TPCM equipment access method and device based on secure and trusted switch
Through a secure and trusted switch, the TPCM device access in the industrial control system is used, and the problem of malicious code spread in the industrial control system is solved, decentralized device access authentication is realized, and the System security and management ease.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411229416.0
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-09-03
- Publication Date
- 2024-12-06
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-09-03
AI Technical Summary
The existing technology has failed to effectively solve the spread and destruction of malicious code in industrial control systems, and traditional defense methods are difficult to deal with, and there is a lack of decentralized device access authentication methods, especially in industrial control systems.
Participate in TPCM device access through secure and trusted switches, realize decentralized management, use trusted reporting, identity authentication and sign-up verification mechanisms, update access control whitelists, execute access frequency, communication relationships and aging time policies, and identify abnormal attacks with the use of trusted reporting, identity authentication and sign-up verification mechanisms, update access control whitelists, execute access frequency, communication relationships and aging time policies, and identify abnormal attacks , improve system security.
The target TPCM equipment is connected to a secure and trusted switch without the participation of a third party, improve the security of industrial control systems, simplify management, reduce resource occupation, economical and practical, identify abnormal attacks and establish a whitelist.
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Figure CN119094206A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of secure and trusted switches, and in particular to a TPCM device access method and device based on a secure and trusted switch. Background Art
[0002] As an important basic strategic resource, Industrial Control System (ICS) is used in more than 80% of critical infrastructure. It has the ability to control the switches of hydropower stations, detect the status of power grids, or control the pressure of fuel and gas pipelines, and plays an important role in the national infrastructure.
[0003] At present, the information security of industrial control systems faces severe challenges. The industrial information security white paper released by Kaspersky in 2018 deeply reveals the severe security situation in the global industrial field. According to the white paper, among the globally representative industrial-related enterprises and organizations surveyed extensively, at least 30% of the respondents confirmed that they had suffered cyber attacks. Given that nearly 20% of the respondents did not conduct detailed statistics, this proportion may actually be more shocking. It is particularly noteworthy that malicious code has quietly become a major security risk for industrial control systems (ICS) and their measurement and control terminals. The spread and destructive actions of these malicious codes are extremely secretive and can penetrate the traditional security protection network with physical isolation as the core, making the existing defense means seem powerless, and more advanced and comprehensive security strategies are urgently needed to deal with them. Frequent security incidents highlight the urgency of strengthening protection. With the development of new technologies, traditional protection mechanisms have become difficult to cope with and need to shift to active immune protection. Driven by both law and technology, building an active defense technology system for industrial control systems, especially through key technologies such as trusted verification and demonstration applications in hot industries, has become the key to improving the security protection capabilities of national production system infrastructure.
[0004] In view of the current status of system network security implementation, the following patent contents have been studied:
[0005] In the patent with publication number "CN111083131A" and invention name "A method for lightweight identity authentication of power Internet of Things sensing terminals", the method sends encrypted data and signature values to the edge Internet of Things agent through the Internet of Things terminal. After the edge agent decrypts and verifies the data, it feedbacks the authentication status to the terminal based on the decryption correctness and signature verification results.
[0006] In the patent with publication number "CN 107579819 B" and invention name "A method and system for generating SM9 digital signature", the two terminals participating in the digital signature exchange temporary public keys and ciphertexts to jointly generate and verify digital signatures, ensuring the security of private keys and preventing them from being leaked, and improving the fairness of both parties participating in the signature.
[0007] In the patent with publication number "CN 109951288 B" and invention name "A hierarchical signature method and system based on SM9 digital signature algorithm", a tree structure is constructed to manage KGCs and user terminals at each level to ensure that the length of the user's private key is constant, the verification process is efficient, and only two bilinear pairing operations are required. At the same time, the scheme is secure under the standard model.
[0008] In the patent with publication number "CN107438005B" and invention name "SM9 joint digital signature method and device", the identification private key generated by the key generation center is divided into two parts and stored in the signature client and server respectively. After both parties sign independently, the client synthesizes the complete signature. Even if either party's sub-key is lost, it will not affect the overall security, thereby enhancing the security of the digital signature.
[0009] Some of the above patents are based on proxy identity authentication and are used in the Internet of Things industry. They are research on the transformation of the SM9 algorithm and the improvement of digital signature security. They are not targeted at related applications in industrial control systems and do not involve decentralized device access authentication methods for industrial control systems. Summary of the invention
[0010] In order to solve the problems existing in the prior art, the present invention provides a TPCM device access method and device based on a secure and trusted switch. The secure and trusted switch is used to participate in TPCM device access, thereby improving the security of the industrial control system. No third-party participation is required, decentralization is achieved, management is simple, implementation is convenient, and it is economical and practical.
[0011] In a first aspect, the present invention proposes a TPCM device access method based on a secure and trusted switch, which is applied to the secure and trusted switch. The secure and trusted switch is applied to an industrial control system. The industrial control system also includes a security management platform, a target TPCM device, and multiple other TPCM devices respectively connected to the secure and trusted switch. The method includes:
[0012] In response to the access request information sent by the target TPCM device, sending a request to send a trusted report information to the target TPCM device;
[0013] In response to the trusted report sent by the target TPCM device, sending the trusted report to a security management platform so that the security management platform evaluates the trusted report;
[0014] In response to the assessment passing information sent by the security management platform, the first identity information of the target TPCM device is sent to the signature verification device; and information is sent to the target TPCM device to send the identity authentication information of the target TPCM device to the signature verification device, so that the signature verification device verifies the target TPCM device according to the first identity information of the target TPCM device and the identity authentication information of the target TPCM device; wherein the signature verification device is one of a plurality of other TPCM devices;
[0015] In response to the signature verification pass information sent by the signature verification device, updating the access control whitelist according to the first identity information of the target TPCM device and the second identity information of the target TPCM device; the access control whitelist is stored in the secure and trusted switch;
[0016] In response to the trusted policy based on the target TPCM device sent by the security management platform, the trusted policy is executed; the trusted policy includes an access frequency policy, a communication relationship control policy and an access control whitelist aging time policy.
[0017] In an optional embodiment, the method further comprises:
[0018] In response to the signature verification failure information sent by the signature verification device, first alarm information is sent to the target TPCM device, where the first alarm information includes access failure information.
[0019] In an optional embodiment, the access frequency strategy includes:
[0020] After the step of responding to the access request information sent by the target TPCM device, the following steps are performed:
[0021] Determining the access times of the target TPCM device;
[0022] Determining the access frequency of the target TPCM device according to the access number;
[0023] Determine whether the access frequency exceeds the preset access frequency threshold range. If so, disconnect the target TPCM device from the secure and trusted switch, generate a second alarm message, and send the second alarm message to the security management platform; if not, continue to execute the step of sending a request to send a trusted report message to the target TPCM device.
[0024] In an optional embodiment, the communication relationship control strategy includes:
[0025] Acquire the communication data of the target TPCM device, and determine the first communication relationship of the target TPCM device according to the communication data; the first communication relationship is the communication relationship between the target TPCM device and other devices connected to the secure and trusted switch, wherein the other devices include multiple other TPCM devices;
[0026] It is determined whether the first communication relationship satisfies a pre-stored preset communication relationship. If not, the target TPCM device is prevented from communicating with other devices, and a third alarm message is generated and sent to the security management platform.
[0027] In an optional embodiment, the first identity information of the target TPCM device includes a factory serial number and / or a chip serial number of the target TPCM device; the second identity information of the target TPCM device includes a MAC address of the target TPCM device.
[0028] In an optional embodiment, the access control whitelist aging time policy includes:
[0029] In response to the target TPCM device being disconnected from the secure trusted switch, determining a retention time of the first identity information and the second identity information of the target TPCM device in the access control whitelist;
[0030] Determine whether the retention time exceeds a preset aging time threshold range; if yes, delete the first identity information and the second identity information of the target TPCM device in the access control whitelist.
[0031] In an optional embodiment, the target TPCM device and the other TPCM devices respectively include an SM9 functional module, and the target TPCM device generates a user signature private key based on the user signature public key and the SM9 functional module; wherein the target TPCM device and the other TPCM devices respectively store a signature master private key, a signature master public key and signature parameters; the user signature public key of the target TPCM device includes the validity date of the target TPCM device and the first identity information of the target TPCM device.
[0032] In an optional embodiment, the signature verification device verifies the target TPCM device according to the first identity information of the target TPCM device and the identity authentication information of the target TPCM device, including:
[0033] The target TPCM device sends access request information to the signature verification device through the secure and trusted switch, wherein the access request information includes the first identity information of the target TPCM device;
[0034] The signature verification device parses the access request information and verifies whether the first identity information of the target TPCM device is in the access whitelist of the signature verification device. If not, the target TPCM device is prohibited from accessing the signature verification device through the secure and trusted switch. If yes, the signature verification device sends a signature request information to the target TPCM device through the secure and trusted switch.
[0035] The target TPCM device signs according to the signature request information, in combination with the SM9 function module of the target TPCM device and the user signature private key of the target TPCM device, to obtain the signature of the target TPCM device;
[0036] The target TPCM device sends the signature to the signature verification device through the secure and trusted switch;
[0037] The signature verification device performs signature verification based on the user signature public key of the target TPCM device and the SM9 functional module of the signature verification device. If the signature verification fails, the target TPCM device is prohibited from accessing the signature verification device through the secure and trusted switch. If the signature verification passes, the target TPCM device is allowed to access the signature verification device through the secure and trusted switch.
[0038] In an optional embodiment, the signature verification device verifies the target TPCM device according to the first identity information of the target TPCM device and the identity authentication information of the target TPCM device, including:
[0039] The target TPCM device sends access request information to the signature verification device through the secure and trusted switch, wherein the access request information includes the first identity information of the target TPCM device;
[0040] The signature verification device parses the access request information and verifies whether the first identity information of the target TPCM device is in the access whitelist of the signature verification device. If not, the target TPCM device is prohibited from accessing the signature verification device through the secure and trusted switch. If yes, the signature verification device sends a signature request information to the target TPCM device through the secure and trusted switch.
[0041] The target TPCM device signs according to the signature request information, in combination with the SM9 function module of the target TPCM device and the user signature private key of the target TPCM device, to obtain the signature of the target TPCM device;
[0042] The target TPCM device sends the signature to the signature verification device through the secure and trusted switch;
[0043] The signature verification device performs signature verification based on the user signature public key of the target TPCM device and the SM9 functional module of the signature verification device. If the signature verification fails, the target TPCM device is prohibited from accessing the signature verification device through the secure and trusted switch. If the signature verification passes, the target TPCM device is allowed to access the signature verification device through the secure and trusted switch.
[0044] In a second aspect, the present invention proposes a TPCM device access device based on a secure and trusted switch, which is applied to the secure and trusted switch. The secure and trusted switch is applied to an industrial control system, and the industrial control system also includes a security management platform, a target TPCM device, and multiple other TPCM devices respectively connected to the secure and trusted switch. The device includes:
[0045] An access request module, configured to send a request to send trusted report information to the target TPCM device in response to the access request information sent by the target TPCM device;
[0046] a trusted report evaluation module, configured to respond to the trusted report sent by the target TPCM device and send the trusted report to the security management platform so that the security management platform evaluates the trusted report;
[0047] A first information sending module is configured to send the first identity information of the target TPCM device to the signature verification device in response to the assessment passing information sent by the security management platform; and to send information to the target TPCM device to send the identity authentication information of the target TPCM device to the signature verification device, so that the signature verification device verifies the target TPCM device according to the first identity information of the target TPCM device and the identity authentication information of the target TPCM device; wherein the signature verification device is one of a plurality of other TPCM devices;
[0048] A signature verification module, configured to respond to the signature verification passing information sent by the signature verification device and update the access control whitelist according to the first identity information of the target TPCM device and the second identity information of the target TPCM device; the access control whitelist is stored in the secure and trusted switch;
[0049] The trusted policy module is used to respond to the trusted policy based on the target TPCM device sent by the security management platform and execute the trusted policy; the trusted policy includes access frequency policy, communication relationship control policy and access control whitelist aging time policy.
[0050] The technical solution provided by the embodiment of the present invention has the following beneficial effects: the TPCM device access method and device of the secure and trusted switch of the present invention forwards the trusted report sent by the target TPCM device requesting access to the security management platform through the secure and trusted switch, and the security management platform verifies the trusted report. When the verification passes, the secure and trusted switch sends the first identity information of the target TPCM device to the signature verification device, and sends information to the target TPCM device that sends the identity authentication information of the target TPCM device to the signature verification device, so that the signature verification device verifies the signature according to the first identity information and the identity authentication information; after the signature verification passes, the access control whitelist is updated; when the target TPCM device is successfully accessed, the access frequency, communication relationship and aging time of the target TPCM device are monitored according to the trusted policy issued by the security management platform; the present invention adopts a secure and trusted switch to execute the access method and device with the target TPCM device, and the secure and trusted switch can identify the communication relationship and establish a whitelist by executing the trusted policy, and can also identify abnormal attacks according to the access frequency, thereby improving the security of the industrial control system and alleviating the resource occupation of the security management platform; the present invention can realize the access of the target TPCM device to the secure and trusted switch without the participation of a third party, thereby realizing decentralization, convenient implementation, and economical and practical. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0051] Figure 1 It is a flow chart of a TPCM device access method based on a secure and trusted switch provided by an embodiment of the present invention;
[0052] Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of a system topology provided by an embodiment of the present invention;
[0053] Figure 3 It is a flowchart of a user identity authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present invention;
[0054] Figure 4 It is a schematic diagram of a node access authentication principle provided by an embodiment of the present invention.
[0055] Figure 5 A system schematic diagram of a TPCM device access device based on a secure and trusted switch provided in an embodiment of the present invention.
[0056] In the figure: 21-secure and trusted switch; 22-security management terminal; 23-target TPCM device; 24-signature verification device; 25-TPCM module; 110-access request module; 120-trusted report evaluation module; 130-first information sending module; 140-signature verification module; 150-trusted policy module. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0057] In order to make the objectives, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more clear, the embodiments of the present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
[0058] The embodiment of the present invention provides a TPCM device access method based on a secure and trusted switch, the method is applied to the secure and trusted switch, the secure and trusted switch is applied to an industrial control system, and the industrial control system also includes a security management platform, a target TPCM device, and multiple other TPCM devices respectively connected to the secure and trusted switch. Figure 2 As shown in the figure, the secure and trusted switch and the nodes in the system together form a local area network. The nodes can be industrial embedded controllers or industrial control system host computers. The TPCM devices can be industrial embedded controllers or host computers. These TPCM devices are integrated with TPCM (Trusted Platform Control Module). TPCM is a hardware core module integrated in the trusted computing platform. It is mainly used to establish and protect the trust source point, provide integrity measurement, secure storage, trusted reporting, cryptographic services, trust chain transmission, protection strategy management and active monitoring for trusted computing, and ensure the credibility and security of the system.
[0059] This embodiment combines a secure and trusted switch and utilizes the identity authentication and access authentication functions of TPCM to implement identity authentication and access authentication of the target device. When a new node n is connected to the industrial control system, the secure and trusted switch and the existing designated node in the system (i.e., the signature verification device below) need to participate in the authentication. The specific processing flow is as follows: Figure 1 As shown in steps S110-S150 in FIG. 1 , the node access authentication principle is as follows: Figure 3 shown.
[0060] Step S110: in response to the access request information sent by the target TPCM device, a request to send a trusted report information is sent to the target TPCM device.
[0061] Specifically, the target TPCM device sends an access request to the secure and trusted switch, and the secure and trusted switch sends a request to send a trusted report message to the target TPCM device in response to the access request. The target TPCM device sends a trusted report to the secure and trusted switch in response to the request to send a trusted report message.
[0062] Trusted report refers to information generated by Trusted Computing 3.0 technology. Trusted Computing 3.0 takes active immunity as its core concept. By building a dual-system architecture and adopting an active trusted monitoring mechanism, it realizes the measurability, controllability and non-interference of the entire computing process, thereby ensuring the security and trustworthiness of the information system. In the architecture of Trusted Computing 3.0, "Trusted Report" is a key link, which is responsible for providing detailed information about the trusted state of the system. These detailed information are produced by the TPCM module in the TPCM device and provided based on the measurement results of the system and the verification of the trust chain. The trusted report can include the following information: whether the firmware has been verified; when the target is running, the trusted state is updated; when it is detected that the TPCM device is attacked or the code is tampered with, the attack information and the code tampering information are recorded.
[0063] It should be noted that before the target TPCM device is connected, the ID of the target TPCM (i.e., the first identity information hereinafter) is manually configured on the secure and trusted switch in advance. In this embodiment, the target TPCM device is connected to node 1, and the first identity information is represented by ID1. Among them, ID refers to the unique identifier of IPCM. Each TPCM device has an ID similar to an ID card after leaving the factory. The factory serial number, chip serial number and other unique identifiers of the target TPCM device can be used as the unique identifier of the target TPCM device, or it can be a combination of the factory serial number, chip serial number and other unique identifiers.
[0064] Step S120, in response to the trust report sent by the target TPCM device, the trust report is sent to the security management platform, so that the security management platform evaluates the trust report.
[0065] In this step, the secure and trusted switch forwards the trusted report to the security management platform, which evaluates the trusted report. If the evaluation passes, it means that the target TPCM device is secure; if the evaluation fails, it means that the target TPCM device is unsafe and the target TPCM device may be attacked maliciously. At this time, the connection between the secure and trusted switch and the target TPCM device needs to be disconnected.
[0066] Step S130, in response to the assessment pass information sent by the security management platform, sending the first identity information of the target TPCM device to the signature verification device; and sending information to the target TPCM device to send the identity authentication information of the target TPCM device to the signature verification device, so that the signature verification device verifies the target TPCM device according to the first identity information of the target TPCM device and the identity authentication information of the target TPCM device; wherein the signature verification device is one of multiple other TPCM devices.
[0067] In a possible embodiment, when the security management platform passes the evaluation of the trusted report, it sends the evaluation pass information to the secure and trusted switch, and the secure and trusted switch forwards the evaluation pass information to the target TPCM device. While forwarding, it also sends the target TPCM device information to send the identity authentication information of the target TPCM device to the signature verification device; in this way, the target TPCM device will send the identity authentication information to the signature verification device. At the same time, the secure and trusted switch also sends the first identity information of the target TPCM device to the signature verification device. In this way, the signature verification device verifies the target TPCM device according to the received signature verification information and the first identity information.
[0068] The signature verification process includes the following steps (1)-(5), which are described below using an example in which the target TPCM device is connected to node 1 of a secure and trusted switch and the signature verification device is connected to node n of a secure and trusted switch.
[0069] (1) The target TPCM device of node 1 sends access request information to the signature verification device of node n through the secure trusted switch, wherein the access request information includes the first identity information of the target TPCM device, namely, ID1.
[0070] (2) The signature verification device of node 2 parses the access request information, parses the first identity information ID1 of the target TPCM device in node 1, and verifies whether the first identity information ID1 of the target TPCM device is in the access whitelist of the signature verification device. If not, the target TPCM device is prohibited from accessing the signature verification device through the secure and trusted switch; if yes, the signature verification device sends a signature request information to the target TPCM device through the secure and trusted switch.
[0071] (3) After receiving the signature request information from node n, the target TPCM device of node 1 signs the random number using the SM9 function module of the target TPCM device and the user signature private key of the target TPCM device according to the signature request information to obtain the signature of the target TPCM device.
[0072] Here, the SM9 functional module is integrated in the TPCM in the target TPCM device and the signature verification device. The SM9 functional block has the SM9 digital signature generation and verification algorithm functions. Before the TPCM device leaves the factory, the same signature master private key ks, signature master public key Ppub-s and signature parameters are preset in the TPCM for secret storage and never exported, thereby ensuring the security of the core key through hardware.
[0073] The target TPCM device generates a user signature private key based on the user signature public key using the SM9 function module and the signature master private key. The user signature public key includes the validity date of the target TPCM device, the first identity information of the target TPCM device, and other data. Among them, other data can be mac address, device type, etc. If the validity date changes, a new user signature public key will be generated, and the user signature private key will be updated and saved based on the updated user signature public key and SM9 function module.
[0074] (4) The target TPCM device of node 1 sends the signature to the signature verification device of node n through the secure and trusted switch.
[0075] (5) The signature verification device of node n performs signature verification based on the user signature public key of the target TPCM device and the SM9 function module of the signature verification device. If the signature verification fails, the target TPCM device is prohibited from accessing the signature verification device through the secure and trusted switch. If the signature verification passes, the target TPCM device is allowed to access the signature verification device through the secure and trusted switch.
[0076] The above identity authentication process is as follows Figure 3 As shown, it can be summarized as the following steps 1-5.
[0077] Step 1: The target TPCM device sends an access request carrying ID1 to the signature verification device.
[0078] Step 2: The signature verification device verifies whether ID1 is in the access control whitelist.
[0079] Step 3: The target TPCM device signs the random number using the user signature private key ds1.
[0080] Step 4: The facial TPCM device sends the signature to the signature verification device.
[0081] Step 5: The signature verification device verifies the signature using the user's signature public key ps1.
[0082] Step S140, in response to the signature verification pass information sent by the signature verification device, update the access control whitelist according to the first identity information of the target TPCM device and the second identity information of the target TPCM device; the access control whitelist is stored in the secure and trusted switch.
[0083] When the signature verification passes, the signature verification device sends a signature verification pass message to the secure and trusted switch. The secure and trusted switch updates the access control whitelist according to the signature verification pass message, and the target TPCM device of node 1 is successfully connected to the secure and trusted switch.
[0084] When the signature verification fails, the signature verification device sends a signature verification failure message to the secure and trusted switch and deletes the ID1 information of node 1. In response to the signature verification failure message sent by the signature verification device, the secure and trusted switch sends a first alarm message to the target TPCM device, and the first alarm message includes access failure information.
[0085] The access authentication process of steps S110-S140 is as follows: Figure 4 As shown, it can be summarized as the following steps 1-4.
[0086] Step 1: Configure the ID1 of the target TPCM device of node 1.
[0087] Step 2: Send the ID1 of the target TPCM device to the signature verification device of node n.
[0088] Step 3: Receive the authentication feedback sent by the node verification device.
[0089] Step 4: Send the ID1 of the target TPCM device to each node.
[0090] The above is the access control process of the target TPCM device accessing the secure and trusted switch for the first time. When the connected target TPCM device disconnects and attempts to re-access, the secure and trusted switch does not need to manually configure the first identity information again.
[0091] After the target TPCM device is connected, the secure and trusted switch executes the trusted policy to monitor the access frequency, communication relationship, etc. of the target TPCM, as shown in step S150.
[0092] Step S150, in response to the trusted policy based on the target TPCM device sent by the security management platform, execute the trusted policy; the trusted policy includes access frequency policy, communication relationship control policy and access control whitelist aging time policy.
[0093] The access frequency strategy includes executing the following steps a1-a3 after the step of responding to the access request information sent by the target TPCM device.
[0094] Step a1: Determine the access times of the target TPCM device.
[0095] Step a2: Determine the access frequency of the target TPCM device according to the number of accesses.
[0096] Step a3: Determine whether the access frequency exceeds the preset access frequency threshold range. If so, disconnect the target TPCM device from the secure and trusted switch, generate a second alarm message, and send the second alarm message to the security management platform; if not, continue to execute the step of sending a request to send a trusted report message to the target TPCM device.
[0097] Specifically, when the target device successfully accesses for the first time, it may be disconnected and then reconnected. The secure and trusted switch will perform trust measurement and control on the access frequency of a certain device according to the trust policy of the security management platform. The preset access frequency threshold can be defined as m times / minute. When the number of accesses (success + failure) of device n is greater than m times / minute, the steps S110-S150 of the above process will no longer be entered. The ID of the target device (i.e., ID1) will be directly deleted from the access control whitelist node, and the device connection will be disconnected. A second alarm message will be generated and reported to the security management platform. Because the execution of trusted report evaluation, signature verification and other operations will occupy certain resources, if frequent access attempts are made, the computing resources of the security management platform, other devices and switches will be consumed, and a certain bandwidth will be occupied. This may be because the node device itself has a fault or has been attacked. In this embodiment, the access times of the target TPCM device are first determined, and then the access frequency is determined. The access frequency is compared with the preset access frequency threshold range. When it exceeds the range, an alarm is issued.
[0098] The communication relationship control strategy includes the following steps b1-b2.
[0099] Step b1: Acquire the communication data of the target TPCM device, and determine the first communication relationship of the target TPCM device according to the communication data; the first communication relationship is the communication relationship between the target TPCM device and other devices connected to the secure and trusted switch, and the other devices include multiple other TPCM devices.
[0100] Step b2: Determine whether the first communication relationship satisfies a pre-stored preset communication relationship. If not, prevent the target TPCM device from communicating with other devices, generate a third alarm message, and send the third alarm message to the security management platform.
[0101] Specifically, for the actual business system, the direct data interaction of each device has rules to follow. For example, there are three devices a, b, and c. The communication relationship may be that a sends data to b, and b sends data to c, which is a certain relationship. So although the target TPCM device can be connected, if the communication relationship is violated, it is also an abnormal situation. The secure and trusted switch will block it and send an alarm to the security management platform. Therefore, in the communication relationship control strategy of this embodiment, the communication relationship of the target TPCM device is first determined, and then the communication relationship between the target TPCM device and other devices is determined, and then it is determined whether to alarm based on the communication relationship. Other devices refer to devices connected to the secure and trusted switch (including other TPCM devices).
[0102] The access control whitelist aging time policy includes the following steps c1-c2.
[0103] Step c1: In response to the target TPCM device being disconnected from the secure trusted switch, determining a retention time of the first identity information and the second identity information of the target TPCM device in the access control whitelist.
[0104] Step c2: determine whether the retention time exceeds a preset aging time threshold range; if yes, delete the first identity information and the second identity information of the target TPCM device in the access control whitelist.
[0105] Specifically, the secure and trusted switch will maintain an access control whitelist, which includes the ID and MAC address of the verified connected devices. When the device is disconnected, if the access control whitelist does not delete the ID and MAC address information of the device, then long-term operation will cause the access control whitelist to grow infinitely, and the retained information that should be deleted is meaningless. Therefore, the secure and trusted management platform will include information on the aging time of the device access control whitelist in the trusted policy. This embodiment determines the aging time of the target TPCM device access control whitelist by determining the retention time of the first identity information (i.e., ID) and the second identity information (i.e., MAC address) of the target TPCM device in the access control whitelist, and compares the event with the preset aging time threshold range to determine whether the aging time of the target TPCM device access control whitelist exceeds the range.
[0106] The trusted strategy also includes a dynamic trusted measurement strategy; the dynamic trusted measurement strategy includes the following steps d1-d2.
[0107] Step d1: Obtain the current information to be measured of the target TPCM device.
[0108] Step d2: Perform trustworthy measurement on the current information to be measured according to the trustworthy verification model; when the measurement passes, return to the step of obtaining the current information to be measured of the TPCM device; when the measurement fails, disconnect the connection between the secure and trusted switch and the TPCM device.
[0109] Among them, the trusted verification model is used to characterize the communication characteristics between the TPCM device and other devices; the trusted verification model includes a logical combination of one or more sub-verification models; the communication characteristics include communication relationship, data bandwidth, communication duration, communication direction and data packet size; the trusted verification model includes a logical combination of one or more sub-verification models in the long-term bandwidth sub-verification model, the burst bandwidth sub-verification model, the high-bandwidth duration sub-verification model and the high-bandwidth occurrence times per unit time sub-verification model.
[0110] It should be noted that before performing dynamic trust measurement, it is necessary to predetermine the threshold range of each sub-verification model, that is, determine the threshold line of the trusted verification model. (The first threshold range - the fourth threshold range constitute the aforementioned threshold line. When configuring the threshold line, it is considered that the engineer station is usually only monitoring the status and the amount of data is small. Only when performing engineering configuration or upgrading the firmware will a large amount of data be sent, and the modification of engineering configuration and firmware must be very low frequency. Therefore, the threshold line can be set as follows: the long-term bandwidth is less than the first threshold, the burst bandwidth increases, the high bandwidth duration is less than the second threshold, and the number of high bandwidth occurrences per unit time is less than the third threshold.
[0111] Since the trusted verification model may include a logical combination of multiple sub-verification models, the principle of trustworthy measurement of the current information to be measured according to the trusted verification model is to first calculate the value of each sub-verification model through the current information to be measured. For example, in the burst bandwidth sub-verification model, the value of the burst bandwidth is calculated through the current information to be measured. For some sub-verification models, it is necessary to record and store information to be measured for a certain duration, such as the long-term bandwidth sub-verification model and the high-bandwidth duration sub-verification model. The long-term bandwidth sub-verification model needs to record the bandwidth of a preset duration and then calculate the bandwidth of the preset duration; the high-bandwidth duration sub-verification model needs to record the duration of the bandwidth that meets the preset bandwidth threshold to obtain the duration value.
[0112] Then, threshold judgment is performed on the values of each sub-verification model. For example, whether the long-term bandwidth value obtained by the long-term bandwidth sub-verification model is less than the first threshold range, whether the high bandwidth duration value obtained by the high bandwidth duration sub-verification model is less than the second threshold range, whether the high bandwidth occurrence times per unit time value obtained by the high bandwidth occurrence times per unit time sub-model is less than the third threshold range, and whether the burst bandwidth value obtained by the burst bandwidth sub-verification model is greater than the fourth threshold range. If any of the above exceeds the threshold range, the measurement fails; if all meet the threshold range, the measurement passes.
[0113] In some possible embodiments, the trusted policy also includes a key management policy to manage the keys of the TPCM device. The key management policy includes a key update frequency policy, a key update permission policy, a mandatory key update policy, and a primary and backup key policy. The TPCM device mentioned in this embodiment refers to a device with TPCM connected to a trusted switch, including a target TPCM device and multiple other TPCM devices.
[0114] Specifically, the key includes the user signature public key and the user signature private key of the TPCM device.
[0115] The key update frequency strategy includes the following steps (11)-(13).
[0116] (11) Obtain the updated user signature public key sent by the TPCM device.
[0117] (12) Determine the key update frequency of the TPCM device within a preset first time period according to the updated user signature public key.
[0118] The secure and trusted switch records the update times of the TPCM device, and when the user signature is updated, updates the update times, and then calculates the value of the update frequency; or, the secure and trusted switch records the update frequency of the TPCM device, and when the user signature is updated, updates the value of the update frequency.
[0119] (13) Determine whether the key update frequency exceeds a preset key update frequency threshold. If yes, send key update disallowance information to the TPCM device and send an alarm message to the security management terminal.
[0120] According to the preset key update frequency threshold, for example, n times / day, it is determined whether the current key update frequency exceeds the threshold. If it exceeds the threshold, it means that the key is updated frequently. The secure and trusted switch refuses the TPCM device to update the key, generates an alarm, and reports it to the security management terminal.
[0121] In actual industrial control systems, when the TPCM device is an embedded device such as a PLC controller, a DCS controller, etc., it is sometimes necessary to ensure that the TPCM device runs continuously and uninterruptedly (for example, when the device is connected to a secure and trusted switch). In this scenario, key updates may affect the access and communication status of the TPCM device; therefore, for such devices, a key update permission policy needs to be implemented to set the TPCM device to not allow key updates. Therefore, the key update permission policy includes the following steps (21).
[0122] (21) When the TPCM device runs continuously and uninterruptedly within a preset time period, a key update prohibition message is sent to the TPCM device within the preset time period to ensure the continuity of the operation status of the TPCM device.
[0123] When the key update permission policy is executed, if it is set to not allow key updates and the TPCM device attempts to update, the secure and trusted switch will reject the update and generate an alarm message, which will be reported to the security management terminal.
[0124] When the equipment is shut down or under maintenance, and key update is indeed required, the security management terminal issues a mandatory key update policy. For example, the TPCM equipment is overhauled and key updated once a year. At this time, the security management terminal initiates a mandatory key update policy, which includes the following steps (31)-(32).
[0125] (31) receiving first mandatory key update information sent by the security management terminal;
[0126] (32) Sending second mandatory key update information to the TPCM device according to the first mandatory key update information, so that the TPCM device performs key update according to the second mandatory key update information.
[0127] The mandatory key update policy is initiated by the security management terminal, so the first mandatory key update information and the second mandatory key update information may have the same content, that is, the secure and trusted switch forwards the mandatory key update information to the target terminal.
[0128] For high-availability devices such as PLC controllers and DCS controllers, in order to ensure the continuity of device operation, the security management terminal can issue a master-slave key strategy to continue to save the original key to ensure that when a special situation such as a key update failure occurs, it can quickly switch to the original key to avoid the situation where no key is available due to a key update failure. This embodiment lists three master-slave key strategies, and the first master-slave key strategy includes the following steps (41).
[0129] (41) In response to the updated user signature public key sent by the TPCM device, the current user signature public key is stored as a backup user signature public key, or the current user signature public key is sent to the security management terminal so that the security management terminal stores the user signature public key, or the current user signature public key storage information is sent to the TPCM device. Specifically, the method of this embodiment is intended to illustrate that the original key can be stored as a backup key in a secure and trusted switch or a security management terminal or a TPCM device.
[0130] The second primary-backup key strategy includes the following step (51), which is intended to illustrate that when the key update fails, the original key is sent to the TPCM device as a backup key.
[0131] (51) In response to the key update failure information sent by the TPCM device, the backup user signature public key is sent to the TPCM device, so that the TPCM device uses the backup user signature public key for security protection.
[0132] The third master-slave key strategy includes the following steps (61) to illustrate that in a scenario where a key update needs to be performed quickly, only the master-slave key switching information can be sent to achieve rapid key switching without going through the process of new key generation and distribution, thereby saving computing resources and network bandwidth.
[0133] (61) Send the primary and backup key switching information to the TPCM device, so that the TPCM device switches to the backup user signature public key for security protection.
[0134] The key management strategy of this embodiment can achieve scientific management of the keys of node devices, ensuring that the devices can operate safely and reliably before, during and after key updates.
[0135] It should also be noted that, in addition to triggering the response trusted policy when the security management platform sends the response trusted policy, the execution time of each trusted policy can also be set to execute the response trusted policy regularly.
[0136] In summary, the TPCM device access method based on a secure and trusted switch of this embodiment uses a secure and trusted switch to implement the method of this embodiment. The secure and trusted switch can identify communication relationships and establish white lists by executing trusted policies. It can also identify abnormal attacks based on access frequencies, thereby improving the security of industrial control systems and alleviating resource usage of security management platforms; it can also perform dynamic trust measurement on access devices, thereby further improving the security of industrial control systems; it can also perform scientific and effective management of keys to ensure that the equipment can operate safely and reliably before, during, and after key updates.
[0137] In addition, the management of this embodiment is simple, and the SM9 algorithm based on the IBC system realizes the function of user identity authentication, which reduces the complexity of public key management and certificate management based on the PKI system. The user identity authentication access authentication of this embodiment does not require the participation of a third party, and the node can automatically update the key. From this perspective, decentralization is achieved, the implementation is convenient, and it is economical and practical. In this embodiment, in the industrial embedded controller, the signature master private key, signature master public key, and parameters are preset in the TPCM at the factory, stored secretly and never exported, and the security of the core key is guaranteed by hardware.
[0138] See also Figure 5The present embodiment provides a TPCM device access device based on a secure and trusted switch, which is applied to a secure and trusted switch. The secure and trusted switch is applied to an industrial control system. The industrial control system also includes a security management platform, a target TPCM device, and multiple other TPCM devices respectively connected to the secure and trusted switch. The device includes an access request module 110, a trusted report evaluation module 120, a first information sending module 130, a signature verification module 140, and a trusted policy module 150. The access request module 110 is used to respond to the access request information sent by the target TPCM device and send a request to send a trusted report information to the target TPCM device. The trusted report evaluation module 120 is used to respond to the trusted report sent by the target TPCM device and send the trusted report to the security management platform so that the security management platform evaluates the trusted report. The first information sending module 130 is used to send the first identity information of the target TPCM device to the signature verification device in response to the evaluation pass information sent by the security management platform; and to send information to the target TPCM device to send the identity authentication information of the target TPCM device to the signature verification device, so that the signature verification device verifies the target TPCM device according to the first identity information of the target TPCM device and the identity authentication information of the target TPCM device; wherein the signature verification device is one of multiple other TPCM devices. The signature verification pass module 140 is used to update the access control whitelist according to the first identity information of the target TPCM device and the second identity information of the target TPCM device in response to the signature verification pass information sent by the signature verification device; the access control whitelist is stored in the secure and trusted switch. The trusted policy module 150 is used to execute the trusted policy based on the target TPCM device sent by the security management platform; the trusted policy includes the access frequency policy, the communication relationship control policy and the access control whitelist aging time policy.
[0139] In a possible embodiment, the apparatus of this embodiment further includes a signature verification failure module, which is used to send first alarm information to the target TPCM device in response to signature verification failure information sent by the signature verification device, where the first alarm information includes access failure information.
[0140] In a possible embodiment, the access frequency strategy includes a determination module, an access frequency module, and a second alarm information module connected to the access request module. The determination module is used to determine the number of accesses of the target TPCM device. The access frequency module is used to determine the access frequency of the target TPCM device according to the number of accesses. The second alarm information module is used to determine whether the access frequency exceeds a preset access frequency threshold range. If yes, the connection between the target TPCM device and the secure and trusted switch is disconnected, and a second alarm information is generated and sent to the security management platform; if no, the step of sending a request to send a trusted report information to the target TPCM device is continued.
[0141] In a possible embodiment, the communication relationship control strategy includes a communication data acquisition module and a first communication relationship judgment module. The communication data acquisition module is used to acquire the communication data of the target TPCM device and determine the first communication relationship of the target TPCM device according to the communication data; the first communication relationship is the communication relationship between the target TPCM device and other devices connected to the secure and trusted switch. The other devices include multiple other TPCM devices. The first communication relationship judgment module is used to determine whether the first communication relationship satisfies a pre-stored preset communication relationship. If not, the target TPCM device is prevented from communicating with other devices, and a third alarm message is generated, and the third alarm message is sent to the security management platform.
[0142] In a possible embodiment, the first identity information of the target TPCM device includes a factory serial number and / or a chip serial number of the target TPCM device; the second identity information of the target TPCM device includes a MAC address of the target TPCM device.
[0143] In a possible embodiment, the access control whitelist aging time policy includes a retention time determination module and a retention time judgment module. The retention time determination module is used to determine the retention time of the first identity information and the second identity information of the target TPCM device in the access control whitelist in response to the target TPCM device disconnecting from the secure trusted switch. The retention time judgment module is used to judge whether the retention time exceeds a preset aging time threshold range; if so, the first identity information and the second identity information of the target TPCM device in the access control whitelist are deleted.
[0144] In a possible embodiment, the target TPCM device and the other TPCM devices respectively include an SM9 functional module, and the target TPCM device generates a user signature private key based on the user signature public key and the SM9 functional module; wherein the target TPCM device and the other TPCM devices respectively store a signature master private key, a signature master public key and signature parameters; the user signature public key of the target TPCM device includes the validity date of the target TPCM device and the first identity information of the target TPCM device.
[0145] In a possible embodiment, the signature verification module 140 includes an access request sending module, a parsing module, a signature generation module, a signature sending module and a signature verification module. The access request information sending module is used for the target TPCM device to send access request information to the signature verification device through a secure and trusted switch, wherein the access request information includes the first identity information of the target TPCM device. The parsing module is used for the signature verification device to parse the access request information and verify whether the first identity information of the target TPCM device is in the access whitelist of the signature verification device. If not, the target TPCM device is prohibited from accessing the signature verification device through the secure and trusted switch. If yes, the signature verification device sends signature request information to the target TPCM device through the secure and trusted switch. The signature generation module is used for the target TPCM device to sign according to the signature request information, combined with the SM9 function module of the target TPCM device and the user signature private key of the target TPCM device, to obtain the signature of the target TPCM device. The signature sending module is used for the target TPCM device to send the signature to the signature verification device through a secure and trusted switch. The signature verification module is used by the signature verification device to verify the signature according to the user signature public key of the target TPCM device and the SM9 function module of the signature verification device. If the signature verification fails, the target TPCM device is prohibited from accessing the signature verification device through the secure and trusted switch. If the signature verification passes, the target TPCM device is allowed to access the signature verification device through the secure and trusted switch.
[0146] In a possible embodiment, the trusted strategy also includes a dynamic trusted measurement strategy; the dynamic trusted measurement strategy includes a current information to be measured acquisition module and a trusted measurement module. The current information to be measured acquisition module is used to obtain the current information to be measured of the target TPCM device. The trusted measurement module is used to perform trusted measurement on the current information to be measured according to the trusted verification model; when the measurement passes, it returns to the step of obtaining the current information to be measured of the TPCM device; when the measurement fails, the connection between the secure trusted switch and the TPCM device is disconnected. Among them, the trusted verification model is used to characterize the communication characteristics between the TPCM device and other devices; the trusted verification model includes a logical combination of one or more sub-verification models; the communication characteristics include communication relationship, data bandwidth, communication duration, communication direction and data packet size; the trusted verification model includes a logical combination of one or more sub-verification models in the long-term bandwidth sub-verification model, the burst bandwidth sub-verification model, the high bandwidth duration sub-verification model and the high bandwidth occurrence times per unit time sub-verification model.
[0147] It is known from common technical knowledge that the present invention can be implemented by other embodiments that do not deviate from its spirit or essential features. Therefore, the above disclosed embodiments are only illustrative in all respects and are not exclusive. All changes within the scope of the present invention or within the scope equivalent to the present invention are included in the present invention.
Claims
1. A TPCM device access method based on a secure and trusted switch, characterized in that: Applied to a secure and trusted switch, the secure and trusted switch is applied to an industrial control system, the industrial control system also includes a security management platform, a target TPCM device and a plurality of other TPCM devices respectively connected to the secure and trusted switch, the method includes: In response to the access request information sent by the target TPCM device, sending a request to send a trusted report information to the target TPCM device; In response to the trusted report sent by the target TPCM device, sending the trusted report to a security management platform so that the security management platform evaluates the trusted report; In response to the assessment passing information sent by the security management platform, the first identity information of the target TPCM device is sent to the signature verification device; and information is sent to the target TPCM device to send the identity authentication information of the target TPCM device to the signature verification device, so that the signature verification device verifies the target TPCM device according to the first identity information of the target TPCM device and the identity authentication information of the target TPCM device; wherein the signature verification device is one of a plurality of other TPCM devices; In response to the signature verification pass information sent by the signature verification device, updating the access control whitelist according to the first identity information of the target TPCM device and the second identity information of the target TPCM device; the access control whitelist is stored in the secure and trusted switch; In response to the trusted policy based on the target TPCM device sent by the security management platform, the trusted policy is executed; the trusted policy includes an access frequency policy, a communication relationship control policy and an access control whitelist aging time policy.
2. The TPCM device access method based on a secure and trusted switch according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method further comprises: In response to the signature verification failure information sent by the signature verification device, first alarm information is sent to the target TPCM device, where the first alarm information includes access failure information.
3. The TPCM device access method based on a secure and trusted switch according to claim 1, characterized in that: The access frequency strategy includes: After the step of responding to the access request information sent by the target TPCM device, the following steps are performed: Determining the access times of the target TPCM device; Determining the access frequency of the target TPCM device according to the access number; Determine whether the access frequency exceeds the preset access frequency threshold range. If so, disconnect the target TPCM device from the secure and trusted switch, generate a second alarm message, and send the second alarm message to the security management platform; if not, continue to execute the step of sending a request to send a trusted report message to the target TPCM device.
4. The TPCM device access method based on a secure and trusted switch according to claim 1, characterized in that: The communication relationship control strategy includes: Acquire the communication data of the target TPCM device, and determine the first communication relationship of the target TPCM device according to the communication data; the first communication relationship is the communication relationship between the target TPCM device and other devices connected to the secure and trusted switch, wherein the other devices include multiple other TPCM devices; It is determined whether the first communication relationship satisfies a pre-stored preset communication relationship. If not, the target TPCM device is prevented from communicating with other devices, and a third alarm message is generated and sent to the security management platform.
5. The TPCM device access method based on a secure and trusted switch according to claim 1, characterized in that: The first identity information of the target TPCM device includes the factory serial number and / or chip serial number of the target TPCM device; the second identity information of the target TPCM device includes the MAC address of the target TPCM device.
6. The TPCM device access method based on a secure and trusted switch according to claim 5, characterized in that: The access control whitelist aging time strategy includes: In response to the target TPCM device being disconnected from the secure trusted switch, determining a retention time of the first identity information and the second identity information of the target TPCM device in the access control whitelist; Determine whether the retention time exceeds a preset aging time threshold range; if yes, delete the first identity information and the second identity information of the target TPCM device in the access control whitelist.
7. The TPCM device access method based on a secure and trusted switch according to claim 1, characterized in that: The target TPCM device and other TPCM devices respectively include an SM9 functional module, and the target TPCM device generates a user signature private key based on the user signature public key and the SM9 functional module; wherein the target TPCM device and other TPCM devices respectively store a signature master private key, a signature master public key and signature parameters; the user signature public key of the target TPCM device includes the validity date of the target TPCM device and the first identity information of the target TPCM device.
8. The TPCM device access method based on a secure and trusted switch according to claim 7, characterized in that: The signature verification device verifies the signature of the target TPCM device according to the first identity information of the target TPCM device and the identity authentication information of the target TPCM device, including: The target TPCM device sends access request information to the signature verification device through the secure and trusted switch, wherein the access request information includes the first identity information of the target TPCM device; The signature verification device parses the access request information and verifies whether the first identity information of the target TPCM device is in the access whitelist of the signature verification device. If not, the target TPCM device is prohibited from accessing the signature verification device through the secure and trusted switch. If yes, the signature verification device sends a signature request information to the target TPCM device through the secure and trusted switch. The target TPCM device signs according to the signature request information, in combination with the SM9 function module of the target TPCM device and the user signature private key of the target TPCM device, to obtain the signature of the target TPCM device; The target TPCM device sends the signature to the signature verification device through the secure and trusted switch; The signature verification device performs signature verification based on the user signature public key of the target TPCM device and the SM9 functional module of the signature verification device. If the signature verification fails, the target TPCM device is prohibited from accessing the signature verification device through the secure and trusted switch. If the signature verification passes, the target TPCM device is allowed to access the signature verification device through the secure and trusted switch.
9. The TPCM device access method based on a secure and trusted switch according to claim 7, characterized in that: The trust strategy also includes a dynamic trust measurement strategy; The dynamic trust measurement strategy includes: Acquire the current information to be measured of the target TPCM device; Performing trustworthy measurement on the current information to be measured according to the trustworthy verification model; when the measurement passes, returning to the step of obtaining the current information to be measured of the TPCM device; when the measurement fails, disconnecting the connection between the secure and trusted switch and the TPCM device; Among them, the trusted verification model is used to characterize the communication characteristics between the TPCM device and other devices; the trusted verification model includes a logical combination of one or more sub-verification models; the communication characteristics include communication relationship, data bandwidth, communication duration, communication direction and data packet size; the trusted verification model includes a logical combination of one or more sub-verification models in the long-term bandwidth sub-verification model, the burst bandwidth sub-verification model, the high-bandwidth duration sub-verification model and the high-bandwidth occurrence times per unit time sub-verification model.
10. A TPCM device access device based on a secure and trusted switch, characterized in that: Applied to a secure and trusted switch, the secure and trusted switch is applied to an industrial control system, the industrial control system also includes a security management platform, a target TPCM device and multiple other TPCM devices respectively connected to the secure and trusted switch, the device includes: An access request module, configured to send a request to send trusted report information to the target TPCM device in response to the access request information sent by the target TPCM device; a trusted report evaluation module, configured to respond to the trusted report sent by the target TPCM device and send the trusted report to the security management platform so that the security management platform evaluates the trusted report; A first information sending module is configured to send the first identity information of the target TPCM device to the signature verification device in response to the assessment passing information sent by the security management platform; and to send information to the target TPCM device to send the identity authentication information of the target TPCM device to the signature verification device, so that the signature verification device verifies the target TPCM device according to the first identity information of the target TPCM device and the identity authentication information of the target TPCM device; wherein the signature verification device is one of a plurality of other TPCM devices; A signature verification module, configured to respond to the signature verification passing information sent by the signature verification device and update the access control whitelist according to the first identity information of the target TPCM device and the second identity information of the target TPCM device; the access control whitelist is stored in the secure and trusted switch; The trusted policy module is used to respond to the trusted policy based on the target TPCM device sent by the security management platform and execute the trusted policy; the trusted policy includes access frequency policy, communication relationship control policy and access control whitelist aging time policy.
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