A method for detecting information leakage at the light source end of quantum key distribution

By using intensity/phase modulators to detect leaked information on the light source side in the quantum key distribution system, the Azuma inequality calculates the security code rate, the problem of hidden dangers of information leakage at the light source side is solved, and real-time security of the quantum key distribution system is achieved Evaluation and improvements ensure the security of the key.

CN115276970BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-19Chinese People's Liberation Army Cyberspace Force Information Engineering University
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202210821354.7
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2022-07-13
Publication Date
2024-11-19
Estimated Expiration
2042-07-13

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In the existing quantum key distribution system, there are security risks of leaking information at the light source end, especially in the MDI-QKD protocol, the security risks brought by light sources are difficult to avoid, and the prior art cannot effectively detect and solve the information leakage problem in actual systems.

Method used

The leakage information detection device is constructed using intensity/phase modulators. By detecting the phase and intensity leakage information at the light source end of the quantum key, the Azuma inequality estimates the empty state yield, the single-photon state yield and the phase error rate, and calculates the safe code rate to Improved key security.

Benefits of technology

Real-time information leakage detection on the light source end of the quantum key distribution system is realized, the security code rate is evaluated and improved, the security of the key is ensured, and the negative impact of information leakage on the key rate is avoided.

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Abstract

The present invention discloses a method for detecting information leakage at a light source end of quantum key distribution, comprising: constructing an intensity / phase modulator phase leakage information security detection device to detect phase leakage information at the light source end of quantum key distribution, and obtaining the amount of phase leakage information; constructing an intensity / phase modulator intensity leakage information security detection device to detect intensity leakage information at the light source end of quantum key distribution, and obtaining the amount of intensity leakage information; based on the amount of phase leakage information and the amount of intensity leakage information, using the Azuma inequality, estimating #imgabs0##imgabs1# and #imgabs2#, and obtaining a security code rate based on #imgabs3# and #imgabs4#. The present invention can detect the light source end of an actual quantum key distribution system in real time, and evaluate the amount of information leakage of its optoelectronic devices, thereby improving its security code rate under a limited code length in real time, and ensuring the security of the final key.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of quantum communication technology, and in particular to a method for detecting information leakage at a light source end of quantum key distribution. Background Art

[0002] Quantum communication, especially quantum key distribution (QKD), is currently recognized as a theoretically provably secure communication method with broad application prospects. However, the security standard of the actual system is both the focus and the difficulty. This is because the devices used in the actual quantum key distribution system are imperfect, and the receiving end of the device has the most security vulnerabilities. In order to solve the problems that may exist in the above-mentioned actual systems, the device-independent quantum key distribution (DI-QKD) protocol and the measurement device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol have been proposed successively, in an attempt to solve the difference between the ideal model and the actual device.

[0003] In current technology, although the fully device-independent quantum key distribution (DI-QKD) protocol can theoretically eliminate the security risks brought by all devices, its experimental implementation requires too high detector efficiency, which makes it impossible to truly apply it in practice. The (MDI-QKD) protocol can eliminate all side channels caused by detector vulnerabilities, but it is difficult to avoid the security risks brought by light sources in MDI-QKD. Summary of the invention

[0004] Aiming at the potential security risk of information leakage at the existing quantum key distribution light source end, the present invention proposes a method for detecting information leakage at the quantum key distribution light source end.

[0005] In order to achieve the above object, the present invention adopts the following technical solutions:

[0006] A method for detecting information leakage at a quantum key distribution light source end, comprising:

[0007] Step 1: Construct an intensity / phase modulator phase leakage information security detection device to detect the phase leakage information at the quantum key distribution light source end and obtain the phase leakage information amount;

[0008] Step 2: Construct an intensity / phase modulator intensity leakage information security detection device to detect the intensity leakage information of the quantum key distribution light source end and obtain the intensity leakage information amount;

[0009] Step 3: Based on the amount of phase leakage information and the amount of intensity leakage information, use the Azuma inequality to estimate and in It means that when both parties choose the basis vector Z and the strength γ sThe lower bound of the empty state yield when It means that when both parties choose the basis vector Z and the strength γ s The lower bound of the single-photon state yield when represents the upper bound of the phase error rate;

[0010] Step 4: Based on and Get the security code rate.

[0011] Furthermore, the intensity / phase modulator phase leakage information security detection device includes: a continuous laser, a fiber optic splitter, a fiber optic delay, a fiber optic circulator, a fiber optic combiner, a balanced zero-beat detector, and an intensity or phase modulation module; the continuous laser, the fiber optic splitter, the fiber optic delay, the fiber optic combiner, and the balanced zero-beat detector are connected in sequence; the continuous laser, the fiber optic splitter, the fiber optic circulator, and the intensity or phase modulation module are connected in sequence; the fiber optic combiner is also connected to the fiber optic circulator.

[0012] Furthermore, the intensity or phase modulation module is an intensity modulator or a phase modulator.

[0013] Furthermore, the intensity / phase modulator intensity leakage information security detection device includes: a semiconductor pulse laser, an optical fiber circulator, a single photon detector, and an intensity or phase modulation module; the semiconductor pulse laser, the optical fiber circulator, and the single photon detector are connected in sequence; the optical fiber circulator is also connected to the intensity or phase modulation module.

[0014] Furthermore, the intensity / phase modulator intensity leakage information security detection device also includes: an attenuator; the attenuator is located between the semiconductor pulse laser and the optical fiber circulator.

[0015] Furthermore, the intensity or phase modulation module is an intensity modulator or a phase modulator.

[0016] Furthermore, in step 1, the continuous laser emitted by the continuous laser is divided into two parts by an optical fiber beam splitter, one part is used as background light, and the other part is incident on the intensity / phase modulator through an optical fiber circulator. The light reflected by the intensity / phase modulator beats with the background light and is detected by a balanced zero-beat detector to obtain the phase leakage information.

[0017] Furthermore, in step 2, the pulse light emitted by the semiconductor pulse laser is incident on the intensity / phase modulator through the circulator, the light reflected by the intensity / phase modulator is detected by a single-photon detector and the count is statistically performed to calculate the intensity of the reflected signal to obtain the intensity leakage information.

[0018] Furthermore, the security code rate is calculated as follows:

[0019]

[0020] in represents the code length; H() is the binary Shannon entropy function; leak EC is the amount of information leaked during the protocol error correction process; ε sec and ε cor are the security parameters of the protocol privacy and correctness respectively; parameter ε≤1-ε Z,0 ε Z,1 ε ph,1 , where ε Z,0 , ε Z,1 and ε ph,1 The estimated parameters are and The success probability when , ε represents the estimated parameters and The probability of failure is when there is at least one estimation error.

[0021] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0022] Currently, there is no method for detecting the amount of information leakage at the light source end of an actual quantum key distribution system in the prior art. The present invention can perform real-time detection on the light source end of an actual quantum key distribution system and evaluate the amount of information leakage of its optoelectronic devices, thereby improving its security code rate under a limited code length in real time and ensuring the security of the final key. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0023] Figure 1 Schematic diagram of MDI-QKD protocol implementation;

[0024] Figure 2 This is a basic flow chart of a method for detecting information leakage at a light source end of quantum key distribution according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0025] Figure 3 This is a diagram of a device for detecting information security of phase leakage of an intensity (phase) modulator according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0026] Figure 4 This is a diagram of a device for detecting information security of intensity leakage of an intensity (phase) modulator according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0027] Figure 5 A model diagram of a safety detection method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0028] Figure 6 The following is an example of numerical simulation results of an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0029] The present invention will be further explained below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments:

[0030] In this embodiment, we take the MDI-QKD protocol as an example to propose a method for detecting information leakage at the light source end of quantum key distribution. This method is universal and is not limited to this protocol framework. Figure 1 In the MDI protocol shown, Alice and Bob independently prepare quantum states and hand them over to a third party (Relay) for Bell state measurement. Based on the measurement results of the third party, Alice and Bob can determine the correlation of the data in their hands and generate a secure key after data processing. The preparation of quantum states in the MDI-QKD protocol requires electro-optical modulation devices such as intensity modulators (IM) and phase modulators (PM). These devices have certain reflection losses on their end faces. If this loss is used by an eavesdropper, the final generated key may be insecure. The leaked information includes phase information and intensity information. Therefore, we propose a set of detection methods for these optoelectronic modulation devices.

[0031] like Figure 2 As shown, a method for detecting information leakage at a quantum key distribution light source end includes:

[0032] Step S101: constructing an intensity / phase modulator phase leakage information security detection device to detect the phase leakage information of the quantum key distribution light source end to obtain the phase leakage information amount;

[0033] Step S102: constructing an intensity / phase modulator intensity leakage information security detection device to detect the intensity leakage information of the quantum key distribution light source end, and obtain the intensity leakage information amount;

[0034] Step S103: Based on the amount of phase leakage information and the amount of intensity leakage information, use the Azuma inequality to estimate and in It means that when both parties (Alice and Bob) choose the basis vector Z and the strength γ s The lower bound of the empty state yield when It means that when both parties choose the basis vector Z and the strength γ s The lower bound of the single-photon state yield when represents the upper bound of the phase error rate;

[0035] Step S104: Based on and Get the security code rate.

[0036] Furthermore, if Figure 3As shown, the intensity / phase modulator phase leakage information security detection device includes: a continuous laser (CW Laser), a fiber beam splitter (BS), a fiber delay (Delay), a fiber circulator (OC), a fiber combiner (BS), a balanced zero-beat detector (BHD), and an intensity or phase modulation module; the continuous laser, the fiber beam splitter, the fiber delay, the fiber combiner, and the balanced zero-beat detector are connected in sequence; the continuous laser, the fiber beam splitter, the fiber circulator, and the intensity or phase modulation module are connected in sequence; the fiber combiner is also connected to the fiber circulator.

[0037] Furthermore, the intensity or phase modulation module is an intensity modulator (IM) or a phase modulator (PM).

[0038] Furthermore, if Figure 4 As shown, the intensity / phase modulator intensity leakage information security detection device includes: a semiconductor pulse laser (DFB), an attenuator (ATT) (optional), an optical fiber circulator (OC), a single photon detector (SPD), and an intensity or phase modulation module; the semiconductor pulse laser, attenuator, optical fiber circulator, and single photon detector are connected in sequence; the optical fiber circulator is also connected to the intensity or phase modulation module.

[0039] Furthermore, the intensity or phase modulation module is an intensity modulator or a phase modulator.

[0040] Furthermore, in the step S101, a beat frequency method is used to test the phase leakage information of the intensity (phase) modulator. Specifically, the continuous laser emitted by the continuous laser is divided into two parts by an optical fiber beam splitter, one part is used as background light, and the other part is incident on the intensity / phase modulator through an optical fiber circulator. The light reflected by the intensity / phase modulator beats with the background light, which is detected by a balanced zero-beat detector to obtain the amount of phase leakage information.

[0041] Furthermore, in step S102, a single-photon detector is used to count the intensity information leaked by the intensity (phase) modulator. Specifically, the pulse light sent by the semiconductor pulse laser is incident on the intensity / phase modulator through an attenuator (optional) and a circulator. The light reflected by the intensity / phase modulator is detected by a single-photon detector and the count is counted to calculate the intensity of the reflected signal to obtain the amount of intensity leakage information.

[0042] Specifically, in step S103, the following method is used to estimate and

[0043] Using the Azuma inequality, we can link the actual number of events in the experiment with the expected number, and then obtain the parameter estimation method under finite code length. Consider the detection event corresponding to Alice and Bob both choosing Z basis or X basis. Specifically, we can get the following expression:

[0044]

[0045] in α∈{j,k,l}, represents the expected number of detector responses when Alice and Bob both choose the basis vector Ω, choose the intensity settings j and j′ respectively, and send light pulses with n and m photons respectively. The rest of the expected numbers are defined similarly, N Ω represents the event that both Alice and Bob choose the number of basis vectors Ω.

[0046] For detecting error events, there is a similar expression, and the result is as follows:

[0047]

[0048] in It represents the expected number of detector responses and bit errors when Alice and Bob both choose the basis vector Ω, select the intensity settings j and j′ respectively, and send light pulses with n and m photons respectively. The definitions of other expected numbers are similar.

[0049] Following the above idea, we first consider a special case, that is, {k=l,k′=l′}, then:

[0050]

[0051] Equivalently, there is

[0052]

[0053] in

[0054] More generally, we can also obtain the relationship between the detection events corresponding to different intensity selection combinations when l≠k or l′≠k′. However, in the numerical simulation, we found that although Alice and Bob have many different intensity selection combinations, the numerical simulation results are good enough when only {k=l, k′=l′} are considered, and the linear programming procedure is much simpler.

[0055] Next, considering the actual number of detection events observed in the experiment, the following relationship can be obtained according to Azuma's inequality:

[0056]

[0057] in represents the actual number of detector responses when Alice and Bob both choose the basis vector Ω, choose intensity settings j and j′, and send light pulses with n and m photons, respectively. It indicates the deviation between the expected number and the actual number due to the statistical fluctuation effect. According to the Azuma inequality, its value falls within the interval The failure probability is Bounds of interval and By the expression and Given, function g A The definition is There are similar expressions for detecting error events.

[0058] Using the same approach as in the analysis of the asymptotic limit, the linear programming procedure is given directly here:

[0059] min N click,00,ss|Z

[0060]

[0061]

[0062]

[0063]

[0064] The calculation result given by the linear programming program is

[0065] The calculation method is almost the same as the above method, except that the objective function is replaced by “minN click,00,ss|Z " is replaced by "minN click,11,ss|Z Before calculating the upper bound of the phase error rate, we first need to obtain the lower bound of the number of single-photon detection events when both Alice and Bob choose the X basis, denoted as Used for calculation The linear programming method can still be used here, but we need to replace all the parameters in the Z basis with the corresponding parameters in the X basis. Then, we need to calculate the upper bound of the number of single-photon detection errors when Alice and Bob both choose the X basis, which is recorded as This parameter can be used to calculate The linear programming of the algorithm is modified to obtain the result. Specifically, all N click,kl|X Replace with the corresponding E click,kl|X , and all N click,nm,kl|X Replace with the corresponding E click,nm,kl|XFinally, the objective function is set to "min-E click,11,ss|X ", which is equivalent to finding the parameter E click,11,ss|X The upper bound of Finally, according to Serfling's inequality, we can get

[0066]

[0067] The failure probability is

[0068]

[0069] The function Υ(x,y,z) is defined as ε X,1 and They are estimated and The failure probability.

[0070] Furthermore, since the number of signals that can be sent in an actual system is always limited, the limited code length problem in actual situations must be considered, and the formula for the security code rate is:

[0071]

[0072] in represents the code length; H() is the binary Shannon entropy function, specifically, H(x) = -xlog2(x)-(1-x)log2(1-x); leak EC is the amount of information leaked during the protocol error correction process (specifically equal to the sum of the phase leakage information and the intensity leakage information); ε sec and ε cor are the security parameters of the protocol privacy and correctness respectively; parameter ε≤1-ε Z,0 ε Z,1 ε ph,1 , where ε Z,0 , ε Z,1 and ε ph,1 The estimated parameters are and The success probability when , ε represents the estimated parameters and The probability of failure is when there is at least one estimation error.

[0073] Specifically, the information leaked by the electro-optical modulator at the light source end includes phase information and intensity information, which will affect the security code rate. Therefore, this embodiment proposes a set of detection methods for these electro-optical modulators to better evaluate and

[0074] For the convenience of calculation, this embodiment assumes that the light reflected from IM and PM is still in a coherent state. Taking the two-decoy state MDI protocol as an example, the theoretical model is as follows: Figure 5 As shown (where represents the intensity and phase information of the detection signal light).

[0075] Specifically, there are three situations in which information is leaked:

[0076] Scenario 1: Assume that the reflected light intensity is independent of Alice’s (Bob’s) choice of light intensity

[0077] In this case, the reflected light intensity I max The specific numerical simulation results are as follows Figure 6 shown.

[0078] Figure 6 (a) Consider the total number of pulses sent by Alice and Bob to be a constant, N = 10 14 When the intensity of reflected light is different, the impact on the security key rate is as follows from bottom to top: I max =10 -13 ,PM&IM;I max =10 -13 ,IM;I max =10 -16 ,PM&IM;I max =10 -16 ,IM;I max =10 -20 ,PM&IM;I max =10 -20 , IM; No Information Leakage. The solid line represents the security key rate with different information leakage when only IM is analyzed, and the dotted line represents the security key rate with different information leakage when both IM and PM are analyzed. The results show that information leakage has a great impact on the performance of the protocol, and the stronger the reflected light intensity (equivalent to the amount of information leakage), the lower the security key rate and the faster it decreases. Figure 6 (b) Considering the information leakage amount as a constant, that is, I max =10 -16 The results show that when there is information leakage, the finite code length effect has a great impact on the security key rate, from bottom to top: N = 10 12 ; N = 10 13 ; N = 10 14 ; N = 10 15 ; Asymptotic. Through the safety detection of phase modulator and intensity modulator, we can obtain the leakage of relevant information and evaluate |Nclick,00,ss|Z | L 、|N click,11,ss|Z | L and Thereby, the security code rate of the real-time information leakage is obtained, thereby ensuring the security of the final key.

[0079] Scenario 2: Assume that the reflected light intensity is related to Alice's (Bob's) choice of light intensity

[0080] In this case, the reflected light has different intensities.

[0081] Case 3: Alice (Bob) randomizes the phase of the outgoing light

[0082] In this case, the reflected light intensity is the same as in case two.

[0083] Cases 2 and 3 can be calculated similarly to case 1, and the security code rate can be obtained based on different amounts of information leakage.

[0084] In summary, the present invention can perform real-time detection on the light source end of an actual quantum key distribution system and evaluate the amount of information leakage of its optoelectronic devices, thereby improving the security code rate under a limited code length in real time and ensuring the security of the final key.

[0085] The above is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention. It should be pointed out that a person skilled in the art can make several improvements and modifications without departing from the principle of the present invention. These improvements and modifications should also be regarded as within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for detecting information leakage at a quantum key distribution light source, characterized in that: include: Step 1: Construct an intensity / phase modulator phase leakage information security detection device to detect the phase leakage information at the quantum key distribution light source end and obtain the phase leakage information amount; The intensity / phase modulator phase leakage information security detection device comprises: a continuous laser, a fiber beam splitter, a fiber delay, a fiber circulator, a fiber combiner, a balanced zero-beat detector, and an intensity or phase modulation module; the continuous laser, the fiber beam splitter, the fiber delay, the fiber combiner, and the balanced zero-beat detector are connected in sequence; the continuous laser, the fiber beam splitter, the fiber circulator, and the intensity or phase modulation module are connected in sequence; the fiber combiner is also connected to the fiber circulator; the intensity or phase modulation module is an intensity modulator or a phase modulator; Among them, the beat frequency method is used to test the phase leakage information of the intensity / phase modulator: The continuous laser emitted by the continuous laser is split into two parts by the fiber beam splitter, one part is used as the background light, and the other part is incident on the intensity / phase modulator through the fiber circulator. The light reflected by the intensity / phase modulator beats with the background light and is detected by the balanced zero-beat detector to obtain the phase leakage information. Step 2: Construct an intensity / phase modulator intensity leakage information security detection device to detect the intensity leakage information of the quantum key distribution light source end and obtain the intensity leakage information amount; The intensity / phase modulator intensity leakage information security detection device comprises: a semiconductor pulse laser, an optical fiber circulator, a single photon detector, and an intensity or phase modulation module; the semiconductor pulse laser, the optical fiber circulator, and the single photon detector are connected in sequence; the optical fiber circulator is also connected to the intensity or phase modulation module; the intensity or phase modulation module is an intensity modulator or a phase modulator; Among them, the single photon detector is used to count the intensity information leaked by the intensity / phase modulator: The pulse light sent by the semiconductor pulse laser is incident on the intensity / phase modulator through the circulator. The light reflected by the intensity / phase modulator is detected by the single-photon detector and the count is counted. The intensity of the reflected signal is measured to obtain the intensity leakage information. Step 3: Based on the amount of phase leakage information and the amount of intensity leakage information, use the Azuma inequality to estimate and in It means that when both parties choose the basis vector Z and the strength γ s The lower bound of the empty state yield when It means that when both parties choose the basis vector Z and the strength γ s The lower bound of the single-photon state yield when represents the upper bound of the phase error rate; Step 4: Based on and Get the security code rate.

2. A method for detecting information leakage at a quantum key distribution light source according to claim 1, characterized in that: The intensity / phase modulator intensity leakage information security detection device further comprises: an attenuator; the attenuator is located between the semiconductor pulse laser and the optical fiber circulator.

3. The method for detecting information leakage at a quantum key distribution light source according to claim 1, characterized in that: The security code rate is calculated as follows: Where l represents the code length; H( ) is the binary Shannon entropy function; leakage EC is the amount of information leaked during the protocol error correction process; sec and ε cor are the security parameters of the protocol privacy and correctness respectively; parameter ε≤1-ε Z,0 ε Z,1 ε ph,1 , where ε Z,0 , ε Z,1 and ε ph,1 The estimated parameters are and The success probability when , ε represents the estimated parameters and The probability of failure is when there is at least one estimation error.