A security reinforcement method for 1553B bus protocol
By introducing a two-way authentication and encrypted communication mechanism into the 1553B bus protocol and combining the message serial number mechanism, the problem of insufficient security of the protocol is solved, and the security reinforcement of the 1553B bus protocol is achieved to prevent attackers from invading and data tampering.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202311657022.0
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2023-12-05
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-26
- Estimated Expiration
- 2043-12-05
AI Technical Summary
The 1553B bus protocol has problems such as plain text transmission, lack of authentication mechanism, data and identity forgery and replay attacks, resulting in insufficient security and ineffective prevention of attackers' invasion.
By establishing a two-way authentication mechanism between the bus controller and the remote terminal, using encrypted identity and root keys to generate authentication vectors, ensuring communication encryption, using the message sequence number mechanism to prevent replay attacks, and in the bus controller and the remote terminal Maintain serial numbers to prevent identity forgery.
Effectively prevent identity forgery and replay attacks, improve the security of the 1553B bus protocol, ensure the confidentiality and integrity of communication, and prevent attackers from intrusion and data tampering.
Smart Images

Figure CN117857024B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the field of communication protocol security technology, and in particular to a security reinforcement method for a 1553B bus protocol. Background Art
[0002] The 1553B bus protocol is a serial multi-channel data bus standard that is widely used in weapon systems and aerospace systems. Traditional weapon basic equipment or aerospace critical infrastructure is relatively physically isolated. It is difficult for attackers to attack related equipment and communication networks. Therefore, security-related issues were not considered when designing the protocol. However, with the diversification of attack methods, it is shown that relative physical isolation cannot fully guarantee the security of critical infrastructure. And with the advent of the era of the Internet of Everything, in order to meet the needs of interconnection and interoperability, some critical infrastructures have external devices connected to communicate, which will further expand the attack surface. As the basic communication facility of key systems such as weapons, aerospace, etc., the 1553B bus protocol is very necessary to strengthen its security in order to maintain the security of the entire system.
[0003] There are three types of devices on the 1553B bus. The bus controller (BC) is the terminal that organizes information transmission in the bus system, and starts and controls all message transmissions on the bus. The remote terminal (RT) performs data reception or transmission according to the controller's instructions. The bus monitor (BM) monitors the information transmission on the bus, records the information transmitted on the bus, and does not participate in the bus communication itself.
[0004] The 1553B bus includes three types of data formats: command words, data words, and status words. Each word is 20 bits long and consists of a 3-bit synchronization header, a 16-bit valid information payload, and a 1-bit check bit. Each group of messages starts with a command word and contains a command word, zero or more data words, and a status word. The communication forms can be divided into three types: BC to RT, BC requires RT to receive data or instructions, BC sends a receive instruction word or a receive instruction word with data words to RT, and RT returns a status word; RT to BC, BC requires RT to send data, BC sends an instruction word to RT, and RT returns a status word or a status word with data words; RT to RT, BC sends and receives instructions to RT through RT to command RT to send or receive messages, and organize communication between RTs.
[0005] The design of the 1553B bus protocol itself only considers the function and performance issues. The protocol communication process has the following problems: (1) Plain text transmission: 1553B is a shared bus. Devices connected to the bus can obtain all messages transmitted on the bus, and all messages are transmitted in plain text. Attackers can easily accumulate key information such as devices and operating status on the bus and use them for subsequent attacks. (2) Lack of authentication mechanism: Any device connected to the bus can send any message on the bus, resulting in unauthorized malicious devices being able to connect to the bus and attack legitimate devices on the bus by injecting false data, affecting the normal service of the bus. (3) Data and identity forgery: Attackers can forge BC or any RT to insert instructions or data on the bus. Normal devices receiving instructions transmitted by forged devices cannot verify their true source and incorrectly handle abnormal instructions, causing service abnormalities. (4) Replay attack: Attackers can capture any data on the bus and replay it to deceive normal devices on the bus. Attackers can use these security flaws to attack the 1553B bus with data theft, false data injection, deception, conflict, etc.
[0006] Therefore, a security reinforcement method is needed to reinforce the 1553B bus protocol, improve the security of the 1553B bus protocol, and then ensure the security of the infrastructure to avoid unnecessary losses caused by attackers. Summary of the invention
[0007] The present invention provides a security reinforcement method for a 1553B bus protocol, which can perform security reinforcement on the 1553B bus protocol, improve the security of the 1553B bus protocol, and further ensure the security of infrastructure, thereby avoiding unnecessary losses caused by intrusion by attackers.
[0008] The technical solution of the present invention to solve the above technical problems is as follows:
[0009] The present invention provides a security reinforcement method for 1553B bus protocol, the method comprising: a bus controller BC generates a BC authentication vector MAC according to the authentication information of a remote terminal RT; BC1 , the authentication information includes the remote terminal address RT i RTID i , Remote Terminal Root Key RTK i , Remote Terminal Public Key RTK pubi ; RAND is a random number, BCCID is the encrypted identity of the bus controller, BCID is the identity of the bus controller; the bus controller sends an authentication request to the remote terminal, and the authentication request carries the serial number SQNBC of the bus controller. i and BC Authentication Vector MACBC1 ; The remote terminal responds to the authentication request and generates a BC authentication vector MAC based on the authentication information of the remote terminal BC2 , where BC authentication vector MAC BC2 The generation method of BC authentication vector MAC BC1 is generated in the same way; in the BC authentication vector MAC BC1 and BC Authentication Vector MAC BC2 Consistent, and serial number SQNBC i If it is consistent with the serial number SQNRT of the bus controller pre-stored in the terminal device, according to the encryption identity BCCID, the random number RAND and the remote terminal root key RTK i Generates and sends RT authentication vector MAC to the bus controller RT1 ;in, The bus controller responds to the received RT authentication vector MAC RT1 , based on the encryption identity BCCID, random number RAND and remote terminal root key RTK i Generate RT Authentication Vector MAC RT2 , RT Authentication Vector MAC RT1 The generation method of RT authentication vector MAC RT1 The RT authentication vector MAC is generated in the same way. RT1 and RT Authentication Vector MAC RT2 If they are consistent, the remote terminal authentication is confirmed to be successful, and the encryption key K of the remote terminal is determined enc , sends authentication success information to the remote terminal; the authentication success information is used to instruct the remote terminal to determine the encryption key K enc , encryption key K enc Used to realize encrypted communication between bus controller and remote terminal; where K enc =KDF(RTK i , S), S = {RAND, SQNBC i , BCCID, RTID i}.
[0010] The method provided by the present invention, when the bus controller communicates with the remote terminal, both parties use the encryption identity identifier BCCID of the bus controller and the root key RTK of the remote terminal i Generate an authentication vector. Since the two are not transmitted on the bus, attackers cannot steal them from the bus. Even if an attacker forges the identity of the bus controller and the remote terminal, they cannot generate the correct authentication vector, which can prevent identity forgery and thus improve the security of the 1553B bus protocol.
[0011] In a possible implementation, the method further includes: the bus controller encrypts the data word M1 to obtain an encrypted message, the data word M1 includes a receiving instruction word and a message counter COUNT field set after the receiving instruction word, the receiving instruction word is used to instruct the remote terminal to receive the target data; wherein C1=Encrypt(K enc , IV, M1), IV = COUNT BC ||DIRECTION,M1=Receive_Command||COUNT BC ||DataWords; DIRECTION is used to indicate the transmission direction of instruction words, COUNT BC The message sequence number maintained by the bus controller for communication with the remote terminal; the bus controller sends an encrypted message to the remote terminal; the remote terminal decrypts the received encrypted message to obtain the COUNT included in the data word M1 BC ;M1=Decrypt(K enc , IV, C), IV = COUNT RT ||DIRECTION; remote terminal in COUNT BC =COUNT RT In the case of receiving the target data and the status field M2 corresponding to the encrypted data word M1, obtaining the encrypted message C2, and sending the encrypted message C2 to the bus controller;
[0012] M2=Status_Word; C2=Encrypt(K enc , IV, M2);
[0013] IV=COUNT RT ||DIRECTION;
[0014] Remote terminal update COUNT RT The value of COUNT RT =COUNT RT +1;
[0015] The bus controller decrypts the received encrypted message C2;
[0016] M2=Decrypt(K enc , IV, C2), where IV = COUNT BC ||DIRECTION;
[0017] The bus controller updates the COUNT value stored locally;
[0018] COUNT BC =COUNT BC +1.
[0019] In a possible implementation, the method further includes:
[0020] The bus controller encrypts the data word M3 to obtain an encrypted message C3, wherein the data word M1 includes a sending instruction word and a message counter COUNT field set after the sending instruction word, and the sending instruction word is used to instruct the remote terminal to send a status field;
[0021] Where C3 = Encrypt(K enc , IV, M3), IV = COUNT BC ||DIRECTION, M3 = Transmit_Command; DIRECTION is used to indicate the transmission direction of the command word, COUNT BC The message sequence number maintained by the bus controller for communications with the remote terminals;
[0022] The bus controller sends an encrypted message C3 to the remote terminal;
[0023] The remote terminal decrypts the received encrypted message C3 and obtains the COUNT included in the data word M3. BC ;M3=Decrypt(K enc , IV, C3), IV = COUNT RT ||DIRECTION;
[0024] In COUNT BC =COUNT RT In the case of , the remote terminal encrypts the data word M4 to obtain the encrypted message C4, and sends the encrypted message C4 to the bus controller;
[0025] C4=Encrypt(K enc , IV, M4), IV = COUNT RT ||DIRECTION, data word M4 includes the status word and the message counter COUNT field set after the instruction word is sent, M4 = Status_Word||COUNT RT ||DATAWORDS;
[0026] The remote terminal updates the COUNT value stored locally RT =COUNT RT +1;
[0027] The bus controller decrypts the encrypted message C4 and obtains the COUNT included in the data word M4. RT ;
[0028] The bus controller is in COUNT RT=COUNT BC In the case of a local storage COUNT value is updated; COUNT BC =COUNT BC +1.
[0029] The beneficial effect of adopting the above further scheme is: the method provided by the present invention adds a COUNT message counter mechanism, and the bus controller and the corresponding remote terminal each maintain a COUNT. COUNT is a part of the encryption and decryption IV vector. Only when the COUNT value is correct can the two parties transmit information through correct encryption and decryption, which increases the complexity of the encryption algorithm and effectively prevents replay attacks. There are many reasons for encryption and decryption failure. By adding a carrying COUNT field to each group of messages, the communication failure caused by the loss of synchronization of the COUNT values of both parties can be discovered in time by verifying the correctness of COUNT, reporting errors and resynchronizing, reducing the waste of bus resources caused by synchronization failure.
[0030] In a possible implementation, the remote terminal RT recv and remote terminal RT trans Communicate with the bus controller respectively, the method also includes:
[0031] The bus controller sends the remote terminal RT recv Send remote terminal RT trans RTK pubt ; and to the remote terminal RT recv Send and receive instruction words;
[0032] The bus controller sends the remote terminal RT trans Send remote terminal RT recv RTK pubt ; and to the remote terminal RT trans Send transmission instruction word;
[0033] Remote Terminal RT trans According to the remote terminal RT trans Private key RTK prit and remote terminal RT recv Generate the session key RTK using the public key sess1 , Session Key RTK sess1 Used for encrypted messages; RTK sess1 =KeyGenerate(RTK prit ,RTK pubr );
[0034] Remote Terminal RT recv According to the remote terminal RT recv Private key RTK prit and remote terminal RTtrans Generate the session key RTK using the public key sess2 , Session Key RTK sess2 For decrypting RTK sess1 Encrypted messages;
[0035] RTK sess2 =KeyGenerate(RTK prir ,RTK pubt ).
[0036] In a possible implementation, the bus controller pre-stores authentication information of multiple remote terminals and a serial number SQNBC of the bus controller. i , bus controller identity BCID;
[0037] The terminal device pre-stores the terminal device's authentication information and the terminal device's public and private key pairs. <RTK pubi ,RTK prii >, the serial number SQNRT of the bus controller and the encrypted identity BCCID of the bus controller.
[0038] The above method further includes:
[0039] The bus controller responds to the received instruction to communicate with the target terminal device, the instruction carrying the remote terminal device identifier RTID of the target remote terminal i ;
[0040] The bus controller uses the remote terminal device identifier RTID i Determine the remote terminal address RT of the target remote terminal i ;
[0041] The bus controller uses the remote terminal address RT of the target remote terminal i Communicate with the target terminal device.
[0042] The beneficial effect of adopting the above further solution is that the method provided by the present invention can effectively prevent the problem of leakage of the bus controller's identity after the remote terminal is controlled by storing the encrypted identity of the bus controller BCCID in the remote terminal instead of storing the identity of the bus controller BCID in the remote terminal. i Remote Terminal Equipment Identifier RTID i The mapping relationship is that during the communication process, only the remote terminal address RT of the target remote terminal is used. i , since the remote terminal device identifier RTID i It is one of the parameters for generating encryption keys and can effectively prevent the remote terminal device identifier RTID of the remote terminali The attacker only needs to know the remote terminal address RT of the target remote terminal. i The key generation information cannot be obtained, which can effectively prevent the identity forgery of the remote terminal. Except for the public key required for communication between multiple remote terminals, all keys are not transmitted on the bus, which can effectively ensure the security of the key.
[0043] In a possible implementation, the method further includes:
[0044] BC Authentication Vector MAC BC1 and BC Authentication Vector MAC BC2 Consistent, and serial number SQNBC i If it is consistent with the serial number SQNRT of the bus controller pre-stored in the terminal device, the terminal device updates SQNRT, SQNRT=SQNRT+1.
[0045] Authentication Vector MAC in RT RT1 and RT Authentication Vector MAC RT2 If the match is true, the bus controller updates SQNBC i , SQNBC i =SQNBC i +1;
[0046] The beneficial effect of adopting the above further scheme is: the method provided by the present invention maintains a serial number through the bus controller and the remote terminal respectively. After each successful authentication, the bus controller and the remote terminal update the values of SQNRT and SQNBC in an incremental manner, and require that the SQNBC carried in the newly initiated authentication process be consistent with the SQNRT, which can effectively prevent attackers from intercepting legitimate authentication messages and performing replay attacks, thereby improving the security of the 1553B bus protocol.
[0047] In a possible implementation, the encryption algorithm used in the communication process between the bus controller and the remote terminal is a symmetric encryption algorithm.
[0048] The beneficial effect of adopting the above further scheme is that the method provided by the present invention can meet the user's usage needs in communication scenarios with large data transmission volume by using a symmetric encryption algorithm, and encryption by a symmetric encryption algorithm can prevent plain text transmission data from being easily stolen by malicious means.
[0049] The beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows: the method provided by the present invention changes the original protocol features of the 1553B protocol, and by setting a security mechanism based on the 1553B protocol, the security defects existing in the 1553B protocol itself can be effectively alleviated, and the security of the 1553B protocol can be improved. In addition, the method provided by the present invention can enable the bus controller and the remote terminal to verify whether the sequence number in the received message is consistent with the locally stored sequence number by adding a message sequence number mechanism. When the sequence numbers are consistent, the bus controller and the remote terminal are not subjected to replay attacks or other tampering attacks. On the other hand, the method provided by the present invention can solve the problem that in the 1553B protocol, any message can be transmitted through the bus by simply accessing the bus, and the security is low. After the remote terminal provided by the present invention accesses the bus, before normal communication, it performs two-way authentication with the bus controller to verify the identities of both the bus controller and the remote terminal. Only the remote terminal registered in the bus controller can access the bus. At the same time, the generation of the message encryption key uses the remote terminal root key and the bus controller identity identification and other information. Even if the attacker forges the remote terminal or the bus controller to send a message on the bus, the message will not be further processed because it cannot be correctly encrypted and decrypted. Finally, the method provided by the present invention can effectively prevent attackers from eavesdropping and obtaining message contents to attack the bus controller or remote terminal on the bus. After completing the key negotiation, the messages on the bus are encrypted for transmission. Even if the attacker captures the message, he cannot obtain the decryption key and cannot parse the transmitted information, which can effectively improve the security of the 1553B protocol. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0050] Figure 1 is a two-way authentication flow chart of the 1553B protocol in a specific embodiment of the present invention;
[0051] Figure 2a It is a milenage algorithm implementation diagram of the authentication vector calculation algorithm in a specific embodiment of the present invention;
[0052] Figure 2b It is a milenage algorithm implementation diagram of the authentication vector calculation algorithm in a specific embodiment of the present invention;
[0053] Figure 3 is a diagram of a method for generating an authentication vector in a specific embodiment of the present invention;
[0054] Figure 4 It is a flowchart of encrypted communication when the 1553B protocol bus controller requires the remote terminal to receive data in a specific embodiment of the present invention;
[0055] Figure 5 It is a flowchart of encrypted communication in a case where a 1553B protocol bus controller requires a remote terminal to send data in a specific embodiment of the present invention;
[0056] Figure 6 It is a flow chart of encrypted communication between multiple remote terminals in a specific embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0057] The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. In the description of the embodiments of the present invention, unless otherwise specified, "multiple" refers to two or more than two. "At least one of the following" or similar expressions refers to any combination of these items, including any combination of single items or plural items. For example, at least one of a, b, or c can represent: a, b, c, ab, ac, bc, or abc, where a, b, and c can be single or multiple.
[0058] In addition, in order to facilitate the clear description of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, in the embodiments of the present invention, the words "first", "second" and the like are used to distinguish the same items or similar items with substantially the same functions and effects. Those skilled in the art will understand that the words "first", "second" and the like do not limit the quantity and execution order, and the words "first", "second" and the like do not necessarily limit the difference. At the same time, in the embodiments of the present invention, the words "exemplary" or "for example" are used to indicate examples, illustrations or explanations. Any embodiment or design described as "exemplary" or "for example" in the embodiments of the present invention should not be interpreted as being more preferred or more advantageous than other embodiments or design. Specifically, the use of words such as "exemplary" or "for example" is intended to present related concepts in a concrete way for easy understanding.
[0059] The embodiment of the present invention provides a method for strengthening the security of the 1553B bus protocol, the method comprising: a bus controller BC generates a BC authentication vector MAC according to the authentication information of a remote terminal RT; BC1 , the authentication information includes the remote terminal address RT i RTID i , Remote Terminal Root Key RTK i , Remote Terminal Public Key RTK pubi ; RAND is a random number, BCCID is the encrypted identity of the bus controller, BCID is the identity of the bus controller; the bus controller sends an authentication request to the remote terminal, and the authentication request carries the serial number SQNBC of the bus controller. i and BC Authentication Vector MAC BC1 ; The remote terminal responds to the authentication request and generates a BC authentication vector MAC based on the authentication information of the remote terminal BC2, where BC authentication vector MAC BC2 The generation method of BC authentication vector MAC BC1 is generated in the same way; in the BC authentication vector MAC BC1 and BC Authentication Vector MAC BC2 Consistent, and serial number SQNBC i If it is consistent with the serial number SQNRT of the bus controller pre-stored in the terminal device, according to the encryption identity BCCID, the random number RAND and the remote terminal root key RTK i Generates and sends RT authentication vector MAC to the bus controller RT1 ;in, The bus controller responds to the received RT authentication vector MAC RT1 , based on the encryption identity BCCID, random number RAND and remote terminal root key RTK i Generate RT Authentication Vector MAC RT2 , RT Authentication Vector MAC RT1 The generation method of RT authentication vector MAC RT1 The RT authentication vector MAC is generated in the same way. RT1 and RT Authentication Vector MAC RT2 If they are consistent, the remote terminal authentication is confirmed to be successful, and the encryption key K of the remote terminal is determined enc , sends authentication success information to the remote terminal; the authentication success information is used to instruct the remote terminal to determine the encryption key K enc , encryption key K enc Used to realize encrypted communication between bus controller and remote terminal; where K enc =KDF(RTK i , S), S = {RAND, SQNBC i , BCCID, RTID i}.
[0060] Specifically, to ensure that a trusted remote terminal accesses the bus, the remote terminal needs to be registered in the bus controller, that is, the authentication information of the remote terminal is written into the bus controller. The authentication information includes the remote terminal address RT. i RTID i , Remote Terminal Root Key RTK i , Remote Terminal Public Key RTK pubi; In the subsequent communication process, only the remote terminal address is used to identify the source of the message to prevent the leakage of sensitive parameters. To prevent the leakage of the bus controller's identity, the bus controller needs to provide the remote terminal with the bus controller's encrypted identity BCCID as a subsequent authentication and key negotiation parameter. The encryption method of the bus controller's identity is:
[0061] To prevent attackers from capturing legitimate authentication vectors and performing replay attacks, the remote terminal needs to maintain a serial number SQNRT, and the bus controller needs to maintain a serial number SQNBC corresponding to each remote terminal.
[0062] Furthermore, in order to prevent illegal RT from accessing the bus and verify the legitimacy of BC, two-way authentication between the remote terminal and the bus controller is required before normal communication. The specific process is as follows: Figure 1 As shown, the bus controller receives the remote terminal address RT i Then, the RANDGenerate function is called to generate a random number RAND; the remote terminal device identifier RTID and the remote terminal root key information RTK are retrieved; the bus controller calculates the encrypted identity BCCID: Among them, The bus controller then uses the milenage algorithm to calculate the authentication vector. The milenage algorithm is implemented as follows: Figure 2a and Figure 2b As shown, the authentication vector generation algorithm is as follows Figure 3 As shown, to prevent SQNBC from being leaked, the key K is calculated SQN , calculation method K SQN =f5(RAND, RTK, BCCID), to verify the bus controller identity, calculate MAC BC1 = f1(RAND, RTK, BCCID, SQNBC). The bus controller then sends an authentication request to the remote terminal, which includes an authentication vector
[0063] After receiving the authentication vector AV, the remote terminal first calculates K SQN ;
[0064] K SQN =f5(RAND, RTK, BCCID), then calculate SQNBC based on the authentication vector AV, and verify whether SQNBC=SQNRT. If not, it means that it may be subject to replay attack and the data packet is discarded. If they are the same, the remote terminal continues to verify MAC BC1 The correctness of the calculation MAC BC2 =f1(RAND, RTK, BCCID, SQNBC), determine MACBC1 With MAC BC2 Are they the same? If they are not the same, it proves that the bus controller is illegal or the message has been tampered with. If they are the same, calculate the bus controller's authentication vector MAC RT1 =f2(RAND,RTK,BCCID).
[0065] The bus controller receives the authentication vector MAC from the remote terminal. RT1 After that, the bus controller calculates the MAC RT2 =f2(RAND, RTK, BCCID). Determine MAC RT1 With MAC RT2 If they are the same, it proves that the remote terminal is illegal or the message has been tampered with. If they are the same, two-way authentication is completed. Then the bus controller and the remote terminal use the method of adding 1 each time to update SQNBC and SQNRT. Finally, the bus controller and the remote terminal use the key derivation algorithm KDF to generate the session key K enc =KDF(RTK, S), S={RAND, SQNBC, BCCID, RTID}, where the KDF algorithm selects the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm.
[0066] The method provided by the present invention, when the bus controller communicates with the remote terminal, both parties use the encryption identity identifier BCCID of the bus controller and the root key RTK of the remote terminal i Generate an authentication vector. Since the two are not transmitted on the bus, attackers cannot steal them from the bus. Even if an attacker forges the identity of the bus controller and the remote terminal, they cannot generate the correct authentication vector, which can prevent identity forgery and thus improve the security of the 1553B bus protocol.
[0067] In a possible implementation, the method further includes: the bus controller encrypts the data word M1 to obtain an encrypted message, the data word M1 includes a receiving instruction word and a message counter COUNT field set after the receiving instruction word, the receiving instruction word is used to instruct the remote terminal to receive the target data; wherein C1=Encrypt(K enc , IV, M1), IV = COUNT BC ||DIRECTION,M1=Receive_Command||COUNT BC ||DataWords; DIRECTION is used to indicate the transmission direction of instruction words, COUNT BC The message sequence number maintained by the bus controller for communication with the remote terminal; the bus controller sends an encrypted message to the remote terminal; the remote terminal decrypts the received encrypted message to obtain the COUNT included in the data word M1 BC;M1=Decrypt(K enc , IV, C), IV = COUNT RT ||DIRECTION; remote terminal in COUNT BC =COUNT RT In the case of receiving the target data and the status field M2 corresponding to the encrypted data word M1, obtaining the encrypted message C2, and sending the encrypted message C2 to the bus controller;
[0068] M2=Status_Word; C2=Encrypt(K enc , IV, M2);
[0069] IV=COUNT RT ||DIRECTION;
[0070] Remote terminal update COUNT RT The value of COUNT RT =COUNT RT +1;
[0071] The bus controller decrypts the received encrypted message C2;
[0072] M2=Decrypt(K enc , IV, C2), where IV = COUNT BC ||DIRECTION;
[0073] The bus controller updates the COUNT value stored locally;
[0074] COUNT BC =COUNT BC +1.
[0075] Specifically, the bus controller requires the remote terminal to receive data through the encryption and decryption process as follows: Figure 4 As shown, after receiving the command word, the bus controller splices the COUNT field data word carrying the message counter and encrypts it M1=Receive_Command||COUNT BC ||DataWords. Where IV = COUNT BC ||DIRECTION. DIRECTION indicates the direction of message transmission, COUNT BC The message sequence number maintained by the bus controller for communication with the remote terminal. The remote terminal decrypts the message Verify COUNT BC Whether to use the locally maintained counter COUNT RTAre they equal? If they are not equal, it means there may be a replay attack or message tampering, and an error is returned to the bus controller. If they are equal, use COUNT RT The encrypted status field M2 obtains the encrypted message C2 and sends it to the bus controller, while updating COUNT RT The value of COUNT RT =COUNT RT +1. The bus controller uses COUNT BC Decrypt message C2, if decryption is successful, update COUNT BC The value of COUNT BC =COUNT BC +1.
[0076] In a possible implementation, the method further includes:
[0077] The bus controller encrypts the data word M3 to obtain an encrypted message C3, wherein the data word M1 includes a sending instruction word and a message counter COUNT field set after the sending instruction word, and the sending instruction word is used to instruct the remote terminal to send a status field;
[0078] Where C3 = Encrypt(K enc , IV, M3), IV = COUNT BC ||DIRECTION, M3 = Transmit_Command; DIRECTION is used to indicate the transmission direction of the command word, COUNT BC The message sequence number maintained by the bus controller for communications with the remote terminals;
[0079] The bus controller sends an encrypted message C3 to the remote terminal;
[0080] The remote terminal decrypts the received encrypted message C3 and obtains the COUNT included in the data word M3. BC ;M3=Decrypt(K enc , IV, C3), IV = COUNT RT ||DIRECTION;
[0081] In COUNT BC =COUNT RT In the case of , the remote terminal encrypts the data word M4 to obtain the encrypted message C4, and sends the encrypted message C4 to the bus controller;
[0082] C4=Encrypt(K enc , IV, M4), IV = COUNT RT||DIRECTION, data word M4 includes the status word and the message counter COUNT field set after the instruction word is sent, M4 = Status_Word||COUNT RT ||DATAWORDS;
[0083] The remote terminal updates the COUNT value stored locally RT =COUNT RT +1;
[0084] The bus controller decrypts the encrypted message C4 and obtains the COUNT included in the data word M4. RT ;
[0085] The bus controller is in COUNT RT =COUNT BC In the case of a local storage COUNT value is updated; COUNT BC =COUNT BC +1.
[0086] Specifically, the bus controller requires the remote terminal to send data encryption and decryption process as follows Figure 5 As shown, the bus controller uses COUNT BC The encrypted instruction word C3 is sent to the remote terminal, and the remote terminal receives the instruction word C3 and uses COUNT RT Decryption is performed. If the decryption fails, an error message is returned to the bus controller. Otherwise, the COUNT field data word carrying the message counter is spliced after the status word. M4 = Status_word||COUNT RT ||DataWords. Where IV = COUNT RT ||DIRECTION, and update COUNT RT The value of COUNT RT =COUNT RT +1. BC decrypted message Verify COUNT RT Whether to maintain COUNT locally BC If they are not equal, it means there may be a replay attack or tampering, then a resynchronization request is sent to the remote terminal. Otherwise, COUNT is updated. BC The value of COUNT BC =COUNT BC +1. Complete the defense work against message leakage, tampering, replay attack, and identity forgery attack during communication.
[0087] The beneficial effect of adopting the above further scheme is: the method provided by the present invention adds a COUNT message counter mechanism, and the bus controller and the corresponding remote terminal each maintain a COUNT. COUNT is a part of the encryption and decryption IV vector. Only when the COUNT value is correct can the two parties transmit information through correct encryption and decryption, which increases the complexity of the encryption algorithm and effectively prevents replay attacks. There are many reasons for encryption and decryption failure. By adding a carrying COUNT field to each group of messages, the communication failure caused by the loss of synchronization of the COUNT values of both parties can be discovered in time by verifying the correctness of COUNT, reporting errors and resynchronizing, reducing the waste of bus resources caused by synchronization failure.
[0088] In a possible implementation, the remote terminal RT recv and remote terminal RT trans The method further comprises: the bus controller sends a signal to the remote terminal RT recv Send remote terminal RT trans RTK pubt ; and to the remote terminal RT recv Send and receive command words; the bus controller sends a command to the remote terminal RT trans Send remote terminal RT recv RTK pubt ; and to the remote terminal RT trans Send transmission instruction word; remote terminal RT trans According to the remote terminal RT trans Private key RTK prit and remote terminal RT recv Generate the session key RTK using the public key sess1 , Session Key RTK sess1 Used for encrypted messages; RTK sess1 =KeyGenerate(RTK prit ,RTK pubr );Remote terminal RT recv According to the remote terminal RT recv Private key RTK prit and remote terminal RT trans Generate the session key RTK using the public key sess2 , Session Key RTK sess2 For decrypting RTK sess1 Encrypted messages;
[0089] RTK sess2 =KeyGenerate(RTK prir ,RTK pubt ).
[0090] Specifically, the remote terminal RT recv and remote terminal RT trans Key negotiation is performed between the two terminals through the elliptic curve key exchange protocol ECDHE. trans Generate a random number private key RTK prit , calculate the sender's public key RTK pubt =RTK prit G. Remote Terminal RT recv Generate a random number private key RTK prir , calculate the receiver's public key RTK pubr =RTK prir G. And the public key is stored in the bus controller when the remote terminal registers. recv and remote terminal RT trans Before the communication starts, the bus controller sends the sender's public key RTK pubt Send to the receiver, the receiver's public key RTK pubr After both parties complete the public key exchange, they generate a key for symmetric encryption and start encrypted communication.
[0091] In a possible implementation, the bus controller pre-stores authentication information of multiple remote terminals and a serial number SQNBC of the bus controller. i , bus controller identity BCID;
[0092] The terminal device pre-stores the terminal device's authentication information and the terminal device's public and private key pairs. <RTK pubi ,RTK prii >, the serial number SQNRT of the bus controller and the encrypted identity BCCID of the bus controller.
[0093] The method further comprises: the bus controller responding to the received instruction to communicate with the target terminal device, the instruction carrying the remote terminal device identifier RTID of the target remote terminal i ; The bus controller uses the remote terminal device identifier RTID i Determine the remote terminal address RT of the target remote terminal i ; The bus controller receives the remote terminal address RT of the target remote terminal i Communicate with the target terminal device.
[0094] The beneficial effect of adopting the above further solution is that the method provided by the present invention can effectively prevent the problem of leakage of the bus controller's identity after the remote terminal is controlled by storing the encrypted identity of the bus controller BCCID in the remote terminal instead of storing the identity of the bus controller BCID in the remote terminal.i Remote Terminal Equipment Identifier RTID i The mapping relationship is that during the communication process, only the remote terminal address RT of the target remote terminal is used. i , since the remote terminal device identifier RTID i It is one of the parameters for generating encryption keys and can effectively prevent the remote terminal device identifier RTID of the remote terminal i The attacker only needs to know the remote terminal address RT of the target remote terminal. i The key generation information cannot be obtained, which can effectively prevent the identity forgery of the remote terminal. Except for the public key required for communication between multiple remote terminals, all keys are not transmitted on the bus, which can effectively ensure the security of the key.
[0095] In a possible implementation, the method further includes:
[0096] BC Authentication Vector MAC BC1 and BC Authentication Vector MAC BC2 Consistent, and serial number SQNBC i If it is consistent with the serial number SQNRT of the bus controller pre-stored in the terminal device, the terminal device updates SQNRT, SQNRT=SQNRT+1.
[0097] Authentication Vector MAC in RT RT1 and RT Authentication Vector MAC RT2 If the match is true, the bus controller updates SQNBC i , SQNBC i =SQNBC i +1;
[0098] The beneficial effect of adopting the above further scheme is: the method provided by the present invention maintains a serial number through the bus controller and the remote terminal respectively. After each successful authentication, the bus controller and the remote terminal update the values of SQNRT and SQNBC in an incremental manner, and require that the SQNBC carried in the newly initiated authentication process be consistent with the SQNRT, which can effectively prevent attackers from intercepting legitimate authentication messages and performing replay attacks, thereby improving the security of the 1553B bus protocol.
[0099] In a possible implementation, the encryption algorithm used in the communication process between the bus controller and the remote terminal is a symmetric encryption algorithm.
[0100] Specifically, in order to solve the problem that the plain text transmission messages of bus communication are easily stolen and tampered, the messages are encrypted. Compared with the asymmetric encryption algorithm, the symmetric encryption algorithm can encrypt large amounts of data faster. Therefore, the symmetric encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the message. However, the encryption key of the symmetric encryption algorithm is easy to be stolen. Therefore, for the communication between the bus controller and the remote terminal, before the remote terminal accesses the bus, some parameters used for key negotiation are solidified in the bus controller and the remote terminal device. During the entire key negotiation process, the key will not be transmitted on the bus to ensure the confidentiality of the key. In the communication process between the remote terminal and the remote terminal, an asymmetric encryption algorithm is used to generate a symmetric key, that is, a session key. Only the public keys of both parties are transmitted through the bus, which can ensure the confidentiality of the private key and the session key.
[0101] The beneficial effect of adopting the above further scheme is that the method provided by the present invention can meet the user's usage needs in communication scenarios with large data transmission volume by using a symmetric encryption algorithm, and encryption by a symmetric encryption algorithm can prevent plain text transmission data from being easily stolen by malicious means.
[0102] The beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows: the method provided by the present invention changes the original protocol features of the 1553B protocol, and by setting a security mechanism based on the 1553B protocol, the security defects existing in the 1553B protocol itself can be effectively alleviated, and the security of the 1553B protocol can be improved. In addition, the method provided by the present invention can enable the bus controller and the remote terminal to verify whether the sequence number in the received message is consistent with the locally stored sequence number by adding a message sequence number mechanism. When the sequence numbers are consistent, the bus controller and the remote terminal are not subjected to replay attacks or other tampering attacks. On the other hand, the method provided by the present invention can solve the problem that in the 1553B protocol, any message can be transmitted through the bus by simply accessing the bus, and the security is low. After the remote terminal provided by the present invention accesses the bus, before normal communication, it performs two-way authentication with the bus controller to verify the identities of both the bus controller and the remote terminal. Only the remote terminal registered in the bus controller can access the bus. At the same time, the generation of the message encryption key uses the remote terminal root key and the bus controller identity identification and other information. Even if the attacker forges the remote terminal or the bus controller to send a message on the bus, the message will not be further processed because it cannot be correctly encrypted and decrypted. Finally, the method provided by the present invention can effectively prevent attackers from eavesdropping and obtaining message contents to attack the bus controller or remote terminal on the bus. After completing the key negotiation, the messages on the bus are encrypted for transmission. Even if the attacker captures the message, he cannot obtain the decryption key and cannot parse the transmitted information, which can effectively improve the security of the 1553B protocol.
[0103] Although the embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described above, it is to be understood that the above embodiments are exemplary and are not to be construed as limitations of the present invention. A person skilled in the art may change, modify, replace and vary the above embodiments within the scope of the present invention.
Claims
1. A security reinforcement method for 1553B bus protocol, characterized in that: The method comprises: The bus controller BC generates a BC authentication vector MAC based on the authentication information of the remote terminal RT BC1 , the authentication information includes the remote terminal address RT i RTID i , Remote Terminal Root Key RTK i , Remote Terminal Public Key RTK pubi ; RAND is a random number, BCCID is the encrypted identity of the bus controller, BCID is the bus controller's identity, SQNBC i is the serial number of the bus controller; The bus controller sends an authentication request to the remote terminal, wherein the authentication request carries the SQNBC i and the BC authentication vector MAC BC1 ; The remote terminal generates a BC authentication vector MAC in response to the authentication request according to the authentication information of the remote terminal. BC2 , wherein the BC authentication vector MAC BC2 The BC authentication vector MAC is generated in the same way as the BC authentication vector MAC BC1 is generated in the same way; in the BC authentication vector MAC BC1 and the BC authentication vector MAC BC2 The same, and the serial number SQNBC i If the serial number SQNRT of the bus controller pre-stored in the terminal device is consistent, the remote terminal root key RTK is generated according to the encryption identity BCCID, the random number RAND and the remote terminal root key RTK. i Generate and send RT authentication vector MAC to the bus controller RT1 ;in, The bus controller responds to the received RT authentication vector MAC RT1 , according to the encryption identity BCCID, the random number RAND and the remote terminal root key RTK i Generate RT Authentication Vector MAC RT2 , the RT authentication vector MAC RT1 The RT authentication vector MAC is generated in the same way as the RT authentication vector MAC RT1 is generated in the same way as in the RT Authentication Vector MAC RT1 and the RT authentication vector MAC RT2 If the remote terminal authentication is successful, the encryption key K of the remote terminal is determined. enc , sending authentication success information to the remote terminal; the authentication success information is used to instruct the remote terminal to determine the encryption key K enc , the encryption key K enc Used to implement encrypted communication between the bus controller and the remote terminal; wherein K enc =KDF(RTK i , S), S = {RAND, SQNBC i , BCCID, RTID i }.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The method further comprises: The bus controller encrypts the data word M1 to obtain an encrypted message C1, wherein the data word M1 includes a receiving instruction word and a message counter COUNT field set after the receiving instruction word, and the receiving instruction word is used to instruct the remote terminal to receive target data; Where C1=Encrypt(K enc , IV, M1), IV = COUNT BC ||DIRECTION,M1=Receive_Command||COUNT BC ||DataWords; DIRECTION is used to indicate the transmission direction of instruction words, COUNT BC a message sequence number maintained by the bus controller for communications with the remote terminal; The bus controller sends the encrypted message C1 to the remote terminal; The remote terminal decrypts the received encrypted message C1 to obtain the COUNT included in the data word M1. BC ;M1=Decrypt(K enc , IV, C), IV = COUNT RT ||DIRECTION; The remote terminal is in COUNT BC =COUNT RT In the case of receiving the target data and the status field M2 corresponding to the encrypted data word M1, obtaining an encrypted message C2, and sending the encrypted message C2 to the bus controller; M2=Status_Word;C2=Encrypt(K enc ,IV,M2); IV=COUNT RT ||DIRECTION; The remote terminal will COUNT RT The value of +1 is used as the updated COUNT RT The value of The bus controller decrypts the received encrypted message C2; M2=Decrypt(K enc , IV, C2), where IV = COUNT BC ||DIRECTION; The bus controller adds 1 to the locally stored COUNT value as the updated COUNT value.
3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The method further comprises: The bus controller encrypts the data word M3 to obtain an encrypted message C3, wherein the data word M1 includes a sending instruction word and a message counter COUNT field set after the sending instruction word, and the sending instruction word is used to instruct the remote terminal to send a status field; Where C3 = Encrypt(K enc , IV, M3), IV = COUNT BC ||DIRECTION, M3 = Transmit_Command; DIRECTION is used to indicate the transmission direction of the command word, COUNT BC a message sequence number maintained by the bus controller for communications with the remote terminal; The bus controller sends the encrypted message C3 to the remote terminal; The remote terminal decrypts the received encrypted message C3 to obtain the COUNT included in the data word M3. BC ;M3=Decrypt(K enc , IV, C3), IV = COUNT RT ||DIRECTION; In COUNT BC =COUNT RT In the case of , the remote terminal encrypts the data word M4 to obtain an encrypted message C4, and sends the encrypted message C4 to the bus controller; C4=Encrypt(K enc , IV, M4), IV = COUNT RT ||DIRECTION, the data word M4 includes a status word and a message counter COUNT field set after the sending instruction word, M4 = Status_Word||COUNT RT ||DATAWORDS; The remote terminal updates the locally stored COUNT value +1 as the updated COUNT value; The bus controller decrypts the encrypted message C4 to obtain the COUNT included in the data word M4. RT ; The bus controller counts RT =COUNT BC In this case, the locally stored COUNT value is increased by 1 as the updated COUNT value.
4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that Remote Terminal RT recv and remote terminal RT trans communicating with the bus controllers respectively, the method further comprising: The bus controller sends a signal to the remote terminal RT recv Send the remote terminal RT trans RTK pubt ; and to the remote terminal RT recv Send and receive instruction words; The bus controller sends a signal to the remote terminal RT trans Send the remote terminal RT recv RTK pubt ; and to the remote terminal RT trans Send transmission instruction word; The remote terminal RT trans According to the remote terminal RT trans Private key RTK prit and the remote terminal RT recv Generate the session key RTK using the public key sess1 , the session key RTK sess1 Used for encrypted messages; RTK sess1 =KeyGenerate(RTK prit ,RTK pubr ); The remote terminal RT recv According to the remote terminal RT recv Private key RTK prit and the remote terminal RT trans Generate the session key RTK using the public key sess2 , the session key RTK sess2 Used to decrypt the RTK sess1 Encrypted messages; RTK sess2 =KeyGenerate(RTK prir ,RTK pubt )。 5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The bus controller pre-stores authentication information of multiple remote terminals and the serial number SQNBC of the bus controller. i , the identity identifier BCID of the bus controller; The terminal device pre-stores the authentication information of the terminal device and the public and private key pair of the terminal device. <RTK pubi ,RTK prii >, the serial number SQNRT of the bus controller and the encrypted identity BCCID of the bus controller; The method further comprises: The bus controller responds to the received instruction to communicate with the target terminal device, wherein the instruction carries the remote terminal device identifier RTID of the target remote terminal i ; The bus controller determines the remote terminal equipment identifier RTID i Determine the remote terminal address RT of the target remote terminal i ; The bus controller receives the remote terminal address RT of the target remote terminal according to the remote terminal address RT i Communicate with the target terminal device.
6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The method further comprises: In the BC Authentication Vector MAC BC1 and the BC authentication vector MAC BC2 The same, and the serial number SQNBC i If the serial number SQNRT is consistent with the serial number SQNRT of the bus controller pre-stored in the terminal device, the terminal device uses the SQNRT+1 as the updated SQNRT value; The RT Authentication Vector MAC RT1 and the RT authentication vector MAC RT2 If the bus controller is consistent, the SQNBC i +1 as updated SQNBC i value.
7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that The encryption algorithm used in the communication process between the bus controller and the remote terminal is a symmetric encryption algorithm.
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