A TrueCrypt hidden partition identification method, terminal device and storage medium

By analyzing Windows registry and ShellBags information and combining known passwords, we can determine whether there is a hidden partition in the TrueCrypt encrypted container, which solves the problem of second-layer partition recognition in the dual-encrypted container in electronic data forensics, and realizes effective identification of hidden partitions and Evidence support.

CN114281766BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-22XIAMEN MEIYA PICO INFORMATION CO LTD
View PDF 0 Cites 0 Cited by

Patent Information

Application Number
CN202111418912.7
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2021-11-26
Publication Date
2024-11-22
Estimated Expiration
2041-11-26

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

During the electronic data forensics process, when there is double encryption in the TrueCrypt encryption container, it is impossible to effectively determine whether there is a second layer of encrypted partition, resulting in increased difficulty in investigation.

Method used

By analyzing the Windows registry and ShellBags information, extracting and comparing the folder path and access time, mounting the encrypted volume with a known password, we can determine whether there is a hidden partition.

Benefits of technology

Effectively identifying hidden partitions provides comprehensive and in-depth integrity of electronic data forensics, and solves the problem of second-layer partition recognition in dual-encrypted containers.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

Smart Images

  • Figure CN114281766B_ABST
    Figure CN114281766B_ABST
Patent Text Reader

Abstract

The present invention relates to a TrueCrypt hidden partition identification method, terminal device and storage medium, the method comprising: after parsing the registry HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\MountedDevices and ShellBag information, by comparing the drive letter information, obtaining a second linked list storing the folder path and the last access time of the folder under the TrueCrypt corresponding drive letter; after removing the drive letter information in the folder path corresponding to all elements in the second linked list, using a known password to mount the encrypted volume, and obtaining a third linked list according to the folder path information and the last access time of the folder of the mounted encrypted volume; by comparing the contents of the second linked list and the third linked list, judging whether there is a hidden partition. The present invention can effectively identify the hidden partition, and provides technical support for the comprehensive, in-depth and complete electronic data forensics.
Need to check novelty before this filing date? Find Prior Art

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of electronic data forensics, and in particular to a TrueCrypt hidden partition identification method, terminal equipment and storage medium. Background Art

[0002] With the development of informatization, the confidentiality and security of electronic information cannot be ignored, and people are becoming more and more aware of encrypting important files. In the process of electronic data forensics, encrypted files are the focus of attention, and they often store important information. At present, TrueCrypt encryption software can set up double encryption for an encrypted partition. By setting two passwords, an encrypted container can have two encrypted partitions. One of these two encrypted partitions often stores very important and unknown information. When only one layer of password of the TrueCrypt encryption container is known, there is no way to determine whether there is a second layer of encrypted partition. When encountering uncontrollable factors, only one of the passwords is explained to confuse investigators, which brings considerable difficulties to electronic data forensics.

[0003] Currently, there are two ways to parse TrueCrypt encrypted containers. One is to load the decrypted partition after it has been decrypted on the system, and the other is to load the encrypted container by entering the password on the software. Both methods have the problem that if the encrypted container is double-encrypted, the other encrypted partition cannot be parsed. Summary of the invention

[0004] In order to solve the above problems, the present invention proposes a TrueCrypt hidden partition identification method, terminal device and storage medium.

[0005] The specific plan is as follows:

[0006] A TrueCrypt hidden partition identification method comprises the following steps:

[0007] S1: Parse all keys and corresponding key values ​​under the registry path HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\MountedDevices, and store the parsed keys and corresponding key values ​​in the first linked list;

[0008] S2: traverse the first linked list and delete the elements whose key values ​​do not contain TrueCryptVolume;

[0009] S3: Parse the ShellBags information in the system, extract the folder path and the corresponding folder last access time, and store them in the second linked list;

[0010] S4: for each element in the second linked list, extract the drive letter information in the corresponding folder path, and determine whether there is an element in the first linked list such that the content of the key corresponding to the element is the same as the drive letter information. If not, delete the element in the second linked list until all elements in the second linked list are determined, and then enter S5;

[0011] S5: After removing the drive letter information in the folder paths corresponding to all elements in the second linked list, the encrypted volume is mounted using a known password;

[0012] S6: extracting all folder paths and folder last access times after removing drive letter information from the mounted encrypted volume, and storing them in the third linked list;

[0013] S7: for all elements in the second linked list, determine whether there is a folder path corresponding to an element in the second linked list that is the same as a folder path corresponding to an element in the third linked list. If so, determine that there is no hidden partition; otherwise, proceed to S8;

[0014] S8: For all elements in the second linked list, determine whether there is a folder whose last access time corresponding to an element in the second linked list is less than the maximum value of the last access time of the folders corresponding to all elements in the third linked list. If so, determine that there is no hidden partition; otherwise, determine that there is a hidden partition.

[0015] Furthermore, the storage address of the file used to store ShellBags information is: C:\Users\username\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat.

[0016] A TrueCrypt hidden partition identification terminal device comprises a processor, a memory and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the method described above in the embodiment of the present invention are implemented.

[0017] A computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the method described above in an embodiment of the present invention are implemented.

[0018] The present invention adopts the above technical solution, which can effectively identify hidden partitions and provide technical support for the comprehensive, in-depth and complete electronic data forensics. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0019] Figure 1 Shown is a flow chart of Embodiment 1 of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0020] To further illustrate various embodiments, the present invention provides drawings. These drawings are part of the disclosure of the present invention, which are mainly used to illustrate the embodiments and can be used in conjunction with the relevant descriptions in the specification to explain the operating principles of the embodiments. With reference to these contents, ordinary technicians in this field should be able to understand other possible implementations and advantages of the present invention.

[0021] The present invention will now be further described with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific implementation methods.

[0022] Embodiment 1:

[0023] All partition information mounted by the system is stored under the key name HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\MountedDevices in the Windows registry. By analyzing all the keys and values ​​under this key name, the drive letter information mounted by the TrueCrypt container can be determined. At the same time, after Windows 7, Microsoft began to introduce the ShellBags mechanism. ShellBags is a set of information used to record the name, size, and icon of the folder, and also records the time when the folder was last accessed. Therefore, the TrueCrypt drive letter information can be determined based on the MountedDevices key, and the folder information in the decrypted disk obtained after the first layer of password is decrypted is compared with the TrueCrypt drive letter related information recorded in ShellBags to determine whether there is a difference. If there is a difference, it can be determined that there are other hidden partitions.

[0024] Based on the above principle, an embodiment of the present invention provides a TrueCrypt hidden partition identification method for determining whether there is a hidden partition in an encrypted container when a first-level password of the encrypted container is known.

[0025] like Figure 1 As shown, the method comprises the following steps:

[0026] S1: Parse all keys and corresponding key values ​​under the registry path HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\MountedDevices, and store the parsed keys and corresponding key values ​​in the first linked list.

[0027] S2: traverse the first linked list and delete the elements whose key values ​​do not contain TrueCryptVolume.

[0028] If the disk corresponding to the TrueCrypt container is drive Q, the key value is TrueCryptVolumeQ. If it is drive F, the key value is TrueCryptVolumeF. The last character in the key value indicates the drive letter information corresponding to the TrueCrypt container.

[0029] S3: Parse the ShellBags information in the system, extract the folder path and the corresponding folder last access time, and store them in the second linked list.

[0030] The storage address of the file used to store ShellBags information in this embodiment is: C:\Users\username\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat.

[0031] S4: For each element in the second linked list, extract the drive letter information (such as: C:\) in the corresponding folder path, and determine whether there is an element in the first linked list such that the content of the key corresponding to the element is the same as the drive letter information. If not, delete the element in the second linked list until all elements in the second linked list are determined, and then enter S5.

[0032] S5: After removing the drive letter information in the folder paths corresponding to all elements in the second linked list, the encrypted volume is mounted using a known password.

[0033] S6: extract all folder path information after removing the drive letter information in the mounted encrypted volume (for example, if the complete folder path is "D:\Documents\2012", only "Documents\2012" is obtained) and the last access time of the folder, and store them in the third linked list.

[0034] S7: For all elements in the second linked list, determine whether there is a folder path corresponding to an element in the second linked list that is the same as a folder path corresponding to an element in the third linked list. If so, determine that there is no hidden partition; otherwise, enter S8.

[0035] S8: For all elements in the second linked list, determine whether there is a folder whose last access time corresponding to an element in the second linked list is less than the maximum value of the last access time of the folders corresponding to all elements in the third linked list. If so, determine that there is no hidden partition; otherwise, determine that there is a hidden partition.

[0036] In the case where the first layer password is known, the embodiment of the present invention can further determine whether there is a second layer hidden partition by analyzing the TrueCrypt mounted operating system information and time change information. The method of this embodiment provides effective technical support for the comprehensive, in-depth and complete electronic data forensics.

[0037] Embodiment 2:

[0038] The present invention also provides a TrueCrypt hidden partition identification terminal device, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor implements the steps in the above-mentioned method embodiment of the first embodiment of the present invention when executing the computer program.

[0039] Further, as an executable solution, the TrueCrypt hidden partition identification terminal device can be a computing device such as a desktop computer, a notebook, a PDA, and a cloud server. The TrueCrypt hidden partition identification terminal device may include, but is not limited to, a processor and a memory. Those skilled in the art can understand that the composition structure of the above-mentioned TrueCrypt hidden partition identification terminal device is only an example of a TrueCrypt hidden partition identification terminal device, and does not constitute a limitation on the TrueCrypt hidden partition identification terminal device. It may include more or less components than the above-mentioned, or a combination of certain components, or different components. For example, the TrueCrypt hidden partition identification terminal device may also include input and output devices, network access devices, buses, etc., and the embodiments of the present invention do not limit this.

[0040] Further, as an executable solution, the processor may be a central processing unit (CPU), or other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSP), application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA) or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. The general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or any conventional processor, etc. The processor is the control center of the TrueCrypt hidden partition identification terminal device, and uses various interfaces and lines to connect various parts of the entire TrueCrypt hidden partition identification terminal device.

[0041] The memory can be used to store the computer program and / or module, and the processor realizes various functions of the TrueCrypt hidden partition identification terminal device by running or executing the computer program and / or module stored in the memory, and calling the data stored in the memory. The memory can mainly include a program storage area and a data storage area, wherein the program storage area can store an operating system and at least one application required for a function; the data storage area can store data created according to the use of the mobile phone, etc. In addition, the memory can include a high-speed random access memory, and can also include a non-volatile memory, such as a hard disk, a memory, a plug-in hard disk, a smart memory card (Smart Media Card, SMC), a secure digital (Secure Digital, SD) card, a flash card (Flash Card), at least one disk storage device, a flash memory device, or other volatile solid-state storage devices.

[0042] The present invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium, wherein the computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the above method in the embodiment of the present invention are implemented.

[0043] If the module / unit integrated in the TrueCrypt hidden partition identification terminal device is implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the present invention implements all or part of the processes in the above-mentioned embodiment method, and can also be completed by instructing the relevant hardware through a computer program. The computer program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and the computer program can implement the steps of the above-mentioned various method embodiments when executed by the processor. Among them, the computer program includes computer program code, and the computer program code can be in source code form, object code form, executable file or some intermediate form, etc. The computer-readable medium may include: any entity or device capable of carrying the computer program code, recording medium, U disk, mobile hard disk, disk, optical disk, computer memory, read-only memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory), random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory) and software distribution medium, etc.

[0044] Although the present invention has been specifically shown and described in conjunction with the preferred embodiments, it should be understood by those skilled in the art that various changes may be made to the present invention in form and details without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention as defined by the appended claims, all of which are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A TrueCrypt hidden partition identification method, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: S1: Parse all keys and corresponding key values ​​under the registry path HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\MountedDevices, and store the parsed keys and corresponding key values ​​in the first linked list; S2: traverse the first linked list and delete the elements whose key values ​​do not contain TrueCryptVolume; S3: Parse the ShellBags information in the system, extract the folder path and the corresponding folder last access time, and store them in the second linked list; S4: for each element in the second linked list, extract the drive letter information in the corresponding folder path, and determine whether there is an element in the first linked list such that the content of the key corresponding to the element is the same as the drive letter information. If not, delete the element in the second linked list until all elements in the second linked list are determined, and then enter S5; S5: After removing the drive letter information in the folder paths corresponding to all elements in the second linked list, the encrypted volume is mounted using a known password; S6: extracting all folder paths and last access times of the folders after removing the drive letter information from the mounted encrypted volume, and storing them in the third linked list; S7: for all elements in the second linked list, determine whether there is a folder path corresponding to an element in the second linked list that is the same as a folder path corresponding to an element in the third linked list; if so, determine that there is no hidden partition; Otherwise, go to S8; S8: For all elements in the second linked list, determine whether there is a folder whose last access time corresponding to an element in the second linked list is less than the maximum value of the last access time of the folders corresponding to all elements in the third linked list. If so, determine that there is no hidden partition; otherwise, determine that there is a hidden partition.

2. The TrueCrypt hidden partition identification method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The storage address of the file used to store ShellBags information is: C:\Users\username\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat.

3. A TrueCrypt hidden partition identification terminal device, characterized in that: The method comprises a processor, a memory and a computer program stored in the memory and running on the processor, wherein the processor implements the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 2 when executing the computer program.

4. A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 2 are implemented.