides drawings, which are part of the disclosure of the present invention and are mainly used to illustrate the embodiments and can be used in conjunction with the relevant descriptions in the specification to explain the operating principles of the embodiments. With reference to these contents, ordinary technicians in the field should be able to understand other possible implementations and advantages of the present invention. The components in the figures are not drawn to scale, and similar component symbols are generally used to represent similar components.

[0042] The present invention is further described with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments. Figure 1As shown, according to an embodiment of the present invention, a quantum computing-resistant HTTPS communication method based on CA and national secret algorithm is provided. In this patent, the public-private key algorithm is SM2 algorithm, the hash algorithm is SM3 algorithm, and the symmetric encryption algorithm is SM4 algorithm.

[0043] In this patent, the HTTPS system structure is as follows Figure 1 As shown, it includes CA, server and client. Among them, CA can be a CA serving the public, or it can be a private CA deployed within a company or family. Each member has a matching quantum computing resistant key card. The quantum computing resistant key card has the characteristic of being non-disassembled and can be self-destructed upon disassembly. Preferably, the key card has a security chip to achieve the non-disassembled characteristic. The server key card stores the public key PKCA of the CA system, the public and private keys PK and SK of this key card, and the digital certificate CERT of this key card; the client key card only stores PKCA; the CA system key card has the public and private keys PKCA and SKCA, and is protected by the key card.

[0044] Step 1: Obtain CA certificate

[0045] The server needs to obtain its own digital certificate from the CA certificate authority.

[0046] 1. The server transmits its public key PK and identity information to the CA (Certificate Authority) through a secure method such as manual copying (corresponding to Figure 1 Step ①). Wherein, PK can be expressed as PK = (PKx, PKy);

[0047] 2. The CA generates a digital certificate CERT for the server. The certificate content includes:

[0048] ①Certificate information: the certificate version number, serial number and validity period (including the effective time T of the certificate), etc.

[0049] ②Issuer information: the name of the CA;

[0050] ③Holder information: server name, supported public key algorithms, etc.;

[0051] ④ Public key: This part is the {PK}KCA obtained by encrypting the server's public key PK using KCA. KCA is obtained by combining the CA's public key PKCA and T, for example, it can be expressed as KCA = HASH (PKCAx||PKCAy||T), HASH (*) means that * is calculated using the SM3 algorithm, and T represents the effective time of the digital certificate.

[0052] ⑤CA signature: This part is the SIG(M,SKCA,T,PKCA)=(SIGR',SIGS) obtained by signing M with CA's private key SKCA. SIG(M,SKCA,T,PKCA)=(SIGR',SIGS) represents the SM2 signature algorithm symmetric encrypted with the SM4 algorithm. Among them, the SM2 signature algorithm SIG SM2 (M,SK)=(SIGR,SIGS) means using the private key SK to perform SM2 signature calculation on M to obtain two signature result components SIGR and SIGS. Among them, M is the summary of the first three items of the certificate (i.e. certificate information, issuer information, and holder information) obtained by the SM3 algorithm, and SK is the SM2 private key of the signer. According to the definition of the SM2 signature algorithm, SIGR is calculated from the signature object and a random elliptic curve point, which can be easily cracked by a quantum computer to obtain the private key of the elliptic curve point, thereby affecting the security of SIGS and further obtaining SK, so SIGR needs to be encrypted. The SM2 signature algorithm using SM4 algorithm symmetric encryption is expressed as SIG(M,SK,T,PKCA)=(SIGR',SIGS), where SK is the private key of the signer; T represents the effective time of the digital certificate; PKCA is the public key of the CA organization, which can be expressed as PKCA=(PKCAx,PKCAy); SIGR' is the value after SM4 symmetric encryption of SIGR using the symmetric key KCA shared by both parties, which can be expressed as SIGR'={SIGR}KCA; KCA is obtained by combining the CA's public key PKCA and T and encrypting them using the national secret algorithm, which can be expressed as KCA=HASH(PKCAx||PKCAy||T).

[0053] 3. CA issues the digital certificate CERT to the server (corresponding to Figure 1 In step ②), the CA certificate issued by the CA organization is a quantum computing-resistant digital certificate.

[0054] Step 2: Communication

[0055] 1. The client initiates a request (corresponding to Figure 1 Step ③): The client (such as a commonly used server) establishes a TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) connection with the server through a three-way handshake.

[0056] 2. The server sends a digital certificate (corresponding to Figure 1 Step ④): The server sends the certificate CERT obtained from the CA to the client, and also sends the random number RAND generated by the server as the authentication challenge value.

[0057] 3. The client verifies CERT through CA's public key PKCA: PKCA is stored in the client's local quantum computing-resistant key card. KCA=HASH(PKCAx||PKCAy||T) is calculated based on PKCA and the certificate validity time T. KCA is used to decrypt SIGR' to obtain SIGR, and PKCA is used to verify the signature SIG SM2 (M, SKCA) = (SIGR, SIGS) is correct. If it is correct, it proves that the certificate is issued by CA. Then verify whether the digital certificate is within the validity period. If the verification is successful, the digital certificate is trusted.

[0058] 4. Generate a symmetric key and encrypt it and send it to the server (corresponding to Figure 1 Step ⑤): After the client trusts the server's certificate CERT, it decrypts the fourth part according to KCA to obtain the server's public key PK. Generate a random key KAB based on the matching key card, and then use PK and RAND to encrypt the key KAB using the encryption method described below to obtain ENC(KAB,PK,RAND)=(ENCR',ENCM,ENCH). Use the server's public key PK to perform SM2 encryption calculation on KAB to obtain three encryption result components ENCR, ENCM and ENCH. The above result can be expressed as ENC SM2 (KAB,PK)=(ENCR,ENCM,ENCH), PK can be expressed as PK=(PKx,PKy). According to the definition of SM2 encryption algorithm, ENCR is a random elliptic curve point, which can be easily cracked by quantum computers to obtain its private key, thus affecting the security of encrypted messages. Therefore, ENCR needs to be encrypted. Therefore, the SM2 encryption algorithm using SM4 algorithm symmetric encryption can be expressed as ENC(KAB,PK,RAND)=(ENCR',ENCM,ENCH), RAND is the authentication challenge value received from the server; ENCR' is the value after SM4 symmetric encryption of ENCR using the symmetric key K shared by both parties, which can be expressed as ENCR'={ENCR}K. K is obtained by combining the server public key PK and RAND, which can be expressed as K=HASH(PKx||PKy||RAND). HASH(PKx||PKy||RAND) means that PKx||PKy||RAND is calculated using SM3 algorithm. K is used as both the authentication response value and the SM4 key to protect the SM2 algorithm;

[0059] Send ENC(KAB,PK,RAND) to the server.

[0060] 5. The server obtains KAB: The server calculates K=HASH(PKx||PKy||RAND) based on its own public key PK and RAND, uses K to decrypt ENCR' to obtain ENCR, and uses SK to decrypt ENC SM2 (KAB,PK)=(ENCR,ENCM,ENCH) to get KAB. If the decryption is successful, KAB is trusted and the client is proved to be a member of the organization. The reason is that the client outside the organization does not have PKCA, and will not be able to complete the quantum computing-resistant encrypted message transmission to the server and be successfully decrypted by the server: the client outside the organization does not have PKCA, and will not be able to obtain KCA and decrypt from the certificate to obtain PK, resulting in encryption failure; even if the client outside the organization obtains PK through unreasonable means and can obtain ENC SM2 (KAB,PK)=(ENCR,ENCM,ENCH). Because the client does not have PKCA, it will not be able to generate the correct authentication response value. It will also fail to decrypt the server because there is no correct authentication response value as the key to encrypt the correct ENCR'. Therefore, by using the authentication response value as the key, the quantum computing-resistant encrypted message transmission to the server can be completed and the members who are successfully decrypted by the server must be members of this organization. At the same time, by using the authentication response value as the key, there is no need to transmit the authentication response value separately, and the quantum computing resistance of the SM2 algorithm is realized. At this point, the server and the client have obtained the random key KAB generated by the client, and can use the combined calculation value of the key and RAND for HTTPS communication. The combined calculation of KAB and RAND is, for example, HASH(KAB||RAND).

[0061] In summary, with the help of the above technical solution of the present invention, the present invention realizes a quantum computing-resistant HTTPS system based on CA. This system avoids the use of symmetric key schemes with many defects, does not need to use pre-issued asymmetric key pools, and only needs to pre-issue a small number of keys to realize secure communication that resists quantum computing, and the issuance and update process is simple; the number of keys of each member of the HTTPS system is small, so the keys are stored in the security chip of each member, which cannot be stolen, and does not occupy the storage space required for the key pool, nor does it increase the number of keys maintained by the CA; there is no need to deploy additional key management servers based on ID cryptography, and the deployment method of traditional CA is not changed, and new uncertainties or increased system complexity will not be introduced due to the deployment of additional key management servers based on ID cryptography. In addition, the encryption result of the SM2 encryption algorithm is symmetrically encrypted again using the national secret algorithm, and the server's challenge response authentication to the client is added to HTTPS. By using the authentication response value as the key, it is not necessary to transmit the authentication response value separately, and the process and data volume of HTTPS are not increased, and the quantum computing resistance of the SM2 algorithm is realized. In addition, the present invention does not use the RSA algorithm, but uses the domestic cryptographic algorithms SM2, SM3, SM4, etc. recognized by the State Cryptography Administration to achieve anti-quantum computing, which meets the requirements of the State Cryptography Administration.

[0062] The technical features of the above-described embodiments may be arbitrarily combined. To make the description concise, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above-described embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this specification.

[0063] The above-mentioned embodiments only express several implementation methods of the present invention, and the descriptions thereof are relatively specific and detailed, but they cannot be understood as limiting the scope of the invention patent. It should be pointed out that, for ordinary technicians in this field, several variations and improvements can be made without departing from the concept of the present invention, and these all belong to the protection scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the patent of the present invention shall be subject to the attached claims.

Claims

1. A quantum computing-resistant HTTPS communication method based on CA and national secret algorithm, characterized in that: The method comprises the following steps: S1. The server transmits its public key and identity information to the certificate authority CA in a secure way; S2. CA generates and issues a digital certificate for the server; S3, the client initiates a communication request; S4, the server sends a digital certificate and authentication challenge value; S5. The client verifies the digital certificate using the CA's public key. S6. After verification, the client generates an authentication response value and a random key and encrypts them using the national encryption algorithm and sends them to the server; S7, the server obtains a random key, and uses the random key and random number encryption to perform Hypertext Transfer Protocol Security HTTPS communication; The authentication challenge value is a random number generated by the server; The content of the digital certificate includes certificate information, issuer information, holder information, the first ciphertext obtained by encrypting the server public key using the national secret algorithm and the CA's symmetric key, and the CA signature; The CA signature is to use the CA's public key and the digital certificate validity time to symmetrically encrypt the signature information one with the fourth national secret algorithm to obtain the signature information two. The signature information one can be calculated by the second national secret signature algorithm using the CA's private key. The message is calculated by the certificate information, issuer information, and holder information using the third national secret algorithm. The digital certificate is a quantum computing resistant digital certificate; The symmetric key of the CA can be calculated using the public key of the CA and the validity time of the digital certificate using the national secret algorithm; The authentication response value is calculated using the server public key and the authentication challenge value through a national encryption algorithm.

2. According to claim 1, the quantum computing HTTPS communication method of CA and national secret algorithm is characterized in that: The signature information 1 includes a first signature component and a second signature component, and the signature information 2 includes a second signature component and a third signature component, and the third signature component is the value obtained by symmetrically encrypting the first signature component with the CA's symmetric key using the fourth national secret algorithm.

3. According to claim 2, the quantum computing HTTPS communication method of CA and national secret algorithm is characterized in that: The verification method in S5 includes CA signature verification and validity period verification. The CA signature verification is to decrypt the third signature component according to the CA's symmetric key to obtain the first signature component to obtain signature information one, and then use the CA's public key to verify the signature information one.

4. The quantum computing HTTPS communication method of CA and national secret algorithm according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The client uses the CA's symmetric key to decrypt the first ciphertext to obtain the server public key, uses the matching quantum computing-resistant key card to generate a random key, uses the server public key to encrypt the random key using the second national secret encryption algorithm to obtain the second ciphertext, uses the fourth national secret algorithm and the authentication response value to symmetric encrypt the second ciphertext to obtain the third ciphertext, and the client in S6 sends the third ciphertext to the server.

5. According to claim 4, the quantum computing HTTPS communication method of CA and national secret algorithm is characterized in that: The second ciphertext includes a first ciphertext component, a second ciphertext component and a third ciphertext component. The third ciphertext includes a fourth ciphertext component, a second ciphertext component and a third ciphertext component. The fourth ciphertext component is the value obtained by symmetric encryption of the first ciphertext component using a fourth national secret algorithm using the authentication response value.

6. The quantum computing HTTPS communication method of CA and national secret algorithm according to claim 5 is characterized in that: The way in which the server obtains the random key in S7 can be to calculate an authentication response value based on the server public key and the authentication challenge value, use the authentication response value to decrypt the fourth ciphertext component to obtain the first ciphertext component, obtain the second ciphertext through the first ciphertext component, the second ciphertext component and the third ciphertext component, and use the server private key to decrypt the second ciphertext to obtain the random key.

7. The quantum computing HTTPS communication method of CA and national secret algorithm according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that: The third national secret algorithm may be the SM3 algorithm, the fourth national secret algorithm may be the SM4 algorithm, the second national secret encryption algorithm is the SM2 encryption algorithm using a public key, and the second national secret signature algorithm is the SM2 signature algorithm using a private key.

8. A quantum computing-resistant HTTPS communication system based on CA and national secret algorithm, used to implement the steps of the quantum computing-resistant HTTPS communication method based on CA and national secret algorithm described in any one of claims 1-6, characterized in that: The system includes a certificate authority, a server, and a client, wherein the certificate authority, the server, and the client have quantum computing resistant key cards; The certificate authority's quantum computing-resistant key card stores its own public and private keys; The server's quantum computing resistant key card stores the public key of the certificate authority, its own public and private keys, and its own digital certificate; The client's quantum computing resistant key card stores a public key of a certificate authority; The quantum computing-resistant key card has the characteristic of being non-disassembled and can be self-destructed upon disassembly.

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