Unmanned aerial vehicle anonymous authentication and identity remote identification method, unmanned aerial vehicle and supervision equipment thereof

Abstract

The invention provides an unmanned aerial vehicle anonymous authentication and identity remote identification method, an unmanned aerial vehicle and supervision equipment thereof, and the method comprises the steps: selecting a system main private key and a main public key by an unmanned aerial vehicle service provider in advance, and defining an attribute set; a certificate is generated and issued for the unmanned aerial vehicle through an unmanned aerial vehicle registration process; in the operation process of the unmanned aerial vehicle, generating an RID data packet which accords with an RID rule and can be authenticated anonymously; the RID data packet comprises the following information: an unmanned aerial vehicle position, an unmanned aerial vehicle speed, an attribute ciphertext of the unmanned aerial vehicle, a position ciphertext of an unmanned aerial vehicle operator, encrypted unmanned aerial vehicle public key information, a timestamp and a group signature; and broadcasting the RID data packet at regular time, so that a receiver obtains the position and the flight speed of the unmanned aerial vehicle according to the received RID data packet. By using the scheme of the invention, effective management and privacy protection of the unmanned aerial vehicle can be realized.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of network security technology, and in particular to a method for anonymous authentication and remote identity recognition of a drone, a drone and monitoring equipment thereof. Background Art

[0002] At present, with the increase in the number of drones, the risk of drones being used for illegal activities is also increasing, and incidents of drones entering no-fly zones (such as airports, government agencies, etc.) also occur from time to time, seriously threatening public safety. In this context, some corresponding regulations have been introduced, such as the Remote Identification (RID) regulations, which require all drones to broadcast messages containing the identity and location of the drone and the drone operator through wireless channels at a minimum frequency of 1 message / second throughout the entire process from takeoff to landing.

[0003] Although RID regulations solve traffic management and safety issues, they also introduce a series of privacy and security issues. For example, the RID data broadcast by drones may be subject to attacks such as spoofing and replay, resulting in invalid drone identification and management; by monitoring wireless channels and long-term covert observation, adversaries can also track drones during daily operations and infer more private information about operators, such as the operator's residence, common flight starting points, paths and destinations, and the location of warehouses of large commercial distribution companies. In order to maintain public safety and meet drone privacy requirements, it is urgent to explore drone remote identification technologies and methods with privacy protection.

[0004] In order to protect privacy, the latest RID rules provide a proposal to replace the drone's long-term identity with a session identifier (i.e., a pseudonym), aiming to reduce the risk of drone privacy leakage by anonymously broadcasting RID messages. In this context, drone remote identification schemes based on anonymous identity authentication technology have been proposed one after another, which can protect the drone's identity privacy while meeting the RID rules. However, existing remote identification schemes based on anonymous identity authentication either require verification support from dedicated infrastructure (such as an online authority) or only consider the drone's identity anonymity without considering the drone operator's location privacy. This makes the RID packet receiver and the central agency face a large management overhead, and the drone operator may also be threatened with security (for example, in commercial drones and border flight scenarios, the disclosure of drone operators' location information may endanger their personal safety). Although the recently proposed remote identification scheme with selective location disclosure takes into account the drone operator's location privacy protection, the scheme still broadcasts the drone's identity ID in plain text, which provides an opportunity for attackers to identify and track the drone. Summary of the invention

[0005] The present invention provides a method for anonymous authentication and remote identity recognition of a drone, a drone and monitoring equipment thereof, so as to realize effective management and privacy protection of the drone.

[0006] The present invention provides a method for anonymous authentication and remote identity recognition of a drone, the method comprising:

[0007] The drone service provider selects the system master private key and master public key in advance, defines the attribute set, and generates and issues a certificate for the drone through the drone registration process;

[0008] During the operation of the drone, a RID data packet that complies with the RID rules and can be anonymously authenticated is generated; the RID data packet includes the following information: drone location, drone speed, drone attribute ciphertext, drone operator location ciphertext, encrypted drone public key information, timestamp, group signature;

[0009] The RID data packet is broadcasted at a fixed time so that the receiver can obtain the position and flight speed of the UAV according to the received RID data packet.

[0010] Optionally, generating and issuing a certificate for the drone through the drone registration process includes:

[0011] Receive the registration request information sent by the drone, the registration request information includes: drone identity, drone public key;

[0012] generating a drone certificate based on the drone public key;

[0013] The drone certificate is sent to the drone.

[0014] Optionally, during the operation of the drone, generating a RID data packet that complies with RID rules and can be anonymously authenticated includes:

[0015] The drone generates an attribute ciphertext according to the access policy;

[0016] Encrypt the drone operator's location to obtain the location ciphertext;

[0017] Generate a group signature, the group signature includes the following information: the drone's certificate information, the encrypted drone public key information, and a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof; the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof includes the following information: the attribute ciphertext, the location ciphertext, the drone's location and flight speed, and a timestamp;

[0018] Generate a RID data packet based on the drone position, drone speed, drone attribute ciphertext, drone operator position ciphertext, encrypted drone public key information, group signature, and current time.

[0019] Optionally, the drone generating the attribute ciphertext according to the access policy includes: the drone performing attribute-based encryption on the random number according to the access policy to generate the attribute ciphertext.

[0020] Optionally, encrypting the drone operator's position to obtain a position ciphertext includes: using the random number as a symmetric key, encrypting the drone operator's position to obtain a symmetrically encrypted position ciphertext.

[0021] Optionally, the method further comprises:

[0022] After receiving the RID data packet, the receiver decodes the RID data packet to obtain the position and flight speed of the drone, as well as the group signature;

[0023] The group signature is verified using the master public key.

[0024] Optionally, the method further comprises:

[0025] The drone service provider generates and distributes a private attribute key to the recipient in advance through a recipient registration process;

[0026] The receiver uses the attribute private key to decrypt the drone operator's location ciphertext to obtain the drone operator's location information.

[0027] Optionally, generating and distributing the attribute private key for the receiver through the receiver registration process includes:

[0028] Receiving a registration request sent by a receiver, wherein the registration request includes: receiver identity information and an attribute set;

[0029] Generate the receiver's attribute private key according to the receiver's attribute set;

[0030] The attribute private key is sent to the recipient through a secure channel.

[0031] Optionally, the method further comprises:

[0032] The receiver determines whether the drone enters a no-fly zone based on the location of the drone;

[0033] If yes, forwarding the RID data packet to the drone service provider;

[0034] Receive a response message returned by the drone service provider, where the response message carries the real identity information of the drone.

[0035] Optionally, the method further comprises:

[0036] After receiving the RID data packet, the drone service provider uses the master public key to recover the drone public key information encrypted in the RID data packet to obtain the public key of the drone;

[0037] Obtaining the real identity of the drone according to the public key of the drone;

[0038] The real identity of the drone is sent to the recipient.

[0039] The present invention also provides a drone, comprising:

[0040] A message generation module is used to generate a RID data packet that complies with the RID rules and can be anonymously authenticated during operation; the RID data packet includes the following information: drone position, drone speed, drone attribute ciphertext, drone operator position ciphertext, encrypted drone public key information, timestamp, group signature;

[0041] The message sending module is used to broadcast the RID data packet at a regular time so that the receiver can obtain the position and flight speed of the drone according to the received RID data packet.

[0042] The present invention also provides a drone monitoring device, the drone monitoring device comprising:

[0043] The receiving module is used to receive the RID data packet sent by the drone;

[0044] A decoding module, used to decode the RID data packet to obtain the position and flight speed of the drone, and the group signature;

[0045] The signature verification module is used to verify the group signature using the master public key.

[0046] Optionally, the drone monitoring device further includes:

[0047] The registration module is used to register with the drone service provider and obtain the attribute private key;

[0048] The decryption module is used to decrypt the drone operator's location ciphertext using the attribute private key to obtain the drone operator's location information.

[0049] Optionally, the drone monitoring device further includes:

[0050] A judgment module, used to determine whether the drone enters a no-fly zone according to the location of the drone;

[0051] The identity information acquisition module is used to forward the RID data packet to the drone service provider after the judgment module determines that the drone has entered a no-fly zone; and receive a response message returned by the drone service provider, wherein the response message carries the real identity information of the drone.

[0052] The anonymous authentication and remote identity identification method of drones, drones and monitoring equipment provided by the present invention, in the system initialization stage, the drone service provider (Unmanned Service Supplier, USS) selects the system master private key and master public key to define the attribute set; and through the drone registration process, generates and issues a certificate for the drone; during the operation of the drone, generates a RID data packet that complies with the RID rule and can be anonymously authenticated; the RID data packet includes the following information: drone position, drone speed, drone attribute ciphertext, drone operator position ciphertext, encrypted drone public key information, timestamp, group signature; the RID data packet is broadcasted regularly so that the receiver can obtain the drone's position and flight speed according to the received RID data packet. Using the scheme of the present invention, the drone can anonymously broadcast a verifiable RID message, and the actual location of the drone operator is broadcast in ciphertext, which improves the security of the RID message and increases the difficulty for attackers to forge, tamper with, and track RID information.

[0053] Furthermore, by utilizing the solution of the present invention, the receiver can directly authenticate the anonymous RID message of the drone without the need for the authority to be online all the time, thereby optimizing the efficiency of RID message management.

[0054] Furthermore, in the solution of the present invention, the actual location of the drone operator is only disclosed to specific qualified recipients, thereby achieving privacy protection of the drone operator's location and better ensuring the safety of the drone operator. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0055] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments are briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention, and for ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative work.

[0056] Figure 1 This is a flow chart of the anonymous authentication and remote identity recognition method for drones provided by the present invention;

[0057] Figure 2 is a flow chart of the generation of RID data packets by a drone in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0058] Figure 3is a flow chart of a process of a receiver on a received RID data packet in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0059] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the UAV provided by the present invention;

[0060] Figure 5 This is a structural schematic diagram of the drone monitoring device provided by the present invention;

[0061] Figure 6 This is another structural schematic diagram of the drone monitoring device provided by the present invention.

[0062] Figure 7 This is another structural schematic diagram of the drone monitoring device provided by the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0063] The specific implementation of the present invention is described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. It should be understood that the specific implementation described here is only used to illustrate and explain the present invention, and is not used to limit the present invention.

[0064] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the scheme of the present invention, the technical scheme in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0065] Although the existing remote identification scheme based on anonymous identity authentication can meet the RID standard and reduce the risk of drone privacy leakage to a certain extent, the following problems still exist:

[0066] 1) RID regulations require drones to broadcast messages containing the identity and location of the drone and drone operator through wireless channels. However, the RID information broadcast by drones is transmitted over non-secure channels and is vulnerable to attacks such as counterfeiting, tampering, and replay, resulting in ineffective drone tracking and management.

[0067] 2) Although RID regulations have improved drone monitoring and situational awareness, they have also brought serious privacy leakage issues. Existing solutions either only implement drone identity privacy protection or only implement drone operator location privacy protection, and have not yet fully met the privacy protection needs of drone remote identification.

[0068] 3) Anonymous broadcasting of RID messages can reduce the risk of drones being identified and tracked, but most existing drone anonymous RID technologies are highly dependent on the help of third-party online organizations. When the receiver receives the RID data packet, it needs to forward it to the third-party organization for verification and wait for the result to be returned, which will cause cumbersome communication and management overhead.

[0069] To this end, the present invention provides a method for anonymous authentication and remote identification of drones, which integrates anonymous authentication technology and attribute-based encryption technology, and can ensure the validity and integrity of drone RID information while realizing the privacy protection of drone identity and the location privacy protection of drone operators. In addition, anonymous messages broadcast by drones can be directly and easily authenticated without the involvement of a third-party trusted agency.

[0070] like Figure 1 The figure shows a flow chart of the anonymous authentication and remote identity recognition method of a drone provided by the present invention.

[0071] In step 101, the USS selects the system master private key and master public key in advance, defines the attribute set, and generates and issues a certificate for the drone through the drone registration process.

[0072] First, the USS triggers the system to initialize and selects three q-order prime groups G1, G2 and G T , where the elements in groups G1 and G2 can be mapped to group G through the bilinear function e T G1×G2→G T , where → represents a mapping.

[0073] In addition, USS also selects two hash functions, namely:

[0074] H: {0,1} * →Z q ;

[0075] H1: {0,1} * →G1,

[0076] Among them, {0,1} * Represents a string of any length consisting of 0 or 1, Z q It is an integer group of order q consisting of (0,1,…,q-1) elements;

[0077] The hash function H represents the mapping of a string of any length composed of 0 or 1 to an integer group Z of order q composed of (0, 1, ..., q-1) elements. q superior;

[0078] The hash function H1 represents mapping a string of any length composed of 0 or 1 into the group G1.

[0079] In addition, USS also randomly selects the value α∈Z q , x∈Z q and y∈Z q , and calculate Z=g1 α , Among them, the symbol “∈” indicates belonging, g1 is a generator of group G1, and g2 is a generator of group G2.

[0080] In addition, USS also defines the attribute space Each attribute A i Represents a specific identity or characteristic.

[0081] In addition, USS sets the system master public key and master private key, which are:

[0082] Master Public Key

[0083] Master private key msk=<α,x,y>.

[0084] In an embodiment of the present invention, the process of generating and issuing a certificate for the drone through the drone registration process is as follows: receiving a registration request sent by the drone, the registration request including: a drone identity (such as a device serial number of the drone), a drone public key; generating a drone certificate based on the drone public key; and sending the drone certificate to the drone.

[0085] For example: drone i Register with USS, assuming that the drone d i Already have a unique ID i and key pair <sk i ,pk i >(these parameters are embedded in the drone during the drone production, configuration or deployment phase) i ∈Z q , drone public key

[0086] When registering, the drone i Will <ID i ,pk i >Send to USS.

[0087] Accordingly, USS uses the drone’s public key pk i , calculate drone d i Certificate i ,B i >, where t i ∈Z q ​is a random value chosen by USS at random; USS will i ,B i >Send to drone i .

[0088] In some non-limiting embodiments, the USS may also generate and distribute attribute private keys for the receiver through the receiver registration process. For example, the USS receives a registration request sent by the receiver, the registration request including: receiver identity information, attribute set; generates the receiver's attribute private key based on the receiver's attribute set; and sends the attribute private key to the receiver through a secure channel.

[0089] For example: USS according to the receiver r j The property set Generate the recipient's attribute private key And send it to the receiver r through a secure channel j ;in, sk 2,i =H1(At i ) k , Represents a collection of attributes The number of attributes included, k∈Z q is a random value arbitrarily chosen by USS.

[0090] It should be noted that the attribute set The various attributes in can be determined according to actual needs, and this embodiment of the present invention does not limit this.

[0091] In addition, it should be noted that the recipient can determine whether to register with USS according to his or her needs. Even if he or she does not register, he or she can obtain information such as the drone's location and flight speed, but cannot obtain some private information, such as the location information of the drone operator.

[0092] In step 102, during the operation of the drone, a RID data packet is generated that complies with the RID rules and can be anonymously authenticated.

[0093] The RID data packet includes the following information: drone location, drone speed, drone attribute ciphertext, drone operator location ciphertext, encrypted drone public key information, timestamp, and group signature.

[0094] In step 103, the RID data packet is broadcasted at a fixed time so that the receiver can obtain the position and flight speed of the UAV according to the received RID data packet.

[0095] The time interval for broadcasting the RID data packet needs to be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the RID rule.

[0096] ​like Figure 2 FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a method for generating a RID data packet by a drone in an embodiment of the present invention, comprising the following steps:

[0097] Step 201: The drone generates attribute ciphertext according to the access policy.

[0098] Step 202, encrypt the drone operator's position to obtain a position ciphertext.

[0099] Step 203, generate a group signature, the group signature includes the following information: the drone's certificate information, the encrypted drone public key information, and non-interactive zero-knowledge proof; the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof includes the following information: the attribute ciphertext, the location ciphertext, the drone's location and flight speed, and a timestamp.

[0100] Step 204, generate a RID data packet based on the drone position, drone speed, drone attribute ciphertext, drone operator position ciphertext, encrypted drone public key information, group signature, and current time.

[0101] The RID packet includes the following information: <lat i ,v i ,c i ,ρ i ,C i ,TS i ,σ i >, where lat i is the position of the drone, v i is the speed of the drone, c i is the attribute ciphertext of the drone, ρ i is the ciphertext of the drone operator’s location, C i is the encrypted drone public key information, TS i is the timestamp, σ i It can be seen that the data packet will not leak the identity information of the drone, and the location information of the drone operator is also encrypted and protected.

[0102] The following further examples explain in detail the process of a drone generating a RID data packet that complies with RID rules and can be anonymously authenticated.

[0103] First, the drone i Randomly select two values ​​s1∈Z p and r∈G T , and according to the access policy (For example, a USS could set a property called COUNTRY and assign different values ​​to each recipient, COUNTRY_1, COUNTRY_2, COUNTRY_3, .... UAV d iYou can use the access policy COUNTRY = COUNTRY_1 to encrypt, ensuring that only recipients whose country is COUNTRY_1 can decrypt) Perform attribute-based encryption on the random number r to generate the attribute ciphertext c i = <ct1,ct 2,u ,ct 3,n ,ct4>, where:

[0104]

[0105] Among them, M is based on the attribute strategy The generated monotone spanning matrix is ​​n1 rows and n2 columns. The variables u∈[θ], n∈[n1], θ represents the maximum number of times an attribute is used in M, s′ is a randomly selected vector with θ elements, s′[u] represents the u-th element of the vector s′, τ(·) is the attribute mapping function, which can map a row of M to an attribute; v is the target vector of length n2-1; ρ(n)=|k|τ(k)=τ(n), k≤n| represents the ρ(n)-th occurrence of the attribute τ(n).

[0106] Secondly, drone d i Take the random number r as the symmetric key and Encrypt to obtain the symmetrically encrypted position ciphertext in, Indicates that the operator position is randomized using a random number r Perform Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption.

[0107] Again, drone d i Randomly choose μ∈Z p , Z p It is an integer group of order q consisting of (0,1,…,p-1) elements. The group signature is calculated as:

[0108] σ i = ′ i ,B i ′ ,C i ,π i >

[0109] Among them, A′ i =A i μ , B i ′=B i μ , C i =ElGmal.Enc(Z,pk i ​), ElGmal.Enc(Z,pk i ) indicates that the parameter Z in the master public key mpk and the random number w∈Z p UAV i The public key pk i Perform ElGmal asymmetric encryption, π u =(s k ,s w ,h) contains the attribute ciphertext c u 、Position ciphertext ρ i 、UAV location lat i 、UAV flight speed v i And the timestamp TS i The non-interactive zero-knowledge proof is:

[0110] C i =(W i,1 ,W i,2 )=ElGmal.Enc(Z,pk i )}(lot i ,c i ,ρ i ,v i ,TS i );

[0111] Among them, ZKPoK{(x,y)|f(·)} represents the proof value that can prove that x and y satisfy the function f without leaking x and y.

[0112] Through the above steps, the drone d i An anonymous data packet to be broadcast that complies with RID regulations can be generated, that is, <lat i ,v i ,c i ,ρ i ,C i ,TS i ,σ i >, the data packet does not reveal the identity information of the drone, and the location information of the drone operator is also encrypted and protected.

[0113] Accordingly, after the receiver receives the RID data packet broadcast by the drone, it decodes it into <lat i ,v i ,c i ,ρ i ,C i ,TS i ,σ i > form, and use the master public key mpk to sign the group σ i Verification is performed to authenticate the source and content integrity of the data packet.

[0114] If the above authentication is passed and the recipient meets the attribute strategy for decrypting the drone operator's location (for example, COUNTRY=COUNTRY_1 above), the recipient can use its own attribute private key to decrypt the drone operator's location ciphertext and obtain the drone operator's location information.

[0115] For example: Receiver r j Use your own private key calculate:

[0116]

[0117] Among them, γ n To satisfy ∑γ n ·M n =(1,0,…,0,0), θ is the maximum number of attribute usages used in the matrix M, I is the set of rows in M ​​of the attributes of the receiver that satisfy the attribute policy, ρ(n) represents the ρ(n)th occurrence of the attribute τ(n), and variables u∈[θ], n∈[n1].

[0118] The receiver uses the random key r to encrypt the position ρ of the drone operator i Decryption is performed by calculating AES.Dec(r,ρ i ), AES.Dec(r,ρ i ) represents the use of random key r to cipher the positional text ρ i Perform symmetric decryption to recover the drone operator’s location

[0119] Through the above steps, any receiver can verify the legitimacy of the RID data packet broadcast anonymously by the drone, but only receivers that meet certain attribute policies can decrypt the attribute ciphertext and obtain the location information of the drone operator.

[0120] In other non-limiting embodiments, the receiver can also determine whether the drone has entered a no-fly zone based on its location. i When entering a no-fly zone, some corresponding measures can be taken, such as expelling the drone or sending an alarm message to the drone operator, forcing it to change its route or return to the starting point.

[0121] Of course, in some cases, it is necessary to further obtain the real identity of the drone and further process it based on the real identity of the drone. In this case, the receiver can i The broadcast RID data packet is forwarded to the USS, and the real identity information of the drone is obtained through the USS.

[0122] like Figure 3FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a process of a receiver processing a received RID data packet in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0123] In step 301, the receiver receives the RID data packet broadcast by the drone.

[0124] In step 302, the RID data packet is decoded to obtain the position and flight speed of the drone, the position ciphertext, and the group signature.

[0125] In step 303, the group signature is verified.

[0126] In step 304, after verification, it is determined whether the position of the drone is within the set no-fly zone; if yes, step 305 is executed; otherwise, the process ends.

[0127] In step 305, the RID data packet is forwarded to the USS.

[0128] Accordingly, after receiving the RID data packet, the USS uses the master public key to obtain the real identity of the drone and returns the real identity to the recipient.

[0129] Specifically, USS is calculated by ElGmal.Dec(z,C i ), recover the drone public key pk i , and obtain the drone d according to the public key information i Real ID i , where ElGmal.Dec(z,C i ) indicates that the alpha in the master private key is used to encrypt the ciphertext C i Perform ElGmal decryption; USS returns a packet containing the ID to the recipient i The receiver sends a response (ack) message to confirm the correct execution of the recognition operation, and the receiver can perform further processing based on it.

[0130] In step 306, a response message returned by the USS is received, wherein the response message carries the real identity of the drone.

[0131] In step 307, the punishment for the drone is determined according to the real identity of the drone, for example, sanctions, charges or bans are imposed on the drone.

[0132] The anonymous authentication and remote identification method for drones provided by the present invention can be used as an auxiliary to the RID specification to provide identity privacy for drones and additional location privacy for drone operators. In the application of the solution of the present invention, it is not required that all receivers register with USS. If a receiver who is not registered with USS receives a RID data packet, the receiver can still obtain the pseudonym of the drone (i.e., Ci ), location, flight speed and other information.

[0133] One or more embodiments of the method for anonymous authentication and remote identity recognition of drones provided by the present invention can achieve the following functions:

[0134] 1) Drones can anonymously broadcast verifiable RID messages, making it more difficult for attackers to forge, tamper with, and track RID information;

[0135] 2) The receiver can directly authenticate the drone’s anonymous RID message without the need for the authority to be online all the time, thus optimizing the efficiency of RID message management;

[0136] 3) The actual location of the drone operator is broadcast in encrypted form and disclosed only to specific eligible receivers, thus protecting the location privacy of the drone operator.

[0137] The following further illustrates the process of implementing the above functions using the method of the present invention.

[0138] In this embodiment, the subjects involved are: USS, specific drone D1, receiver R1 that complies with the attribute policy, and receiver R2 that does not comply with the attribute policy. The functions and interaction processes of these different subjects are as follows:

[0139] A. System initialization and registration

[0140] This stage includes three parts: USS generates system parameters and keys, drone D1 registration, and receiver R1 registration.

[0141] A1.USS generates system parameters and keys. The specific implementation process is as follows:

[0142] First, USS selects three prime order groups G1, G2 and G T , and two hash functions, namely:

[0143] H: {0,1} * →Z q ;

[0144] H1: {0,1} * →G1;

[0145] Among them, the elements in groups G1 and G2 can be mapped to group G through the bilinear function e T G1×G2→G T ;→ represents mapping, {0,1} * Represents a string of any length consisting of 0 or 1; Z qIt is a q-order integer group consisting of (0,1,…,q-1) elements; the hash function H represents the mapping of a string of any length composed of 0 or 1 to a q-order integer group Z consisting of (0,1,…,q-1) elements. q Above; the hash function H1 represents mapping a string of any length composed of 0 or 1 into the group G1.

[0146] Second, USS randomly selects a value α∈Z q , x∈Z q and y∈Z q , and calculate Z=g1 α , Among them, the symbol “∈” indicates belonging; g1 is a generator of group G1, and g2 is a generator of group G2.

[0147] Again, USS defines the attribute space Each attribute A i Represents a specific identity or characteristic.

[0148] Again, USS sets the system master public key and master private key:

[0149] Master Public Key

[0150] Master private key msk=<α,x,y>.

[0151] A2. Registration process of drone D1

[0152] The interaction process between drone D1 and USS in this process is as follows:

[0153] (1) Drone D1 randomly selects a value sk1∈Z q , calculate the public key and will<ID1,pk1> Sent to USS, where ID1 is the device serial number of the drone, representing the drone's identity.

[0154] (2) USS receives<ID1,pk1> After that, randomly select a value t1∈Z q , and calculate two values ​​A1 and B1 based on the public key pk1 of drone D1, where A1 and B1 satisfy the relationship

[0155] (3) USS settings<A1,B1> The certificate for drone D1, and the certificate<A1,B1> Send to drone D1.

[0156] A3. Registration process of receiver R1

[0157] The interaction process between the receiver R1 and USS in this process is as follows:

[0158] (1) Receiver R1 initiates a registration request, which contains R1’s real identity and attribute set

[0159] (2) USS based on the attribute set of receiver R1 Randomly choose a value k∈Z q ,calculate:

[0160]

[0161] in, Represents a set of attributes The number of attributes to include.

[0162] (3) USS sets the recipient's private key And through the secure channel Sent to receiver R1.

[0163] B. Anonymous RID message generation

[0164] In this process, drone D1 performs attribute-based encryption, symmetric encryption of the drone operator's position, and the generation of a group signature, as follows:

[0165] B1. Drone D1 attribute-based encryption

[0166] In this process, drone D1 encrypts the symmetric key required in the subsequent step B2 according to the attribute strategy. The main encryption process is as follows:

[0167] (1) Drone D1 randomly selects two values ​​s1∈Z p and r∈G T , set r to the symmetric key.

[0168] (2) Based on the preset access attribute strategy Drone D1 calculation:

[0169]

[0170] Among them, M is based on the attribute strategy Generate a monotone span matrix with n1 rows and n2 columns, M iis the i-th row of the matrix M; the variables j∈[θ], i∈[n1], and θ represents the maximum number of times an attribute is used in M; s′ is a randomly selected vector with θ as its elements, and s′[j] represents the j-th element of the vector s′; τ(·) is the attribute mapping function that can map a row of M to an attribute; ρ(i)=|k|τ(k)=τ(i), k≤i| represents the ρ(i)-th occurrence of attribute τ(i), and v is the target vector of length n2-1.

[0171] (3) Drone D1 sets the attribute-based encrypted ciphertext c = <ct1,ct 2,j ,ct 3,i ,ct4>.

[0172] B2. Symmetric encryption of drone operator location

[0173] In this process, drone D1 calculates the ciphertext in Denotes the operator position of D1 with key r Perform AES encryption. B3. Drone D1 generates a group signature. The specific process of this step is as follows:

[0174] (1) UAV D1 randomly selects μ∈Z p , and according to the certificate obtained during the registration stage<A1,B1> Calculate A1′=A1 μ , B1′=B1 μ .

[0175] (2) Drone D1 calculates C1 = (W1, W2) = ElGmal.Enc(Z, pk1), where ElGmal.Enc(Z, pk1) represents the ElGmal asymmetric encryption of the public key pk1 of drone D1 using the parameter Z in the master public key mpk. For example, drone D1 randomly selects w∈Z p , calculate W1 = g1 w ,W2=Z w ·pk1.

[0176] (3) Drone D1 calculates the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof π including the attribute ciphertext c, the symmetric encrypted ciphertext ρ, the drone position lat1, the drone flight speed v1 and the timestamp TS, that is, calculates:

[0177]

[0178] π= k ,s w ,h>The specific calculation process is: UAV D1 randomly selects the value r k ∈Z p and r w ∈Z​p , calculate the auxiliary value:

[0179]

[0180] Then calculate the zero-knowledge proof:

[0181] h=H(lat1,c,ρ,C1,v1,R0,R1,R2,TS),s k =sk1·hr k ,s w =w·hr w .

[0182] (4) Drone D1 sets group signature σ =<A1′,B1′,C1,π> , and generates an anonymous data packet to be broadcast that complies with RID regulations<lat1,c,ρ,v1,TS,σ> .

[0183] C. Anonymous RID message authentication and decryption

[0184] The process includes three parts: group signature verification, attribute-based decryption, and symmetric decryption, as follows:

[0185] C1. Both the registered receiver R1 and the unregistered receiver R2 can use the master public key mpk to verify the legitimacy and integrity of the RID data packet broadcast by the drone D1. The specific process is as follows:

[0186] (1) After receiving the broadcast RID packet, receiver R1 or R2 decodes it into<lat1,c,ρ,v1,TS,σ> form.

[0187] (2) Receiver R1 or R2 uses the master public key mpk and group signature σ =<A1′,B1′,C1,π1> ,calculate:

[0188]

[0189] (3) Receiver R1 or R2 verifies whether the equation H(lat1,c,ρ,C1,v1,R0,R1,R2,TS)=h holds. If so, it means that the data packet comes from a registered drone and the content has not been tampered with.

[0190] C2. Different from the above group signature verification, attribute-based decryption can only be performed by the receiver R1 who has registered and whose attributes meet the encryption policy, as follows:

[0191] (1) Receiver R1 uses its own attribute key calculate where γ i To satisfy ∑γ i ·Mi = vector of (1,0,…,0,0) elements in ; τ(·) is the attribute mapping function, which can map the rows of M to an attribute; I is the set of row labels of the attributes of the receiver that satisfy the attribute policy in M; ρ(i)=|k|τ(k)=τ(i), k≤i| represents the ρ(i)th occurrence of attribute τ(i); the variable j∈[θ], i∈[n1], θ represents the maximum number of times an attribute is used in the matrix M; v is the target vector of length n2-1.

[0192] (2) After obtaining ξ, the receiver recovers the random key

[0193] C3. Symmetric decryption can only be performed by the registered receiver R1 that meets the attribute policy. Specifically, the receiver R1 uses the key r recovered in step C2 to perform the AES.Dec(r,ρ) operation to obtain the position calculation of the drone operator. AES.Dec(r,ρ) represents the symmetric decryption operation on ρ using the key r.

[0194] D. Drone identity disclosure: mainly includes RID data packet forwarding and drone identity recovery, as follows:

[0195] (1) The specific process of forwarding the drone RID data packet is as follows: the receiver R1 or R2 first confirms that the drone D1 has entered the no-fly area, and then forwards the RID data packet broadcast by D1 to the USS.

[0196] (2) The main process of determining the identity of drone D1 is as follows:

[0197] First, USS calculates the public key of drone D1 pk1=W2 / W1 based on the RID data packet of drone D1 and the α in the master private key. α ; Obtain the real identity ID1 of the drone according to the public key pk1; Then, USS returns a response (ack) message containing the identity ID1 to R1 or R2, and the receiver R1 or R2 can perform further processing based on the ack message.

[0198] Accordingly, an embodiment of the present invention further provides a drone, such as Figure 4 FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of the structure of the UAV provided by the present invention.

[0199] The drone 400 includes: a message generating module 401 and a message sending module 402. Among them:

[0200] The message generation module 401 is used to generate a RID data packet that complies with the RID rules and can be anonymously authenticated during operation; the RID data packet includes the following information: drone position, drone speed, drone attribute ciphertext, drone operator position ciphertext, encrypted drone public key information, timestamp, group signature;

[0201] The message sending module 402 is used to broadcast the RID data packet at a fixed time, so that the receiver can obtain the position and flight speed of the drone according to the received RID data packet.

[0202] Accordingly, an embodiment of the present invention also provides a drone monitoring device, such as Figure 5 The figure shows a schematic diagram of the structure of the UAV monitoring device provided by the present invention.

[0203] The drone monitoring device 500 includes the following modules:

[0204] The receiving module 501 is used to receive the RID data packet sent by the drone;

[0205] A decoding module 502 is used to decode the RID data packet to obtain the position and flight speed of the drone, as well as the group signature;

[0206] The signature verification module 503 is used to verify the group signature using the master public key.

[0207] like Figure 6 , which is another structural schematic diagram of the drone monitoring device provided by the present invention.

[0208] and Figure 5 Compared with the shown Figure 6 The drone monitoring device 500 shown further includes: a registration module 601 and a decryption module 602. Among them:

[0209] The registration module 601 is used to register with the drone service provider and obtain the attribute private key;

[0210] The decryption module 602 is used to decrypt the drone operator's location ciphertext using the attribute private key to obtain the drone operator's location information.

[0211] like Figure 7 , which is another structural schematic diagram of the drone monitoring device provided by the present invention.

[0212] and Figure 5 Compared with the shown Figure 7 The drone monitoring device 500 shown further includes: a judgment module 701 and an identity information acquisition module 702. Among them:

[0213] The judgment module 701 is used to determine whether the drone enters a no-fly zone according to the location of the drone;

[0214] The identity information acquisition module 702 is used to forward the RID data packet to the drone service provider after the judgment module determines that the drone has entered a no-fly area; and receive a response message returned by the drone service provider, wherein the response message carries the real identity information of the drone.

[0215] The above-mentioned determination module 701 and identity information acquisition module 702 can also be applied to Figure 6 The embodiment shown.

[0216] The specific implementation methods of each module in the above-mentioned drone and drone monitoring device can refer to the description in the previous embodiment of the method of the present invention, and will not be repeated here.

[0217] It should be noted that, for the above-mentioned method embodiments, for the sake of simplicity, they are all described as a series of action combinations, but those skilled in the art should know that the present invention is not limited by the described action sequence, because according to the present invention, certain steps can be performed in other sequences or simultaneously. Secondly, those skilled in the art should also know that the embodiments described in the specification are all preferred embodiments, and the actions and modules involved are not necessarily required by the present invention.

[0218] In the above embodiments, the description of each embodiment has its own emphasis. For parts that are not described in detail in a certain embodiment, reference can be made to the relevant descriptions of other embodiments.

[0219] In several embodiments provided by the present invention, it should be understood that the disclosed device may also be implemented in other ways.

[0220] The present invention also provides a storage medium, which is a computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored, and the computer program can be executed when it is run. Figure 1 or Figure 2 or Figure 3 The storage medium may include a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk or an optical disk, etc. The storage medium may also include a non-volatile memory (non-volatile) or a non-transitory memory, etc.

[0221] The above embodiments may be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, firmware or any other combination thereof. When implemented using software, the above embodiments may be implemented in whole or in part in the form of a computer program product. The computer program product includes one or more computer instructions or computer programs. When the computer instructions or computer programs are loaded or executed on a computer, the process or function described in the embodiment of the present application is generated in whole or in part. The computer may be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable devices. The computer instructions may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium, for example, the computer instructions may be transmitted from one website site, computer, server or data center to another website site, computer, server or data center by wired or wireless means.

[0222] The embodiments of the present invention are described in detail above. The present invention is described in detail using specific implementation methods herein. The description of the above embodiments is only used to help understand the method and system of the present invention. It is only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work should belong to the scope of protection of the present invention, and the content of this specification should not be understood as limiting the present invention. Therefore, any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included in the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for anonymous authentication and remote identity recognition of drones, characterized in that: The method comprises: The drone service provider selects the system master private key and master public key in advance, defines the attribute set, and generates and issues a certificate for the drone through the drone registration process; During the operation of the drone, a RID data packet that complies with the RID rules and can be anonymously authenticated is generated; the RID data packet includes the following information: drone location, drone speed, drone attribute ciphertext, drone operator location ciphertext, encrypted drone public key information, timestamp, group signature; The RID data packet is broadcasted at a fixed time so that the receiver can obtain the position and flight speed of the UAV according to the received RID data packet.

2. The method for anonymous authentication and remote identity recognition of drones according to claim 1, characterized in that: The generating and issuing of a certificate for the drone through the drone registration process includes: Receive the registration request information sent by the drone, the registration request information includes: drone identity, drone public key; generating a drone certificate based on the drone public key; The drone certificate is sent to the drone.

3. The method for anonymous authentication and remote identity recognition of drones according to claim 1, characterized in that: During the operation of the drone, the RID data packet generated that complies with the RID rules and can be anonymously authenticated includes: The drone generates an attribute ciphertext according to the access policy; Encrypt the drone operator's location to obtain the location ciphertext; Generate a group signature, the group signature includes the following information: the drone's certificate information, the encrypted drone public key information, and a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof; the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof includes the following information: the attribute ciphertext, the location ciphertext, the drone's location and flight speed, and a timestamp; Generate a RID data packet based on the drone position, drone speed, drone attribute ciphertext, drone operator position ciphertext, encrypted drone public key information, group signature, and current time.

4. The method for anonymous authentication and remote identity recognition of drones according to claim 3, characterized in that: The drone generates attribute ciphertext according to the access policy including: The drone performs attribute-based encryption on the random number according to the access policy to generate attribute ciphertext.

5. The method for anonymous authentication and remote identity recognition of drones according to claim 4, characterized in that: The position of the drone operator is encrypted to obtain the position ciphertext including: The random number is used as a symmetric key to encrypt the drone operator's position to obtain a symmetrically encrypted position ciphertext.

6. The method for anonymous authentication and remote identity recognition of a drone according to any one of claims 3 to 5, characterized in that: The method further comprises: After receiving the RID data packet, the receiver decodes the RID data packet to obtain the position and flight speed of the drone, as well as the group signature; The group signature is verified using the master public key.

7. The method for anonymous authentication and remote identity recognition of drones according to claim 6, characterized in that: The method further comprises: The drone service provider generates and distributes a private attribute key to the recipient in advance through a recipient registration process; The receiver uses the attribute private key to decrypt the drone operator's location ciphertext to obtain the drone operator's location information.

8. The method for anonymous authentication and remote identity recognition of drones according to claim 7, characterized in that: The generating and distributing of attribute private keys for the receivers through the receiver registration process includes: Receiving a registration request sent by a receiver, wherein the registration request includes: receiver identity information and an attribute set; Generate the receiver's attribute private key according to the receiver's attribute set; The attribute private key is sent to the recipient through a secure channel.

9. The method for anonymous authentication and remote identity recognition of drones according to claim 6, characterized in that: The method further comprises: The receiver determines whether the drone enters a no-fly zone based on the location of the drone; If yes, forwarding the RID data packet to the drone service provider; Receive a response message returned by the drone service provider, where the response message carries the real identity information of the drone.

10. The method for anonymous authentication and remote identity recognition of drones according to claim 6, characterized in that: The method further comprises: After receiving the RID data packet, the drone service provider uses the master public key to recover the drone public key information encrypted in the RID data packet to obtain the public key of the drone; Obtaining the real identity of the drone according to the public key of the drone; The real identity of the drone is sent to the recipient.

11. A drone, characterized in that: The drone comprises: A message generation module is used to generate a RID data packet that complies with the RID rules and can be anonymously authenticated during operation; the RID data packet includes the following information: drone position, drone speed, drone attribute ciphertext, drone operator position ciphertext, encrypted drone public key information, timestamp, group signature; The message sending module is used to broadcast the RID data packet at a regular time so that the receiver can obtain the position and flight speed of the drone according to the received RID data packet.

12. A drone monitoring device, characterized in that: The drone monitoring equipment includes: The receiving module is used to receive the RID data packet sent by the drone; A decoding module, used to decode the RID data packet to obtain the position and flight speed of the drone, and the group signature; The signature verification module is used to verify the group signature using the master public key.

13. The drone monitoring device according to claim 12, characterized in that: The drone monitoring device also includes: The registration module is used to register with the drone service provider and obtain the attribute private key; The decryption module is used to decrypt the drone operator's location ciphertext using the attribute private key to obtain the drone operator's location information.

14. The drone monitoring device according to claim 12 or 13, characterized in that: The drone monitoring device also includes: A judgment module, used to determine whether the drone enters a no-fly zone according to the location of the drone; The identity information acquisition module is used to forward the RID data packet to the drone service provider after the judgment module determines that the drone has entered a no-fly zone; and receive a response message returned by the drone service provider, wherein the response message carries the real identity information of the drone.

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