Low-carbon integrated energy system mixed game operation method based on dynamic multi-energy pricing

By adopting a multi-subject hybrid game framework and dynamic pricing model based on carbon emission flow in an integrated energy system, combined with the Nash-Harsanyi interest distribution method, the problem of mining carbon reduction potential and maximizing global interests of the energy system under the low-carbon requirements is solved. , achieving improved resource utilization efficiency and reduced carbon emissions.

CN118967189APending Publication Date: 2024-11-15TIANJIN UNIV
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411016160.5
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-07-27
Publication Date
2024-11-15

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing technology is difficult to effectively utilize the carbon reduction potential of the integrated energy system under the requirements of low carbon, and the existing cooperative game allocation method cannot guarantee the maximization of global benefits, and fails to fully consider the potential of demand-side carbon emission reduction and multiple production and consumption. the possibility of cooperation among the parties.

Method used

Adopt a multi-subject hybrid game framework based on carbon emission flow to establish a multi-subject multi-energy dynamic pricing model that considers carbon emission reduction, formulate a decision model for each stakeholder through a dynamic pricing model, and propose a Nash-Harsanyi interest distribution method to ensure production and consumption maximize the benefits of cooperation among the parties.

Benefits of technology

Through dynamic multi-energy pricing methods, the resource utilization efficiency and economy of the comprehensive energy system are improved, carbon emissions are reduced, and more comprehensive carbon emission reduction effects and fairness in the distribution of benefits are achieved.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention provides a low-carbon integrated energy system mixed game operation method based on dynamic multi-energy pricing, and relates to the field of integrated energy system optimized operation, and the method specifically comprises the steps: constructing a multi-body mixed game framework based on a carbon emission flow, the mixed game framework is composed of a master-slave game of a comprehensive energy service provider and a plurality of animators and a cooperative game between multiple animators, and the multiple subjects are composed of the comprehensive energy service provider and the multiple animators; establishing a multi-subject multi-energy dynamic pricing model considering carbon emission reduction; based on the multi-energy dynamic pricing model, establishing a decision-making model of a comprehensive energy service provider and a producer; and proposing a benefit distribution method of a Nish-Harsanyi cooperative game considering the contribution of carbon emission reduction for the producer and the consumer. The economical efficiency and the low-carbon property of the comprehensive energy system can be improved.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of optimized operation of integrated energy systems, and in particular to a hybrid game operation method of a low-carbon integrated energy system based on dynamic multi-energy pricing. Background Art

[0002] In an integrated energy system, the demands of various energy users vary significantly, and the demands vary in size, making it difficult for a large number of small-scale entities to conduct direct transactions with large energy suppliers. Multiple producers and consumers in an integrated energy system can be integrated and operated by integrated energy service providers, and conflicts of interest between different market entities can be handled through game theory.

[0003] Research on energy trading often focuses on a single energy pricing strategy, changing the user-side energy consumption strategy to reduce operating costs. Research on an integrated energy system pricing method that integrates energy prices and carbon emission factors to stimulate user-side participation in carbon emission reduction still needs to be deepened.

[0004] In addition, under the low-carbon requirements, integrated energy systems usually introduce carbon emissions as part of the model objective function or as a constraint to achieve emission reduction effects. At present, all studies only consider the source side, based on the idea that demand generates supply. Measuring demand-side carbon emissions and tapping the carbon emission reduction potential of producers and consumers are urgent issues to be solved.

[0005] Energy users have a large carbon reduction capacity, but the current emission reduction strategy is mainly aimed at large users who meet the carbon market access threshold. There is also the possibility of cooperation between multiple producers and consumers, and their cooperation can improve energy utilization and reduce carbon emissions. Most of the current cooperative game allocation methods only consider marginal contributions to distribute benefits, which cannot guarantee the maximization of overall benefits and do not take into account the contribution of each subject to carbon emission reduction.

[0006] To sum up, in the existing technology, it is necessary to provide a hybrid game operation method for a low-carbon integrated energy system with dynamic multi-energy pricing, so that the integrated energy system can better adapt to the operating characteristics under low-carbon requirements, and then tap the carbon reduction potential of the integrated energy system, give full play to the resource utilization efficiency, and improve the economy and low carbon of the operation. Summary of the invention

[0007] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a hybrid game operation method for a low-carbon integrated energy system with dynamic multi-energy pricing, so as to further tap the carbon reduction potential of the integrated energy system, give full play to the resource utilization efficiency, and improve the economy and low carbon of the operation.

[0008] A hybrid game operation method for a low-carbon integrated energy system based on dynamic multi-energy pricing, comprising:

[0009] S1 constructs a multi-agent hybrid game framework based on carbon emission flow, which consists of a master-slave game between an integrated energy service provider and multiple prosumers, and a cooperative game between multiple prosumers. The multi-agents consist of an integrated energy service provider and multiple prosumers.

[0010] S2 establishes a multi-agent and multi-energy dynamic pricing model considering carbon emission reduction;

[0011] S3 builds decision-making models for various stakeholders, including integrated energy service providers and prosumers, based on the dynamic pricing model;

[0012] S4 proposes the Nash-Harsanyi benefit allocation method for the cooperative game between producers and consumers considering their contribution to carbon emission reduction.

[0013] Moreover, the multi-agent hybrid game framework based on carbon emission flow described in S1:

[0014] The multiple entities are integrated energy service providers and multiple prosumers. The integrated energy service providers and prosumers formulate trading strategies based on their own interests and environmental benefits, optimize internal operating conditions, and meet diversified load demands.

[0015] The hybrid game can be divided into two stages. The first stage is a master-slave game between the upper-level integrated energy service provider and multiple producers and consumers. The integrated energy service provider pursues its own maximum benefit and is the coordinator and leader in the multi-agent game process. The producers and consumers are followers in the game process. The integrated energy service provider adjusts the energy price according to the energy purchase and sale demand feedback from the producers and consumers and passes it to the lower level. The second stage is the cooperative game of the producers and consumers in the lower level, with the goal of maximizing the cooperative benefits among the producers and consumers. According to the energy price decided by the integrated energy service provider, the appropriate electricity transaction volume among the producers and consumers is calculated. Each producer and consumer ensures that they cooperate with each other to make profits on the basis of maximizing the cooperative benefits, and sends the energy purchase and sale demand back to the upper level.

[0016] Moreover, S2 establishes a multi-agent multi-energy dynamic pricing model considering carbon emission reduction:

[0017]

[0018] In the formula, It is the comprehensive energy selling price of the integrated energy service provider. is the electricity purchase price of the integrated energy service provider. are the basic energy prices of electricity, heat and gas sold by integrated energy service providers, τ c It's a carbon tax. They are the carbon emission intensity of electricity, heat and gas of integrated energy service providers.

[0019] Furthermore, S3 uses the following formula to obtain the decision model of each stakeholder:

[0020] (1) Decision-making model of integrated energy service providers

[0021]

[0022]

[0023] Where U IESP is the total revenue of the integrated energy service provider, It is the income from energy sales of comprehensive energy service providers, which is composed of income from electricity, heat and gas sales. It is the cost of purchasing electricity from the upper grid by the integrated energy service provider. is the revenue from selling energy to the upper grid, It is the transaction cost between the integrated energy service provider and the upper-level gas grid. is the operating cost of an integrated energy service provider. is the carbon trading cost of the integrated energy service provider, It is the electricity purchased from the upper power grid. It is the amount of gas purchased by the integrated energy service provider from the gas grid. are the electricity, heat and gas purchased by prosumers, μ n is the operating cost coefficient of equipment n, are the gas consumption of gas boilers and cogeneration equipment, P n,t is the output power of device n at time t, θ G is the carbon emission coefficient of the gas;

[0024] (2) Decision-making model of producers and consumers

[0025]

[0026] Where U pro is the benefit to the prosumer, C pro,n is the preferred cost of energy use by prosumers, is the cooperative game benefit, is the operating cost of the prosumer’s equipment, Network transmission costs, are the initial values ​​of electricity, heat and gas loads of prosumers, ε e , ε T , ε g are the preference coefficients of prosumers for electricity, heat and gas demand, is the electrical energy transmitted from prosumer i to prosumer j, is the transmission power price, and α is the grid transmission cost coefficient.

[0027] Moreover, the constraints that need to be considered in the decision model of the integrated energy service provider are as follows:

[0028] 1) Power balance constraints

[0029] The integrated energy service provider contains multiple types of energy conversion equipment, and its electricity, heat and gas power balance constraints are as follows:

[0030]

[0031] Where P CHP.t , P PV,t are the electricity produced by cogeneration and photovoltaic equipment, are the charging and discharging power of the energy storage device, P HP,t , P P2G,t are the electricity consumed by the heat pump and the power-to-gas equipment, are the charging and discharging power of the thermal energy storage device, P GB.t is the thermal output power of the gas boiler, They are the heat-to-electricity ratio of the cogeneration unit and the electric-to-heat conversion efficiency of the heat pump. is the power-to-gas efficiency of the power-to-gas equipment, They are the gas consumption of gas boilers and cogeneration units respectively;

[0032] 2) Equipment operation constraints

[0033] When the equipment in the integrated energy service provider is running, the upper and lower limits of the output power and the maximum ramp rate constraints should be met:

[0034]

[0035] P n,t -P n,t-1 ≤ΔP n,max (29) In the formula, They are the upper and lower limits of the device output power, ΔP n,max is the maximum value of the equipment’s ramp rate;

[0036] 3) Network constraints

[0037] When the integrated energy service provider interacts with the upper-level network, power flows in one direction and needs to meet the upper limit constraint of the transmission power:

[0038]

[0039] In the formula, They are the upper limits of power transmission of the power grid and gas transmission of the gas grid. is a 0-1 variable;

[0040] 4) Price constraints

[0041] In order to ensure the rationality of its pricing and the enthusiasm of producers and consumers to trade with integrated energy service providers, the electricity sales price of integrated energy service providers should not be lower than the electricity purchase price of the power grid. At the same time, the electricity purchase price of integrated energy service providers should not be lower than the electricity purchase price of the power grid. In addition, the heat and gas sales prices of integrated energy service providers should also meet the requirements of being lower than the upper-level network pricing:

[0042]

[0043] In the formula, The purchase and sale prices of electricity from the power grid are: These are the energy sales prices of the heating company and the gas company respectively.

[0044] Furthermore, the constraints that need to be considered in the prosumer operation model are as follows:

[0045] 1) Equipment operation constraints

[0046] The output of photovoltaic equipment needs to be less than the maximum output power:

[0047]

[0048] In the formula, It is the upper limit of the output of photovoltaic equipment;

[0049] 2) Energy interaction constraints between producers and consumers

[0050] Energy interactions between prosumers must meet the upper and lower limits of power constraints and ensure that the transaction volume between prosumers is equal:

[0051]

[0052] In the formula, are the lower and upper limits of the interactive power between light producers and consumers, It is the electrical energy transmitted from prosumer j to i.

[0053] Moreover, S4 proposes a Nash-Harsanyi benefit allocation method for the prosumer cooperative game considering the contribution of carbon emission reduction to the prosumer decision-making model:

[0054] In the Nash-Harsanyi bargaining game problem, bargaining power is an important factor in determining the profit distribution coefficient of each participant. The subject with greater bargaining power will have more advantages in the profit distribution game;

[0055] Each producer and consumer uses their own contribution as bargaining power to negotiate to determine the energy transaction price between them and achieve fair and reasonable energy sharing. The specific expression is:

[0056]

[0057] In the formula, S n is the comprehensive score of each subject, v(N) is the actual benefit of the cooperative alliance, and v(Nn) is the benefit of the alliance without subject n. They are the indicators of electricity contribution and carbon emission reduction contribution, is the actual carbon reduction, It is the carbon emission reduction contribution of subject n participating independently in the market;

[0058]

[0059] γ e +γ c =1 (45)

[0060] In the formula, γ e , γ c are the weight coefficients of electric energy contribution and carbon emission reduction contribution respectively.

[0061] An electronic device comprises a processor and a memory, wherein the memory is used to store instructions, and the processor is used to execute the instructions stored in the memory so that the electronic device executes any one of the methods described above.

[0062] A computer-readable storage medium stores instructions, and when the instructions are executed, any one of the above methods is executed.

[0063] Advantages and technical effects of this application:

[0064] Based on the carbon emission theory, the present invention can calculate the carbon emission intensity of integrated energy service providers and prosumers, and reduce carbon emissions by establishing a dynamic pricing model based on carbon emission flows. In addition, the present invention fully analyzes the interest relationship between integrated energy service providers and prosumers, and applies hybrid game theory to construct an optimized operation model for the integrated energy system, providing ideas for formulating the optimal operation strategy for each subject in the integrated energy system.

[0065] In order to make the above-mentioned objects, features and advantages of the present invention more obvious and easy to understand, preferred embodiments are given below and described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0066] In order to more clearly illustrate the specific implementation methods of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the specific implementation methods or the description of the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are some implementation methods of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0067] AttachedFigure 1 A multi-agent hybrid game framework for an integrated energy system is provided for the embodiments of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0068] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solution of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0069] To facilitate understanding of this embodiment, a hybrid game operation method for a low-carbon integrated energy system based on dynamic multi-energy pricing disclosed in an embodiment of the present invention is first introduced in detail.

[0070] S1 establishes a multi-agent hybrid game framework based on carbon emission flow:

[0071] The multiple subjects are integrated energy service providers and multiple prosumers. The integrated energy service provider seeks its own maximum profit, while the multiple prosumers are in a cooperative relationship. Prosumers seek optimal efficiency based on their own energy needs and satisfaction, and form a mutually competitive game relationship with the integrated energy service provider. The interactive framework of multi-agent mixed game is as follows: Figure 1 shown.

[0072] The carbon emission flow of each entity is the weighted average of the carbon emission intensity of all injected energy. Based on this, a carbon emission flow model is established.

[0073]

[0074] In the formula, is the carbon emission intensity of the electricity from the power grid, and ρ0 is the carbon emission intensity of the coal-fired units.

[0075] If the energy demand of the prosumer is less than the amount of electricity it produces, that is, the net load of the prosumer is negative, the carbon emission flows of the integrated energy service provider and the prosumer are shown in (2) and (3).

[0076]

[0077] In the formula, They are the carbon emission intensity of electricity from integrated energy service providers and prosumers, is the carbon emission intensity of CHP, P CHP.t , P PV,t The electricity produced by cogeneration and photovoltaic equipment, are the electricity purchased from prosumers and the upper grid, P HP,t , PP2G,t These are the electricity consumed by the heat pump and the power-to-gas equipment respectively.

[0078] If the energy demand of the prosumer exceeds the amount of electricity it produces, that is, the net load of the prosumer is positive, then the carbon emission flow of the integrated energy service provider and the prosumer is as follows.

[0079]

[0080] The carbon emission flow for thermal energy is modeled as follows.

[0081]

[0082] In the formula, are the thermal carbon emission intensity of integrated energy service providers and prosumers, are the heat-to-electricity ratio of cogeneration and the electric-to-heat conversion efficiency of the heat pump, is the carbon emission intensity of the gas boiler, P GB.t is the thermal output power of the gas boiler.

[0083] The carbon emission flow for fuel gas is modeled as follows.

[0084]

[0085] In the formula, They are respectively the gas carbon emission intensity of integrated energy service providers and prosumers, is the carbon intensity of the gas grid, It is the amount of gas purchased by the integrated energy service provider from the gas grid. are the gas consumption of gas boilers and cogeneration equipment, It is the power-to-gas efficiency of the power-to-gas equipment.

[0086] S2 establishes a multi-agent and multi-energy dynamic pricing model considering carbon emission reduction based on the carbon emission flow:

[0087]

[0088] In the formula, It is the comprehensive energy selling price of the integrated energy service provider. is the electricity purchase price of the integrated energy service provider. are the basic energy prices of electricity, heat and gas sold by integrated energy service providers, τ c It's a carbon tax.

[0089] S3 establishes a decision-making model for each stakeholder:

[0090] (1) Decision-making model of integrated energy service providers

[0091]

[0092]

[0093] In the formula, It is a comprehensive energy service provider, consisting of the income from electricity, heat and gas sales. It is the cost of purchasing electricity from the upper grid by the integrated energy service provider. is the revenue from selling energy to the upper grid, It is the transaction cost between the integrated energy service provider and the upper-level gas grid. is the operating cost of an integrated energy service provider. is the carbon trading cost of the integrated energy service provider, are the electricity, heat and gas purchased by prosumers, μ n is the operating cost coefficient of equipment n, P n,t is the output power of device n at time t, θ G is the carbon emission coefficient of the gas.

[0094] The constraints that need to be considered in the integrated energy service provider operation model are as follows:

[0095] 1) Power balance constraints

[0096] The integrated energy service provider contains multiple types of energy conversion equipment, and its electricity, heat and gas power balance constraints are as follows.

[0097]

[0098] In the formula, They are the charging and discharging power of the energy storage device, They are the charging and discharging power of the thermal energy storage equipment respectively.

[0099] 2) Equipment operation constraints

[0100] When the equipment in the integrated energy service provider is running, the upper and lower limits of the output power and the maximum ramp rate constraints should be met.

[0101]

[0102] P n,t -P n,t-1 ≤ΔP n,max (29) In the formula, They are the upper and lower limits of the device output power, ΔP n,max It is the maximum value of the equipment's ramp rate.

[0103] 3) Network constraints

[0104] When integrated energy service providers interact with the upper-level network, power flows in one direction and must meet the upper limit constraint of the transmission power.

[0105]

[0106] In the formula, They are the upper limits of power transmission of the power grid and gas transmission of the gas grid. is a 0-1 variable.

[0107] 4) Price constraints

[0108] In order to ensure the rationality of its pricing and the enthusiasm of producers and consumers to trade with integrated energy service providers, the electricity sales price of integrated energy service providers should not be lower than the electricity purchase price of the power grid. At the same time, the electricity purchase price of integrated energy service providers should not be lower than the electricity purchase price of the power grid. In addition, the heat and gas sales prices of integrated energy service providers should also meet the requirements of being lower than the upper-level network pricing.

[0109]

[0110] In the formula, The purchase and sale prices of electricity from the power grid are: These are the energy sales prices of the heating company and the gas company respectively.

[0111] (2) Decision-making model of producers and consumers

[0112]

[0113]

[0114] In the formula, C pro,n is the preferred cost of energy use by prosumers, is the cooperative game benefit, is the operating cost of the prosumer’s equipment, Network transmission costs, are the electricity, heat and gas loads of the prosumers, ε e , ε T , ε g are the preference coefficients of prosumers for electricity, heat and gas demand, is the electrical energy transmitted from prosumer i to prosumer j, is the transmission power price, and α is the grid transmission cost coefficient.

[0115] The constraints that need to be considered in the prosumer operation model are as follows:

[0116] 1) Equipment operation constraints

[0117] The output of photovoltaic equipment needs to be less than the maximum output power.

[0118]

[0119] 2) Energy interaction constraints between producers and consumers

[0120] Energy interactions between producers and consumers must meet the upper and lower limits of power constraints and ensure that the transaction volume between each producer and consumer is equal.

[0121]

[0122] S4 solves the objective function of the decision-making model and proposes a Nash-Harsanyi benefit allocation method for the cooperative game between producers and consumers considering the contribution of carbon emission reduction.

[0123] The solution of the objective function is divided into two stages. In the first stage, the objective function is solved by the solver, and the purchase and sale prices of energy decided by the integrated energy service provider, the purchase and sale of electricity by the prosumer, and the transaction situation between the prosumers are obtained through the dichotomy method, and the above data are input into the second stage. In the second stage, the cooperative game problem of the prosumer is solved by ADMM and the benefits are distributed using the Nash-Harsanyi theory.

[0124] (1) Solution method for the master-slave game between integrated energy service providers and prosumers

[0125] The bisection method is an iterative method that checks whether the solutions of two consecutive iterations are the same. If they are the same, the algorithm uses the bisection method to manage the boundaries and converge quickly to the final iteration result.

[0126] Will I k,t Set it as the energy price at time t in the kth iteration, and assume that I k,t This is the upper bound.

[0127] When I k,t ≠I k-2,t When adding constraint I k-1,t ≤I k+2,t ≤I k,t .

[0128] When I k,t =I k-2,t When adding constraint I k+1,t =(I k-1,t +I k,t ) / 2.

[0129] Under the above constraints, the operation boundary is ensured to decrease rapidly in each iteration, thereby improving the computational efficiency of the algorithm. In each iteration, the convergence condition is judged as whether ξ satisfies the following formula. If converged, the iteration ends.

[0130]

[0131] In the formula, They represent the energy selling and purchasing prices from the integrated energy service provider to the prosumer in the kth iteration.

[0132] After the convergence conditions are met, the integrated energy service provider will use the determined energy trading price and the electricity trading volume between producers and consumers as the initial data of the cooperative game to calculate the electricity trading price between producers and consumers.

[0133] (2) Solution method for cooperative game among multiple producers and consumers

[0134] In the Nash-Harsanyi bargaining game problem, bargaining power is an important factor in determining the profit distribution coefficient of each participant. The subject with greater bargaining power will have more advantages in the profit distribution game. The present invention quantifies this indicator from two perspectives: electric energy contribution and carbon emission reduction contribution. Each producer and consumer negotiates with their respective contributions as bargaining power to determine the energy transaction price between them and achieve fair and reasonable energy sharing. The specific expression is:

[0135]

[0136] In the formula, S n is the comprehensive score of each subject, v(N) is the actual benefit of the cooperative alliance, and v(Nn) is the benefit of the alliance without subject n. They are the indicators of electricity contribution and carbon emission reduction contribution, is the actual carbon reduction, It is the carbon emission reduction contribution of subject n participating independently in the market.

[0137]

[0138] γ e +γ c =1 (45)

[0139] In the formula, γ e , γ c are the weight coefficients of electric energy contribution and carbon emission reduction contribution respectively.

[0140] For prosumer i and prosumer j, the energy transaction prices are coupled with each other, and the two need to be decoupled to ensure that the transaction prices between prosumers are equal, which can be expressed as:

[0141]

[0142] In the formula, is a shared variable between prosumers i and j.

[0143] The basic idea of ​​ADMM distributed solution is to decouple the coupling variables between producers and consumers, and decompose the centralized producer-consumer alliance optimization scheduling problem into sub-problems that each producer and consumer optimizes independently. Then, the optimal solution is obtained through iterative calculation. The decomposed distributed optimization model of producer-consumer i is as follows:

[0144]

[0145] In the formula, λ ij is the dual variable of the transaction between prosumers i and j, and ρ is the penalty factor.

[0146] According to the above method, this example takes a comprehensive energy system as the research object. In the comprehensive energy service provider of the present invention, the equipment includes photovoltaic power generation equipment, cogeneration units, heat pumps, gas boilers, power-to-gas equipment and energy storage equipment. This example sets up the following three scenarios for benefit analysis to analyze its effectiveness in improving the economy of the system and reducing carbon emissions:

[0147] Scenario 1: Prosumers do not participate in game interactions and energy prices are fixed.

[0148] Scenario 2: Prosumers participate in game interaction and only consider dynamic energy prices.

[0149] Scenario 3: Prosumers participate in game interaction, adopt dynamic energy prices and consider carbon emissions, carbon tax τ c =0.05 yuan / kg.

[0150]

[0151]

[0152] By comparing scenarios 1, 2, and 3, it can be concluded that higher energy prices will lead to economic losses for producers and consumers, that is, a reduction in consumer surplus. For integrated energy service providers, although higher energy prices reduce the benefits of energy supply, they significantly reduce the carbon emissions of the integrated energy system, and enhance environmental friendliness. This carbon reduction can be reflected in environmental costs. In addition, the cost of purchasing electricity and natural gas from the power grid and gas grid for integrated energy service providers is also reduced. Based on the above analysis, it can be concluded that after considering the carbon factor pricing method, the total profit of integrated energy service providers has increased and the overall carbon emissions of the system have decreased.

[0153] The present application also provides an electronic device, which may include: at least one processor and at least one memory.

[0154] The processor may include one or more processing cores. The processor uses various interfaces and lines to connect various parts of the entire server, and executes various functions of the server and processes data by running or executing instructions, programs, code sets or instruction sets stored in the memory, and calling data stored in the memory.

[0155] Optionally, the processor can be implemented in at least one hardware form of digital signal processing (DSP), field programmable gate array (FPGA), and programmable logic array (PLA). The processor can integrate one or a combination of a central processing unit (CPU), a graphics processing unit (GPU), and a modem. Among them, the CPU mainly processes the operating system, user interface, and application programs; the GPU is responsible for rendering and drawing the content to be displayed on the display; and the modem is used to process wireless communications. It is understandable that the above-mentioned modem may not be integrated into the processor, but may be implemented separately through a chip.

[0156] Among them, the memory may include a random access memory (Random Access Memory, RAM) and may also include a read-only memory (Read-Only Memory). Optionally, the memory includes a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium. The memory can be used to store instructions, programs, codes, code sets or instruction sets. The memory may include a program storage area and a data storage area, wherein the program storage area may store instructions for implementing an operating system, instructions for at least one function (such as a touch function, a sound playback function, an image playback function, etc.), instructions for implementing the above-mentioned various method embodiments, etc.; the data storage area may store data involved in the above-mentioned various method embodiments, etc. The memory may also be optionally at least one storage device located away from the aforementioned processor. The memory as a computer storage medium may include an operating system, a network communication module, a user interface module, and an application program for a method for diagnosing a fault of a worm gearbox.

[0157] The present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, which stores instructions. When executed by one or more processors, the electronic device executes one or more of the methods described in the above embodiments.

[0158] In addition, each functional unit in the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit. The above integrated unit may be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of software functional units.

[0159] If the integrated unit is implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable memory. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present application, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product, which is stored in a memory and includes several instructions for a computer device (which can be a personal computer, server or network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the various embodiments of the present application. The aforementioned memory includes: various media that can store program codes, such as USB flash drives, mobile hard drives, magnetic disks or optical disks.

[0160] Finally, it should be noted that the above-described embodiments are only specific implementations of the present invention, which are used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than to limit them. The protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto. Although the present invention is described in detail with reference to the above-described embodiments, ordinary technicians in the field should understand that any technician familiar with the technical field can still modify the technical solutions recorded in the above-described embodiments within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention, or can easily think of changes, or make equivalent replacements for some of the technical features therein; and these modifications, changes or replacements do not make the essence of the corresponding technical solutions deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, and should be included in the protection scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention shall be subject to the protection scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A hybrid game operation method for a low-carbon integrated energy system based on dynamic multi-energy pricing, characterized in that: include: S1 constructs a multi-agent hybrid game framework based on carbon emission flow, which consists of a master-slave game between an integrated energy service provider and multiple prosumers, and a cooperative game between multiple prosumers. The multi-agents consist of an integrated energy service provider and multiple prosumers. S2 establishes a multi-agent and multi-energy dynamic pricing model considering carbon emission reduction; S3 builds decision-making models for various stakeholders, including integrated energy service providers and prosumers, based on the dynamic pricing model; S4 proposes the Nash-Harsanyi benefit allocation method for the cooperative game between producers and consumers considering their contribution to carbon emission reduction.

2. According to claim 1, a hybrid game operation method for a low-carbon integrated energy system based on dynamic multi-energy pricing is characterized in that: The multi-agent hybrid game framework based on carbon emission flow described in S1: The multiple entities are integrated energy service providers and multiple prosumers. The integrated energy service providers and prosumers formulate trading strategies based on their own interests and environmental benefits, optimize internal operating conditions, and meet diversified load demands. The hybrid game can be divided into two stages. The first stage is the master-slave game between the upper-level integrated energy service providers and multiple producers and consumers. The integrated energy service providers pursue their own maximum benefits and are the coordinators and leaders in the multi-agent game process. The producers and consumers are followers in the game process. The integrated energy service providers adjust the energy price according to the energy purchase and sale demand feedback from the producers and consumers and pass it on to the lower level. The second stage is the cooperative game among the lower-level producers and consumers, with the goal of maximizing the benefits of cooperation among all producers and consumers. Based on the energy price decided by the integrated energy service provider, the appropriate electricity trading volume among producers and consumers is calculated. All producers and consumers ensure that they cooperate with each other to make profits on the basis of maximizing the benefits of cooperation, and send the demand for purchasing and selling energy back to the upper level.

3. A hybrid game operation method for a low-carbon integrated energy system based on dynamic multi-energy pricing according to claim 2, characterized in that: S2 describes the establishment of a multi-agent multi-energy dynamic pricing model that considers carbon emission reduction: In the formula, It is the comprehensive energy selling price of the integrated energy service provider. is the electricity purchase price of the integrated energy service provider. are the basic energy prices of electricity, heat and gas sold by integrated energy service providers, τ c It's a carbon tax. They are the carbon emission intensity of electricity, heat and gas of integrated energy service providers.

4. A hybrid game operation method for a low-carbon integrated energy system based on dynamic multi-energy pricing according to claim 3, characterized in that: S3 uses the following formula to obtain the decision model of each stakeholder: (1) Decision-making model of integrated energy service providers Where U IESP is the total revenue of the integrated energy service provider, It is the income from energy sales of comprehensive energy service providers, which is composed of income from electricity, heat and gas sales. It is the cost of purchasing electricity from the upper grid by the integrated energy service provider. is the revenue from selling energy to the upper grid, It is the transaction cost between the integrated energy service provider and the upper-level gas grid. is the operating cost of an integrated energy service provider. is the carbon trading cost of the integrated energy service provider, It is the electricity purchased from the upper power grid. It is the amount of gas purchased by the integrated energy service provider from the gas grid. are the electricity, heat and gas purchased by prosumers, μ n is the operating cost coefficient of equipment n, are the gas consumption of gas boilers and cogeneration equipment, P n,t is the output power of device n at time t, θ G is the carbon emission coefficient of the gas; (2) Decision-making model of producers and consumers Where U pro is the benefit to the prosumer, C pro,n is the preferred cost of energy use by prosumers, is the cooperative game benefit, is the operating cost of the prosumer’s equipment, Network transmission costs, are the initial values ​​of electricity, heat and gas loads of prosumers, ε e , ε T , ε g are the preference coefficients of prosumers for electricity, heat and gas demand, is the electrical energy transmitted from prosumer i to prosumer j, is the transmission power price, and α is the grid transmission cost coefficient.

5. A hybrid game operation method for a low-carbon integrated energy system based on dynamic multi-energy pricing according to claim 4, characterized in that: The constraints that need to be considered in the decision-making model of the integrated energy service provider are as follows: 1) Power balance constraints The integrated energy service provider contains multiple types of energy conversion equipment, and its electricity, heat and gas power balance constraints are as follows: Where P CHP.t , P PV,t are the electricity produced by cogeneration and photovoltaic equipment, are the charging and discharging power of the energy storage device, P HP,t , P P2G,t are the electricity consumed by the heat pump and the power-to-gas equipment, are the charging and discharging power of the thermal energy storage device, P GB.t is the thermal output power of the gas boiler, They are the heat-to-electricity ratio of the cogeneration unit and the electric-to-heat conversion efficiency of the heat pump. is the power-to-gas efficiency of the power-to-gas equipment, They are the gas consumption of gas boilers and cogeneration units respectively; 2) Equipment operation constraints When the equipment in the integrated energy service provider is running, the upper and lower limits of the output power and the maximum ramp rate constraints should be met: P n,t -P n,t-1 ≤ΔP n,max (29) In the formula, They are the upper and lower limits of the device output power, ΔP n,max is the maximum value of the equipment’s ramp rate; 3) Network constraints When the integrated energy service provider interacts with the upper-level network, power flows in one direction and needs to meet the upper limit constraint of the transmission power: In the formula, They are the upper limits of power transmission of the power grid and gas transmission of the gas grid. is a 0-1 variable; 4) Price constraints In order to ensure the rationality of its pricing and the enthusiasm of producers and consumers to trade with integrated energy service providers, the electricity sales price of integrated energy service providers should not be lower than the electricity purchase price of the power grid. At the same time, the electricity purchase price of integrated energy service providers should not be lower than the electricity purchase price of the power grid. In addition, the heat and gas sales prices of integrated energy service providers should also meet the requirements of being lower than the upper-level network pricing: In the formula, The purchase and sale prices of electricity from the power grid are: These are the energy sales prices of the heating company and the gas company respectively.

6. A hybrid game operation method for a low-carbon integrated energy system based on dynamic multi-energy pricing according to claim 4, characterized in that: The constraints that need to be considered in the prosumer operation model are as follows: 1) Equipment operation constraints The output of photovoltaic equipment needs to be less than the maximum output power: In the formula, It is the upper limit of the output of photovoltaic equipment; 2) Energy interaction constraints between producers and consumers Energy interactions between prosumers must meet the upper and lower limits of power constraints and ensure that the transaction volume between prosumers is equal: In the formula, are the lower and upper limits of the interactive power between light producers and consumers, It is the electrical energy transmitted from prosumer j to i.

7. A hybrid game operation method for a low-carbon integrated energy system based on dynamic multi-energy pricing according to claim 4, characterized in that: S4 proposes a Nash-Harsanyi benefit allocation method for the prosumer cooperative game considering the contribution of carbon emission reduction to the prosumer decision-making model: In the Nash-Harsanyi bargaining game problem, bargaining power is an important factor in determining the profit distribution coefficient of each participant. The subject with greater bargaining power will have more advantages in the profit distribution game. Each producer and consumer uses their own contribution as bargaining power to negotiate and determine the energy transaction price between them to achieve fair and reasonable energy sharing. The specific expression is: In the formula, S n is the comprehensive score of each subject, v(N) is the actual benefit of the cooperative alliance, and v(Nn) is the benefit of the alliance without subject n. They are the indicators of electricity contribution and carbon emission reduction contribution, is the actual carbon reduction, It is the carbon emission reduction contribution of subject n participating independently in the market; c e +g c =1 (45) In the formula, γ e , γ c are the weight coefficients of electric energy contribution and carbon emission reduction contribution respectively.

8. An electronic device, comprising a processor and a memory, wherein the memory is used to store instructions, and the processor is used to execute the instructions stored in the memory, so that the electronic device executes the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

9. A computer-readable storage medium storing instructions, wherein when the instructions are executed, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 is executed.