Service pricing method for business resource service industrial software platform in industrial aggregation area

Through the two-layer dynamic game of Stackelberg game model, the iterative adjustment of pricing and demand between small and medium-sized enterprises and industrial software platforms has solved the problem of personalized demand for industrial software platforms by small and medium-sized enterprises, and maximized the platform's revenue and resource utilization. Improve operational efficiency and industrial development.

CN119027152AInactive Publication Date: 2024-11-26WUHAN UNIV OF TECH
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411012340.6
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-07-26
Publication Date
2024-11-26
Estimated Expiration
Not applicable · inactive patent

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Industrial software platforms are difficult to effectively support the development of small and medium-sized enterprises, and unified software application and management service pricing strategies cannot meet the needs of different enterprises, resulting in low platform revenue and resource utilization efficiency.

Method used

Using Stackelberg game model, through two-layer dynamic game, the software service platform and small and medium-sized enterprises iteratively adjust pricing and demands between them, ensuring the maximum platform revenue and enterprise utility, and formulating personalized pricing strategies to meet the needs of different enterprises.

Benefits of technology

It has achieved the maximization of platform revenue and resource utilization, improved the operational efficiency of small and medium-sized enterprises, reduced operating costs, and promoted the development of industrial agglomeration areas and the construction of industrial ecosystems.

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Abstract

The technical scheme adopted by the invention is as follows: the service pricing method for the industrial software platform of the business resource service in the industrial aggregation area comprises the following steps: a software service platform side sets initial pricing of each service; and circularly executing the following steps until the revenue function of the software service platform side is maximized, and outputting corresponding software application and management service requirements of the purchaser and prices of various software applications and management services: the purchaser iteratively adjusts the software application and management service requirements of the purchaser according to the prices of various services and constraint conditions of the purchaser, so as to obtain the software application and management service of the purchaser. Until the utility function of the purchaser is maximized; and the software service platform side adjusts the prices of various services according to the software application and management service requirements of the purchaser. According to the invention, personalized pricing strategies can be formulated for different types of small and medium-sized enterprises, so that the maximization of platform income and resource utilization is realized, and meanwhile, the actual requirements of the small and medium-sized enterprises are met to improve the operation efficiency of the small and medium-sized enterprises.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of resource service industrial software platform, and specifically relates to a service pricing method for an industrial cluster area business resource service industrial software platform. Background Art

[0002] At present, the industrial software market faces the problems of fragmented functions and insufficient systematization, which makes it difficult for industrial software platforms to effectively support the development of small and medium-sized enterprises in industrial clusters. These enterprises face challenges such as unclear value network coordination mechanisms, heterogeneous resource distribution, and multiple couplings in the supply chain, which in turn lead to a series of problems such as difficulty in win-win, integration, and optimization. To solve these problems, it is urgent to build an industrial software platform model that serves the business resource management and organizational optimization of small and medium-sized enterprises in industrial clusters.

[0003] In the process of industrial software platforms integrating various software resources and adopting the SaaS service model to provide small and medium-sized enterprises with software cloud services such as design and development, information management, and production control, although these services can help small and medium-sized enterprises improve R&D operation efficiency and reduce R&D operation costs, the sustainable development of the platform depends on a stable profit model.

[0004] However, in actual activities, there are significant differences in the needs and categories of industrial software services for SMEs. There are companies that focus on improving production efficiency, and there are companies that focus on strengthening marketing capabilities. In addition, different SMEs have different capabilities and willingness to purchase. Therefore, a unified pricing strategy for software applications and management services cannot meet the actual needs of SMEs, nor can it maximize platform revenue, which in turn leads to low utilization efficiency of industrial software platforms, and SMEs as users cannot maximize their own efficiency. Summary of the invention

[0005] The purpose of the present invention is to address the deficiencies of the above-mentioned background technology and to provide a pricing method for industrial software platform services in industrial cluster areas, which can formulate personalized pricing strategies for different types of small and medium-sized enterprises, thereby maximizing platform revenue and resource utilization, while meeting the actual needs of small and medium-sized enterprises to improve their operational efficiency.

[0006] The technical solution adopted by the present invention is: a pricing method for industrial software platform services of business resource services in industrial cluster areas, comprising the following steps:

[0007] The software service platform sets the initial pricing for each service;

[0008] The following steps are executed in a loop until the revenue function of the software service platform is maximized, and the corresponding purchaser's software application and management service requirements, as well as the pricing of various software application and management services are output: the purchaser includes multiple purchasers, and the geographical locations of the purchasers are in the same industrial cluster area, and the partial software application and management service requirements of the purchasers are consistent;

[0009] The buyer iteratively adjusts its software application and management service requirements based on the pricing of each service and the buyer's constraints until the buyer's utility function is maximized;

[0010] The software service platform adjusts the pricing of its services based on the purchaser's software application and management service needs.

[0011] In the above technical solution, the constraints of the purchaser include: the sum of the software application and management service requirements of all purchasers cannot exceed the maximum load capacity of the server of the software service platform.

[0012] In the above technical solution, the criterion for the purchaser's utility function to be maximized is that the difference between the results of two consecutive adjustments of the software application and management service requirements is less than the corresponding set value;

[0013] The criterion for maximizing the software service platform's profit function is that the difference between the results of two consecutive adjustments to the pricing of various software applications and management services is less than the corresponding set value.

[0014] In the above technical solution, the iterative adjustment strategy of the purchaser's software application and management service requirements is: adjust the current software application and management service requirements based on the last adjusted software application and management service requirements and their impact on the purchaser's utility function.

[0015] In the above technical solution, the iterative adjustment strategy equation for the software application and management service requirements of the i-th purchaser is expressed as follows:

[0016]

[0017]

[0018] in, Denotes the buyer's utility function U i The gradient of (); t i Indicates time; r i () represents the software application and management service demand of the i-th buyer; a>0, represents the adjustment step of the software application and management service demand strategy.

[0019] In the above technical solution, the pricing adjustment strategy of the software service platform is: according to the last adjusted pricing and its impact on the revenue function of the software service platform, adjust the pricing of various services provided to various buyers this time.

[0020] In the above technical solution, the price p of the software service platform for the i-th buyer is i The expression of the adjustment strategy equation is as follows:

[0021]

[0022] Among them, r i () represents the software application and management service demand of the i-th buyer; T represents the cycle round; b>0, represents the adjustment step of the pricing strategy; θ represents the set change; E() represents the profit function of the software service platform; n represents the number of buyers.

[0023] In the above technical solution, the revenue function E of the software service platform is expressed as:

[0024]

[0025] Among them, r i () represents the software application and management service demand of the i-th buyer, n represents the number of buyers, and C represents the unit cost of the software service platform for subsequent maintenance and upgrading of the software; p i Represents the pricing strategy of the software service platform for the i-th buyer.

[0026] In the above technical solution, the utility function U of the i-th buyer is i The expression is:

[0027] U i =ω i *log(1+qd i r i )-(p i +C)r i

[0028] Among them, ω i represents the purchase intention of the i-th buyer; d i represents the diversity of demand of the i-th buyer; p i represents the pricing strategy of the software service platform for the i-th buyer; q represents the quality of software service; r i represents the software application and management service demand of the ith buyer, and C represents the unit cost of the software service platform for subsequent maintenance and upgrading of the software.

[0029] The present invention also provides an industrial cluster area business resource service industrial software platform service pricing system, which is used to implement the industrial cluster area business resource service industrial software platform service pricing method described in the above technical solution.

[0030] The beneficial effects of the present invention include:

[0031] Improve the rationality and flexibility of pricing strategies: By constructing a two-layer dynamic game Stackelberg model, the present invention can formulate personalized pricing strategies for different types of small and medium-sized enterprises. This strategy fully considers the different needs and purchasing intentions of enterprises for software services, thereby improving the rationality and flexibility of pricing and better meeting the actual needs of small and medium-sized enterprises.

[0032] Achieve a win-win situation for the platform and SMEs: The pricing method of the present invention aims to maximize the platform revenue while ensuring that SMEs can obtain the required software services. This win-win pricing strategy helps to enhance the trust and dependence of SMEs on the industrial software platform and promote the long-term development of the platform.

[0033] Promoting the development of industrial clusters: By providing small and medium-sized enterprises with reasonable pricing strategies, the present invention helps to reduce their operating costs and improve their operating efficiency. This will enable small and medium-sized enterprises to better adapt to market changes, enhance their competitiveness, and thus promote the development of the entire industrial cluster.

[0034] Optimize resource allocation and utilization: The pricing method of the present invention helps the industrial software platform allocate and utilize resources more effectively. Through a reasonable pricing strategy, the platform can ensure that resources are used where they are most needed, thereby improving the overall utilization efficiency of resources.

[0035] The designed iterative algorithm dynamically adjusts pricing and demand strategies, allowing the industrial software platform to optimize resource allocation in each iteration based on feedback from SMEs and market changes. The algorithm adjusts the step size and number of iterations to ensure that resources are directed to where they are most needed, thereby improving resource utilization efficiency and flexibility in responding to market changes.

[0036] Considering the load capacity limit of the industrial software platform server, the present invention introduces the critical value concept in the iterative algorithm. When the sum of the software application and management service requirements of all enterprises approaches or reaches this load limit, the algorithm will automatically adjust resource allocation to ensure that it does not exceed the maximum load capacity of the platform and maximize the efficiency of resource use.

[0037] Through the pricing method and iterative algorithm of the present invention, the industrial software platform can more accurately predict and meet the software application and management service needs of small and medium-sized enterprises, reduce resource waste, and improve the pertinence and effectiveness of services. This not only improves the overall utilization efficiency of resources, but also directly translates into the economic benefits of the industrial software platform, achieving cost savings and increased revenue.

[0038] The implementation of this invention not only improves the operational efficiency of the industrial software platform by optimizing resource allocation and utilization, but also provides more stable and efficient service support for small and medium-sized enterprises in the industrial cluster area. This optimization helps to reduce the operating costs of the entire region, improve industrial competitiveness, and promote the sustainable development of the industrial cluster area.

[0039] Promoting the construction of industrial ecosystem: Through the integration and innovation of industrial software platform and industrial value network, this invention helps to build an industrial ecosystem based on value network. This will reshape the value creation and distribution model of enterprises, achieve multilateral synergy and win-win, and further promote the development and upgrading of the industry. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0040] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of the method flow of the present invention;

[0041] Figure 2 It is a schematic diagram of the algorithm iteration time of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0042] The present invention will be further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments to facilitate a clear understanding of the present invention, but they do not constitute a limitation on the present invention.

[0043] like Figure 1 As shown, the present invention provides a pricing method for industrial software platform services of business resource services in industrial cluster areas, comprising the following steps:

[0044] The software service platform sets the initial pricing for each service;

[0045] The following steps are executed in a loop until the revenue function of the software service platform is maximized, and the corresponding purchaser's software application and management service requirements, as well as the pricing of various software application and management services are output: the purchaser includes multiple purchasers, and the geographical locations of the purchasers are in the same industrial cluster area, and the partial software application and management service requirements of the purchasers are consistent;

[0046] The buyer iteratively adjusts its software application and management service requirements according to the pricing of various software applications and management services and the buyer's constraints until the buyer's utility function is maximized;

[0047] The software service platform adjusts the pricing of its services based on the purchaser's software application and management service needs.

[0048] The principle of the present invention is further explained below with reference to specific embodiments.

[0049] The application scenario of the present invention is small and medium-sized enterprises in industrial clusters and platforms that provide industrial software services to the small and medium-sized enterprises, wherein each small and medium-sized enterprise is the purchaser and the industrial software platform is the software service platform.

[0050] This specific embodiment is applied to a specific industrial cluster area, such as an industrial park dominated by manufacturing. The industrial park has a number of small and medium-sized enterprises as buyers, and they share similar business needs and market environment. The industrial software platform specifically provides industrial software services for small and medium-sized enterprises in the industrial park. The needs purchased by each enterprise are roughly the same, and there are some personalized and differentiated needs based on the differences in their business operations.

[0051] Business resource services in industrial clusters refer to a series of resources and services shared by a group of enterprises within a specific geographical area, including but not limited to supply chains, talent pools, R&D facilities, and market information. These resource services play an important role in enhancing the competitiveness of enterprises in the region and promoting industrial upgrading.

[0052] In this industrial cluster area, the industrial software platform integrates business resource services such as design and development, information management, and production control to provide a one-stop solution for small and medium-sized enterprises in the area. The industrial software platform analyzes the specific needs and purchasing power of different enterprises in the region and applies the Stackelberg game pricing model of the present invention to provide customized pricing solutions for each enterprise or each type of enterprise.

[0053] Specifically, the present invention comprehensively considers various factors of both industrial software platforms and SMEs, and constructs a Stackelberg game pricing model, in which the industrial software platform acts as a leader (the upper level of the game) and SMEs act as followers (the lower level of the game). When constructing the game model, the present invention particularly considers the characteristics of business resource services in industrial clusters, such as service diversity, regional market dynamics, etc. These factors are directly reflected in the demand intensity and willingness to pay of SMEs for industrial software services, which in turn affects the pricing strategy of the platform.

[0054] The model deeply describes the game process between the industrial software platform and small and medium-sized enterprises, and proves the existence of the Nash equilibrium solution. The present invention uses the reverse induction method to obtain the theoretical solution of the Nash equilibrium, and designs an iterative algorithm to solve the game model solution under incomplete information. The present invention fully considers the different needs and purchasing intentions of small and medium-sized enterprises for software services, and can formulate personalized pricing strategies for different types of small and medium-sized enterprises, so as to maximize the platform revenue while meeting the actual needs of small and medium-sized enterprises. For example, if a company has higher demands in design and research and development, while another company pays more attention to production control, the industrial software platform can reasonably allocate server resources, technical support and customer service according to these different needs to meet the specific needs of different companies.

[0055] The industrial software platform initially sets a pricing strategy, and then collects feedback information through interaction with small and medium-sized enterprises. Using iterative algorithms, the platform continuously adjusts pricing, while enterprises adjust their software application and management service requirements based on their own maximum utility. This process can be specifically described as:

[0056] Industrial software platform releases initial pricing;

[0057] Each SME adjusts the demand for software applications and management services according to its own needs and purchasing intentions;

[0058] The enterprise feeds back the adjustment results to the platform, and the platform updates the pricing strategy based on the feedback;

[0059] Repeat the above process until the Nash equilibrium is reached, that is, neither the enterprise nor the platform can obtain better results by unilaterally changing its strategy.

[0060] Specifically, the present invention defines the decision variable of the industrial software platform as the price p of the industrial software platform for enterprise i i , the decision variables of SMEs are the industrial software application and management service demand of enterprise i r i In addition, other factors that affect pricing include the purchase intention of enterprise i ω i , the diversity of enterprise i's demand for industrial software applications and management services i , the unit cost of the industrial software platform for later maintenance and upgrading software C. Software service quality q, the total service volume L that the industrial software platform server can carry, the total software application and management service needs of small and medium-sized enterprises must meet:

[0061]

[0062] The present invention adopts Stackelberg game theory to establish a two-layer dynamic game model, in which the industrial software platform is the leader and the small and medium-sized enterprises are the followers. In the upper layer of the model, the pricing problem of industrial software application and management service given the needs of different small and medium-sized enterprises can be studied. In the lower layer of the model, the problem of software application and management service demand adopted by each small and medium-sized enterprise for its own utility optimization can be studied after the pricing strategies of different small and medium-sized enterprises are given in the upper layer.

[0063] First, analyze the revenue of the industrial software platform. Revenue = income - cost. The revenue of the industrial software platform depends on the unit price of the industrial software service, the maintenance and upgrade costs and the sales volume. In addition, unlike traditional software suppliers, under the SaaS model, the industrial software platform only needs to provide a set of software systems to meet the simultaneous use needs of multiple corporate tenants. For the update and maintenance of the software system, the platform only needs to perform an operation on its own server, without the need to update each tenant separately. Therefore, as long as the industrial software platform has enough customers, the cost of platform maintenance and software upgrades can be ignored. The present invention regards the cost of the industrial software platform as 0, which does not affect the analysis of the final results.

[0064] From the perspective of the industrial software platform, the industrial software platform hopes to find a suitable price to optimize its own profits. The price should not be too high or too low. If the price is too high, the demand for software applications and management services of small and medium-sized enterprises will decrease, and they may even choose to develop their own software. If the price is too low, although the demand for software applications and management services of small and medium-sized enterprises will increase, the profits will be very low, and even the income will be lower than the cost, resulting in losses. Therefore, the profit function of the industrial software platform can be defined as:

[0065]

[0066] The lower layer of the game model is a non-cooperative game between n enterprises. The enterprises are completely isolated from each other. There is no communication between the enterprises and they do not know any information about each other. The purpose of small and medium-sized enterprises purchasing industrial software services is to improve their work efficiency and gain greater profits for themselves. Because the carrying capacity of the platform server is limited, the industrial software services purchased by small and medium-sized enterprises are also limited, so a resource competition relationship is formed between enterprises.

[0067] In the non-cooperative game between n enterprises, given the platform's own industrial software application and management service pricing, each enterprise constantly adjusts its software application and management service needs to optimize its own utility. The utility of each enterprise consists of pure utility and expenditure. Considering the purchase willingness of enterprises, the diversity of their demand for industrial software application and management services, and the impact of software service quality, the utility function of enterprise i can be expressed as:

[0068] U i =ω i *log(1+qd i r i )-(p i +C)r i (2)

[0069] The total software application and management service requirements of all enterprises must meet:

[0070]

[0071] Based on the enterprise utility function and platform revenue function constructed above, the existence analysis of the Nash equilibrium solution of the constructed game model was carried out.

[0072] First, the non-cooperative game problem between small and medium-sized enterprises at the lower level can be regarded as a utility optimization problem, that is, enterprise i will adjust its software application and management service needs according to the pricing strategy given to it by the industrial software platform to maximize its utility function U i , the present invention defines the utility problem of small and medium-sized enterprises as follows:

[0073]

[0074] At the same time, the above formula must meet the following conditions:

[0075]

[0076] It can be observed that the enterprise's utility function U i It is continuous in its domain, and the function is i , its partial derivatives exist, so for the function U i Find the variable r i The first-order partial derivative of , we get:

[0077]

[0078] Then derive the second-order partial derivative of the enterprise utility function:

[0079]

[0080] It can be found that the enterprise utility function U i The second-order partial derivative of is strictly less than 0, which indicates that the enterprise utility function U i It is a strict concave function. According to the relevant properties of concave functions and related mathematical theories, it can be concluded that the non-cooperative game between the platform and SMEs has a Nash equilibrium point.

[0081] The present invention uses the reverse induction method to solve the game model. Considering the sharing and complementarity of business resource services in the industrial cluster area, the present invention takes these factors into consideration when solving the Nash equilibrium to ensure that the pricing strategy not only reflects the utility maximization of a single enterprise, but also promotes resource sharing and coordinated development in the entire region. The present invention defines the non-cooperative game problem between lower-level small and medium-sized enterprises as a utility optimization problem, and it is a constrained optimization problem, so it can be regarded as a problem of finding the extreme value of a function with constraints.

[0082] In order to solve this type of problem, the present invention adopts the classical Lagrangian method.

[0083] Introducing the Lagrange multiplier λ≥0, the constraint function The problem can be formulated as a Lagrangian function F:

[0084]

[0085] The solution to problem (4) is i * is a necessary condition for the entire Nash equilibrium solution, and together we can get:

[0086]

[0087] Depend on It can be solved as:

[0088]

[0089] If λ = 0, because the pricing strategy of the industrial software platform and the software application and management service demand strategy of small and medium-sized enterprises are greater than 0, that is, r i >0, p i > 0. From (10), we can deduce:

[0090] 0<p i +C<ω i qd i (11) If λ>0, the first two equations in (9) can be combined to obtain:

[0091]

[0092] The above formula is equivalent to:

[0093]

[0094] The left side of the above equation is equivalent to:

[0095]

[0096] Let ζ be the right side of the equal sign in (13):

[0097]

[0098] Substituting (14) and (15) into (13), we obtain:

[0099]

[0100] Taking enterprise t out of the left side of equation (16), we get:

[0101]

[0102] By adding n-1 enterprises other than enterprise i on both sides of equation (17), we get:

[0103]

[0104] The right side of equation (18) does not contain enterprise i, so (18) is equivalent to:

[0105]

[0106] The left side of equation (19) Excluding enterprise t, the right side of the equation does not include enterprise k, so (19) is equivalent to:

[0107]

[0108] It can be observed that the sum of both sides of (20) and the multiplication are just different in signs, but there is no real difference. Therefore, we can cancel out the common factors and get:

[0109] ζ(p t + C + λ) = (n-1)ω t (twenty one)

[0110] Substituting ζ into (21) we obtain:

[0111]

[0112] Add enterprise i to both sides of equation (22) to obtain:

[0113]

[0114] The above formula is equivalent to:

[0115]

[0116] Substituting (12) into (24), we obtain:

[0117]

[0118] The Nash equilibrium point can be obtained by combining (25) and (10)

[0119]

[0120] Observing the Nash equilibrium The factors affecting the optimal pricing strategy of the industrial software platform can be concluded as follows:

[0121] 1) The larger the load limit L of the industrial software platform server, the better the pricing strategy The lower, because:

[0122]

[0123] 2) The higher the quality of software services provided by the platform, the better the pricing strategy. The higher, because:

[0124]

[0125] 3) The lower the unit cost C of platform development and maintenance software, the better the pricing strategy The higher, because

[0126] 4) Diversity of enterprise demand for industrial software i The higher the value, the better the pricing strategy. The higher, because

[0127] 5) The stronger the company's willingness to buy, the better the pricing strategy The higher, because:

[0128]

[0129] When the Nash equilibrium is reached At this time, the benefits of the industrial software platform are as follows:

[0130]

[0131] It can be observed that:

[0132] (1) Diversity of enterprises’ demands for industrial software i The higher the value, the higher the revenue of the industrial software platform. * The higher, because

[0133] (2) The stronger the purchasing intention of enterprises, the greater the revenue of industrial software platform E * The higher, because

[0134] Based on the above observations, the present invention designs an iterative algorithm to address the limitations of the reverse induction method under incomplete information. The iterative algorithm continuously adjusts the pricing strategy of the industrial software platform while taking into account the dynamic changes of business resource services in the industrial cluster area to achieve optimal allocation and utilization of resources, thereby promoting the common growth of enterprises in the region and improving their overall competitiveness.

[0135] The Stackelberg game is a master-slave dynamic game. The decision-making of the game participants is in order. The game participants constantly adjust their strategies and eventually reach an equilibrium state. The iterative algorithm of this method is designed according to the iterative process. Therefore, the iterative process can be divided into multiple stages. Industrial software platforms and small and medium-sized enterprises update their pricing strategies and software application and management service demand strategies at each stage based on the information they have at the current stage.

[0136] Assume that the set of SMEs I = {1,...,n}, and the initial software application and management service demand strategies of each enterprise are the same, denoted as r(T = 0). Different types of SMEs have different needs and capabilities for services in the industrial software platform. Therefore, after multiple iterations, the software application and management service demand strategies of each enterprise will change differently. As the leader of the model, the industrial software platform cannot know the behavior of the followers, that is, the enterprises, in the initial state. Therefore, in the initial state, the industrial software platform keeps the same pricing for each enterprise, denoted as p(T = 0). Because the pricing strategy of the industrial software platform and the software application and management service demand strategy of SMEs will eventually reach a Nash equilibrium, the termination condition of the algorithm is that the absolute value of the difference between the results of two iterations of the industrial software platform pricing strategy is less than δ (δ is a very small value). The termination condition of each iteration of SMEs is similar.

[0137] The iterative algorithm is described as follows:

[0138] At a specific time T, the industrial software platform’s pricing strategy for each enterprise is p(T). When enterprise i learns the pricing strategy p given to it by the platform, i (T), and continuously iterate and adjust its software application and management service demand strategy to r within ΔT time. i (T), until one's own utility function U i When the service function demand strategy r(T) of all enterprises is iterated, the industrial software platform formulates a new round of pricing strategy p(T+1) based on r(T) and informs SMEs. After learning the new round of pricing strategy, each enterprise continuously iterates and adjusts its service function demand strategy to r within ΔT time. i (T+1), and the above steps are repeated until the revenue of the industrial software platform and the utility function of SMEs reach the optimal value.

[0139] In the time interval ΔT between industrial software platforms T and T+1, each SME has repeatedly iterated its software application and management service demand strategy. Assume that enterprise i is at time t i Iterate the software application and management service demand strategy once, then at time t i +1 for the next iteration, so the iteration timing of enterprise i is t i With t i In the dynamic model of enterprise software application and management service demand strategy iteration, the present invention uses the gradient of the enterprise utility function To represent the rate of change of enterprise software application and management service demand strategy.

[0140]

[0141] The iterative equation of the software application and management service demand strategy function of enterprise i can be obtained (a>0 represents the adjustment step of the software application and management service demand strategy):

[0142]

[0143] Since the utility function of SMEs is a concave function, based on the utility function U i The non-cooperative game will definitely reach an equilibrium state within a finite number of iterations, that is, the Nash equilibrium point.

[0144] In the time interval between T and T+1, after the utility functions of all enterprises converge to the Nash equilibrium point, the industrial software platform will formulate new pricing strategies for each enterprise at time T+1 based on the software application and management service needs of all enterprises. Therefore, the iterative equation of the pricing strategy function of the industrial software platform can be expressed as follows (b>0 represents the adjustment step of the industrial software platform pricing strategy)

[0145]

[0146] Similar to the marginal revenue in microeconomics, the partial derivative of the revenue function of the industrial software platform with respect to the pricing price can be calculated with the help of a very small change θ (for example, θ = 10 -4 ), can be calculated using the following formula:

[0147]

[0148] Because the total software application and management service requirements of all enterprises cannot exceed the maximum limit of the services that the industrial software platform server can carry, that is, Therefore, in the process of iterating enterprise software application and management service demand strategy, a critical value needs to be defined. season It can meet the total software application and management service needs of all small and medium-sized enterprises without exceeding the maximum load limit of the platform server.

[0149] To sum up, the execution process of the entire iterative algorithm is:

[0150] (1) At time 0, the industrial software platform does not know the information of SMEs. The industrial software platform will give an initial price and inform each SME. At any time T other than 0, the platform will re-formulate a pricing strategy for each enterprise according to formula (33-34) and inform each enterprise.

[0151] (2) Enterprise i at each iteration time t i They will adjust their software application and management service demand strategies iteratively based on the pricing given by the platform and the critical value according to formula (31-32) until the enterprise utility function reaches the maximum value. The standard for the enterprise utility function to reach the maximum value is: i (t)-r i (t-1)≥δ means that the enterprise cannot obtain higher utility by further adjusting its own strategy. When all enterprises complete the above iterative process, they will inform the industrial software platform.

[0152] (3) If the profit function of the industrial software platform reaches its maximum value at this moment, the algorithm ends, and the solution at this moment is the Nash equilibrium solution of the entire Stackelberg game; the criterion for the profit function to reach its maximum value is: p(T)-p(T-1)≥δ

[0153] If the profit function of the industrial software platform has not reached its maximum value, then at time T+1, return to step (1) and continue iterating, and repeat the above steps until both the profit function of the industrial software platform and the utility function of SMEs reach their maximum values.

[0154] The game pricing model constructed by the present invention comprehensively considers the factors of both the platform and the enterprise, so that the optimal pricing can not only maximize the revenue of the industrial software platform but also optimize the utility of small and medium-sized enterprises, thereby achieving a win-win situation for the platform and enterprises and promoting the digital transformation of small and medium-sized enterprises and the sustainable development of the industrial software platform.

[0155] The present invention proposes an iterative algorithm for solving the Stackelberg game model under incomplete information conditions. The industrial software platform only needs to know part of the information of small and medium-sized enterprises to obtain the optimal pricing strategy, which is more in line with the actual market situation.

[0156] The symbols of this specific embodiment are shown in Table 1.

[0157] Table 1 Mathematical symbols and their explanations

[0158]

[0159]

[0160] The contents not described in detail in this specification belong to the prior art known to professional and technical personnel in this field.

Claims

1. A pricing method for software application and management services of industrial software platform for business resource services in industrial cluster areas, characterized by: The following steps are involved: The software service platform sets the initial pricing for each software application and management service; The following steps are executed in a loop until the revenue function of the software service platform is maximized, and the corresponding purchaser's software application and management service requirements, as well as the pricing of various software application and management services are output: the purchaser includes multiple purchasers, and the geographical locations of the purchasers are in the same industrial cluster area, and the partial software application and management service requirements of the purchasers are consistent; The buyer iteratively adjusts its software application and management service requirements according to the pricing of various software applications and management services and the buyer's constraints until the buyer's utility function is maximized; The software service platform adjusts the pricing of its various software applications and management services based on the purchaser's software application and management service needs.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The purchaser's constraints include: the total software application and management service requirements of all purchasers cannot exceed the maximum load capacity of the software service platform's server.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The criterion for the buyer's utility function to be maximized is that the difference between two consecutive adjustments of the software application and management service demand is less than the corresponding set value; The criterion for maximizing the software service platform's profit function is that the difference between the results of two consecutive adjustments to the pricing of various software applications and management services is less than the corresponding set value.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The iterative adjustment strategy of the purchaser's software application and management service demand is: adjust the current software application and management service demand based on the last adjusted software application and management service demand and its impact on the purchaser's utility function.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that: The expression of the iterative adjustment strategy equation for the software application and management service demand of the i-th buyer is as follows: in, Denotes the buyer's utility function U i The gradient of (); t i Indicates time; r i () represents the software application and management service demand of the i-th buyer; a>0, represents the adjustment step of the software application and management service demand strategy.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The pricing adjustment strategy of the software service platform is to adjust the pricing of the various services provided to each buyer this time based on the pricing adjusted last time and its impact on the revenue function of the software service platform.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that: The price p of the software service platform for the i-th buyer i The expression of the adjustment strategy equation is as follows: Among them, r i () represents the software application and management service demand of the i-th buyer; T represents the cycle round; b>0, represents the adjustment step of the pricing strategy; θ represents the set change; E() represents the profit function of the software service platform; n represents the number of buyers.

8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The revenue function E of the software service platform is expressed as: Among them, r i () represents the software application and management service demand of the i-th buyer, n represents the number of buyers, and C represents the unit cost of the software service platform for subsequent maintenance and upgrading of the software; p i Represents the pricing strategy of the software service platform for the i-th buyer.

9. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The utility function U of the i-th buyer i The expression is: U i =ω i *log(1+qd i r i )-(p i +C)r i Among them, ω i represents the purchase intention of the i-th buyer; d i represents the diversity of demand of the i-th buyer; p i represents the pricing strategy of the software service platform for the i-th buyer; q represents the quality of software service; r i represents the software application and management service demand of the ith buyer, and C represents the unit cost of the software service platform for subsequent maintenance and upgrading of the software.

10. An industrial software platform service pricing system for business resource services in industrial cluster areas, characterized by: A method for pricing industrial software platform services for business resource services in industrial cluster areas as described in any one of claims 1-9.