Unattended control method and system protected by signal system in full-automatic mode

Abstract

The invention provides an unattended control method and system protected by a signal system in a full-automatic mode. Comprising automatic coupling; the coupling is stopped; automatic de-coding is carried out; and stopping decoding. According to the method, coupling and decompilation operation sites are confirmed by identifying map section types and safety conditions, a signal system carries out pre-testing according to the condition meeting condition, and layer-by-layer check is realized with the assistance of monitoring measures, so that the safety and reliability of operation are ensured; the preciseness, safety and flexibility of the operation process are improved and the operation efficiency is improved through pre-testing and operation stopping, the operation cost is effectively reduced, the safety guarantee is improved, and the defect that coupling and de-compiling of flexibly-grouped trains only depend on manual protection is overcome; the system is reasonable in structure, ingenious in design and high in safety, the operation efficiency is effectively improved on the premise that operation safety and reliability are guaranteed, the operation cost can be effectively reduced, the system availability is remarkably improved, operation is flexible, and execution is safe and orderly.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of rail transit signal systems, and specifically, relates to an unmanned control method and system protected by a signal system in a fully automatic mode, and in particular to an unmanned coupling and uncoupling system protected by a signal system in a flexible and practical fully automatic mode based on a Bombardier system. Background Art

[0002] In the traditional rail transit operation and management process, train coupling / uncoupling operations require manual protection from the driver, which requires high skills from the train driver, and there are risks in the driver's manual operation. However, with the increasing application of fully automatic driving technology, rail transit operation and management are becoming more and more flexible, especially flexible marshaling projects, which require changes to the train marshaling configuration to meet operational needs. In this context, the coupling and uncoupling between trains rely on driver operation and protection, which is bound to result in high talent skill requirements, increased accident risks, reduced operational efficiency, and increased operating costs.

[0003] In order to improve operational efficiency, reduce operating costs, and reduce accident risks, a coupling / uncoupling operation is required that provides unattended coupling and uncoupling protected by a signal system in a fully automatic mode. By identifying the map section type, confirming the coupling and uncoupling operation location, identifying the train mode, train stationary state, door status, running direction and other conditions, the signal system performs a pre-test based on the conditions met, thereby confirming that the coupling and uncoupling can be completed and the operation is safe. By terminating the operation, the waiting time caused by unsatisfied conditions during the coupling and uncoupling operation can be effectively reduced, greatly avoiding time waste and improving operational efficiency. It not only ensures the safety and reliability of the operation, effectively improves operational efficiency, but also effectively reduces operating costs.

[0004] The patent document "A Method for Implementing Flexible Grouping Operation of Urban Rail Transit" (CN111874008A) provides an automatic coupling / uncoupling method. However, once the automatic coupling / uncoupling starts, this method can only be executed until the coupling / uncoupling operation is completed. The automatic coupling / uncoupling operation cannot be terminated in time, and the operation does not have operational flexibility and lacks functionality. At the same time, it does not include pre-testing, and the supervision of coupling / uncoupling operations is not cautious enough, which increases the risk of coupling / uncoupling and lacks necessary supervision and control.

[0005] The present invention designs the operation of stopping the connection and stopping the unbundling for the automatic connection / unbundling step, and provides more flexible functions for the automatic connection / unbundling. At the same time, the present invention starts from the ATS system, and realizes the automatic connection / unbundling operation of layer-by-layer supervision through the pre-test of each subsystem and the result feedback. Summary of the invention

[0006] In view of the defects in the prior art, an object of the present invention is to provide an unmanned control method and system protected by a signal system in a fully automatic mode.

[0007] According to the present invention, an unattended control method protected by a signal system in a fully automatic mode is provided for automatic coupling and automatic uncoupling, and the method comprises:

[0008] Step S1: The two trains are located in the coupling and uncoupling type section, and the coupling / uncoupling instruction is sent through the timetable or ATS. When the train footprint is located in the coupling and uncoupling section or according to the coupling / uncoupling time, the ATS performs a pre-test on the coupling / uncoupling of the two trains to check the conditions required for coupling / uncoupling;

[0009] Step S2: After the pre-test is passed, the trackside ATO receives the coupling / uncoupling instruction from the ATS and immediately performs the trackside ATO pre-test to check the conditions required for safe coupling / uncoupling;

[0010] Step S3: After the trackside ATO coupling / uncoupling pre-test is successful, the trackside ATO sends a coupling / uncoupling preparation instruction to the train-mounted ATO waiting for operation. After the coupling / uncoupling conditions are met, the on-board ATO feeds back the trackside ATO coupling / uncoupling preparation confirmation information, and when the coupling / uncoupling preparation confirmation work is accepted, the on-board ATO requests the on-board ATP to apply emergency braking;

[0011] Step S4: The trackside ATO receives the confirmation information from the onboard ATO, and sends a coupling / uncoupling instruction to the onboard ATO of the train to be operated. After the conditions required for safe coupling / uncoupling are met, the onboard ATO requests coupling / uncoupling authorization from the onboard ATP;

[0012] Step S5: The onboard ATP receives the coupling / uncoupling authorization request. After the conditions required for safe coupling / uncoupling are met, the onboard ATP provides coupling authorization to the onboard ATO and feeds back the coupling / uncoupling status to the trackside ATP. The trackside ATP receives the train position and the coupling / uncoupling information in progress, and the trackside ATP accepts the train position.

[0013] Step S6: The on-board ATO obtains coupling authorization and adjusts the traction force to control the train to move forward at a speed lower than the coupling upper limit speed imposed by the on-board ATP. After the train composition changes, the on-board ATP notifies the trackside ATP that the coupling / uncoupling is completed, and the ATS displays the results and reasons of the coupling / uncoupling operation process.

[0014] The coupling / uncoupling of the train can be stopped by sending a stop command.

[0015] Preferably, the automatic hanging includes an automatic hanging step and a hanging suspension step.

[0016] The automatic coupling step includes determining that the train meets the pre-test conditions, triggering the coupling instruction through the ATS or timetable to perform the coupling pre-test;

[0017] The trackside ATO receives the coupling command from the ATS, determines the conditions required for coupling, and sends a coupling preparation command to complete the coupling preparation work;

[0018] The ATO on the leading vehicle receives the instruction to prepare for coupling, determines the pre-test conditions and train status, and sends a confirmation message;

[0019] The trackside ATO receives the confirmation information and sends a coupling instruction to the onboard ATO of the rear train of the two trains to be coupled;

[0020] After receiving the coupling instruction, the ATO on the rear vehicle determines the safe coupling conditions and requests coupling authorization from the ATP on the rear vehicle. The ATP on the rear vehicle continuously provides coupling authorization to the ATO on the rear vehicle and continuously sends coupling instructions to the trackside ATP.

[0021] On-board ATP monitoring coupling;

[0022] Evaluate the coupling results. When the two trains are successfully coupled, the train composition is changed, and the ATP of the two trains applies emergency braking and starts the initialization process.

[0023] When the automatic coupling of trains fails in the described terminating coupling step, the ATS sends a terminating coupling instruction to the onboard ATOs of the two trains being coupled through the trackside ATO, and the onboard ATOs receive the terminating coupling instruction and terminate the coupling.

[0024] Preferably, the train is judged whether it meets the pre-test conditions. If so, the train status is judged; if not, the ATS coupling pre-test fails and the pre-test is stopped.

[0025] The pre-test conditions are that the train is in UTO mode, the train is in a coupling position, the time conditions and the automatic coupling request are not disabled.

[0026] If the train is stationary, the door status is determined; if the train is not stationary, the ATS coupling pre-test fails, and the failure message is displayed, the count is performed, and the pre-test conditions are re-determined;

[0027] If the doors are fully locked, the ATS sends a coupling command with the numbers of the two trains to the trackside ATO at the time defined in the timetable; if the doors are not fully locked, the ATS coupling pre-test fails, counts, and re-judges the pre-test conditions;

[0028] If the pre-test fails after exceeding the set number of times, the ATS stops the repeated pre-test.

[0029] The train is in the coupling position when the footprint of the front train is completely located in the coupling type section, and the footprint position of the head of the rear train is located in the coupling position defined by the coupling type section.

[0030] The time condition is that both trains are located at the coupling position and there is a delay time after the trains arrive at the coupling position or the planned coupling time is met.

[0031] The automatic hang request can be disabled or enabled by ATS.

[0032] The conditions required for coupling are that the train is in UTO mode, the train is stationary, the train is running in the correct direction, the train length meets the standard, there is no non-communication vehicle occupying the coupled trains, the train footprint is located in the coupling area, there is no non-communication vehicle occupying the two trains, and the doors are fully locked.

[0033] The conditions required for coupling are determined. If the conditions are met, the trackside ATO sends a coupling preparation command to the onboard ATO of the train ahead; if the conditions are not met, the trackside ATO sends a coupling rejection command message and the reason to the ATS.

[0034] The pre-test conditions and train status are judged. If the pre-test conditions are met and the train is in a stationary state, the on-board ATO of the leading vehicle completes the pre-test and sends a confirmation message to the trackside ATO; if the pre-test conditions are not met or the train is not in a stationary state, the on-board ATO of the leading vehicle does not send any information, the trackside ATO stops sending the coupling preparation command, and feeds back a failure message to the ATS.

[0035] The confirmation information includes the coupling preparation confirmation status, and the front vehicle's onboard ATO requests the front vehicle's onboard ATP to apply emergency braking and maintain it until the coupling is completed or the emergency brake is reset.

[0036] Preferably, the safe coupling conditions are judged. If the safe coupling conditions are not met, the on-board ATO of the rear vehicle transmits the coupling rejection information and the reason for failure to the ATS through the trackside ATO; if the safe coupling conditions are met, the on-board ATO of the rear vehicle requests the coupling authorization from the on-board ATP of the rear vehicle, and judges the safe coupling conditions. If they are met, the on-board ATP of the rear vehicle continues to provide coupling authorization to the on-board ATO of the rear vehicle until the coupling is successful, terminated or fails and continues to send coupling instructions to the trackside ATP; if they are not met, the on-board ATP of the rear vehicle rejects the on-board ATO of the rear vehicle and provides the reason for failure, and the on-board ATO of the rear vehicle transmits the rejection information to the ATS through the trackside ATO.

[0037] The safe coupling conditions include the train being in UTO mode, meeting the departure conditions, the train footprint being in the coupling position, the train being in the normal braking state, the section between the head footprint and the front conflict point belonging to the coupling type and meeting the front conflict point type.

[0038] When the trackside ATP receives the train position and coupling instructions from the ATP on the rear vehicle, the trackside ATP will accept the train position.

[0039] During the supervised coupling, the on-board ATP forces the train to execute the coupling limit speed, and the on-board ATO adjusts the traction force and controls the train at a speed lower than the coupling limit speed. When the head footprint of the rear train has exceeded the front conflict point, the distance that the rear train continues to travel and the distance required for the front train to couple are judged. If they are greater, the on-board ATP of the rear car will apply emergency braking. If they are less than or equal to the limit, the coupling will continue.

[0040] The coupling speed limit is 7km / h.

[0041] The evaluation result of the coupling is that in the case of coupling in the UTO mode, the emergency brake during the initialization process can be automatically or remotely reset.

[0042] If the train composition changes, the ATS will display that the coupling process is completed and determine the completion time of the coupling process. If it is within the set reasonable time, the coupling is completed. If it is not within the set reasonable time, the ATS will feedback the coupling failure information. If the train composition does not change, the on-board ATO will transmit the coupling failure information to the ATS through the trackside ATO.

[0043] The coupling failure information includes instructions for initialization or removal of the lost train.

[0044] Preferably, the step of stopping the connection includes:

[0045] Determine the status of the on-board ATO. If the on-board ATO has not received the coupling authorization, the on-board ATO terminates the coupling process and sends a coupling termination instruction to the vehicle to terminate the operation. If the on-board ATO is receiving the coupling authorization, the on-board ATO deletes the coupling request to the on-board ATP and terminates the coupling process.

[0046] The abort hook instruction clears the active prepare hook and hook instructions.

[0047] The stop coupling instruction applies emergency braking to the train when the rear train is moving for coupling.

[0048] Preferably, the automatic decompilation includes an automatic decompilation step and a decompilation suspension step.

[0049] The automatic de-marshalling step includes determining that the train meets the de-marshalling test conditions, triggering a de-marshalling instruction through the ATS or timetable to perform a de-marshalling pre-test;

[0050] The trackside ATO receives the decoupling instruction from the ATS, determines the conditions required for decoupling, and sends the decoupling instruction to the onboard ATO after the decoupling pre-test is successful;

[0051] The on-board ATO receives the decommissioning instruction, determines the safe decommissioning conditions, and requests decommissioning authorization from the on-board ATP. The on-board ATP continues to provide decommissioning authorization to the on-board ATO.

[0052] The onboard ATO receives the decoupling authorization from the onboard ATP and activates the electrical or mechanical decoupling on the train;

[0053] The on-board ATP supervises the de-coupling, and the on-board ATP applies emergency braking and is initialized through the trackside ATP;

[0054] Evaluate the decompilation results, and ATS displays the decompilation result information.

[0055] The step of terminating the unbundling includes causing the ATS to clear the unbundling instruction sent to the onboard ATO through the trackside ATO, and immediately terminating the ongoing unbundling operation.

[0056] Preferably, the train is judged whether it meets the de-assembly test conditions. If so, the train status is judged; if not, the ATS de-assembly pre-test fails and the de-assembly pre-test is stopped.

[0057] The disassembly test conditions are that the train is in UTO mode, the train is stationary, the doors are fully closed and locked, the automatic disassembly request is not disabled, and the train is in the disassembly position and time conditions.

[0058] The de-assembling instruction includes the identification number of the train to be de-assembled and the main train composition information after de-assembling.

[0059] If the train is stationary, the de-training pre-test continues; if the train is not stationary, the ATS de-training pre-test fails, and the failure message is displayed, the count is performed, and step SB.1 is executed again;

[0060] If the decompilation test fails after exceeding the set number of times, the ATS stops the repeated decompilation pre-test.

[0061] The train being in the disassembling position means that the train is in a position where it is planned to be disassembled.

[0062] The time condition is that there is a delay time after the train runs to the designated position and the time taken by the train to reach the disassembly position is not earlier than the disassembly time defined in the timetable with the current time.

[0063] The automatic demarshalling request may be disabled or enabled by the ATS.

[0064] The conditions required for disbanding are that the train is in UTO mode, the train is stationary, the train vehicle composition is greater than 1, the train footprint is located in the disbanding area, there are no non-communication vehicles occupying the two workshops, and the designated number of disbanding vehicles is consistent with the number of train vehicles.

[0065] The conditions required for unmarshaling are determined. If the conditions required for unmarshaling are met, the trackside ATO sends an unmarshaling preparation command to the on-board ATO of the train ahead; if the conditions required for unmarshaling are not met, the trackside ATO sends a rejection of the unmarshaling command and the reason to the ATS; if the unmarshaling instruction is not rejected but is not executed for more than 5 minutes, a new warning is sent every 5 minutes.

[0066] The safe unbundling conditions are judged. If the safe unbundling conditions are not met, the on-board ATP will feedback the rejection reason to the on-board ATO and transmit it to the ATS through the trackside ATO. The trackside ATO will stop sending unbundling instructions to the on-board ATO; if the safe unbundling conditions are met, the on-board ATO will request unbundling authorization from the on-board ATP and judge the safe coupling conditions. If they are met, the on-board ATP will provide unbundling authorization to the on-board ATO. If they are not met, the on-board ATP will cancel the unbundling authorization.

[0067] The safe disbanding conditions include that the disbanding vehicle composition is consistent with the number of train vehicles, the train vehicle composition is valid, the train mode is UTO mode, the train is stationary, the train footprint is within the disbanding area, the departure conditions are met, and the forward moving distance is sufficient for train disbanding and the on-board ATC controlled by the train is disbanding the train forward.

[0068] Preferably, the activation is that when the on-board ATO receives confirmation from the train that the coupler has been electrically or mechanically uncoupled, the on-board ATO controls the train speed at the upper limit speed of uncoupling, and moves the front train forward, stops the train movement after the virtual occupancy of the two trains formed by the uncoupling does not overlap, and complies with the movement authorization of the on-board ATP.

[0069] The onboard ATP sends the train position and ongoing unbundling information to the trackside ATP, and feeds back the ATS unbundling process status through the trackside ATO.

[0070] The upper limit speed of de-assembly is 7 km / h.

[0071] During the supervised disassembly, the onboard ATP retains and executes the current movement authorization and ignores the movement authorization update of the trackside ATP until the train is disassembled and stopped or the train does not move until the departure timer expires.

[0072] The on-board ATP sets the common braking conflict point far enough in front of the train.

[0073] Determine the movement of the train within the set time. If the train moves, the onboard ATP will continue to provide the de-training authorization. If the train does not move, the de-training authorization will be cancelled.

[0074] Determine the number of trains. If the number has not changed, continue to authorize the disbanding. If the number has changed, the on-board ATP of the rear car after the disbanding will apply emergency braking until it is initialized by the trackside ATP.

[0075] The evaluation result of the unbundling is to determine if the ATS receives the train identification number from the trackside ATO, then the ATS displays that the unbundling process is completed; if the initialization and removal are not performed as set and the train identification number is not received, then the ATS displays a fault message.

[0076] Determine the distance from the conflict point ahead to the head virtual occupancy reported by the on-board ATP. If it is less than this distance, the on-board ATO will feed back the information of insufficient mobile authorization to ATS through the trackside ATO. If it is greater than or equal to this distance, determine the completion time of the unmarshaling process. If it is within the set reasonable time, the unmarshaling will be completed. If it is not within the set reasonable time, ATS will feed back the unmarshaling failure information. If the train composition has not changed, the on-board ATO will transmit the unmarshaling failure information to ATS through the trackside ATO.

[0077] The de-training failure information includes instructions for initialization or removal of the lost train.

[0078] Preferably, in the step of terminating unmarshaling, it is determined whether the train has started unmarshaling. If unmarshaling has started and the coupler has been electrically or mechanically unmarshaled, the unmarshaling process cannot be ended by the abort instruction. If unmarshaling has not started, the abort unmarshaling instruction is forwarded to the trackside ATO through the ATS, and the trackside ATO clears the unmarshaling instruction sent to the on-board ATO and immediately terminates the ongoing unmarshaling operation.

[0079] When the on-board ATO and on-board ATP have not started to disassemble and the disassembly instruction has been cleared, the train can continue to run with the current coupling configuration.

[0080] According to the present invention, an unmanned control system protected by a signal system in a fully automatic mode is provided, which is operated by adopting the unmanned control method protected by a signal system in a fully automatic mode.

[0081] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0082] 1. The present invention identifies the map section type and safety conditions, confirms the coupling and uncoupling operation locations, pre-tests the signal system based on whether the conditions are met, and uses monitoring measures to implement layer-by-layer checks to ensure safe and reliable operations.

[0083] 2. The present invention has a reasonable structure, ingenious design and high safety. It can effectively improve operational efficiency while ensuring safe and reliable operation, effectively reduce operating costs, and significantly improve system availability.

[0084] 3. The present invention improves the rigor, safety, flexibility and operational efficiency of the operation process through pre-testing and suspending operations, effectively reduces operating costs, improves safety assurance, and solves the problem of flexible train coupling and uncoupling relying solely on manual protection. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0085] Other features, objects and advantages of the present invention will become more apparent from the detailed description of non-limiting embodiments made with reference to the following drawings:

[0086] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of the automatic hanging process.

[0087] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the automatic decoding process.

[0088] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of automatic hanging.

[0089] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram for automatic decompilation. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0090] The present invention is described in detail below in conjunction with specific embodiments. The following embodiments will help those skilled in the art to further understand the present invention, but are not intended to limit the present invention in any form. It should be noted that, for those of ordinary skill in the art, several changes and improvements can also be made without departing from the concept of the present invention. These all belong to the protection scope of the present invention.

[0091] According to the present invention, an unattended control method protected by a signal system in a fully automatic mode is provided for automatic coupling and automatic uncoupling, and the method comprises:

[0092] by Figure 1 For example, the automatic connection includes an automatic connection step and a connection suspension step;

[0093] by Figure 2 For example, the automatic decompilation includes an automatic decompilation step and a decompilation suspension step;

[0094] Step S1: When two trains are in the coupling and uncoupling type section, coupling / uncoupling instructions are sent through the timetable or the operator. When the train footprint is in the coupling and uncoupling section or according to the coupling / uncoupling time, ATS pre-tests the coupling / uncoupling of the two trains to check the train mode, train status and other conditions required for coupling / uncoupling.

[0095] Step S2: When the ATS pre-test passes, the trackside ATO receives the coupling / discoupling instruction from the ATS and immediately performs a pre-test to check the train mode, status, footprint, train length, section type, presence of other vehicles between trains, and running direction, etc., which are some conditions required for safe coupling / discoupling.

[0096] Step S3: When the trackside ATO coupling / uncoupling pre-test is successful, the trackside ATO sends a coupling / uncoupling preparation instruction to the train-mounted ATO waiting for operation. When the train mode, train status and other conditions are met, the on-board ATO feeds back the trackside ATO coupling / uncoupling preparation confirmation information, and when the coupling / uncoupling preparation confirmation work is accepted, the on-board ATO requests the on-board ATP to apply emergency braking.

[0097] Step S4: When the trackside ATO receives the confirmation information of the onboard ATO preparing the coupling / uncoupling instruction, the trackside ATO sends the coupling / uncoupling instruction to the onboard ATO of the train to be operated. After meeting some conditions required for the safe completion of coupling / uncoupling, such as train mode, train footprint, departure conditions, etc., the onboard ATO requests coupling / uncoupling authorization from the onboard ATP.

[0098] Step S5: After receiving the coupling / uncoupling authorization request, the onboard ATP checks the train mode, departure conditions, train location, type of the conflict point ahead, the type of the train section, and other conditions required for safe coupling / uncoupling. The onboard ATP provides coupling authorization to the onboard ATO and feeds back the coupling / uncoupling status to the trackside ATP. When the trackside ATP receives the train position and the ongoing coupling / uncoupling information from the onboard ATP, the trackside ATP will accept the train position.

[0099] Step S6: When the onboard ATO obtains the coupling authorization, the onboard ATO will adjust the traction force to control the train to move forward at a speed lower than the coupling upper limit imposed by the onboard ATP. After meeting the conditions such as train composition change, the onboard ATP will notify the trackside ATP that the coupling / uncoupling is completed.

[0100] The success, failure and reasons for failure of the coupling / uncoupling operation will be displayed on the ATS interface for real-time monitoring by the ATS operator.

[0101] In more preferred embodiments, if coupling / uncoupling fails due to unsatisfied conditions or the operator needs to temporarily stop coupling / uncoupling, a more flexible coupling / uncoupling operation is required. If coupling / uncoupling fails and the operator needs to stop the ongoing coupling / uncoupling operation, the ATS operator can flexibly stop the coupling / uncoupling operation of the train by sending a stop command.

[0102] by Figure 3 For example, the automatic connection step includes:

[0103] Step SA.1: trigger the link command;

[0104] The footprint of the stationary train in front is completely located in the coupling and uncoupling type section, and the footprint position of the head of the train in the rear that is about to move forward for coupling is located in the coupling position defined in the coupling and uncoupling type section.

[0105] like Figure 3 As shown, there are two trains to be coupled in UTO mode, with all doors closed and locked. The footprint of the stationary train in front is completely located in the coupling and uncoupling type section, and the footprint position of the head of the train to be coupled forward in the rear is within the coupling position defined in the coupling and uncoupling type section.

[0106] ATS provides operators with the option of coupling, or automatically requests coupling two trains through timetable triggers, where both trains are at the planned coupling locations and there is a delay after the trains arrive at the designated location or the planned coupling time is met.

[0107] The automatic request to couple the two trains is triggered by the coupling time defined in the timetable and the two trains being in the coupling position. If the automatic coupling request of the ATS is not disabled, the ATS will perform a pre-test to check the train UTO mode and the door closing and locking status. After the pre-test is passed, a coupling command with the numbers of the two trains expected to be coupled is sent to the trackside ATO.

[0108] When a train in UTO mode is stationary and its doors are all closed, if the ATS automatic coupling request is not disabled, the ATS will automatically send a coupling command with the two train numbers to the trackside ATO at the time defined by the timetable.

[0109] If the ATS coupling pre-test fails because the train is not stationary or the doors are not fully locked, the ATS can repeat the pre-test a configurable number of times.

[0110] If the train's operating mode is not UTO mode, any train has left the coupling position / planned route, or the automatic coupling request is disabled, resulting in the ATS coupling pre-test failure, ATS will stop pre-testing the coupling events on the timetable.

[0111] If the pre-test fails after exceeding the set number of times, the ATS will notify the operator to stop repeating the pre-test.

[0112] When the ATS stops pre-testing a tie-in event because the pre-test conditions are not met, the ATS will not automatically make a tie-in request according to the specific schedule.

[0113] When the coupling pre-test is stopped without the ATS sending a coupling command to the trackside ATO, and the automatic coupling request is not disabled, the ATS will display a failure message to the ATS operator.

[0114] ATS provides the operator with the function of disabling schedule-based hook-up in the system as a whole. When ATS receives a command from the operator to disable schedule hook-up, ATS shall lock the hook-up operation as disabled.

[0115] ATS provides the operator with the function of selecting and removing the schedule connection prohibition. When ATS receives the command to remove the schedule connection prohibition from the operator, ATS will enable the schedule-based connection function.

[0116] Coupling / uncoupling is an operation that requires careful handling. Pre-testing is performed at each subsystem stage, that is, monitoring whether the conditions for safe coupling / uncoupling are always met. Once the conditions for safe coupling / uncoupling are not met at a certain stage of the coupling / uncoupling process, the coupling / uncoupling operation is terminated and the reason for the operation failure is fed back.

[0117] Step SA.2: Complete the preparation work for the connection;

[0118] When the trackside ATO receives the coupling command from ATS, it checks the train UTO mode, train stationary status, consistent train running direction, train length, no non-communication vehicle occupying the coupled trains, current or inter-train section type, no non-communication vehicle occupying the two trains, and full door locking status. When all the conditions required for coupling are met, the trackside ATO pre-test passes successfully and sends a coupling preparation command to the onboard ATO of the train ahead.

[0119] If the trackside ATO coupling pre-test is unsuccessful, the trackside ATO will send a message to the ATS to reject the coupling command and display the reason for the rejection.

[0120] Step SA.3: receiving a command to prepare for connection;

[0121] When the front train receives the command to prepare for coupling, it checks that all pre-test conditions such as the train UTO mode, the door fully locked state, and the train stationary state are met. The on-board ATO completes the pre-test and feeds back the coupling preparation confirmation status to the trackside ATO. The on-board ATO will also request the on-board ATP to apply emergency braking and maintain it until the coupling is completed or the emergency brake is reset.

[0122] When the coupling preparation confirmation is accepted by the preceding vehicle ATO, the onboard ATO sends a confirmation indication to the trackside ATO, and the onboard ATO will request the onboard ATP to apply and maintain emergency braking until the coupling is completed or the emergency brake is reset.

[0123] If the wayside ATO does not receive the coupling preparation confirmation information from the preceding vehicle ATO within the specified time, the wayside ATO will stop sending coupling preparation commands to the preceding vehicle ATO and feedback failure information to the ATS.

[0124] Step SA.4: Send a connection command;

[0125] When the trackside ATO receives confirmation information from the ATO of the preceding train that it is ready to couple, the trackside ATO will send a coupling command to the onboard ATO of the rear train in the two trains to be coupled.

[0126] Step SA.5: Linking authorization;

[0127] When the following car receives the coupling command, it checks that all safety coupling conditions are met, including the train UTO mode, the section type of the head footprint, the departure conditions, and the distance to the conflict point ahead. Then, the on-board ATO of the following car requests the on-board ATP for coupling authorization.

[0128] If the onboard ATO has received a coupling command from the trackside ATO, but the conditions for requesting coupling authorization from the onboard ATP are not met, the onboard ATO will forward the coupling rejection information and the reason for failure to the ATS through the trackside ATO.

[0129] When the on-board ATP receives the coupling authorization request from the on-board ATO, it checks the train UTO mode, departure conditions, train footprint position in the coupling type section, train common braking status, section type from the head footprint to the front conflict point, and the front conflict point type. When all conditions for safe coupling are met, the on-board ATP will continue to provide coupling authorization to the on-board ATO until the coupling is successful, aborted or fails. At the same time, the on-board ATP will inform the trackside ATP that the coupling is in progress.

[0130] If the following car obtains ATP coupling authorization, but the on-board ATO coupling request is cancelled, the train operation mode is changed, the train applies emergency braking, the front train moves, or the rear car's head footprint exceeds the front conflict point, the on-board ATP will cancel the coupling authorization.

[0131] If the onboard ATP receives a request for coupling authorization, but any coupling authorization conditions are not met, the onboard ATP will reject the request made by the onboard ATO and provide the reason for failure. At the same time, if the onboard ATO receives a rejection of the coupling authorization by the onboard ATP, the onboard ATO will forward the message including the rejection reason to the ATS through the trackside ATO.

[0132] During the coupling process, the position of the rear train moving forward to prepare for coupling will exceed its super virtual occupancy. Therefore, when the trackside ATP receives the train position and coupling instructions from the onboard ATP, the trackside ATP will accept the train position to ensure continuous train tracking.

[0133] Step SA.6: On-board ATP monitors the coupling;

[0134] When the on-board ATP authorizes coupling, the on-board ATP will force the train to execute the coupling limit speed of 7km / h, but will not enforce the safety margin distance and the safety distance to the front conflict point and the common braking conflict point to allow the coupler collision between the rear train and the front train.

[0135] When the onboard ATP authorizes coupling and the head footprint of the rear train has exceeded the front conflict point, if the rear train continues to travel a distance greater than the distance required to couple with the front train, the rear train ATP will apply emergency braking.

[0136] When the on-board ATO obtains the coupling authorization from the ATP, the on-board ATO will adjust the traction force and use a coupling limit speed lower than the on-board ATP to control the train to move forward.

[0137] Step SA.7: Evaluate the results of the joint hanging;

[0138] When two trains are successfully coupled, the number of vehicles will change. This will cause the ATP of both trains to apply emergency brakes. The initialization process will also be started and 2 trains will be deleted and replaced by 1 train.

[0139] In the case of UTO mode coupling, the emergency brake can be reset automatically or remotely when the new train is initialized.

[0140] When the ATS receives the train identification number from the trackside ATO, indicating that the coupled train has been initialized and the previous coupled train has been removed, the ATS will display that the coupling process is complete.

[0141] When a coupled train with coupling authorization stops moving, if the vehicle composition has not changed, it is considered that the coupling has failed. The onboard ATO will report the coupling failure result to the ATS through the trackside ATO.

[0142] If the ATS has received an indication of successful coupling from the trackside ATO, but the coupling process is not completed within a reasonable time, the ATS will also provide feedback to the operator that the coupling process failed, including instructions for initialization / removal of the missing train.

[0143] In more preferred embodiments, in the step of stopping the connection:

[0144] The abort coupling command is mainly used to solve the problem of automatic coupling failure of trains. ATS provides the operator with the abort coupling option, and the ATS issues a command to immediately abort the ongoing coupling operation. When the ATS receives the abort coupling command issued by the operator, the ATS forwards the abort coupling command to the onboard ATOs of the two trains being coupled through the trackside ATO.

[0145] If the on-board ATO is ready to activate coupling at this time, the on-board ATO will terminate the coupling process and send a coupling termination instruction to other vehicle subsystems.

[0146] When the on-board ATO receives a coupling termination instruction from the trackside ATO and the on-board ATO is ready to couple, the on-board ATO will terminate the coupling operation and send a coupling termination instruction to the vehicle.

[0147] When the onboard ATO receives an abort coupling instruction from the trackside ATO and the onboard ATO is receiving coupling authorization from the onboard ATP, the onboard ATO will delete the coupling request to the onboard ATP. The onboard ATP will only authorize coupling when the onboard ATO requests it.

[0148] Aborting the coupling command will clear active prepare coupling and coupling commands. When these commands are cleared, the trains can be managed normally like separate trains. If the train footprints overlap due to coupling failure, the trains will have to be separated in RM mode.

[0149] If the coupling is aborted while the rear train is moving for coupling, the aborted coupling operation will cause the train to apply emergency brakes.

[0150] by Figure 4 For example, the automatic decompilation step includes:

[0151] Step SB.1: Decompilation command trigger;

[0152] When the footprint of the train to be uncoupled is within the coupling uncoupling type area, the ATS uncoupling command can be triggered at the time defined in the timetable. ATS performs ATS pre-test according to the conditions required for uncoupling, such as the train UTO mode and stationary state, to confirm that the conditions for the uncoupling operation are met. After the ATS pre-test passes, it sends an uncoupling request with the identification number of the train to be uncoupled and the main vehicle composition to the trackside ATO. If the pre-test fails, the ATS will repeat the pre-test in a configurable number of times. If the pre-test fails after the number of times, the ATS will notify the operator to stop repeating the pre-test and provide failure information.

[0153] Specifically, the footprint of the train to be disassembled must be within the coupling disassembly type area. Only when all the conditions for keeping the train stationary are cleared, can the train start to perform the disassembly operation. In order to avoid the train from departing without disassembling, the disassembly command must be issued before the departure conditions are met. Figure 4 As shown, a train consisting of more than two units is in UTO mode, with all doors closed and locked, and the footprint of the train to be uncoupled is located in the coupling and uncoupling type area.

[0154] The ATS provides the operator with the option of a train disassembly command, which includes the train to be disassembled and the vehicle composition of the main train after the disassembly. Alternatively, the ATS disassembly command can be triggered by the timetable. The triggering conditions are usually the train being in the position for the planned disassembly, the delay time after the train runs to the specified position, or the earliest disassembly time. The main train is defined as the part of the train to be disassembled that is located at the front relative to the traffic direction.

[0155] If the traffic direction changes before the disbanding conditions are met, the vehicle composition of the main train is determined according to the changed traffic direction. When the ATS receives the disbanding instruction from the operator, it forwards the disbanding instruction to the trackside ATO.

[0156] When the train footprint position is located in the coupling and uncoupling type area, the time taken for the train to reach the uncoupling position, and the current time is not earlier than the uncoupling time defined in the timetable, the ATS will perform a train uncoupling pre-test to check other conditions that need to be met for uncoupling.

[0157] When all ATS pre-test conditions are met, such as the train UTO mode, the train stationary state, and the automatic de-marshaling request is not disabled, the ATS will send a de-marshaling request containing the identification number of the train to be de-marshaled and the main train composition to the trackside ATO.

[0158] ATS will stop pre-testing when the train mode is not UTO mode, the train to be disassembled is not in the disassembling area / leaves the planned route, or the automatic disassembling request is disabled in the system.

[0159] If the ATS detraining pre-test fails because the train is not at rest, the ATS will repeat the pre-test for the configured number of times. If the pre-test fails after the number of times, the ATS will notify the operator to stop repeating the pre-test.

[0160] When the ATS stops the deprogramming pretest without sending a deprogramming request, and schedule-based deprogramming requests are not disabled, the ATS will display a failure message to the operator.

[0161] ATS provides the operator with the function of turning off schedule-based decommissioning in the system globally. When ATS receives a command from the operator to disable schedule decommissioning, ATS should lock the decommissioning operation to disabled.

[0162] ATS provides the operator with the option to remove the schedule decommissioning disable function. When ATS receives the command to remove the schedule decommissioning disable from the operator, ATS will enable the schedule-based decommissioning function.

[0163] Step SB.2: Prepare for decompression and send decompression instructions:

[0164] When the wayside ATO receives a de-marshaling command from the ATS, either issued by the operator or automatically by the ATS according to the schedule, the wayside ATO will perform a pre-test.

[0165] The trackside ATO pre-test is considered successful when all conditions are met, including the train operation mode is UTO mode, the train is stationary, the train footprint is within the demarshalling area, there is no non-communication vehicle occupying the train section, the vehicle composition is valid (greater than 1), and the number of demarshalling vehicles specified by the ATS for demarshalling the train is consistent with the number of vehicles on the train.

[0166] If the trackside ATO unmarshaling pre-test is successful, the trackside ATO sends an unmarshaling instruction containing the unmarshaling vehicle components to the onboard ATO. If the trackside ATO unmarshaling pre-test is unsuccessful, the trackside ATO will display the rejection of the unmarshaling instruction to the ATS and feedback the reason for the failure. If the unmarshaling instruction is not rejected but has not been executed after 5 minutes, the ATS will provide a new warning to the operator every 5 minutes.

[0167] Step SB.3: Decompilation authorization;

[0168] When the on-board ATO receives a disassembly command and the composition of the disassembly vehicles is consistent with the number of train vehicles, the train mode is UTO mode, the train is stationary, the train footprint is within the disassembly area, the departure conditions are met, the forward moving distance meets the train disassembly, and the on-board ATC is controlling the train to disassemble forward, the on-board ATO sends a disassembly request to the on-board ATP.

[0169] When the on-board ATP receives a disassembly request from the on-board ATO, it checks that the train vehicle composition is valid (greater than 1), the train operation mode is UTO mode, the train is stationary, the train is located in the disassembly area, the departure conditions are met, and the on-board ATC is controlled to be in the vehicle moving forward for disassembly. When all the conditions are met, the on-board ATP will provide the on-board ATO with the disassembly authorization.

[0170] Once the train disbanding is authorized, the onboard ATP will cancel the train disbanding authorization when any of the following situations occurs: the onboard ATO cancels the request for train disbanding, the train operation mode changes, the train applies emergency braking, the departure fails, or the train returns to zero speed after successful start.

[0171] After the deregistration authorization is revoked, no deregistration authorization may be allowed again for a period of time, which is used to satisfy all authorization conditions again.

[0172] If the onboard ATP has received the onboard ATO's request for authorization to de-train, and not all authorization conditions are met, the onboard ATP will feedback the onboard ATO the reason for rejection, and will feed the message back to the ATS through the trackside ATO, and the trackside ATO will stop sending de-training commands to the onboard ATO.

[0173] Step SB.4: Train disassembly operation;

[0174] When the onboard ATO receives the de-marshaling authorization from the onboard ATP, the onboard ATO will activate the vehicle commands required for the electrical or mechanical de-marshaling on the train to divide the front part of the train into the number of coupled vehicles.

[0175] When the onboard ATO of the train ahead receives confirmation from the train that the coupler has been electrically or mechanically uncoupled, the onboard ATO limits the train speed to the upper limit of the uncoupling speed and generates a vehicle signal to move the train ahead forward, stopping the train movement when the virtual occupancy of the two newly uncoupled trains does not overlap, while complying with the movement authorization of the onboard ATP.

[0176] When the onboard ATP provides the onboard ATO with the authorization to unbundle, the onboard ATP sends the train position and the ongoing unbundling information to the trackside ATP, which receives the train position. The unbundling process status will be sent to the ATS via the trackside ATO.

[0177] Step SB.5: On-board ATP supervision decompilation;

[0178] After the on-board ATP grants the de-training authorization, if the vehicle cannot be electrically / mechanically de-trained or the departure conditions are not met, resulting in the train not moving after the specified time, the on-board ATP will cancel the de-training authorization.

[0179] When the onboard ATP provides the onboard ATO with the de-marshaling authorization, the onboard ATP will retain and execute the current movement authorization and ignore the movement authorization update of the trackside ATP until the train is de-marshaled and stopped or the train has not moved until the departure timer expires.

[0180] When the onboard ATP authorizes a shunting operation, the onboard ATP will not apply emergency brakes due to changes in the number of cars, loss of train integrity, or changes in initialization status. The onboard ATP will also achieve the maximum shunting distance by setting the common brake conflict point far enough ahead of the train to allow the two newly formed trains to separate virtual occupancy.

[0181] When the coupler is electrically uncoupled and the number of trains changes, the new controlling onboard ATP of the rear train will apply the emergency brake. When the onboard ATP is initialized with the trackside ATP, the emergency brake will automatically reset.

[0182] Step SB.6: Evaluate the decompilation results;

[0183] When the ATS receives the train identifier number from the trackside ATO, which indicates that the uncoupling train has been initialized and the train before uncoupling has been removed, the ATS shall declare the uncoupling process complete. If the onboard ATP cancels the uncoupling authorization due to the train's failure to depart, the onboard ATO will feedback the uncoupling failure to the ATS through the trackside ATO.

[0184] If initialization and removal do not proceed as expected, the ATS will display a fault message to the operator.

[0185] After the train is disbanded and the newly marshaled train is initialized, if the distance to the conflict point ahead is less than the head virtual occupancy reported by the onboard ATP, the controlling onboard ATO will display the insufficient movement authorization to the ATS through the trackside ATO.

[0186] If not all train initializations and removals are completed within a reasonable time as expected, the ATS will provide the operator with an indication of the failure of the unmarshaling process, including an indication of the missing train initializations / removals.

[0187] In more preferred embodiments, in the step of terminating the decompilation:

[0188] The ATS provides the operator with the option to abort the unmarshaling operation. By clearing the unmarshaling instruction sent to the onboard ATO through the trackside ATO, an instruction can be initiated to immediately abort the ongoing unmarshaling operation.

[0189] When the ATS receives the abort unmarshaling instruction from the operator, it forwards the instruction to the trackside ATO.

[0190] When the wayside ATO receives the abort de-marshalling instruction from the ATS and the wayside ATO is sending the de-marshalling instruction to the onboard ATO, the wayside ATO will clear the de-marshalling instruction.

[0191] Once the on-board ATO and on-board ATP start the uncoupling movement and the train starts the uncoupling operation, it is impossible to end the uncoupling process by aborting the command because the couplers on the train have been electrically / mechanically uncoupled.

[0192] The purpose of aborting the unmarshaling command is to solve the situation where unmarshaling has been ordered but has not been performed for a long time and is no longer needed. Aborting the unmarshaling command will cause the trackside ATO to cancel the train unmarshaling command to the onboard ATO. When the onboard ATO and onboard ATP have not started the unmarshaling movement and the unmarshaling command has been cleared, the train can continue to run in the current coupling configuration.

[0193] In more preferred examples, all operations need to meet the conditions of connection / disconnection completion and safety, and the connection / disconnection operation is executed or rejected according to the satisfied conditions. When the connection / disconnection fails, the failure reason will be notified to the operator and the necessity of solving the situation will be emphasized. The operator can selectively initiate a command to immediately terminate the ongoing connection / disconnection operation according to the connection / disconnection completion situation. The termination operation can effectively reduce the waiting time caused by unsatisfied conditions during the connection / disconnection operation, greatly avoiding time waste and improving operational efficiency.

[0194] Through pre-testing, it is determined whether the coupling / uncoupling has the conditions for safe operation, and the next subsystem in the automatic coupling / uncoupling is executed according to the result of the pre-test, and the result is fed back at the same time. Through pre-testing, effective checks and supervision are implemented at all levels to ensure the safety and reliability of automatic coupling / uncoupling operations. The function of suspending operations can avoid the situation where the automatic coupling / uncoupling operation can only be executed continuously once it starts, which greatly improves the flexibility of system operation and saves unnecessary waiting time.

[0195] Compared with the traditional manual protection train coupling / uncoupling operation, the signal system of the present invention performs automatic coupling and uncoupling operations by identifying map section type, train mode, train status, door status, running direction and other conditions, which not only ensures the safe, flexible and reliable operation, effectively supervises the coupling and uncoupling operations, and is safe and orderly, but also can improve the efficiency of the train's fully automatic coupling / uncoupling process, thereby improving operational efficiency and effectively reducing operating costs.

[0196] The present invention also provides an unmanned coupling and de-coupling system protected by a signal system in a fully automatic mode. The unmanned coupling and de-coupling system protected by a signal system in a fully automatic mode can be realized by executing the process steps of the unmanned coupling and de-coupling method protected by a signal system in a fully automatic mode. That is, those skilled in the art can understand the unmanned coupling and de-coupling method protected by a signal system in a fully automatic mode as a preferred implementation of the unmanned coupling and de-coupling system protected by a signal system in a fully automatic mode.

[0197] Those skilled in the art know that, in addition to realizing the system and its various devices, modules, and units provided by the present invention in a purely computer-readable program code, it is entirely possible to realize the same functions in the form of logic gates, switches, application-specific integrated circuits, programmable logic controllers, and embedded microcontrollers by logically programming the method steps. Therefore, the system and its various devices, modules, and units provided by the present invention can be considered as a hardware component, and the devices, modules, and units included therein for realizing various functions can also be regarded as structures within the hardware component; the devices, modules, and units for realizing various functions can also be regarded as both software modules for realizing the method and structures within the hardware component.

[0198] According to the present invention, an unmanned control system protected by a signal system in a fully automatic mode includes: ATS, trackside ATO, vehicle-mounted ATO, vehicle-mounted ATP, trackside ATP;

[0199] The two trains are located in the coupling / uncoupling type section, and the coupling / uncoupling instructions are sent through the timetable or ATS. When the train footprint is located in the coupling and uncoupling section or according to the coupling / uncoupling time, ATS pre-tests the coupling / uncoupling of the two trains to check the conditions required for coupling / uncoupling;

[0200] After the pre-test is passed, the trackside ATO receives the coupling / uncoupling instruction from the ATS and immediately performs the trackside ATO pre-test to check the conditions required for safe coupling / uncoupling;

[0201] After the trackside ATO coupling / uncoupling pre-test is successful, the trackside ATO sends a coupling / uncoupling preparation instruction to the train-mounted ATO waiting for operation. After the coupling / uncoupling conditions are met, the on-board ATO feeds back the trackside ATO coupling / uncoupling preparation confirmation information, and when the coupling / uncoupling preparation confirmation work is accepted, the on-board ATO requests the on-board ATP to apply emergency braking;

[0202] After receiving the confirmation information from the onboard ATO, the trackside ATO sends a coupling / uncoupling instruction to the onboard ATO of the train to be operated. After the conditions required for safe coupling / uncoupling are met, the onboard ATO requests coupling / uncoupling authorization from the onboard ATP.

[0203] After the onboard ATP receives the coupling / uncoupling authorization request and meets the conditions required for safe coupling / uncoupling, the onboard ATP provides coupling authorization to the onboard ATO and feeds back the coupling / uncoupling status to the trackside ATP. The trackside ATP receives the train position and the coupling / uncoupling information in progress, and accepts the train position.

[0204] The on-board ATO obtains the coupling authorization and adjusts the traction force to control the train to move forward at a speed lower than the coupling upper limit speed imposed by the on-board ATP. After the train composition changes are met, the on-board ATP notifies the trackside ATP that the coupling / uncoupling is completed, and the ATS displays the results and reasons of the coupling / uncoupling operation process.

[0205] The coupling / uncoupling of the train can be stopped by sending a stop command.

[0206] In more preferred examples, the automatic hanging includes an automatic hanging module and a hanging suspension module.

[0207] The automatic coupling module includes determining that the train meets the pre-test conditions, triggering the coupling instruction through ATS or timetable to perform coupling pre-test;

[0208] The trackside ATO receives the coupling command from the ATS, determines the conditions required for coupling, and sends a coupling preparation command to complete the coupling preparation work;

[0209] The ATO on the leading vehicle receives the instruction to prepare for coupling, determines the pre-test conditions and train status, and sends a confirmation message;

[0210] The trackside ATO receives the confirmation information and sends a coupling instruction to the onboard ATO of the rear train of the two trains to be coupled;

[0211] After receiving the coupling instruction, the ATO on the rear vehicle determines the safe coupling conditions and requests coupling authorization from the ATP on the rear vehicle. The ATP on the rear vehicle continuously provides coupling authorization to the ATO on the rear vehicle and continuously sends coupling instructions to the trackside ATP.

[0212] On-board ATP monitoring coupling;

[0213] Evaluate the coupling results. When the two trains are successfully coupled, the train composition is changed, and the ATP of the two trains applies emergency braking and starts the initialization process.

[0214] In the coupling suspension module, when the automatic coupling of trains fails, the ATS sends a coupling suspension instruction to the onboard ATOs of the two trains being coupled through the trackside ATO, and the onboard ATOs receive the coupling suspension instruction and terminate the coupling.

[0215] In more preferred examples, it is determined whether the train meets the pre-test conditions. If so, the train status is determined. If not, the ATS coupling pre-test fails and the pre-test is stopped.

[0216] The pre-test conditions are that the train is in UTO mode, the train is in a coupling position, the time conditions and the automatic coupling request are not disabled.

[0217] If the train is stationary, the door status is determined; if the train is not stationary, the ATS coupling pre-test fails, and the failure message is displayed, the count is performed, and the pre-test conditions are re-determined;

[0218] If the doors are fully locked, the ATS sends a coupling command with the numbers of the two trains to the trackside ATO at the time defined in the timetable; if the doors are not fully locked, the ATS coupling pre-test fails, counts, and re-judges the pre-test conditions;

[0219] If the pre-test fails after exceeding the set number of times, the ATS stops the repeated pre-test.

[0220] The train is in the coupling position when the footprint of the front train is completely located in the coupling type section, and the footprint position of the head of the rear train is located in the coupling position defined by the coupling type section.

[0221] The time condition is that both trains are located at the coupling position and there is a delay time after the trains arrive at the coupling position or the planned coupling time is met.

[0222] The automatic hang request can be disabled or enabled by ATS.

[0223] The conditions required for coupling are that the train is in UTO mode, the train is stationary, the train is running in the correct direction, the train length meets the standard, there is no non-communication vehicle occupying the coupled trains, the train footprint is located in the coupling area, there is no non-communication vehicle occupying the two trains, and the doors are fully locked.

[0224] The conditions required for coupling are determined. If the conditions are met, the trackside ATO sends a coupling preparation command to the onboard ATO of the train ahead; if the conditions are not met, the trackside ATO sends a coupling rejection command message and the reason to the ATS.

[0225] The pre-test conditions and train status are judged. If the pre-test conditions are met and the train is in a stationary state, the on-board ATO of the leading vehicle completes the pre-test and sends a confirmation message to the trackside ATO; if the pre-test conditions are not met or the train is not in a stationary state, the on-board ATO of the leading vehicle does not send any information, the trackside ATO stops sending the coupling preparation command, and feeds back a failure message to the ATS.

[0226] The confirmation information includes the coupling preparation confirmation status, and the front vehicle's onboard ATO requests the front vehicle's onboard ATP to apply emergency braking and maintain it until the coupling is completed or the emergency brake is reset.

[0227] In more preferred examples, the safe coupling conditions are judged. If the safe coupling conditions are not met, the on-board ATO of the rear vehicle will transmit the coupling rejection information and the reason for failure to the ATS through the trackside ATO; if the safe coupling conditions are met, the on-board ATO of the rear vehicle will request the coupling authorization from the on-board ATP of the rear vehicle and judge the safe coupling conditions. If they are met, the on-board ATP of the rear vehicle will continue to provide coupling authorization to the on-board ATO of the rear vehicle until the coupling is successful, terminated or fails and continue to send coupling instructions to the trackside ATP; if they are not met, the on-board ATP of the rear vehicle will reject the on-board ATO of the rear vehicle and provide the reason for failure, and the on-board ATO of the rear vehicle will transmit the rejection information to the ATS through the trackside ATO.

[0228] The safe coupling conditions include the train being in UTO mode, meeting the departure conditions, the train footprint being in the coupling position, the train being in the normal braking state, the section between the head footprint and the front conflict point belonging to the coupling type and meeting the front conflict point type.

[0229] When the trackside ATP receives the train position and coupling instructions from the ATP on the rear vehicle, the trackside ATP will accept the train position.

[0230] During the supervised coupling, the on-board ATP forces the train to execute the coupling limit speed, and the on-board ATO adjusts the traction force and controls the train at a speed lower than the coupling limit speed. When the head footprint of the rear train has exceeded the front conflict point, the distance that the rear train continues to travel and the distance required for the front train to couple are judged. If they are greater, the on-board ATP of the rear car will apply emergency braking. If they are less than or equal to the limit, the coupling will continue.

[0231] The coupling speed limit is 7km / h.

[0232] The evaluation result of the coupling is that in the case of coupling in the UTO mode, the emergency brake during the initialization process can be automatically or remotely reset.

[0233] If the train composition changes, the ATS will display that the coupling process is completed and determine the completion time of the coupling process. If it is within the set reasonable time, the coupling is completed. If it is not within the set reasonable time, the ATS will feedback the coupling failure information. If the train composition does not change, the on-board ATO will transmit the coupling failure information to the ATS through the trackside ATO.

[0234] The coupling failure information includes instructions for initialization or removal of the lost train.

[0235] In more preferred embodiments, the suspension module includes:

[0236] Determine the status of the on-board ATO. If the on-board ATO has not received the coupling authorization, the on-board ATO terminates the coupling process and sends a coupling termination instruction to the vehicle to terminate the operation. If the on-board ATO is receiving the coupling authorization, the on-board ATO deletes the coupling request to the on-board ATP and terminates the coupling process.

[0237] The abort hook instruction clears the active prepare hook and hook instructions.

[0238] The stop coupling instruction applies emergency braking to the train when the rear train is moving for coupling.

[0239] In more preferred examples, the automatic decompilation includes an automatic decompilation module and a termination decompilation module;

[0240] The automatic unbundling module includes determining that the train meets the unbundling test conditions, triggering unbundling instructions through ATS or timetable to perform unbundling pre-test;

[0241] The trackside ATO receives the decoupling instruction from the ATS, determines the conditions required for decoupling, and sends the decoupling instruction to the onboard ATO after the decoupling pre-test is successful;

[0242] The on-board ATO receives the decommissioning instruction, determines the safe decommissioning conditions, and requests decommissioning authorization from the on-board ATP. The on-board ATP continues to provide decommissioning authorization to the on-board ATO.

[0243] The onboard ATO receives the decoupling authorization from the onboard ATP and activates the electrical or mechanical decoupling on the train;

[0244] The on-board ATP supervises the de-coupling, and the on-board ATP applies emergency braking and is initialized through the trackside ATP;

[0245] Evaluate the decompilation results, and ATS displays the decompilation result information.

[0246] The termination unbundling module includes instructing the ATS to clear the unbundling instruction sent to the on-board ATO through the trackside ATO, and immediately terminate the ongoing unbundling operation.

[0247] In more preferred examples, it is determined whether the train meets the de-training test conditions. If so, the train status is determined; if not, the ATS de-training pre-test fails and the de-training pre-test is stopped.

[0248] The disassembly test conditions are that the train is in UTO mode, the train is stationary, the doors are fully closed and locked, the automatic disassembly request is not disabled, and the train is in the disassembly position and time conditions.

[0249] The de-assembling instruction includes the identification number of the train to be de-assembled and the main train composition information after de-assembling.

[0250] If the train is stationary, the de-training pre-test continues; if the train is not stationary, the ATS de-training pre-test fails, and the failure message is displayed, the count is performed, and step SB.1 is executed again;

[0251] If the decompilation test fails after exceeding the set number of times, the ATS stops the repeated decompilation pre-test.

[0252] The train being in the disassembling position means that the train is in a position where it is planned to be disassembled.

[0253] The time condition is that there is a delay time after the train runs to the designated position and the time taken by the train to reach the disassembly position is not earlier than the disassembly time defined in the timetable with the current time.

[0254] The automatic demarshalling request may be disabled or enabled by the ATS.

[0255] The conditions required for disbanding are that the train is in UTO mode, the train is stationary, the train vehicle composition is greater than 1, the train footprint is located in the disbanding area, there are no non-communication vehicles occupying the two workshops, and the designated number of disbanding vehicles is consistent with the number of train vehicles.

[0256] The conditions required for unmarshaling are determined. If the conditions required for unmarshaling are met, the trackside ATO sends an unmarshaling preparation command to the on-board ATO of the train ahead; if the conditions required for unmarshaling are not met, the trackside ATO sends a rejection of the unmarshaling command and the reason to the ATS; if the unmarshaling instruction is not rejected but is not executed for more than 5 minutes, a new warning is sent every 5 minutes.

[0257] The safe unbundling conditions are judged. If the safe unbundling conditions are not met, the on-board ATP will feedback the rejection reason to the on-board ATO and transmit it to the ATS through the trackside ATO. The trackside ATO will stop sending unbundling instructions to the on-board ATO; if the safe unbundling conditions are met, the on-board ATO will request unbundling authorization from the on-board ATP and judge the safe coupling conditions. If they are met, the on-board ATP will provide unbundling authorization to the on-board ATO. If they are not met, the on-board ATP will cancel the unbundling authorization.

[0258] The safe disbanding conditions include that the disbanding vehicle composition is consistent with the number of train vehicles, the train vehicle composition is valid, the train mode is UTO mode, the train is stationary, the train footprint is within the disbanding area, the departure conditions are met, and the forward moving distance is sufficient for train disbanding and the on-board ATC controlled by the train is disbanding the train forward.

[0259] In more preferred examples, the activation is that when the on-board ATO receives confirmation from the train that the coupler has been electrically or mechanically uncoupled, the on-board ATO controls the train speed to the upper limit speed of uncoupling, and moves the front train forward, stops the train movement after the virtual occupancy of the two trains formed by uncoupling does not overlap, and complies with the movement authorization of the on-board ATP;

[0260] The onboard ATP sends the train position and ongoing unbundling information to the trackside ATP, and feeds back the ATS unbundling process status through the trackside ATO.

[0261] The upper limit speed of de-assembly is 7 km / h.

[0262] During the supervised disassembly, the onboard ATP retains and executes the current movement authorization and ignores the movement authorization update of the trackside ATP until the train is disassembled and stopped or the train does not move until the departure timer expires;

[0263] The on-board ATP sets the common braking conflict point far enough in front of the train.

[0264] Determine the movement of the train within the set time. If the train moves, the onboard ATP will continue to provide the de-training authorization. If the train does not move, the de-training authorization will be cancelled.

[0265] Determine the number of trains. If the number has not changed, continue to authorize the disbanding. If the number has changed, the on-board ATP of the rear car after the disbanding will apply emergency braking until it is initialized by the trackside ATP.

[0266] The evaluation result of the unbundling is to determine if the ATS receives the train identification number from the trackside ATO, then the ATS displays that the unbundling process is completed; if the initialization and removal are not performed as set and the train identification number is not received, then the ATS displays a fault message.

[0267] Determine the distance from the conflict point ahead to the head virtual occupancy reported by the on-board ATP. If it is less than this distance, the on-board ATO will feed back the information of insufficient mobile authorization to ATS through the trackside ATO. If it is greater than or equal to this distance, determine the completion time of the unmarshaling process. If it is within the set reasonable time, the unmarshaling will be completed. If it is not within the set reasonable time, ATS will feed back the unmarshaling failure information. If the train composition has not changed, the on-board ATO will transmit the unmarshaling failure information to ATS through the trackside ATO.

[0268] The de-training failure information includes instructions for initialization or removal of the lost train.

[0269] In more preferred examples, the abort unbundling module determines whether the train has started unbundling. If unbundling has started and the coupler has been electrically or mechanically unbundled, the unbundling process cannot be ended by the abort instruction; if unbundling has not started, the abort unbundling instruction is forwarded to the trackside ATO through the ATS, and the trackside ATO clears the unbundling instruction sent to the on-board ATO and immediately aborts the ongoing unbundling operation;

[0270] When the on-board ATO and on-board ATP have not started to disassemble and the disassembly instruction has been cleared, the train can continue to run with the current coupling configuration.

[0271] The above describes the specific embodiments of the present invention. It should be understood that the present invention is not limited to the above specific embodiments, and those skilled in the art can make various changes or modifications within the scope of the claims, which does not affect the essence of the present invention. In the absence of conflict, the embodiments of the present application and the features in the embodiments can be combined with each other arbitrarily.

Claims

1. An unattended control method protected by a signal system in a fully automatic mode, characterized in that: For automatic coupling and automatic uncoupling, the method comprises: Step S1: The two trains are located in the coupling and uncoupling type section, and the coupling / uncoupling instruction is sent through the timetable or ATS. When the train footprint is located in the coupling and uncoupling section or according to the coupling / uncoupling time, the ATS performs a pre-test on the coupling / uncoupling of the two trains to check the conditions required for coupling / uncoupling; Step S2: After the pre-test is passed, the trackside ATO receives the coupling / uncoupling instruction from the ATS and immediately performs the trackside ATO pre-test to check the conditions required for safe coupling / uncoupling; Step S3: After the trackside ATO coupling / uncoupling pre-test is successful, the trackside ATO sends a coupling / uncoupling preparation instruction to the train-mounted ATO waiting for operation. After the coupling / uncoupling conditions are met, the on-board ATO feeds back the trackside ATO coupling / uncoupling preparation confirmation information, and when the coupling / uncoupling preparation confirmation work is accepted, the on-board ATO requests the on-board ATP to apply emergency braking; Step S4: The trackside ATO receives the confirmation information from the onboard ATO, and sends a coupling / uncoupling instruction to the onboard ATO of the train to be operated. After the conditions required for safe coupling / uncoupling are met, the onboard ATO requests coupling / uncoupling authorization from the onboard ATP; Step S5: The onboard ATP receives the coupling / uncoupling authorization request. After the conditions required for safe coupling / uncoupling are met, the onboard ATP provides coupling authorization to the onboard ATO and feeds back the coupling / uncoupling status to the trackside ATP. The trackside ATP receives the train position and the coupling / uncoupling information in progress, and the trackside ATP accepts the train position. Step S6: The onboard ATO obtains coupling authorization and adjusts the traction force to control the train to move forward at a speed lower than the coupling upper limit speed imposed by the onboard ATP. After the train composition change is satisfied, the onboard ATP notifies the trackside ATP that the coupling / uncoupling is completed, and the ATS displays the result and reason of the coupling / uncoupling operation process. The coupling / uncoupling of the train can be stopped by sending a stop command.

2. The unattended control method protected by a signal system in a fully automatic mode according to claim 1, characterized in that: The automatic hanging includes an automatic hanging step and a hanging suspension step; The automatic coupling step includes determining that the train meets the pre-test conditions, triggering the coupling instruction through the ATS or timetable to perform the coupling pre-test; The trackside ATO receives the coupling command from the ATS, determines the conditions required for coupling, and sends a coupling preparation command to complete the coupling preparation work; The ATO on the leading vehicle receives the instruction to prepare for coupling, determines the pre-test conditions and train status, and sends a confirmation message; The trackside ATO receives the confirmation information and sends a coupling instruction to the onboard ATO of the rear train of the two trains to be coupled; After receiving the coupling instruction, the ATO on the rear vehicle determines the safe coupling conditions and requests coupling authorization from the ATP on the rear vehicle. The ATP on the rear vehicle continuously provides coupling authorization to the ATO on the rear vehicle and continuously sends coupling instructions to the trackside ATP. On-board ATP monitoring coupling; Evaluate the coupling results. When two trains are successfully coupled, the train composition is changed, and the ATP of the two trains applies emergency brakes and starts the initialization process. When the automatic coupling of trains fails in the described terminating coupling step, the ATS sends a terminating coupling instruction to the onboard ATOs of the two trains being coupled through the trackside ATO, and the onboard ATOs receive the terminating coupling instruction and terminate the coupling.

3. The unattended control method protected by a signal system in a fully automatic mode according to claim 2, characterized in that: Determine whether the train meets the pre-test conditions. If so, determine the train status. If not, the ATS coupling pre-test fails and the pre-test is stopped. The pre-test conditions are that the train is in UTO mode, the train is in coupling position, the time condition and the automatic coupling request are not disabled; If the train is stationary, the door status is determined; If the train is not stationary, the ATS coupling pre-test fails, and the failure message is displayed, the count is counted, and the pre-test conditions are re-judged; If the doors are fully locked, the ATS sends a coupling command with the numbers of the two trains to the trackside ATO at the time defined in the timetable; if the doors are not fully locked, the ATS coupling pre-test fails, counts, and re-judges the pre-test conditions; If the pre-test fails after the set number of times, the ATS stops the repeated pre-test; The train is in the coupling position when the footprint of the front train is completely located in the coupling type section, and the footprint position of the head of the rear train is located in the coupling position defined in the coupling type section; The time condition is that both trains are at the coupling position and there is a delay time after the trains arrive at the coupling position or the planned coupling time is met; The automatic connection request can be disabled or enabled by ATS; The conditions required for coupling are that the train is in UTO mode, the train is stationary, the train is running in the correct direction, the train length meets the standard, there is no non-communication vehicle occupying the coupled train, the train footprint is located in the coupling area, there is no non-communication vehicle occupying the two trains, and the doors are fully locked; The conditions required for coupling are determined. If the conditions required for coupling are met, the trackside ATO sends a coupling preparation command to the onboard ATO of the train ahead; if the conditions required for coupling are not met, the trackside ATO sends a coupling rejection command message and the reason to the ATS; The pre-test conditions and train status are judged. If the pre-test conditions are met and the train is in a stationary state, the ATO on the preceding vehicle completes the pre-test and sends a confirmation message to the trackside ATO; If the pre-test conditions are not met or the train is not stationary, the ATO on the leading train will not send any information, the trackside ATO will stop sending coupling preparation commands, and will feedback failure information to the ATS. The confirmation information includes the coupling preparation confirmation status, and the front vehicle's onboard ATO requests the front vehicle's onboard ATP to apply emergency braking and maintain it until the coupling is completed or the emergency brake is reset.

4. The unattended control method protected by a signal system in a fully automatic mode according to claim 2, characterized in that: The safe coupling condition is judged. If the safe coupling condition is not met, the on-board ATO of the rear vehicle transmits the coupling rejection information and the reason for failure to the ATS through the trackside ATO; if the safe coupling condition is met, the on-board ATO of the rear vehicle requests the on-board ATP of the rear vehicle for coupling authorization, and judges the safe coupling condition. If it is met, the on-board ATP of the rear vehicle continues to provide coupling authorization to the on-board ATO of the rear vehicle until the coupling is successful, terminated or failed, and continues to send coupling instructions to the trackside ATP; if it is not met, the on-board ATP of the rear vehicle rejects the on-board ATO of the rear vehicle and provides the reason for failure, and the on-board ATO of the rear vehicle transmits the rejection information to the ATS through the trackside ATO; The safety coupling conditions include that the train is in UTO mode, the departure conditions are met, the train footprint is in the coupling position, the train is in the common braking state, the section between the head footprint and the front conflict point belongs to the coupling type and the front conflict point type is met; When the trackside ATP receives the train position and coupling instructions from the onboard ATP of the following vehicle, the trackside ATP will accept the train position; During the supervised coupling, the on-board ATP forces the train to execute the coupling limit speed, and the on-board ATO adjusts the traction force to control the train at a speed lower than the coupling limit speed. When the head footprint of the rear train has exceeded the front conflict point, the distance that the rear train continues to travel is judged to be greater than the distance required for coupling with the front train. If it is greater, the on-board ATP of the rear train will apply emergency braking. If it is less than or equal to, the coupling will continue. The coupling speed limit is 7km / h; The evaluation result of the coupling is that in the case of coupling in the UTO mode, the emergency brake during the initialization process can be automatically or remotely reset; If the train composition changes, the ATS will display that the coupling process is completed and determine the completion time of the coupling process. If it is within the set reasonable time, the coupling is completed. If it is not within the set reasonable time, the ATS will feedback the coupling failure information; if the train composition does not change, the on-board ATO will transmit the coupling failure information to the ATS through the trackside ATO; The coupling failure information includes instructions for initialization or removal of the lost train.

5. The unattended control method protected by a signal system in a fully automatic mode according to claim 2, characterized in that: The step of stopping the connection includes: Determine the status of the onboard ATO. If the onboard ATO has not received the coupling authorization, the onboard ATO will terminate the coupling process and send a coupling termination instruction to the vehicle to terminate the operation. If the onboard ATO is receiving the coupling authorization, the onboard ATO will delete the coupling request to the onboard ATP and terminate the coupling process. The abort hook instruction clears the active prepare hook and hook instructions; The stop coupling instruction applies emergency braking to the train when the rear train is moving for coupling.

6. The unattended control method protected by a signal system in a fully automatic mode according to claim 1, characterized in that: The automatic decompilation includes an automatic decompilation step and a suspending decompilation step; The automatic de-marshalling step includes determining that the train meets the de-marshalling test conditions, triggering a de-marshalling instruction through the ATS or timetable to perform a de-marshalling pre-test; The trackside ATO receives the de-marshalling instruction from the ATS, determines the conditions required for de-marshalling, and sends the de-marshalling instruction to the onboard ATO after the de-marshalling pre-test is successful; The on-board ATO receives the decommissioning instruction, determines the safe decommissioning conditions, and requests decommissioning authorization from the on-board ATP. The on-board ATP continues to provide decommissioning authorization to the on-board ATO. The onboard ATO receives the decoupling authorization from the onboard ATP and activates the electrical or mechanical decoupling on the train; The on-board ATP supervises the de-coupling, and the on-board ATP applies emergency braking and is initialized through the trackside ATP; Evaluate the decompilation results, and ATS displays the decompilation result information; The step of terminating the unbundling includes causing the ATS to clear the unbundling instruction sent to the onboard ATO through the trackside ATO, and immediately terminating the ongoing unbundling operation.

7. The unattended control method protected by a signal system in a fully automatic mode according to claim 6, characterized in that: Determine whether the train meets the disassembly test conditions. If so, determine the train status. If not, the ATS disassembly pre-test fails and the disassembly pre-test is stopped. The disassembly test conditions are that the train is in UTO mode, the train is stationary, the doors are fully closed and locked, the automatic disassembly request is not disabled, and the train is in the disassembly position and time conditions; The de-assembling instruction includes the identification number of the train to be de-assembled and the main train composition information after de-assembling; If the train is stationary, the de-training pre-test continues; if the train is not stationary, the ATS de-training pre-test fails, and the failure message is displayed, the count is performed, and step SB.1 is executed again; If the decompilation test fails after exceeding the set number of times, the ATS stops the repeated decompilation pre-test; The train being in the disbanding position means that the train is in the position where it is planned to be disbanded; The time condition is that there is a delay after the train runs to the designated location and the time it takes for the train to arrive at the disassembly location and the current time is not earlier than the disassembly time defined in the timetable; The automatic decompilation request can be disabled or enabled by ATS; The conditions required for the disassembly are that the train is in UTO mode, the train is stationary, the train vehicle composition is greater than 1, the train footprint is located in the disassembly area, there are no non-communication vehicles occupying the two workshops, and the number of designated disassembly vehicles is consistent with the number of train vehicles; The conditions required for unbundling are determined. If the conditions required for unbundling are met, the trackside ATO sends an unbundling preparation command to the onboard ATO of the train ahead; if the conditions required for unbundling are not met, the trackside ATO sends a rejection unbundling command message and reason to the ATS; if the unbundling command is not rejected but is not executed for more than 5 minutes, a new warning is sent every 5 minutes; The safe unbundling conditions are judged. If the safe unbundling conditions are not met, the on-board ATP will feedback the rejection reason to the on-board ATO and transmit it to the ATS through the trackside ATO. The trackside ATO will stop sending unbundling instructions to the on-board ATO. If the safe unbundling conditions are met, the on-board ATO will request unbundling authorization from the on-board ATP and judge the safe coupling conditions. If they are met, the on-board ATP will provide unbundling authorization to the on-board ATO. If they are not met, the on-board ATP will cancel the unbundling authorization. The safe disbanding conditions include that the disbanding vehicle composition is consistent with the number of train vehicles, the train vehicle composition is valid, the train mode is UTO mode, the train is stationary, the train footprint is within the disbanding area, the departure conditions are met, and the forward moving distance is sufficient for train disbanding and the on-board ATC controlled by the train is disbanding the train forward.

8. The unattended control method protected by a signal system in a fully automatic mode according to claim 6, characterized in that: The activation is that when the on-board ATO receives confirmation from the train that the coupler has been electrically or mechanically uncoupled, the on-board ATO controls the train speed to the upper limit of the uncoupling speed and moves the front train forward. After the virtual occupancy of the two trains formed by uncoupling does not overlap, the train movement is stopped, and the movement authorization of the on-board ATP is complied with. The onboard ATP sends the train position and ongoing unbundling information to the trackside ATP, and feeds back the unbundling process status to the ATS through the trackside ATO; The upper limit speed of de-assembly is 7km / h; During the supervised disassembly, the onboard ATP retains and executes the current movement authorization and ignores the movement authorization update of the trackside ATP until the train is disassembled and stopped or the train does not move until the departure timer expires; The onboard ATP sets the common braking conflict point far enough in front of the train; Determine the movement of the train within the set time. If the train moves, the onboard ATP will continue to provide the de-training authorization. If the train does not move, the de-training authorization will be cancelled. Determine the number of trains. If the number has not changed, continue to authorize the disbanding. If the number has changed, the onboard ATP of the following train after the disbanding will apply emergency braking until it is initialized by the trackside ATP. The evaluation of the unbundling result is to determine if the ATS receives the train identification number from the trackside ATO, then the ATS displays the completion of the unbundling process; if the initialization and removal are not performed as set and the train identification number is not received, then the ATS displays a fault message; Determine the distance from the front conflict point to the head virtual occupancy reported by the on-board ATP. If it is less than the distance, the on-board ATO will feedback the insufficient movement authorization information to ATS through the trackside ATO. If it is greater than or equal to the distance, determine the completion time of the unbundling process. If it is within the set reasonable time, the unbundling is completed. If it is not within the set reasonable time, ATS will feedback the unbundling failure information. If the train composition has not changed, the on-board ATO will transmit the unbundling failure information to ATS through the trackside ATO. The de-training failure information includes instructions for initialization or removal of the lost train.

9. The unattended control method protected by a signal system in a fully automatic mode according to claim 6, characterized in that: In the abort unbundling step, it is determined whether the train has started unbundling. If unbundling has started and the coupler has been electrically or mechanically unbundled, the unbundling process cannot be ended by the abort command. If unbundling has not started, the abort unbundling command is forwarded to the trackside ATO through the ATS, and the trackside ATO clears the unbundling command sent to the on-board ATO and immediately aborts the ongoing unbundling operation. When the on-board ATO and on-board ATP have not started to disassemble and the disassembly instruction has been cleared, the train can continue to run with the current coupling configuration.

10. An unmanned control system protected by a signal system in full automatic mode, characterized in that: The unattended control method protected by a signal system in a fully automatic mode according to any one of claims 1 to 9 is used for operation.

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