A trusted access method for industrial equipment based on cloud-edge-end collaboration

Through the hierarchical authentication model of cloud-edge-end collaboration and the Chebishev polynomial and elliptic curve algorithm, combined with inter-domain node collaboration, the authentication complexity and cross-domain problems caused by large number of industrial equipment and strong mobility are solved, and high efficiency is achieved , real-time industrial equipment access certification improves the robustness and efficiency of the system.

CN115514474BActive Publication Date: 2024-12-03NORTHWESTERN POLYTECHNICAL UNIV
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202211059138.X
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2022-08-30
Publication Date
2024-12-03
Estimated Expiration
2042-08-30

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In industrial intelligent manufacturing systems, there is a large number of industrial equipment and strong mobility, and the traditional certification model is difficult to adapt, resulting in increased system complexity, high management and maintenance costs, weak robustness, and low cross-domain authentication efficiency.

Method used

Adopt a hierarchical tree trusted authentication chain model based on cloud-edge-end collaboration, combining Chebishev polynomial and elliptic curve algorithm to realize cloud-edge and edge-end bidirectional access authentication of industrial equipment, and pass inter-domain nodes. Coordinately improve cross-domain access efficiency.

Benefits of technology

It shortens the authentication delay, improves the cross-domain authentication efficiency of industrial equipment, reduces the load of cloud authentication centers, enhances the security of edge nodes, and meets the requirements of efficient and real-time equipment access.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

This invention discloses a trusted access method for industrial equipment based on cloud-edge-device collaboration. Addressing the challenges of a large number and heterogeneity of industrial equipment, a hierarchical tree-structured trusted authentication chain model is constructed to solve the distributed authentication problem for trusted access of industrial equipment, providing technical support for cloud-edge-device collaborative authentication. To ensure the trustworthiness of the edge authentication server, a Chebyshev multinomial-based cloud-edge access authentication for industrial edge devices is adopted. Considering the mobility and randomness of industrial equipment, elliptic curve-based IBC identifier cryptography edge-device bidirectional access authentication and inter-domain node collaboration-based cross-domain access authentication for industrial equipment edge-devices are employed to meet the requirements of efficiency, real-time performance, and mobility for industrial equipment access authentication. This invention avoids the authentication difficulties caused by different system parameters between devices in different security domains, shortens authentication latency, and improves the efficiency of cross-domain authentication for industrial equipment.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The invention belongs to the technical field of information security processing, and in particular relates to a trusted access method for industrial equipment. Background Art

[0002] As the "nerve center" of the key infrastructure of intelligent manufacturing enterprises, the safe and stable operation of the industrial intelligent manufacturing network information system is the premise for the normal development of the enterprise's production business. The biggest threat to the system is the tens of millions of industrial equipment connected to the system. As one of the terminals of the intelligent manufacturing system, industrial equipment has the characteristics of large quantity and wide distribution. With the introduction of flexible production technology, new and old production lines are constantly combined, and there are still mobility problems in the access authentication of industrial equipment, which is particularly prominent in the discrete industry. There are many types of industrial equipment, large structural differences, and random network access / revocation. All of these characteristics increase the technical difficulty of trusted access to industrial equipment. In order to reduce the security risks of the system, a secure and trusted authentication mechanism has become the basis for trusted access to equipment. In the edge computing scenario, edge nodes can process and analyze data nearby. The collaborative processing between edge nodes and the cloud can greatly reduce the load and data transmission volume of the cloud authentication center. However, due to the complex communication protocol of edge nodes and insufficient security functions, they are very easy to become a springboard for attacks to penetrate into the cloud platform. As an important extension of cloud computing, edge computing has evolved the traditional cloud-end network architecture into a cloud-edge-end integrated architecture.

[0003] Due to the wide variety of equipment and application systems in industrial intelligent manufacturing systems, traditional security authentication models are difficult to adapt to the characteristics of large numbers of industrial equipment, mobility, and random access / revocation of the network. On the other hand, the traditional authentication model adopts a centralized authentication architecture. As the scale of industrial intelligent manufacturing systems expands, the complexity of the system will grow rapidly, and the management and maintenance costs will increase. In addition, the development, maintenance, and function addition of the system under this model are relatively complex. On the other hand, the system robustness under this model is weak, and when the authentication server fails, the authentication service of the entire system will be paralyzed. In addition, a large number of industrial equipment initiating authentication applications at the same time will cause network delays and reduced server efficiency. Summary of the invention

[0004] In order to overcome the shortcomings of the prior art, the present invention provides a trusted access method for industrial equipment based on cloud-edge-end collaboration. Aiming at the huge number and heterogeneity of industrial equipment, a hierarchical tree-shaped trusted authentication chain model is constructed to solve the distributed authentication problem of trusted access of industrial equipment and provide technical service support for cloud-edge-end collaborative authentication; to ensure the credibility of the edge authentication server, the cloud-edge access authentication of industrial edge devices based on Chebyshev polynomials is adopted; considering the mobility and randomness of industrial equipment, the IBC identification password edge-end bidirectional access authentication based on elliptic curves and the edge-end cross-domain access authentication of industrial equipment based on inter-domain node collaboration are adopted to meet the high efficiency, real-time and mobility requirements of industrial equipment access authentication. The method of the present invention avoids the authentication difficulty problem caused by different system parameters of devices in different security domains, shortens the authentication delay, and improves the efficiency of cross-domain authentication of industrial equipment.

[0005] The technical solution adopted by the present invention to solve the technical problem includes the following steps:

[0006] Step 1: Building a cloud-edge-end collaborative industrial equipment authentication environment;

[0007] A three-layer tree-shaped distributed trusted authentication chain model is adopted to decouple some authentication and management functions of the cloud server and deploy them on the edge node to implement cloud-edge, edge-edge, and edge-end collaborative access authentication; the details are as follows:

[0008] The cloud-edge-end collaborative industrial equipment authentication environment includes three entities: cloud authentication center, edge nodes and industrial equipment. The cloud authentication center is used to provide equipment networking services, responsible for global policy data distribution, edge node management, receiving data uploaded by industrial equipment for analysis and processing, and providing authentication access services for edge nodes; the cloud-edge-end collaborative industrial equipment authentication environment is an authentication model with cloud servers as the authentication center and decentralized extension layer by layer, including cloud-edge collaboration, edge-edge collaboration and edge-end collaborative authentication.

[0009] Step 2: Cloud-edge access authentication for industrial edge devices based on Chebyshev polynomials;

[0010] (1) Edge node E sends its own ID and the ID of cloud server S to server S to initiate a connection request;

[0011] (2) When the cloud server S receives the connection request, it returns the public key of the cloud server S and the key K shared by the cloud server S and the third-party key distribution center KDC to the edge node E. SK Encrypted information;

[0012] (3) The edge node E sends the received information to the trusted third-party key distribution center KDC through clock authentication to verify the identity of the cloud server S;

[0013] (4) The third-party key distribution center KDC decrypts the received information and returns it to the edge node E;

[0014] (5) The edge node E calculates the shared key K between the edge node E and the cloud server S based on the received decrypted value and the semigroup property of the Chebyshev polynomial. SE ; Encrypt and send authentication information to cloud server S;

[0015] (6) After receiving the encrypted information, the cloud server S calculates the shared key and verifies the identity of the edge node E, and returns a successful authentication message;

[0016] (7) After receiving the authentication information from the cloud, the edge node E returns a successful access response. The edge node completes the access in the cloud-edge access authentication phase;

[0017] Step 3: IBC identity password edge-to-end bidirectional access authentication based on elliptic curve;

[0018] Industrial equipment access authentication at the edge is based on a challenge-response authentication mechanism and adopts a two-way access authentication method. Through two challenge responses between the industrial equipment and the edge node, the authenticity of each other's identity can be verified by both parties in communication. Among them, T is the authentication initiator, i.e. the industrial equipment; U is the authentication server, i.e. the edge node. The details are as follows:

[0019] (1) Industrial device T selects a random number and timestamp, then connects it with the ID number of edge node U and sends it to edge node U to request access;

[0020] (2) After receiving the access request from industrial device T, edge node U calculates the public key of industrial device T and decrypts the ciphertext, verifies the validity of the timestamp and verifies the authenticity of the message. If they do not match, the access request is discarded; otherwise, edge node U selects a random number and sends an identity authentication challenge message to industrial device T;

[0021] (3) After receiving the challenge from edge node U, industrial device T calculates the public key of edge node U and decrypts the obtained information, verifies the timestamp, and uses the elliptic curve bilinear pairing property to check whether edge node U is a registered device in the security domain. If the verification fails, it means that edge node U is an illegal device and the authentication fails. Otherwise, it proves that industrial device T successfully authenticates edge node U.

[0022] (4) Industrial device T generates a new timestamp and random number, and returns the challenge response information to edge node U. After receiving the verification information of industrial device T, edge node U verifies the validity of the timestamp and verifies whether industrial device T is a registered device in the security domain through the bilinear pairing property of elliptic curves. If the verification fails, it indicates that T is an illegal device and edge node U fails to authenticate industrial device T. If the verification succeeds, it indicates that edge node U successfully authenticates industrial device T. The two-way access authentication between industrial device and edge node is completed.

[0023] Step 4: Edge-to-end cross-domain access authentication of industrial equipment based on inter-domain node collaboration;

[0024] The edge node authentication server is used to divide the entire working area into different access authentication security domains, and the efficiency of cross-domain authentication is improved through the collaborative authentication of the central node. When the industrial equipment enters a certain security domain, it sends an access authentication message to the edge node. If the industrial equipment has been authenticated in another security domain, the edge node verifies the authenticity of the industrial equipment identity through the collaborative authentication of the central node between domains, realizing access authentication of industrial equipment without time and geographical restrictions. The details are as follows:

[0025] (1) Let M be the industrial device to be connected, A and B represent two edge nodes, P and Q represent the central node servers of the home domain and roaming domain respectively, and the central node server belongs to the edge node;

[0026] (2) M sends a message to the central node server Q indicating that it wants to access B;

[0027] (3) The central node server Q connects to the central node server P of M's home domain through information and requests verification of M's authentication information;

[0028] (4) After passing the verification, P responds with an encrypted message, including the legitimacy of M and the encapsulated information of the session key between Q and M;

[0029] (5) Q receives the information, confirms the legitimacy of M, obtains the session key, and sends a message to M;

[0030] (6) M receives the message, obtains the session keys of M and Q as well as M and B, verifies Q’s identity, and sends a message to B.

[0031] (7) B receives the message. B first decrypts the encapsulated information and checks the time and life cycle. If the time when the encapsulated information is generated is within the set time range, it uses the encapsulation key to decrypt it, and then uses the session key k bm After encryption, a timestamp is returned so that M can confirm B’s identity;

[0032] (8) After B and M confirm the legitimacy of each other's identities, B will approve M's access request and use this session key to communicate.

[0033] The beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows:

[0034] The present invention aims at the technical problems such as difficulty in cross-domain equipment, low real-time performance, and low access authentication efficiency in industrial intelligent manufacturing environments, and proposes a trusted access authentication method based on cloud-edge-end collaboration, which realizes the collaborative access authentication of industrial equipment cloud-edge, edge-edge, and edge-end. The cloud-edge access authentication stage adopts an industrial edge device access authentication method based on Chebyshev polynomials, which reduces the resource consumption of both communicating parties by using the semigroup characteristics based on Chebyshev polynomials, and automatically generates edge node E and S session keys during the identity authentication process, without relying on KDC to distribute session keys. This not only solves the bottleneck problem that KDC may encounter when distributing keys when there are many edge nodes, but also solves the security problem of the session between the edge node and the cloud. In the edge-end access authentication stage of industrial equipment, a two-way access authentication method based on the IBC identification password of the elliptic curve is adopted. Compared with other methods, this method does not require pre-negotiation of passwords or exchange of certificates, which can greatly reduce the application and verification links of traditional certificate authentication methods, is easy to use, and has higher access efficiency. During the edge-to-end cross-domain access authentication stage of industrial equipment, an industrial equipment cross-domain access authentication method based on inter-domain node collaboration is adopted. A central authentication server is built in the security domain as an inter-domain collaboration node, and the identity verification problem in the cross-domain access process of industrial equipment is handed over to the central servers in different domains for negotiation. This avoids the authentication difficulties caused by different system parameters of devices in different security domains. Compared with other cross-domain authentication methods, it shortens the authentication delay and improves the efficiency of cross-domain authentication of industrial equipment. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0035] Figure 1 This is the cloud-edge-end distributed industrial equipment authentication environment of the present invention.

[0036] Figure 2 This is a topological diagram of the trusted access scenario of industrial equipment in the present invention.

[0037] Figure 3 This is the cloud-edge access authentication flow chart of the present invention.

[0038] Figure 4 It is a schematic diagram of the edge-to-end access authentication method for industrial equipment of the present invention.

[0039] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of cross-domain access authentication for industrial equipment according to the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0040] The present invention is further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments.

[0041] The present invention proposes a trusted access technology for industrial equipment based on cloud-edge-end collaboration. In view of the huge number and heterogeneity of industrial equipment, a hierarchical tree-shaped trusted authentication chain model is constructed to solve the distributed authentication problem of trusted access of industrial equipment and provide technical service support for cloud-edge-end collaborative authentication. To ensure the credibility of the edge authentication server, a trusted authentication method based on cloud-edge collaboration is adopted; considering the mobility and randomness of industrial equipment, an edge-end collaboration and cross-domain security access authentication technology based on different security domains is adopted to meet the efficiency, real-time and mobility requirements of industrial equipment access authentication. The specific method is described as follows:

[0042] 1. Construction of cloud-edge-end collaborative industrial equipment certification environment

[0043] The main problem addressed by this method is the access authentication of industrial equipment. In order to solve the problems of a large number of industrial equipment, strong mobility, and limited resources, while also ensuring the efficiency and real-time performance of authentication, an access authentication technology based on cloud-edge-end collaboration is proposed. This method adopts a hierarchical tree-shaped trusted authentication chain model and a distributed authentication method to achieve cloud-edge, edge-edge, and edge-end collaborative access authentication. Cloud-edge-end collaborative access authentication technology can effectively solve the problems of cloud authentication center load, latency caused by long authentication distance, and large data transmission volume. The cloud-edge-end three-layer authentication mode decouples some authentication and management functions of the cloud server and deploys them to industrial edge nodes. A distributed terminal authentication mechanism based on edge gateways is designed to achieve edge authentication and management of industrial equipment. Cloud-edge-end distributed industrial equipment authentication environment such as Figure 1 shown.

[0044] The cloud-edge-end distributed industrial equipment authentication environment mainly includes three entities: cloud authentication center, edge nodes and industrial equipment. The cloud authentication center is mainly used to provide equipment networking services, responsible for the global policy data distribution, edge node management, receiving data uploaded by industrial equipment for analysis and processing, and providing authentication access services for edge devices, which mainly include data storage module and information display module. Cloud-edge, edge-edge, and edge-end form an overall cloud-edge-end collaborative network. The cloud-edge-end collaborative authentication system is an authentication model with the cloud authentication server as the center and distributed layer by layer. It mainly involves three parts: cloud-edge collaboration, edge-edge collaboration, and edge-end collaborative authentication.

[0045] A basic application mode of the trusted access system based on cloud-edge-end collaboration is the distributed authentication mode. After the industrial equipment is registered in the identity authentication system, it can request access in all different security domains that support the identity authentication system. The topology diagram of the trusted access system for industrial equipment is as follows: Figure 2 shown.

[0046] 2. Cloud-edge access authentication method for industrial edge devices based on Chebyshev polynomials

[0047] In view of the poor real-time performance and low efficiency of the centralized authentication method based on certificate exchange, the present invention adopts a certificate-free access authentication method based on Chebyshev polynomials. This method reduces the complexity of public key certificates in management and maintenance, while reducing the amount of calculation, communication overhead and node storage capacity in the public key authentication process; secondly, a tree-shaped authentication chain model including the cloud and edge devices is established based on a hierarchical tree structure. At the same time, a challenge-response authentication method based on a chaotic asymmetric encryption algorithm is used to solve the identity authentication problem between edge nodes and the cloud in a cloud environment.

[0048] exist Figure 3 In the cloud-edge access authentication phase, the edge device E first sends its own ID and the ID of the server S it wants to log in to the server S to initiate a connection request; when the server S receives it, it returns S's public key and information encrypted by the shared key of the server S and KDC; after receiving it, the edge device E sends the received information to the trusted third party KDC to verify S's identity; then, the edge node E calculates its shared key K with the server S based on the semigroup characteristics of the Chebyshev polynomial according to the received decrypted value. SE After receiving the encrypted information, the cloud server S calculates the shared key and verifies E's identity, and returns a successful authentication message. After receiving the authentication information from the cloud, the edge node E returns a successful access response. At this point, the edge node completes access in the cloud-edge access authentication stage.

[0049] In the entire authentication process, a trusted third party KDC is first introduced, and a clock is used instead of a random number. The transmission of the clock T is encrypted, so that attackers cannot obtain this value; secondly, the algorithm used in the authentication uses the good semigroup properties of Chebyshev on a finite field. During the authentication process, both parties do not disclose prime numbers, but only disclose large numbers each. Therefore, even if the attacker obtains the information of the edge node E and the server S during the transmission process, he cannot find the valid public key information from it. It effectively resists man-in-the-middle attacks. Finally, the generation of the session keys of the edge nodes E and S in this patented method is based on the semigroup properties of the Chebyshev polynomial, which is automatically generated during the identity authentication process, and does not need to rely on the KDC to distribute the session keys.

[0050] 3. IBC identity password edge-to-end bidirectional access authentication method based on elliptic curve

[0051] In the IBC identification cryptographic system, each entity has a meaningful and unique identifier, which is itself the entity's public key. There is no need to pre-negotiate passwords or exchange certificates, which can greatly reduce the application and verification steps of traditional certificate authentication methods and is easy to use. However, the existing IBC identification password authentication protocol only implements the authentication server for industrial equipment, which is a one-way authentication and still has security risks. This method improves the existing identity-based authentication protocol and proposes an authentication method that is less complex and more efficient than CA authentication, and more secure than IBC one-way authentication, namely a two-way access authentication method between edge nodes and industrial equipment.

[0052] Industrial equipment access authentication at the edge is based on a challenge-response authentication mechanism and adopts a two-way access authentication method. Through two challenge responses between the industrial equipment and the edge node, the authenticity of each other's identity is verified by both parties in communication. Among them, T is the authentication initiator (i.e., industrial equipment) and U is the authentication server (edge ​​node). Figure 4 shown.

[0053] exist Figure 4 In the edge-to-end access authentication phase of industrial equipment, first, industrial equipment T selects a random number and a timestamp, and then connects it with U's ID number and sends it to U to request access; after receiving T's access request, U calculates the public key of industrial equipment T and decrypts the ciphertext, verifies the validity of the timestamp to verify the authenticity of the message, and discards the message if they are not equal. U selects relevant values ​​such as random numbers, and then sends identity authentication challenge information to T; after receiving the challenge from U, industrial equipment T calculates U's public key and decrypts the information, verifies the timestamp, and verifies whether U is a registered device in the security domain through the properties of elliptic curve bilinear pairings. If the verification fails, it means that U is an illegal device and the authentication fails. Otherwise, it proves that T successfully authenticates U. Generate a new timestamp and random number, and return the challenge response information to U; after receiving T's verification information, U verifies the validity of the timestamp and verifies whether T is a registered device in the security domain through the properties of elliptic curve bilinear pairings. If the verification fails, T indicates that T is an illegal device and U's authentication to T fails. If the verification succeeds, it means that U successfully authenticates T. At this point, the two-way access authentication of industrial equipment and edge nodes is completed.

[0054] In the edge-to-end access authentication phase of industrial equipment, this authentication method combines random numbers and timestamps, so that only all random numbers within a very short period of time need to be saved, and the synchronization of timestamps does not need to be too accurate, thereby achieving anti-replay attack. Secondly, in the industrial equipment access authentication method, the information of the two parties to be authenticated must be sent after being encrypted by the other party's public key, so only the private key corresponding to the recipient can decrypt it. In the communication process based on identity identification passwords, it is easy for the eavesdropping party to obtain the public keys of both parties, but the distribution of private keys is privately sent to the device by the key generation center through a secure channel. In the case that the trusted third-party key generation center PKG is compromised, the middleman cannot obtain the private keys of the two parties in communication, thus achieving anti-eavesdropping; at the same time, because the third party may intercept the sender's information, forge one by itself, and then encrypt it with the receiver's public key, the communicating parties first sign with their own private keys and then encrypt with the other party's public key, and finally send the data information to the receiver, thus achieving the functions of anti-eavesdropping and anti-tampering information.

[0055] 4. Edge-to-end cross-domain access authentication method for industrial equipment based on inter-domain node collaboration

[0056] In industrial intelligent manufacturing systems, industrial equipment has the characteristics of large scale, mobility and random access. The mobility of industrial equipment causes the problem of repeated authentication of different edge nodes, which greatly increases the authentication resource consumption of edge nodes and reduces the authentication efficiency. The present invention proposes a cross-domain authentication method based on the edge node authentication hosting mechanism, that is, the edge authentication server is used to divide the entire area into different access authentication security domains, and the efficiency of cross-domain authentication is improved through collaborative authentication of the central node. When the industrial equipment enters a certain security domain, it sends an access authentication message to the edge node. If it has been authenticated in another security domain, the edge node verifies the authenticity of the industrial equipment identity through collaborative authentication of the central node between domains, thereby realizing access authentication of industrial equipment that is not restricted by time and region, and solving the problem of difficult cross-domain access and low efficiency of industrial equipment. The schematic diagram of cross-domain access authentication of industrial equipment is shown in the figure. Figure 5 shown.

[0057] exist Figure 5In the figure, M is the main body of the industrial equipment to be connected, A and B represent two edge nodes, P and Q represent the central node servers of the home domain and roaming domain respectively. First, M sends a message to Q to indicate that it wants to access B; the central node Q connects to the central node Q of M's home domain through information, and requests to verify M's authentication information; after verification, P responds with an encrypted message, including the legitimacy of M, the session key between Q and M, and the encapsulation information of the Q legitimacy mark and the session key of Q and M; Q receives the information, confirms the legitimacy of M, obtains the session key, and sends a message to M; M receives the message, obtains the session keys with Q and B, verifies Q's identity, and sends a message to B; B receives the message, B first decrypts the encapsulated information and checks the time cutoff and life cycle. If the encapsulated information is generated close enough, he uses the encapsulated key to decrypt it. Then use the session key k bm After encryption, a timestamp is returned for M to confirm B's identity. After B and M confirm the legitimacy of each other's identities, B will approve M's access request and will use this session key to communicate.

Claims

1. A trusted access method for industrial equipment based on cloud-edge-end collaboration, characterized in that: The steps include: Step 1: Building a cloud-edge-end collaborative industrial equipment authentication environment; A three-layer tree-shaped distributed trusted authentication chain model is adopted to decouple some authentication and management functions of the cloud server and deploy them on the edge node to implement cloud-edge, edge-edge, and edge-end collaborative access authentication; the details are as follows: The cloud-edge-end collaborative industrial equipment authentication environment includes three entities: cloud authentication center, edge nodes and industrial equipment. The cloud authentication center is used to provide equipment networking services, responsible for global policy data distribution, edge node management, receiving data uploaded by industrial equipment for analysis and processing, and providing authentication access services for edge nodes; the cloud-edge-end collaborative industrial equipment authentication environment is an authentication model with cloud servers as the authentication center and decentralized extension layer by layer, including cloud-edge collaboration, edge-edge collaboration and edge-end collaborative authentication. Step 2: Cloud-edge access authentication for industrial edge devices based on Chebyshev polynomials; (1) Edge node E sends its own ID and the ID of cloud server S to server S to initiate a connection request; (2) When the cloud server S receives the connection request, it returns the public key of the cloud server S and the key K shared by the cloud server S and the third-party key distribution center KDC to the edge node E. SK Encrypted information; (3) The edge node E sends the received information to the trusted third-party key distribution center KDC through clock authentication to verify the identity of the cloud server S; (4) The third-party key distribution center KDC decrypts the received information and returns it to the edge node E; (5) The edge node E calculates the shared key K between the edge node E and the cloud server S based on the received decrypted value and the semigroup property of the Chebyshev polynomial. SE ; Encrypt and send authentication information to cloud server S; (6) After receiving the encrypted information, the cloud server S calculates the shared key and verifies the identity of the edge node E, and returns a successful authentication message; (7) After receiving the authentication information from the cloud, the edge node E returns a successful access response. The edge node completes the access in the cloud-edge access authentication phase; Step 3: IBC identity password edge-to-end bidirectional access authentication based on elliptic curve; Industrial equipment access authentication at the edge is based on a challenge-response authentication mechanism and adopts a two-way access authentication method. Through two challenge responses between the industrial equipment and the edge node, the authenticity of each other's identity can be verified by both parties in communication. Among them, T is the authentication initiator, i.e. the industrial equipment; U is the authentication server, i.e. the edge node. The details are as follows: (1) Industrial device T selects a random number and timestamp, then connects it with the ID number of edge node U and sends it to edge node U to request access; (2) After receiving the access request from industrial device T, edge node U calculates the public key of industrial device T and decrypts the ciphertext, verifies the validity of the timestamp and verifies the authenticity of the message. If they do not match, the access request is discarded; otherwise, edge node U selects a random number and sends an identity authentication challenge message to industrial device T; (3) After receiving the challenge from edge node U, industrial device T calculates the public key of edge node U and decrypts the obtained information, verifies the timestamp, and uses the elliptic curve bilinear pairing property to check whether edge node U is a registered device in the security domain. If the verification fails, it means that edge node U is an illegal device and the authentication fails. Otherwise, it proves that industrial device T successfully authenticates edge node U. (4) Industrial device T generates a new timestamp and random number, and returns the challenge response information to edge node U. After receiving the verification information of industrial device T, edge node U verifies the validity of the timestamp and verifies whether industrial device T is a registered device in the security domain through the bilinear pairing property of elliptic curves. If the verification fails, it indicates that T is an illegal device and edge node U fails to authenticate industrial device T. If the verification succeeds, it indicates that edge node U successfully authenticates industrial device T. The two-way access authentication between industrial device and edge node is completed. Step 4: Edge-to-end cross-domain access authentication of industrial equipment based on inter-domain node collaboration; The edge node authentication server is used to divide the entire working area into different access authentication security domains, and the efficiency of cross-domain authentication is improved through the collaborative authentication of the central node. When the industrial equipment enters a certain security domain, it sends an access authentication message to the edge node. If the industrial equipment has been authenticated in another security domain, the edge node verifies the authenticity of the industrial equipment identity through the collaborative authentication of the central node between domains, realizing access authentication of industrial equipment without time and geographical restrictions. The details are as follows: (1) Let M be the industrial device to be connected, A and B represent two edge nodes, P and Q represent the central node servers of the home domain and roaming domain respectively, and the central node server belongs to the edge node; (2) M sends a message to the central node server Q indicating that it wants to access B; (3) The central node server Q connects to the central node server P of M's home domain through information and requests verification of M's authentication information; (4) After passing the verification, P responds with an encrypted message, including the legitimacy of M and the encapsulated information of the session key between Q and M; (5) Q receives the information, confirms the legitimacy of M, obtains the session key, and sends a message to M; (6) M receives the message, obtains the session keys of M and Q as well as M and B, verifies Q’s identity, and sends a message to B. (7) B receives the message. B first decrypts the encapsulated information and checks the time and life cycle. If the time when the encapsulated information is generated is within the set time range, it uses the encapsulation key to decrypt it, and then uses the session key k bm After encryption, a timestamp is returned so that M can confirm B’s identity; (8) After B and M confirm the legitimacy of each other's identities, B will approve M's access request and use this session key to communicate.

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