Method of combining anti-quantum signature and x.509 format identity authentication method

Abstract

This invention discloses an identity authentication method integrating quantum-resistant signatures and the X.509 format, relating to the field of data security technology. The method includes: S1, CA generates and publishes globally public parameters; S2, EE1 and EE2 obtain Cert1 and Cert2; S3, EE1 and EE2 perform bidirectional authentication and session key negotiation, and communicate using the session key; constructing a quantum-resistant digital identity certificate to ensure the long-term security and traceability of registration information; during the registration phase, the SLH-DSA algorithm is used to sign the user-submitted registration information to ensure the long-term validity and strong anchoring of the identity certificate, while the ML-DSA algorithm is reused to sign the registration information for rapid verification scenarios; during the authentication interaction phase, the ML-KEM quantum-resistant algorithm is used to implement a dual-path quantum-resistant DKE key exchange protocol to generate a session key, and the ML-DSA algorithm, with higher signature and verification performance, is used to digitally sign and verify the authentication message, achieving identity confirmation and communication integrity protection for both parties, and improving the performance of establishing a secure session link.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of data security technology, and in particular to an identity authentication method that integrates quantum-resistant signatures and the X.509 format. Background Technology

[0002] In next-generation network and information systems, massive numbers of users and devices frequently need to authenticate their identities and interact with data over the network. Therefore, ensuring data security and the credibility of identity information during communication has become a critical issue that urgently needs to be addressed. Currently, traditional identity authentication largely relies on digital certificate technology, especially the standard X.509 digital certificate. However, the core flaw of this type of certificate lies in the fact that its public-key algorithm is vulnerable to quantum computing attacks. It is well known that quantum computers have enormous potential in cryptographic cracking. Most mainstream asymmetric encryption algorithms today, such as RSA and ECDSA, are based on mathematical problems such as large integer factorization or discrete logarithms in finite fields, and their security directly depends on the computational difficulty of these problems. Once quantum computers mature, the complexity of these problems will be significantly reduced, rendering digital signature and authentication systems built upon them insecure. Therefore, the existing X.509 digital certificate system, due to its widespread use of traditional signature algorithms such as RSA and ECDSA, lacks the ability to cope with quantum threats.

[0003] In 2020, Fu Yao et al. proposed using quantum-resistant IBE (Independent Quantum Encryption Authentication) for key negotiation during the authentication process in their invention patent, "A Quantum-Resistant Identity Authentication System and Method Based on Digital Certificates." Both the client and the CA (Certificate Authority) can negotiate keys with the communicating object based on ID cryptography using the assigned key, thus achieving quantum-resistant secure communication of data transmitted during the authentication process. However, there is currently no standardized method for quantum-resistant IBE, making it difficult to implement in practical application systems.

[0004] In 2024, Li Ye et al., in their invention patent "A Quantum-Resistant Identity Authentication Method, System, and Electronic Device," implemented quantum-resistant security using a hybrid Dilihium and SM2 signature method during the authentication process. This method introduces quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms at the root of trust and authentication ends, employing a hybrid approach of quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms and Chinese national cryptographic algorithms for signing and verification, thus providing a higher level of security. However, this re-signing method increases the system's verification overhead and can only serve as a transitional solution for post-quantum cryptography implementations.

[0005] In 2025, Jiang Jiangong et al. introduced a process for generating segmented keys through hash iteration and generating and verifying digital signatures based on elliptic curve cryptography in their invention patent "Hybrid Encryption Authentication Method, Device and Equipment for Quantum Computing Resistance," thereby achieving resistance to quantum computer attacks. However, the public and private keys of the ECC-based digital signature algorithm used in the signature process are not quantum resistant, thus failing to fully achieve quantum resistance.

[0006] In the same year, Guo Songhui et al. used the MLWE algorithm from the KYBER algorithm in post-quantum key negotiation for private key design during the authentication process in their invention patent "A Post-Quantum Identity Authentication Method and System under a Multi-Server Architecture". They combined this with central binomial distribution sampling technology to achieve resistance to server leakage attacks and quantum computing attacks. However, using anti-quantum algorithms only in the key negotiation process also failed to achieve complete quantum resistance.

[0007] In summary, existing research on identity authentication using post-quantum schemes has proposed transitional solutions prior to post-quantum standardization, enabling quantum resistance in certain aspects and integration with existing national cryptographic algorithms. These solutions improve the system's quantum resistance to some extent, but their completeness remains constrained, particularly in terms of integration with existing frameworks and performance. Especially in scenarios with resource-constrained device authentication requirements, such as the Internet of Things and smart grids, it is difficult to meet the storage and computing performance requirements of these devices. Furthermore, there is a lack of design and consideration for compatibility with existing TLS frameworks and X.509 certificate systems. Summary of the Invention

[0008] The purpose of this invention is to design an identity authentication method that integrates quantum-resistant signatures and the X.509 format in order to solve the above problems.

[0009] The present invention achieves the above objectives through the following technical solutions:

[0010] An authentication method that integrates quantum-resistant signatures and the X.509 format includes:

[0011] S1. Certificate Authority (CA) generates and publishes globally common parameters;

[0012] S2, user EE1, and user EE2 each obtain identity certificates from the Certificate Authority (CA) through the Registration Authority (RA) using global public parameters. and identity certificate User EE obtains identity certificate Specifically:

[0013] S21. User EE generates signature key pairs for ML-DSA and ML-KEM algorithms. and ;

[0014] S22. User EE initiates a registration request to the registration authority RA. ,in, This represents the minimum registration attribute of user EE, containing user EE's real identity information. ;

[0015] S23. The registration authority RA checks the registration list to confirm whether user EE has already registered. If so, the registration request is rejected; otherwise, proceed to S24.

[0016] S24. The registration authority (RA) uses methods such as external database comparison to verify... Does it meet the requirements? ,like If the requirements are not met, the registration request will be rejected; otherwise, proceed to step S25.

[0017] S25. The registration authority (RA) selects a random salt value. Calculate the commitment value of the registration information. The registration information and corresponding commitment value will be sent to the Certificate Authority (CA).

[0018] S26. Certificate Authority (CA) assembles a certificate to be signed. ;

[0019] S27. The Certificate Authority (CA) performs a compound signature on the certificate to be signed and adds the compound signature to the identity certificate. Then the identity certificate Send to user EE.

[0020] S3, user EE1, and user EE2 use identity certificates and identity certificate Two-way authentication and session key negotiation are performed to establish a communication connection. Subsequently, users EE1 and EE2 use the session key to communicate.

[0021] The beneficial effects of this invention are as follows: It proposes a quantum-resistant digital identity certificate that integrates two post-quantum signature algorithms, SLH-DSA and ML-DSA, ensuring the long-term security and traceability of registration information. During the registration phase, the SLH-DSA algorithm is used to sign the user-submitted registration information, guaranteeing the long-term validity and strong anchoring of the identity certificate. The ML-DSA algorithm can be optionally reused to sign the registration information again for rapid verification scenarios. During the authentication interaction phase, the ML-KEM quantum-resistant algorithm is used to generate session keys through a dual-path quantum-resistant DKE key exchange protocol. The ML-DSA algorithm, with its higher signature and verification performance, is then used to digitally sign and verify the authentication messages, achieving identity verification and communication integrity protection for both parties, and improving the performance of establishing secure session links. The signatures of both parties cover the complete interaction record and the peer's certificate, effectively preventing man-in-the-middle attacks and degradation. The overall solution uses the high-cost SLH-DSA only for CA / log signing and low-frequency operations, while ML-DSA (signing / verification) and ML-KEM (de-encapsulation / de-encapsulation) are used for frequent online paths. This enables an efficient and fast identity authentication process, meeting the communication needs of low-latency, bandwidth-sensitive IoT, smart grid and other scenarios. Attached Figure Description

[0022] Figure 1 This is an implementation architecture diagram of the identity authentication method that integrates quantum-resistant signatures and X.509 format of the present invention;

[0023] Figure 2 This is a flowchart of the identity authentication process;

[0024] Figure 3 This is a flowchart of the two-way secure identity authentication process between the client and the server. Detailed Implementation

[0025] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, not all, of the embodiments of the present invention. The components of the embodiments of the present invention described and shown in the accompanying drawings can generally be arranged and designed in various different configurations.

[0026] Therefore, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the invention provided in the accompanying drawings is not intended to limit the scope of the claimed invention, but merely to illustrate selected embodiments of the invention. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of the invention without inventive effort are within the scope of protection of the invention.

[0027] It should be noted that similar labels and letters in the following figures indicate similar items. Therefore, once an item is defined in one figure, it does not need to be further defined and explained in subsequent figures.

[0028] In the description of this invention, it should be understood that the terms "upper," "lower," "inner," "outer," "left," "right," etc., indicate the orientation or positional relationship based on the orientation or positional relationship shown in the accompanying drawings, or the orientation or positional relationship commonly used when the product of this invention is in use, or the orientation or positional relationship commonly understood by those skilled in the art. They are only used to facilitate the description of this invention and to simplify the description, and are not intended to indicate or imply that the device or element referred to must have a specific orientation, or be constructed and operated in a specific orientation. Therefore, they should not be construed as limitations on this invention.

[0029] Furthermore, the terms "first," "second," etc., are used only to distinguish descriptions and should not be interpreted as indicating or implying relative importance.

[0030] In the description of this invention, it should also be noted that, unless otherwise explicitly specified and limited, terms such as "set" and "connection" should be interpreted broadly. For example, "connection" can be a fixed connection, a detachable connection, or an integral connection; it can be a mechanical connection or an electrical connection; it can be a direct connection or an indirect connection through an intermediate medium; it can be a connection within two components. Those skilled in the art can understand the specific meaning of the above terms in this invention according to the specific circumstances.

[0031] The specific embodiments of the present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0032] Registration Authority (RA): The RA is the first link in the trust chain within the system, primarily responsible for user / device authentication and registration information verification. During the authentication process, the RA verifies the submitted identity credentials to ensure the legitimacy and uniqueness of the registrant. After successful verification, the RA submits the verified application information to the Certificate Authority (CA), laying the foundation for subsequent digital identity certificate issuance. The RA's responsibility is to establish a trust chain for users / devices, ensuring the authenticity and credibility of subsequent certificates; it is the cornerstone of trust in the entire system.

[0033] (2) Certificate Authority (CA): The Certificate Authority (CA) is a key trusted entity in the system, primarily responsible for managing and publishing global public parameters, and generating and distributing quantum-resistant digital identity certificates to communication participants based on post-quantum algorithms (such as SLH-DSA and ML-DSA). These identity certificates not only contain identity information and public keys, but also support efficient verification mechanisms, ensuring identity authenticity while significantly improving verification efficiency. By maintaining a transparent certificate database and a post-quantum-secure certificate issuance process, the CA lays a solid security foundation for subsequent key negotiation and data transmission, ensuring the system remains secure in the face of quantum computing threats.

[0034] (3) Terminal Entity: The terminal entity, or user EE, is the end user or device in the system, including clients and servers. It holds a quantum-resistant digital identity certificate issued by a Certificate Authority (CA), which serves as its unique identity credential within the system. The user EE uses this identity certificate to participate in authentication and secure interaction, supporting quantum-resistant key exchange and signature verification to ensure identity trustworthiness and data integrity during communication. The user EE's role in the system is to provide a secure and trustworthy terminal device, laying the foundation for secure data exchange. Multiple entities interact using their respective quantum-resistant digital certificates to achieve two-way authentication and session key negotiation.

[0035] like Figure 1 , Figure 2 , Figure 3 As shown, the authentication method integrating quantum-resistant signatures and the X.509 format includes:

[0036] S1. Certificate Authorities (CAs) generate and publish globally common parameters; specifically including:

[0037] S11. Obtain security parameters from the Certificate Authority (CA). and set a secure hash function. Message verification code function and key derivation functions ;

[0038] S12. The Certificate Authority (CA) sets the first common parameter of the SLH-DSA algorithm and generates a random seed for private key derivation. Used for pseudo-random functions and address hashes used for tree nodes ; and calculate The first common parameter includes , and , , and These are the Winternitz parameters, the height of the Merkle hash tree, and the number of levels in the multi-level structure, respectively. The Certificate Authority (CA) determines these parameters based on... Construct a Merkle tree of the size and obtain the root node. ;

[0039] S13. The Certificate Authority (CA) sets the second common parameter for the ML-DSA algorithm and calculates it. The second common parameter includes , respectively, represent module dimension, module, signature noise limit, signature norm limit, challenge domain limit, Hamming weight, and challenge number;

[0040] S14. The Certificate Authority (CA) sets the third common parameter for the ML-KEM algorithm. The third common parameter includes... , representing the dimension of the ring, the rank of the module, the modulus, the error distribution parameter, and the compression parameter of the consistency noise, respectively;

[0041] S15, Certificate Authority (CA) publishes system-wide public parameters, including .

[0042] S2, user EE1, and user EE2 each obtain identity certificates from the Certificate Authority (CA) through the Registration Authority (RA) using global public parameters. and identity certificate User EE obtains identity certificate Specifically:

[0043] S21. User EE generates signature key pairs for ML-DSA and ML-KEM algorithms. and ;

[0044] S22. User EE initiates a registration request to the registration authority RA. ,in, This represents the minimum registration attribute of user EE, containing user EE's real identity information. ;

[0045] S23. The registration authority RA checks the registration list to confirm whether user EE has already registered. If so, the registration request is rejected; otherwise, proceed to S24.

[0046] S24. The registration authority (RA) uses methods such as external database comparison to verify... Does it meet the requirements? ,like If the requirements are not met, the registration request will be rejected; otherwise, proceed to step S25.

[0047] S25. The registration authority (RA) selects a random salt value. Calculate the commitment value of the registration information. The registration information and corresponding commitment value will be sent to the Certificate Authority (CA).

[0048] S26. Certificate Authority (CA) assembles a certificate to be signed. Certificate to be signed Represented as: After assembly, the certificate to be signed will be... Write the data into the PQ-CT constructed from the Merkle tree to form a verifiable Merkle tree structure, with the root node denoted as . The timestamp is recorded as Calculate the root SLH-DSA signature , represented as: Log identifier The issuance timestamp and the root signature are written to the PQ-CT signature certificate timestamp. ;

[0049] S27. The Certificate Authority (CA) uses the SLH-DSA algorithm and the ML-DSA algorithm respectively to perform a compound signature on the certificate to be signed, as shown below: and and add the matching signature to the identity certificate. Then, the identity certificate Send the identity certificate to the user EE. Represented as: and add compound signature to identity certificate Then the identity certificate Send to user EE.

[0050] S3, user EE1, and user EE2 use identity certificates and identity certificate Two-way authentication and session key negotiation are performed to establish a communication connection. Subsequently, users EE1 and EE2 communicate using the session key; specifically including:

[0051] S31. User EE1 selects a random number. Used as a session ID, and for the EE2 public key Initiating the first PQ-KEM package to obtain And the optional second-path PQ-KEM is obtained ;

[0052] S32. User EE1 sends an authentication request message ClientHello to user EE2. The authentication request message ClientHello includes parameters. ;

[0053] S33. After user EE2 receives the authentication request message ClientHello, ... and Unlocked and obtained and Then calculate the session key SK, and use the ML-DSA algorithm to sign the negotiated information. User EE2 sends a service response message ServerHello to user EE1, including parameters. The session key SK is represented as: One signature Represented as: User EE2 generates a session key SK once. And send it to user EE1; This serves as a marker for the end of the session, primarily used by both parties to confirm that the entire authentication negotiation process has not been tampered with.

[0054] S34, User EE1 Calculation Obtain the session key SK and use the key SK to verify the message. With Receiving Messages To verify if they match, the signature is then verified again using the ML-DSA and SLH-DSA algorithms. and and calculate Then send to user EE2 User EE2 uses key SK to verify the message. The consistent message indicates that the verification is complete and the two-way authentication is finished.

[0055] The advantages of this method are:

[0056] 1. A digital identity certificate based on the post-quantum cryptographic algorithms SLH-DSA and ML-DSA is introduced, issued by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) to communication users. This identity certificate maintains high-efficiency signature verification performance while possessing excellent resistance to quantum attacks, enhancing the long-term security and adaptability of the system. By using the post-quantum signature algorithms SLH-DSA and ML-DSA to generate the digital identity certificate, it effectively resists the potential threats posed by quantum computing, effectively overcoming the bottlenecks of traditional digital certificates in terms of security and verification efficiency, and is suitable for high-security communication scenarios in future quantum computing environments.

[0057] 2. Lightweight and scalable identity authentication and key negotiation mechanism. It seamlessly integrates with existing TLS 1.3 protocols, defining novel quantum-resistant signature algorithms and key exchange identifiers while maintaining compatibility with the standard X.509 certificate system, achieving reliable identity verification and efficient key negotiation between communicating parties. This mechanism integrates algorithms such as ML-KEM to construct shared keys, significantly reducing computational and communication overhead while providing quantum-resistant security capabilities. Certificate verification is based on lightweight ML-DSA operations, suitable for resource-constrained and high-security scenarios such as IoT, smart grids, vehicle-to-everything (V2X) systems, and edge computing. It effectively defends against man-in-the-middle attacks and replay attacks, improving authentication response speed and overall system security while ensuring forward security.

[0058] 3. Enhanced Certificate Management and Auditing Mechanism. An SLH-DSA-based signature log and Merkle tree structure are introduced into the certificate system to form a quantum-resistant transparent certificate log (PQ-CT), ensuring certificate integrity and traceability. This mechanism supports the rapid revocation of malicious or expired certificates and provides efficient auditing and verification capabilities, effectively improving system manageability and controllability. By combining tamper-proof log storage with lightweight verification algorithms, this solution achieves trusted oversight of the entire certificate lifecycle while ensuring identity authentication security.

[0059] 4. High authentication efficiency, suitable for resource-constrained environments. The more expensive SLH-DSA is only used for CA / log signing and low-frequency operations; for frequent online paths, only ML-DSA (signature / verification) and ML-KEM (decapsulation / encapsulation) are used, which can achieve efficient and fast authentication processes and meet the communication needs of low-latency, bandwidth-sensitive IoT, smart grid and other scenarios.

[0060] 5. Includes a certificate management mechanism to effectively enhance certificate integrity verification capabilities. Through the SLH-DSA signature log Merkle tree, the PQ-CT log is made tamper-proof, effectively enabling user certificate auditing and tracing, thus improving system security.

[0061] The technical solutions of the present invention are not limited to the specific embodiments described above. Any technical modifications made in accordance with the technical solutions of the present invention fall within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A quantum-resistant signature and X.509 format authentication method, characterized in that, include: S1. Certificate Authority (CA) generates and publishes globally common parameters; Specifically, it includes: S11. Obtain security parameters from the Certificate Authority (CA). and set a secure hash function. Message verification code function and key derivation functions ; S12. The Certificate Authority (CA) sets the first common parameter of the SLH-DSA algorithm and generates a random seed for private key derivation. Used for pseudo-random functions and address hashes used for tree nodes ; and calculate The first common parameter includes , and , , and These are the Winternitz parameters, the height of the Merkle hash tree, and the number of levels in the multi-level structure, respectively. The Certificate Authority (CA) determines these parameters based on... Construct a Merkle tree of the size and obtain the root node. ; S13. The Certificate Authority (CA) sets the second common parameter for the ML-DSA algorithm and calculates it. The second common parameter includes , respectively, represent module dimension, module, signature noise limit, signature norm limit, challenge domain limit, Hamming weight, and challenge number; S14. The Certificate Authority (CA) sets the third common parameter for the ML-KEM algorithm. The third common parameter includes... , representing the dimension of the ring, the rank of the module, the modulus, the error distribution parameter, and the compression parameter of the consistency noise, respectively; S15, Certificate Authority (CA) publishes system-wide public parameters, including ; S2, user EE1, and user EE2 each obtain identity certificates from the Certificate Authority (CA) through the Registration Authority (RA) using global public parameters. and identity certificate User EE obtains identity certificate Specifically: S21. User EE generates signature key pairs for ML-DSA and ML-KEM algorithms. and ; S22. User EE initiates a registration request to the registration authority RA. ,in, This represents the minimum registration attribute of user EE, containing user EE's real identity information. ; S23. The registration authority RA checks the registration list to confirm whether user EE has already registered. If so, the registration request is rejected; otherwise, proceed to S24. S24. The registration authority (RA) uses methods such as external database comparison to verify... Does it meet the requirements? ,like If the requirements are not met, the registration request will be rejected; otherwise, proceed to step S25. S25. The registration authority (RA) selects a random salt value. Calculate the commitment value of the registration information. The registration information and corresponding commitment value will be sent to the Certificate Authority (CA). S26. Certificate Authority (CA) assembles a certificate to be signed. ; S27. The Certificate Authority (CA) performs a compound signature on the certificate to be signed and adds the compound signature to the identity certificate. Then the identity certificate Send to user EE; S3, user EE1, and user EE2 use identity certificates and identity certificate Two-way authentication and session key negotiation are performed to establish a communication connection. Subsequently, users EE1 and EE2 use the session key to communicate.

2. The authentication method integrating quantum-resistant signatures and X.509 format according to claim 1, characterized in that, In S26, the certificate to be signed Represented as: After assembly, the certificate to be signed will be... Write the data into the PQ-CT constructed from the Merkle tree to form a verifiable Merkle tree structure, with the root node denoted as . Calculate the root signature , represented as: Log identifier Issuance timestamp And tree root signature Write the signature certificate timestamp to PQ-CT .

3. The authentication method integrating quantum-resistant signatures and X.509 format according to claim 1, characterized in that, In S27, the Certificate Authority (CA) uses both the SLH-DSA and ML-DSA algorithms to perform a compound signature on the certificate to be signed, as shown below: and and add the matching signature to the identity certificate. Then, the identity certificate Send the identity certificate to the user EE. Represented as: .

4. The authentication method integrating quantum-resistant signatures and X.509 format according to claim 1, characterized in that, S3 includes: S31. User EE1 selects a random number. Used as a session ID, and for the user's EE2 public key. Initiating the first PQ-KEM package to obtain The optional second PQ-KEM is obtained ; S32. User EE1 sends an authentication request message ClientHello to user EE2. The authentication request message ClientHello includes parameters. ; S33. After user EE2 receives the authentication request message ClientHello, ... and Unlocked and obtained and Then calculate the session key SK, and use the ML-DSA algorithm to sign the negotiated information. User EE2 sends a service response message ServerHello to user EE1, including parameters. The session key SK is represented as: One signature Represented as: ;EE2 uses session key SK to generate once And send it to user EE1; S34, User EE1 Calculation Obtain the session key SK and use the key SK to verify the message. With Receiving Messages To verify if they match, the signature is then verified again using the ML-DSA and SLH-DSA algorithms. and and calculate Then send to user EE2 User EE2 uses key SK to verify the message. The consistent message indicates that the verification is complete and the two-way authentication is finished.

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