A virtual machine trusted startup method and system

Abstract

The present invention discloses a trusted startup method and system for a virtual machine, including: during the startup of the host machine, the host system is measured for security by a server built-in security chip to ensure the trustworthiness of the host system; in the host machine, the virtual unified extensible firmware interface is used to guide the virtual machine startup, and a measurement value is generated according to the virtual machine core file in the virtual machine image read by the virtual unified extensible firmware interface; the measurement value is transmitted to the server built-in security chip via the virtual machine monitor; based on the measurement value and the measurement reference value in the server built-in security chip, it is determined whether to start the virtual machine. The present invention solves the problems of virtual machine kernel being tampered with and difficulty in ensuring the security of the startup process, and stores the measurement reference value of the virtual machine core file in the built-in security chip in combination with the built-in security chip to ensure the storage security of the measurement reference value, and uses the virtual UEFI to measure the virtual machine core file, thereby streamlining the trusted startup process.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of virtualization security technology and trusted computing, and relates to a trusted startup method and system for a virtual machine, and in particular to a trusted startup method for a virtual machine based on modifying a virtual unified extensible firmware interface (UEFI) and a virtual machine monitor. Background Art

[0002] In computer technology, virtualization (technology) or virtualization technology is a resource management technology that abstracts and transforms various physical resources of a computer (CPU, memory, disk space, network adapter, etc.) and presents them so that they can be divided and combined into one or more computer configuration environments. In this way, the inseparable barriers between physical structures are broken, allowing users to use these computer hardware resources in a better way than the original configuration. The new virtual parts of these resources are not limited by the way existing resources are set up, the region or the physical configuration. Generally speaking, virtualized resources include computing power and data storage. Virtualization technology has been widely used in a series of fields represented by cloud computing.

[0003] Trusted Computing (TC) is a technology promoted and developed by the Trusted Computing Group (Trusted Computing Cluster, TCPA). Trusted computing is the use of trusted computing platforms based on hardware security modules in computing and communication systems to improve the overall security of the system. Information security has four levels: device security, data security, content security and behavioral security. Trusted computing belongs to behavioral security, which should include the following characteristics: confidentiality of behavior, integrity of behavior, authenticity of behavior, etc.

[0004] In summary, in the trusted startup process of the virtual machine, the method has a more concise and automated process. Summary of the invention

[0005] To solve the above problems, the present invention proposes a virtual machine trusted boot method and system, which measures the virtual machine core files through virtual UEFI, does not rely on other software except the virtual machine monitor, and simplifies the trusted boot process.

[0006] The technical solution adopted by the present invention is as follows:

[0007] A trusted startup method for a virtual machine, the steps of which include:

[0008] 1) During the host startup process, the server's built-in security chip is used to measure the host system's security to ensure the trustworthiness of the host system, where the host system includes: the host and the virtual machine monitor;

[0009] 2) using the virtual unified extensible firmware interface to boot the virtual machine in the host machine, and generating a metric value based on a virtual machine core file in the virtual machine image read by the virtual unified extensible firmware interface;

[0010] 3) The measurement value is transmitted to the virtual machine monitor and then to the server's built-in security chip;

[0011] 4) According to the measurement value and the measurement reference value in the built-in security chip of the server, the information of enabling startup or disabling startup of the virtual machine is obtained to determine whether to enable the virtual machine.

[0012] Furthermore, the server's built-in security chip is independent of the server's CPU processor through one-way physical isolation.

[0013] Furthermore, the virtual machine monitor includes: QEMU.

[0014] Furthermore, the core files include: grub.cfg and vmlinuz.

[0015] Furthermore, the method for calculating the metric value includes: calculating the hash value of each core file.

[0016] Furthermore, methods for calculating the hash value include: MD5 function, SHA-1 function or SHA-256 function.

[0017] Furthermore, the virtual machine monitor registers a virtual device, and after the virtual machine monitor captures the metric value, it is handed over to a virtual device for processing, wherein the virtual device is registered in the virtual machine monitor.

[0018] Further, the following steps are used to obtain the startup permission information or the startup permission information.

[0019] 1) Find the measurement benchmark value in the server's built-in security chip;

[0020] 2) If the metric reference value is not found, the startup permission information is obtained and the metric value is stored as the metric reference value; if the metric reference value is found, the following strategy is used to determine whether the startup permission information or the startup permission information is obtained:

[0021] a) if the measurement reference value is consistent with the measurement value, obtaining the startup permission information;

[0022] b) If the metric reference value is inconsistent with the metric value, information on whether the metric value is updated is sent to the virtualization system administrator to obtain information on whether startup is allowed or not allowed.

[0023] A trusted boot system for a virtual machine, comprising:

[0024] The host machine is used to send virtual machine boot information to the virtual unified extensible firmware interface;

[0025] A virtual unified extensible firmware interface is used to read virtual machine core files in a virtual machine image according to a received virtual machine boot startup information of a host machine, and calculate the measurement value of each virtual machine core file; and send the measurement value to a virtual machine monitor;

[0026] A server with a built-in server security chip is used to perform security measurement on the host system during the host startup process to ensure the trustworthiness of the host system, wherein the host system includes: a host and a virtual machine monitor; receiving a measurement value sent from the virtual machine monitor; obtaining information on whether the virtual machine is allowed to start or not allowed to start based on the measurement value and the measurement reference value in the built-in server security chip;

[0027] A virtual machine monitor for receiving the measurement value from the virtual unified extensible firmware interface; sending the measurement value to a server having a server built-in security chip;

[0028] The virtual machine is used to provide a number of core files to the virtual unified extensible firmware interface; and decides whether to start or not to start according to the startup permission information or the startup disallowance information.

[0029] Further, the following steps are used to obtain the startup permission information or the startup permission information.

[0030] 1) Find the measurement benchmark value in the server's built-in security chip;

[0031] 2) If the metric reference value is not found, the startup permission information is obtained and the metric value is stored as the metric reference value; if the metric reference value is found, the following strategy is used to determine whether the startup permission information or the startup permission information is obtained:

[0032] a) if the measurement reference value is consistent with the measurement value, obtaining the startup permission information;

[0033] b) If the metric reference value is inconsistent with the metric value, information on whether the metric value is updated is sent to the virtualization system administrator to obtain information on whether startup is allowed or not allowed.

[0034] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0035] 1. The present invention ensures the security of the core files of the virtual machine during the life cycle of the virtual machine, solves the problems of the virtual machine kernel being tampered with and the difficulty in ensuring the security of the startup process, and ensures the integrity of the virtual machine kernel.

[0036] 2. The present invention combines a built-in security chip to store the measurement benchmark value of the virtual machine core file in the built-in security chip to ensure the storage security of the measurement benchmark value of the virtual machine startup file.

[0037] 3. The present invention measures the virtual machine core files through virtual UEFI, does not rely on other software except the virtual machine monitor, and simplifies the trusted startup process.

[0038] 4. Compared with Chinese patent application CN111638936A, the present invention discloses a virtual machine static measurement method and device based on a built-in security architecture. The core files in the virtual machine image are read by the virtual UEFI itself without the need for other manual operations, and a virtual device dedicated to transmitting measurement values ​​and measurement results between the virtual UEFI and the server built-in chip is added to the virtual machine monitor. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0039] Figure 1 The present invention provides a flow chart of a virtual machine trusted startup method. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0040] In order to further illustrate the implementation case, the present invention provides drawings for supporting explanation. These drawings are part of the content of the present invention and can be used in conjunction with the relevant description of the specification to explain the operating principle. With these contents, relevant technical personnel in the field can understand the specific implementation and deployment of the present invention and its advantages.

[0041] The virtual machine trusted startup method of the present invention is as follows: Figure 1 As shown, the steps include:

[0042] 1) During the host startup process, the server's built-in security chip measures the host system's security to ensure the trustworthiness of the host system (including the virtual machine monitor);

[0043] 2) Use virtual UEFI to boot the virtual machine in the host machine;

[0044] 3) The virtual UEFI reads the virtual machine core files in the virtual machine image, such as grub.cfg, vmlinuz, etc., and measures the read core files (using a hash algorithm) to generate a measurement value;

[0045] 4) The virtual UEFI calls the built-in protocol to transmit the calculated metric value, which is received by the virtual machine monitor;

[0046] 5) The virtual machine monitor passes the received hash value to the server's built-in security chip;

[0047] 6) If the virtual machine is started for the first time, the measurement reference value is empty. At this time, the passed hash value is stored as the measurement reference value in the server's built-in security chip, allowing the virtual machine to start;

[0048] 7) If the virtual machine is not started for the first time, the hash value passed in is compared with the measurement reference value in the server's built-in security chip. If they are consistent, a permission signal is passed to the virtual UEFI via the virtual machine monitor to allow the virtual machine to start; if they are inconsistent, the virtualization system administrator is asked whether the measurement reference value needs to be updated;

[0049] 8) If the update is allowed, the passed hash value is stored in the built-in security chip as a measurement reference value, and the virtual machine starts normally;

[0050] Otherwise, the virtual machine is denied startup.

[0051] In an example of the present invention, the virtual machine monitor may be a common virtual machine monitor such as QEMU.

[0052] In one embodiment of the present invention, the built-in security chip is a processor independent of the CPU and has a separate security storage module.

[0053] In one example of the present invention, the built-in security chip is an independent security device on the physical server. It ensures security through one-way physical isolation. It starts before the system and is the trusted root of the entire system. It can perform security measurement on the entire boot and operation process of the system to prevent or monitor illegal tampering.

[0054] In an example of the present invention, there are multiple virtual machine core files read for measurement, all of which are related to the configuration and startup of the virtual machine.

[0055] In an example of the present invention, the hash value calculated by the file can be a function such as MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, etc. In this embodiment, MD5 is used. This hash value calculation module is built into the virtual UEFI.

[0056] In an example of the present invention, the method for transmitting the metric value is to register a virtual device in the virtual machine monitor, transmit it through a specific protocol in the virtual UEFI, capture it by the virtual machine monitor, and hand it over to the registered virtual device for processing.

[0057] In an embodiment of the present invention, a virtual machine monitor registers a virtual device that is only used to receive the hash value transmitted by the virtual UEFI. After the virtual machine monitor captures the device request of the virtual UEFI, it is handed over to the virtual device for processing.

[0058] Experimental results:

[0059] Whether the trusted startup method of the virtual machine can detect anomalies in the virtual machine system is verified. First, a virtual machine is created; second, the virtual machine is booted and started using this method, and it can be started normally; third, the key startup files in the virtual machine image are modified to simulate the situation of malicious tampering with the virtual machine, and the virtual machine startup process is terminated using this method. This shows that the present invention can measure the key files of the virtual machine, report anomalies and shut down the virtual machine in time, that is, the present invention is feasible and effective for ensuring the security of key files during the life cycle of the virtual machine.

[0060] Although the specific display of the implementation scheme and the introduction of the present invention are combined, those skilled in the art should understand that various changes can be made to the present invention in form and details without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention as defined in the appended claims, all of which are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A trusted startup method for a virtual machine, comprising the steps of: 1) During the host startup process, the server's built-in security chip is used to measure the host system's security to ensure the trustworthiness of the host system, where the host system includes: the host and the virtual machine monitor; 2) Use virtual UEFI to boot the virtual machine in the host machine; 3) The virtual UEFI reads the virtual machine core file in the virtual machine image, measures the read virtual machine core file, and generates a measurement value; 4) The virtual UEFI calls the built-in protocol to transmit the calculated metric value, which is received by the virtual machine monitor; wherein a virtual device is registered in the virtual machine monitor, and after the virtual machine monitor captures the metric value, it is handed over to the virtual device for processing; 5) The virtual machine monitor transmits the received measurement value to the server's built-in security chip; 6) According to the measurement value and the measurement reference value in the built-in security chip of the server, the information of allowing startup of the virtual machine or not allowing startup is obtained to determine whether to start the virtual machine.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The server's built-in security chip is independent of the server's CPU processor through one-way physical isolation.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Virtual machine monitors include: QEMU.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The virtual machine core files include: grub.cfg and vmlinuz.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The method for calculating the metric value includes: calculating the hash value of each virtual machine core file.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that Methods for calculating hash values ​​include: MD5 function, SHA-1 function or SHA-256 function.

7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Get the startup permission information or the startup permission information by following the steps below. 1) Find the measurement benchmark value in the server's built-in security chip; 2) If the metric reference value is not found, the startup permission information is obtained and the metric value is stored as the metric reference value; if the metric reference value is found, the following strategy is used to determine whether the startup permission information or the startup permission information is obtained: a) if the measurement reference value is consistent with the measurement value, obtaining the startup permission information; b) If the metric reference value is inconsistent with the metric value, information on whether the metric value is updated is sent to the virtualization system administrator to obtain information on whether startup is allowed or not allowed.

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