Deception defense device and method for non-inductive migration website backdoor
By introducing a deceptive defense device for migrating the backdoor of the website in Miwang, detecting and rewriting the website backdoor files uploaded by the attacker and migrating them to the honeypot, the low degree of integration with Miwang and passive trapping ability is solved. The problem is to achieve efficient deception and active defense within the business.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411292357.1
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-09-14
- Publication Date
- 2024-12-03
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-09-14
AI Technical Summary
The existing honeynet technology has limited integration between the dense network and the business, and cannot perform fraud within the business, and has passive trapping ability, which cannot delay attack time and monitor attack methods.
Using the deception defense device for the backdoor of the website without sensing migration, including the website backdoor detection module, file ferry module and file rewriting module, it can be used to monitor and identify the website backdoor files uploaded by the attacker, pass them into a honeypot to run, and then transfer the files. The destination address of the content is rewritten as the website backdoor address in the honeypot to realize the interaction between the attacker and the honeypot.
Without the attacking party's perception, the interaction and control actions between the attacker and the backdoor of the real business server website are transferred to the honeypot, improving the integration of the dense network and the business and the active trapping ability.
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Figure CN119071078A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the field of network security technology, and in particular to a deception defense device and method for seamlessly migrating a website backdoor. Background Art
[0002] Honeynet is a technology that actively defends network security. By setting up honeypots and networks, honeynets can effectively attract, monitor and analyze the behavior of malicious attackers, thereby improving the security of the entire network. A honeynet is a network environment composed of multiple honeypots and related infrastructure. These honeypots simulate real computer systems, network devices or application services, and are specifically used to attract and capture attackers. Honeypots can be virtual machines, containers, or even physical devices. These honeypots are usually isolated from the actual production environment, but they look the same as real systems, misleading attackers into thinking they are attacking real targets. Honeynets record the attacker's behavior and tools in detail through logs, network traffic capture, and other monitoring tools. This data can be used to analyze attack methods, identify attackers, and improve defense strategies. The real-time attack information provided by honeynets can be used to generate threat intelligence to help other security systems and defense strategies respond to new threats in a timely manner.
[0003] Deception Defense Honeynet plays an important role in the current network security system through the carefully designed disguised nodes and bait systems. Honeynet can not only effectively confuse the attacker's sight and guide him into the preset monitoring area, but also capture and analyze the attack behavior without being noticed. This process not only provides the security team with valuable attack intelligence, reveals the tactics, techniques and processes of hackers, but also greatly enhances the security resilience of the network. The application of honeynet enables enterprises to respond quickly and accurately defend against unknown threats, realizing the strategic transformation from passive defense to active early warning.
[0004] Although the existing honeynet technology has played an important role in practical applications, there are still some common problems. First, the IP and port occupied by the honeynet deployment are usually distinguished from the real business system to avoid the problem of resource preemption such as network IP and port, resulting in limited integration between the honeynet and the business, and unable to conduct deception and trapping within the business. Secondly, after the attacker identifies the real business system and attacks the business system, the network resources of the honeynet and the real business are relatively separated. When the attacker attacks a certain identified real business system, he cannot be trapped by the honeynet. In addition, the honeynet's trapping and deception technology mainly relies on the attacker to actively discover the honeypot of the honeynet attack, lacking the ability to dynamically interact with the attacker during the attack process, and the trapping of the attack is relatively passive, which cannot achieve the purpose of delaying the attack time and monitoring the attack method. Summary of the invention
[0005] In view of this, the purpose of the present invention is to provide a deception defense device and method for seamlessly migrating website backdoors, so as to solve the problems existing in the existing honeynet solutions, such as limited integration of honeynet and business, inability to execute deception within the business, reliance on attackers to actively discover and attack, and passive trapping capabilities.
[0006] To achieve the above object, the present invention is implemented by adopting the following technical solutions: The present invention provides a fraud prevention device for seamlessly migrating website backdoors, comprising: A website backdoor detection module is deployed on the real business server of the defender, and is used to monitor the website directory files of the real business server of the defender, identify and extract the website backdoor files uploaded by the attacker; A file ferry module is used to transfer the website backdoor file uploaded by the attacker to the honeypot and run it, so as to obtain the website backdoor address running in the honeypot; A file rewriting module, used to rewrite the destination address in the website backdoor file content uploaded by the attacker into the website backdoor address running in the honeypot; The virtual honeypot module is used to run the rewritten website backdoor file and monitor the malicious instructions and interactive operations sent by the attacker to the backdoor of the defender's real business server website.
[0007] Preferably, the website backdoor detection module is specifically used to: Monitor changes in the website directory files of the real business server of the defender, including newly added files and modified files; The newly added file and the modified file contents are matched, and if a file with website backdoor features is matched, it is identified as a website backdoor file uploaded by the attacker.
[0008] Preferably, the website backdoor detection module is specifically used to: Extract the website backdoor file uploaded by the attacker, and record the file name, file path, file content, real business IP and real business port of the website backdoor file.
[0009] Preferably, the file ferry module is specifically used to: Get the backdoor address of the website running in the honeypot, including the honeypot IP, honeypot port, file path in the honeypot, and file name in the honeypot.
[0010] Preferably, the file rewriting module is specifically used to: The website backdoor file uploaded by the attacker on the defender's real business server is not modified in terms of file path, file name, real business IP and real business port, and only the file content is rewritten to the reverse proxy file content; in the reverse proxy file content, the reverse proxy destination address points to the website backdoor address running in the honeypot.
[0011] The present invention also provides a deception defense method based on the above-mentioned deception defense device for the seamless migration website backdoor, comprising: The website backdoor detection module monitors the website directory files of the defender's real business server, identifies and extracts the website backdoor files uploaded by the attacker; The website backdoor file uploaded by the attacker is transferred to the honeypot through the file ferry module and run, and the website backdoor address running in the honeypot is obtained; Rewrite the destination address in the website backdoor file content uploaded by the attacker into the website backdoor address running in the honeypot through the file rewriting module; The rewritten website backdoor file is run through the virtual honeypot module to monitor the malicious instructions and interactive operations issued by the attacker to the website backdoor.
[0012] Preferably, the monitoring of the website directory files of the real business server of the defender to identify and extract the website backdoor files uploaded by the attacker includes: Monitor changes in the website directory files of the real business server of the defender, including newly added files and modified files; The newly added files and modified file contents are matched by regular expressions or AST semantic analysis. If a file with website backdoor features is matched, it is identified as a website backdoor file uploaded by the attacker. Extract the website backdoor file uploaded by the attacker and record the file name, file path, file content, real business IP and real business port; Based on the extracted file name, file path, file content, real business IP and real business port, the URL path that the attacker uses to access the website backdoor is obtained.
[0013] Preferably, the backdoor address of the website running in the honeypot is obtained as follows: According to the honeypot IP, honeypot port, file path in the honeypot and file name in the honeypot, the access URL path of the website backdoor file in the honeypot is obtained.
[0014] Preferably, rewriting the destination address in the website backdoor file content uploaded by the attacker into the website backdoor address running in the honeypot includes: The website backdoor file uploaded by the attacker on the real business server of the defender does not modify the file path, file name, real business IP and real business port, and only rewrites the file content to the reverse proxy file content; the reverse proxy file content is: receiving any data packet traffic of the URL path of the attacker to access the website backdoor, forwarding it to the access URL path of the website backdoor file in the honeypot, and returning the request response value of the website backdoor URL in the honeypot to the current page.
[0015] The beneficial effects of the present invention are at least: The present invention provides a deception defense device and method for imperceptibly migrating a website backdoor, which detects and identifies the website backdoor file uploaded by the attacker to the real business server of the defender by deploying a website backdoor detection module on the real business server of the defender, extracts the website backdoor file through a file ferry module, and passes it to a honeypot for running, rewrites the website backdoor file content on the real business server into a reverse proxy file content through a file rewriting module, and the reverse proxy destination address points to the website backdoor in the honeypot. The present invention can transfer the interaction and control actions of the attacker and the website backdoor of the real business server to the honeypot without the attacker's perception, and the attacker actually interacts with the website backdoor file in the honeypot, which greatly improves the integration of deception defense technology and real business, and improves the ability of the honeypot to actively trap the attacker's actions. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0016] Figure 1 A data interaction diagram of each module of a fraud prevention device for seamlessly migrating website backdoors provided by an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 2 A flow chart of a method for preventing deception of backdoors in seamlessly migrated websites provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0017] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the present invention more clearly understood, the present invention is further described in detail below in conjunction with the embodiments and the accompanying drawings. Here, the illustrative embodiments of the present invention and their descriptions are used to explain the present invention, but are not intended to limit the present invention.
[0018] It should also be noted that, in order to avoid obscuring the present invention due to unnecessary details, only structures and / or processing steps closely related to the solutions according to the present invention are shown in the accompanying drawings, while other details that are not closely related to the present invention are omitted.
[0019] It should be emphasized that the term “include / comprises” when used herein refers to the presence of features, elements, steps or components, but does not exclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, elements, steps or components.
[0020] It should be emphasized here that the step marks mentioned in the following embodiments are not intended to limit the order of the steps, but it should be understood that the steps may be executed in the order mentioned in the embodiments, or may be different from the order in the embodiments, or several steps may be executed simultaneously. Example 1
[0021] To facilitate a better understanding, the existing honeynet solution is further explained. In the traditional honeynet solution, the IP and port occupied by the honeynet deployment are usually distinguished from the real business system, so as to avoid the problem of resource preemption such as network IP and port, resulting in limited integration between the honeynet and the business, and unable to perform deception and trapping within the business. When the attacker identifies the real business system and attacks the business system, the network resources of the honeynet and the real business are relatively separated, and the attacker cannot be trapped by the honeynet when attacking a certain identified real business system. The trapping and deception technology of the honeynet mainly relies on the attacker to actively discover the honeypot of the honeynet attack, lacking the ability to dynamically interact with the attacker during the attack process, and the trapping of the attack is relatively passive, which cannot achieve the purpose of delaying the attack time and monitoring the attack method.
[0022] Based on the defects of the above-mentioned prior art solutions, the present invention proposes a fraud prevention device for seamlessly migrating website backdoors. The principle is as follows: Figure 1 As shown in the figure. In response to the attacker's behavior of attacking the website backdoor, from the perspective of deception attack, we integrate network backdoor detection, file ferrying, file rewriting, virtual honeypot and other modules to build an attack deception technology that is unaware of the attacker, highly integrated with the business, and actively defends the attack process, aiming to improve the success rate of trapping and obtain the attacker's characteristics and information.
[0023] See also Figure 1 The embodiment 1 proposes a fraud prevention device for a backdoor of a website that is not sensitively migrated, including: The website backdoor detection module is deployed on the real business server of the defender, and is used to monitor the website directory files of the real business server of the defender, as well as to detect and extract the website backdoor files uploaded by the attacker; The file ferry module is used to transfer the website backdoor file uploaded by the attacker to the honeypot and run it, and obtain the website backdoor address running in the honeypot; The file rewriting module is used to rewrite the website backdoor file content on the defender's real business server by rewriting the destination address in the website backdoor file content to the website backdoor address running in the honeypot; The virtual honeypot module is used to run the rewritten backdoor file of the attacker's website and monitor the malicious instructions and interactive operations issued by the attacker to the website backdoor.
[0024] In this embodiment, the website backdoor detection module monitors the website directory files of the real business server, which means monitoring the changes of the website directory files of the real business server, including addition and modification.
[0025] In this embodiment, the website backdoor detection module detects and extracts the website backdoor file uploaded by the attacker, and records the file name (file_name), file path (file_path), file content (webshell_content), real business IP (ip_realserver) and real business port (port_realserver) of the backdoor file.
[0026] In this embodiment, the file ferry module obtains the backdoor address of the website running in the honeypot, including the honeypot IP (ip_honeypot), the honeypot port (port_honeypot), the file path in the honeypot (file_honey_path) and the file name in the honeypot (file_honey_name).
[0027] In this embodiment, the file rewriting module rewrites only the file content of the website backdoor file uploaded by the attacker detected by the website backdoor detection module in the real business server into the reverse proxy file content (proxy_content) (without modifying the file path, file name, real business IP and real business port), wherein, in the reverse proxy file content (proxy_content), the reverse proxy destination address points to the website backdoor address running in the honeypot, that is: ip_honeypot:port_honeypot / file_honey_path / file_honey_name.
[0028] Based on this, this embodiment realizes the migration of the website backdoor file uploaded by the attacker to the real business server to the honeypot without the attacker's awareness; the attacker continues to interact with the website backdoor address (ip_realserver:port_realserver / file_path / file_name) in the real business server, but the interaction traffic is forwarded to the website backdoor address in the honeypot, and all backdoor control behaviors for the real business server are migrated to the honeypot for execution, which greatly improves the integration of dense network technology and real business, and improves the active trapping capability of the dense network. Example 2
[0029] Based on the above-mentioned embodiment 1, the fraud prevention device for the backdoor of the senseless migration website, this embodiment 2 provides a fraud prevention method for the backdoor of the senseless migration website, see Figure 2 , the method comprises the following steps: (1) The website backdoor detection module monitors the changes in the files in the website directory of the defender's real business server, monitors the newly added and modified files in the website directory, and identifies files with website backdoor characteristics, which are the website backdoor files uploaded by the attacker; (2) The website backdoor detection module detects the website backdoor file uploaded by the attacker, extracts the website backdoor file, and records the website backdoor file's file name (file_name), file path (file_path), file content (webshell_content), real business IP (ip_realserver), and real business port (port_realserver); (3) The detected website backdoor file uploaded by the attacker is transferred to the honeypot environment through the file ferry module, and the website backdoor file is run to obtain the website backdoor address running in the honeypot, including the honeypot IP (ip_honeypot), honeypot port (port_honeypot), file path in the honeypot (file_honey_path) and file name in the honeypot (file_honey_name); (4) The file rewriting module rewrites the website backdoor file detected in the defender's real business server to the reverse proxy file content (proxy_content) without modifying the file path and file name. In the reverse proxy file content (proxy_content), the reverse proxy destination address points to the website backdoor address running in the honeypot, that is, ip_honeypot:port_honeypot / file_honey_path / file_honey_name; (5) Use the virtual honeypot module to monitor the malicious commands and interactive operations issued by attackers to the website backdoor.
[0030] In step (1) of this embodiment, the website backdoor detection module monitors the website directory of the real business server of the defender. The website directory of the business server is usually set by the user. The system default directory is generally / var / www, / var / website, etc. The website directory is monitored for files to promptly discover new files and modified files in the website directory. The website backdoor detection module generally uses regular expressions, AST semantic analysis, etc. to match the directory file content. If a file with website backdoor characteristics is matched, it is considered to be a website backdoor file uploaded by the attacker.
[0031] The website backdoor detection module detects the website backdoor file, extracts the website backdoor file, and records the website backdoor file's file name (file_name), file path (file_path), file content (webshell_content), real business IP (ip_realserver), and real business port (port_realserver).
[0032] In the general business website construction method, such as PHP website, Python website, etc., after obtaining the website backdoor file name (file_name) and file path (file_path), based on the real business IP (ip_realserver) and real business port (port_realserver), you can splice the URL path for the attacker to access the website backdoor, which is generally: ip_realserver:port_realserver / file_path / file_name. When the attacker accesses this path, the code function in the website backdoor file name (file_name) will be executed.
[0033] In step (3) of this embodiment, the backdoor address of the website running in the honeypot is obtained, including the honeypot IP (ip_honeypot), the honeypot port (port_honeypot), the file path in the honeypot (file_honey_path) and the file name in the honeypot (file_honey_name); After transferring the website backdoor file to the honeypot and running it, the access URL path of the website backdoor in the honeypot can be obtained based on the honeypot IP (ip_honeypot), honeypot port (port_honeypot), file path in the honeypot (file_honey_path) and file name in the honeypot (file_honey_name), which is generally: ip_honeypot:port_honeypot / file_honey_path / file_honey_name.
[0034] In step (4) of this embodiment, the website backdoor file detected in the real business server of the defender is rewritten by the file rewriting module without modifying the file path and file name, and only rewriting the file content to the reverse proxy file content (proxy_content). The reverse proxy file content (proxy_content) code implementation sample and code explanation are as follows: <?php / / Target URL $targetUrl = 'ip_honeypot:port_honeypot / file_honey_path / file_honey_name'; / / Initialize the cURL session $ch = curl_init(); / / Prepare cURL options curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $targetUrl); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true); / / Return result as string curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HEADER, false); / / Do not get the HTTP header yet, you can process it later curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, true); / / Follow redirects curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_MAXREDIRS, 10); / / Maximum number of redirects / / If it is a POST request, set the POST data if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] == 'POST') { curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, http_build_query($_POST)); / / Assume it is application / x-www-form-urlencoded / / If you need to process other types of POST data (such as JSON, file upload, etc.), you need to set CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS and CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER accordingly } / / Forward HTTP headers (optional, forward as needed) if (!empty($_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'])) { $headers[] = 'X-Forwarded-For: ' . $_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR']; } / / You can add more HTTP headers as needed / / curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER, $headers); / / If $headers is set / / Send request and get response $response = curl_exec($ch); / / Check if any error occurred if (curl_errno($ch)) { / / If the cURL request fails, output an error message http_response_code(502); / / Bad Gateway echo 'cURL Error: ' . curl_error($ch); } else { / / Request successful, set response header (optional, if necessary) / / header('Content-Type: application / json'); / / Assume the response is JSON, set it according to the actual situation / / Get and forward HTTP headers (if necessary) / / $info = curl_getinfo($ch); / / You can get information such as the HTTP status code through the $info array and set the response header accordingly / / Output the response content echo $response; } / / Close the cURL session curl_close($ch); ?> In the above code, the $targetUrl variable value is set to the URL address where the backdoor file of the website in the honeypot is running, which is generally: ip_honeypot:port_honeypot / file_honey_path / file_honey_name; When the attacker accesses the URL address of the website backdoor file on the real server: ip_realserver:port_realserver / file_path / file_name, the content of the website backdoor file (webshell_content) is replaced by the content of the reverse proxy file (proxy_content). The code function of the reverse proxy file is implemented to receive any data packet traffic of the attacker accessing this URL, and forward it to the URL where the website backdoor file in the honeypot runs: ip_honeypot:port_honeypot / file_honey_path / file_honey_name, and return the request response value of the website backdoor URL in the honeypot to the current page, realizing the reverse proxy function. At this time, the attacker accesses the URL address of the website backdoor file on the real server, and the actual running website backdoor file is already running in the honeypot, which the attacker cannot perceive, achieving the ability to achieve deception and active trapping inside the business server, greatly improving the integration of the dense network and the business system, and the active deception ability of the dense network.
[0035] In summary, this embodiment provides a deception defense method for imperceptibly migrating website backdoors. The website backdoor detection module detects the website backdoor uploaded by the attacker to the real business server of the defender, extracts the website backdoor file through the file ferry module, and transfers the website backdoor file to the honeypot for operation. The file rewriting module rewrites the website backdoor file content on the real business server into the reverse proxy file content, and the reverse proxy destination address points to the website backdoor in the honeypot. This embodiment realizes the transfer of the attacker's interaction and control actions with the website backdoor of the real business server to the honeypot without the attacker's awareness. The attacker actually interacts with the website backdoor file in the honeypot, which greatly improves the integration of deception defense technology with real business and improves the ability of the honeypot to actively trap the attacker's actions.
[0036] It should be understood by those skilled in the art that the exemplary components, systems and methods described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in hardware, software or a combination of the two. Whether it is performed in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Professional and technical personnel can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered to be beyond the scope of the present invention. When implemented in hardware, it can be, for example, an electronic circuit, an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), appropriate firmware, a plug-in, a function card, etc. When implemented in software, the elements of the present invention are programs or code segments used to perform the required tasks. The program or code segment can be stored in a machine-readable medium, or transmitted on a transmission medium or a communication link via a data signal carried in a carrier.
[0037] It should be clear that the present invention is not limited to the specific configuration and processing described above and shown in the figures. For the sake of simplicity, a detailed description of the known method is omitted here. In the above embodiments, several specific steps are described and shown as examples. However, the method process of the present invention is not limited to the specific steps described and shown, and those skilled in the art can make various changes, modifications and additions, or change the order between the steps after understanding the spirit of the present invention.
[0038] In the present invention, features described and / or illustrated for one embodiment may be used in the same or similar manner in one or more other embodiments, and / or combined with features of other embodiments or replace features of other embodiments.
[0039] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. For those skilled in the art, the embodiments of the present invention may have various modifications and variations. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present invention shall be included in the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims
1. A fraud prevention device for a backdoor of a non-perceptible migration website, characterized in that: include: A website backdoor detection module is deployed on the real business server of the defender, and is used to monitor the website directory files of the real business server of the defender, identify and extract the website backdoor files uploaded by the attacker; A file ferry module is used to transfer the website backdoor file uploaded by the attacker to the honeypot and run it, so as to obtain the website backdoor address running in the honeypot; A file rewriting module, used to rewrite the destination address in the website backdoor file content uploaded by the attacker into the website backdoor address running in the honeypot; The virtual honeypot module is used to run the rewritten website backdoor file and monitor the malicious instructions and interactive operations sent by the attacker to the backdoor of the defender's real business server website.
2. According to claim 1, a fraud prevention device for a backdoor of a website that is not sensitively migrated is characterized in that: The website backdoor detection module is specifically used to: Monitor changes in the website directory files of the real business server of the defender, including newly added files and modified files; The newly added file and the modified file contents are matched, and if a file with website backdoor features is matched, it is identified as a website backdoor file uploaded by the attacker.
3. The deception defense device for the backdoor of a website that is not sensitively migrated according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The website backdoor detection module is specifically used to: Extract the website backdoor file uploaded by the attacker, and record the file name, file path, file content, real business IP and real business port of the website backdoor file.
4. The deception defense device for the backdoor of a website that is not sensitively migrated according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The file ferry module is specifically used for: Get the backdoor address of the website running in the honeypot, including the honeypot IP, honeypot port, file path in the honeypot, and file name in the honeypot.
5. The deception defense device for the backdoor of a website that is not sensitively migrated according to claim 4 is characterized in that: The file rewriting module is specifically used for: The website backdoor file uploaded by the attacker on the defender's real business server is not modified in terms of file path, file name, real business IP and real business port, and only the file content is rewritten to the reverse proxy file content; in the reverse proxy file content, the reverse proxy destination address points to the website backdoor address running in the honeypot.
6. A deception defense method based on the deception defense device for the seamless migration website backdoor according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that: include: The website backdoor detection module monitors the website directory files of the defender's real business server, identifies and extracts the website backdoor files uploaded by the attacker; The website backdoor file uploaded by the attacker is transferred to the honeypot through the file ferry module and run, so as to obtain the website backdoor address running in the honeypot; Rewrite the destination address in the website backdoor file content uploaded by the attacker into the website backdoor address running in the honeypot through the file rewriting module; The rewritten website backdoor file is run through the virtual honeypot module to monitor the malicious instructions and interactive operations issued by the attacker to the website backdoor.
7. The fraud prevention method according to claim 6, characterized in that: The monitoring of the website directory files of the defender's real business server, identifying and extracting the website backdoor files uploaded by the attacker, includes: Monitor changes in the website directory files of the real business server of the defender, including newly added files and modified files; The newly added files and modified file contents are matched by regular expressions or AST semantic analysis. If a file with website backdoor features is matched, it is identified as a website backdoor file uploaded by the attacker. Extract the website backdoor file uploaded by the attacker and record the file name, file path, file content, real business IP and real business port; Based on the extracted file name, file path, file content, real business IP and real business port, the URL path that the attacker uses to access the website backdoor is obtained.
8. The fraud prevention method according to claim 7, characterized in that: The backdoor address of the website running in the honeypot is obtained as follows: According to the honeypot IP, honeypot port, file path in the honeypot and file name in the honeypot, the access URL path of the website backdoor file in the honeypot is obtained.
9. The fraud prevention method according to claim 8, characterized in that: Rewrite the destination address in the website backdoor file uploaded by the attacker to the website backdoor address running in the honeypot, including: The website backdoor file uploaded by the attacker on the real business server of the defender does not modify the file path, file name, real business IP and real business port, and only rewrites the file content to the reverse proxy file content; the reverse proxy file content is: receiving any data packet traffic of the URL path of the attacker to access the website backdoor, forwarding it to the access URL path of the website backdoor file in the honeypot, and returning the request response value of the website backdoor URL in the honeypot to the current page.
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