Defense method and system for detector control attack
Through a dual-threshold identification single-photon detector, the threshold identification and proportional calculation of the photon signals in the quantum key distribution system is used to generate a security key, which solves the information leakage problem caused by detector control attacks and ensures the security of the key and system sex.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411016910.9
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-07-29
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-26
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-07-29
AI Technical Summary
Existing quantum key distribution systems are prone to information leakage under detector control attacks, and lack simple and effective defense measures.
A single photon detector with a double threshold identification threshold is used to identify the received photon signal, and the proportion of the logical signal is calculated through the proportion value obtained in advance to calculate the proportion of the attacked signal to determine the proportion of the target attacked signal, so as to make the initial secret The key is subject to key compression processing to generate a security key for defending the detector to control attacks.
Accurate calculation of the amount of information leakage is achieved, ensuring the security of the key and protecting the security of the quantum key distribution system.
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Figure CN118590215B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to a method and system for defending against detector-controlled attacks. Background Art
[0002] Quantum secure communication represented by quantum key distribution has information-theoretic security in theory and has broad application prospects. Among them, semiconductor single-photon detectors are key components of practical quantum key distribution systems. However, due to the imperfection of devices in actual quantum key distribution systems, quantum key distribution systems are exposed to the risk of side-channel attacks. The most representative vulnerability is that an eavesdropper can control the receiver's detector, which is called a detector control attack.
[0003] Since the quantum key distribution system responds to the detector control attack under the control of the attacker, it is easy to cause information leakage and thus cause security problems. Therefore, how to simply and effectively defend against the detector control attack is a technical problem that needs to be solved in the prior art. Summary of the invention
[0004] In view of the above problems, the present invention provides a method and system for defending against detector control attacks.
[0005] According to a first aspect of the present invention, there is provided a method for defending against a detector control attack, comprising:
[0006] Using a dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector, threshold discrimination processing is performed on all received photon signals in sequence to obtain a first logic signal output by a first output end and a second logic signal output by a second output end corresponding to each of the photon signals, wherein the first output end and the second output end are two output ends of the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector;
[0007] Respectively counting the true ratios of the first logic signal and the second logic signal corresponding to each of the photon signals, to obtain a first ratio value corresponding to the first output terminal and a second ratio value corresponding to the second output terminal;
[0008] The proportion of attacked signals corresponding to the first output terminal is calculated based on the first proportion value and the third proportion value obtained in advance, wherein the attacked signal represents the photon signal attacked by the detector control, and the third proportion value represents the proportion of the logic signal output by the first output terminal being true when the photon signal is not attacked by the detector control;
[0009] The proportion of attacked signals corresponding to the second output terminal is calculated based on the second proportion value and a fourth proportion value obtained in advance, wherein the fourth proportion value represents the proportion of true logic signals output by the second output terminal when none of the photon signals are attacked by the detector control;
[0010] Determine the minimum value of the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the first output terminal and the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the second output terminal as the target attacked signal ratio;
[0011] Based on the above-mentioned target attacked signal ratio, the obtained initial key is subjected to key compression processing to obtain a security key for defending against detector control attacks.
[0012] The second aspect of the present invention provides a defense system against detector-controlled attacks, comprising: a dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector, a statistical module, a first calculation module, a second calculation module, a determination module and an acquisition module.
[0013] Among them, the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector is used to perform threshold discrimination processing on all received photon signals in sequence to obtain a first logic signal output by the first output end and a second logic signal output by the second output end corresponding to each of the above photon signals, wherein the above-mentioned first output end and the above-mentioned second output end are the two output ends of the above-mentioned dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector.
[0014] The statistical module is used to respectively count the true proportions of the first logic signal and the second logic signal corresponding to each of the above photon signals, and obtain a first proportion value corresponding to the above first output end and a second proportion value corresponding to the above second output end.
[0015] The first calculation module is used to calculate the proportion of attacked signals corresponding to the above-mentioned first output end based on the above-mentioned first proportion value and the third proportion value obtained in advance by testing, wherein the attacked signal represents the photon signal attacked by the detector control, and the above-mentioned third proportion value represents the proportion of the logical signal output by the above-mentioned first output end being true when the photon signal is not attacked by the detector control.
[0016] The second calculation module is used to calculate the proportion of attacked signals corresponding to the above-mentioned second output end based on the above-mentioned second proportion value and the fourth proportion value obtained in advance, wherein the above-mentioned fourth proportion value represents the proportion of true logic signals output by the above-mentioned second output end when none of the photon signals are attacked by the detector control.
[0017] The determination module is used to determine the minimum value of the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the first output end and the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the second output end as the target attacked signal ratio.
[0018] The acquisition module is used to perform key compression processing on the acquired initial key based on the above-mentioned target attacked signal ratio to obtain a security key for defending against the detector control attack.
[0019] According to a method and system for defending against detector-controlled attacks provided by the present invention, through a dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector, all received photon signals can be threshold-discriminated in turn to obtain the corresponding first logic signal and second logic signal, and based on the first proportion value and second proportion value of the logic signal being true obtained by statistics, and the third proportion value and fourth proportion value of the logic signal being true obtained when the photon signals are not attacked by the detector control in the test phase, the proportion of attacked signals corresponding to the first output end and the second output end are calculated to determine the proportion of photon signals attacked by the detector control in the quantum key distribution process, that is, the target attacked signal proportion, so that the initial key can be compressed based on the target attacked signal proportion in the confidentiality amplification step to obtain a secure key that can be used to defend against the detector control attack, and the accurate calculation of the amount of information leakage can ensure the security of the key and protect the security of the quantum key distribution system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0020] The above contents and other objects, features and advantages of the present invention will become more apparent through the following description of the embodiments of the present invention with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:
[0021] Figure 1 A diagram showing an application scenario of a method for defending against a detector-controlled attack according to an embodiment of the present invention;
[0022] Figure 2 A flow chart of a method for defending against a detector control attack according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown;
[0023] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the structure of a dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown;
[0024] Figure 4 A flowchart of obtaining a first logic signal and a second logic signal according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown;
[0025] Figure 5 It shows a flow chart of obtaining the proportion of the attacked signal corresponding to the first output terminal according to an embodiment of the present invention;
[0026] Figure 6 A flow chart of obtaining the proportion of attacked signals according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown;
[0027] Figure 7A structural block diagram of a defense system for detector-controlled attacks according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0028] Below, embodiments of the present invention will be described with reference to the accompanying drawings. However, it should be understood that these descriptions are exemplary only and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention. In the following detailed description, for ease of explanation, many specific details are set forth to provide a comprehensive understanding of embodiments of the present invention. However, it is apparent that one or more embodiments may also be implemented without these specific details. In addition, in the following description, descriptions of known structures and technologies are omitted to avoid unnecessary confusion of concepts of the present invention.
[0029] The terms used herein are only for describing specific embodiments and are not intended to limit the present invention. The terms "comprise", "include", etc. used herein indicate the existence of the features, steps, operations and / or components, but do not exclude the existence or addition of one or more other features, steps, operations or components.
[0030] All terms (including technical and scientific terms) used herein have the meanings commonly understood by those skilled in the art unless otherwise defined. It should be noted that the terms used herein should be interpreted as having a meaning consistent with the context of this specification and should not be interpreted in an idealized or overly rigid manner.
[0031] When using expressions such as "at least one of A, B, and C, etc.", they should generally be interpreted according to the meaning of the expression commonly understood by those skilled in the art (for example, "a system having at least one of A, B, and C" should include but is not limited to a system having A alone, B alone, C alone, A and B, A and C, B and C, and / or A, B, C, etc.).
[0032] In the technical solution of the present invention, the user information (including but not limited to user personal information, user image information, user device information, such as location information, etc.) and data (including but not limited to data used for analysis, stored data, displayed data, etc.) involved are all information and data authorized by the user or fully authorized by all parties, and the collection, storage, use, processing, transmission, provision, disclosure and application of the relevant data comply with relevant laws, regulations and standards, take necessary confidentiality measures, do not violate public order and good morals, and provide corresponding operation entrances for users to choose to authorize or refuse.
[0033] In the process of implementing the present invention, it is found that the detector control attack is a general term for a series of attacks and is considered to be the most threatening attack. Practical quantum key distribution systems usually use single-photon avalanche diodes to detect light pulses / single photons. The carriers excited by single photons are very weak, but after avalanche amplification by the single-photon avalanche diode, they can be detected by the threshold, that is, there is an avalanche event after the single-photon avalanche diode, which is called the Geiger mode.
[0034] The detector control attack works by forcing the single-photon avalanche diode to operate in non-Geiger mode, in which the number of carriers is linearly related to the number of absorbed photons. Therefore, the eavesdropper can control the amplitude of the carrier signal by sending light pulses of different intensities. In quantum cryptography, random selection of basis is a prerequisite for security. If the measurement basis is different from the preparation basis, the light intensity is reduced by half. In a detector control attack, the eavesdropper can choose the appropriate intensity so that the detector will only respond if the receiver and the eavesdropper choose the same basis. In other words, the choice of basis is not random, but controlled by the eavesdropper.
[0035] The earliest and most representative detector control attack is the blinding attack. Subsequently, a series of attacks have emerged that force the detector into non-Geiger mode through various means, such as backdoor attacks, laser destruction attacks, and avalanche transition zone attacks. However, there is still a lack of simple and effective defense countermeasures against these attacks.
[0036] The countermeasures in related technologies are mainly based on anomaly detection of system optoelectronic parameters, active perturbation of optical signals for attack detection, or device-independent protocols, but this not only requires additional hardware but also degrades performance. On the other hand, many countermeasures are limited to detecting the existence of attacks and cannot make a good estimate of the amount of information leakage. Some are even only applicable to specific attacks or detector schemes and are ineffective against new attacks.
[0037] Therefore, how to conduct simple and effective defense against detector control attacks is a technical problem that needs to be solved in the prior art.
[0038] To this end, an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for defending against detector control attacks, including: using a dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector to perform threshold discrimination processing on all received photon signals in turn to obtain a first logic signal output by a first output end and a second logic signal output by a second output end corresponding to each photon signal; respectively counting the true proportions of the first logic signal and the second logic signal corresponding to each photon signal to obtain a first proportion value corresponding to the first output end and a second proportion value corresponding to the second output end; calculating the proportion of attacked signals corresponding to the first output end according to the first proportion value and a third proportion value obtained in advance by testing; calculating the proportion of attacked signals corresponding to the second output end according to the second proportion value and a fourth proportion value obtained in advance by testing; determining the minimum value of the attacked signal proportion corresponding to the first output end and the attacked signal proportion corresponding to the second output end as the target attacked signal proportion; and based on the target attacked signal proportion, performing key compression processing on the obtained initial key to obtain a security key for defending against detector control attacks.
[0039] Figure 1 A diagram showing an application scenario of a method for defending against a detector-controlled attack according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown.
[0040] like Figure 1 As shown, the application scenario 100 according to this embodiment may include a dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector 101 and a server 102 .
[0041] A dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector 101 can be used to perform threshold discrimination processing on all received photon signals in turn to obtain a first logic signal output by the first output end and a second logic signal output by the second output end corresponding to each photon signal, wherein the first output end and the second output end are the two output ends of the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector.
[0042] The server 102 may be a server that provides various services. The server 102 may count the true proportions of the first logic signal and the second logic signal corresponding to each photon signal outputted from the first output terminal and the second output terminal of the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector 101, respectively, to obtain a first proportion value corresponding to the first output terminal and a second proportion value corresponding to the second output terminal, so that the proportion of attacked signals corresponding to the first output terminal is calculated based on the first proportion value and the third proportion value obtained in advance, and then the proportion of attacked signals corresponding to the second output terminal is calculated based on the second proportion value and the fourth proportion value obtained in advance, so that the minimum value of the proportion of attacked signals corresponding to the first output terminal and the proportion of attacked signals corresponding to the second output terminal may be determined as the target attacked signal proportion. Finally, based on the target attacked signal proportion, the obtained initial key is subjected to key compression processing to obtain a security key for defending against detector control attacks.
[0043] It should be understood that Figure 1 The number of dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detectors and servers in the embodiment is only for illustration. Any number of dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detectors and servers may be provided according to implementation requirements.
[0044] The following will be based on Figure 1 The scene described by Figure 2~Figure 6 The method for defending against a detector control attack according to an embodiment of the present invention is described in detail.
[0045] Figure 2 A flow chart of a method for defending against a detector-controlled attack according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown.
[0046] like Figure 2 As shown, the method 200 includes operations S210 to S260.
[0047] In operation S210, a dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector is used to perform threshold discrimination processing on all received photon signals in sequence to obtain a first logic signal output by a first output terminal and a second logic signal output by a second output terminal corresponding to each photon signal.
[0048] The first output end and the second output end are two output ends of a dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector.
[0049] According to an embodiment of the present invention, during the quantum key distribution process, the sender will send a photon signal to the receiver, wherein the receiver may include a dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector, and the photon signal may refer to a light pulse, a single photon, etc.
[0050] According to an embodiment of the present invention, during the quantum key distribution process, the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector will receive multiple photon signals, and the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector will perform threshold discrimination processing on all received photon signals in turn to obtain a first logic signal output by the first output end and a second logic signal output by the second output end corresponding to each photon signal.
[0051] In operation S220, the true ratios of the first logic signal and the second logic signal corresponding to each photon signal are counted respectively to obtain a first ratio value corresponding to the first output terminal and a second ratio value corresponding to the second output terminal.
[0052] According to an embodiment of the present invention, after threshold discrimination processing is performed on all received photon signals using a dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector, the proportion of the first logical signal corresponding to each photon signal output by the first output end of the dual-threshold discrimination detector that is true can be counted to obtain a first proportion value; and the proportion of the second logical signal corresponding to each photon signal output by the second output end of the dual-threshold discrimination detector that is true can be counted to obtain a second proportion value.
[0053] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the first ratio value can be represented by the ratio of the number of photon signals for which the first logic signal is true to the number of all photon signals; the second ratio value can be represented by the ratio of the number of photon signals for which the second logic signal is true to the number of all photon signals.
[0054] In operation S230, the ratio of the attacked signal corresponding to the first output terminal is calculated according to the first ratio value and a third ratio value obtained by a pre-test.
[0055] The attacked signal represents the photon signal that is attacked by the detector control, and the third ratio value represents the ratio of the true logic signal output by the first output terminal when the photon signal is not attacked by the detector control.
[0056] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector can detect photon signals that are attacked by the detector control, and can also detect photon signals that have undergone an avalanche event. In the process of pre-testing the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector, a certain number of photon signals that have not been attacked by the detector control can be sent to the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector, thereby obtaining the proportion of the logical signal output by the first output end of the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector that is true, that is, the third proportion value. Among them, the photon signal that has not been attacked by the detector control only has an avalanche event in the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector.
[0057] According to an embodiment of the present invention, for the first output end, the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the first output end can be calculated based on the first ratio value and the third ratio value considering that only an avalanche event exists and no attacked event exists.
[0058] In operation S240, the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the second output terminal is calculated according to the second ratio value and a fourth ratio value obtained by a pre-test.
[0059] The fourth ratio value represents the ratio of the logic signal output by the second output terminal being true when none of the photon signals is attacked by the detector control.
[0060] According to an embodiment of the present invention, during the pre-testing of the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector, a certain number of photon signals that have not been attacked by the detector control can be sent to the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector, thereby obtaining the proportion of the logical signal output by the second output end of the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector that is true, that is, the fourth proportion value.
[0061] According to an embodiment of the present invention, for the second output terminal, the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the second output terminal can be calculated based on the second ratio value and a fourth ratio value considering that only an avalanche event exists and no attacked event exists.
[0062] In operation S250, a minimum value of the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the first output terminal and the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the second output terminal is determined as a target attacked signal ratio.
[0063] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the attacked signal ratio can reflect the amount of information leakage in the quantum key distribution process. The minimum value of the attacked signal ratios corresponding to the first output end and the second output end can be determined as the target attacked signal ratio, so that based on the target attacked signal ratio, the amount of information leakage can be accurately calculated, so that the key leaked due to the attack on the photon signal can be removed based on the target attacked signal ratio.
[0064] In operation S260, based on the target attacked signal ratio, key compression processing is performed on the obtained initial key to obtain a security key for defending against the detector control attack.
[0065] According to an embodiment of the present invention, in the quantum key distribution confidentiality amplification step in the quantum key distribution process, additional key compression can be performed based on the target attacked signal ratio to remove the key leaked in the initial key due to the attack on the photon signal, thereby obtaining a secure key that can be used to defend against detector control attacks, ensuring the security of the key, and further protecting the security of the quantum key distribution system.
[0066] Among them, in the process of quantum key distribution, the initial key is determined based on all the photon signals received.
[0067] According to an embodiment of the present invention, through a dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector, all received photon signals can be threshold discriminated in turn to obtain the corresponding first logic signal and the second logic signal, and based on the first proportion value and the second proportion value of the logic signal being true obtained by statistics, and the third proportion value and the fourth proportion value of the logic signal being true obtained when the photon signals are not attacked by the detector control in the test phase, the proportion of attacked signals corresponding to the first output end and the second output end are calculated to determine the proportion of photon signals attacked by the detector control in this quantum key distribution process, that is, the target attacked signal proportion, so that the initial key can be compressed based on the target attacked signal proportion in the confidentiality amplification step to obtain a secure key that can be used to defend against the detector control attack. Since the accurate calculation of the amount of information leakage is achieved, the security of the key can be ensured and the security of the quantum key distribution system can be protected.
[0068] According to an embodiment of the present invention, a dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector includes a single-photon avalanche diode and a dual-threshold discriminator, the dual-threshold discriminator includes a first comparator, a second comparator and a logic processing unit, the first comparator has a first reference voltage, the second comparator has a second reference voltage, the first reference voltage is twice the second reference voltage, and the two output ends of the logic processing unit correspond to the first output end and the second output end of the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector respectively.
[0069] Figure 3 A schematic structural diagram of a dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown.
[0070] like Figure 3 As shown, a dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector 300 is shown. The dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector 300 may include a single-photon avalanche diode 310 and a dual-threshold discriminator 320.
[0071] According to an embodiment of the present invention, when receiving a photon signal, the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector 300 first uses the single-photon avalanche diode 310 to perform photoelectric detection on the photon signal, and inputs the output signal into the dual-threshold discriminator 320 .
[0072] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the dual threshold discriminator 320 may include a comparator 1, a comparator 2 and a logic processing unit 321, wherein the comparator 1 is a first comparator, the comparator 2 is a second comparator, and the logic processing unit 321 may further include an XOR gate 322.
[0073] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the comparator 1 can set a first reference voltage V H , comparator 2 can set the second reference voltage V L In order to improve the resolution accuracy of the dual threshold discriminator 320 for the signal output by the single photon avalanche diode 310, the first reference voltage V H Set as the second reference voltage V L double.
[0074] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the signals that can be detected by the dual threshold discriminator 320 may include photon signals that are attacked by the detector control and photon signals that have an avalanche event after passing through the single photon avalanche diode 310. The photon signal either has an avalanche event or has been attacked by the detector control, that is, the avalanche event and the detector control attack cannot exist at the same time in the photon signal.
[0075] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the logic processing unit 321 has two output terminals, which respectively correspond to the two output terminals of the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector 300 . Figure 3 The output port 1 shown in the figure is the first output terminal, and the output port 2 is the second output terminal.
[0076] According to an embodiment of the present invention, due to the use of the dual-threshold discriminator 320 in the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector, it is possible to distinguish signals higher than the first reference voltage and the second reference voltage and signals between the first reference voltage and the second reference voltage, so that the logic signal output by the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector is more accurate.
[0077] Figure 4 A flow chart of obtaining a first logic signal and a second logic signal according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown.
[0078] like Figure 4 As shown, the method 400 includes operations S410 to S470.
[0079] In operation S410 , for each photon signal, a single photon avalanche diode is used to perform photoelectric detection on the photon signal to obtain an analog signal.
[0080] According to an embodiment of the present invention, when the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector receives a photon signal, the single-photon avalanche diode 310 is used to perform photoelectric detection on the photon signal to obtain an analog signal.
[0081] According to an embodiment of the present invention, if the photon signal received by the single-photon avalanche diode 310 is attacked by the detector control, there will be no avalanche event after detection by the single-photon avalanche diode 310. If the photon signal received by the single-photon avalanche diode 310 is not attacked by the detector control, there will be an avalanche event after detection by the single-photon avalanche diode 310.
[0082] In operation S420, a first comparator is used to compare the level of the analog signal with the level of the first reference voltage to obtain a first comparison result.
[0083] According to the embodiment of the present invention, the analog signal can enter the comparator 1 and the comparator 2 in the dual threshold discriminator 320 through the signal input port.
[0084] According to an embodiment of the present invention, in the comparator 1, the level of the analog signal is compared with the first reference voltage V H The level is compared to obtain a first comparison result.
[0085] In operation S430 , based on the first comparison result, a third logic signal output by the first comparator is determined.
[0086] According to an embodiment of the present invention, when the first comparison result indicates that the level of the analog signal is higher than the level of the first reference voltage, the third logic signal output by the first comparator is 1, that is, the third logic signal is true.
[0087] According to an embodiment of the present invention, when the first comparison result indicates that the level of the analog signal is lower than the level of the first reference voltage, the third logic signal at the output terminal of the first comparator is 0, that is, the third logic signal is false.
[0088] In operation S440, the level of the analog signal is compared with the level of the second reference voltage by using a second comparator to obtain a second comparison result.
[0089] According to an embodiment of the present invention, in the comparator 2, the level of the analog signal is compared with the second reference voltage V L The level is compared to obtain a second comparison result.
[0090] In operation S450 , based on the second comparison result, a fourth logic signal output by the second comparator is determined.
[0091] According to an embodiment of the present invention, when the second comparison result indicates that the level of the analog signal is higher than the level of the second reference voltage, the fourth logic signal output by the second comparator is 1, that is, the fourth logic signal is true.
[0092] According to an embodiment of the present invention, when the second comparison result indicates that the level of the analog signal is lower than the level of the second reference voltage, the fourth logic signal output by the second comparator is 0, that is, the fourth logic signal is false.
[0093] In operation S460, the third logic signal and the fourth logic signal are compared by using a logic processing unit to obtain a third comparison result.
[0094] According to the embodiment of the present invention, the third logic signal output by the first comparator and the fourth logic signal output by the second comparator are respectively input into the logic processing unit 321 through different input terminals of the logic processing unit 321 .
[0095] According to the embodiment of the present invention, with respect to the fourth logic signal inputted into the logic processing unit 321 by the second comparator, the third logic signal and the fourth logic signal are compared through the XOR gate 322 to obtain a third comparison result.
[0096] In operation S470 , based on the third comparison result, a second logic signal output by the logic processing unit is determined.
[0097] The third logic signal is output as the first logic signal by the logic processing unit, and the third logic signal is the same as the first logic signal.
[0098] According to an embodiment of the present invention, when the third comparison result indicates that the third logic signal and the fourth logic signal are the same, the logic signal output by port 2 of the logic processing unit 321 is 0, that is, the second logic signal output by the second output end of the dual threshold discrimination single photon detector 300 is false.
[0099] According to an embodiment of the present invention, when the third comparison result indicates that the third logic signal and the fourth logic signal are different, the logic signal output by port 2 of the logic processing unit 321 is 1, that is, the second logic signal output by the second output end of the dual threshold discrimination single photon detector 300 is true.
[0100] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the logic signal output by port 1 of the logic processing unit 321 is the same as the third logic signal output by the first comparator, that is, the first logic signal output by the first output end of the dual threshold discrimination single photon detector 300 is the same as the third logic signal.
[0101] According to an embodiment of the present invention, after the photon signal is processed by single-photon avalanche diode photodetection, the analog signal is compared with the levels of the first reference voltage and the second reference voltage in the dual-threshold discriminator 320, and a corresponding logic signal is output for subsequent calculation of the proportion of the attacked signal. Due to the use of the dual-threshold discriminator, the output logic signal is more accurate, thereby improving the calculation accuracy of the proportion of the attacked signal.
[0102] According to an embodiment of the present invention, a third ratio value and a fourth ratio value are obtained by pre-testing, including: using a dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector to perform threshold discrimination processing on photon signals that have not been attacked by the detector control, and obtaining a fifth logic signal output by the first output terminal and a sixth logic signal output by the second output terminal corresponding to each photon signal that has not been attacked by the detector control; counting the proportion of the fifth logic signal corresponding to each photon signal that has not been attacked by the detector control that is true, and obtaining the third ratio value corresponding to the first output terminal; counting the proportion of the sixth logic signal corresponding to each photon signal that has not been attacked by the detector control that is true, and obtaining the fourth ratio value corresponding to the second output terminal.
[0103] According to an embodiment of the present invention, during the pre-test of the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector, a certain number of photon signals that have not been attacked by the detector control can be sent to the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector 300. Using the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector 300, the photon signals that have not been attacked by the detector control are subjected to threshold discrimination processing, and a fifth logic signal outputted by the first output terminal and a sixth logic signal outputted by the second output terminal corresponding to each photon signal that has not been attacked by the detector control can be obtained. The operation of the threshold discrimination processing is the same as the above-mentioned operation S410 to operation S470.
[0104] According to an embodiment of the present invention, after using the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector 300 to perform threshold discrimination processing on all photon signals that have not been attacked by the detector control, the proportion of the fifth logic signal corresponding to each photon signal that has not been attacked by the detector control and outputted from the first output end of the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector that is true is counted to obtain a third proportion value; the proportion of the sixth logic signal corresponding to each photon signal that has not been attacked by the detector control and outputted from the second output end of the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector that is true is counted to obtain a fourth proportion value.
[0105] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the third proportional value can be represented by the ratio of the number of photon signals that have not been attacked by detector control and whose fifth logic signal is true to the number of all photon signals that have not been attacked by detector control; the fourth proportional value can be represented by the ratio of the number of photon signals that have not been attacked by detector control and whose sixth logic signal is true to the number of all photon signals that have not been attacked by detector control.
[0106] According to an embodiment of the present invention, in the calculation of the proportion of attacked signals in subsequent multiple quantum key distribution processes, the third proportion value and the fourth proportion value obtained by pre-testing can be equivalent to fixed values. New third proportion values and fourth proportion values can also be obtained by re-testing as needed.
[0107] According to an embodiment of the present invention, in the process of quantum key distribution, the dual-threshold discriminator 320 detects a photon signal that is attacked by the detector control or a photon signal that has an avalanche event after passing through a single-photon avalanche diode. Therefore, a third proportional value and a fourth proportional value of the logical signals output by the two output ends of the dual-threshold discriminator single-photon detector are pre-tested to be true when only an avalanche event exists and there is no detector-controlled attack, so that the third proportional value and the fourth proportional value are used in the subsequent calculation of the proportion of the attacked signal, so that the calculated proportion of the attacked signal is more accurate.
[0108] Figure 5 A flow chart of obtaining the proportion of the attacked signal corresponding to the first output terminal according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown.
[0109] like Figure 5 As shown, the method 500 includes operations S510 to S540.
[0110] In operation S510, a first expected value upper bound and a first expected value lower bound corresponding to a first output terminal are calculated according to the first ratio value and the number of photon signals.
[0111] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the upper bound of the expected value It can be calculated by the following formula (1).
[0112] (1)
[0113] Among them, x can be expressed as the ratio value obtained by actual statistics; n can be expressed as the number of photon signals received by the double-threshold discrimination single-photon detector in a certain quantum key distribution process; Expressed as the probability of failure, usually 10 -10 ,and Can be set as needed.
[0114] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the expected value lower bound It can be calculated by the following formula (2).
[0115] (2)
[0116] in, Also expressed as the failure probability, and The value of can be set as needed, that is, and The value of can be set to be the same or different.
[0117] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the first ratio value is substituted into x in formula (1), and the number of photon signals is substituted into n in formula (1), so that the first upper bound of the expected value corresponding to the first output end can be calculated: .
[0118] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the first ratio value is substituted into x in formula (2), and the number of photon signals is substituted into n in formula (2), so that the first expected value lower bound corresponding to the first output end can be calculated: .
[0119] In operation S520, a second expected value upper bound and a second expected value lower bound corresponding to the first output terminal are calculated according to the third ratio value and the number of photon signals that are not attacked by the detector control.
[0120] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the third ratio value is substituted into x in formula (1), and the number of photon signals that are not attacked by the detector control is substituted into n in formula (1), so that the upper bound of the second expected value corresponding to the first output end can be calculated. .
[0121] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the third ratio value is substituted into x in formula (2), and the number of photon signals that are not attacked by the detector control is substituted into n in formula (2), so that the lower bound of the second expected value corresponding to the first output end can be calculated. .
[0122] The second expected value upper bound and the second expected value lower bound may be fixed values in the calculation of the proportion of attacked signals in subsequent multiple quantum key distribution processes, or may be obtained by subsequent retesting as needed.
[0123] In operation S530, the fifth proportional value corresponding to the first output terminal is compared with the second expected value upper bound and the second expected value lower bound respectively to obtain a fourth comparison result.
[0124] The fifth ratio value represents the ratio of the logic signal output by the first output terminal being true when all photon signals are attacked by the detector control.
[0125] According to an embodiment of the present invention, a certain number of photon signals that are attacked by detector control are sent to a dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector so that the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector performs threshold discrimination processing on the photon signals that are attacked by detector control, that is, performs the same operations as the above-mentioned operations S410 to S470 to obtain the logic signal output by the first output terminal, and obtains the fifth ratio value based on the statistical proportion of the logic signal output by the first output terminal that is true.
[0126] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the second expected value upper limit may be and the second expected value lower bound Respectively with the fifth ratio value A comparison is performed to obtain a fourth comparison result.
[0127] In operation S540, when the fourth comparison result indicates that the fifth ratio value is greater than the second expected value upper bound, the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the first output terminal is calculated according to the first expected value upper bound, the second expected value lower bound and the fifth ratio value.
[0128] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the fourth comparison result represents the fifth ratio value Greater than the second expected value upper bound In the case of , the proportion of the attacked signal corresponding to the first output end can be calculated by the following formula (3): .
[0129] (3)
[0130] According to an embodiment of the present invention, through the above formula (3), the first expected value upper bound can be , the second lower bound of expected value and the fifth ratio value , calculate the proportion of the attacked signal corresponding to the first output end .
[0131] According to an embodiment of the present invention, for the proportion of attacked signals corresponding to the first output end, since the dual-threshold discriminator can detect photon signals that are attacked by detector control or photon signals that have an avalanche event after passing through a single-photon avalanche diode, the third proportion value obtained when only an avalanche event exists but no detector control attack is carried out, and the fifth proportion value obtained when only an detector control attack is carried out but no avalanche event exists, are involved in the calculation of the proportion of attacked signals, thereby improving the calculation accuracy of the proportion of attacked signals, achieving accurate calculation of the amount of information leakage, and protecting the security of the quantum key distribution system.
[0132] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the above-mentioned detector-controlled attack defense method also includes: when the fourth comparison result indicates that the fifth ratio value is less than the second expected value lower limit, the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the first output end is calculated based on the first expected value lower limit, the second expected value upper limit and the fifth ratio value.
[0133] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the fourth comparison result represents the fifth ratio value Less than the second expected value lower bound In the case of , the proportion of the attacked signal corresponding to the first output end can be calculated by the following formula (4): .
[0134] (4)
[0135] According to an embodiment of the present invention, through the above formula (3), the first expected value lower bound can be , the second upper bound of the expected value and the fifth ratio value , calculate the proportion of the attacked signal corresponding to the first output end .
[0136] According to an embodiment of the present invention, when the fifth ratio value is greater than the upper limit of the second expected value, the ratio of the attacked signal corresponding to the first output terminal can be calculated by the above formula (3); when the fifth ratio value is less than the lower limit of the second expected value, the ratio of the attacked signal corresponding to the first output terminal can be calculated by the above formula (4). Under normal circumstances, the fifth ratio value is either greater than the upper limit of the second expected value or less than the lower limit of the second expected value. If the fifth ratio value is greater than the lower limit of the second expected value and less than the upper limit of the second expected value, the ratio of the attacked signal corresponding to the first output terminal cannot be calculated by the fifth ratio value.
[0137] According to an embodiment of the present invention, based on the fifth ratio value and the second upper bound of the expected value and the second expected value lower bound The size relationship between them is used to determine the formula for calculating the proportion of attacked signals corresponding to the first output terminal, so that the third proportion value obtained when only an avalanche event occurs but the detector is not attacked under control, and the fifth proportion value obtained when only the detector is attacked under control but there is no avalanche event, can be better involved in the calculation of the proportion of attacked signals, so as to improve the calculation accuracy of the proportion of attacked signals.
[0138] Figure 6 A flow chart of obtaining the proportion of attacked signals according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown.
[0139] like Figure 6 As shown, the method 600 includes operations S610 to S640.
[0140] In operation S610, a third expected value upper bound and a third expected value lower bound corresponding to the second output terminal are calculated according to the second ratio value and the number of photon signals.
[0141] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the second ratio value is substituted into x in formula (1), and the number of photon signals is substituted into n in formula (1), so that the third upper limit of the expected value corresponding to the second output end can be calculated: .
[0142] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the second ratio value is substituted into x in formula (2), and the number of photon signals is substituted into n in formula (2), so that the third expected value lower bound corresponding to the second output end can be calculated: .
[0143] In operation S620, a fourth expected value upper bound and a fourth expected value lower bound corresponding to the second output terminal are calculated according to the fourth ratio value and the number of photon signals that are not attacked by the detector control.
[0144] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the fourth ratio value is substituted into x in formula (1), and the number of photon signals that are not attacked by the detector control is substituted into n in formula (1), so that the fourth upper limit of the expected value corresponding to the second output end can be calculated. .
[0145] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the fourth ratio value is substituted into x in formula (2), and the number of photon signals that are not attacked by the detector control is substituted into n in formula (2), so that the fourth expected value lower bound corresponding to the second output end can be calculated. .
[0146] Among them, the fourth expected value upper bound and the fourth expected value lower bound can be fixed values in the calculation of the proportion of attacked signals in subsequent multiple quantum key distribution processes, and can also be obtained by retesting as needed in the subsequent process.
[0147] In operation S630, the sixth proportional value corresponding to the second output terminal is compared with the fourth expected value upper bound and the fourth expected value lower bound respectively to obtain a fifth comparison result.
[0148] The sixth ratio value represents the ratio of the logic signal output by the second output terminal being true when all photon signals are attacked by the detector control.
[0149] According to an embodiment of the present invention, a certain number of photon signals that are attacked by detector control are sent to a dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector so that the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector performs threshold discrimination processing on the photon signals that are attacked by detector control, that is, performs the same operations as the above-mentioned operations S410 to S470 to obtain the logic signal output by the second output terminal, and obtains a sixth ratio value based on the statistical proportion of the logic signal output by the second output terminal that is true.
[0150] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the fourth expected value upper limit can be and the fourth expected value lower bound Respectively with the sixth ratio value A comparison is performed to obtain a fifth comparison result.
[0151] In operation S640, when the fifth comparison result indicates that the sixth ratio value is greater than the fourth expected value upper bound, the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the second output terminal is calculated according to the third expected value upper bound, the fourth expected value lower bound and the sixth ratio value.
[0152] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the fifth comparison result represents the sixth ratio value Greater than the fourth expected value upper bound In the case of , the proportion of the attacked signal corresponding to the second output terminal can be calculated by the following formula (5): .
[0153] (5)
[0154] According to an embodiment of the present invention, through the above formula (5), the third expected value upper bound can be , the fourth expected value lower bound and the sixth ratio value , calculate the proportion of the attacked signal corresponding to the second output end .
[0155] In the case where the attack is controlled only by the detector and there is no avalanche event, the ratio of the logical signals output by the first output terminal and the second output terminal being true is obtained by statistics, that is, the fifth ratio value and the sixth ratio value , after multiple tests and verifications, the fifth ratio value and the sixth ratio value The same, that is .
[0156] According to an embodiment of the present invention, for the proportion of attacked signals corresponding to the second output end, since the dual-threshold discriminator can detect photon signals that are attacked by detector control or photon signals that have an avalanche event after passing through a single-photon avalanche diode, the fourth proportion value obtained when only an avalanche event exists but no detector control attack is carried out, and the sixth proportion value obtained when only an detector control attack is carried out but no avalanche event exists, are involved in the calculation of the proportion of attacked signals, thereby improving the calculation accuracy of the proportion of attacked signals, achieving accurate calculation of the amount of information leakage, and protecting the security of the quantum key distribution system.
[0157] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the above-mentioned detector-controlled attack defense method also includes: when the fifth comparison result indicates that the sixth ratio value is less than the fourth expected value lower limit, the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the second output end is calculated based on the third expected value lower limit, the fourth expected value upper limit and the sixth ratio value.
[0158] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the fifth comparison result represents the sixth ratio value Less than the fourth expected value lower bound In the case of , the proportion of the attacked signal corresponding to the second output terminal can be calculated by the following formula (6): .
[0159] (6)
[0160] According to an embodiment of the present invention, through the above formula (6), the third expected value lower bound can be , the fourth upper bound of the expected value and the sixth ratio value , calculate the proportion of the attacked signal corresponding to the second output end .
[0161] According to an embodiment of the present invention, when the sixth ratio value is greater than the fourth expected value upper limit, the ratio of the attacked signal corresponding to the second output terminal can be calculated by the above formula (5); when the sixth ratio value is less than the fourth expected value lower limit, the ratio of the attacked signal corresponding to the second output terminal can be calculated by the above formula (6). Under normal circumstances, the sixth ratio value is either greater than the fourth expected value upper limit or less than the fourth expected value lower limit. If the sixth ratio value is greater than the fourth expected value lower limit and less than the fourth expected value upper limit, the ratio of the attacked signal corresponding to the second output terminal cannot be calculated by the sixth ratio value.
[0162] According to an embodiment of the present invention, based on the sixth ratio value And the fourth upper bound of the expected value and the fourth expected value lower bound The size relationship between them is used to determine the formula for calculating the proportion of the attacked signal corresponding to the second output terminal, so that the fourth proportion value obtained when only an avalanche event occurs but the detector is not controlled to attack, and the sixth proportion value obtained when only the detector is controlled to attack but there is no avalanche event, can be better involved in the calculation of the proportion of the attacked signal, so as to improve the calculation accuracy of the proportion of the attacked signal.
[0163] According to the embodiment of the present invention, the ratio of the attacked signal corresponding to the first output terminal can be calculated by using the above formulas (1) to (6): and the ratio of the attacked signal corresponding to the second output terminal The target attack signal ratio can be determined by the following formula (7): .
[0164] (7)
[0165] in, The value can be 1 and 2. When the value is 1, it indicates the proportion of the attacked signal corresponding to the first output end. and the ratio of the attacked signal corresponding to the second output terminal The proportion of attacked signals Minimum, that is, the proportion of the target being attacked That is ;exist When the value is 2, it indicates the proportion of the attacked signal corresponding to the first output end and the ratio of the attacked signal corresponding to the second output terminal The proportion of attacked signals Minimum, that is, the proportion of the target being attacked That is .
[0166] According to an embodiment of the present invention, based on the proportion of target attacked signals, key compression processing is performed on the obtained initial key to obtain a security key for defending against detector control attacks, including: determining the compression ratio according to the proportion of target attacked signals; and performing key compression processing on the initial key according to the compression ratio to obtain a security key.
[0167] According to an embodiment of the present invention, when the target attacked signal ratio is calculated, in the confidentiality amplification step in the quantum key distribution process, the compression ratio can be determined according to the target attacked signal ratio and the ratio required by the original confidentiality amplification step, so that the initial key can be compressed according to the compression ratio to obtain a secure key.
[0168] For example, if the proportion of the target attacked signal is 10%, and the proportion required in the original confidentiality amplification step is 20%, then the compression ratio can be 30%.
[0169] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the initial key is compressed using a compression ratio determined by the ratio of the target attacked signal to remove the key leaked due to the detector-controlled attack on the photon signal, thereby ensuring the key security and the security of the quantum key distribution system.
[0170] Based on the above-mentioned detector control attack defense method, the present invention also provides a detector control attack defense system. Figure 7 The system is described in detail.
[0171] Figure 7 A structural block diagram of a defense system for detector-controlled attacks according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown.
[0172] like Figure 7As shown, the detector-controlled attack defense system 700 of this embodiment includes a dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector 101 and a detector-controlled attack defense device 710 .
[0173] The dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector 101 is used to perform threshold discrimination processing on all received photon signals in sequence, and obtain a first logic signal output by a first output terminal and a second logic signal output by a second output terminal corresponding to each of the photon signals, wherein the first output terminal and the second output terminal are two output terminals of the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector. In one embodiment, the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector 101 can be used to perform the operation S210 described above, which will not be described in detail here.
[0174] like Figure 7 As shown, the detector-controlled attack defense device 710 includes a statistical module 711 , a first calculation module 712 , a second calculation module 713 , a determination module 714 and an acquisition module 715 .
[0175] The statistical module 711 is used to respectively count the true proportions of the first logic signal and the second logic signal corresponding to each of the photon signals, and obtain a first proportion value corresponding to the first output terminal and a second proportion value corresponding to the second output terminal. In one embodiment, the statistical module 711 can be used to perform the operation S220 described above, which will not be repeated here.
[0176] The first calculation module 712 is used to calculate the proportion of attacked signals corresponding to the first output end according to the first proportion value and the third proportion value obtained in advance, wherein the attacked signal represents the photon signal attacked by the detector control, and the third proportion value represents the proportion of the logical signal output by the first output end being true when the photon signal is not attacked by the detector control. In one embodiment, the first calculation module 712 can be used to perform the operation S230 described above, which will not be repeated here.
[0177] The second calculation module 713 is used to calculate the proportion of attacked signals corresponding to the second output end according to the second proportion value and a fourth proportion value obtained in advance, wherein the fourth proportion value represents the proportion of true logic signals output by the second output end when none of the photon signals are attacked by the detector control. In one embodiment, the second calculation module 713 can be used to perform the operation S240 described above, which will not be described in detail here.
[0178] The determination module 714 is used to determine the minimum value of the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the first output terminal and the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the second output terminal as the target attacked signal ratio. In one embodiment, the determination module 714 can be used to perform the operation S250 described above, which will not be repeated here.
[0179] The acquisition module 715 is used to perform key compression processing on the acquired initial key based on the target attacked signal ratio to obtain a security key for defending against the detector control attack. In one embodiment, the acquisition module 715 can be used to perform the operation S260 described above, which will not be repeated here.
[0180] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the first calculation module 712 includes a first calculation unit, a second calculation unit, a first comparison unit and a third calculation unit.
[0181] The first calculation unit is used to calculate a first expected value upper bound and a first expected value lower bound corresponding to the first output end according to the first ratio value and the number of the photon signals.
[0182] The second calculation unit is used to calculate a second expected value upper bound and a second expected value lower bound corresponding to the first output end according to the third ratio value and the number of photon signals that are not attacked by the detector control.
[0183] The first comparison unit is used to compare the fifth ratio value corresponding to the first output end with the second expected value upper limit and the second expected value lower limit respectively, to obtain a fourth comparison result, wherein the fifth ratio value represents the proportion of the logical signal output by the first output end being true when all photon signals are attacked by the detector control.
[0184] A third calculation unit is used to calculate the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the first output end according to the first expected value upper bound, the second expected value lower bound and the fifth ratio value when the fourth comparison result indicates that the fifth ratio value is greater than the second expected value upper bound.
[0185] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the first calculation module 712 further includes a fourth calculation unit.
[0186] The fourth calculation unit is used to calculate the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the first output end according to the first expected value lower bound, the second expected value upper bound and the fifth ratio value when the fourth comparison result indicates that the fifth ratio value is less than the second expected value lower bound.
[0187] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the second calculation module 713 includes a fifth calculation unit, a sixth calculation unit, a second comparison unit and a seventh calculation unit.
[0188] A fifth calculation unit is used to calculate a third expected value upper bound and a third expected value lower bound corresponding to the second output end according to the second ratio value and the number of the photon signals.
[0189] The sixth calculation unit is used to calculate a fourth expected value upper bound and a fourth expected value lower bound corresponding to the second output end according to the fourth ratio value and the number of photon signals that are not attacked by the detector control.
[0190] The second comparison unit is used to compare the sixth proportional value corresponding to the second output end with the fourth expected value upper limit and the fourth expected value lower limit respectively, to obtain a fifth comparison result, wherein the sixth proportional value represents the proportion of the logical signal output by the second output end being true when all photon signals are attacked by the detector control.
[0191] The seventh calculation unit is used to calculate the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the second output end according to the third expected value upper bound, the fourth expected value lower bound and the sixth ratio value when the fifth comparison result indicates that the sixth ratio value is greater than the fourth expected value upper bound.
[0192] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the second calculation module 713 further includes an eighth calculation unit.
[0193] an eighth calculation unit, for calculating, when the fifth comparison result indicates that the sixth ratio value is less than the fourth expected value lower limit, the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the second output end according to the third expected value lower limit, the fourth expected value upper limit and the sixth ratio value.
[0194] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the obtaining module 715 includes a determining unit and an obtaining unit.
[0195] The determination unit is used to determine the compression ratio according to the ratio of the target attacked signal.
[0196] The obtaining unit is used to perform key compression processing on the initial key according to the compression ratio to obtain the security key.
[0197] According to an embodiment of the present invention, any multiple modules among the statistical module 711, the first calculation module 712, the second calculation module 713, the determination module 714 and the acquisition module 715 can be combined into one module for implementation, or any one of the modules can be split into multiple modules. Alternatively, at least part of the functions of one or more of these modules can be combined with at least part of the functions of other modules and implemented in one module. According to an embodiment of the present invention, at least one of the statistical module 711, the first calculation module 712, the second calculation module 713, the determination module 714 and the acquisition module 715 can be at least partially implemented as a hardware circuit, such as a field programmable gate array (FPGA), a programmable logic array (PLA), a system on a chip, a system on a substrate, a system on a package, an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or can be implemented by hardware or firmware such as any other reasonable way of integrating or packaging the circuit, or implemented in any one of the three implementation methods of software, hardware and firmware or in a proper combination of any of them. Alternatively, at least one of the statistical module 711, the first calculation module 712, the second calculation module 713, the determination module 714 and the acquisition module 715 may be at least partially implemented as a computer program module, which may perform a corresponding function when executed.
[0198] It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that the features described in the various embodiments of the present invention may be combined and / or combined in various ways, even if such combinations or combinations are not explicitly described in the present invention. In particular, without departing from the spirit and teachings of the present invention, the features described in the various embodiments of the present invention may be combined and / or combined in various ways. All of these combinations and / or combinations fall within the scope of the present invention.
[0199] The embodiments of the present invention are described above. However, these embodiments are only for the purpose of illustration, and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention. Although each embodiment is described above, it does not mean that the measures in each embodiment cannot be used in combination advantageously. Without departing from the scope of the present invention, those skilled in the art may make various substitutions and modifications, which should all fall within the scope of the present invention.
Claims
1. A defense method against detector control attacks, It is characterized in that include: Using a dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector, threshold discrimination processing is performed on all received photon signals in sequence to obtain a first logic signal output by a first output end and a second logic signal output by a second output end corresponding to each of the photon signals, wherein the first output end and the second output end are two output ends of the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector; Respectively counting the true ratios of the first logic signal and the second logic signal corresponding to each of the photon signals, to obtain a first ratio value corresponding to the first output end and a second ratio value corresponding to the second output end; The proportion of attacked signals corresponding to the first output terminal is calculated according to the first proportion value and a third proportion value obtained in advance, wherein the attacked signal represents a photon signal attacked by the detector control, and the third proportion value represents a proportion of true logic signals output by the first output terminal when none of the photon signals are attacked by the detector control; The proportion of attacked signals corresponding to the second output end is calculated according to the second proportion value and a fourth proportion value obtained by a pre-test, wherein the fourth proportion value represents the proportion of true logic signals output by the second output end when none of the photon signals are attacked by the detector control; Determine a minimum value of the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the first output end and the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the second output end as a target attacked signal ratio; Based on the proportion of the target attacked signal, the obtained initial key is subjected to key compression processing to obtain a security key for defending against the detector control attack.
2. The method according to claim 1, It is characterized in that The dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector includes a single-photon avalanche diode and a dual-threshold discriminator. The dual-threshold discriminator includes a first comparator, a second comparator and a logic processing unit. The first comparator has a first reference voltage, the second comparator has a second reference voltage, the first reference voltage is twice the second reference voltage, and the two output ends of the logic processing unit correspond to the first output end and the second output end of the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector respectively.
3. The method according to claim 2, It is characterized in that The dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector is used to perform threshold discrimination processing on all received photon signals in sequence to obtain a first logic signal output by the first output terminal and a second logic signal output by the second output terminal corresponding to each of the photon signals, including: For each of the photon signals, use the single photon avalanche diode to perform photoelectric detection on the photon signal to obtain an analog signal; Using the first comparator, comparing the level of the analog signal with the level of the first reference voltage to obtain a first comparison result; Based on the first comparison result, determining a third logic signal output by the first comparator; using the second comparator to compare the level of the analog signal with the level of the second reference voltage to obtain a second comparison result; Based on the second comparison result, determining a fourth logic signal output by the second comparator; using the logic processing unit to compare the third logic signal with the fourth logic signal to obtain a third comparison result; and Based on the third comparison result, a second logic signal output by the logic processing unit is determined, wherein the third logic signal is output as the first logic signal by the logic processing unit, and the third logic signal is the same as the first logic signal.
4. The method according to claim 1, It is characterized in that Preliminary testing to obtain the third ratio value and the fourth ratio value includes: Using the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector, threshold discrimination processing is performed on photon signals that have not been attacked by the detector control, so as to obtain a fifth logic signal output by the first output end and a sixth logic signal output by the second output end corresponding to each photon signal that has not been attacked by the detector control; Counting the proportion of the fifth logic signal corresponding to each photon signal that has not been attacked by the detector control being true, to obtain a third proportion value corresponding to the first output end; The proportion of the sixth logic signal corresponding to each photon signal that has not been attacked by the detector control being true is counted to obtain a fourth proportion value corresponding to the second output end.
5. The method according to claim 4, It is characterized in that The step of calculating the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the first output terminal according to the first ratio value and a third ratio value obtained in advance through a test comprises: Calculate a first expected value upper bound and a first expected value lower bound corresponding to the first output end according to the first ratio value and the number of the photon signals; Calculate a second expected value upper bound and a second expected value lower bound corresponding to the first output end according to the third ratio value and the number of the photon signals that are not attacked by the detector control; Comparing the fifth ratio value corresponding to the first output end with the second expected value upper bound and the second expected value lower bound respectively, to obtain a fourth comparison result, wherein the fifth ratio value represents the ratio of the logic signal output by the first output end being true when all photon signals are attacked by the detector control; When the fourth comparison result indicates that the fifth ratio value is greater than the second expected value upper limit, the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the first output end is calculated according to the first expected value upper limit, the second expected value lower limit and the fifth ratio value.
6. The method according to claim 5, It is characterized in that Also includes: When the fourth comparison result indicates that the fifth ratio value is less than the second expected value lower bound, the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the first output end is calculated according to the first expected value lower bound, the second expected value upper bound and the fifth ratio value.
7. The method according to claim 4, It is characterized in that The step of calculating the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the second output terminal according to the second ratio value and a fourth ratio value obtained in advance through a test comprises: Calculate a third expected value upper bound and a third expected value lower bound corresponding to the second output end according to the second ratio value and the number of the photon signals; Calculate a fourth expected value upper bound and a fourth expected value lower bound corresponding to the second output end according to the fourth ratio value and the number of photon signals that are not attacked by the detector control; Comparing the sixth ratio value corresponding to the second output end with the fourth expected value upper bound and the fourth expected value lower bound respectively, to obtain a fifth comparison result, wherein the sixth ratio value represents the ratio of the logic signal output by the second output end being true when all photon signals are attacked by the detector control; When the fifth comparison result indicates that the sixth ratio value is greater than the fourth expected value upper limit, the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the second output end is calculated according to the third expected value upper limit, the fourth expected value lower limit and the sixth ratio value.
8. The method according to claim 7, It is characterized in that Also includes: When the fifth comparison result indicates that the sixth ratio value is less than the fourth expected value lower bound, the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the second output end is calculated according to the third expected value lower bound, the fourth expected value upper bound and the sixth ratio value.
9. The method according to claim 1, It is characterized in that The method of performing key compression processing on the acquired initial key based on the target attacked signal ratio to obtain a security key for defending against the detector control attack includes: Determining a compression ratio according to the ratio of the target attacked signals; The initial key is compressed according to the compression ratio to obtain the security key.
10. A defense system against detector-controlled attacks, It is characterized in that include: A dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector, used for sequentially performing threshold discrimination processing on all received photon signals to obtain a first logic signal output by a first output end and a second logic signal output by a second output end corresponding to each of the photon signals, wherein the first output end and the second output end are two output ends of the dual-threshold discrimination single-photon detector; A statistical module, used for respectively counting the true proportions of the first logic signal and the second logic signal corresponding to each of the photon signals, to obtain a first proportion value corresponding to the first output end and a second proportion value corresponding to the second output end; A first calculation module, configured to calculate the proportion of attacked signals corresponding to the first output end according to the first proportion value and a third proportion value obtained in advance by a test, wherein the attacked signal represents a photon signal attacked by the detector control, and the third proportion value represents a proportion of true logic signals output by the first output end when none of the photon signals are attacked by the detector control; a second calculation module, configured to calculate the proportion of attacked signals corresponding to the second output end according to the second proportion value and a fourth proportion value obtained by a pre-test, wherein the fourth proportion value represents the proportion of true logic signals output by the second output end when none of the photon signals are attacked by the detector control; a determination module, configured to determine a minimum value of the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the first output end and the attacked signal ratio corresponding to the second output end as a target attacked signal ratio; The acquisition module is used to perform key compression processing on the acquired initial key based on the proportion of the target attacked signal to obtain a security key for defending against the detector control attack.
