Platform identity authentication method based on TCM (Trusted Cryptography Module) under dual-system architecture

Abstract

The invention discloses a platform identity authentication method based on a TCM (Trusted Cryptography Module) under a dual-system architecture. The platform identity authentication method comprises the following steps: S1, a trusted management center; and S2, a cloud management system. And S3, a dual-system architecture server platform. And S4, a threat analysis monitoring platform. On the basis of credible starting and static measurement, a safe and reliable identity authentication mechanism is provided, the mechanism can perform credible authentication on the identity of the platform, and the method is particularly suitable for scenes such as file transmission and virtual machine credible migration in a cloud computing environment. Identity authentication is carried out on the platforms through the TCM module, legality of the identities of the platforms is ensured, credible authentication is carried out on the identities of the two platforms before data on a certain platform is migrated to the other platform, migration can be initiated after authentication is passed, and safety of the data is ensured. By combining the dual-system architecture, the method can effectively separate the processes of key generation and communication with the trusted management center, so that the stability of system operation is improved while the authentication security is guaranteed.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of information security, and in particular to a platform identity authentication method based on TCM under a dual-system architecture. Background Art

[0002] Trusted computing is a secure computing technology based on the collaborative work of hardware and software. It takes the trusted chip as the root of trust, the motherboard as the platform, the software as the core, and the network as the link, forming a self-protection systematic security framework. The characteristic of this mechanism is that while the terminal device is performing computing operations, it can also perform its own security protection, ensuring that the calculation results are always in line with expectations in various environments, and the entire process is monitorable and controllable. The core idea of ​​trusted computing is the transmission of the trust chain: starting from the root of trust, to the hardware platform, operating system, and finally extending to the application, forming a trust chain. Each level extends trust through measurement and certification, and ultimately covers the entire system, thereby ensuring the security and credibility of the computer system and network.

[0003] Trusted Computing 3.0 is an innovative concept proposed by my country for cyberspace security. The core of this concept is to establish a dual system architecture, including computing components and protection components. The original computing component function process remains unchanged, and a logically independent protection component is established in parallel, which can actively implement trusted monitoring of computing components. Active immune trusted computing emphasizes security protection while the system is operating, so that the computing results are always in line with expectations, and the entire computing process is measurable and controllable without interference.

[0004] Trusted Cryptography Module (TCM) is a hardware security module widely used in trusted computing platforms to provide basic security functions and encryption support. As the root of trust of the system, TCM implements a series of security mechanisms through hardware to ensure the integrity, authentication and data protection of the computing system. The main functions of TCM include integrity measurement, secure storage, authentication, encryption and decryption, etc. During system startup and operation, TCM measures key components (such as BIOS, boot loader and operating system) and stores the generated hash values ​​in the platform configuration register (PCR) to detect the integrity of the system and prevent tampering. In addition, TCM provides secure storage of encryption keys to ensure that sensitive data (such as encryption keys and certificates) will not be accessed or tampered with without authorization. Even if the attacker obtains the storage medium, the data is still encrypted. TCM also provides authentication for devices by generating unique identity keys to ensure that the identity of the device in the network environment is credible. Hardware-based encryption, decryption and digital signature services are also a major function of TCM. These cryptographic operations are completed in hardware, making them more secure and efficient. Through these functions, TCM provides integrity, identity credibility and data security for computing platforms, and is widely used in personal computing devices, servers and other devices to ensure the security of systems and data.

[0005] Remote attestation is an important security mechanism in trusted computing. It can verify the trust status of a computing platform. Platform identity authentication is a core part of remote attestation. During the identity authentication process, the platform proves the legitimacy of its identity through the endorsement key (EK) and authentication key (AK) of TCM. The trusted management center ensures that the identity of the platform is authentic and trustworthy by verifying the EK certificate and AK public key. This process ensures that only authenticated trusted platforms can participate in key business operations in the network, while preventing unauthorized devices or systems from impersonating legitimate platforms to enter the system.

[0006] The patent name of CN109951276 A is "Remote identity authentication method for embedded devices based on TPM". It is characterized by: taking advantage of trusted computing integrity measurement, key management and platform binding, first making a trusted measurement of the platform configuration, then expanding the measurement value to the platform configuration register, and using this measurement value as one of the authentication information. The endorsement key (EK) in the TPM chip is bound to the platform identity, and the identity authentication key (AIK) is generated by the endorsement key (EK), and then the identity authentication key (AIK) signs the platform configuration measurement value. In this way, the platform identity can be verified and the platform integrity can also be authenticated. However, this method does not design a specific protection mechanism for complex attacks (such as replay attacks). At the same time, this method mainly relies on a single system architecture and does not adopt a dual system architecture, so security cannot be guaranteed.

[0007] The patent name of CN114679284 A is "Trusted Remote Attestation System and Its Storage, Verification Method, and Storage Medium", which is characterized by: multiple trusted remote attestation servers form an alliance chain, which is used to store the expected value of device measurement. After receiving the integrity verification request of the prover initiated by the challenger and forwarding the integrity measurement data of the prover, the actual integrity measurement data of the prover is compared with the expected value of the measurement, and the verification result of the prover is obtained and returned to the challenger; the challenger is used to initiate the integrity verification request of the prover to the alliance chain and forward the integrity measurement data of the prover to the prover after receiving the integrity measurement data sent by the prover. This method does not have a central system, and the challenger will not be unable to provide remote integrity verification services normally due to the inaccessibility of the central system or problems with the server. However, this method relies more on external alliance chain servers for integrity verification, does not use hardware-level security module TPM, and does not adopt a dual system architecture, which does not conform to the active measurement concept of Trusted Computing 3.0.

[0008] The patent name of CN 114547656 A is "A two-stage remote attestation method based on Intel SGX in a cloud environment", which is characterized by: by modifying the vTPM architecture of KVM and introducing Intel SGX technology to create a trusted execution environment TEE to build a secure remote attestation agent center VRAC. The software-simulated vTPM instance is created inside the remote attestation agent service center, and Intel SGX is used to protect the vTPM instance and NVRAM data from memory leakage attacks and cracking attacks. The challenger and the prover are protected from man-in-the-middle attacks through a new two-stage remote attestation protocol. The adaptive periodic dynamic measurement scheme not only ensures the operational security of cloud computing nodes, but also reduces the performance overhead caused by the introduction of dynamic measurement. However, this method uses a software-simulated virtual TPM (vTPM) for identity authentication and integrity verification, rather than relying on a more secure hardware TPM. Its dependence on virtualization and Intel SGX makes it difficult to apply in non-virtualized and non-Intel architecture devices. And without adopting a dual architecture, it cannot meet the requirements of active immune trusted computing. Summary of the invention

[0009] Based on TCM, the present invention proposes a platform identity authentication method based on a dual-architecture, which provides a safe and reliable identity authentication mechanism based on trusted startup and static measurement. The mechanism can perform trusted authentication on the identity of the platform, and is particularly suitable for scenarios such as file transfer and trusted migration of virtual machines in cloud computing environments.

[0010] The purpose of the present invention is to authenticate the platform through the TCM module after the platform is started to ensure the legitimacy of the platform identity, and to authenticate the identities of both platforms before the data on a certain platform needs to be migrated to another platform. The migration can be initiated only after the authentication is passed to ensure the security of the data. By combining the dual system architecture, the present invention can effectively separate the generation of keys and the process of communicating with the trusted management center, thereby improving the stability of system operation while ensuring the security of authentication.

[0011] The solution of the present invention is a platform identity authentication method based on TCM under a dual-system architecture, which includes four parts:

[0012] S1: Trusted Management Center. The Trusted Management Center owns and can use the physical TCM chip normally. It is mainly responsible for providing a remote attestation interface for the cloud management system to call, and for initiating a remote attestation challenge to the server platform. Through encryption, decryption, and challenge-response mechanisms, it generates an encrypted challenge credential and sends it to the source server platform. It completes the platform identity authentication process and returns the authentication result to the cloud management system through the interface.

[0013] S2: Cloud management system. The cloud management system is responsible for the management and scheduling of cloud resources. It plays the role of coordinator in the entire remote attestation process. During the data migration of the server platform, the server platform will first initiate a migration request to the cloud management system. The cloud management system calls the remote attestation interface on the trusted management center, and the trusted management center initiates a remote attestation challenge to the server platform. The remote attestation interface returns the platform's identity authentication result to the cloud management system, and the cloud management system decides whether to allow the migration operation based on the result.

[0014] S3: Dual-architecture server platform. The server platform consists of a computing component and a protection component. Since only the protection component is directly connected to the TCM chip, the computing component is isolated from the protection component. The computing component acts as a bridge to communicate with the trusted management center on the one hand and with the protection component on the other. After receiving the challenge from the trusted management center, the computing component communicates with the protection component. The protection component calls the TCM chip to generate keys and perform data encryption and decryption operations. After completion, the key and data are sent to the computing component, which then sends them to the trusted management center.

[0015] S4: Threat Analysis and Monitoring Platform. The Threat Analysis and Monitoring Platform is responsible for real-time monitoring and analysis of security threats in the entire identity authentication process to ensure the security of the platform. By introducing machine learning algorithms, the Threat Analysis and Monitoring Platform can automatically analyze the logs and data streams generated during the operation of the platform and predict potential security threats. Through continuous learning and updating, the Threat Analysis and Monitoring Platform can dynamically identify abnormal behaviors and take defensive measures in a timely manner. At the same time, the platform has an adaptive security policy function that can dynamically adjust the system's security policy based on the currently detected attack mode.

[0016] Furthermore, the experimental environment is deployed with dual architecture based on Trusted 3.0, the computing component environment is Linux operating system, the protection component environment is Linux operating system, and the TCM is connected. The specific implementation includes the following process.

[0017] Process 1: Initialization phase.

[0018] The trusted management center implements an HTTP server and uses the MHD_start_daemon() function in the libmicrohttpd library to create an HTTP daemon based on an internal polling thread, which listens to the specified port and processes incoming requests. The cloud management system uses the GET request to specify the interface, allowing the trusted management center to initiate a remote proof challenge to the server platform. The trusted management center and the computing component of the server platform communicate using Linux Socket. The computing component of the server platform calls listen() to start listening and wait for the connection request from the trusted management center. The computing component and the protection component of the server platform also communicate through Linux Socket. Both the computing component and the protection component act as both the server and the client, respectively realizing the functions of listening to each other's connection and actively connecting to each other. The threat analysis and monitoring platform is started to monitor security threats in real time throughout the authentication process and communication process.

[0019] Process 2: Platform identity authentication.

[0020] Platform identity authentication is the process of proving the true identity of the trusted computing platform through identity credentials. It uses the trusted management center to verify the EK certificate of the server platform TCM chip and generate encrypted credentials for the server platform to decrypt, thereby proving the identity of the trusted platform. After the trusted management center initiates a remote attestation challenge to the server platform, the server platform computing component sends a message to the protection component, which reads the EK certificate from the TCM chip and uses the TCM chip to generate the AK public key. After the generation, the file is sent to the computing component. The computing component sends the read EK certificate and the generated AK public key to the trusted management center; the trusted management center uses OpenSSL to verify the validity of the received EK certificate. If the EK certificate verification is successful, the trusted management center extracts the EK public key in the server platform TCM chip from the EK certificate; the trusted management center imports the received AK public key to calculate AKName, and then loads the EK public key and AKName to generate encryption credentials; then the trusted management center sends the encrypted credentials to the server platform computing component, and the computing component forwards the encrypted credentials to the protection component, which uses the EK private key of the TCM chip to decrypt and sends the decrypted credentials to the computing component; the computing component sends the decrypted credentials to the trusted management center, and the trusted management center compares the decrypted credentials and the original data. If the comparison is successful, the server platform identity authentication is successful.

[0021] Process 3: Threat analysis and dynamic adjustment;

[0022] The threat analysis and monitoring platform continuously runs and dynamically monitors the data flow and communication behavior in the authentication process. Once abnormal behavior or potential attack is detected, the threat analysis and monitoring platform will immediately notify the cloud management system and automatically adjust the security policy according to the specific threat pattern. The threat analysis and monitoring platform will record in detail the key operations and data interactions in each authentication step, including the initiation of remote attestation requests, the generation and transmission of TCM keys, and the generation and decryption of encrypted credentials, for security personnel to analyze and judge.

[0023] Compared with the prior art, the present invention is based on a dual-system architecture, in which the computing component and the protection component work closely together in the entire identity authentication process. The computing component is responsible for communication coordination and data transmission, while the protection component is responsible for the interaction and encryption operations of the TCM chip. Through the division of labor in the dual system, the system achieves a high degree of security, ensuring the stability of the platform's identity authentication and the credibility of remote proof. The identity authentication process ensures the authenticity of the device's identity through TCM, and uses the endorsement key (EK) and authentication key (AK) in TCM to prevent identity forgery. By concentrating TCM operations in the protection component and isolating it from the computing component that performs computing tasks, the dual-system architecture can effectively reduce security risks. This architecture not only improves the platform's anti-attack capabilities, but also ensures the high availability and stability of the system. The introduced threat analysis and monitoring platform monitors data flows and behaviors in real time through machine learning algorithms, detects potential threats, and dynamically adjusts security policies based on attack patterns, while recording and analyzing logs to ensure the security and credibility of the system in a complex network environment. Through the above methods, the platform can provide higher security in complex network environments, especially in scenarios such as cloud computing that are vulnerable to remote attacks, further ensuring the credibility and security of the platform, in line with the basic idea of ​​Trusted Computing 3.0. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0024] Figure 1 It is a platform identity authentication model based on a trusted management center.

[0025] Figure 2 This is a timing diagram of platform identity authentication based on TCM in a dual-system architecture.

[0026] Figure 3 The following is a flow chart of the platform identity authentication based on TCM in a dual-system architecture. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0027] The present invention is described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments.

[0028] like Figure 1 The figure shows the platform identity authentication model based on the trusted management center.

[0029] like Figure 2The figure shows the timing diagram of platform identity authentication based on TCM in a dual-system architecture.

[0030] like Figure 3 The figure shows the platform identity authentication flow chart based on TCM under the dual architecture.

[0031] The purpose of the present invention is to authenticate the platform through the TCM module after the platform is started to ensure the legitimacy of the platform identity, and to authenticate the identities of both platforms before the data on a certain platform needs to be migrated to another platform. The migration can be initiated only after the authentication is passed to ensure the security of the data. By combining the dual system architecture, the present invention can effectively separate the generation of keys and the process of communicating with the trusted management center, thereby improving the stability of system operation while ensuring the security of authentication.

[0032] The solution of the present invention is a platform identity authentication method based on TCM under a dual-system architecture, which mainly includes three parts:

[0033] Part 1: Trusted Management Center. The trusted management center owns and can use the physical TCM chip normally. It is mainly responsible for providing a remote attestation interface for the cloud management system to call and initiating a remote attestation challenge to the server platform. It generates an encrypted challenge credential through encryption, decryption and challenge-response mechanism and sends it to the source server platform. It completes the main process of platform identity authentication and returns the authentication result to the cloud management system through the interface.

[0034] Part 2: Cloud Management System. The cloud management system is mainly responsible for the management and scheduling of cloud resources. It plays the role of coordinator in the entire remote attestation process. Taking the server platform data migration as an example, the platform will first initiate a migration request to the cloud management system. The cloud management system calls the remote attestation interface on the trusted management center, and the trusted management center initiates a remote attestation challenge to the server platform. The remote attestation interface returns the platform's identity authentication result to the cloud management system, and the cloud management system decides whether to allow the migration operation based on the result.

[0035] Part 3: Dual-architecture server platform. The server platform consists of computing components and protection components. Since only the protection component is directly connected to the TCM chip, and the computing component and the protection component are isolated, if you want to send the key and other data generated by the TCM to the trusted management center, you must rely on the computing component as a bridge to communicate with the trusted management center on the one hand and with the protection component on the other. After receiving the challenge from the trusted management center, the computing component communicates with the protection component, which calls the TCM chip to perform key generation, data encryption and decryption, and other operations. After completion, it sends the key and data to the computing component, which then sends them to the trusted management center.

[0036] Part 4: Threat Analysis and Monitoring Platform. The Threat Analysis and Monitoring Platform is responsible for real-time monitoring and analysis of security threats in the entire identity authentication process to ensure the security of the platform. By introducing machine learning algorithms, the platform can automatically analyze the logs and data streams generated during the operation of the platform and predict potential security threats, such as replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks. Through continuous learning and updating, the Threat Analysis and Monitoring Platform can dynamically identify abnormal behaviors and take defensive measures in a timely manner. At the same time, the platform has an adaptive security policy function that can dynamically adjust the system's security policy based on the currently detected attack mode.

[0037] The present invention is based on the Trusted 3.0 technical solution, adopts a dual-architecture deployment experimental environment, the computing component environment is a Linux operating system, the protection component environment is a Linux operating system, and is connected to TCM, which has certain versatility and effectiveness. The specific implementation includes the following process.

[0038] Process 1: Initialization phase.

[0039] The Trusted Management Center implements a simple HTTP server. It uses the MHD_start_daemon() function in the libmicrohttpd library to create an HTTP daemon based on an internal polling thread, which listens to the specified port and processes incoming requests. The cloud management system can enable the Trusted Management Center to initiate a remote proof challenge to the server platform by requesting the specified interface through GET. At the same time, the Trusted Management Center and the computing component of the server platform communicate using Linux Socket. The computing component of the server platform calls listen() to start listening and wait for the connection request from the Trusted Management Center. The computing component and the protection component of the server platform also communicate through Linux Socket. The computing component and the protection component act as both the server and the client, respectively realizing the functions of listening to each other's connection and actively connecting to each other. At the same time, the threat analysis and monitoring platform is started to monitor security threats in real time during the entire identity authentication process and communication process.

[0040] Process 2: Platform identity authentication.

[0041] Platform identity authentication is the process of proving the true identity of a trusted computing platform through identity credentials. In this solution, a trusted management center is used to verify the EK certificate of the server platform TCM chip, and to generate encrypted credentials for the server platform to decrypt, thereby proving the identity of the trusted platform. After the trusted management center initiates a remote attestation challenge to the server platform, the server platform computing component sends a message to the protection component, which reads the EK certificate from the TCM chip and uses the TCM chip to generate an AK public key. After the generation, the file is sent to the computing component. The computing component sends the read EK certificate and the generated AK public key to the trusted management center; the trusted management center uses OpenSSL to verify the validity of the received EK certificate. If the EK certificate verification is successful, the trusted management center extracts the EK public key in the server platform TCM chip from the EK certificate; the trusted management center imports the received AK public key to calculate AKName, and then loads the EK public key and AKName to generate encryption credentials; then the trusted management center sends the encrypted credentials to the server platform computing component, and the computing component forwards the encrypted credentials to the protection component, which uses the EK private key of the TCM chip to decrypt and sends the decrypted credentials to the computing component; the computing component sends the decrypted credentials to the trusted management center, and the trusted management center compares the decrypted credentials and the original data. If the comparison is successful, the server platform identity authentication is successful.

[0042] Process 3: Threat analysis and dynamic adjustment

[0043] The threat analysis and monitoring platform continuously runs and dynamically monitors the data flow and communication behavior in the authentication process. Once abnormal behavior or potential attack is detected, the platform will immediately notify the cloud management system and automatically adjust the security policy according to the specific threat model. In addition, the platform will record in detail the key operations and data interactions in each authentication step, including the initiation of remote attestation requests, the generation and transmission of TCM keys, the generation and decryption process of encrypted credentials, etc., for security personnel to analyze and judge.

[0044] Compared with the prior art, the present invention is based on a dual-system architecture, in which the computing component and the protection component work closely together in the entire identity authentication process. The computing component is responsible for communication coordination and data transmission, while the protection component is responsible for the interaction and encryption operations of the TCM chip. Through the division of labor in the dual system, the system achieves a high degree of security, ensuring the stability of the platform's identity authentication and the credibility of remote proof. The identity authentication process ensures the authenticity of the device's identity through TCM, and uses the endorsement key (EK) and authentication key (AK) in TCM to prevent identity forgery. By concentrating TCM operations in the protection component and isolating it from the computing component that performs computing tasks, the dual-system architecture can effectively reduce security risks. This architecture not only improves the platform's anti-attack capabilities, but also ensures the high availability and stability of the system. The introduced threat analysis and monitoring platform monitors data flows and behaviors in real time through machine learning algorithms, detects potential threats, and dynamically adjusts security policies based on attack patterns, while recording and analyzing logs to ensure the security and credibility of the system in a complex network environment. Through the above methods, the platform can provide higher security in complex network environments, especially in scenarios such as cloud computing that are vulnerable to remote attacks, further ensuring the credibility and security of the platform, in line with the basic idea of ​​Trusted Computing 3.0.

Claims

1. A platform identity authentication method based on TCM under a dual-system architecture, characterized in that: It consists of four parts: S1: Trusted Management Center; The trusted management center owns and can use the physical TCM chip normally. It is mainly responsible for providing a remote attestation interface for the cloud management system to call, and initiating a remote attestation challenge to the server platform. Through encryption, decryption and challenge-response mechanism, it generates an encrypted challenge credential and sends it to the source server platform. Complete the platform identity authentication process and return the authentication results to the cloud management system through the interface; S2: cloud management system; The cloud management system is responsible for the management and scheduling of cloud resources. It plays the role of coordinator in the entire remote attestation process. During the data migration of the server platform, the server platform will first initiate a migration request to the cloud management system. The cloud management system calls the remote attestation interface on the trusted management center, and the trusted management center initiates a remote attestation challenge to the server platform. The remote attestation interface returns the platform's identity authentication result to the cloud management system, and the cloud management system decides whether to allow the migration operation based on the result. S3: dual-architecture server platform; The server platform consists of a computing component and a protection component. Since only the protection component is directly connected to the TCM chip, the computing component and the protection component are isolated. The computing component acts as a bridge to communicate with the trusted management center on the one hand and with the protection component on the other hand. After receiving the challenge from the trusted management center, the computing component communicates with the protection component. The protection component calls the TCM chip to generate keys and perform data encryption and decryption operations. After completion, the key and data are sent to the computing component, which then sends them to the trusted management center. S4: Threat Analysis and Monitoring Platform; The threat analysis and monitoring platform is responsible for real-time monitoring and analysis of security threats in the entire identity authentication process to ensure the security of the platform; the threat analysis and monitoring platform introduces machine learning algorithms to automatically analyze the logs and data streams generated during the operation of the platform and predict potential security threats; through continuous learning and updating, the threat analysis and monitoring platform can dynamically identify abnormal behaviors and take defensive measures in a timely manner; at the same time, the platform has an adaptive security policy function that can dynamically adjust the system's security policy based on the currently detected attack mode.

2. According to a TCM-based platform identity authentication method under a dual-system architecture according to claim 1, it is characterized in that: Based on Trusted 3.0, a dual-architecture experimental environment is deployed. The computing component environment is the Linux operating system, the protection component environment is the Linux operating system, and is connected to TCM.

3. According to a TCM-based platform identity authentication method under a dual-system architecture according to claim 1, it is characterized in that: The initialization phase includes the following: The trusted management center implements an HTTP server and uses the MHD_start_daemon() function in the libmicrohttpd library to create an HTTP daemon based on an internal polling thread, which listens to the specified port and processes incoming requests. The cloud management system uses the GET request to specify the interface, allowing the trusted management center to initiate a remote proof challenge to the server platform. The trusted management center and the computing component of the server platform communicate using Linux Socket. The computing component of the server platform calls listen() to start listening and wait for the connection request from the trusted management center. The computing component and protection component of the server platform also communicate through Linux Socket. Both the computing component and the protection component act as both the server and the client, respectively realizing the functions of listening to each other's connection and actively connecting to each other. The threat analysis and monitoring platform is started to monitor security threats in real time during the entire identity authentication process and communication process.

4. According to a dual-system architecture TCM-based platform identity authentication method according to claim 1, it is characterized in that: Platform identity authentication includes the following: Platform identity authentication is the process of proving the true identity of a trusted computing platform through identity credentials. It uses a trusted management center to verify the EK certificate of the server platform TCM chip and generates encrypted credentials for the server platform to decrypt, thereby proving the identity of the trusted platform. After the trusted management center initiates a remote attestation challenge to the server platform, the server platform computing component sends a message to the protection component. The protection component reads the EK certificate from the TCM chip and uses the TCM chip to generate the AK public key. After the generation, the file is sent to the computing component. The computing component sends the read EK certificate and the generated AK public key to the trusted management center. The trusted management center uses OpenSSL to verify the validity of the received EK certificate. If the EK certificate verification is successful, the trusted management center extracts the EK public key in the server platform TCM chip from the EK certificate; the trusted management center imports the received AK public key to calculate AKName, and then loads the EK public key and AKName to generate an encrypted credential; then the trusted management center sends the encrypted credential to the server platform computing component, which forwards the encrypted credential to the protection component, which decrypts it using the EK private key of the TCM chip and sends the decrypted credential to the computing component; The computing component sends the decryption credentials to the trusted management center, which compares the decryption credentials with the original data. If the comparison is successful, the server platform identity authentication is passed.

5. According to a TCM-based platform identity authentication method under a dual-system architecture according to claim 1, it is characterized in that: Threat analysis and dynamic adjustment are as follows: The threat analysis and monitoring platform runs continuously and dynamically monitors the data flow and communication behavior in the authentication process; once abnormal behavior or potential attack is detected, the threat analysis and monitoring platform will immediately notify the cloud management system and automatically adjust the security policy according to the specific threat pattern; the threat analysis and monitoring platform will record in detail the key operations and data interactions in each authentication step, including the initiation of remote attestation requests, the generation and transmission of TCM keys, and the generation and decryption of encrypted credentials, for security personnel to analyze and judge.

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