Interference switching method based on information transmission and related equipment

Abstract

The present application provides an interference switching method and related equipment based on information transmission, which obtains a switching threshold of an interference terminal, determines a first interference terminal that is not currently in a working state, and a first confidentiality interruption probability corresponding to when the first interference terminal is in a working state, and by comparing the first confidentiality interruption probability with the switching threshold of the interference terminal, determines whether better security performance can be provided if the first interference terminal is used, thereby determining whether to switch the first interference terminal from a non-working state to a working state, thereby achieving switching of the interference terminal that can be applicable to mobile scenarios and can provide better security performance, and ensuring security during the transmission process.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to an interference switching method based on information transmission and related equipment. Background Art

[0002] Network security is an important guarantee for the application of mobile communication networks. If the network communication system is threatened by attacks, it will cause serious economic losses and major security risks. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure the security of information transmission.

[0003] Based on the above situation, the information transmission method in the prior art only considers the security of the transmission process in static scenarios. This method only selects a fixed interference end to interfere with the eavesdropping end, and does not take into account the mobile scenario. If the information transmission method that only considers static scenarios is applied to mobile scenarios, the mobile eavesdropping end can try to move to a location with poor interference effect to eavesdrop, and the security of the transmission process cannot be guaranteed. Summary of the invention

[0004] In view of this, the purpose of the present application is to propose an interference switching method based on information transmission and related equipment to solve the above technical problems.

[0005] Based on the above purpose, the first aspect of the present application provides an interference switching method based on information transmission, which is applied to an interference switching system based on information transmission, wherein the system is respectively connected to a base station, a legitimate receiving end, an eavesdropping end, and multiple interfering ends in communication, and the method includes:

[0006] Obtaining a switching threshold of the interfering end;

[0007] Acquire operation flags of the multiple interfering terminals, and determine a first interfering terminal that is not currently in a working state among the multiple interfering terminals according to the operation flags of the multiple interfering terminals;

[0008] Determine a first signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio of the eavesdropping end and a redundant transmission code rate between the base station and the legitimate receiving end when the first interfering end is in a working state;

[0009] Obtaining a first security interrupt signal interference plus noise ratio for a security interruption at the eavesdropping end based on the redundant transmission code rate, comparing the first security interrupt signal interference plus noise ratio with the first signal interference plus noise ratio of the eavesdropping end and determining a first comparison result, and obtaining a first confidentiality interruption probability based on the first comparison result;

[0010] The first confidentiality interruption probability is compared with the switching threshold of the interference end to determine a second comparison result, and based on the second comparison result, it is determined whether to switch the first interference end from a non-working state to a working state.

[0011] Based on the same inventive concept, the second aspect of the present application provides an electronic device, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory and executable by the processor, wherein the processor implements the method described in the first aspect above when executing the computer program.

[0012] From the above, it can be seen that the interference switching method based on information transmission and related equipment provided by the present application obtain the switching threshold of the interference end, determine the first interference end that is not in a working state, and the first confidentiality interruption probability corresponding to when the first interference end is in a working state, and by comparing the first confidentiality interruption probability with the switching threshold of the interference end, it is determined whether better security performance can be provided if the first interference end is used, thereby determining whether to switch the first interference end from a non-working state to a working state, thereby realizing the switching of the interference end that can be applicable to mobile scenarios and can provide better security performance, thereby ensuring the security of the transmission process. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0013] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the present application or related technologies, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or related technical descriptions are briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative work.

[0014] Figure 1 A flowchart of an interference switching method based on information transmission according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0015] Figure 2A This is a first schematic diagram of an interference switching scenario based on information transmission according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0016] Figure 2B A second schematic diagram of an interference switching scenario based on information transmission according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0017] Figure 2C A third schematic diagram of an interference switching scenario based on information transmission according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0018] Figure 2D A first schematic diagram of the influence of the parameters of the system model of an embodiment of the present application on the average security outage probability (ASOP);

[0019] Figure 2E A second schematic diagram of the effect of the parameters of the system model of an embodiment of the present application on the average security outage probability (ASOP);

[0020] Figure 2FA third schematic diagram of the influence of the parameters of the system model of the embodiment of the present application on the average privacy outage probability (ASOP);

[0021] Figure 2G A fourth schematic diagram of the influence of the parameters of the system model of an embodiment of the present application on the average privacy outage probability (ASOP);

[0022] Figure 2H It is a first schematic diagram of the influence of the system model parameters on the power average safety gain (PASG) according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0023] Fig.2I A second schematic diagram of the influence of system model parameters on the power average safety gain (PASG) according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0024] Figure 2J A third schematic diagram of the influence of system model parameters on the power average safety gain (PASG) according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0025] Figure 2K A fourth schematic diagram of the influence of system model parameters on the power average safety gain (PASG) according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0026] Figure 2L It is a first schematic diagram of the power average safety gain (PASG) of the system of the embodiment of the present application after being stabilized by using the solution (CJSH) of the present application;

[0027] Figure 2M A second schematic diagram of the power average safety gain (PASG) of the system of the embodiment of the present application after being stabilized using the solution (CJSH) of the present application;

[0028] Figure 2N It is a first schematic diagram of the average confidentiality interruption probability (ASOP) of the system of the embodiment of the present application after being stabilized by using the solution (CJSH) of the present application;

[0029] Fig.2O A second schematic diagram of the average confidentiality outage probability (ASOP) of the system of the embodiment of the present application after being stabilized using the solution (CJSH) of the present application;

[0030] Figure 2P Schematic diagram of instantaneous privacy interruption probability (SOP) values ​​under different schemes of an embodiment of the present application;

[0031] Figure 2Q A schematic diagram of the working state of the system under the P1 optimization problem (CJSH-P1) using the solution of the present application in an embodiment of the present application;

[0032] Figure 3 This is a structural block diagram of an interference switching device based on information transmission according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0033] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0034] In order to make the objectives, technical solutions and advantages of the present application more clearly understood, the present application is further described in detail below in combination with specific embodiments and with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0035] It should be noted that, unless otherwise defined, the technical terms or scientific terms used in the embodiments of the present application should be the usual meanings understood by people with ordinary skills in the field to which the present application belongs. The "first", "second" and similar words used in the embodiments of the present application do not represent any order, quantity or importance, but are only used to distinguish different components. "Including" or "comprising" and similar words mean that the elements or objects appearing in front of the word cover the elements or objects listed after the word and their equivalents, without excluding other elements or objects. "Connect" or "connected" and similar words are not limited to physical or mechanical connections, but can include electrical connections, whether direct or indirect. "Up", "down", "left", "right" and the like are only used to indicate relative positional relationships. When the absolute position of the described object changes, the relative positional relationship may also change accordingly.

[0036] It is understandable that before using the technical solutions of each embodiment of the present application, the type, scope of use, usage scenarios, etc. of the personal information involved will be informed to the user in an appropriate manner, and the user's authorization will be obtained.

[0037] For example, in response to receiving an active request from a user, a prompt message is sent to the user to clearly remind the user that the operation requested to be performed will require obtaining and using the user's personal information. Thus, the user can independently choose whether to provide personal information to the electronic device, application, server, storage medium or other software or hardware that performs the operation of the technical solution of the present application according to the prompt message.

[0038] As an optional but non-limiting implementation, in response to receiving the user's active request, the prompt information may be sent to the user in the form of a pop-up window, in which the prompt information may be presented in text form. In addition, the pop-up window may also carry a selection control for the user to choose "agree" or "disagree" to provide personal information to the electronic device.

[0039] It is understandable that the above notification and the process of obtaining user authorization are merely illustrative and do not constitute a limitation on the implementation method of this application. Other methods that meet relevant laws and regulations may also be applied to the implementation method of this application.

[0040] The embodiments of the present application are described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0041] In the related technologies, network security is an important guarantee for the application of mobile communication networks. If the network communication system is threatened by attacks, it will cause serious economic losses and major security risks. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure the security of information transmission.

[0042] Based on the above situation, the information transmission method in the prior art only considers the security of the transmission process in static scenarios. In the transmission process in static scenarios, the distance between the base station and the legitimate receiving end is fixed and time-invariant, and the mobile scenario is not considered. The legitimate receiving end in the wireless network generally moves randomly. The change in the geographical location of the legitimate receiving end and the eavesdropping end in the wireless network will affect the channel characteristics, thereby affecting the security performance.

[0043] The information transmission method in a static scenario only selects a fixed interference end to interfere with the eavesdropping end. If the information transmission method that only considers static scenarios is applied to mobile scenarios, the mobile eavesdropping end can try to move to a location with a poor interference effect to eavesdrop, and the security of the transmission process cannot be guaranteed.

[0044] An embodiment of the present application provides an interference switching method based on information transmission, which is applied to an interference switching system based on information transmission, wherein the system is respectively communicatively connected with a base station, a legal receiving end, an eavesdropping end, and multiple interfering ends.

[0045] In order to improve the security of information transmission, multiple interference ends are set up. Multiple interference ends cooperate to transmit interference signals to resist the attack of the eavesdropping end, thereby improving the reliability of information transmission. The collaborative interference of multiple interference ends mainly uses artificial noise and beamforming. The interference signals sent by the collaborative interference ends deteriorate the channel of the eavesdropping end, thereby achieving enhanced security of information transmission.

[0046] like Figure 1 As shown, the method of this embodiment includes:

[0047] Step 101: Obtain a switching threshold of the interfering end.

[0048] In this step, if Figure 2A As shown in the figure, in the interference switching scenario based on information transmission, there is a base station (Alice), and the radius of the signal coverage area of ​​the base station is r. In the coverage area, there is a legitimate receiving end (Bob), an eavesdropping end (Eve), and multiple known interfering ends (Carol). The base station intends to continuously transmit information to the legitimate receiving end, while the eavesdropping end attempts to continuously eavesdrop in the process. In order to reduce the eavesdropping ability of the eavesdropping end, several interfering ends in the coverage area will selectively send artificial noise (AN, Artificial Noise) to interfere with the eavesdropping end to ensure the security of the transmission process.

[0049] Considering the mobile scenario, assuming that the legitimate receiver is mobile, the eavesdropper keeps moving to improve the effectiveness of eavesdropping. In order to prevent the eavesdropper from being too close to the base station, the distance from the eavesdropper to the base station is d AE , the base station uses a radius of r G The safe area of ​​​​ AE Greater than or equal to r G Such a secure area is achievable in actual scenarios. For example, if the antenna of a base station is installed on a large tower or the roof of a building, it is difficult for an eavesdropper to approach the base station.

[0050] This application proposes an Intelligent Eavesdropping Mobile Model (IEM) for the eavesdropping end: when the base station is communicating with the legitimate receiving end, a typical downlink connection is considered. Assume that the eavesdropping end knows the location of the base station and the radius r of the safe area G . In this model, the eavesdropper only stays or moves near the border of the secure area. Due to its intelligence, the eavesdropper tries to move around the border of the confidential area at will to reduce the impact of the interference from the interferer. This also proves the importance of using switching to perform collaborative interference by multiple interferers, because if only a fixed interferer is selected for interference in a scenario with multiple interferers, the eavesdropper with mobility can try to move to a location with poor interference effect for eavesdropping. Therefore, in a scenario with multiple distributed interferers, it is necessary to provide a switching mechanism for the interferers to deal with potential mobile eavesdroppers.

[0051] The switching of the interference end is achieved by using the switching threshold of the interference end related to security performance. The interference end with high security quality can be added and the interference end with low security quality can be exited during the information transmission process. There is always an interference end in working state, which effectively avoids the interruption problem of sudden deterioration of security performance during the hard switching of a single interference end.

[0052] In this application, the interference end in working state will simultaneously transmit artificial noise signals, which are received by the eavesdropping end and the legal receiving end. For the legal receiving end, these artificial noise signals can be identified and eliminated for normal communication, while the eavesdropping end cannot eliminate the interference formed by the superposition of these artificial noise signals due to the lack of channel state information (CSI, Channel State Information). Therefore, this application can ensure the safe transmission of legal links in downlink communication.

[0053] Step 102: Acquire operation flags of the multiple interfering terminals, and determine a first interfering terminal that is not currently in an operating state among the multiple interfering terminals according to the operation flags of the multiple interfering terminals.

[0054] In this step, the operation mark is used to indicate whether the interfering end is in a working state. The operation mark can be used to quickly determine the first interfering end that is not currently in a working state among the multiple interfering ends.

[0055] Step 103: determine a first signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio of the eavesdropping end when the first interfering end is in a working state, and a redundant transmission code rate between the base station and the legitimate receiving end.

[0056] In this step, there is legitimate communication between the base station and the legitimate receiving end, while the eavesdropping end eavesdrops for a certain period of time. There are multiple interference ends distributed within the signal coverage of the base station, and one or more of them are selected to send artificial noise to improve the security of transmission. Then the received signal at the eavesdropping end can be expressed as:

[0057]

[0058] Among them, y E represents the received signal at the eavesdropping end, h AE represents the channel response from the base station to the eavesdropping end, x represents the transmitted signal from the base station, k represents the kth interference end, N J represents the number of interfering terminals, h kE represents the channel response from the kth interference end to the eavesdropping end, z k represents the transmitted signal from the interference end, n E Represents the ambient noise at the eavesdropping end.

[0059] represents the channel vector from the base station to the eavesdropping end, P A represents the transmission power of the base station, θ AE represents the path loss of the channel from the base station to the eavesdropping end, θ AE It can be expressed as follows:

[0060] 10lgθ AE =-32.4-10αlg d AE (Km)-20lg f(MHz)

[0061] Where α represents the path loss coefficient, which can vary between 2 and 6. The specific value depends on the propagation environment. Here, α=2 is preferred. AE It represents the distance from the base station to the eavesdropping end, and f represents the frequency of the signal transmitted by the base station during the communication process.

[0062] The SINR of the eavesdropping end can be determined as follows:

[0063]

[0064] Among them, γ E represents the signal interference plus noise ratio of the eavesdropping end, h AE represents the channel response from the base station to the eavesdropping end, P A represents the transmission power of the base station, θ AE represents the path loss of the channel from the base station to the eavesdropping end, N J represents the number of interference terminals, k represents the kth interference terminal, represents the channel vector from the base station to the eavesdropping end, P k represents the transmission power of the kth interference end, θ kE represents the path loss from the kth interference end to the eavesdropping end, represents the channel vector from the kth interference end to the eavesdropping end, n0 represents the bilateral power spectrum density, B c Indicates the channel bandwidth.

[0065] The process of determining the redundant transmission code rate between the base station and the legal receiving end is as follows:

[0066] Get the total transmission code rate R between the base station and the legal receiving end B , and the transmission code rate R used for security information in the total transmission code rate S .

[0067] Determine the total transmission code rate R B and the transmission code rate R for security information S The difference R E =R B -R S , the difference R E Indicates the redundant transmission code rate used to protect non-valid information for secure transmission.

[0068] Step 104: obtain a first security interrupt signal interference-plus-noise ratio of a security interruption occurring at the eavesdropping end based on the redundant transmission code rate, compare the first security interrupt signal interference-plus-noise ratio with the first signal interference-plus-noise ratio of the eavesdropping end and determine a first comparison result, and obtain a first confidentiality interruption probability based on the first comparison result.

[0069] In this step, the total transmission code rate R B and the transmission code rate R for security information S The difference R E =R B -R S , that is, the redundant transmission code rate determines the interference plus noise ratio of the security interrupt signal when the eavesdropping end has a security interrupt as follows:

[0070]

[0071] Among them, γth The signal interference plus noise ratio of the security interruption signal representing the security interruption at the eavesdropping end, R B Represents the total transmission bit rate, R S Represents the total transmission code rate R B The transmission code rate used for security information.

[0072] Step 105: compare the first confidentiality interruption probability with the switching threshold of the interference end and determine a second comparison result, and determine whether to switch the first interference end from a non-working state to a working state based on the second comparison result.

[0073] In this step, if Figure 2B As shown, any interference end in idle mode (i.e., the first interference end that is not currently in working state) is checked. If the probability of confidentiality interruption of an interference end entering working state can provide better security performance compared with the switching threshold of the interference end, the interference end is changed from idle mode to working state.

[0074] For example, the switching threshold of the interference end is the joining threshold of the interference end. If the probability of confidentiality interruption of the interference end entering the working state is less than the joining threshold of the interference end, it means that the joining of the interference end can provide better security performance, and the interference end is changed from idle mode to working state.

[0075] By comparing the first confidentiality interruption probability with the switching threshold of the interference end, it is determined whether the use of the first interference end can provide better security performance, thereby determining whether to switch the first interference end from a non-working state to a working state. This realizes the addition of an interference end that is suitable for mobile scenarios and can provide better security performance, thereby ensuring the security of the transmission process.

[0076] Through the above scheme, the switching threshold of the interference end is obtained, the first interference end that is not in a working state and the first confidentiality interruption probability corresponding to when the first interference end is in a working state are determined, and by comparing the first confidentiality interruption probability with the switching threshold of the interference end, it is determined whether better security performance can be provided if the first interference end is used, so as to determine whether to switch the first interference end from a non-working state to a working state, thereby realizing the switching of the interference end that can be applicable to mobile scenarios and can provide better security performance, thereby ensuring the security of the transmission process.

[0077] In some embodiments, after step 105, the method further includes:

[0078] Step A1: determining a second interfering end currently in working state among the multiple interfering ends according to the operation flags of the multiple interfering ends.

[0079] Step A2, determining a second signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio of the eavesdropping end when the second interfering end is in a working state.

[0080] Step A3, based on the redundant transmission code rate, obtain the second security interruption signal interference plus noise ratio of the eavesdropping end when a security interruption occurs, compare the second security interruption signal interference plus noise ratio with the second signal interference plus noise ratio of the eavesdropping end and determine a third comparison result, and obtain the second confidentiality interruption probability based on the third comparison result.

[0081] Step A4: compare the second confidentiality interruption probability with the switching threshold of the interference end and determine a fourth comparison result, and determine whether to switch the second interference end from a working state to a non-working state based on the fourth comparison result.

[0082] In the above solution, the operation mark is used to indicate whether the interfering end is in a working state, and the second interfering end currently in a working state among the multiple interfering ends can be quickly determined through the operation mark.

[0083] There is legitimate communication between the base station and the legitimate receiving end, while the eavesdropping end eavesdrops for a certain period of time. There are multiple interference ends distributed within the signal coverage of the base station, and one or more of them are selected to send artificial noise to improve the security of transmission. Then the received signal at the eavesdropping end can be expressed as:

[0084]

[0085] Among them, y E represents the received signal at the eavesdropping end, h AE represents the channel response from the base station to the eavesdropping end, x represents the transmitted signal from the base station, k represents the kth interference end, N J represents the number of interfering terminals, h kE represents the channel response from the kth interference end to the eavesdropping end, z k represents the transmitted signal from the interference end, n E Represents the ambient noise at the eavesdropping end.

[0086] represents the channel vector from the base station to the eavesdropping end, P A represents the transmission power of the base station, θ AE represents the path loss of the channel from the base station to the eavesdropping end, θ AE It can be expressed as follows:

[0087] 10lgθ AE =-32.4-10αlg d AE (Km)-20lg f(MHz)

[0088] Where α represents the path loss coefficient, which can vary between 2 and 6. The specific value depends on the propagation environment. Here, α=2 is preferred. AE It represents the distance from the base station to the eavesdropping end, and f represents the frequency of the signal transmitted by the base station during the communication process.

[0089] The SINR of the eavesdropping end can be determined as follows:

[0090]

[0091] Among them, γ E represents the signal interference plus noise ratio of the eavesdropping end, h AE represents the channel response from the base station to the eavesdropping end, P A represents the transmission power of the base station, θ AE represents the path loss of the channel from the base station to the eavesdropping end, N J represents the number of interference terminals, k represents the kth interference terminal, represents the channel vector from the base station to the eavesdropping end, P k represents the transmission power of the kth interference end, θ kE represents the path loss from the kth interference end to the eavesdropping end, represents the channel vector from the kth interference end to the eavesdropping end, n0 represents the bilateral power spectrum density, B c Indicates the channel bandwidth.

[0092] Using the total transmission code rate R B and the transmission code rate R for security information S The difference R E =R B -R S , that is, the redundant transmission code rate determines the interference plus noise ratio of the security interrupt signal when the eavesdropping end has a security interrupt as follows:

[0093]

[0094] Among them, γ th The signal interference plus noise ratio of the security interruption signal representing the security interruption at the eavesdropping end, R B Represents the total transmission bit rate, R S Represents the total transmission code rate R B The transmission code rate used for security information.

[0095] like Figure 2C As shown, any interfering end in working state (i.e., the second interfering end currently in working state) is checked. If the probability of confidentiality interruption of an interfering end in working state can provide poorer security performance compared with the switching threshold of the interfering end, the interfering end is changed from working state to idle mode.

[0096] For example, the switching threshold of the interference end is the exit threshold of the interference end. If the probability of confidentiality interruption of the interference end in the working state is greater than the exit threshold of the interference end, it means that the interference end can provide poor security performance in the working state, then the interference end is changed from the working state to the idle mode.

[0097] By comparing the second confidentiality interruption probability with the switching threshold of the interference end, it is determined whether the use of the second interference end can provide better security performance, thereby determining whether to switch the second interference end from a working state to a non-working state. This realizes the exit of the interference end that can provide poor security performance and is applicable to mobile scenarios, thereby ensuring the security of the transmission process.

[0098] In some embodiments, step 101 includes:

[0099] Step 1011, determine the average confidentiality interruption probability between the base station and the legal receiving end, the average power consumption between the base station and the legal receiving end, and the third confidentiality interruption probability between the base station and the legal receiving end when any interfering end is not in a working state.

[0100] Step 1012: perform ratio processing on the difference between the third confidentiality interruption probability and the average confidentiality interruption probability, and the difference between the average power consumption and the transmission power of the base station to obtain a power-average security gain function.

[0101] Step 1013: maximizing the power average safety gain function using a solution space exhaustive search algorithm to obtain a switching threshold of the interference terminal.

[0102] In the above scheme, the outage probability of confidentiality capacity, also known as confidentiality outage probability, is the probability of achieving a non-negative target confidentiality rate, which is one of the commonly used security performance indicators when there is an eavesdropper in a fading channel. The confidentiality outage probability (SOP) is a conditional probability based on the reliability of the transmitted codeword for the purpose of physical layer security. The base station selects the total transmission code rate R for transmission during the encoding process of the transmitted signal. B , and the transmission code rate R used for security information in the total transmission code rate S .

[0103] Determine the total transmission code rate R B and the transmission code rate R for security information S The difference R E =R B -R S , the difference R Erepresents the redundant transmission code rate used to protect the non-effective information of secure transmission. Under unit frequency, for any transmitted message, if C B >R B , C B represents the ratio of the channel capacity of the legal receiving end to the channel transmission frequency. The legal receiving end can decode correctly. If C E >R E , C E It represents the ratio of the channel capacity of the eavesdropping end to the channel transmission frequency, R E =R B -R S , then complete confidentiality fails. The Secrecy Outage Probability (SOP) is defined as:

[0104]

[0105] definition Then the Secrecy Outage Probability (SOP) can be expressed as:

[0106]

[0107] Among them, γ E Represents the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio of the eavesdropping end.

[0108] The switching threshold of the interference end can measure the balance between the security performance and energy consumption of information transmission. Using the switching threshold of the interference end can not only meet the security requirements of the legitimate transmission link, but also reduce energy consumption.

[0109] The power-average safety gain function is used to determine the balance between the security performance and energy consumption of information transmission. By utilizing the discretized solution space exhaustive search algorithm, the switching threshold of the interfering end corresponding to the maximization of the power-average safety gain function is determined. The switching threshold solved by the algorithm is used as the basis for judging the joining and exit of the collaborative interfering end.

[0110] In the next step, the Secrecy Outage Probability (SOP) of a single interfering end interfering with the eavesdropping end is calculated, and the value of the Secrecy Outage Probability is used to determine the threshold β for adding the interfering end. Add and the exit threshold β of the interference end Drop , the interference end adding threshold β Add and the exit threshold β of the interference end Drop is the switching threshold of the interfering end. Then, the following optimization problem P1 is established.

[0111]

[0112] st0<β Drop <1

[0113] 0<β Add <1

[0114] β Add <β Drop

[0115] in, Expressed as the power average safety gain function, β Add represents the threshold of adding interference end, β Drop represents the exit threshold of the interference end, and st represents the constraint condition.

[0116] The optimization problem P1 is solved by optimizing the interference threshold β Add and the exit threshold β of the interference end Drop To determine the maximized power-average security gain function. For confidentiality, a lower probability of confidentiality interruption corresponds to an interferer with better interference effect, so the interferer should join at a low threshold and exit at a high threshold, which corresponds to the constraint in the third clause of P1.

[0117] Similarly, under the assumption that at most two interferers cooperate in interference, considering the case of optimal security performance without paying attention to power consumption, an optimization problem P2 with minimizing the average secrecy outage probability (ASOP) is established.

[0118]

[0119] st0<β Drop <1

[0120] 0<β Add <1

[0121] β Add <β Drop

[0122] In order to solve the optimization problems P1 and P2, for simplicity, in the switching scenario of the cooperative interference end of this application, it is assumed that at most two interference ends participate in the cooperative interference at the same time. And all the interference ends in the working state transmit the same artificial noise power P C , where P k =P C ,(k∈N J ), P k represents the transmission power of the kth interference end, N Jrepresents the number of interfering terminals. Under the above assumptions, the Secrecy Outage Probability (SOP) can be expressed as:

[0123]

[0124] In the above formula, represents the probability of confidentiality interruption, m∈N J , m represents the serial number of the interfering end participating in the cooperative interference, γ E represents the signal interference plus noise ratio of the eavesdropping end, γ th Indicates the interference plus noise ratio of the security interrupt signal when a security interrupt occurs at the eavesdropping end, R B Represents the total transmission bit rate, R S Represents the total transmission code rate R B The transmission code rate for security information, P A represents the transmission power of the base station, θ AE represents the path loss of the channel from the base station to the eavesdropping end, represents the channel vector from the base station to the eavesdropping end, P k represents the transmission power of the kth interference end, θ kE represents the path loss from the kth interference end to the eavesdropping end, represents the channel vector from the kth interference end to the eavesdropping end, n0 represents the bilateral power spectrum density, B c represents the channel bandwidth, n∈N J , n represents the serial number of the interference terminal participating in the cooperative interference, P m represents the transmission power of the mth interference end, P n represents the transmission power of the nth interference end, θ mE represents the path loss from the mth interfering end to the eavesdropping end, θ nE represents the path loss from the nth interference end to the eavesdropping end, represents the channel vector from the mth interference end to the eavesdropping end, represents the channel vector from the nth interference end to the eavesdropping end, It indicates that the participation of the second interfering end is determined as a binary variable, and a value of 1 indicates that there is a second interfering end in a non-idle state participating in the cooperative interference, and a value of 0 indicates that there is no second interfering end in a non-idle state participating in the cooperative interference.

[0125] In order to simplify the representation of the Secrecy Outage Probability (SOP), the new variable is defined as follows:

[0126]

[0127] In the presence of Rayleigh fading channels, it has been shown that X~exp(λ), Y1~exp(λ1), Y2~exp(λ2, Therefore, the Secrecy Outage Probability (SOP) can be expressed as:

[0128]

[0129] when When a single interference end transmits artificial noise to help the base station communicate with the legitimate receiving end, the Secrecy Outage Probability (SOP) can be expressed as:

[0130]

[0131] when When another interference end that provides good security performance joins the cooperative interference, the two interference ends will work together to help ensure communication security. The Secrecy Outage Probability (SOP) can be expressed as:

[0132]

[0133] Considering the power-average security gain function, a simple calculation is performed for the case without interference, where the Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio (SINR) at the eavesdropping end can be expressed as:

[0134]

[0135] Among them, γ E，non It represents the signal interference plus noise ratio of the eavesdropping end when the interfering end is not in working state, r E represents the distance from the eavesdropping end to the base station, and α represents the path loss coefficient of the channel from the base station to the eavesdropping end.

[0136] Therefore, in the absence of collaborative interference, the Secrecy Outage Probability (SOP) can be expressed as:

[0137]

[0138] in, It indicates the probability of confidentiality interruption when none of the interfering ends are in working state.

[0139] Here, the optimization problem P1 is preferred.

[0140] The power average safety gain function can be expressed as follows:

[0141]

[0142] in, represents the value of the work-average safety gain function, It represents the probability of confidentiality interruption between the base station and the legitimate receiving end when any interference end is not in working state. represents the average secrecy outage probability (ASOP), Represents the average power consumption (The Average Power Consumption), P A Indicates the transmission power of the base station.

[0143] In some embodiments, in step 1011, determining the average confidentiality interruption probability between the base station and the legitimate receiving end includes:

[0144] Step B1, obtaining the transmission time between the base station and the legal receiving end.

[0145] Step B2: determining a first integral result of the third confidentiality interruption probability within the transmission time, and performing ratio processing on the first integral result and the transmission time to obtain the average confidentiality interruption probability.

[0146] In the above scheme, the Average Secrecy Outage Probability (ASOP) represents a security performance indicator related to the system running time.

[0147] The Secrecy Outage Probability (SOP) only represents the instantaneous performance of the system, while the security performance of the entire system is more important. Therefore, after the system runs for a long enough time T, the average value is calculated. When the instantaneous secrecy outage probability at time t is expressed as The average value of the secrecy outage probability is defined as the average secrecy outage probability (ASOP) of the system, which can be expressed as follows:

[0148]

[0149] Assume that the system experiences a sufficiently long time T until the Average Secrecy Outage Probability (ASOP) converges. In the ASOP, the changing parameters are the positions of the eavesdropping end and the working interference end, which correspond to each other. As the time T increases, this correspondence converges to a stable distribution and has an expected value, and the calculated converged value is used as the expected value.

[0150] In some embodiments, in step 1011, determining the average power consumption between the base station and the legal receiving end includes:

[0151] Step C1, obtaining the transmission power of the first interfering terminal currently in working state, the transmission power of the base station, and the transmission time between the base station and the legal receiving end;

[0152] Step C2, determining a second integral result of the sum of the transmit power of the first interfering terminal currently in operation and the transmit power of the base station within the transmission time, and performing ratio processing on the second integral result and the transmission time to obtain the average power consumption.

[0153] In the above scheme, the average power consumption It represents the ratio of the total energy consumption of the system to the total time T, including the energy consumption of the base station transmission and the interference end in the working state. Similar to the Secrecy Outage Probability (SOP), the system experiences a sufficiently long time T for the average power consumption to converge. It can be expressed as:

[0154]

[0155] Among them, P k represents the transmission power of the kth interference end, P A Indicates the transmission power of the base station.

[0156] In some embodiments, in step 1011, determining a third confidentiality interruption probability between the base station and the legal receiving end when any interfering end is not in a working state includes:

[0157] Step D1, obtaining the bilateral power spectrum density of the eavesdropping end, the first channel bandwidth between the base station and the eavesdropping end, the transmit power of the base station, and the first path loss coefficient between the base station and the eavesdropping end.

[0158] Step D2, performing ratio processing using the product of the bilateral power spectrum density and the first channel bandwidth, and the product of the transmission power of the base station and the first path loss coefficient, to obtain a first ratio result.

[0159] Step D3, performing an exponential operation on the product of the first security interrupt signal interference plus noise ratio and the first ratio result to obtain the third confidentiality interrupt probability.

[0160] In the above scheme, in the absence of collaborative interference, the Secrecy Outage Probability (SOP) can be expressed as:

[0161]

[0162] in, n0 represents the bilateral power spectrum density, B c represents the channel bandwidth, P A represents the transmission power of the base station, θ AE Represents the path loss of the channel from the base station to the eavesdropping end.

[0163] The secrecy outage probability, also known as the secrecy outage probability, is the probability of achieving a non-negative target secrecy rate. It is one of the commonly used security performance indicators when there is an eavesdropper in a fading channel. The secrecy outage probability (SOP) is a conditional probability based on the reliability of the transmitted codeword for the purpose of physical layer security. The base station selects the total transmission code rate R for transmission during the encoding process of the transmitted signal. B , and the transmission code rate R used for security information in the total transmission code rate S .

[0164] Determine the total transmission code rate R B and the transmission code rate R for security information S The difference R E =R B -R S , the difference R E represents the redundant transmission code rate used to protect the non-effective information of secure transmission. Under unit frequency, for any transmitted message, if C B >R B , C B represents the ratio of the channel capacity of the legal receiving end to the channel transmission frequency. The legal receiving end can decode correctly. If C E >R E , C E It represents the ratio of the channel capacity of the eavesdropping end to the channel transmission frequency, R E =R B-R S , then complete confidentiality fails. The Secrecy Outage Probability (SOP) is defined as:

[0165]

[0166] definition Then the Secrecy Outage Probability (SOP) can be expressed as:

[0167]

[0168] Among them, γ E Represents the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio of the eavesdropping end.

[0169] In some embodiments, step 1013 includes:

[0170] Step E1, determining a first limit value of the switching threshold of the interfering end, and a second limit value of the switching threshold of the interfering end, wherein the first limit value is smaller than the second limit value.

[0171] Step E2, based on the first limit value of the switching threshold of the interference end and the second limit value of the switching threshold of the interference end, construct a solution set of the switching threshold of the interference end through an exhaustive algorithm, and the solution set includes multiple data groups, each data group includes a set of corresponding joining thresholds of the interference end and exit thresholds of the interference end.

[0172] Step E3, calculating the power average safety gain function based on each data group to obtain values ​​of multiple power average safety gain functions.

[0173] Step E4, selecting a maximum value of the average power safety gain function from the values ​​of the plurality of average power safety gain functions, and determining a target data set corresponding to the maximum value of the average power safety gain function.

[0174] Step E5, combining the adding threshold of the interfering end of the target data group and the exiting threshold of the interfering end of the target data group to generate a switching threshold of the interfering end.

[0175] In the above solution, based on the first limit of the switching threshold of the interfering end and the second limit of the switching threshold of the interfering end, a constraint condition of the optimization problem is formed. The optimization problem and the corresponding constraint condition are as follows:

[0176]

[0177] st0<β Drop <1

[0178] 0<β Add <1

[0179] β Add <β Drop

[0180] in, represents the maximum work-average safety gain function, and st represents the constraint condition.

[0181] The discretized solution space exhaustive search algorithm is used to find the approximate solution. The specific method is: divide the solution set of the switching threshold of the interference end into N β intervals, and using the exhaustive method, the solution space of the two thresholds will be decomposed into N β ×N β Discrete solutions are obtained, and each time one of the corresponding discrete solutions (i.e., the adding threshold of the interference end and the exit threshold of the interference end) is input to start the calculation, and the converged result is obtained to determine whether it is the current optimal solution. The maximum value of the power-average safety gain function corresponds to the optimal solution. After the maximum value of the power-average safety gain function is determined, the optimal solution (i.e., the target data group) corresponding to the maximum value of the power-average safety gain function is determined, and the adding threshold of the interference end and the exit threshold of the interference end corresponding to the optimal solution are used as the final switching threshold of the interference end. This method has low complexity and is not easy to fall into a local optimal solution, thereby ensuring the accuracy of the optimal solution obtained.

[0182] In some embodiments, in step E1, determining a first limit value of the switching threshold of the interfering end includes:

[0183] Step F1, obtaining the bilateral power spectrum density of the eavesdropping end, the first channel bandwidth between the base station and the eavesdropping end, the second channel bandwidth between the interfering end and the eavesdropping end, the transmit power of the interfering end, the transmit power of the base station, the first path loss coefficient between the base station and the eavesdropping end, the second path loss coefficient between the interfering end and the eavesdropping end, the minimum value of the distance between the base station and the interfering end, the radius of the security area of ​​the base station, and the interference plus noise ratio of the security interruption signal when a security interruption occurs at the eavesdropping end.

[0184] Step F2, performing ratio processing using the product of the double-sided power spectrum density and the first channel bandwidth, and the product of the transmission power of the base station and the first path loss coefficient, to obtain a first ratio result.

[0185] Step F3, performing ratio processing using the product of the double-sided power spectrum density and the second channel bandwidth, and the product of the transmission power of the interference end and the second path loss coefficient, to obtain a second ratio result.

[0186] Step F4, performing an exponential operation on the product of the interference plus noise ratio of the security interruption signal of the eavesdropping end and the first ratio result to obtain a fourth confidentiality interruption probability.

[0187] Step F5, performing product processing using the second ratio result and the fourth privacy interruption probability to obtain a first product processing result.

[0188] Step F6, using the product of the second ratio result and summing the product of the interference plus noise ratio of the security interrupt signal of the security interruption occurring at the eavesdropping end and the first ratio result to obtain a first summing result.

[0189] Step F7: taking the ratio of the first product processing result to the first addition processing result as the first limit value of the switching threshold of the interfering end.

[0190] In the above scheme, if Figure 2A As shown in Figure 1, considering the security area, the secrecy outage probability (SOP) of the random direction mobility model (RD) of the eavesdropper outside the security area is calculated. Then, the average secrecy outage probability (ASOP) of the random direction mobility model can be expressed as:

[0191]

[0192] The new variables are defined as follows:

[0193]

[0194] Among them, r E represents the distance from the base station to the eavesdropper, r G represents the radius of the safe area of ​​the base station, and r represents the radius of the signal coverage area of ​​the base station.

[0195] In the above scheme, the present application determines which interfering terminals in the coverage area of ​​the base station may participate in cooperative interference. The present application assumes that the eavesdropping terminal is in r E =r G At the same time, all interference ends send artificial interference noise with the same power. Obviously, the interference ends close to the base station can participate in the cooperation better. k is defined as the distance between the base station and the kth interference end, and when When the kth interference end is never greater than the (arg min r k )th Therefore, the distance range from the interfering end to the base station that can participate in the interference is reduced to (min r k , min r k +2r G ). Among them, min r k represents the minimum distance between the base station and the kth interference end, (argmin r k ) th Indicates the number of the interfering end corresponding to the minimum value.

[0196] From the expressions of secrecy outage probability (SOP) and path loss, it can be seen that under the same artificial noise power of the interference end, the secrecy outage probability (SOP) of the eavesdropping end under the interference of a single interference end is proportional to the distance r between the base station and the kth interference end. k is positively correlated, where λ1 can be expressed by parameter d as λ1(d), where d represents the distance between the eavesdropping end and the kth interfering end. Therefore, β Add (i.e., the interference end addition threshold) and β Drop The lower limit (i.e., the first limit) of (i.e., the exit threshold of the interference end) can be derived as follows:

[0197]

[0198] In some embodiments, in step E1, determining a second limit value of the switching threshold of the interfering end includes:

[0199] Step G1, obtaining the bilateral power spectrum density of the eavesdropping end, the first channel bandwidth between the base station and the eavesdropping end, the second channel bandwidth between the interfering end and the eavesdropping end, the transmit power of the interfering end, the transmit power of the base station, the first path loss coefficient between the base station and the eavesdropping end, the second path loss coefficient between the interfering end and the eavesdropping end, the minimum value of the distance between the base station and the interfering end, the radius of the security area of ​​the base station, and the interference plus noise ratio of the security interruption signal when a security interruption occurs at the eavesdropping end.

[0200] Step G2, using the product of the double-sided power spectrum density and the first channel bandwidth, and the product of the base station's transmission power and the first path loss coefficient to perform ratio processing to obtain a first ratio result.

[0201] Step G3, performing ratio processing using the product of the bilateral power spectrum density and the second channel bandwidth, and the product of the transmission power of the interference end and the second path loss coefficient, to obtain a second ratio result.

[0202] Step G4, performing an exponential operation on the product of the interference plus noise ratio of the security interruption signal of the eavesdropping end and the first ratio result to obtain a fourth confidentiality interruption probability.

[0203] Step G5, performing product processing using the second ratio result and the fourth confidentiality interruption probability to obtain a second product processing result.

[0204] Step G6, using the product of the second ratio result, and summing it with the product of the interference plus noise ratio of the security interrupt signal of the security interrupt occurring at the eavesdropping end and the first ratio result, to obtain a second summing result.

[0205] Step G7: taking the ratio of the second product processing result to the second addition processing result as the second limit value of the switching threshold of the interfering end.

[0206] In the above scheme, the present application determines which interfering terminals in the coverage area of ​​the base station may participate in cooperative interference. The present application assumes that the eavesdropping terminal is in r E =r G At the same time, all interference ends send artificial interference noise with the same power. Obviously, the interference ends close to the base station can participate in the cooperation better. k is defined as the distance between the base station and the kth interference end, and when When the kth interference end is never greater than the (arg min r k ) th Therefore, the distance range from the interfering end to the base station that can participate in the interference is reduced to (min r k , min r k +2r G ), where min r k represents the minimum distance between the base station and the kth interference end, (argmin r k ) th Indicates the number of the interfering end corresponding to the minimum value.

[0207] From the expressions of secrecy outage probability (SOP) and path loss, it can be seen that under the same artificial noise power of the interference end, the secrecy outage probability (SOP) of the eavesdropping end under the interference of a single interference end is proportional to the distance r between the base station and the kth interference end. kis positively correlated, where λ1 can be expressed by parameter d as λ1(d), where d represents the distance between the eavesdropping end and the kth interfering end. Therefore, β Add (i.e., the interference end addition threshold) and β Drop The upper limit (i.e., the second limit) of (i.e., the exit threshold of the interference end) can be derived as:

[0208]

[0209] In some embodiments, the present application performs simulation analysis. A Cartesian coordinate system is established with the base station (Alice) as the origin, wherein the positions of the interference terminal (Carol) are randomly selected as (-42, -41), (34, -40), (26, 49) and (38, 46) (m).

[0210] The influence of system model parameters on the average security outage probability (ASOP), such as Figure 2D , Figure 2E , Figure 2F and Figure 2G As shown, CJSH is the solution proposed in this application. CJHH represents a hard-switching cooperative interference scheme, in which the system chooses to switch to a single jammer (i.e., the jammer end) closest to the eavesdropper to improve security. NJ represents a non-interference scheme, in which there is no friendly jammer in the auxiliary security system model. IEM is the mobile model of the eavesdropper proposed in this application. RD represents a random direction model, in which the eavesdropper (i.e., the eavesdropping end) is not intelligent and moves randomly outside the confidentiality boundary. P1 represents the optimization problem and the corresponding solution.

[0211] Figure 2D , Figure 2E , Figure 2F and Figure 2G The trend shows that ASOP is monotonic for each parameter. When Eve (i.e., the eavesdropper) follows the RD model, the ASOP is much lower than the ASOP of the IEM model, because Eve is farther away from Alice (i.e., the base station) and closer to Carol (i.e., the interference end). This also confirms the reason why Eve moves within the security boundary, because IEM is an effective movement model for Eve to increase the eavesdropping effect. In the IEM model, the ASOP of the CJSH scheme is lower than that of CJHH and even lower than that of NJ, and this result is directly related to the number of jobs Carol does.

[0212] The influence of system model parameters on the power average safety gain PASG is as follows: Figure 2H , Fig.2I , Figure 2J and Figure 2KAs shown. It can be seen that the PASG of CJHH is higher than that of CJSH. Among them, P1 represents the maximum PASG in the CJSH scenario, but it is still lower than that of CJHH, because the energy consumption factor has a very intuitive impact on PASG. As can be seen from the figure, the PASG of P1 is similar to that of CJHH, which shows that the CJSH scheme corresponding to the P1 problem effectively improves the instantaneous confidentiality interruption probability SOP of the system and overcomes the interruption problem that may occur during the CJHH switching process.

[0213] like Figure 2L , Figure 2M , Figure 2N and Fig.2O shows the PASG and ASOP of the system after stabilization using the CJSH scheme, and the results are given by β Add (i.e., the interference end addition threshold) and β Drop (interference end exit threshold) is jointly determined. It can be seen that the values ​​of ASOP and PASG will not change with β Add and β Drop Monotonically changes. On the contrary, there is an extreme point corresponding to the optimal solution of problem P1, and the position of the optimal solution is close to the point representing β Add =β Drop This means that under the CJSH scheme, the thresholds corresponding to Carol’s entry and exit are very close.

[0214] From the perspective of P1 maximizing the PASG goal, when a single jammer does not work well, the scenario of two jammers cooperating should occur as much as possible, and due to power consumption constraints, cooperative interference will not last for a long time, so the time interval from the new jammer joining to the old jammer exiting is very short, so β Add and β Drop Very close.

[0215] like Figure 2P The figure shows the instantaneous secrecy interruption probability (SOP) values ​​under different schemes. It can be seen that CJHH is higher than CJSH-P1 at almost all moments, which is the same as the above conclusion. It is worth noting that CJSH-P1 aims to minimize PASG, and the effect reflected in the instantaneous SOP is that the cooperative interference scheme is used when the interference effect is very poor, which effectively reduces the peak in the figure, while the single Carol effect is still maintained for most of the other time, so the SOP is the same as the SOP of the CJHH part.

[0216] like Figure 2QAs shown, the working status of the system under CJSH-P1 is shown. Specifically, it includes the change of the immediate SOP, the number of Carols participating in the work in the CJSH strategy, and the change of each Carol's respective status. It can be seen that in CJSH-P1, the process of collaborative interference is very short, but this is not the short time from the same Carol to the exit, but the alternation of the working status of different Carols. When collaborative interference occurs, the SOP does not rise, but drops suddenly, which effectively improves the safety performance. In addition, CJSH ensures that there is always at least one jammer in operation, which effectively solves the problem of interference interruption.

[0217] It should be noted that the method of the embodiment of the present application can be performed by a single device, such as a computer or server. The method of this embodiment can also be applied to a distributed scenario and completed by multiple devices cooperating with each other. In the case of such a distributed scenario, one of the multiple devices can only perform one or more steps in the method of the embodiment of the present application, and the multiple devices will interact with each other to complete the described method.

[0218] It should be noted that the above describes some embodiments of the present application. Other embodiments are within the scope of the appended claims. In some cases, the actions or steps recorded in the claims can be performed in an order different from that in the above embodiments and still achieve the desired results. In addition, the processes depicted in the accompanying drawings do not necessarily require the specific order or continuous order shown to achieve the desired results. In some embodiments, multitasking and parallel processing are also possible or may be advantageous.

[0219] Based on the same inventive concept, corresponding to any of the above-mentioned embodiment methods, the present application also provides an interference switching device based on information transmission.

[0220] refer to Figure 3 , the interference switching device based on information transmission, the device is arranged in an interference switching system based on information transmission, the system is respectively connected to a base station, a legal receiving end, an eavesdropping end and a plurality of interference ends in communication, the device comprises:

[0221] The threshold acquisition module 301 is configured to acquire a joining threshold of the interfering terminal and a withdrawing threshold of the interfering terminal;

[0222] A first determining module 302 is configured to obtain operation flags of the multiple interfering terminals, and determine a first interfering terminal that is not currently in an operating state among the multiple interfering terminals according to the operation flags of the multiple interfering terminals;

[0223] A second determination module 303 is configured to determine a first signal interference plus noise ratio of the eavesdropping end and a redundant transmission code rate between the base station and the legitimate receiving end when the first interfering end is in a working state;

[0224] A first comparison module 304 is configured to obtain a first security interruption signal plus interference and noise ratio of a security interruption occurring at the eavesdropping end based on the redundant transmission code rate, compare the first security interruption signal interference and noise ratio with the first signal interference and noise ratio of the eavesdropping end and determine a first comparison result, and obtain a first confidentiality interruption probability based on the first comparison result;

[0225] The second comparison module 305 is configured to compare the first confidentiality interruption probability with the switching threshold of the interference end and determine a second comparison result, and determine whether to switch the first interference end from a non-working state to a working state based on the second comparison result.

[0226] For the convenience of description, the above device is described in terms of functions divided into various modules. Of course, when implementing the present application, the functions of each module can be implemented in the same or multiple software and / or hardware.

[0227] The device of the above embodiment is used to implement the corresponding interference switching method based on information transmission in any of the above embodiments, and has the beneficial effects of the corresponding method embodiment, which will not be described in detail here.

[0228] Based on the same inventive concept, corresponding to any of the above-mentioned embodiments and methods, the present application also provides an electronic device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein when the processor executes the program, the interference switching method based on information transmission described in any of the above embodiments is implemented.

[0229] Figure 4 A more specific schematic diagram of the hardware structure of an electronic device provided in this embodiment is shown, and the device may include: a processor 401, a memory 402, an input / output interface 403, a communication interface 404, and a bus 405. The processor 401, the memory 402, the input / output interface 403, and the communication interface 404 are connected to each other in communication within the device through the bus 405.

[0230] The processor 401 can be implemented by a general-purpose CPU (Central Processing Unit), a microprocessor, an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or one or more integrated circuits, and is used to execute relevant programs to implement the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of this specification.

[0231] The memory 402 can be implemented in the form of ROM (Read Only Memory), RAM (Random Access Memory), static storage device, dynamic storage device, etc. The memory 402 can store an operating system and other application programs. When the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of this specification are implemented by software or firmware, the relevant program codes are stored in the memory 402 and called and executed by the processor 401.

[0232] The input / output interface 403 is used to connect the input / output module to realize information input and output. The input / output module can be configured in the device as a component (not shown in the figure), or it can be externally connected to the device to provide corresponding functions. The input device may include a keyboard, a mouse, a touch screen, a microphone, various sensors, etc., and the output device may include a display, a speaker, a vibrator, an indicator light, etc.

[0233] The communication interface 404 is used to connect a communication module (not shown) to realize communication interaction between the device and other devices. The communication module can realize communication through a wired mode (such as USB, network cable, etc.) or a wireless mode (such as mobile network, WIFI, Bluetooth, etc.).

[0234] The bus 405 comprises a pathway for transmitting information between the various components of the device (eg, the processor 401 , the memory 402 , the input / output interface 403 , and the communication interface 404 ).

[0235] It should be noted that, although the above device only shows the processor 401, the memory 402, the input / output interface 403, the communication interface 404 and the bus 405, in the specific implementation process, the device may also include other components necessary for normal operation. In addition, it can be understood by those skilled in the art that the above device may also only include the components necessary for implementing the embodiments of the present specification, and does not necessarily include all the components shown in the figure.

[0236] The electronic device of the above embodiment is used to implement the corresponding interference switching method based on information transmission in any of the above embodiments, and has the beneficial effects of the corresponding method embodiment, which will not be repeated here.

[0237] Based on the same inventive concept, corresponding to any of the above-mentioned embodiment methods, the present application also provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, wherein the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium stores computer instructions, and the computer instructions are used to enable the computer to execute the interference switching method based on information transmission as described in any of the above embodiments.

[0238] The computer-readable medium of this embodiment includes permanent and non-permanent, removable and non-removable media, and information storage can be implemented by any method or technology. Information can be computer-readable instructions, data structures, modules of programs, or other data. Examples of computer storage media include, but are not limited to, phase change memory (PRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), other types of random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technology, read-only compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), digital versatile disk (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic cassettes, tape disk storage or other magnetic storage devices or any other non-transmission media that can be used to store information that can be accessed by a computing device.

[0239] The computer instructions stored in the storage medium of the above embodiment are used to enable the computer to execute the interference switching method based on information transmission as described in any of the above embodiments, and have the beneficial effects of the corresponding method embodiments, which will not be repeated here.

[0240] Those skilled in the art should understand that the discussion of any of the above embodiments is merely illustrative and is not intended to imply that the scope of the present application (including the claims) is limited to these examples. In line with the concept of the present application, the technical features in the above embodiments or different embodiments may be combined, the steps may be implemented in any order, and there are many other variations of the different aspects of the embodiments of the present application as described above, which are not provided in detail for the sake of simplicity.

[0241] In addition, to simplify the description and discussion, and in order not to make the embodiments of the present application difficult to understand, the known power supply / ground connection with the integrated circuit (IC) chip and other components may or may not be shown in the provided drawings. In addition, the device can be shown in the form of a block diagram to avoid making the embodiments of the present application difficult to understand, and this also takes into account the fact that the details of the implementation of these block diagram devices are highly dependent on the platform to be implemented in the embodiments of the present application (that is, these details should be fully within the scope of understanding of those skilled in the art). In the case of elaborating specific details (e.g., circuits) to describe exemplary embodiments of the present application, it is obvious to those skilled in the art that the embodiments of the present application can be implemented without these specific details or when these specific details are changed. Therefore, these descriptions should be considered to be illustrative rather than restrictive.

[0242] Although the present application has been described in conjunction with specific embodiments of the present application, many replacements, modifications and variations of these embodiments will be apparent to those skilled in the art from the foregoing description. For example, other memory architectures (e.g., dynamic RAM (DRAM)) may use the embodiments discussed.

[0243] The embodiments of the present application are intended to cover all such substitutions, modifications and variations that fall within the broad scope of the appended claims. Therefore, any omissions, modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principles of the embodiments of the present application should be included in the scope of protection of the present application.

Claims

1. An interference switching method based on information transmission, characterized in that: Applied to an interference switching system based on information transmission, the system is respectively connected to a base station, a legal receiving end, an eavesdropping end and a plurality of interference ends in communication, and the method comprises: Obtaining a switching threshold of the interfering end; Acquire operation flags of the multiple interfering terminals, and determine a first interfering terminal that is not currently in a working state among the multiple interfering terminals according to the operation flags of the multiple interfering terminals; Determine a first signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio of the eavesdropping end and a redundant transmission code rate between the base station and the legitimate receiving end when the first interfering end is in a working state; Obtaining a first security interrupt signal interference plus noise ratio for a security interruption at the eavesdropping end based on the redundant transmission code rate, comparing the first security interrupt signal interference plus noise ratio with the first signal interference plus noise ratio of the eavesdropping end and determining a first comparison result, and obtaining a first confidentiality interruption probability based on the first comparison result; The first confidentiality interruption probability is compared with the switching threshold of the interference end to determine a second comparison result, and based on the second comparison result, it is determined whether to switch the first interference end from a non-working state to a working state.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that After determining whether to switch the first interference end from a non-working state to a working state based on the second comparison result, the method further includes: Determine, according to the operation marks of the multiple interfering terminals, a second interfering terminal that is currently in a working state among the multiple interfering terminals; Determine a second signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio of the eavesdropping end when the second interfering end is in an operating state; Obtaining a second security interrupt signal interference plus noise ratio at which a security interrupt occurs at the eavesdropping end based on the redundant transmission code rate, comparing the second security interrupt signal interference plus noise ratio with the second signal interference plus noise ratio of the eavesdropping end to determine a third comparison result, and obtaining a second confidentiality interruption probability based on the third comparison result; The second confidentiality interruption probability is compared with the switching threshold of the interference end to determine a fourth comparison result, and based on the fourth comparison result, it is determined whether to switch the second interference end from a working state to a non-working state.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The obtaining the switching threshold of the interfering end includes: Determine an average confidentiality interruption probability between the base station and the legitimate receiving end, an average power consumption between the base station and the legitimate receiving end, and a third confidentiality interruption probability between the base station and the legitimate receiving end when any interfering end is not in a working state; Performing ratio processing on the difference between the third confidentiality interruption probability and the average confidentiality interruption probability, and the difference between the average power consumption and the transmission power of the base station to obtain a power average security gain function; The power average safety gain function is maximized by using an exhaustive search algorithm in a solution space to obtain a switching threshold of the interference end.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The determining an average confidentiality interruption probability between the base station and the legal receiving end comprises: Acquire the transmission time between the base station and the legal receiving end; A first integral result of the third confidentiality interruption probability within the transmission time is determined, and a ratio processing is performed on the first integral result and the transmission time to obtain the average confidentiality interruption probability.

5. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that: The determining the average power consumption between the base station and the legal receiving end includes: Acquire the transmission power of the first interfering terminal currently in working state, the transmission power of the base station, and the transmission time between the base station and the legal receiving end; Determine a second integral result of the sum of the transmit power of the first interfering terminal currently in operation and the transmit power of the base station within the transmission time, and perform ratio processing on the second integral result and the transmission time to obtain the average power consumption.

6. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that: The determining of the third confidentiality interruption probability between the base station and the legal receiving end when any interfering end is not in a working state includes: Acquire the bilateral power spectrum density of the eavesdropping end, the first channel bandwidth between the base station and the eavesdropping end, the transmit power of the base station, and the first path loss coefficient between the base station and the eavesdropping end; Performing ratio processing using the product of the bilateral power spectrum density and the first channel bandwidth and the product of the transmit power of the base station and the first path loss coefficient to obtain a first ratio result; An exponential operation is performed on the product of the first security interrupt signal interference plus noise ratio and the first ratio result to obtain the third confidentiality interrupt probability.

7. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The method of using an exhaustive search algorithm in a solution space to maximize the power average safety gain function to obtain a switching threshold of the interference end includes: Determine a first limit value of a switching threshold of the interfering end, and a second limit value of the switching threshold of the interfering end, wherein the first limit value is less than the second limit value; Based on the first limit value of the switching threshold of the interfering end and the second limit value of the switching threshold of the interfering end, constructing a solution set of the switching threshold of the interfering end by an exhaustive algorithm, wherein the solution set includes multiple data groups, each data group includes a set of corresponding joining thresholds of the interfering end and exit thresholds of the interfering end; Calculating the power average safety gain function based on each data group to obtain multiple power average safety gain function values; Selecting a maximum value of the average power safety gain function from the values ​​of the plurality of average power safety gain functions, and determining a target data group corresponding to the maximum value of the average power safety gain function; The adding threshold of the interfering end of the target data group and the exiting threshold of the interfering end of the target data group are combined to generate a switching threshold of the interfering end.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that The determining of a first limit value of the switching threshold of the interfering end includes: Obtain the bilateral power spectrum density of the eavesdropping end, the first channel bandwidth between the base station and the eavesdropping end, the second channel bandwidth between the interfering end and the eavesdropping end, the transmit power of the interfering end, the transmit power of the base station, the first path loss coefficient between the base station and the eavesdropping end, the second path loss coefficient between the interfering end and the eavesdropping end, the minimum value of the distance between the base station and the interfering end, the radius of the security area of ​​the base station, and the security interruption signal interference plus noise ratio of the eavesdropping end; Performing ratio processing using the product of the bilateral power spectrum density and the first channel bandwidth and the product of the transmit power of the base station and the first path loss coefficient to obtain a first ratio result; Performing ratio processing using the product of the bilateral power spectrum density and the second channel bandwidth and the product of the transmit power of the interference end and the second path loss coefficient to obtain a second ratio result; Performing an exponential operation on the product of the interference plus noise ratio of the security interruption signal of the eavesdropping end and the first ratio result to obtain a fourth confidentiality interruption probability; Using the minimum value of the distance between the base station and the interference end, and the radius of the safety area of ​​the base station to perform difference processing, to obtain a difference processing result; Performing product processing using the first ratio result, the difference processing result, and the fourth confidentiality interruption probability to obtain a first product processing result; The product of the second ratio result and the interference plus noise ratio of the security interruption signal of the security interruption occurring at the eavesdropping end is added to the product of the difference processing result and the first ratio result to obtain a first addition processing result; The ratio of the first product processing result to the first addition processing result is used as a first limit value of the switching threshold of the interfering end.

9. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that: The determining a second limit value of the switching threshold of the interfering end includes: Obtain the bilateral power spectrum density of the eavesdropping end, the first channel bandwidth between the base station and the eavesdropping end, the second channel bandwidth between the interfering end and the eavesdropping end, the transmit power of the interfering end, the transmit power of the base station, the first path loss coefficient between the base station and the eavesdropping end, the second path loss coefficient between the interfering end and the eavesdropping end, the minimum value of the distance between the base station and the interfering end, the radius of the security area of ​​the base station, and the security interruption signal interference plus noise ratio of the eavesdropping end; Performing ratio processing using the product of the bilateral power spectrum density and the first channel bandwidth and the product of the transmit power of the base station and the first path loss coefficient to obtain a first ratio result; Performing ratio processing using the product of the bilateral power spectrum density and the second channel bandwidth and the product of the transmit power of the interference end and the second path loss coefficient to obtain a second ratio result; Performing an exponential operation on the product of the interference plus noise ratio of the security interruption signal of the eavesdropping end and the first ratio result to obtain a fourth confidentiality interruption probability; A summation process is performed using the minimum value of the distance between the base station and the interference end and the radius of the safety area of ​​the base station to obtain a summation result; Performing product processing using the first ratio result, the summation processing result, and the fourth confidentiality interruption probability to obtain a second product processing result; The product of the second ratio result and the interference plus noise ratio of the security interruption signal of the security interruption occurring at the eavesdropping end is added to the product of the summation result and the first ratio result to obtain a second addition result; The ratio of the second product processing result to the second addition processing result is used as a second limit value of the switching threshold of the interfering end.

10. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that: When the processor executes the program, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 9 is implemented.

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