A dynamic revocation strategy for cloud security user attributes
By designing a dynamic revocation strategy for cloud security user attributes in a cloud computing environment, using global public parameters and update key mechanisms, the problems of poor scalability and difficulty in attribute revocation are solved, and efficient user attribute management and security enhancement are achieved .
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202210223461.X
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2022-03-07
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-12
- Estimated Expiration
- 2042-03-07
AI Technical Summary
CP-ABE has poor scalability and difficulty in attribute revocation in cloud computing environments, especially in the case of a large number of users and attribute changes, which affect the security and access control of data resources.
A cloud security user attribute dynamic revocation strategy was designed, and global public parameters were generated by semi-trusted third parties, distributed to attribute authorization agencies and data users, and user attribute revocation was realized through UpkeyGen, UpTKuid and UpCT algorithms, and the attribute version key was updated. and user version keys, outsourcing decryption calculations for improved efficiency.
Dynamic user attribute revocation and user revocation are realized, security is enhanced, conspiracy attacks are resisted, large attribute domains are supported, and has good scalability and computing efficiency advantages.
Smart Images

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Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the field of cloud security technology, and in particular to a cloud security user attribute dynamic revocation strategy. Background Art
[0002] With the development of cloud computing in scale and intensification, cloud security issues have become increasingly prominent. Access control is the core technology of cloud security. In cloud computing environments, users lose control of data resources placed in cloud storage servers. There is a lack of trust between users and cloud service providers. Cloud service providers may arbitrarily leak users' sensitive data to competitors to obtain improper benefits. In the CP-ABE scheme, ciphertexts are related to access structures, while keys are related to attributes. Ciphertexts can only be decrypted when the user's attributes meet the attributes of the embedded access structure. In KP-ABE, this relationship is exactly the opposite, that is, ciphertexts are related to attributes, while keys are related to access structure attributes. Compared with KP-ABE, CP-ABE is more suitable for access control in large-scale cloud computing environments and plays an important role in protecting data resources in the cloud. However, CP-ABE is mostly based on small attribute domains in practical applications. The attribute domain needs to be determined when the system is established. Since a large number of user attributes change during the operation of the system, the scalability of the scheme is seriously affected; another challenge of CP-ABE in the application process is attribute revocation. Since there are a large number of users in the cloud storage system, some user-related attributes may change during the operation of the system, or some user private keys may be leaked. Each attribute in CP-ABE may be shared by different users, which means that revoking any attribute may affect other users. For this reason, we provide a cloud security user attribute dynamic revocation strategy. Summary of the invention
[0003] In view of the deficiencies in the prior art, the present invention provides a cloud security user attribute dynamic revocation strategy, which solves the problems raised in the above background technology.
[0004] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention is implemented through the following technical solutions: a cloud security user attribute dynamic revocation strategy, comprising the following steps:
[0005] S1. Build system model;
[0006] S2, system initialization;
[0007] S3, attribute private key generation;
[0008] S4, data encryption;
[0009] S5. Data decryption;
[0010] S6, user attribute revocation;
[0011] S7. User revocation.
[0012] Preferably, the system model of step S1 is mainly composed of six entities: a semi-trusted third party SM, k attribute authorization agencies AA, a cloud storage server CSS, a proxy decryption server PDS, a data owner DO and a data user DU. The semi-trusted third party SM calls the system initialization algorithm to generate global public parameters and distributes GP to the attribute authorization agency AA, the data owner DO and the data user DU.
[0013] Preferably, the step S2 includes three algorithms of GlobaSetup, UserSetup and AASetup.
[0014] Preferably, in step S3, KeyGen(GP,S uid,aid ,PK uid ,SK aid ,PK att )→(Sk uid,aid )AA runs the algorithm.
[0015] Preferably, in step S4, Encrypt(GP, PKaid, PKatt, m, M, CT:DO runs the algorithm.
[0016] Preferably, the step S4 includes three algorithms: ProxyDec, UserVerandDec and Decrypt.
[0017] Preferably, in step S6, the user attribute revocation is the revocation of certain attributes in the user attribute set. After the user attribute revocation operation occurs, the user loses the access right to the attribute, but does not affect the permissions of other attributes of the user. At the same time, it does not affect the access rights of other users who have the attribute but have not been revoked to the attribute, and can be restored through UpkeyGen, UpTK uid,aid and UpCT three algorithms to realize user attribute revocation.
[0018] Preferably, in step S7, when some users in the system are judged as "illegal users" or exit the system for other reasons, all access rights of the users in the system need to be revoked to ensure the security of the ciphertext.
[0019] The present invention provides a cloud security user attribute dynamic revocation strategy, which has the following beneficial effects:
[0020] The present invention realizes user attribute revocation by updating attribute version keys, and realizes user revocation by updating user version keys; in order to improve system efficiency, complex decryption calculations are outsourced to cloud service providers; the present invention realizes dynamic user attribute revocation and user revocation, and can effectively resist collusion attacks, enhance the security of the solution, and has certain advantages in terms of function and computing efficiency; the present invention supports large attribute domains, has good scalability, and can be more flexibly applied to actual environments. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0021] A cloud security user attribute dynamic revocation strategy includes the following steps:
[0022] S1. Build system model;
[0023] S2, system initialization;
[0024] S3, attribute private key generation;
[0025] S4, data encryption;
[0026] S5. Data decryption;
[0027] S6, user attribute revocation;
[0028] S7. User revocation.
[0029] Further preferably, the system model of step S1 is mainly composed of six entities: a semi-trusted third party SM, k attribute authorization agencies AA, a cloud storage server CSS, a proxy decryption server PDS, a data owner DO and a data user DU. The semi-trusted third party SM calls the system initialization algorithm to generate global public parameters and distributes GP to the attribute authorization agency AA, the data owner DO and the data user DU.
[0030] Further preferably, the step S2 includes three algorithms of GlobaSetup, UserSetup and AASetup;
[0031] GlobalSetup(λ)→GP:SM runs the algorithm, inputs the security parameter λ, selects two multiplicative cyclic groups G and G whose order is prime number P T , and there exists a bilinear mapping e:G×G→G T , the system attribute domain is represented by S, the system attribute authorization agency set is represented by Auth, and the system user identity set is represented by U. For the problem of attribute revocation in a large attribute domain, three hash functions H, F and T are randomly selected, H: S → G to convert the attribute att i ∈S is mapped to G; F:U→G maps the user identity uid∈U to G; T:S→I Auth Map the attributes to AA, and finally output the global public parameter GP = (G,GT ,p,g,S,I Auth ,U,F,T);
[0032] UserSetup(uid,GP)→(PK uid ,SK uid ):DU runs the algorithm and selects a random number Calculate the public key And SK uid =Z uid Keep it secret as a private key;
[0033] AASetup(aid,GP)→(PK aid ,SK aid ,VK att ,PK att )AA runs the algorithm and selects two random numbers Set the attribute version VK for each attribute att att =v att , public attribute key Output attribute authority AA public key and the attribute authority AA private key SK aid =(α aid ,β aid ).
[0034] More preferably, the step S3 further comprises the following steps:
[0035] KeyGen(GP,S uid,aid ,PK uid ,SK aid ,PK att )→(Sk uid,aid )AA runs the algorithm and randomly selects Setting the User Version Key Output attribute private key SK uid,aid =(TK uid,aid ,L uid,aid ) and sent to CCS, where
[0036] More preferably, the step S4 further comprises the following steps:
[0037] Encrypt(GP, PKaid, PKatt, m, M, CT: DO runs the algorithm and defines a function x T x that maps the rows of the matrix M to specific AA, i.e., 1, 2, ..., l A. Then randomly select v = (s, v2, ...v n ) T , Two vectors, Calculating λ i =(M i v), ω i =(M i ·ω) and C0=m·e(g,g) s , where M i is the i-th row of the matrix M, and the parameter r is randomly selected x ∈Z p ,calculate Finally output the ciphertext
[0038] Further preferably, the step S4 includes three algorithms: ProxyDec, UserVerandDec and Decrypt;
[0039] ProxyDec(CT,TK uid,aid )→parCT: PDS runs the algorithm. If the user attributes satisfy the ciphertext access policy, the subscript set {i: ρ(i)∈S}, and satisfies Then there exists a constant {c i ∈Z p} i∈l Make Established, calculate the semi-decrypted ciphertext parCT;
[0040]
[0041] UserVerandDec(C 5,i , VK uid,aid ) / parCT→CT′CSS runs the algorithm and sends the verification ciphertext CT′ to DU;
[0042]
[0043] Decrypt(SK uid , CT′)→m: DU runs the algorithm and obtains the plaintext;
[0044]
[0045] Further preferably, in step S6, the user attribute revocation is the revocation of certain attributes in the user attribute set. After the user attribute revocation operation occurs, the user loses the access right to the attribute, but does not affect the rights of other attributes of the user, and does not affect the access right of other users who have the attribute but have not been revoked to the attribute; through UpkeyGen, UpTK uid,aid and UpCT 3 algorithms to achieve user attribute revocation;
[0046] AA runs the algorithm, when the user attribute att x (Corresponding attribute version ) is revoked, AA random calculation and Set a new property version The attribute public key for synchronous update is Calculate the key update key Update the key with ciphertext Sent to CCS, and the conversion key TK is completed on the CSP side uid,aid and ciphertext component C 5,x Update tasks;
[0047] UGo uid,aid (SK uid,aid ,UKK aid )→(TK′ uid,aid ):PDS runs the algorithm and updates the conversion key of users who have not revoked the attribute
[0048]
[0049] Update the associated att in the ciphertext x The ciphertext component The ciphertext is updated to
[0050]
[0051] Further preferably, in step S7, when some users in the system are judged as "illegal users" or exit the system for other reasons, all access rights of the users in the system need to be revoked to ensure the security of the ciphertext;
[0052] When user revocation occurs, AA only needs to update the user version key to complete the user revocation. CCS runs the UserVerandDec algorithm to generate the verification ciphertext CT′.
[0053]
[0054] Due to t′ uid,aid , k′ uid,aid and t uid,aid , k uid,aid The values are different and CT′ cannot be obtained, and the user cannot further decrypt to obtain the ciphertext.
[0055] The above are only preferred specific implementation modes of the present invention, but the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any technician familiar with the technical field can make equivalent replacements or changes according to the technical solutions and inventive concepts of the present invention within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention, which should be covered by the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims
1. A method for dynamically revoking cloud security user attributes, comprising the following steps: S1. Build system model; S2, system initialization; S3, attribute private key generation; S4, data encryption; S5. Data decryption; S6, user attribute revocation; S7, user revocation; The system model of step S1 is mainly composed of six entities: a semi-trusted third party SM, k attribute authorization agencies AA, a cloud storage server CSS, a proxy decryption server PDS, a data owner DO and a data user DU. The semi-trusted third party SM calls the system initialization algorithm to generate global public parameters and distributes GP to the attribute authorization agency AA, the data owner DO and the data user DU. The step S2 includes three algorithms of GlobaSetup, UserSetup and AASetup; GlobalSetup(λ)→GP:SM runs the algorithm, inputs the security parameter λ, selects two multiplicative cyclic groups G and G with order P being a prime number. T , and there exists a bilinear mapping e:G×G→G T , the system attribute domain is represented by S, the system attribute authorization agency set is represented by Auth, and the system user identity set is represented by U. For the problem of attribute revocation in a large attribute domain, three hash functions H, F and T are randomly selected, H: S → G to convert the attribute att i ∈S is mapped to G; F:U→G maps the user identity uid∈U to G; T:S→I Auth Map the attributes to AA, and finally output the global public parameter GP = (G,G T ,p,g,S,I Auth ,U,F,T); UserSetup(uid,GP)→(PK uid ,SK uid ):DU runs the algorithm and selects a random number Calculate the public key And SK uid =Z uid Keep it secret as a private key; AASetup(aid,GP)→(PK aid ,SK aid ,VK att ,PK att )AA runs the algorithm and selects two random numbers Set the attribute version VK for each attribute att att =v att , public attribute key Output attribute authority AA public key and the attribute authority AA private key SK aid =(α aid ,β aid ); In step S3, KeyGen(GP,S uid,aid ,PK uid ,SK aid ,PK att )→(Sk uid,aid )AA runs the algorithm; Random Selection Setting the User Version Key Output attribute private key SK uid,aid =(TK uid,aid ,L uid,aid ) and sent to CCS, where In step S4, Encrypt(GP, PKaid, PKatt, m, M, CT: DO runs the algorithm; The step S4 includes three algorithms: ProxyDec, UserVerandDec and Decrypt; ProxyDec(CT,TK uid,aid )→parCT:PDS runs the algorithm. If the user attributes satisfy the ciphertext access policy, the subscript set {i:ρ(i)∈S} and satisfies Then there exists a constant {c i ∈Z p } i∈l Make Established, calculate the semi-decrypted ciphertext parCT; UserVerandDec(C 5,t , VK uid,aid ) / parCT→CT′CSS runs the algorithm and sends the verification ciphertext CT′ to DU; Decrypt(SK uid , CT′)→m: DU runs the algorithm and obtains the plaintext; Define a function xTx to map the rows of the matrix M to specific AA, i.e., 1, 2, ..., 1A; then randomly select v = (s, v2, ..., v n ) T , Two vectors, Calculating λ i =(M i v), ω i =(M i ·ω) and C0=m·e(g,g) s , where M i is the i-th row of the matrix M, and the parameter r is randomly selected x ∈Z p ,calculate and Finally, the ciphertext CT is outputted as (C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, C 5,i ) i∈{1,2,…l} In step S6, the user attribute revocation is the revocation of certain attributes in the user attribute set. After the user attribute revocation operation occurs, the user loses the access right to the attribute, but does not affect the user's rights to other attributes. At the same time, it does not affect the access right to the attribute of other users who have the attribute but have not been revoked, and can be restored through UpkeyGen, UpTK uid,aid and UpCT 3 algorithms to achieve user attribute revocation; AA runs the algorithm, when the user attribute att x (Corresponding attribute version ) is revoked, AA random calculation and Set a new property version The attribute public key for synchronous update is Calculate the key update key Update the key with ciphertext Sent to CCS, and the conversion key TK is completed on the CSP side uid,aid and ciphertext component C 5,x Update tasks; UGo uid,aid (SK uid,aid ,UKK aid )→(TK′ uid,aid ): PDS runs the algorithm and updates the conversion key of users who have not revoked the attribute CCS updates the associated att in the ciphertext x The ciphertext component The ciphertext is updated to In step S7, when some users in the system are judged as "illegal users" or exit the system for other reasons, all access rights of the users in the system need to be revoked to ensure the security of the ciphertext; When user revocation occurs, AA only needs to update the user version key to complete the user revocation. CCS runs the UserVerandDec algorithm to generate the verification ciphertext CT′. Due to t′ uid,aid , k′ uid,aid and t uid,aid , k uid,aid The values are different and CT′ cannot be obtained, and the user cannot further decrypt to obtain the ciphertext.
