Path verification method and device for avoiding high-risk area in low-orbit satellite network

Abstract

The invention provides a path verification method and device for avoiding a high-risk area in a low-orbit satellite network. The method comprises the following steps: determining path relay information and a detour delay threshold value corresponding to the path relay information; wherein the path relay information comprises a safe path for avoiding a high-risk area and a relay satellite node for path verification; carrying out Hash calculation on the packet sending timestamp, the path relay information and the corresponding detour delay threshold value, embedding the calculated Hash value into the data packet, and starting to transmit the data packet; and in a data packet transmission process, based on the relay satellite node and the destination node, according to the actual segment path delay truth value and the corresponding detour delay upper limit value, obtaining a path verification result. According to the method, path verification is carried out by selecting a small number of relay satellite nodes, verification does not need to be carried out by hop-by-hop satellite nodes, the calculation and communication overhead is greatly reduced, the method is also suitable for the high-dynamic satellite network, and the accuracy of path verification of the high-dynamic satellite network is effectively improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of satellite communication technology, and in particular to a path verification method and device for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network. Background Art

[0002] In recent years, with the rapid development of space communication technology, satellite networks have become an important development direction of future networks, and are expected to provide global users with wide-coverage, low-latency, and high-bandwidth network services, making up for the shortcomings of traditional ground networks in terms of coverage and other aspects.

[0003] Currently, multiple low-orbit satellite constellation networks are being actively deployed around the world, such as OneWeb, Telesat, and Starlink. However, with the development of satellite networks and the increasing scope of their applications, the security issues they face are becoming increasingly prominent. Satellites fly dynamically around the world, which means that they can fly out of the airspace of their home country and reach other countries. At this time, their home country's ability to control the data packets forwarded by the satellite will be limited. When reaching high-risk areas, satellites will face more security threats, such as attackers eavesdropping on data packets to extract or infer user privacy information, and attackers with routing awareness in high-risk areas hijack routing to make the forwarding path of data packets inconsistent with the pre-set path, thereby leading to risks such as man-in-the-middle attacks.

[0004] Therefore, secure routing needs to ensure that the data forwarding path can avoid these high-risk areas and be protected from the above-mentioned attack threats. However, the source node does not have complete control over the data packets it sends, and a path verification mechanism is required to prove that the data is indeed forwarded along the path pre-defined by the secure routing policy.

[0005] Existing path verification mechanisms are mainly divided into two categories: encryption-based path verification mechanism and delay-based path verification mechanism.

[0006] Among them, the encryption-based path verification mechanism requires each node on the path to perform cryptographic operations (such as calculating the message authentication code, MAC), update the verification field of the corresponding data packet header, and then forward it to the next hop node for verification. This method has a large computational and communication overhead and is not suitable for resource-constrained satellite Internet.

[0007] The delay-based path verification mechanism uses delay to determine whether a data packet passes through a high-risk area. By using the proportional relationship between the ground great circle distance and the end-to-end delay RTT (Round-Trip Time), a relay node far away from the high-risk area is found in advance, and the data packet is forced to be forwarded through the relay node. In this case, any data packet passing through the high-risk area will generate an additional long detour delay, so that the actual forwarding path can be verified based on the delay of the data packet. It does not pass through the high-risk area. However, this mechanism is based on static ground networks and nodes and is not suitable for highly dynamic satellite networks.

[0008] Therefore, how to solve the problem that the existing path verification mechanism has large computational and communication overhead and is not suitable for highly dynamic satellite networks is an important issue that needs to be urgently solved in the field of satellite communications. Summary of the invention

[0009] The present invention provides a path verification method and device for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network, which are used to overcome the defects of the existing path verification mechanism having large calculation and communication overhead and being unsuitable for high-dynamic satellite networks. It can not only effectively improve the accuracy of path verification in high-dynamic satellite networks, but also significantly reduce communication overhead.

[0010] On the one hand, the present invention provides a path verification method for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network, including: determining path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold; wherein the path relay information includes a safe path for avoiding high-risk areas, and a relay satellite node for path verification; performing a hash calculation on a packet sending timestamp, path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold, and embedding the calculated hash value into a data packet, and starting to transmit the data packet; during the data packet transmission process, based on the relay satellite node and the destination node, obtaining a path verification result according to an actual segment path delay true value and its corresponding detour delay upper limit value.

[0011] Furthermore, the determining of the path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold includes: calculating the nearest low-risk plane; and determining the relay satellite node based on the intersection relationship between the bounding box composed of the satellite logical coordinates of the source satellite node and the destination satellite node and the nearest low-risk plane.

[0012] Furthermore, the relay satellite node is determined based on the intersection relationship between the bounding box composed of the satellite logical coordinates of the source satellite node and the destination satellite node and the nearest low-risk plane, including: when the bounding box does not intersect with the nearest low-risk plane, the intersection of orbits of different dimensions in the satellite logical coordinates of the source satellite node and the destination node is determined as the relay satellite node; or, when the bounding box semi-intersects with the nearest low-risk plane, the turning point in the low-risk path is determined as the relay satellite node; wherein the low-risk path is an equivalent path that does not include a high-risk satellite node, and the high-risk satellite node is a satellite node in a high-risk area; or, when the bounding box fully intersects with the nearest low-risk plane, the bounding box composed of the satellite logical coordinates of the source satellite node and the destination satellite node is expanded to coincide with the boundary of the low-risk path in the target direction, and the turning point of the low-risk path in the expanded bounding box is determined as the relay satellite node.

[0013] Furthermore, the detour delay threshold is twice the minimum propagation delay value from a satellite node to a high-risk satellite node on a segment path of the safe path.

[0014] Furthermore, the method of obtaining a path verification result based on the relay satellite node and the destination node according to the actual segment path delay true value and its corresponding detour delay upper limit value includes: calculating the actual segment path delay true value according to the timestamp of the previous relay satellite node and the timestamp of the current relay satellite node; calculating the detour delay upper limit value according to the segment path detection delay value and its corresponding detour delay threshold value; and obtaining the path verification result according to the segment path delay true value and the corresponding detour delay upper limit value.

[0015] Furthermore, the data packet includes a verification field corresponding to each relay satellite node; accordingly, the path verification result is obtained according to the true value of the segment path delay and the corresponding upper limit value of the detour delay, including: when the true value of the segment path delay is higher than the upper limit value of the detour delay, determining that the data packet passes through a high-risk area as a path verification result, and discarding the data packet; or, when the true value of the segment path delay is lower than or equal to the upper limit value of the detour delay, updating the verification field corresponding to the current relay satellite node in the data packet, calculating the message verification code for the updated verification field, and embedding the calculated message verification code into the data packet to continue transmitting the data packet.

[0016] Furthermore, based on the relay satellite nodes and the destination node, the path verification result is obtained according to the actual segment path delay true value and its corresponding detour delay upper limit value, including: when all relay satellite nodes have passed the verification and the data packet arrives at the destination access satellite node, the packet receiving timestamp is embedded into the data packet, and the path verification result is obtained according to the segment path delay true value of the last segment of the path and its corresponding detour delay upper limit value.

[0017] In a second aspect, the present invention also provides a path verification device for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network, comprising: a path relay information determination module, used to determine path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold; wherein the path relay information includes a safe path for avoiding high-risk areas, and a relay satellite node for path verification; a data packet transmission module, used to perform a hash calculation on the packet sending timestamp, path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold, and embed the calculated hash value into the data packet to start transmitting the data packet; a path verification result acquisition module, used to obtain the path verification result based on the relay satellite node and the destination node during the data packet transmission process according to the actual segment path delay true value and its corresponding detour delay upper limit value.

[0018] In a third aspect, the present invention also provides an electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein when the processor executes the computer program, the method for path verification for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network as described in any one of the above is implemented.

[0019] In a fourth aspect, the present invention further provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements a path verification method for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network as described in any one of the above.

[0020] The path verification method for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network provided by the present invention determines the path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold; wherein the path relay information includes a safe path for avoiding high-risk areas, and a relay satellite node for path verification; the packet sending timestamp, the path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold are hashed together, and the calculated hash value is embedded in the data packet to start transmitting the data packet; during the data packet transmission process, based on the relay satellite node and the destination node, according to the actual segment path delay true value and its corresponding detour delay upper limit value, the path verification result is obtained. This method selects a small number of relay satellite nodes for path verification, without hopping satellite nodes for verification, which not only greatly reduces the calculation and communication overhead, but is also suitable for high-dynamic satellite networks, and effectively improves the accuracy of high-dynamic satellite network path verification. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0021] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the present invention or the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0022] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of a satellite network routing architecture and high-risk areas provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0023] Figure 2 It is a schematic diagram of a path verification method for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0024] Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram of the nearest low-risk plane in the NE direction when the source satellite node and the destination satellite node are in the same direction provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0025] Figure 4 It is a schematic diagram of the nearest low-risk plane in the NE direction when the source satellite node and the destination satellite node are in different directions provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0026] Figure 5 It is a schematic diagram of data packet fields provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0027] Figure 6 It is a schematic diagram of the overall process of a path verification method for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0028] Figure 7 It is a comparison diagram of delay expansion ratios for avoiding the first high-risk area provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0029] Figure 8 It is a comparison diagram of delay expansion ratios for avoiding the second highest risk area provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0030] Fig. 9 It is a schematic diagram of the header overhead of the present invention and three cryptography-based hop-by-hop authentication mechanisms when the number of path hops is 30, provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0031] Fig.10 It is a schematic diagram of the packet header overhead of the present invention and three cryptography-based hop-by-hop authentication mechanisms under different path hop numbers provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0032] Fig.11 It is a structural schematic diagram of a path verification device for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0033] Fig.12 It is a schematic diagram of the physical structure of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0034] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the present invention clearer, the technical solution of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0035] It should be noted that with the development of satellite networks and the increasing scope of their applications, the security issues they face are becoming increasingly prominent. Satellites fly dynamically around the world, which means that they can fly out of the airspace of their home country and reach other countries. At this time, their home country's ability to control the data packets forwarded by the satellite will be limited. When reaching high-risk areas, satellites will face more security threats.

[0036] Figure 1 The satellite network routing architecture and high-risk area diagram provided by the embodiment of the present invention are shown. Figure 1 As shown, a “high-risk area” is defined as a geographical area where an attacker may conduct the following attacks (1) and (2).

[0037] (1) Information theft: Attackers extract or infer user privacy information by eavesdropping on data packets. Figure 1 In the example, it is assumed that the data packet is forwarded from the satellite network to the ground network along the pre-defined path S1-S6-S7-S8-S9, and the attacker in the high-risk area eavesdrops on the data on the path S7-S8.

[0038] (2) Data interception: Attackers with routing awareness in high-risk areas hijack routes to make the forwarding path of data packets inconsistent with the pre-set path, thereby causing risks such as man-in-the-middle attacks. Attackers spread false routing announcements to attract surrounding satellites to forward data packets to the high-risk area, and then the risk nodes in the area redirect the data packets to other nodes for review or man-in-the-middle attacks, such as packet injection attacks, modification or forgery. Figure 1 In the example, S7 modifies the predefined path by means of route hijacking and forwards the data packets to the S4 and S5 nodes in the high-risk area.

[0039] In this regard, existing technologies have proposed encryption-based path verification mechanisms and delay-based path verification mechanisms. The former has large computational and communication overheads and is not suitable for resource-constrained satellite Internet; the latter is based on static ground networks and nodes and is not suitable for highly dynamic satellite networks.

[0040] In view of this, the present invention proposes a path verification method for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network. Specifically, Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a path verification method for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network provided by an embodiment of the present invention is shown.

[0041] like Figure 2 As shown, the method includes steps S210-S230, and steps S210-S230 and related steps will be described in detail below.

[0042] S210, determining path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold; wherein the path relay information includes a safe path that avoids high-risk areas and a relay satellite node for path verification.

[0043] It is easy to understand that before the data packet starts to be transmitted, the Satellite Network Operator (SNO) controller in the ground network will pre-calculate the safe path for each flow (data flow) to avoid high-risk areas in the future period of time based on the predictable satellite trajectory and network topology, as well as the dynamic relay satellite nodes for path verification, and then forward this information to the end user and the source node.

[0044] Among them, SNO is responsible for operating and managing satellite communication services, including but not limited to providing broadband Internet access, television broadcasting, mobile communications and other satellite-based services. SNO maintains satellite constellations, ground stations and related infrastructure, and ensures the quality and reliability of services.

[0045] A safe path refers to a route that avoids known or potential threats (such as high-risk areas) when a data packet travels from the sender (source node) to the receiver (destination node). The selection of a safe path can be based on a variety of factors, including but not limited to security assessments of geographic locations, historical attack data, etc., to ensure that data packets passing through this path can be transmitted with minimal risk.

[0046] It should be noted that the high-risk areas mentioned in this embodiment are known and can be customized according to actual conditions or user needs. For example, a set of boundary points provided by the SNO determines the high-risk areas on the ground. Once the high-risk areas on the ground are determined, the data packets forwarded in the low-orbit satellite network will not use the low-orbit satellites above the high-risk areas as forwarding nodes in the data packet routing path.

[0047] A relay satellite node is a communication satellite located in space, which acts as an intermediary point to forward signals between ground stations or between different satellites. The use of relay satellite nodes can achieve long-distance communication in the presence of geographical obstacles (such as mountains and oceans), while also enhancing the security and stability of communication. For specific application scenarios, there may be multiple candidate relay satellite nodes, and the most suitable one or more can be selected according to actual needs.

[0048] The relay satellite node determined in this embodiment is used to verify whether the data transmission path passes through the high-risk area. This embodiment does not specifically limit the specific determination / selection method of the relay satellite node, but it will be detailed in the following embodiments.

[0049] It is worth mentioning that in addition to determining the safe path to avoid high-risk areas and the relay satellite nodes used for path verification, it is also necessary to determine the detour delay threshold corresponding to each segment of the safe path, and the segment path corresponds to the detour delay threshold one by one.

[0050] When a non-direct path has to be used for data transmission for security or other reasons, a certain amount of additional time overhead will be incurred. The detour delay threshold defines the maximum acceptable delay time in the above situation. The specific value of the detour delay threshold depends on the real-time requirements of the application scenario. For example, applications such as video conferencing can allow lower delays, while applications such as file transfer can allow higher delays.

[0051] In a specific embodiment, the detour delay threshold is determined according to the minimum propagation delay value from a satellite node to a high-risk satellite node on a segment path of the safety path, wherein the high-risk satellite node refers to a satellite node located in a high-risk area.

[0052] After the path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold are determined in step S210, step S220 is further performed.

[0053] S220, performing a hash calculation on the packet sending timestamp, the path relay information and the corresponding detour delay threshold, and embedding the calculated hash value into the data packet, and starting to transmit the data packet.

[0054] It is easy to understand that when the source node initializes a session or when the path changes, the source-destination node pair, SNO and relay satellite node will negotiate the session key through a secure encrypted channel and obtain the relay satellite node sequence and verification information (verification field).

[0055] After the source node sends the control packet and negotiates the session key, it starts sending the formal data packet. Specifically, after the SNO sends the safe path to avoid high-risk areas, the relay satellite node for path verification, and the detour delay threshold corresponding to each path segment to the source node through the secure channel, the source node will hash the packet sending timestamp, safe path, relay satellite node, and detour delay threshold together, and embed the calculated hash value into the data packet to construct the relay verification field chain, and then start sending / transmitting / transmitting the data packet according to the selected safe path.

[0056] In this way, the receiving end can use the same information to recalculate the hash value and compare it with the hash value in the received data packet. If they are consistent, it means that the data packet has not been tampered with; if they are inconsistent, it means that the data packet may have been tampered with or transmitted incorrectly.

[0057] It should be noted that, in each data packet, the source node constructs a corresponding verification field for each relay satellite node, so that the relay satellite node can perform verification and update.

[0058] Among them, the packet sending timestamp refers to the sum of the current packet sending timestamp of the source node satellite (the exact time when the data packet is sent from the source node satellite) and the access delay (the delay detection value from the source node satellite to the source node access satellite). This is to avoid the impact of the first hop delay on the subsequent first segment path verification.

[0059] Hashing is the process of converting data of arbitrary length into a fixed-length output, which is often called a hash value or digest. The design goal of a hash function is to provide a fast way to verify the integrity and uniqueness of data while ensuring that even slight changes in the input data will result in completely different hash outputs.

[0060] This embodiment performs hash calculation on the packet sending timestamp, path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold, and embeds the hash value into the data packet, which can be used to detect whether the data packet has been tampered with or replayed during transmission, so as to effectively ensure data integrity and verify the transmission path.

[0061] It should be noted that although only the hash calculation is mentioned here for the packet sending timestamp, path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold that the present invention is concerned with, it is well known that the information transmitted by the data packet itself will also be hashed before transmission to detect whether the data packet has been tampered with during the transmission process.

[0062] That is to say, in a detailed embodiment, the data to be transmitted, the packet sending timestamp, the packet sending timestamp, the path relay information and the corresponding detour delay threshold in the data packet are hashed together, and the calculated hash value is embedded in the data packet, and then the data packet is transmitted.

[0063] In step S220, the packet sending timestamp, the path relay information and the corresponding detour delay threshold are hashed together, and the calculated hash value is embedded in the data packet, and the data packet transmission is started. Then, step S230 is further executed.

[0064] S230, during data packet transmission, based on the relay satellite node and the destination node, a path verification result is obtained according to the actual segment path delay true value and its corresponding detour delay upper limit value.

[0065] It is easy to understand that after obtaining the transmitted data packet, the relay satellite node extracts the timestamp of the previous relay satellite node (including the source node accessing the satellite), calculates the upper limit of the delay for the segment path based on the sum of the detected segment path detection delay value and the corresponding detour delay threshold, and then compares the actual segment path delay true value with the upper limit of the delay for the segment path to determine whether the data packet has passed through a high-risk area on the segment path.

[0066] When the true value of the segment path delay is higher than the upper limit of the segment path delay, the data packet is discarded, and the final path verification result is that the data packet has passed through the high-risk area in the segment path; when the true value of the segment path delay is less than or equal to the upper limit of the segment path delay, the corresponding verification field in the data packet is updated and forwarded to the next relay satellite node (or destination node) for verification. At this time, the path verification result is that the data packet has not passed through the high-risk area in the segment path, and the final path verification result depends on the verification status of the subsequent relay satellite nodes (or destination nodes).

[0067] In this embodiment, by determining the path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold; wherein the path relay information includes a safe path to avoid high-risk areas, and a relay satellite node for path verification; the packet sending timestamp, the path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold are hashed together, and the calculated hash value is embedded in the data packet, and the data packet transmission begins; during the data packet transmission process, based on the relay satellite node and the destination node, according to the actual segment path delay true value and its corresponding detour delay upper limit value, the path verification result is obtained. This method selects a small number of relay satellite nodes for path verification, without hopping satellite nodes for verification, which not only greatly reduces the calculation and communication overhead, but is also suitable for highly dynamic satellite networks, and effectively improves the accuracy of highly dynamic satellite network path verification.

[0068] On the basis of the above embodiment, the process of the SNO determining the path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold will be described in detail below.

[0069] It is easy to understand that the SNO needs to select low-risk paths (safe paths) and relay satellite nodes for each data flow that avoid high-risk areas.

[0070] First, the relay satellite node selection algorithm is modeled. Specifically, the satellite dynamics is modeled and the continuous time is split into discrete time slices. , the topology within each time slice is static.

[0071] Every moment The topology is represented as .in, Is a collection of satellite nodes and ground entities The union of (terrestrial network infrastructure, users, etc.), represents the set of inter-satellite links (ISL) and ground-satellite links (GSL). In time If there is a link, then the 0-1 variable The satellite orbit and the satellite's position within the orbit are respectively The logical coordinates of each satellite are .

[0072] exist At this moment, SNO will calculate the high-risk areas A collection of high-risk satellite nodes within ,node The path between It is composed of the satellite nodes that pass through. The path between adjacent nodes in is the shortest path obtained by the Dijkstra algorithm, where It is a set of relay satellite nodes.

[0073] Since the selected relay node satellites and safe paths are both ordered satellite node sets, the sequence set Indicates the order between satellite nodes. Representation Node exist Before, on the path The links between adjacent nodes in are 0-1 variables , the delay between two adjacent satellite nodes Using the straight-line distance divided by the speed of light, the delay for the complete path is estimated to be Since there are multiple equal-cost paths in the satellite network, the set to represent the nodes in all equal-cost paths.

[0074] The goal of modeling satellite dynamics is to minimize the end-to-end delay while selecting as few verifiable relay satellite nodes as possible, as shown in the following equations (1)-(6).

[0075] (1).

[0076] st

[0077] (2).

[0078] (3).

[0079] (4).

[0080] (5).

[0081] (6).

[0082] In equations (1)-(6), represents the delay of the complete path, represents a satellite node, represents the complete secure path from the source satellite node to the destination satellite node, , Satellite node Serial number, Satellite node exist The link between the two in the previous phase (a 0-1 variable), Indicates two adjacent satellite nodes The delay between represents the set of high-risk satellite nodes, Indicates the distance between the high-risk satellite node and the actual path. The distance can be customized, such as delay, great circle distance, number of hops, etc. Indicates setting the distance threshold. Satellite node In time 0-1 variables (satellite nodes If there is a link, the value is 1; if there is no link, the value is 0). represents the satellite nodes in all equal-cost paths, Indicates the source satellite node at time The logical coordinates of represents the set of relay satellite nodes in the secure path, Indicates the destination satellite node at time The logical coordinates of Indicates the upper bound of the number of relay satellite nodes finally selected.

[0083] In equations (1)-(6), constraint (2) describes the sequence of satellite nodes in the safe path, constraint (3) represents the distance between the high-risk satellite node and the actual path / safe path, constraint (4) represents the connection relationship of the links in the safe path, constraint (5) ensures that no equivalent path will pass through the high-risk area RA, and constraint (6) specifies the upper bound of the number of relay satellite nodes finally selected.

[0084] The problem of verifiable dynamic relay satellite node selection to avoid high-risk areas can be reduced to: it is difficult to select dynamic relay satellite nodes through equations (1)-(6). NP-hard Hamiltonian path problem

[0085] In this regard, this embodiment proposes a new dynamic relay satellite node selection algorithm.

[0086] Specifically, determining the path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold includes: calculating the nearest low-risk plane; and determining the relay satellite node according to the intersection relationship between the border composed of the satellite logical coordinates of the source satellite node and the destination satellite node and the nearest low-risk plane.

[0087] First, the nearest low-risk plane is calculated.

[0088] SNO needs to calculate the nearest low risk plane NLRP, Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the nearest low-risk plane in the NE direction when the source satellite node and the destination satellite node provided by an embodiment of the present invention are in the same direction is shown.

[0089] like Figure 3 As shown, NLRP is a set of eight orbital planes. Specifically, the satellite has two orbital directions: NE is from southwest to northeast, and SE is from northwest to southeast. Each satellite orbital direction has four low-risk planes, consisting of two vertical orbital planes and two horizontal orbital planes. For details, see the following formula (7).

[0090] (7).

[0091] In (7), Represent the left, right and upper boundaries respectively.

[0092] The nearest low-risk plane is the available satellite orbit plane closest to the high-risk area. It is the nearest boundary of the upper area corresponding to the high-risk area in the low-orbit satellite network. It is determined by the distance between the high-risk satellite and the actual path. Decide if If the distance is expressed in hops, it means that the nearest low-risk plane is 100 km away from the outermost high-risk satellite in the high-risk area. Far away.

[0093] It should be noted that the time taken for the next-hop low-orbit satellite node in the nearest available orbital plane to reach the high-risk area is less than the transmission time of the next-hop data packet. Therefore, the time from the current low-orbit satellite node in the nearest available orbital plane to the next-hop low-orbit satellite can be set to be less than the minimum distance between the low-orbit satellite and the high-risk area.

[0094] Then, the SNO determines the relay satellite node based on the intersection relationship between the bounding box composed of the satellite logical coordinates of the source satellite node and the destination satellite node and the nearest low-risk plane.

[0095] For example, in a specific embodiment, when the bounding box formed by the satellite logical coordinates of the source satellite node and the destination satellite node does not intersect with the nearest low-risk plane, the intersection of orbits of different dimensions in the satellite logical coordinates of the satellite node and the destination node is determined as a relay satellite node.

[0096] The “disjoint” described in this embodiment means that all equivalent paths from the source satellite node to the destination satellite node do not contain high-risk satellite nodes.

[0097] by Figure 3 Take the path shown as an example, Composition of borders middle, As the horizontal dimension ( ) and the vertical dimension ( ) is determined as the most suitable relay satellite node. It should be noted that It was discarded because it was close to the high-risk area.

[0098] In another specific embodiment, when the border formed by the satellite logical coordinates of the source satellite node and the destination satellite node semi-intersects the nearest low-risk plane, the turning point in the low-risk path is determined as a relay satellite node; wherein the low-risk path is an equivalent path that does not include a high-risk satellite node, and the high-risk satellite node is a satellite node in a high-risk area.

[0099] The “semi-intersection” described in this embodiment means that among all equivalent paths from the source satellite node to the destination satellite node, there are low-risk paths that do not intersect with the high-risk area, and the low-risk paths do not contain any high-risk satellite nodes.

[0100] by Figure 3 Take the path shown as an example, in the border In the figure, the purple equivalent path passes through the high-risk area, and the green path is a low-risk path that does not intersect the high-risk area. Therefore, the turning point in the green path Will be identified as the only relay satellite node.

[0101] In another specific embodiment, when the bounding box formed by the satellite logical coordinates of the source satellite node and the destination satellite node fully intersects with the nearest low-risk plane, the bounding box formed by the satellite logical coordinates of the source satellite node and the destination satellite node is expanded to coincide with the boundary of the low-risk path in the target direction, and the inflection point of the low-risk path in the expanded bounding box is determined as the relay satellite node.

[0102] The “full intersection” described in this embodiment means that all equivalent paths from the source satellite node to the destination satellite node contain high-risk nodes.

[0103] Still Figure 3 The path shown is an example, in the border Fully intersects the nearest low-risk plane, in which case the bounding box is enlarged For border , in the border middle, and Two turning points in the low-risk path will be identified as relay satellite nodes.

[0104] The target direction is consistent with the full intersection direction. Figure 3 In the figure, the track direction is vertical. The direction is horizontal, obviously, the border The nearest low-risk plane is fully intersected in the vertical direction. At this time, the vertical direction is the fully intersecting direction, so the border is enlarged. When expanding, it is along the target direction (i.e. the track direction / vertical direction).

[0105] The above description is about the selection algorithm of the relay satellite node when the direction of the source node satellite is consistent with that of the destination node satellite. On the contrary, when the direction of the source node satellite is inconsistent with that of the destination node satellite, the above algorithm can still be used.

[0106] Figure 4 FIG. 1 shows a schematic diagram of the nearest low-risk plane in the NE direction when the source satellite node and the destination satellite node are in different directions provided by an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 4 As shown, when the directions of the source node satellite and the destination node satellite are inconsistent, the 3D satellite network topology is first converted into a 2D satellite network topology, and then the dynamic relay selection algorithm described above is applied.

[0107] For example, in Figure 4 Border in middle, Relay satellite nodes will be identified as inflection points in the low-risk path.

[0108] Based on the above content, suitable relay satellite nodes can be selected, and these relay satellite nodes meet equations (1)-(6).

[0109] It is also worth mentioning that, in addition to determining the safe path and relay satellite nodes, the SNO also needs to determine the detour delay thresholds corresponding to the safe path and relay satellite nodes.

[0110] It is easy to understand that the determined safe path is divided into multiple segment paths for verification according to the relay satellite node. The actual delay of each segment path will fluctuate within a certain range. The delay jitter of the data packet in this segment path due to network instability may be misjudged as a detour to a high-risk area. Therefore, SNO needs to estimate the detour delay threshold of each segment path as a buffer.

[0111] That is to say, the detour delay threshold corresponds to the segment path in the safe path one by one, and each segment path has its corresponding detour delay threshold.

[0112] In one embodiment, the SNO uses twice the minimum propagation delay value from a satellite node to a high-risk satellite node on a segment path of a safe path as a detour delay threshold, and uses the sum of the detour delay threshold and the segment path detection delay value detected periodically for each segment path as the final detour delay upper limit for the segment path.

[0113] In this embodiment, the path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold are determined by SNO, and then the packet sending timestamp, path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold are hashed together, and the calculated hash value is embedded in the data packet to start transmitting the data packet; during the data packet transmission process, based on the relay satellite node and the destination node, the path verification result is obtained according to the actual segment path delay true value and its corresponding detour delay upper limit value. This method selects a small number of relay satellite nodes for path verification, without hopping satellite nodes for verification, which not only greatly reduces the calculation and communication overhead, but is also suitable for high-dynamic satellite networks, and effectively improves the accuracy of high-dynamic satellite network path verification.

[0114] On the basis of the above-mentioned embodiment, the processing process of the source satellite node will be further described in detail below.

[0115] It is easy to understand that when a new communication starts or the path changes, the source node, destination node, relay satellite node and SNO need to negotiate the session key, relay satellite node sequence and verification information through a secure channel. Then, before sending the data packet, the source satellite node will insert a timestamp in the data packet and calculate the HASH value to prevent the data packet from being tampered with.

[0116] Specifically, before obtaining the timestamp, the source node first performs delay detection with the satellite it accesses to avoid the impact of the first hop delay on the subsequent first segment path verification. The current packet sending timestamp plus the access delay is used as the packet sending timestamp of the node accessing the satellite in the first segment path.

[0117] Secondly, the source node sends the path relay information, the detour delay threshold of the segment path, and the corrected packet sending timestamp Joint hash calculation , and embed the calculated hash value into the data packet. Indicates the data content actually transmitted by the data packet. Indicates a safe path. for The detour delay threshold set for the time segment path, Indicates the corrected packet sending timestamp. Represents a set of relay satellite nodes.

[0118] It is also worth mentioning that the source node will also construct a corresponding verification field for each relay satellite node for the relay satellite node to verify and update.

[0119] Figure 5 FIG. 2 shows a schematic diagram of data packet fields provided by an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 5 In the figure, IP header represents the packet header, Payload represents the payload (the data content actually transmitted by the packet), AUTH represents the verification field, PATH represents the determined secure path, and HASH represents the hash value obtained by hashing the packet sending timestamp, path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold. represents the relay satellite node, , , Indicates the timestamp of satellite nodes 0, 1, d (destination satellite node), Relay satellite node The packet verification field of Indicates the detour delay threshold.

[0120] In this embodiment, the packet sending timestamp, path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold are hashed together, and the calculated hash value is embedded in the data packet to start transmitting the data packet; during the data packet transmission process, based on the relay satellite node and the destination node, the path verification result is obtained according to the actual segment path delay true value and its corresponding detour delay upper limit value. This method selects a small number of relay satellite nodes for path verification, without hopping satellite nodes for verification, which not only greatly reduces the calculation and communication overhead, but is also suitable for highly dynamic satellite networks, and effectively improves the accuracy of path verification in highly dynamic satellite networks.

[0121] On the basis of the above-mentioned embodiment, the process of performing path verification on the relay satellite node and the destination node will be described in detail below.

[0122] It is easy to understand that after the source node performs hash calculation on the packet sending timestamp, path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold, and embeds the calculated hash value into the data packet, it starts to transmit the data packet. Then, the data packet will pass through the intermediate satellite node and end the transmission process at the destination node.

[0123] When passing through an intermediate satellite node, the intermediate satellite node will first check the verification field of the data packet to determine whether it is a relay satellite node. If the current intermediate satellite node is not a relay satellite node, it will directly forward the data packet, or, when receiving a segment path probe data packet, it will sign the data packet with the symmetric key negotiated with the adjacent satellite node and verify the signature information of the previous hop satellite node in the data packet to ensure the reliability of the probe data packet.

[0124] If the current intermediate satellite node is a relay satellite node, it periodically sends a probe data packet to the previous relay satellite node (or source access satellite) to obtain a data packet containing link state information that has been signed and verified by all satellite nodes on the path. In addition, when the relay satellite node receives a formal session data packet, it first checks whether the verification field of the previous path has been updated. If so, it means that the data packet has passed through the relay satellite node in sequence.

[0125] Based on this, according to the actual true value of the segment path delay and its corresponding upper limit value of the detour delay, the path verification result is obtained, including: calculating the actual true value of the segment path delay according to the timestamp of the previous relay satellite node and the timestamp of the current relay satellite node; calculating the upper limit value of the detour delay according to the segment path detection delay value and its corresponding detour delay threshold; obtaining the path verification result according to the true value of the segment path delay and the corresponding upper limit value of the detour delay.

[0126] Specifically, the relay satellite node extracts the timestamp of the previous relay satellite node and the current timestamp , to obtain the actual segment path delay true value of the segment path , and then, the detected segment path detection delay value Detour delay threshold The sum of the two values ​​is used as the upper limit of the detour delay corresponding to this path segment.

[0127] Further, the segment path delay true value is compared with the detour delay upper limit value. When the segment path delay true value is higher than the detour delay upper limit value, the data packet is determined to have passed through a high-risk area as a path verification result, and the data packet is discarded; or, when the segment path delay true value is lower than or equal to the detour delay upper limit value, the verification field corresponding to the current relay satellite node in the data packet is updated, and the message verification code is calculated for the updated verification field. , and, embed the calculated MAC value into the data packet and continue to transmit the data packet. The specific judgment process can be seen in the following formula (8).

[0128] (8).

[0129] If all relay satellite nodes are verified and the data packet reaches the destination node access satellite node, the destination satellite node directly embeds the packet receiving timestamp in the data packet and obtains the path verification result based on the true value of the segment path delay of the last segment of the path and its corresponding detour delay upper limit.

[0130] Specifically, the main verification process of the destination node is as follows: (1) First, verify the identity of the source node of the data packet; (2) Then, perform the same HASH calculation on the data packet as the source node and compare whether it is consistent with the result (hash value) in the data packet. This step determines that the data packet has not been tampered with; (3) Then use the negotiated session key to recalculate the MAC value calculated by each relay satellite node in the verification chain and compare whether they are consistent; (4) Finally, extract the packet receiving timestamp of the destination access satellite and verify the last segment of the path in the same way as other relay satellite nodes. If all the above four judgments are passed, it is determined that the data packet has not passed through the high-risk area.

[0131] In this embodiment, during the data packet transmission process, based on the relay satellite node and the destination node, the path verification result is obtained according to the actual segment path delay true value and its corresponding detour delay upper limit value. This method selects a small number of relay satellite nodes for path verification, without hopping satellite nodes for verification, which not only greatly reduces the calculation and communication overhead, but also is applicable to highly dynamic satellite networks, and effectively improves the accuracy of path verification in highly dynamic satellite networks.

[0132] Additionally, in one embodiment, Figure 6The overall flow chart of the path verification method for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network provided by an embodiment of the present invention is shown.

[0133] like Figure 6 As shown, the process of the path verification method mainly includes dynamic relay selection, inter-segment delay detection, data packet verification field initialization, segment path verification based on relay satellite nodes, and destination node verification.

[0134] First, regarding dynamic relay selection, SNO calculates the safe path, relay satellite nodes, and detour delay thresholds for each flow to avoid high-risk areas in the future based on predictable satellite trajectories and network topology, and sends this information to the source node through a secure channel.

[0135] Secondly, regarding the detection of inter-segment delays. When the source node initializes a session or when the path changes, the source node, destination node, SNO, and relay satellite node negotiate the session key through a secure encrypted channel, and obtain the relay satellite node sequence and verification information. Subsequently, the relay satellite node extracts the path and relay satellite node sequence information from the data packet, and regularly detects the segment path detection delay value on this path as a basis for subsequent judgment of whether the data packet passes through a high-risk area. This detection packet needs to be authenticated and signed by all satellite nodes on this segment of the path to prove the reliability and authenticity of the detection reply packet. Symmetric keys are regularly negotiated between adjacent satellite nodes on this segment of the path for reliability authentication of probe data packets.

[0136] Regarding the initialization of the data packet verification field. After the source node sends the control packet and negotiates the session key, it starts to send the formal data packet. The source node embeds the packet sending timestamp, the path relay information of the corresponding time slice obtained from the SNO, and the corresponding detour delay threshold into the data packet (such as hop-by-hop in IPv6) to construct the relay verification field chain, and then sends the data packet.

[0137] Regarding segment path verification based on relay satellite nodes. After the relay satellite node obtains the data packet, it extracts the timestamp of the previous relay satellite node (including the source node accessing the satellite), calculates the upper limit of the segment path delay (i.e. the upper limit of the detour delay mentioned above) based on the sum of the detected segment path detection delay value and the detour delay threshold, and then compares the segment path delay true value with the segment path delay upper limit to determine whether the data packet has passed through the high-risk area on the segment path. If not, update the corresponding verification field of the data packet and forward it to the next relay satellite node (or destination node) for verification; if it has passed, discard the data packet.

[0138] Regarding destination node verification. When the destination node receives a data packet, it first verifies the source node identity information and integrity of the packet, then verifies the relay verification chain of the data packet, and determines the relationship between the true value of the segment path delay of the last segment of the path and the upper limit of the segment path delay, and finally decides whether the data packet has passed through a high-risk area.

[0139] In other embodiments, based on the platform simulation of StarryNet, the path verification method for avoiding high-risk areas in the low-orbit satellite network provided in the embodiment of the present invention was experimentally verified, and the following experimental results were obtained.

[0140] First, about path verification accuracy.

[0141] The prototype system of the present invention is implemented on StarryNet. Experimental results show that under the condition of more realistic time delay, the false positive rate of the verification of the present invention is close to 0. Since the additional delay caused by passing through the high-risk area will not be lower than the upper bound of the detour delay, the false negative rate is 0. In summary, the verification accuracy of the present invention is close to 100%.

[0142] Second, regarding latency performance.

[0143] The present invention uses verifiable relay satellite nodes to segment the safe path. Data packets need to pass through these relay satellite nodes that avoid high-risk areas in sequence. Therefore, the actual path delay will be higher than the shortest delay to avoid high-risk areas. This section calculates the ratio of the delay of different avoidance schemes to the theoretical minimum delay after avoiding high-risk areas (delay expansion ratio) to measure performance.

[0144] Figure 7 A comparison diagram of delayed expansion ratios for avoiding large-size high-risk areas provided by an embodiment of the present invention is shown. Figure 8 A comparison diagram of delay expansion ratios for avoiding small-sized high-risk areas provided by an embodiment of the present invention is shown.

[0145] like Figure 7 and Figure 8 As shown, the present invention is compared with Alibi Routing. The experimental results show that under different constellations and different parameter settings, the delay expansion ratio of the present invention is significantly smaller than that of Alibi Routing. The smaller the delay expansion ratio, the closer the performance of the solution is to the lowest delay and has higher performance.

[0146] Finally, a word about verification overhead.

[0147] This section compares the scheme with the cryptographic hop-by-hop authentication scheme in terms of packet header size and header overhead Goodput Ratio (GR). Fig. 9A schematic diagram of the header overhead of the present invention and three cryptography-based hop-by-hop authentication mechanisms provided by an embodiment of the present invention when the number of path hops is 30 is shown.

[0148] according to Fig. 9 It can be found that the packet header length of the present invention is only related to the number of relay satellite nodes, and there are at most 2 relay satellite nodes, so the packet header is at most 48B, which is much smaller than the packet header overhead of the other three mechanisms.

[0149] also, Fig.10 A schematic diagram of packet header overhead of the present invention and three cryptography-based hop-by-hop authentication mechanisms under different path hop numbers provided by an embodiment of the present invention is shown.

[0150] like Fig.10 As shown, in the comparison of GR, the present invention (STARVERI) can achieve GR that is 110.16%, 43.53% and 11.33% higher than the ICING, OPT and EPIC algorithms respectively when the path length is 30 hops, the data packet message load is 1024B, and the number of relay satellite nodes is 2. This fully demonstrates that the communication overhead of the present invention is far lower than the existing hop-by-hop verification mechanism.

[0151] Corresponding to the path verification method for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network provided in the above embodiments, the present invention also provides a path verification device for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network.

[0152] Specifically, Fig.11 A schematic diagram of the structure of a path verification device for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network provided by an embodiment of the present invention is shown.

[0153] like Fig.11 As shown, the device includes: a path relay information determination module 1110, which is used to determine the path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold; wherein the path relay information includes a safe path that avoids high-risk areas, and a relay satellite node for path verification; a data packet transmission module 1120, which is used to perform a hash calculation on the packet sending timestamp, the path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold, and embed the calculated hash value into the data packet to start transmitting the data packet; a path verification result acquisition module 1130, which is used to obtain the path verification result during the data packet transmission process, based on the relay satellite node and the destination node, according to the actual segment path delay true value and its corresponding detour delay upper limit value.

[0154] In this embodiment, the path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold are determined by the path relay information determination module 1110; wherein the path relay information includes a safe path to avoid high-risk areas and a relay satellite node for path verification; the data packet transmission module 1120 performs hash calculation on the packet sending timestamp, the path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold, and embeds the calculated hash value into the data packet to start transmitting the data packet; the path verification result acquisition module 1130 obtains the path verification result based on the relay satellite node and the destination node, according to the actual segment path delay true value and its corresponding detour delay upper limit value during the data packet transmission process. The device selects a small number of relay satellite nodes for path verification, without hopping satellite nodes for verification, which not only greatly reduces the calculation and communication overhead, but also is suitable for high-dynamic satellite networks, and effectively improves the accuracy of high-dynamic satellite network path verification.

[0155] It should be noted that the path verification device for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network provided in this embodiment can correspond to the path verification method for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network described in the above embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0156] Fig.12 An example of a physical structure diagram of an electronic device is shown in FIG. Fig.12 As shown, the electronic device may include: a processor 1210, a communication interface 1220, a memory 1230 and a communication bus 1240, wherein the processor 1210, the communication interface 1220 and the memory 1230 communicate with each other through the communication bus 1240. The processor 1210 may call the logic instructions in the memory 1230 to execute a path verification method for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network, the method comprising: determining path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold; wherein the path relay information includes a safe path for avoiding high-risk areas and a relay satellite node for path verification; performing a hash calculation on the packet sending timestamp, the path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold, and embedding the calculated hash value into the data packet, and starting to transmit the data packet; in the process of data packet transmission, obtaining a path verification result based on the relay satellite node and the destination node according to the actual segment path delay true value and its corresponding detour delay upper limit value.

[0157] In addition, the logic instructions in the above-mentioned memory 1230 can be implemented in the form of a software functional unit and can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium when it is sold or used as an independent product. Based on such an understanding, the technical solution of the present invention can be essentially or partly embodied in the form of a software product that contributes to the prior art. The computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including several instructions for enabling a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the method described in each embodiment of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes: various media that can store program codes, such as a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk or an optical disk.

[0158] On the other hand, the present invention also provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, is implemented to execute a path verification method for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network provided by the above-mentioned methods, the method comprising: determining path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold; wherein the path relay information includes a safe path for avoiding high-risk areas, and a relay satellite node for path verification; performing a hash calculation on the packet sending timestamp, the path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold, and embedding the calculated hash value into the data packet, and starting to transmit the data packet; during the data packet transmission process, based on the relay satellite node and the destination node, the path verification result is obtained according to the actual segment path delay true value and its corresponding detour delay upper limit value.

[0159] The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative, wherein the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place, or they may be distributed on multiple network units. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the scheme of this embodiment. Ordinary technicians in this field can understand and implement it without paying creative labor.

[0160] Through the description of the above implementation methods, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that each implementation method can be implemented by means of software plus a necessary general hardware platform, and of course, can also be implemented by hardware. Based on this understanding, the above technical solution is essentially or the part that contributes to the prior art can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, such as ROM / RAM, a disk, an optical disk, etc., including a number of instructions for a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute the methods described in each embodiment or some parts of the embodiments.

[0161] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that they can still modify the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments, or make equivalent replacements for some of the technical features therein. However, these modifications or replacements do not deviate the essence of the corresponding technical solutions from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

1. A path verification method for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network, characterized in that: include: Determine path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold; wherein the path relay information includes a safe path avoiding high-risk areas and a relay satellite node for path verification; The packet sending timestamp, path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold are hashed together, and the calculated hash value is embedded into the data packet, and the data packet is transmitted; During the data packet transmission process, based on the relay satellite node and the destination node, the path verification result is obtained according to the actual segment path delay true value and its corresponding detour delay upper limit value.

2. The path verification method for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network according to claim 1, characterized in that: The determining of the path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold includes: Calculate the nearest low-risk plane; The relay satellite node is determined according to the intersection relationship between the bounding box composed of the satellite logical coordinates of the source satellite node and the destination satellite node and the nearest low-risk plane.

3. The path verification method for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network according to claim 2, characterized in that: The step of determining the relay satellite node according to the intersection relationship between the border formed by the satellite logical coordinates of the source satellite node and the destination satellite node and the nearest low-risk plane includes: In the case where the border does not intersect with the nearest low-risk plane, the intersection of orbits of different dimensions in the satellite logical coordinates of the satellite node and the destination node is determined as a relay satellite node; Alternatively, when the border semi-intersects the nearest low-risk plane, the turning point in the low-risk path is determined as a relay satellite node; wherein the low-risk path is an equivalent path that does not include a high-risk satellite node, and the high-risk satellite node is a satellite node in a high-risk area; Alternatively, when the border fully intersects the nearest low-risk plane, the border composed of the satellite logical coordinates of the source satellite node and the destination satellite node is expanded to coincide with the boundary of the low-risk path in the target direction, and the inflection point of the low-risk path in the expanded border is determined as the relay satellite node.

4. The path verification method for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network according to claim 3, characterized in that: The detour delay threshold is twice the minimum propagation delay value from a satellite node to a high-risk satellite node on a segment path of the safety path.

5. The path verification method for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that: The method of obtaining a path verification result based on the relay satellite node and the destination node according to the actual segment path delay true value and the corresponding detour delay upper limit value includes: Calculate the actual segment path delay true value according to the timestamp of the previous relay satellite node and the timestamp of the current relay satellite node; Calculate the detour delay upper limit value according to the segment path detection delay value and its corresponding detour delay threshold value; The path verification result is obtained based on the true value of the segment path delay and the corresponding detour delay upper limit value.

6. The path verification method for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network according to claim 5, characterized in that: The data packet includes a verification field corresponding to each relay satellite node; Accordingly, obtaining the path verification result according to the segment path delay true value and the corresponding detour delay upper limit value includes: In the case where the true value of the segment path delay is higher than the upper limit value of the detour delay, determining that the data packet passes through a high-risk area as a path verification result, and discarding the data packet; or, When the true value of the segment path delay is lower than or equal to the detour delay upper limit value, the verification field corresponding to the current relay satellite node in the data packet is updated, and the message verification code is calculated for the updated verification field, and the calculated message verification code is embedded in the data packet to continue transmitting the data packet.

7. The path verification method for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network according to claim 1, characterized in that: Based on the relay satellite node and the destination node, the path verification result is obtained according to the actual segment path delay true value and its corresponding detour delay upper limit value, including: When all relay satellite nodes have passed the verification and the data packet has arrived at the destination access satellite node, the packet receiving timestamp is embedded in the data packet, and the path verification result is obtained based on the true value of the segment path delay of the last segment of the path and its corresponding detour delay upper limit.

8. A path verification device for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network, characterized in that: include: A path relay information determination module, used to determine path relay information and its corresponding detour delay threshold; wherein the path relay information includes a safe path avoiding high-risk areas and a relay satellite node for path verification; The data packet transmission module is used to perform hash calculation on the packet sending timestamp, the path relay information and the corresponding detour delay threshold, and embed the calculated hash value into the data packet to start transmitting the data packet; The path verification result acquisition module is used to obtain the path verification result based on the relay satellite node and the destination node during the data packet transmission process according to the actual segment path delay true value and its corresponding detour delay upper limit value.

9. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein: When the processor executes the computer program, the path verification method for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network as described in any one of claims 1 to 7 is implemented.

10. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the path verification method for avoiding high-risk areas in a low-orbit satellite network as described in any one of claims 1 to 7 is implemented.

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