Method for deriving partial signatures using partial verification
Through the local signature method, random scalars in a bilinear environment are used for anonymization, which solves the inefficiency problem of existing electronic signature technology in multi-data element verification and anonymity, and realizes efficient constant-size signature and anonymity verification , suitable for a variety of use cases.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202080083136.7
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2019-10-11
- Filing Date
- 2020-10-06
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-12
- Estimated Expiration
- 2040-10-06
AI Technical Summary
Existing electronic signature technology has inefficient problems in verification and anonymity, especially when processing multiple data elements, the relationship between data cannot be effectively hidden and verified, resulting in an increase in signature size and complexity, affecting its Application in practice.
A local signature method is proposed. By deriveing the local signature of a subset of the message set, only the messages in the subset of the message are verified. The signature consists of a constant number of elements, including a signature element, a first verification element and a second verification element. Anonymize random scalars in bilinear environments to ensure the untraceability of signatures.
Implement a constant-size signature system, improves signature efficiency and anonymity, allows verification of signature validity on a subset of messages without leaking other data, suitable for a variety of anonymous and non-anonymous use cases, and enhances security and performance.
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Figure CN114762289B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the general field of telecommunications and, more particularly, to the security of exchanges between communication devices using encryption techniques such as electronic signature techniques. Background Art
[0002] An electronic signature is a cryptographic tool that allows the authentication of any digital data, thus acting as the equivalent of a traditional handwritten signature. This technology is now ubiquitous in our daily lives, whether when browsing the Internet (since accessing any URL in https involves the use of an electronic signature) or during payments using a bank card. It also forms the true basis of the anonymous authentication mechanisms promoted by DAA (Direct Anonymous Authentication) and EPID (Enhanced Privacy Identity).
[0003] In most cases, it's not a single piece of data being authenticated, but rather a collection of n pieces of data, where n > 0, such as a person's name, date of birth, address, and so on. Existing electronic signature solutions can then be divided into two families: those that produce signatures of constant size, and others whose size depends on the value of n. The former is certainly preferred with regard to the size of the signature, but this constant cost hides a major flaw: the signature is valid only on the collection of signed data and can therefore only be verified by sending all the data that has been signed. It's certainly possible to hide these elements using techniques known as zero-knowledge proofs, but this only addresses the anonymity issue: these very expensive proofs have a complexity at least linear in the number of hidden elements.
[0004] Two recent schemes are able to have constant size both for signing and for verifying proofs.
[0005] Thus, the first known construction that satisfies this property is the one proposed by Camenisch et al. in their 2015 Asiacrypt paper, "Composable and Modular Anonymous Credentials: Definitions and Practical Constructions." However, by the authors' own admission, the most efficient implementation of this construction involves proofs of over a hundred elements, precluding its practical use. In practice, the verification proof here has a constant size, but this constant is very high.
[0006] More recently, Fuchsbauer et al. published "Structure-Preserving Signatures on Equivalence Classes and Constant-Size Anonymous Credentials" in the Journal of Cryptology in 2019, which presents a construction with the same properties. Proving the validity of a signature can be accomplished more efficiently than previous schemes, but the main problem here is that it's impossible to prove any relationship on the authenticated data without revealing it. For example, it's impossible to prove a person's legal age without revealing their date of birth, which goes against the spirit of anonymous authentication. Summary of the Invention
[0007] One of the objects of the present invention is to address the shortcomings / deficiencies of the prior art and / or to improve upon them.
[0008] To this end, the present invention proposes a method for deriving a local signature of a subset (I) of a message set ({m_1, ..., m_n}), where the subset of the message set is called a message subset. The local signature is intended to prove the validity of the signature of the message set for the messages in the message subset. The method is implemented by a local signature derivation entity and includes:
[0009] - receiving said message set ({m_1, ..., m_n}) and a signature of said message set, said signature comprising a signature element ((q, s)) of said message set,
[0010] - deriving a first authentication element (A) computed from messages in said set other than messages in said subset of messages, and
[0011] - deriving a second verification element (B) intended to prove that the first verification element is correctly formed, and sending a local signature specific to the message subset to the verification entity (12), the local signature comprising a constant number of elements, the constant number of elements comprising at least the elements of the signature of the message set, the first verification element (A) and the second verification element (B), the local signature intended to be verified only with messages from the message subset.
[0012] This approach describes a constant-size signature system that combines the best of both worlds. In practice, signature verification can be done very efficiently because the proof consists of a constant number of elements of reasonable size; it does require four elements of the partial signature. This system also allows verification of the validity of a signature on a subset of the message without requiring knowledge of, and therefore transmission of, the rest of the message. This scheme can be advantageously used in all use cases requiring authentication, whether anonymous or not.
[0013] Advantageously, the generation of the partial signature comprises anonymization of the partial signature, said anonymization comprising:
[0014] - anonymizing said signature element ((q, s)) by means of a random scalar, and
[0015] - Anonymizing the first authentication element and the second authentication element by means of one of the random scalars.
[0016] Due to this anonymization achieved through the judicious addition of random elements, the signature becomes completely untraceable. Consequently, a signature-deriving entity will present different partial signatures during two different authentications of the same subset of messages. In effect, using this approach, the set of unrevealed messages is completely randomly masked. It should be recognized that the untraceability property of signatures is an important security property.
[0017] In an exemplary embodiment, the method includes pre-generating a private key and an associated public key in a bilinear environment, the environment involving a first group G1, a second group G2, and a third group GT of prime order p, and a bilinear map e, the bilinear map e taking as input the values of the elements of the first group G1, namely g, and the values of the elements of the second group G2, namely h, and having values in the third group GT, the generating comprising:
[0018] - generating (n+1) random scalars (x, y_1, ..., y_n) by the signing entity, said random scalars forming the private key of the signing entity, and
[0019] -X=g^{x}, Y_i=g^{y_i} (for 1≤i=j≤n), Z_{i,j}=g^{y_i.y_j} (for 1≤i≠j≤n), and H_i=h^{y_i} (for 1≤i≤n) are calculated by the signing entity, and the elements X, Y_i, Z_{i,j} and H_i form the public key.
[0020] This exemplary embodiment describes how to calculate the private and public keys of a signing entity.
[0021] In an exemplary embodiment, the signature of a message set {1, ..., n} represented as m_1, ..., m_n includes: selecting a random element q from the second group G2 by the signing entity, and calculating s = q^{x+y_1.m_1+...+y_n.m_n}, then the signature is (q, s).
[0022] This exemplary embodiment describes how to calculate the signature of a message set. It includes two elements q and S.
[0023] In an exemplary embodiment, deriving a partial signature of a subset I of the message set {1, ..., n} includes:
[0024] - generating the first verification element A = Π_{j in {1, ..., n}\I}.Y_j^{m_j}, and
[0025] -Generate the second verification element B = Π_{i in I, j in {1, ..., n}\I}.Z_{i, j}^{m_j}, then the local signature is (q, s, A, B).
[0026] This exemplary embodiment precisely describes how to calculate or derive a partial signature for a message subset. The calculation of the partial signature involves the calculation of two elements, A and B. The first element, A, is used to calculate messages that are not part of the message subset. The second element, B, uses one subscript, i, to pass through the messages in set I associated with the message subset, while the other subscript, j, refers to messages that are not part of the message subset. The signature is formed from the signature of the message set, the first element, A, and the second element, B.
[0027] In another exemplary embodiment, the signature of the message set includes:
[0028] - two scalars r and t are chosen by the signing entity,
[0029] - Calculate q′=q^r,
[0030] - Calculate s′=s^rq^{rt},
[0031] - generating the first verification element A = g^t.Π_{j in{1, ..., n}\I}Y_j^{m_j}, and
[0032] -Generate the second verification element B = (Π_{i in I}Y_i)^t.Π_{i in I, j in{1,...,n}\I}Z_{i,j}^{m_j}, then the local signature is (q′, s′, A, B).
[0033] This other example describes how to calculate or derive an anonymous local signature using a random scalar, making the local signature completely untraceable.
[0034] The present invention also relates to a method for verifying a partial signature of a subset I of a message set ({m_1, ..., m_n}), wherein the subset of the message set is called a message subset. The partial signature is intended to prove the validity of the signature of the message set for the messages in the message subset. The method is implemented by a partial signature verification entity and comprises:
[0035] - receiving said subset of messages and a partial signature specific to said subset of messages, said partial signature comprising a constant number of elements including at least a signature element of said set of messages, a first verification element calculated from messages of said set other than messages of said subset of messages, and a second verification element intended to prove that the first element was correctly formed,
[0036] - verifying a first equation involving a message in the subset of messages, an element of a signature in the set of messages, and an element of the first verification element and a public key, and
[0037] - verifying a second equation involving said first signature verification element, said second signature verification element and an element of said public key.
[0038] This partial signature verification method is suitable for verifying the validity of partial signatures on a subset of messages. Whether it is a partial signature or an anonymous partial signature, partial signature verification is the same. Therefore, the same verification method is used regardless of whether it is a partial signature or an anonymous partial signature. This simplifies and optimizes the implementation of the signature scheme, providing better performance.
[0039] In an exemplary embodiment of a local signature verification method in which a private key and an associated public key have been generated for a signing entity in a bilinear environment, the environment involving a first group G1, a second group G2, and a third group GT of prime order p, and a bilinear map e having as input a value g of an element of the first group G1 and a value h of an element of the second group G2 and having a value in the third group GT, the generating comprises:
[0040] - (n+1) random scalars (x, y_1, ..., y_n) are generated by the signing entity, and
[0041] - The signing entity calculates X = g^{x}, Y_i = g^{y_i} (for 1≤i=j≤n), Z_{i,j} = g^{y_i.y_j} (for 1≤i≠j≤n), and H_i = h^{y_i} (for 1≤i≤n), where the elements X, Y_i, Z_{i,j} and H_i form the public key, and verification of the partial signature includes:
[0042] - verify the first equation: e(XA_{i in I}Y_i^{m_i},q) = e(g,s), and
[0043] - Verify the second equation: e(A, _{i in I}H_i) = e(B, h).
[0044] The different steps of the local signature verification method are specified here.
[0045] The present invention also relates to an entity for deriving a local signature, wherein the local signature is intended to derive a local signature of a subset I of a message set {m_1, ..., m_n} {1, ..., n}, where the subset I of the message set is called a message subset. The local signature is intended to prove the validity of the signature of the message set for the messages in the message subset. The local signature deriving entity includes:
[0046] - receiving means arranged to receive said set of messages {m_1, ..., m_n} and a signature (q, s) of said set of messages, said signature of said set of messages comprising a signature element of said set of messages, and
[0047] - means for deriving a first element, arranged to derive a first authentication element A calculated from messages of said set other than messages of said subset of messages, and
[0048] - A second element derivation and sending component, arranged to derive a second verification element B intended to prove that the first verification element is correctly formed, and to send a local signature specific to the message subset to a local signature verification entity, the local signature comprising a constant number of elements, the constant number of elements comprising at least the elements of the signature of the message set, the first verification element and the second element verification, the local signature intended to be verified only with messages in the message subset.
[0049] The present invention also relates to an entity for verifying a partial signature, which is intended to verify the partial signature of a subset I of a message set {m_1, ..., m_n}, where the subset of the message set is called a message subset. The partial signature is intended to prove the validity of the signature of the message set for the messages in the message subset. The partial signature verification entity includes:
[0050] - receiving means arranged to receive said subset of messages and a partial signature (q, s, A, B) specific to said subset of messages, said partial signature comprising a constant number of elements including at least an element of the signature of said set of messages, a first verification element A calculated from messages of said set other than the messages in said subset of messages, and a second verification element B intended to prove that said first verification element was correctly formed,
[0051] - a first verification means arranged to verify a first equation involving a message of said subset of messages, an element of a signature of said set of messages and an element of said first verification element and a public key, and
[0052] - second verification means arranged to verify a second equation involving said first verification element, said second verification element and elements of said public key.
[0053] The present invention also relates to a local signature derivation and verification system, comprising:
[0054] - a local signature generating entity as described above,
[0055] - A local signature verification entity as described above.
[0056] The invention also relates to the use of the local signature derivation and verification system as described above in an anonymous credential system.
[0057] The partial signature derivation method and the partial signature verification method are particularly suitable for anonymous credentials. The need to keep some of this data private is evident in the field of anonymous credentials and is addressed by the proposed scheme. The exemplary embodiment related to anonymous partial signatures can be directly used as an anonymous credential system, as it additionally satisfies the strongest untraceability property while offering better performance than other prior art solutions.
[0058] The invention also relates to a computer program on a data medium and loadable in a memory of a computer, comprising program code instructions intended to control the execution of the steps of the signature derivation method as described above, when the program is run on said computer.
[0059] The present invention also relates to a data medium in which the aforementioned program is recorded.
[0060] The invention also relates to a computer program on a data medium and loadable in a memory of a computer, comprising program code instructions intended to control the execution of the steps of the local signature verification method as described above, when the program is run on said computer.
[0061] The present invention also relates to a data medium in which the aforementioned program is recorded. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0062] Other features and advantages of the present invention will be better understood from the detailed description and accompanying drawings, in which:
[0063] - Figure 1 The steps of a signing method according to an exemplary embodiment are presented;
[0064] - Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of a local signature derivation entity capable of implementing the steps of a local signature derivation method for a message subset according to an exemplary embodiment;
[0065] - Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of a local signature verification entity capable of implementing the steps of a local signature verification method for a subset of messages according to an exemplary embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0066] Now about Figure 1 The steps of a partial verification signature method according to the first exemplary embodiment are described.
[0067] Note that the usual cryptographic notation is used here, where:
[0068] - "x_i" means "x subscript i", that is, "x i ”;
[0069] - "g^x" means "g to the power of x", that is, "g x ”,
[0070] - when many index factors are involved, the product is shown by a dot "." or by the classical symbol π (capital pi),
[0071] - When a number of index factors are involved, addition is usually shown by the symbol "+" or by the symbol Σ (capital sigma).
[0072] The signature scheme described here operates in a bilinear environment involving three groups of prime order p, typically denoted G1, G2, and GT, and a bilinear map e, called a "bilinear coupling," which takes as input elements of group G1 and elements of group G2 and has values in group GT. This type of environment has become a classic in cryptography and can be implemented very efficiently. It should be noted that the roles of G1 and G2 are completely interchangeable.
[0073] The signature scheme is based on a system that includes several entities:
[0074] - a signing entity 10. The signing entity 10 is a computer device comprising code instructions for implementing those of the steps of the signature derivation method implemented by the signing entity,
[0075] - a local signature derivation entity 11. The signature derivation entity 11 is a computer device comprising code instructions for implementing those of the steps of the signature derivation method implemented by the local signature derivation entity 11,
[0076] A local signature verification entity 12 . The local signature verification entity 12 is a computer device comprising code instructions for implementing those of the steps of the signature derivation method implemented by the local signature verification entity 12 .
[0077] It should be noted that the same entity can combine several roles. For example, a signing entity can also act as a local signature derivation entity. Similarly, a signing entity may also need to act as a local signature verification entity.
[0078] As a reminder, the bilinear coupling e is a function that verifies the following properties, among others:
[0079] e(g^a, h^b)=e(g, h)^(ab)
[0080] e(g^a,q)=e(g,q)^a
[0081] In the following, n refers to the maximum amount of data that can be signed simultaneously. In common parlance, this is referred to as a message rather than data. Therefore, a set of messages {1, …, n} to be signed, denoted as {m_1, …, m_n}, is available. For example, for an individual, such a message might be a name, address, date of birth, and so on.
[0082] The signature scheme described here allows very efficient verification of the validity of a signature on any subset of messages.
[0083] In an initial key generation step E10, the signing entity 10 generates a pair of private / public keys Ks / Kp for the signature scheme. It should be noted that in another exemplary embodiment, the key generation can be implemented by a dedicated entity different from the signing entity 10, and the keys (particularly the private key) can then be sent to the signing entity 10 in a secure manner according to known methods not presented here.
[0084] Let g (respectively h) be a random element of group G1 (respectively group G2), the signing entity controls the generation of (n+1) random integers (x, y_1, ..., y_n) less than p, and construct the following elements:
[0085] X=g^{x},
[0086] Y_i=g^{y_i}, for 1<=i<=n,
[0087] Z_{i, j}=g^{y_i.y_j}, for 1<=i≠j<=n,
[0088] H_i=h^{y_i}, for 1<=I<=n
[0089] The signer's private key Ks in the signature system consists of a random integer (x, y_1, ..., y_n).
[0090] The public key Kp is formed by the elements X, Y_i, Z_{i,j} and H_i.
[0091] therefore:
[0092] Ks = (x, y_1, ..., y_n), and
[0093] Kp=(X, Y_i, Z_{i, j}, H_i)
[0094] Conventionally, the public key Kp is then published here by the signing entity 10 .
[0095] In a second signing step E11, the signing entity 10 signs the n messages m_1, ..., m_n with the help of its private key Ks. To this end, the signing entity 10 selects a random element q from the group G2 and calculates:
[0096] s=q^{x+y_1.m_1+...+y_n.m_n}
[0097] Then the signature of the set of n messages is (q, s).
[0098] It should be noted that the signing entity 10 can also use this same key pair to sign messages of size n', where n'<n, that is, without regenerating the key pair. In this case, the messages of size n' to be signed are completed with '0' until a message of size n is obtained, which the signing entity 10 then signs using its key pair Ks / Kp. At the end of the signing step E11, the signing entity 10 sends the signature (q, s) of the set of n messages and the set {m_1, ..., m_n} to the local signature derivation entity 11.
[0099] In the local signature derivation step E12, the local signature derivation entity 11 receives the signature (q, s) on the message set {m_1,…, m_n} in the receiving sub-step E12, wherein the local signature derivation step E12 is implemented to prove the validity of the signature (q, s) on the message subset m_i, where i belongs to the subset I of the set {1,…, n}.
[0100] The local signature derivation entity 11 calculates or derives, in a step E13 of deriving the first element, a first verification element A that aggregates all messages m_j whose index j is in {1, ..., n} but not in the subset I. A suitable notation is {1, ..., n}\I. The first verification element A is therefore related in some way to messages that are not of interest to the signing entity 10, more specifically to messages that are not part of those for which it is desired to prove the validity of the signature (q, s). Therefore, the local signature derivation entity 11 calculates:
[0101] A=Π_{j in{1,...,n}\I}Y_j^{m_j}
[0102] At this stage, the local signature is then (q, s, A). This signature is specific to a message m_i, where i is in the set I, that is, it is intended to be used to sign (q, s) based on n messages and to verify the validity of the signature of this subset of messages m_i using a unique message in the message subset.
[0103] In this exemplary embodiment, in the second element derivation and sending step E14, the local signature derivation entity 11 calculates or derives a second verification element B. This second verification element B is intended to prove that the first verification element A is valid, that is to say correctly formed. Intuitively, the second verification element B allows to show that the first verification element A calculated from the hidden message is correctly formed, that is to say, for i in I, it cannot be used to spoof the value of the message m_i presented to the local signature verification entity 12. Therefore, the local signature derivation entity 11 calculates:
[0104] B=Π_{i in I,j in{1,...,n}\I}Z_{i,j}^{m_j}
[0105] The partial signature is then (q, s, A, B).The partial signature (q, s, A, B) and the message subset m_i (where i is in I) are then sent to the partial signature verification entity 12 at the end of step E14.
[0106] Thus, regardless of the number of messages in the message subset, and regardless of the number of messages in the message set, the partial signature has a constant size and comprises a small number of elements, in this case four. It should also be noted that only the messages of the message subset {m_i} are sent where i is in I. Thus, the verifying entity 12 does not need to know the message set {m_1, ..., m_n} or the messages that will be linked to the messages of the message subset by construction, such as age, date of birth.
[0107] In a subsequent receiving step E15 , the local signature verification entity 12 receives from the signature derivation entity 11 the message subset {m_i} (where i is in I) and the local signature (q, s, A, B).
[0108] The local signature verification entity 12 verifies the first equation in a first verification sub-step E16:
[0109] e(XAΠ_{i in I}Y_i^{m_i}, q)=e(g, s), (1)
[0110] The local signature verification entity 12 verifies in a second step E17 of verifying the second equation:
[0111] e(A, Π_{i in I}H_i)=e(B, h), (2)
[0112] If these two equality properties or equations are satisfied, then the partial signature associated with the message subset m_i where i is in I is valid. Otherwise, it is considered invalid.
[0113] In fact, when developing the first equation (1) using the definition of the first verification element A defined during the step E13 of deriving the first element:
[0114] =e(X.Π_{i in I}Y_i^{m_i}.Π_{j in{1,...,n}\I}Y_j^{m_j}, q)
[0115] was obtained.
[0116] Using the definitions of X and Y:
[0117] =e(g^x.Π_{i in I}(g^{y_i})^{m_i}.Π_{j in{1,...,n}\I}(g^{y_j})^{m_j},q)
[0118] was obtained.
[0119] Using the rule (g^a)^b=g^{ab} and the fact that the product of the Y_j^{m_j} of the set {1, ..., n} whose index j belongs to the removed set I is combined with the Y_i^{m_i} whose index i is in I:
[0120] =e(g^{x+∑_{i in{1,...,n}}y_i.m_i}, q)
[0121] was obtained.
[0122] Using the coupled property: e(g^a,q)=e(g,q)^a:
[0123] =e(g,q)^{x+∑_{i in[1,n]}y_i.m_i}
[0124] was obtained.
[0125] Use the coupling property that allows reintroduction of exponentials on selected terms:
[0126] =e(g,q^{x+∑_{i in{1,...,n}}y_i.m_i})
[0127] was obtained.
[0128] Using the definition of s specified in the key generation phase P10, this term becomes:
[0129] =e(g,s)
[0130] Therefore, e(X.Π_{i in I}Y_i^{m_i}A, q)=e(g, s).
[0131] This first verification equation may be sufficient to verify the validity of the partial signature associated with the message m_i with the index i in I. However, there is no indication that the first verification element A is correctly generated. This is why the partial signature verification entity 12 verifies the second equation in a second verification step E16. When developing the second equation (2) using the definition of the first verification element A:
[0132] =e(Π_{j in{1,...,n}\I}Y_j^{m_j}, Π_{i in I}H_i)
[0133] was obtained.
[0134] Using the definitions of Y and H:
[0135] =e(Π_{j in{1,...,n}\I}g^{y_j}^{m_j}, Π_{i in I}h^{y_i})
[0136] was obtained.
[0137] Use the rule (g^a)^b=g^{ab}:
[0138] =e(g^{∑_{j in{1,...,n}\I}y_j.m_j},h^∑_{i in I}y_i)
[0139] was obtained.
[0140] Using the coupled property e(g^a, h^b)=e(g, h)^(ab):
[0141] =e(g,h)^((∑_{j in{1,...,n}\I}y_j.m_j).(∑_{i in I}y_i))
[0142] =e(g,h)^(∑_{i in I,jin{1,...,n}\I}y_j.m_j.y_i)
[0143] was obtained.
[0144] This term is equal to e(B, h). In fact, using the definition of the second verification elements B and Z:
[0145] e(B,h)=e(Π_{i in I,j in{1,...,n}\I}(g^{y_i.y_j})^m_j,h)
[0146] was obtained.
[0147] Using the rules (g^a)^b=g^(ab) and g^ag^b=g^{a+b}:
[0148] e(B,h)=e(g^{∑_{i in I,j in{1,...,n}\I}(y_i.y_j.m_j)},h)
[0149] was obtained.
[0150] Using the coupled property e(g^a,h)=e(g,h)^a:
[0151] e(B, h)=e(g, h)^{∑_{i in I, j in{1,...,n}\I}(y_i.y_j.m_j)}
[0152] was obtained.
[0153] So: e(A, Π_{i in I}H_i)=e(B, h)
[0154] was obtained.
[0155] This second equation is intended to ensure that the first verification element A is correctly formed, which groups all hidden messages (i.e., messages that are not part of the subset of messages to be signed). "Correctly formed" here means that the first verification element A cannot be used to spoof the value of the message m_i for i in i presented for verification.
[0156] In fact, by continuing to develop the second equation, the exponential of e(g,h) is:
[0157] ∑_{j in{1,...,n}\I}y_j.m_j).(∑_{i in I}y_i)=
[0158] ∑_{i in I, j in{1,...,n}\I}y_j.m_j.y_i
[0159] This yields a sum of monomials of the form y_j.m_j.y_i. This sum of monomials is represented by the polynomial P. Observe that the subscripts i and j appearing in the same monomial are different. In fact, the first sum involves messages indexed by j that are not in I, while the second sum involves messages indexed by i that are in I. Therefore, using this equation, it is guaranteed that the monomial y_j.m_j.y_i where i = j will never be satisfied, which would give the square m_j.y^2_j.
[0160] If the local signature derivation entity 11 has cheated, that is, if in the first verification element A (more specifically in the product), it has added the element Y_i^r=g^(r.y_i), whose subscript i will be in I, then the exponent will have the following form:
[0161] (r.y_i+∑_{j in{1,...,n}\I}y_j.m_j).(∑_{i in I}y_i)
[0162] Then, a squared monomial of the form r.y_i^2 will appear in the polynomial P that did not appear before.
[0163] It is then possible to distinguish the case where the first verification element A is correctly formed from the erroneous first element A. In fact, the second verification element B is exactly g^P. By verifying the second equation (2), the local signature derivation entity 12 is forced to reconstruct the polynomial P. The public key includes the elements Z_{i, j} = g^(y_i, y_j), where i≠j. Therefore, these elements allow the reconstruction of all monomials of the form y_j.m_j.y_i. In the case where the local signature derivation entity 11 has been deceived, the polynomial P contains square monomials of the form ry^2_i, which cannot be reconstructed from the elements Z_{i, j} of the public key, which only exist under the condition i≠j. Therefore, if the local signature derivation entity 11 is honest, all monomials required to reconstruct the polynomial P are provided in the public key. On the contrary, if the local signature derivation entity 11 has been deceived, the local signature verification entity 12 cannot reconstruct the polynomial P.
[0164] At the end of the second partial signature verification step E17 , the verification entity 12 sends the result to any entity that requested this verification.
[0165] In a second exemplary embodiment of a method for partially verifying a signature, the first signature derivation step E13 and the second signature derivation step E14 are slightly modified so as to make the Figure 1The described signature scheme anonymizes. Indeed, with the previously described scheme, each time a local signature deriving entity uses its signature to authenticate itself, it presents the same signature, which allows it to be traced.
[0166] Therefore, in an additional step E18 of generating scalars and calculating new elements of the signature, the local signature derivation entity 11 generates two scalars r and t, this additional step E18 being Figure 1 It is represented by a dotted line and is implemented with the purpose of proving the validity of the signatures (q, s) of m messages on a subset of messages m_i, where i is in I. Then, the local signature derivation entity 11 calculates:
[0167] q′=q^r,
[0168] s′=s^rq^{rt}, (q′, s′) forms a new element of the signature. Thus, the elements (q, s) of the signature are anonymized by means of a random scalar.
[0169] In this second exemplary embodiment, in the step E13 of deriving the first authentication element, the local signature deriving entity 11 calculates the first authentication element A as follows:
[0170] A=(g^t).(Π_{j in{1,...,n}\I}Y_j^{m_j})
[0171] In the step E14 of deriving the second element, the local signature derivation entity 11 calculates the second verification element B as follows:
[0172] B=(Π_{i in I}Y_i)^t.(Π_{i in I,j in{1,...n}\I}Z_{i,j}^{m_j})
[0173] Therefore, both elements of the computation, A and B, depend on one of the random scalars. Therefore, they are also anonymized.
[0174] The new local signature is then denoted as (q′, s′, A, B).
[0175] At the end of the step E14 of deriving the second element, the local signature deriving entity 11 sends the new local signature (q′, s′, A, B) and the message m_i, where i is in I, to the verifying entity 12 .
[0176] Therefore, each time the local signature deriving entity 11 derives a local signature on the same subset of messages for the purpose of authenticating itself, the derived local signature is different. Therefore, the local signature is anonymous and it is therefore impossible to track the local signature deriving entity 11 during its different authentication periods.
[0177] It should be noted that the new partial signature or anonymous partial signature (q', s', A, B) is verified by the signature verification entity 12 in the same manner as in the first exemplary embodiment, that is, it is processed in the same manner as the non-anonymous partial signature. More specifically, the verification takes as input the message subset {m_i} (where i is in I), the anonymous partial signature (q', s', A, B), and verifies the same two equations (1) and (2) described previously.
[0178] Therefore, the implementation of local signature derivation is facilitated, since the verification of the local signature is implemented in the same way depending on whether the local signature is anonymous or not.
[0179] This embodiment is particularly suitable for anonymous certificates or credentials. An anonymous certificate allows the proof of property or rights associated with its holder without revealing its identity. It protects the private life of the holder of an anonymous credential by providing the properties of anonymity and non-traceability. It takes the form of cryptographic data: a partial signature, which can be presented by its holder (here, the partial signature derivation entity 11) to an organization (here, the partial signature verification entity 12) to prove attributes related to its identity.
[0180] Now about Figure 2 A local signature derivation entity according to an exemplary embodiment is described.
[0181] The local signature derivation entity 11 is a piece of computing equipment, such as a computer.
[0182] The local signature derivation entity 11 includes:
[0183] - a processing unit or processor 30 or CPU (Central Processing Unit), intended to load instructions into a memory in order to execute them and thus perform operations;
[0184] a set of memories, including a volatile memory 31 or RAM (Random Access Memory) for executing code instructions, storing variables, etc., and a storage memory 32 of the EEPROM (Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory) type. In particular, the storage memory 32 is arranged to store a local signature derivation software module comprising code instructions for implementing the steps of the local signature derivation method as previously described and implemented by the local signature derivation entity 11. The storage memory 32 is also arranged to store the public key Kp of the signature scheme in a secure area.
[0185] The local signature derivation entity 11 further includes:
[0186] - a receiving module 33, arranged to receive a message set {m_1, ..., m_n} and a signature of said message set. The signature of said message set comprises a signature element of said message set, denoted as (q, s). The receiving module 33 is arranged to implement step E12 of the local signature derivation method,
[0187] - means 34 for deriving a first authentication element, arranged to derive a first authentication element A calculated from the messages of the set other than the messages of the subset of messages,
[0188] a module 35 for deriving and sending a second verification element, arranged to derive a second verification element B and to send a partial signature specific to the subset of messages to the local signature verification entity, wherein the second verification element B is intended to prove that the first verification element A is correctly formed, said partial signature comprising a constant number of elements comprising at least the elements of the signature of the set of messages, the first verification element A and the second verification element B. The partial signature is intended to be verified only using messages from said subset of messages. The deriving and sending module 34 is arranged to implement steps E13 and E14 of the partial signature derivation method as previously described.
[0189] The receiving module 33 of the first verification element, the derivation module 34 and the derivation module 35 of the second verification and sending element are preferably software modules comprising software instructions for implementing those steps of the local signature derivation method implemented by the local signature derivation entity.
[0190] In a second exemplary embodiment, the local signature derivation entity 11 comprises a module for deriving an anonymous local signature ( Figure 2 (not shown in ). This module is arranged to generate random scalars and compute new elements of the signature. Thus, the module generates two scalars r and t, and then computes:
[0191] q′=q^r,
[0192] s′=s^rq^{rt}, (q′, s′) forms a new element of the signature.
[0193] In this exemplary embodiment, the module 34 for deriving the first authentication element is arranged to calculate the first element A as follows:
[0194] A=g^t.Π_{j in{1,...,n}\I}Y_j^{m_j}.
[0195] The module 35 for deriving the second authentication and sending element is arranged to calculate the second authentication element B as follows:
[0196] B=(Π_{i in I}Y_i)^t.Π_{i in I, j in{1,...n}\I}Z_{i, j}^{m_j}.
[0197] Thus, the first authentication element A and the second authentication element B are anonymized by means of one of the random scalars.
[0198] The new partial signature is denoted (q′, s′, A, B). In this exemplary embodiment, the module 35 for deriving the second verification and sending element is further arranged to send the new partial signature (q′, s′, A, B) to the partial signature verification entity 12 .
[0199] Therefore, the present invention also relates to:
[0200] - a computer program comprising instructions for implementing the steps of the local signature derivation method as described above, and when the program is executed by a processor of the local signature derivation device, the instructions are implemented by the local signature derivation entity,
[0201] - A readable recording medium having recorded thereon the previously described computer program.
[0202] A local signature verification entity according to an exemplary embodiment will now be described with respect to FIG. 4 .
[0203] The local signature verification entity 12 is a computer device, such as a computer.
[0204] The local signature verification entity 12 includes:
[0205] - a processing unit or processor 40 or CPU intended to load instructions into a memory in order to execute them, in order to perform operations;
[0206] a set of memories, including a volatile memory 41 or RAM for executing code instructions, storing variables, etc., and a storage memory 42 of the EEPROM type. In particular, the storage memory 42 is arranged to store a local signature verification software module comprising code instructions for implementing the steps of the local signature derivation method as described above and implemented by the local signature verification entity 12. The storage memory 42 is also arranged to store the public key Kp of the signature scheme.
[0207] The local signature verification entity 11 also includes:
[0208] - a receiving module 43 arranged to receive the message subset and the partial signature (q, s, A, B) of the partial signature derivation entity 11. The receiving module 43 is arranged to implement the receiving step E15 of the partial signature derivation method as described above,
[0209] a first verification module 44 arranged to verify a first equation involving the messages of the subset of messages, the elements of the signature of the set of messages, the first verification element and the elements of the public key. The first verification module 44 is arranged to implement step E16 of verifying the first equation of the local signature derivation method as described above, and
[0210] A second verification module 45 arranged to verify a second equation involving the first partial signature verification element, the second partial signature verification element and an element of the public key. The second verification module 45 is arranged to implement a step E17 of verifying the second equation of the partial signature derivation method as previously described.
[0211] The receiving module 43 , the first verification module 44 and the second verification module 45 are preferably software modules comprising software instructions for implementing the steps of the local signature derivation method previously described and implemented by the local signature verification entity 12 .
[0212] Therefore, the present invention also relates to:
[0213] - a computer program comprising instructions for implementing the steps of the local signature derivation method as described above, and which instructions are implemented by the local signature verification entity 12 when the program is run by a processor of the local signature verification device,
[0214] - A readable recording medium having recorded thereon the previously described computer program.
[0215] The present invention also relates to a local signature derivation and verification system, comprising:
[0216] - a local signature derivation entity 11 as previously described, and
[0217] - A local signature verification entity 12 as previously described.
Claims
1. A method for deriving a partial signature of a subset I of a message set {1, ..., n} represented as {m_1, ..., m_n}, wherein the subset of the message set is called a message subset, and the partial signature is intended to prove the validity of the signature of the message set for the messages in the message subset, the method being implemented by an entity for deriving partial signatures, and the method comprising: - receiving the message set {m_1, ..., m_n} and the signature of the message set, the signature comprising the signature elements q and s of the message set, - deriving a first authentication element, namely A, computed from messages in said set other than messages in said subset of messages, and - deriving a second verification element, namely B, intended to prove that the first verification element is correctly formed, and sending a local signature specific to the message subset to the verification entity, the local signature comprising a constant number of elements, the constant number of elements comprising at least the elements of the signature of the message set, the first verification element A and the second verification element B, the local signature being intended to be verified only with messages in the message subset.
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The generation of the partial signature includes anonymization of the partial signature, and the anonymization includes: - anonymizing said signature element by means of a random scalar, and - Anonymizing the first authentication element and the second authentication element by means of one of the random scalars.
3. The method according to claim 1, comprising: Pre-generating a private key and an associated public key in a bilinear environment involving a first group, a second group, and a third group of prime order, and a bilinear map, namely, e, which takes as input a value of an element of the first group, namely, g, and a value of an element of the second group, namely, h, and has a value in the third group, the generating comprising: - generating (n+1) random scalars (x, y_1, ..., y_n) by a signing entity, said random scalars forming said private key of said signing entity, and -The signing entity calculates X=g^{x}, Y_i=g^{y_i} for 1≤i=j≤n, Z_{i,j}=g^{y_i.y_j} for 1≤i≠j≤n, and H_i=h^{y_i} for 1≤i≤n, and the elements X, Y_i, Z_{i,j} and H_i form the public key, where i and j are subscripts.
4. The method according to claim 3, wherein: A message set represented as m_1, ..., m_n And calculate s=q^{x+y_1.m_1+…+y_n.m_n}, then the signature is (q,s).
5. The method according to claim 3 or 4, wherein: Deriving the local signature of a subset I of the message set {1, ..., n} includes: - Generate the first verification element A = Π_{j in{1, ..., n}\I}.Y_j^{m_j}, and -Generate the second verification element B = Π_{iin I,j in{1,…,n}\I}.Z_{i,j}^{m_j}, then the local signature is (q,s,A,B).
6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, wherein: The signature of the message set includes: - two scalars r and t are chosen by the signing entity, - Calculate q' = q^r, - Calculate s' = s^rq^{rt}, - Generate the first verification element A = g^t.Π_{j in{1,…,n}\I}Y_j^{m_j}, and -Generate the second verification element B = (Π_{iin I}Y_i)^t.Π_{iin I,j in{1,…,n}\I}Z_{i,j}^{m_j}, then the local signature is (q',s',A,B).
7. A method for verifying a partial signature of a subset of a message set, i.e., {m_1, ..., m_n}, i.e., I, wherein the subset of the message set is called a message subset, and the partial signature is intended to prove the validity of the signature of the message set for the messages in the message subset, the method being implemented by an entity for verifying the partial signature, and the method comprising: - receiving said subset of messages and a local signature specific to said subset of messages, namely (q,s,A,B), said local signature comprising a constant number of elements, said constant number of elements comprising at least the signature elements q and s of said set of messages, a first verification element, namely A, calculated from messages of said set other than those in said subset of messages, and a second verification element, namely B, intended to prove that the first element was correctly formed, - verifying a first equation involving a message in said subset of messages, an element of a signature of said set of messages and an element of said first verification element and a public key, and - verifying a second equation involving said first verification element, said second verification element and an element of said public key.
8. The method according to claim 7, wherein: A private key and an associated public key have been generated for a signing entity in a bilinear environment involving a first group, a second group, and a third group of prime orders, and a bilinear map, namely e, which takes as input a value of an element of the first group, namely g, and a value of an element of the second group, namely h, and has a value in the third group, the generating comprising: - (n+1) random scalars (x, y_1, ..., y_n) are generated by the signing entity, and - The signing entity calculates X = g^{x}, Y_i = g^{y_i} for 1≤i=j≤n, Z_{i,j} = g^{y_i.y_j} for 1≤i≠j≤n, and H_i = h^{y_i} for 1≤i≤n, the elements X, Y_i, Z_{i,j} and H_i forming the public key, where i and j are subscripts, and the verification of the partial signature includes: - verify the first equation: e(XAΠ_{iin I}Y_i^{m_i},q) = e(g,s), and -Verify the second equation: e(A,Π_{iin I}H_i)=e(B,h).
9. An entity for deriving a local signature, wherein the local signature is intended to derive a local signature of a subset of a message set, wherein the subset of the message set is called a message subset, and the local signature is intended to prove the validity of the signature of the message set for the messages in the message subset, wherein the entity for deriving the local signature comprises: - receiving means arranged to receive said message set and a signature of said message set, said signature of said message set comprising a signature element of said message set, and - means for deriving a first element, arranged to derive a first verification element computed from messages in said set other than messages in said subset of messages, and - A second element export and sending component, arranged to export a second verification element intended to prove that the first verification element is correctly formed, and to send a local signature specific to the message subset to an entity used to verify the local signature, the local signature comprising a constant number of elements, the constant number of elements comprising at least elements of the signature of the message set, the first verification element and the second verification element, the local signature being intended to be verified only with messages in the message subset.
10. An entity for verifying a partial signature, intended to verify a partial signature of a subset of a message set, the subset of the message set being called a message subset, the partial signature being intended to prove the validity of the signature of the message set for messages in the message subset, the entity for verifying the partial signature comprising: - receiving means arranged to receive said subset of messages and a local signature specific to said subset of messages, said local signature comprising a constant number of elements including at least an element of the signature of said set of messages, a first verification element calculated from messages of said set other than those in said subset of messages, and a second verification element intended to prove that said first verification element is correctly formed, - a first verification means arranged to verify a first equation involving a message in said subset of messages, an element of a signature of said set of messages and an element of said first verification element and a public key, and - second verification means arranged to verify a second equation involving said first verification element, said second verification element and elements of said public key.
11. A local signature derivation and verification system, comprising: - an entity for deriving a partial signature according to claim 9, - Entity for verifying a partial signature according to claim 10.
12. Use of the local signature derivation and verification system according to claim 11 in an anonymous credential system.
13. A data medium having recorded therein a program loadable in a memory of a computer, the program comprising program code instructions, which are intended to control the execution of the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6 when the program is run on the computer.
14. A data medium having recorded thereon a program loadable in a memory of a computer, the program comprising program code instructions, which are intended to control the execution of the steps of the method according to any one of claims 7 or 8 when the program is run on the computer.
