Attack behavior monitoring method and device for relay protection information processing system
By performing application-layer message analysis and attack behavior detection on traffic data packets of relay protection information processing system, the limitations of the detection method in the prior art focus on measurement point data analysis are solved, and clock tampering and abnormal messages are realized Effective identification of business logic attacks improves the security and reliability of the system.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202111675512.4
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2021-12-31
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-26
- Estimated Expiration
- 2041-12-31
AI Technical Summary
The existing network attack detection methods of relay protection information processing systems focus on measurement point data analysis, making it difficult to effectively detect attack behaviors at the application layer, resulting in false alarms and missed alarms. There is a lack of message-level attack detection for specific services.
By capturing traffic data packets in real time, extracting application-level messages and performing field-level analysis, detecting clock tampering, malformed messages and business logic attacks, establishing a business model for attack behavior detection, and ensuring that messages comply with normal clock characteristics, formats and business logic .
It improves the accuracy of attack behavior detection of relay protection information processing systems, enhances network security defense capabilities, and avoids equipment failures and information tampering caused by clock abnormalities and malformed messages.
Smart Images

Figure CN114825607B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of power system information security, and in particular to a method and device for monitoring attack behavior of a relay protection information processing system. Background Art
[0002] With the continuous improvement of substation automation and dispatching automation, the informationization and intelligence of power systems have gradually increased. The relay protection information processing system composed of relay protection devices, safety automatic devices and fault recorders has become an important part of the power system. The relay protection information processing system can collect the action information and operating status information of the relay protection device in real time, and automatically and deeply analyze the action information of the protection device, assisting power dispatchers to quickly judge the protection action behavior, locate faults, make decisions, and handle accidents. Therefore, the reliable transmission and correct processing of relay protection information are of great significance to the safe and stable operation of the power system.
[0003] The relay protection information processing system uses the IEC 60870-5-103 protocol to transmit information. Due to the vulnerability of the protocol's own design, such as the lack of authentication mechanism, authorization mechanism, and encryption mechanism, it faces network attacks such as message theft, interception, and tampering. However, the existing network attack detection methods for relay protection systems focus on data analysis at the measurement points of relay protection devices, which are prone to false alarms and omissions. At the same time, there is a lack of detection of attack behaviors at the message level for specific relay protection services. Therefore, it is urgent to invent a new attack behavior monitoring method for relay protection information processing systems to improve the accuracy of detecting attack behaviors and enhance the network security defense capabilities of power systems. Summary of the invention
[0004] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a method and device for monitoring attack behavior of a relay protection information processing system in view of the shortcomings of the existing technology, so as to effectively solve the limitation that the existing detection method cannot detect attack behavior at the application layer of the relay protection system business, and improve the security and reliability of the relay protection information processing system.
[0005] In order to solve the above technical problems, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is: a method for monitoring attack behavior of a relay protection information processing system, comprising the following steps:
[0006] S1, real-time capture of relay protection information processing system traffic data packets, and extraction of the application layer message of the current frame traffic data;
[0007] S2. Performing field-level analysis on the application layer message;
[0008] S3, perform clock tampering attack detection on the parsed message. If the clock range, clock logic, clock synchronization, and clock delay of the message do not meet the normal clock characteristics, it is determined that a clock tampering attack exists, otherwise proceed to step S4;
[0009] S4, perform malformed message attack detection on the parsed message. If the length field, type identifier, transmission reason, and information sequence number value of the message do not meet the protocol requirements, it is determined that a malformed message attack exists, otherwise proceed to step S5;
[0010] S5. Perform attack detection on the parsed message according to the business system to which the parsed message belongs. If the parsed message does not conform to the normal business model, it is determined that there is a business logic attack. Otherwise, the current frame traffic data is determined to be normal traffic.
[0011] The present invention parses the application layer message of the flow data of the relay protection information processing system (parses the message according to the IEC60870-5-103 protocol), and performs clock tampering attack detection, deformed message attack detection, and business logic attack detection on the parsed message, which effectively solves the limitation that the existing detection method cannot detect attack behavior at the application layer for the relay protection system business, and improves the security and reliability of the relay protection information processing system.
[0012] In step S3, the specific implementation process of performing clock tampering attack detection on the parsed message includes:
[0013] 1) Judgment formula Y t ∈[1970,2069] is true, if not, it is determined to be a clock tampering attack, otherwise, go to step 2); where, Y t Indicates the time scale year, y t The year identification byte value representing the time stamp;
[0014] 2) Judgment formula Is it established? If not, it is determined to be a clock tampering attack. Otherwise, go to step 3); where, represents the universal quantifier "arbitrary", P is the application layer message parsed in step S2, P DS Indicates IEC60870-5-103 synchronization message, A g (P) indicates the value of the high 8 bits of the ASDU address of the message, F indicates 15 in hexadecimal, and H indicates that the value is in hexadecimal;
[0015] 3) Judgment formula Is it true? If not, it is determined to be a clock tampering attack. Otherwise, go to step 4); where P DZIndicates one of the IEC 60870-5-103 alarm, remote signal change, and action event data transmission messages. js (P) represents the event substation receiving time, T sj (P) indicates the actual time when the event occurred;
[0016] 4) Check whether the time period of the substation sending historical fault information is consistent with the time period of the main station calling fault historical information. If the two times are inconsistent, it is determined to be a clock tampering attack, otherwise go to step 5);
[0017] 5) Judgment formula Is it established? If not, it is determined to be a clock tampering attack. Otherwise, go to step S4; wherein, P XC Indicates IEC 60870-5-103 master-slave information transmission message, T cs (P) represents the information transmission time, T max Indicates the maximum delay time, P 1 Indicates the message of relay protection device action information transmission, P 2 Indicates the analog measurement value transmission message of the relay protection device, P 3 Indicates the transmission message of the operating status of the relay protection device, P 4 Indicates the message transmitted by the relay protection device setting.
[0018] The present invention can identify attack behaviors against clock features such as clock range, clock logic, clock synchronization, and clock delay by performing clock tampering attack detection on the flow data of the relay protection information processing system, thus overcoming the deficiency that the existing detection methods focus on the numerical analysis of the time scale and cannot perform abnormal detection on features such as the time scale logic. The clock tampering attack detection effectively avoids the occurrence of various relay protection devices not being able to work normally due to clock anomalies, and can also prevent attackers from maliciously expanding the time range of information upload and illegally obtaining system information, thus improving the ability of the relay protection information processing system to deal with non-numerical time scale tampering attacks.
[0019] The specific implementation process of performing malformed message attack detection on the parsed message includes:
[0020] I) Judgment formula Is it true? If not, it is determined to be a malformed message attack, otherwise it goes to step II); where P IEC103 Indicates IEC 60870-5-103 message, F l (P) indicates the theoretical length of the message, L s (P) indicates the actual length of the message;
[0021] II) Judgment formula Is it established? If not, it is determined to be a malformed message attack, otherwise go to step III);
[0022] III) Judgment formula Is it true? If not, it is determined to be a malformed message attack, otherwise go to step IV); where F t (P) indicates the message type identification field value;
[0023] IV) Judgment formula Is it true? If not, it is determined to be a malformed message attack, otherwise it goes to step V); where F c (P) indicates the value of the message transmission reason field;
[0024] V) Judgment formula Is it true? If not, it is determined to be a malformed message attack, otherwise, go to step S5; F i (P) indicates the message information sequence number field value.
[0025] The malformed message attack detection process of the present invention can identify malformed messages when the message format is correct, including malformed message length, malformed message field threshold, etc., overcoming the limitation of the existing method that can only perform legitimacy verification on the message format. At the same time, the malformed message attack detection finds the malformation of the specific business to which the message belongs before it is executed, so as to quickly respond to the dispatch center, re-establish the communication process of the business in the relay protection information processing system, and send normal business messages, so as to avoid abnormalities of the malformed message after execution, thereby affecting the execution process of the normal business.
[0026] In step S5, when the message is for reading the substation configuration service, the specific implementation process of performing attack detection on the parsed message includes:
[0027] Judgment formula Is it true? If not, it is determined that there is a malicious interception attack on the configuration data. Otherwise, the judgment formula Is it true? If not, it is determined that there is a data tampering attack, otherwise the current frame traffic data is determined as normal traffic; where P BT Indicates the reading of substation configuration service message in the relay protection information processing system, B n (P) indicates the number of titles sent by the substation, B s Indicates the number of all titles configured in the substation, B zh (P) indicates the group number of each item of the same group of header information, C zh Indicates the group number of the current group header information.
[0028] The attack behavior detection of reading substation configuration business logic of the present invention can detect whether the configuration information is completely uploaded and whether the items and group numbers of the configuration information are consistent. The complete upload of configuration information and the consistency of items and group numbers are the prerequisites for ensuring the normal operation of the relay protection device. This detection method overcomes the shortcomings of the existing attack behavior detection method of the relay protection information processing system, which focuses on the data analysis of the measurement point of the relay protection device and lacks the attack behavior detection for the business logic of the flow data application layer message, and effectively avoids the risk of the configuration information being intercepted and tampered.
[0029] In step S5, when the message is a protection event sending service, the specific implementation process of attack detection on the parsed message includes:
[0030] A) Judgment formula Is it established? If not, it is determined that there is a malicious tampering attack on the double-point information. Otherwise, go to step B); where P BH Indicates the protection event message sent in the relay protection information processing system, D pi (P) indicates the double point information value;
[0031] B) Check whether the message logic of the previous and next frames of the switch position change, action signal, and pressure plate status is correct. If the switch position change is open / closed in the previous frame, it is still open / closed in the next frame; the action signal is reset / action in the previous frame, and it is still reset / action in the next frame; the pressure plate status is not put into / put into the previous frame, and it is still not put into / put into the next frame, it is determined that there is a malicious opening and closing attack, otherwise go to step C);
[0032] C) Judgment formula Is it true? If not, it is determined that there is an illegal action event sending attack, otherwise the current frame traffic data is determined as normal traffic; where L bh (P) indicates the protection event message type identifier, P 5 Indicates alarm or switch position change event message, P 6 Indicates action event message.
[0033] The protection event uploading business logic attack behavior detection of the present invention can realize malicious tampering attack detection and illegal uploading attack detection of various protection events in the relay protection information processing system. The business logic attack behavior of the protection event can be highly hidden in the normal flow data. The existing methods only analyze the data of the measurement point of the relay protection device, and it is difficult to detect such high-energy stealth attack behavior. The present invention deeply integrates the uploading business logic of the protection event in the flow data application layer message, thereby improving the accuracy of the attack behavior of the relay protection information processing system.
[0034] In step S5, when the message is a recording briefing uploading service, the specific implementation process of performing attack detection on the parsed message includes:
[0035] i) Judgment formula Is it established? If not, it is determined that there is a trip phase malicious tampering attack, otherwise it goes to step ii); where P LB Indicates the recording briefing service message in the relay protection information processing system, G xb (P) indicates the fault phase, Z xb (P) indicates trip phase;
[0036] ii) Judgment formula Is it established? If not, it is determined that there is a ground fault flag data tampering attack, otherwise it goes to step iii); where D 3 Indicates the value of the short circuit ground fault flag of the message, D 0 Indicates the value of the A phase short circuit fault flag bit in the message, D 1 Indicates the value of the phase B short circuit fault flag bit in the message, D 2 Indicates the value of the C phase short circuit fault flag bit in the message;
[0037] iii) Check whether the reclosing in the recording briefing is abnormal. If there is a reclosing after the fault occurs, but the reclosing time is 0, or there is no reclosing but the reclosing time is not 0, it is determined that there is a reclosing time tampering attack, otherwise the current frame traffic data is determined to be normal traffic.
[0038] The attack behavior detection of the recording briefing sending business logic of the present invention can distinguish the malicious tampering attack of the trip phase difference, the tampering attack of the ground fault flag data and the tampering attack of the reclosing time. The information of the recording briefing sending business such as the trip phase difference, fault flag, reclosing time, etc. must be extracted through the field-level deep analysis of the application layer message of the relay protection information system flow data. Such attack behavior cannot be identified only through the format verification of the message. The attack behavior detection method provided by the present invention overcomes the limitation that the existing detection method cannot detect the timing and context logic of the recording briefing, and improves the ability to protect the integrity and accuracy of the recording briefing data.
[0039] In step S5, when the message is a fixed value operation service, the specific implementation process of performing attack detection on the parsed message includes:
[0040] Judgment Logic X g1 →X g2 →X g3 →X g4 →X g5 →X g6 →X g7 →X g8 Is it true? If not, it is determined that there is a malicious tampering attack on the setting value of the relay protection device. Otherwise, the current frame flow data is determined to be normal flow; where Xg1 Indicates the calling device's current running fixed value area code message, X g2 Indicates the current running fixed value area code message of the substation upload device, X g3 Indicates the master station calls the device setting message, X g4 Indicates that the substation uploads the device setting message, X g5 Indicates that the fixed value message is downloaded to the substation, X g6 Indicates that the response substation downloads the fixed value message, X g7 Indicates execution of fixed value modification message, X g8 The substation responds to the fixed value modification message.
[0041] The fixed value operation business logic attack behavior detection of the present invention can identify malicious tampering attacks on the set value of the relay protection device during the fixed value modification process according to the normal fixed value modification logic, and actively block the attack behavior of malicious tampering with the set value. However, the existing relay protection device measurement point data analysis method can only detect after the set value is tampered, and cannot monitor and block the modification of the set value in time. The fixed value operation business logic attack behavior detection method provided by the present invention goes deep into the application layer of the flow data, and can effectively prevent the set value of the relay protection device from being maliciously tampered, which is of great significance to the correct operation of the relay protection device.
[0042] In step S5, when the message is a general call service, the specific implementation process of performing attack detection on the parsed message includes:
[0043] Judgment Logic Z h1 →Z h2 →Z h3 Is it true? If not, it is determined that there is an illegal general attack. Otherwise, the judgment formula Is it true? If not, it is determined that there is an illegal call-up attack, otherwise the current frame traffic data is determined as normal traffic; where Z h1 Indicates that the master station starts the general call message, Z h2 Indicates that the substation sends information messages, Z h3 Indicates the end of the general call message, P ZH Indicates the total call service of the relay protection information processing system, Z hn Indicates the number of messages sent by the substation, Z hs Indicates the number of substation devices, A s Indicates the ASDU address of the message. H indicates that the value is in hexadecimal.
[0044] The total call business logic attack behavior detection of the present invention can identify illegal total call attacks based on the normal business logic of the total call. Illegal total call attacks can combine the constructed total call business message with the normal total call business message by tampering or injection, thereby illegally acquiring data. This type of attack behavior cannot be identified only by checking the legitimacy of the message fields and analyzing the consistency of the telemetry data. It is necessary to go deep into the business logic level of the message to identify the attack behavior. The total call business logic attack behavior detection provided by the present invention can effectively identify attack behaviors against the total call business by detecting the logic and scope of the total call business, and prevent redundant and incomplete information from being sent.
[0045] In step S5, when the message is a general file transfer service, the specific implementation process of attack detection on the parsed message includes: detecting whether the file name only contains the directory name and wildcards. If it contains other illegal characters, it is determined that there is an illegal file sending attack. Otherwise, the judgment formula Is it true? If not, it is determined that there is a file clock tampering attack, otherwise the current frame traffic data is determined as normal traffic; where P WJ Indicates the file list upload message of the relay protection information processing system, T lb (P) indicates the time when the file list is uploaded, C q Indicates the query start time when listing files, C z Indicates the query end time for file lists.
[0046] The universal file transfer service logic attack behavior detection of the present invention can identify illegal file upload attacks and file clock tampering attacks. Once an illegal file containing an attack code is uploaded to the main station, the main station will lose control authority; the file clock tampering attack tampers with the time of the file upload list, thereby illegally stealing information. The universal file transfer service logic attack behavior detection provided by the present invention overcomes the limitations of the existing methods that focus on network layer traffic statistics analysis, and can effectively prevent attackers from causing the main station to crash and files to be stolen by uploading malicious file data or tampering with file time.
[0047] A computer device comprises a memory, a processor and a computer program stored in the memory; the processor executes the computer program to implement the steps of the method of the present invention.
[0048] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:
[0049] (1) Aiming at the risks of network attacks such as message theft, interception, and tampering faced by relay protection information processing systems, the present invention proposes an attack behavior detection method for flow data application layer messages, overcoming the limitation of existing attack detection methods that focus on data analysis at the measurement point of relay protection devices.
[0050] (2) The present invention proposes clock tampering attack and deformed message attack detection for the flow data application layer message of the relay protection information processing system, which overcomes the shortcomings of the IEC 60870-5-103 protocol that lacks an authentication mechanism, an authorization mechanism, and an encryption mechanism.
[0051] (3) The present invention establishes a normal behavior model of the power business according to the business characteristics of the relay protection information processing system, performs attack behavior detection on the application layer messages of the flow data, realizes active defense against attack behaviors on the application layer of the flow data of the relay protection information processing system, and improves the security of information transmission of the business system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0052] Figure 1 It is a flow chart of the attack behavior monitoring method of the relay protection information processing system in the embodiment of the present invention.
[0053] Figure 2 It is a structural diagram of an attack behavior monitoring system of a relay protection information processing system in an embodiment of the present invention.
[0054] Figure 3 4 is a system unit diagram of a clock tampering attack detection module in an embodiment of the present invention.
[0055] Figure 4 It is a system unit diagram of the malformed message attack detection module in an embodiment of the present invention.
[0056] Figure 5 It is a system unit diagram of a business logic attack detection module in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0057] Figure 1 The flowchart of the attack behavior monitoring method of the relay protection information processing system provided by the embodiment of the present invention, the specific implementation steps are as follows:
[0058] Step S1: capturing the flow data packets of the relay protection information processing system in real time, and extracting the application layer message of the current frame flow data;
[0059] Step S2: Perform field-level parsing on the message according to the IEC 60870-5-103 protocol to obtain the specific values of the message length field, type identifier, transmission reason, information sequence number and clock characteristics, and determine the system service to which the message belongs;
[0060] Step S3: Perform clock tampering attack detection on the message parsed in step S2. If the clock range, clock logic, clock synchronization, and clock delay of the message do not meet the normal clock characteristics, it is determined that a clock tampering attack exists, otherwise, proceed to step S4;
[0061] Step S4: Perform a malformed message attack detection on the message parsed in step S2. If the length field, type identifier, transmission reason, and information sequence number value of the message do not meet the protocol requirements, it is determined that a malformed message attack exists, otherwise, proceed to step S5;
[0062] Step S5: Establish a normal behavior model according to the system service to which the message belongs, and perform attack detection on the message based on the normal behavior model. If the message does not conform to the normal service model, it is determined that there is a service logic attack, otherwise the current frame traffic data is determined to be normal traffic.
[0063] Further, step S3 includes:
[0064] S3-1: Check whether the message time stamp year is within the normal range. If the time stamp year exceeds the limit, that is, violates formula (1), it is determined to be a clock tampering attack, otherwise go to step S3-2.
[0065] Y t ∈[1970,2069] (1)
[0066]
[0067] Among them, Y t Indicates the time scale year, y t The year identifier byte value representing the time stamp.
[0068] S3-2: Check whether the synchronization message is a broadcast synchronization. The master station sends a broadcast synchronization command to synchronize the time of all devices. At this time, the high 8 bits of the application service data unit public address (ASDU address) of the message are FFH, indicating that it is broadcast to all devices in the substation. If it violates formula (3), it is determined to be a clock tampering attack, otherwise it goes to step S3-3.
[0069]
[0070] in, represents the universal quantifier "arbitrary", P is the application layer message parsed in step S2, P DS Indicates IEC60870-5-103 synchronization message, A g (P) indicates the value of the high 8 bits of the message ASDU address, F indicates 15 in hexadecimal, and H indicates that the value is in hexadecimal.
[0071] S3-3: Check whether the actual occurrence time of alarm, remote signal change, and action event and the logic of substation receiving time are correct. After the alarm, remote signal change, and action event occurs, the relay protection device will record the actual occurrence time of the event. There will be a certain delay when the substation receives the fault information. Therefore, the substation receiving time must be greater than the actual occurrence time. If it violates formula (4), it is determined to be a clock tampering attack, otherwise it goes to step S3-4.
[0072]
[0073] Among them, P DZ Indicates one of the IEC 60870-5-103 alarm, remote signal change, and action event data transmission messages. js (P) represents the event substation receiving time, T sj (P) indicates the actual time when the event occurred.
[0074] S3-4: Check whether the time period for sending historical fault information from the slave station is consistent with the time period for calling historical fault information from the master station. If the two times are inconsistent, it is determined to be a clock tampering attack, otherwise, proceed to step S3-5.
[0075] S3-5: Check whether the master-slave information transmission has timed out. If the information transmission time exceeds the maximum delay time required by the protocol, that is, it violates formula (5), it is determined to be a clock tampering attack, otherwise it goes to step S4.
[0076]
[0077]
[0078] Among them, P XC Indicates IEC 60870-5-103 master-slave information transmission message, T cs (P) represents the information transmission time, T max Indicates the maximum delay time, P 1 Indicates the message of relay protection device action information transmission, P 2 Indicates the analog measurement value transmission message of the relay protection device, P 3 Indicates the transmission message of the operating status of the relay protection device, P 4 Indicates the message transmitted by the relay protection device setting.
[0079] Further, step S4 includes:
[0080] S4-1: For the message parsed in step S2, check whether the theoretical length of the message calculated by the length field is equal to the actual length. If they are not equal, that is, they violate formula (7), it is determined to be a malformed message attack, otherwise go to step S4-2.
[0081]
[0082] Among them, P IEC103 Indicates IEC 60870-5-103 message, F l (P) indicates the theoretical length of the message, L s (P) indicates the actual length of the message.
[0083] S4-2: Check whether the actual length of the message is greater than 2048 bytes. If it is greater, that is, it violates formula (8), it is determined to be a malformed message attack, otherwise go to step S4-3.
[0084]
[0085] S4-3: Check whether the type identification field value of the message is valid. If it is invalid, that is, it violates formula (9), it is determined to be a malformed message attack, otherwise, go to step S4-4.
[0086]
[0087] Among them, F t (P) indicates the message type identification field value.
[0088] S4-4: Check whether the value of the transmission reason field of the message is valid. If it is invalid, that is, it violates formula (10), it is determined to be a malformed message attack, otherwise, go to step S4-5.
[0089]
[0090] Among them, F c (P) indicates the value of the message transmission reason field.
[0091] S4-5: Check whether the value of the information sequence number field of the message is valid. If it is invalid, that is, it violates formula (11), it is determined to be a malformed message attack, otherwise, go to step S5.
[0092]
[0093] Among them, F i (P) indicates the message information sequence number field value.
[0094] Further, step S5 includes:
[0095] S5-1: Perform attack behavior classification detection on the service to which the message obtained in step S2 belongs. If the message is a substation configuration reading service, go to step S5-2; if the message is a protection event sending service, go to step S5-3; if the message is a recording briefing sending service, go to step S5-4; if the message is a fixed value operation service, go to step S5-5; if the message is a general call service, go to step S5-6; if the message is a general file transfer service, go to step S5-7;
[0096] S5-2: Analyze the normal logic of the substation configuration reading service according to the technical specifications of the relay protection information processing system, establish a normal behavior model of the substation configuration reading service based on the normal service logic, and perform attack behavior detection on the traffic data of the service in the relay protection information processing system according to the normal behavior model. If the message does not conform to the normal behavior model, it is determined that there is an attack on the substation configuration reading service logic; otherwise, the current frame traffic data is determined to be normal traffic.
[0097] S5-3: Analyze the normal logic of the protection event sending service according to the technical specifications of the relay protection information processing system, establish a normal behavior model of the protection event sending service based on the normal business logic, and perform attack behavior detection on the traffic data of the service in the relay protection information processing system according to the normal behavior model. If the message does not conform to the normal behavior model, it is determined that there is an attack on the protection event sending service logic; otherwise, the current frame traffic data is determined to be normal traffic.
[0098] S5-4: Analyze the normal logic of the recording briefing sending service according to the technical specifications of the relay protection information processing system, establish a normal behavior model of the recording briefing sending service based on the normal business logic, and perform attack behavior detection on the traffic data of the service in the relay protection information processing system according to the normal behavior model. If the message does not conform to the normal behavior model, it is determined that there is an attack on the logic of the recording briefing sending service. Otherwise, the current frame traffic data is determined to be normal traffic.
[0099] S5-5: Analyze the normal logic of the fixed value operation business according to the technical specifications of the relay protection information processing system, establish a normal behavior model of the fixed value operation business based on the normal business logic, and perform attack behavior detection on the traffic data of the business in the relay protection information processing system according to the normal behavior model. If the message does not conform to the normal behavior model, it is determined that there is a fixed value operation business logic attack, otherwise the current frame traffic data is determined to be normal traffic.
[0100] S5-6: Analyze the normal logic of the total call service according to the technical specifications of the relay protection information processing system, establish a normal behavior model of the total call service based on the normal business logic, and perform attack behavior detection on the traffic data of the service in the relay protection information processing system according to the normal behavior model. If the message does not conform to the normal behavior model, it is determined that there is a total call service logic attack, otherwise the current frame traffic data is determined to be normal traffic.
[0101] S5-7: Analyze the normal logic of the general file transfer service according to the technical specifications of the relay protection information processing system, establish a normal behavior model of the general file transfer service based on the normal business logic, and perform attack behavior detection on the traffic data of the service in the relay protection information processing system according to the normal behavior model. If the message does not conform to the normal behavior model, it is determined that there is a general file transfer service logic attack, otherwise the current frame traffic data is determined to be normal traffic.
[0102] Further, step S5-2 includes:
[0103] S5-2-1: Check whether the number of headers sent by the substation is complete when the relay protection information processing system reads each group of headers configured by the substation. If it is incomplete, that is, it violates formula (12), it is determined that there is a malicious interception attack on the configuration data, otherwise go to step S5-2-2.
[0104]
[0105] Among them, P BT Indicates the reading of substation configuration service message in the relay protection information processing system, B n (P) indicates the number of titles sent by the substation, B s Indicates the number of all titles configured for the substation.
[0106] S5-2-2: Check whether the group numbers of all entries in the same group of header information are consistent. If they are inconsistent, that is, they violate formula (13), it is determined that there is a data tampering attack, otherwise the current frame traffic data is determined to be normal traffic.
[0107]
[0108] Among them, B zh (P) indicates the group number of each item of the same group of header information, C zh Indicates the group number of the current group header information.
[0109] Further, step S5-3 includes:
[0110] S5-3-1: Check whether the dual-point information of the protection event is abnormal. If the dual-point information status is not within the specified range, that is, it violates formula (14), it is determined that there is a malicious tampering attack on the dual-point information, otherwise go to step S5-3-2.
[0111]
[0112] Among them, P BH Indicates the protection event message sent in the relay protection information processing system, D pi (P) indicates the double point information value.
[0113] S5-3-2: Check whether the message logic of the previous and next frames of the switch position change, action signal, and pressure plate status is correct. If the switch position change is open / closed in the previous frame, it is still open / closed in the next frame; the action signal is reset / action in the previous frame, and it is still reset / action in the next frame; the pressure plate status is not engaged / engaged in the previous frame, and it is still not engaged / engaged in the next frame, then it is determined that there is a malicious opening and closing attack, otherwise go to step S5-3-3.
[0114] S5-3-3: Check whether the type identifier used for sending protection events is correct. Alarms and switch change events can only be sent using type identifier 1, and action events can only be sent using type identifier 2. If formula (15) is violated, it is determined that there is an illegal action event sending attack. Otherwise, the current frame traffic data is determined to be normal traffic.
[0115]
[0116] Among them, L bh (P) indicates the protection event message type identifier, P 5 Indicates alarm or switch position change event message, P 6 Indicates action event message.
[0117] Further, step S5-4 includes:
[0118] S5-4-1: Check whether the fault phase difference in the recording briefing is consistent with the trip phase difference. If they are inconsistent, that is, they violate formula (16), then it is determined that there is a malicious tampering attack on the trip phase difference, otherwise go to step S5-4-2.
[0119]
[0120] Among them, P LB Indicates the recording briefing service message in the relay protection information processing system, G xb (P) indicates the fault phase, Z xb (P) indicates the tripping phase.
[0121] S5-4-2: Check whether the short-circuit grounding fault flag in the recording brief is correct. If it is incorrect, that is, it violates formula (17), then determine that the grounding fault flag data is tampered with. Otherwise, go to step S5-4-3.
[0122]
[0123] Among them, D 3 Indicates the value of the short circuit ground fault flag of the message, D 0 Indicates the value of the A phase short circuit fault flag bit in the message, D 1 Indicates the value of the phase B short circuit fault flag bit in the message, D 2 Indicates the value of the C phase short circuit fault flag in the message.
[0124] S5-4-3: Check whether the reclosing in the recording briefing is abnormal. If there is a reclosing after the fault occurs, but the reclosing time is 0, or there is no reclosing, but the reclosing time is not 0, it is determined that there is a reclosing time tampering attack, otherwise the current frame traffic data is determined to be normal traffic.
[0125] Further, step S5-5 includes:
[0126] S5-5-1: Check whether the setting modification logic of the relay protection device is correct. If the logic is wrong, that is, it violates formula (18), it is determined that there is a malicious tampering attack on the setting of the relay protection device. Otherwise, the current frame flow data is determined to be normal flow.
[0127] X g1 →X g2 →X g3 →X g4 →X g5 →X g6 →X g7 →X g8 (18)
[0128] Among them, X g1 Indicates the calling device's current running fixed value area code message, X g2 Indicates the current running fixed value area code message of the substation upload device, X g3 Indicates the master station calls the device setting message, X g4 Indicates that the substation uploads the device setting message, X g5 Indicates that the fixed value message is downloaded to the substation, X g6 Indicates that the response substation downloads the fixed value message, X g7 Indicates execution of fixed value modification message, X g8 The substation responds to the fixed value modification message.
[0129] Further, step S5-6 includes:
[0130] S5-6-1: Check whether the business process of the general call is abnormal. If the actual general call business process does not conform to the normal process, that is, it violates formula (19), it is determined that there is an illegal general call attack, otherwise go to step S5-6-2.
[0131] Z h1 →Z h2 →Z h3 (19)
[0132] Among them, Z h1 Indicates that the master station starts the general call message, Z h2 Indicates that the substation sends information messages, Z h3 Indicates the end of the general call message.
[0133] S5-6-2: Check whether the number of information sent by the substation is correct. After receiving the general call command from the master station, the substation replies with the specified information according to the ASDU address in the message. When the ASDU address is not equal to zero, it replies with the switch quantity information of the specific device; when the ASDU address is equal to zero, it replies with the communication status of each device in the substation and the operating status of each device. If formula (20) is violated, it is determined that there is an illegal general call attack, otherwise the current frame traffic data is determined to be normal traffic.
[0134]
[0135] Among them, P ZH Indicates the total call service of the relay protection information processing system, Z hn Indicates the number of messages sent by the substation, Z hs Indicates the number of substation devices, A s Indicates the ASDU address of the message. H indicates that the value is in hexadecimal.
[0136] Further, step S5-7 includes:
[0137] S5-7-1: Check whether the file name only contains the directory name and wildcards (* and ?). If it contains other illegal characters, it is determined that there is an illegal file upload attack, otherwise go to step S5-7-2.
[0138] S5-7-2: Check whether the file list upload is within the query time range. When the master station calls for the file list, it will give the query start time and end time. The file list uploaded by the slave station needs to be within this time range. If it exceeds, that is, it violates formula (21), it is determined that there is a file clock tampering attack, otherwise the current frame traffic data is determined as normal traffic.
[0139]
[0140] Among them, P WJ Indicates the file list upload message of the relay protection information processing system, Tlb (P) indicates the time when the file list is uploaded, C q Indicates the query start time when listing files, C z Indicates the query end time for file lists.
[0141] The present invention relies on the massive flow data of the relay protection information processing system, extracts the application layer message of the flow data and parses the message according to the IEC 60870-5-103 protocol to obtain the specific value of the message feature field and the system service to which the message belongs. Secondly, clock tampering attack detection and deformed message attack detection are performed according to the specific value of the message feature field. Finally, a normal business model is established according to the specific system service to which the message belongs, and business logic attack detection is performed based on the normal business model, thereby realizing comprehensive monitoring of attack behaviors of the relay protection information processing system and ensuring the safe and reliable operation of the power system.
[0142] Figure 2 A structural diagram of an attack behavior monitoring system for a relay protection information processing system provided in an embodiment of the present invention, the system is suitable for executing the method provided in any embodiment of the present invention, including: a flow data acquisition module 100, an application layer message parsing module 200, a clock tampering attack detection module 300, a deformed message attack detection module 400, and a business logic attack detection module 500.
[0143] The flow data acquisition module 100 is used to collect flow data of the relay protection information processing system and extract application layer messages.
[0144] The application layer message parsing module 200 is used to perform field-level parsing on the application layer message according to the IEC 60870-5-103 protocol to obtain the specific relay protection service represented by the message.
[0145] The clock tampering attack detection module 300 is used to detect the clock range, clock logic, clock synchronization, and clock delay of the message to determine whether there is a clock tampering attack.
[0146] The malformed message attack detection module 400 is used to verify the message format according to the specification requirements and determine whether there is a malformed message attack.
[0147] The business logic attack detection module 500 is used to establish a normal behavior model for the system business to which the message belongs, and perform detection based on the normal behavior model to determine whether a business logic attack occurs.
[0148] The output end of the flow data acquisition module 100 is connected to the input end of the application layer message parsing module 200 for inputting the extracted application layer message.
[0149] The output end of the application layer message parsing module 200 is connected to the input end of the clock tampering attack detection module 300 for inputting the application layer message and the parsing result thereof.
[0150] The output end of the clock tampering attack detection module 300 is connected to the input end of the deformed message attack detection module 400 for inputting application layer messages and parsing results thereof.
[0151] The output end of the malformed message attack detection module 400 is connected to the input end of the business logic attack detection module 500 for inputting application layer messages and parsing results thereof.
[0152] like Figure 3 Furthermore, the clock tampering attack detection module 300 includes: a data acquisition unit 301, a first detection unit 302, a second detection unit 303, a third detection unit 304, a fourth detection unit 305, and a fifth detection unit 306.
[0153] The output end of the data acquisition unit 301 is connected to the input end of the first detection unit 302 for inputting application layer messages and parsing results thereof.
[0154] The output end of the first detection unit 302 is connected to the input end of the second detection unit 303, the output end of the second detection unit 303 is connected to the input end of the third detection unit 304, the output end of the third detection unit 304 is connected to the input end of the fourth detection unit 305, and the output end of the fourth detection unit 305 is connected to the input end of the fifth detection unit 306.
[0155] In one embodiment, the data acquisition unit 301 reads the application layer message of the traffic data and its parsing result, and passes the read information to the first detection unit 302, the second detection unit 303, the third detection unit 304, the fourth detection unit 305, and the fifth detection unit 306.
[0156] The first detection unit 302 is used to detect whether the time stamp year of the message is within a normal range. If the time stamp year exceeds the limit, it is determined to be a clock tampering attack.
[0157] The second detection unit 303 is used to detect whether the synchronization message is a broadcast synchronization, and if not, it is determined to be a clock tampering attack.
[0158] The third detection unit 304 is used to detect whether the actual occurrence time of sending alarm, remote signal change, and action event data is logically correct with the substation receiving time. If not, it is determined to be a clock tampering attack.
[0159] The fourth detection unit 305 is used to detect whether the time period for the slave station to send historical fault information is consistent with the time period for the master station to call for historical fault information. If not, it is determined to be a clock tampering attack.
[0160] The fifth detection unit 306 is used to detect whether the master-slave station information transmission has timed out, and if so, it is determined to be a clock tampering attack.
[0161] like Figure 4 Furthermore, the deformed message attack detection module 400 includes: a data acquisition unit 401, a message length field detection unit 402, a message length threshold detection unit 403, a type identification field detection unit 404, a transmission reason field detection unit 405, and an information sequence number field detection unit 406.
[0162] The output end of the data acquisition unit 401 is connected to the input end of the message length field detection unit 402, and is used to input the application layer message and the parsing result thereof.
[0163] The output end of the message length field detection unit 402 is connected to the input end of the message length threshold detection unit 403, the output end of the message length threshold detection unit 403 is connected to the input end of the type identification field detection unit 404, the output end of the type identification field detection unit 404 is connected to the input end of the transmission reason field detection unit 405, and the output end of the transmission reason field detection unit 405 is connected to the input end of the information sequence number field detection unit 406.
[0164] In one embodiment, the data acquisition unit 401 reads the traffic data application layer message and its parsing results, and the unit passes the read information to the message length field detection unit 402, the message length threshold detection unit 403, the type identification field detection unit 404, the transmission reason field detection unit 405, and the information sequence number field detection unit 406.
[0165] The message length field detection unit 402 is used to detect whether the theoretical length of the message calculated by the length field is equal to the actual length. If they are not equal, it is determined to be a malformed message attack.
[0166] The message length threshold detection unit 403 is used to detect whether the actual message length is greater than 2048 bytes. If so, it is determined to be a malformed message attack.
[0167] The type identification field detection unit 404 is used to detect whether the type identification field value of the message is valid. If it is invalid, it is determined to be a malformed message attack.
[0168] The transmission reason field detection unit 405 is used to detect whether the transmission reason field value of the message is valid. If it is invalid, it is determined to be a malformed message attack.
[0169] The information sequence number field detection unit 406 is used to detect whether the information sequence number field value of the message is valid. If invalid, it is determined to be a malformed message attack.
[0170] like Figure 5 Furthermore, the business logic attack detection module 500 includes: a data acquisition unit 501, a substation configuration reading business detection unit 502, a protection event sending business detection unit 503, a recording report sending business detection unit 504, a customized operation business detection unit 505, a total call business detection unit 506, and a general file transfer business detection unit 507.
[0171] The output end of the data acquisition unit 501 is connected to the input end of the substation configuration reading service detection unit 502, and is used to input the relay protection service to which the message belongs.
[0172] The output end of the reading substation configuration service detection unit 502 is connected to the input end of the protection event uploading service detection unit 503, the output end of the protection event uploading service detection unit 503 is connected to the input end of the recording brief uploading service detection unit 504, the output end of the recording brief uploading service detection unit 504 is connected to the input end of the customized operation service detection unit 505, the output end of the customized operation service detection unit 505 is connected to the input end of the general calling service detection unit 506, and the output end of the general calling service detection unit 506 is connected to the input end of the general file transfer service detection unit 507.
[0173] In one embodiment, the data acquisition unit 501 obtains the specific relay protection service to which the message belongs, and the unit passes the read information to the reading substation configuration service detection unit 502, the protection event uploading service detection unit 503, the recording briefing uploading service detection unit 504, the customized operation service detection unit 505, the general call service detection unit 506, and the general file transfer service detection unit 507.
[0174] The substation configuration reading service detection unit 502 is used to detect whether there is an attack behavior in the substation configuration reading service in the relay protection information processing system.
[0175] In one embodiment, a normal behavior model of the substation configuration reading service is established, and attack behavior detection is performed on the traffic data of the service in the relay protection information processing system based on the normal behavior model. If the message does not conform to the normal behavior model, it is determined that there is a logic attack on the substation configuration reading service. The unit uses the detection result as the output end of the service logic attack detection module 500.
[0176] The protection event sending service detection unit 503 is used to detect whether there is an attack behavior in the protection event sending service.
[0177] In one embodiment, a normal behavior model of the protection event sending service is established, and attack behavior detection is performed on the traffic data of the service in the relay protection information processing system based on the normal behavior model. If the message does not conform to the normal behavior model, it is determined that there is a logic attack on the protection event sending service. The unit uses the detection result as the output end of the service logic attack detection module 500.
[0178] The recording briefing report sending service detection unit 504 is used to detect whether there is an attack behavior in the recording briefing report sending service.
[0179] In one embodiment, a normal behavior model of the recording briefing sending service is established, and attack behavior detection is performed on the traffic data of the service in the relay protection information processing system based on the normal behavior model. If the message does not conform to the normal behavior model, it is determined that there is a logical attack on the recording briefing sending service. The unit uses the detection result as the output end of the service logic attack detection module 500.
[0180] The customized operation service detection unit 505 is used to detect whether there is an attack behavior in the fixed value operation service.
[0181] In one embodiment, a normal behavior model of the fixed value operation business is established, and attack behavior detection is performed on the traffic data of the business in the relay protection information processing system based on the normal behavior model. If the message does not conform to the normal behavior model, it is determined that a customized operation business logic attack exists, and the unit uses the detection result as the output end of the business logic attack detection module 500.
[0182] The general calling service detection unit 506 is used to detect whether there is an attack behavior in the general calling service.
[0183] In one embodiment, a normal behavior model of the general call service is established, and attack behavior detection is performed on the traffic data of the service in the relay protection information processing system based on the normal behavior model. If the message does not conform to the normal behavior model, it is determined that there is a general call service logic attack, and the unit uses the detection result as the output end of the service logic attack detection module 500.
[0184] The general file transfer service detection unit 507 is used to detect whether there is an attack behavior in the general file transfer service.
[0185] In one embodiment, a normal behavior model of the general file transfer service is established, and attack behavior detection is performed on the traffic data of the service in the relay protection information processing system based on the normal behavior model. If the message does not conform to the normal behavior model, it is determined that there is a general file transfer service logic attack, and the unit uses the detection result as the output end of the service logic attack detection module 500.
Claims
1. A method for monitoring attack behavior of a relay protection information processing system, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: S1, real-time capture of relay protection information processing system traffic data packets, and extraction of the application layer message of the current frame traffic data; S2. Performing field-level analysis on the application layer message; S3, perform clock tampering attack detection on the parsed message. If the clock range, clock logic, clock synchronization, and clock delay of the message do not meet the normal clock characteristics, it is determined that a clock tampering attack exists, otherwise proceed to step S4; S4, perform malformed message attack detection on the parsed message. If the length field, type identifier, transmission reason, and information sequence number value of the message do not meet the protocol requirements, it is determined that a malformed message attack exists, otherwise proceed to step S5; S5. Perform attack detection on the parsed message according to the service system to which the parsed message belongs. If the parsed message does not conform to the normal service model, it is determined that there is a service logic attack. Otherwise, the current frame traffic data is determined to be normal traffic. In step S3, the specific implementation process of performing clock tampering attack detection on the parsed message includes: 1) Judgment formula Y t ∈[1970,2069] is true, if not, it is determined to be a clock tampering attack, otherwise, go to step 2); where, Y t Indicates the time scale year, y t The year identification byte value representing the time stamp; 2) Judgment formula Is it established? If not, it is determined to be a clock tampering attack. Otherwise, go to step 3); where, represents the universal quantifier "arbitrary", P is the application layer message after parsing in step S2, P DS Indicates IEC60870-5-103 synchronization message, A g (P) indicates the value of the high 8 bits of the ASDU address of the message, F indicates 15 in hexadecimal, and H indicates that the value is in hexadecimal; 3) Judgment formula Is it true? If not, it is determined to be a clock tampering attack. Otherwise, go to step 4); where P DZ Indicates one of the IEC 60870-5-103 alarm, remote signal change, and action event data transmission messages. js (P) represents the event substation receiving time, T sj (P) indicates the actual time when the event occurred; 4) Check whether the time period of the substation sending historical fault information is consistent with the time period of the main station calling fault historical information. If the two times are inconsistent, it is determined to be a clock tampering attack, otherwise go to step 5); 5) Judgment formula Is it established? If not, it is determined to be a clock tampering attack. Otherwise, go to step S4; wherein, P XC Indicates IEC 60870-5-103 master-slave information transmission message, T cs (P) represents the information transmission time, T max Indicates the maximum delay time, P1 indicates the message transmitted for the action information of the relay protection device, P2 indicates the message transmitted for the analog measurement value of the relay protection device, P3 indicates the message transmitted for the operating status of the relay protection device, and P4 indicates the message transmitted for the setting value of the relay protection device.
2. The method for monitoring attack behavior of a relay protection information processing system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The specific implementation process of performing malformed message attack detection on the parsed message includes: I) Judgment formula Is it true? If not, it is determined to be a malformed message attack, otherwise it goes to step II); where P IEC103 Indicates IEC 60870-5-103 message, F l (P) indicates the theoretical length of the message, L s (P) indicates the actual length of the message; II) Judgment formula Is it established? If not, it is determined to be a malformed message attack, otherwise go to step III); III) Judgment formula Is it true? If not, it is determined to be a malformed message attack, otherwise go to step IV); where F t (P) indicates the message type identification field value; IV) Judgment formula Is it true? If not, it is determined to be a malformed message attack, otherwise it goes to step V); where F c (P) indicates the value of the message transmission reason field; V) Judgment formula Is it true? If not, it is determined to be a malformed message attack, otherwise, go to step S5; F i (P) indicates the message information sequence number field value.
3. The method for monitoring attack behavior of a relay protection information processing system according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S5, when the message is for reading the substation configuration service, the specific implementation process of performing attack detection on the parsed message includes: Judgment formula Is it true? If not, it is determined that there is a malicious interception attack on the configuration data. Otherwise, the judgment formula Is it true? If not, it is determined that there is a data tampering attack, otherwise the current frame traffic data is determined as normal traffic; where P BT Indicates the reading of substation configuration service message in the relay protection information processing system, B n (P) indicates the number of titles sent by the substation, B s Indicates the number of all titles configured in the substation, B zh (P) indicates the group number of each item of the same group of header information, C zh Indicates the group number of the current group header information.
4. The method for monitoring attack behavior of a relay protection information processing system according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S5, when the message is a protection event sending service, the specific implementation process of attack detection on the parsed message includes: A) Judgment formula Is it established? If not, it is determined that there is a malicious tampering attack on the double-point information. Otherwise, go to step B); where P BH Indicates the protection event message sent in the relay protection information processing system, D pi (P) indicates the double point information value; B) Check whether the message logic of the previous and next frames of the switch position change, action signal, and pressure plate status is correct. If the switch position change is open / closed in the previous frame and is still open / closed in the next frame; the action signal is reset / action in the previous frame and is still reset / action in the next frame; the pressure plate status is not engaged / engaged in the previous frame and is still not engaged / engaged in the next frame, it is determined that there is a malicious opening and closing attack, otherwise enter step C); C) Judgment formula Is it true? If not, it is determined that there is an illegal action event sending attack, otherwise the current frame traffic data is determined as normal traffic; where L bh (P) indicates the protection event message type identifier, P5 indicates an alarm or switch value change event message, and P6 indicates an action event message.
5. The method for monitoring attack behavior of a relay protection information processing system according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S5, when the message is a recording briefing uploading service, the specific implementation process of performing attack detection on the parsed message includes: i) Judgment formula Is it established? If not, it is determined that there is a trip phase malicious tampering attack, otherwise it goes to step ii); where P LB Indicates the recording briefing service message in the relay protection information processing system, G xb (P) indicates the fault phase, Z xb (P) indicates trip phase; ii) Judgment formula Is it established? If not, it is determined that there is a ground fault flag data tampering attack, otherwise it goes to step iii); wherein D3 represents the value of the message short-circuit ground fault flag, D0 represents the value of the message A phase short-circuit fault flag, D1 represents the value of the message B phase short-circuit fault flag, and D2 represents the value of the message C phase short-circuit fault flag; iii) Check whether the reclosing in the recording briefing is abnormal. If there is a reclosing after the fault occurs, but the reclosing time is 0, or there is no reclosing but the reclosing time is not 0, it is determined that there is a reclosing time tampering attack, otherwise the current frame traffic data is determined to be normal traffic.
6. The method for monitoring attack behavior of a relay protection information processing system according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S5, when the message is a fixed value operation service, the specific implementation process of performing attack detection on the parsed message includes: Judgment Logic X g1 →X g2 →X g3 →X g4 →X g5 →X g6 →X g7 →X g8 Is it true? If not, it is determined that there is a malicious tampering attack on the setting value of the relay protection device. Otherwise, the current frame flow data is determined to be normal flow; where X g1 Indicates the calling device's current running fixed value area code message, X g2 Indicates the current running fixed value area code message of the substation upload device, X g3 Indicates the master station calls the device setting message, X g4 Indicates that the substation uploads the device setting message, X g5 Indicates that a fixed value message is downloaded to the substation, X g6 Indicates that the response substation downloads the fixed value message, X g7 Indicates execution of fixed value modification message, X g8 The substation responds to the fixed value modification message.
7. The method for monitoring attack behavior of a relay protection information processing system according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S5, when the message is a general call service, the specific implementation process of performing attack detection on the parsed message includes: Judgment Logic Z h1 →Z h2 →Z h3 Is it true? If not, it is determined that there is an illegal general attack. Otherwise, the judgment formula Is it true? If not, it is determined that there is an illegal call-up attack, otherwise the current frame traffic data is determined as normal traffic; where Z h1 Indicates that the master station starts the general call message, Z h2 Indicates that the substation sends information messages, Z h3 Indicates the end of the general call message, P ZH Indicates the total call service of the relay protection information processing system, Z hn Indicates the number of messages sent by the substation, Z hs Indicates the number of substation devices, A s Indicates the message ASDU address, H indicates that the value is in hexadecimal.
8. The method for monitoring attack behavior of a relay protection information processing system according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S5, when the message is a general file transfer service, the specific implementation process of performing attack detection on the parsed message includes: Check whether the file name contains only directory names and wildcards. If it contains other illegal characters, it is determined that there is an illegal file upload attack. Otherwise, the judgment formula Is it true? If not, it is determined that there is a file clock tampering attack, otherwise the current frame traffic data is determined as normal traffic; where P WJ Indicates the file list upload message of the relay protection information processing system, T lb (P) indicates the time when the file list is uploaded, C q Indicates the query start time when listing files, C z Indicates the query end time for file lists.
9. A computer device comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored in the memory; characterized in that: The processor executes the computer program to implement the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 8.
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