Method for realizing information hidden transmission in power line network
By adopting a hidden transmission strategy in the power line network in the smart grid, using the receiver to generate artificial noise and interfere with the eavesdropper and adjust the transmission power, the problem of high computing resources and inability to protect communication behavior in the prior art is solved, and efficient concealment is achieved Data transmission significantly improves the system's hidden performance and security.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202410992182.9
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-07-23
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-22
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-07-23
AI Technical Summary
The existing technology has problems in the safe transmission of data in smart grids with high computing resource requirements, increased system complexity and inability to protect communication behaviors, and encryption technology and physical layer security technology cannot meet high security requirements, especially in the face of eavesdropping. When the computing power of the user is enhanced, the system security performance is threatened.
In the power line network, transmitters and receivers are used to transmit hidden information through power lines, and the receiver generates artificial noise to interfere with the eavesdropper. At the same time, the transmitting power is adjusted to maximize the receiver's hidden information reception rate, evaluate the probability of eavesdropper error detection, and optimize the System parameters to improve hidden transmission performance.
The hidden transmission strategy based on the receiver full duplex artificial noise assisted in the power line network is realized, which significantly improves the hidden performance of the system. By adjusting the interference power and impulse noise, the hidden performance of the system is significantly improved. Ensure the security of information transmission.
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Figure CN119011214A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of covert communication, and in particular to a method for realizing covert information transmission in a power line network. Background Art
[0002] With the rapid development of domestic industry, the demand for electricity is increasing. As a new management technology, smart grid is increasingly valued and applied by various countries. The access of smart meters and home appliances to the Internet has extended the network boundary to the user side, which has aroused great concern about the security protection of electricity information. The openness and easy accessibility of the power grid may cause false data to be injected into the power grid control system, affecting the normal operation of the power grid. At the same time, it may also cause the leakage of power user information and lead to economic losses. Therefore, it is crucial to ensure the secure transmission of data in the smart grid.
[0003] Traditional data security transmission technology is to encrypt the transmission content above the network layer to increase the difficulty of decryption by the adversary. However, some encryption algorithms consume a lot of computing resources and increase the complexity of the system, which may exceed the carrying capacity of the smart grid under the massive number of electricity users. Although physical layer security (PLS) technology does not rely on the computing power of the transmission equipment, it has the same shortcomings as encryption technology. They cannot fully protect the privacy of users, such as transmission time, location and other related information. In some political and military fields where there are higher requirements for secure transmission, encryption technology and PLS technology are far from enough. In this context, covert communication, as a transmission technology that can provide higher security, came into being.
[0004] Current encryption methods and devices have high computing resource requirements, involve multiple hardware and software, and have high initial investment and maintenance costs. When the computing power of eavesdroppers gradually increases, the security performance of the system will be threatened. In addition, the encryption methods in the prior art only protect the communication content, but not the communication behavior, which brings risks to information transmission in smart grids. Summary of the invention
[0005] The purpose of the present invention is to solve the technical problems in the above background and to propose a method for realizing hidden information transmission in a power line network, comprising the following steps:
[0006] S1, the covert information that the transmitter is ready to transmit to the receiver;
[0007] S2, the transmitter uses the determined transmission power to send the covert information to the receiver through the power line network;
[0008] S3, while receiving the transmitter signal, the receiver generates and transmits artificial noise to interfere with the eavesdropper's monitoring;
[0009] S4, evaluate the false detection probability of the eavesdropper to ensure that the eavesdropper cannot accurately determine whether the transmitter is transmitting information;
[0010] S5. On the premise of meeting the concealment requirements, the transmitter and the receiver adjust the transmission power to maximize the receiver's concealed information reception rate;
[0011] S6, analyzing the concealed interruption probability when the receiver receives the signal, and evaluating the concealment, and adjusting the system parameters to optimize the concealed transmission performance according to the analysis and evaluation results;
[0012] S7, the receiver decodes the received signal to recover the hidden information sent by the transmitter;
[0013] S8. Verify the integrity and accuracy of the information received by the receiver.
[0014] In a preferred solution, the transmitter and the eavesdropper are in half-duplex mode, and the receiver is in full-duplex working mode.
[0015] In a preferred solution, the power line includes a branch and a branch node o;
[0016] The location of the branch connection affects the distance from the eavesdropper to the transmitter and receiver.
[0017] In a preferred solution, step S2 further includes the following steps: given a communication time slot, all channels remain unchanged within the communication time slot, but change randomly between different communication time slots, and all channels are modeled using a log-normal distribution, that is, the channel gain from node u to node v is expressed as:
[0018]
[0019] Where u∈{a,b},v∈{b,w}, a is the transmitter, b is the receiver, w is the eavesdropper, A uv Represents the signal channel loss and is expressed as:
[0020]
[0021] where d uv is the link distance between nodes u and v, f c is the power line carrier frequency; a0, a1 and κ are parameters measured from power line communication experiments; is a random variable that characterizes the statistical distribution characteristics of the channel. According to the properties of lognormal distribution, Since the power line between nodes o and w is shared by the channel between the transmitter and the eavesdropper and the channel between the receiver and the eavesdropper, we set their channel correlation to ρ and the joint distribution is
[0022] In a preferred solution, step S2 further includes the following steps: channel noise is modeled using Bernoulli-Gaussian distribution, and the total noise at node c is expressed as:
[0023] n c =n b +b i ·n i ,
[0024] where c∈{a,b,w}; n b is the background noise, expressed as n i is impulse noise, expressed as b i is a one-dimensional Bernoulli random variable, b i =1 indicates that impulse noise occurs with probability p I , b i =0 means that impulse noise does not occur, with a probability of 1-p I , the probability density function of the total channel noise at node c is expressed as:
[0025]
[0026] Where p1 = 1-p I , p2=p I ; represents the random variable n c Gaussian probability density function.
[0027] In a preferred solution, step S3 further comprises the following steps:
[0028] When the transmitter sends a covert message, the signal received at the receiver is expressed as:
[0029]
[0030] Where P a and P b are the transmission powers of the transmitter and receiver respectively; h ab and h bb They represent the channel gain from the transmitter to the receiver and from the receiver to itself respectively; φ(0<φ≤1) represents the self-interference elimination coefficient; x a and x bn They represent the concealed signal sent by the transmitter and the artificial noise signal sent by the receiver, and their average powers are both 1, that is, n b represents the channel noise at the receiver, P b It obeys uniform distribution, and its probability density function is expressed as:
[0031]
[0032] in is the maximum interference power transmitted by the receiver.
[0033] In a preferred solution, step S5 further comprises the following steps:
[0034] Define the optimization problem:
[0035]
[0036] in is a hidden constraint;
[0037] During the transmission process, the eavesdropper will use the hypothesis test method to determine whether the transmitter has transmitted hidden information based on the average energy of the received signal. In order to meet the given hidden constraints, the minimum probability of error in the eavesdropper's detection process must first be calculated. Indicates that the transmitter is not transmitting covert information. It means that the transmitter transmits hidden information, and the signal received by the eavesdropper can be expressed as:
[0038]
[0039] where h aw and h bw represent the channel gains from transmitter to eavesdropper and from receiver to eavesdropper respectively; n w is the channel noise at the eavesdropper; according to Shannon's formula, in one information transmission process, that is, one communication time slot, the average power of the signal received by the eavesdropper is:
[0040]
[0041] In the preferred solution, step S4 further includes the following steps: according to the Newman-Pearson criterion, the eavesdropper minimizes the probability of detection error through a likelihood ratio test; for a given transmission time slot, the average power of the signal received by the eavesdropper is determined as follows:
[0042]
[0043] Where D1 means that the eavesdropper judges that the transmitter has transmitted hidden information, and D0 means that the eavesdropper judges that the transmitter has not transmitted hidden information; τ is the detection threshold; when the average power received by the eavesdropper is greater than τ, the eavesdropper judges that the transmitter has transmitted hidden information, and when the average power received by the eavesdropper is less than τ, the eavesdropper judges that the transmitter has not transmitted hidden information;
[0044] In the energy detection process, the false detection probability of the eavesdropper consists of two parts. One is the false alarm probability, which is defined as The other is the missed detection probability, defined as Then the false detection probability of the eavesdropper is expressed as:
[0045] ξ=P FA +P MD ,
[0046] When e1≥e2,
[0047]
[0048] When e1<e2,
[0049]
[0050] in
[0051] By derivation analysis, the minimum false detection probability of the eavesdropper and the optimal detection threshold τ * Given by:
[0052]
[0053] The mean minimum false detection probability is used to evaluate the covert performance, and the mean minimum false detection probability is given by:
[0054]
[0055] where f JP,LN (x,y) is the joint log-normal distribution probability density function of x and y, expressed as:
[0056]
[0057] in ρ is and The correlation coefficient of ; using the Gauss-Chebyshev integration method, the approximate closed-form expression of the average minimum detection error probability is obtained:
[0058]
[0059] in,
[0060]
[0061] N represents the complexity trade-off index;
[0062] In order to achieve covert transmission, the following covert constraints should be ensured:
[0063]
[0064] Where ε is an arbitrarily small positive number used to evaluate the strength of the hidden constraint.
[0065] In a preferred solution, step S6 further includes the following steps: firstly analyzing the concealment constraints, then analyzing the optimal transmission power of the transmitter to maximize the concealment rate at the receiver, and finally analyzing the concealment outage probability of the system;
[0066] In a signal transmission process, the channel between node u (u∈{a,b}) and node v (v∈{b,w}) follows a log-normal distribution, which can be expressed as set up The approximate optimal solution is:
[0067]
[0068] in,
[0069]
[0070] Analyzing the concealed interruption probability of the receiver, the probability of interruption of the concealed communication between the transmitter and the receiver is expressed as:
[0071]
[0072] Where R b represents the rate requirement for covert communication between the transmitter and the receiver, set to R b =1bps / Hz; p j =p1 represents the probability that the channel noise at the receiver contains both background noise and impulse noise, p j =p2 represents the probability that the channel noise at the receiver contains only background noise; The concealed outage probability of the receiver under two different channel noises is expressed by the following formula:
[0073]
[0074] in,
[0075]
[0076] Continuously apply the Gauss-Chebyshev integration method to obtain The approximate closed-form expression for is:
[0077]
[0078] Finally, an approximate closed-form expression for the concealed outage probability of the receiver is obtained.
[0079] The beneficial effects of the present invention are:
[0080] 1) The present invention develops a covert transmission strategy based on receiver full-duplex artificial noise assistance in power line networks. Specifically, while the transmitter and the receiver are communicating secretly, the receiver sends artificial noise through the full-duplex receiver to interfere with the eavesdropper's eavesdropping, making it impossible for the eavesdropper to determine whether covert information is being transmitted between the transmitter and the receiver.
[0081] 2) The present invention aims at the idea of covert transmission in power line network and obtains the approximate closed-form expression of the average minimum false detection probability of the eavesdropper. The results show that the communication distance and interference power have an important influence on the eavesdropper's eavesdropping performance. In addition, we obtain the approximate closed-form expression of the optimal transmission power under the concealment constraint and find the maximum concealment rate that the system can achieve. The results show that a higher concealment rate can be obtained by adjusting the interference power and impulse noise.
[0082] 3) The present invention uses interference to enhance concealment performance, and uses concealment rate and concealment interruption probability for evaluation. The results show that by setting a larger interference power and a better transmission signal-to-noise ratio, the concealment performance of the system can be significantly improved. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0083] Figure 1 It is a model diagram of the concealed transmission system of the power line network;
[0084] Figure 2 This is an experimental graph showing the variation of Willie's minimum error detection probability with channel correlation ρ at different communication distances;
[0085] Figure 3 is the ratio of Bob’s concealment rate to the maximum interference noise power under different impulse noise levels. Experimental diagram of changes;
[0086] Figure 4 This is an experimental graph showing how Bob's interruption probability changes with the input signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) under different impulse noise levels. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0087] like Figure 1As shown, the present invention considers a covert communication system in a power line network, which consists of a transmitter, a receiver and a potential eavesdropper, corresponding to Alice (a), Bob (b) and Willie (w) respectively. Node o represents a branch node of the power line, and the access position of the branch affects the distance from Willie to Alice and Bob. In this system, Alice hopes to transmit secret information to Bob without Willie's knowledge, and Willie acts as a passive eavesdropper to detect whether Alice and Bob are communicating secretly. Alice and Willie are in half-duplex mode, while Bob is in full-duplex working mode, that is, Bob transmits artificial noise to interfere with Willie's eavesdropping behavior while receiving secret information.
[0088] The present invention mainly focuses on a given information transmission time slot. All channels remain unchanged within this communication time slot, but will change randomly between different communication time slots. All channels are modeled with log-normal distribution, that is, the channel gain from node u to node v is expressed as:
[0089]
[0090] where u∈{a,b},v∈{b,w}, A uv represents the signal channel loss and can be expressed as:
[0091]
[0092] where d uv is the link distance between nodes u and v, f c is the power line carrier frequency; a0, a1 and κ are parameters measured from power line communication experiments; is a random variable that characterizes the statistical distribution characteristics of the channel. According to the properties of lognormal distribution, In addition, since the power line between nodes o and w is shared by the channels of Alice-Willie and Bob-Willie, their channel correlation is set to ρ, and the joint distribution is
[0093] The channel noise is modeled using Bernoulli-Gaussian distribution, and the total noise at node c can be expressed as:
[0094] n c =n b +b i ·n i , (3) where c∈{a,b,w}; n b is the background noise, expressed as n i is impulse noise, expressed as b i is a one-dimensional Bernoulli random variable, b i =1 indicates that impulse noise occurs with probability p I , b i =0 means that impulse noise does not occur, with a probability of 1-p I Therefore, the probability density function of the total channel noise at node c can be expressed as:
[0095]
[0096] Where p1 = p I , p2=1-p I ; represents the random variable n c Gaussian probability density function.
[0097] Without loss of generality, assuming that when Alice sends a hidden message, the signal received by Bob can be expressed as:
[0098]
[0099] Where P a and P b are the transmission powers of Alice and Bob respectively; h ab and h bb They represent the channel gains from Alice to Bob and from Bob to himself respectively; φ(0<φ≤1) represents the self-interference elimination coefficient; x a and x bn They represent the covert signal sent by Alice and the artificial noise signal sent by Bob, and their average powers are both 1, that is, n b represents the channel noise at Bob. In order to confuse Willie’s eavesdropping and achieve covert transmission, we assume that P b It obeys uniform distribution, and its probability density function can be expressed as:
[0100]
[0101] in is the maximum interference power sent by Bob.
[0102] 1. Optimization goal of the present invention
[0103] The goal of the present invention is to maximize Bob's concealment rate under given concealment constraints. Therefore, the optimization problem is defined as follows:
[0104]
[0105] Where (7a) is a hidden constraint, which will be explained in detail below.
[0106] 1) Hidden Constraints
[0107] During the transmission process, Willie will use the hypothesis test method to determine whether Alice has transmitted hidden information based on the average energy of the received signal. In order to meet the given hidden constraints, we must first calculate Willie's minimum error detection probability (MDEP), that is, the minimum probability of error in Willie's detection process. Consider It means that Alice did not transmit any hidden information. Indicates that Alice transmitted hidden information. Under the two assumptions, the signal received by Willie can be expressed as:
[0108]
[0109] where h aw and h bw They represent the channel gains from Alice to Willie and from Bob to Willie respectively; n w is the channel noise at Willie. According to Shannon's formula, in one information transmission process, i.e., one communication time slot, the average power of the signal received by Willie is:
[0110]
[0111] Substituting (1) into (9) we can obtain:
[0112]
[0113] According to the Newman-Pearson criterion, Willie minimizes the probability of detection error through the likelihood ratio test. For a given transmission time slot, the average power of the signal received by Willie is determined as follows:
[0114]
[0115] Where D1 means Willie judges that Alice has transmitted hidden information, D0 means Willie judges that Alice has not transmitted hidden information; τ is the detection threshold. The meaning of formula (11) is that when the average power received by Willie is greater than τ, Willie judges that Alice has transmitted hidden information; if it is less than τ, it is judged that Alice has not transmitted hidden information.
[0116] In the energy detection process, Willie's false detection probability consists of two parts. One is the false alarm probability, which is defined as The other is the missed detection probability, defined as Then Willie's false detection probability is expressed as:
[0117] ξ=P FA +P MD , (12)
[0118] When e1≥e2,
[0119]
[0120] When e1<e2,
[0121]
[0122] in
[0123] By derivation analysis and combining with formula (10), Willie's minimum error detection probability is and the optimal detection threshold τ * Given by:
[0124]
[0125] Since Alice and Bob do not know the instantaneous channel state information (CSI) from them to Willie, but only know the statistical state information of the channel, we use the average minimum error detection probability (AMDEP) to evaluate the concealment performance, and AMDEP is given by the following formula:
[0126]
[0127] where f JP,LN (x,y) is the probability density function of the joint log-normal distribution of x and y, which can be expressed as:
[0128]
[0129] in ρ is and Substituting (18) into (17), and then using the Gauss-Chebyshev integration method, we can get the approximate closed-form expression of AMDEP:
[0130]
[0131] in
[0132]
[0133] N represents the complexity trade-off index. Simulation experiments show that when N is 10, the error between the approximate value and the actual value is very small.
[0134] Therefore, in order to achieve covert transmission, the following covert constraints should be ensured:
[0135]
[0136] Where ε is an arbitrarily small positive number used to evaluate the strength of the hidden constraint.
[0137] 2. Problem Solving
[0138] The present invention mainly considers the concealment performance without interruption under the condition of meeting the concealment constraint. First, the concealment constraint is analyzed, then the optimal transmission power of Alice is analyzed to maximize the concealment rate at Bob, and finally the concealment interruption probability of the system is analyzed.
[0139] For the convenience of solving, we assume that in a signal transmission process, the channel between node u (u ∈ {a, b}) and node v (v ∈ {b, w}) follows a log-normal distribution, which can be expressed as set up Therefore, we can obtain the approximate optimal solution of problem (7):
[0140]
[0141] in
[0142]
[0143] In order to ensure the reliability of covert communication between Alice and Bob, we will analyze Bob's covert interruption probability (CTOP). The probability of interruption of covert communication between Alice and Bob is expressed as:
[0144]
[0145] Where R b represents the rate requirement for covert communication between Alice and Bob, set to R b =1bps / Hz; p j =p1 represents the probability that the channel noise at Bob contains both background noise and impulse noise, p j =p2 represents the probability that the channel noise at Bob contains only background noise; The concealed outage probability of Bob under two different channel noises can be expressed as follows:
[0146]
[0147] in
[0148]
[0149] By continuously integrating equation (22a) using the Gauss-Chebyshev integration method and substituting it into equation (22), we can get The approximate closed-form expression for is:
[0150]
[0151]
[0152] Substituting (23) into (22), we can obtain an approximate closed-form expression for Bob's CTOP.
[0153] Figure 1 An example of a full-duplex artificial noise-assisted covert communication system in a power line network is given. The mean and variance of the channel distribution function between any two nodes are set to 2dB and 1dB. In addition, since the Alice-Willie and Bob-Willie channels share the power line between node o and node w, the correlation between them is set to ρ (0≤ρ≤1).
[0154] like Figure 2 As shown in Figure 2, the average minimum error detection probability of Willie at different communication distances is The relationship between the channel correlation ρ. It can be seen that As ρ increases, it increases as the distance between Alice and Willie increases. This is because as the channel correlation ρ gradually increases from 0 to 1, the changes in the eavesdropping channel and the interference channel caused by the change in the communication time slot have an impact on the minimum error detection probability. The impact is reduced, resulting in This shows that channel correlation is beneficial for covert transmission. In addition, as Willie moves away from Alice and approaches Bob, the eavesdropping channel deteriorates while the interference channel improves, improving the covert performance. It can be seen that choosing a suitable sending node so that Willie cannot eavesdrop at close range can effectively achieve covert information transmission.
[0155] like Figure 3 As shown in Figure 2, under different impulse noise levels, Bob's concealment rate and the maximum interference power It can be observed that as the interference power P b max Increase, stealth speed will also increase, and the probability of impulse noise occurring p I Increase, stealth speed This is because the interference power The increase of will make the average minimum false detection probability Increase, under the same concealment requirements, we can appropriately increase Alice's transmission power P a To obtain a higher concealment rate, although the interference transmitted by Bob will also cause interference to himself, the current self-interference elimination technology in the power line can reduce this interference to a very low level. a Caused by The increase is much smaller, so overall along with In addition, the probability of impulse noise occurring is p I As it increases, the total noise at Bob will increase, so the concealment rate will decrease, and overall, the interference power and the impulse noise level p I The combined effect on the stealth rate is significant.
[0156] like Figure 4 As shown in Figure 1, the relationship between the system's concealed outage probability CTOP and the input signal-to-noise ratio SNR under different impulse noise levels. We can see that the system's concealed outage probability CTOP decreases as the input signal-to-noise ratio SNR increases, while as the probability of impulse noise occurring p I This is because the larger the input signal-to-noise ratio SNR, the larger the received signal-to-noise ratio at Bob’s output, the interruption probability CTOP will decrease, and the probability of impulse noise occurring p I The larger the value, the smaller the signal-to-noise ratio that Bob receives, and the higher the interruption probability CTOP. Therefore, in order to make the system transmit information more stably and covertly, we need to make the quality of the transmitted signal as good as possible, and create better transmission conditions to reduce the impulse noise level.
[0157] The above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than to limit the same. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments may still be modified, or some of the technical features may be replaced by equivalents. However, these modifications or replacements do not deviate the essence of the corresponding technical solutions from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.
Claims
1. A method for realizing hidden information transmission in a power line network, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: S1, the covert information that the transmitter is ready to transmit to the receiver; S2, the transmitter uses the determined transmission power to send the covert information to the receiver through the power line network; S3, while receiving the transmitter signal, the receiver generates and transmits artificial noise to interfere with the eavesdropper's monitoring; S4, evaluate the false detection probability of the eavesdropper to ensure that the eavesdropper cannot accurately determine whether the transmitter is transmitting information; S5. On the premise of meeting the concealment requirements, the transmitter and the receiver adjust the transmission power to maximize the receiver's concealed information reception rate; S6, analyzing the concealed interruption probability when the receiver receives the signal, and evaluating the concealment, and adjusting the system parameters to optimize the concealed transmission performance according to the analysis and evaluation results; S7, the receiver decodes the received signal to recover the hidden information sent by the transmitter; S8. Verify the integrity and accuracy of the information received by the receiver.
2. A method for realizing hidden information transmission in a power line network according to claim 1, characterized in that: The transmitter and the eavesdropper are in half-duplex mode, and the receiver is in full-duplex mode.
3. A method for realizing hidden information transmission in a power line network according to claim 1, characterized in that: The power line includes branches and branch nodes o; The location of the branch connection affects the distance from the eavesdropper to the transmitter and receiver.
4. The method for realizing hidden information transmission in a power line network according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step S2 also includes the following steps: given a communication time slot, all channels remain unchanged within this communication time slot, but will change randomly between different communication time slots, and all channels are modeled using log-normal distribution, that is, the channel gain from node u to node v is expressed as: Where u∈{a,b},v∈{b,w}, a is the transmitter, b is the receiver, w is the eavesdropper, A uv Represents the signal channel loss and is expressed as: where d uv is the link distance between nodes u and v, f c is the power line carrier frequency; a0, a1 and κ are parameters measured from power line communication experiments; is a random variable that characterizes the statistical distribution characteristics of the channel. According to the properties of lognormal distribution, Since the power line between nodes o and w is shared by the channel between the transmitter and the eavesdropper and the channel between the receiver and the eavesdropper, we set their channel correlation to ρ and the joint distribution is 5. The method for realizing hidden information transmission in a power line network according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step S2 also includes the following steps: the channel noise is modeled using Bernoulli-Gaussian distribution, and the total noise at node c is expressed as: n c =n b +b i ·n i , where c∈{a,b,w}; n b is the background noise, expressed as n i is impulse noise, expressed as b i is a one-dimensional Bernoulli random variable, b i =1 indicates that impulse noise occurs with probability p I , b i =0 means that impulse noise does not occur, with a probability of 1-p I , the probability density function of the total channel noise at node c is expressed as: Where p1 = 1-p I , p2=p I ; represents the random variable n c The Gaussian probability density function of .
6. The method for realizing hidden information transmission in a power line network according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step S3 also includes the following steps: When the transmitter sends a covert message, the signal received at the receiver is expressed as: Where P a and P b are the transmission powers of the transmitter and receiver respectively; h ab and h bb They represent the channel gain from the transmitter to the receiver and from the receiver to itself respectively; φ(0<φ≤1) represents the self-interference elimination coefficient; x a and x bn They represent the concealed signal sent by the transmitter and the artificial noise signal sent by the receiver, and their average powers are both 1, that is, n b represents the channel noise at the receiver, P b It obeys uniform distribution, and its probability density function is expressed as: in is the maximum interference power transmitted by the receiver.
7. The method for realizing hidden information transmission in a power line network according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step S5 also includes the following steps: Define the optimization problem: in is a hidden constraint; During the transmission process, the eavesdropper will use the hypothesis test method to determine whether the transmitter has transmitted hidden information based on the average energy of the received signal. In order to meet the given hidden constraints, the minimum probability of error in the eavesdropper's detection process must first be calculated. Indicates that the transmitter is not transmitting covert information. It means that the transmitter transmits hidden information, and the signal received by the eavesdropper is expressed as: where h aw and h bw represent the channel gains from transmitter to eavesdropper and from receiver to eavesdropper respectively; n w is the channel noise at the eavesdropper; according to Shannon's formula, in one information transmission process, that is, one communication time slot, the average power of the signal received by the eavesdropper is:
8. A method for implementing concealed information transmission in a power line network according to claim 7, characterized in that: Step S4 The method also includes the following steps: according to the Newman-Pearson criterion, the eavesdropper minimizes the probability of detection error through a likelihood ratio test; for a given transmission time slot, the average power of the signal received by the eavesdropper is determined as follows: Where D1 means that the eavesdropper judges that the transmitter has transmitted hidden information, and D0 means that the eavesdropper judges that the transmitter has not transmitted hidden information; τ is the detection threshold; when the average power received by the eavesdropper is greater than τ, the eavesdropper judges that the transmitter has transmitted hidden information, and when the average power received by the eavesdropper is less than τ, the eavesdropper judges that the transmitter has not transmitted hidden information; In the energy detection process, the false detection probability of the eavesdropper consists of two parts. One is the false alarm probability, which is defined as The other is the missed detection probability, defined as Then the false detection probability of the eavesdropper is expressed as: ξ=P FA +P MD , When e1≥e2, When e1<e2, in By derivation analysis, the minimum false detection probability of the eavesdropper and the optimal detection threshold τ * Given by: The mean minimum false detection probability is used to evaluate the covert performance, and the mean minimum false detection probability is given by: where f JP,LN (x,y) is x The joint log-normal distribution probability density function of and y is expressed as: in ρ is and The correlation coefficient of Using the Gauss-Chebyshev integration method, an approximate closed-form expression for the average minimum detection error probability is obtained: in, N represents the complexity trade-off index; In order to achieve covert transmission, the following covert constraints should be ensured: Where ε is an arbitrarily small positive number used to evaluate the strength of the hidden constraint.
9. The method for realizing hidden information transmission in a power line network according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step S6 also includes the following steps: firstly analyzing the concealment constraints, then analyzing the optimal transmission power of the transmitter to maximize the concealment rate at the receiver, and finally analyzing the concealment outage probability of the system; In a signal transmission process, the channel between node u (u∈{a,b}) and node v (v∈{b,w}) follows a log-normal distribution, which can be expressed as set up The approximate optimal solution is: in, Analyzing the concealed interruption probability of the receiver, the probability of interruption of the covert communication between the transmitter and the receiver is expressed as: Where R b represents the rate requirement for covert communication between the transmitter and the receiver, set to R b =1bps / Hz; p j =p1 represents the probability that the channel noise at the receiver contains both background noise and impulse noise, p j =p2 represents the probability that the channel noise at the receiver contains only background noise; The concealed outage probability of the receiver under two different channel noises is expressed by the following formula: in, Continuously apply the Gauss-Chebyshev integration method to obtain The approximate closed-form expression for is: Finally, an approximate closed-form expression for the concealed outage probability of the receiver is obtained.
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