Anti-decoy and anti-invasion method for deep coupling integrated navigation

Through combined filtering, vector tracking and message demodulation in deep coupled combined navigation system, combined with AR-SRCKF algorithm and CADLL, the problem of deception intrusion detection in deep coupled navigation system is solved, and effective suppression and authenticity of deception signals are achieved. Fast tracking of signals improves the robustness and accuracy of the system.

CN118915096AInactive Publication Date: 2024-11-08CHENGDU AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY GROUP
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202410968787.4
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-07-19
Publication Date
2024-11-08
Estimated Expiration
Not applicable · inactive patent

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The prior art is difficult to effectively detect and suppress deception intrusion in deep coupled combined navigation systems, resulting in the receiver being easily tracked by deception signal and it is difficult to quickly re-track the real signal.

Method used

Using the anti-deception and intrusion method of deep-coupled combined navigation, through combined filtering, vector tracking, message demodulation, AR-SRCKF algorithm and joint monitoring, CADLL and prefilters are used to detect deception signals, and combined with ephemeris information for signal capture and Tracking to improve the robustness of the system.

Benefits of technology

Effectively detect and suppress deception signals, improve the anti-deception and intrusion ability of the navigation system, ensure that the receiver can quickly re-track the real signal, and enhance the robustness and accuracy of the system.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention belongs to the field of satellite navigation testing, and particularly relates to a deep coupling integrated navigation decoy and infestation resisting method, which comprises the following steps of: reducing the search range of carrier frequency and code phase by utilizing a combined filtering result, and reducing the possibility of capturing decoy and infestation. The loop control precision is improved by using the predicted average value; estimating parameters of each signal component by using CADLL, and obtaining signal power estimation through pre-filtering to detect interference; detecting the demodulated navigation message, and judging whether the demodulated navigation message is maliciously changed or not; judging whether there is decoy and intrusions or not through distance comparison; monitoring results in vector tracking, message demodulation and combined filtering processes are collected through a combined monitor, and whether decoy and intrusions exist in a receiver channel or not is comprehensively judged. According to the method, the characteristics of the deep coupling integrated navigation system are fully utilized, so that all aspects of the system are mutually assisted to jointly resist decoy and infestation, and the robustness of the system is improved.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of satellite navigation testing, and in particular to an anti-deception and interference method for deep-coupled combined navigation. Background Art

[0002] For general anti-spoofing navigation methods, when the receiver channel is stably tracking the real signal, it is easy to be deceived and track the decoy signal. When the receiver tracks the decoy signal for some reason, it is difficult to detect the interference and quickly re-track the real signal.

[0003] In the prior art, for example, there is a Chinese invention patent with patent application number CN202010979968.9 and the name is "Position Masking System Based on Software Defined Radio Platform", which discloses a position masking system based on a software defined radio platform, including a pseudo satellite signal transmitting device, an internal receiver and a temperature compensated crystal oscillator. The pseudo satellite signal transmitting device obtains time and satellite ephemeris information through the internal receiver, and performs time training through the temperature compensated crystal oscillator. By adjusting the phase delay and Doppler frequency shift of the pseudo satellite signal in real time, the fixed pseudo satellite can simulate the trajectory of a real satellite in orbit. For any pseudo satellite signal coverage range, the positioning results of the navigation receiving terminal are all preset positioning points.

[0004] The key to GPS / INS integrated navigation is the introduction of INS to assist the entire system, while the INS navigation solution itself is not directly affected by deception, providing a good "starting point" for the anti-interference of integrated navigation. The GPS / INS deep-coupled integrated navigation is the cutting-edge technology of integrated navigation. It deeply mines and utilizes INS information, and uses the deep mutual assistance of GPS and INS to achieve a navigation system with higher accuracy and better robustness. How to effectively detect and suppress deception intrusion in a deeply coupled integrated navigation system is an important guarantee for improving the anti-deception capability of the navigation system. Summary of the invention

[0005] In order to overcome the above problems existing in the existing technology, a method for anti-spoofing and intrusion prevention of deeply coupled integrated navigation is proposed. This method makes full use of the characteristics of the deeply coupled integrated navigation system, so that various aspects of the system can assist each other to carry out joint anti-spoofing and intrusion prevention to improve the robustness of the system.

[0006] In order to achieve the above technical effects, the technical solution of this application is as follows:

[0007] A method for anti-deception and intrusion of deep-coupled integrated navigation comprises the following steps:

[0008] S1: Capture: Use the results of combined filtering to predict the approximate range of Doppler frequency shift and code phase, reduce the search range of carrier frequency and code phase, and reduce the possibility of capturing intrusion;

[0009] S2: Vector tracking: Use the average error of position, velocity and acceleration prediction to calculate the control amount of the local NCO to improve the loop control accuracy;

[0010] The deep coupling structure based on CADLL is adopted, and the advantage of CADLL in accurately estimating the parameters of each signal component is utilized to suppress the influence of the IQ correlation values ​​of other signal components, thereby improving the accuracy of the frequency difference and phase difference output by the discrimination function and the robustness of the bias induction.

[0011] obtaining a power estimate of the signal through a pre-filter and detecting decoy intrusion by comparing the estimate with a preset power range;

[0012] S3: Message demodulation: After stable tracking, the navigation message can be demodulated, so that the existence of deception and intrusion can be judged by monitoring the navigation message update time interval and the rationality of the message parameters;

[0013] S4: Combined filtering: When CADLL fails to effectively suppress deception intrusion, the AR-SRCKF algorithm is used to suppress the influence of deception intrusion on the combined filtering;

[0014] By comparing the distance, we can determine whether there is unreasonable delay in the pseudo-range observation and whether there is deception or intrusion.

[0015] S5: Joint monitoring: The detection results of steps S2, S3 and S4 are integrated and joint detection is achieved by deceiving the non-existent coefficients;

[0016] S6: loop: when the signal tracked by the current receiver channel is determined to be a decoy, the signal parameters estimated by the next unit in CADLL are first used to quickly re-track. If the signal estimated by the next unit is still not a real signal, the next one is read until the last unit. When there is no real signal in the signal estimated by CADLL, the result of combined filtering is used to assist re-capture outside the range of decoy signal parameters.

[0017] When the signal tracked by the current receiver channel is determined to be a real signal, on the one hand, the result of combined filtering and ephemeris are used to jointly calculate the local NCO control amount to close the vector tracking loop; on the other hand, the result of combined filtering and ephemeris are used to assist in capturing the visible satellites that are not currently captured.

[0018] Furthermore, in S2, the power of the signal is estimated and the estimated value is compared with a preset power range to detect the deception intrusion. Specifically,

[0019] In a deeply coupled system, the pre-filter state vector is:

[0020] Aeq =Asinc(πf err ΔT)

[0021] In the formula, A eq is the actual signal amplitude caused by the frequency difference, A is the signal amplitude when there is no deviation, and f err is the frequency difference, △T is the time interval.

[0022] Therefore, the power estimate of the signal can be expressed as:

[0023]

[0024] Furthermore, the allowed signal power range is set. If The more the signal exceeds the upper limit of the range, the more likely it is to be a decoy intrusion. When the signal power exceeds 20 times the upper limit of the range, the signal is considered to be a decoy intrusion.

[0025] Furthermore, for the C / A component of the L1 channel, the allowed signal power range can be set to -158.5dBW to -153.0dBW. The more it exceeds -153.0dBW, the more likely it is to be a decoy intrusion. The threshold for completely identifying it as a decoy intrusion is set at -153.0+10lg20≈-140dBW. When the signal power exceeds 20 times of -153.0dBW, the signal is considered to be a decoy intrusion.

[0026] In order to conduct joint monitoring, a deception non-existence coefficient is defined here based on the above analysis:

[0027]

[0028] The deception non-existence coefficient will be sent to the joint detection module for identification.

[0029] Furthermore, S3 is implemented by adopting a navigation message monitoring method, and the navigation message monitoring method is performed from the navigation message update time interval monitoring, navigation message parameter rationality monitoring, satellite clock error correction parameter monitoring and ionospheric delay correction parameter monitoring.

[0030] Furthermore, the monitoring of the navigation message update time interval is specifically as follows: if the receiver records the last message update time, the current message data is different from the navigation message of the previous 12.5 minutes, and the current time is not within the preset range of about two hours from the last message update time, then it can be judged as a deception intrusion.

[0031] Furthermore, the method for estimating the expected range in the navigation message update time interval monitoring is as follows:

[0032] The radial relative speed of the satellite and the carrier is a constant value of 300m / s, so the relative position change caused by 2 hours is 300*2*3600=2160000m. Dividing this distance by the speed of light, the change in the update time difference can be obtained as:

[0033] Δt=2160000 / 3e8=0.0072s.

[0034] Furthermore, the rationality monitoring of navigation message parameters is specifically as follows: satellite ephemeris is used to calculate satellite coordinates. If spoofing intrusion modifies the satellite ephemeris parameters, it will cause errors in the satellite position. It can be identified based on empirical values. If it exceeds the range, it is considered that spoofing intrusion exists.

[0035] Furthermore, the satellite clock error correction parameter monitoring is specifically as follows: the satellite clock error correction parameter is the clock data reference time t oc and three polynomial coefficients a f0 ,a f1 ,a f2 , satellite clock error δt SV Expressed as

[0036] δt SV =a f0 +a f1 (tt oc )+a f2 (tt oc ) 2 +Δt r

[0037] Where t is the current GPS time, Δt r is the relative correction term, δt SV Less than 3.3ns. If the calculated satellite clock correction value exceeds this range, it is considered that spoofing intrusion exists.

[0038] Furthermore, the ionospheric delay correction parameter monitoring is as follows: the ionospheric delay of the signal depends on the electron concentration in the ionosphere. Since the correction rate of the ionospheric single-frequency delay correction is 75%, its order of magnitude is between several meters and tens of meters. If it exceeds this range, it is considered that there is deception intrusion.

[0039] Furthermore, in order to conduct joint monitoring, the deception non-existence coefficient is defined according to the empirical value:

[0040]

[0041] In the formula, ξ i is the variable currently being tested, Valuel1 and Value2 are thresholds preset based on empirical values, when ξ i ≤,Valuel1,Λ i=1, it is considered that there is no deception intrusion; when Value1<ξ i ≤Value2, It is believed that there may be interference, and the degree of deviation from the threshold is used to measure the possibility of interference; when ξ i >Value2,Λ i = 0, the current tracking signal is considered to be a deception intrusion, and finally Λ i Multiply cumulatively to obtain the navigation message comprehensive detection result Λ NavM

[0042]

[0043] Where N is the number of navigation message detection parameters.

[0044] Furthermore, the distance in S4 is more specifically:

[0045] Let ρ ion is the ionospheric delay equivalent distance, ρ trop The distance equivalent to the tropospheric delay, the receiver clock error is estimated to be δt u ,|P 1 P s | is the distance from the satellite position to the corrected inertial navigation position calculated by the ephemeris, and the reference value of the pseudorange is ρ r =|P 1 P 2 |+ρ ion +ρ trop +δt u c, and the pseudorange value ρ measured by the receiver is calculated using the receiving time t j Subtract the launch time t f Multiply it by the speed of light c to get ρ = (t j -t f )c, if ρ r If -ρ is greater than a preset threshold, it can be considered that there is an unreasonable delay in the pseudorange, and the signal of the channel may be deception or multipath.

[0046] Furthermore, in the satellite part, the ephemeris error and model error are 1.5~7.0m; satellite clock error is 6.0m; satellite perturbation is 1.0m; others are 1.4m; signal propagation: ionospheric refraction is about 75% correction rate, that is, 1.25~37.5m; process refraction is about 95% correction rate, that is, 0.114~1.0m; multipath effect is 1.2~10m; others are 0.5m; signal reception: receiver noise is 0.5m; others are 7.5m; AR-SRCKF: receiver clock error is less than 5m; carrier position error is 10m;

[0047] The pseudorange error of the deep coupling system should be less than 86.9m, which is about 0.289chip for the code phase. As long as the error caused by decoy intrusion exceeds this range, the signal tracked by the corresponding channel can be considered as a decoy signal.

[0048] Going a step further, we define the deception non-existence coefficient based on empirical values:

[0049]

[0050] In the formula, ζ d The variable currently being tested.

[0051] Furthermore, the joint detection in S8 is specifically as follows:

[0052] A joint interference detection module is set up in the system to collect detection results, and finally the identification of deception intrusion is obtained through the comprehensive deception non-existence coefficient. The deception non-existence coefficient reserves a question area, and the comprehensive deception non-existence coefficient is used to comprehensively evaluate whether the channel has deception intrusion. The comprehensive deception non-existence coefficient is defined as:

[0053] Λ Total =Λ P ·Λ NavM ·Λ d

[0054] If Total If the value is less than the preset threshold, the channel is considered to be disturbed; otherwise, the channel is considered to be normal.

[0055] The advantages of this application are:

[0056] The present invention proposes an anti-deception and intrusion method for deep-coupled integrated navigation, which fully utilizes the characteristics of the deep-coupled integrated navigation system and enables various aspects of the system to assist each other in joint anti-deception and intrusion, thereby improving the robustness of the system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0057] Figure 1 This is the flow chart of the anti-deception and intrusion system based on deep coupling. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0058] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the embodiments of the present application clearer, the technical solution in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present application, rather than all the embodiments. The components of the embodiments of the present application described and shown in the drawings here can be arranged and designed in various different configurations.

[0059] Therefore, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the present application provided in the accompanying drawings is not intended to limit the scope of the present application for which protection is sought, but merely represents selected embodiments of the present application. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in the field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present application.

[0060] It should be noted that similar reference numerals and letters denote similar items in the following drawings, and therefore, once an item is defined in one drawing, further definition and explanation thereof is not required in subsequent drawings.

[0061] In the description of the present application, it should be noted that the terms "upper", "vertical", "inner", "outer", etc. indicate the orientation or position relationship based on the orientation or position relationship shown in the drawings, or the orientation or position relationship in which the product of the application is usually placed when in use, or the orientation or position relationship commonly understood by those skilled in the art. They are only for the convenience of describing the present application and simplifying the description, and do not indicate or imply that the device or element referred to must have a specific orientation, be constructed and operated in a specific orientation, and therefore cannot be understood as a limitation on the present application. In addition, the terms "first", "second", etc. are only used to distinguish the description, and cannot be understood as indicating or implying relative importance.

[0062] In the description of this application, it should also be noted that, unless otherwise clearly specified and limited, the terms "set", "install", and "connect" should be understood in a broad sense, for example, it can be a fixed connection, a detachable connection, or an integral connection; it can be a mechanical connection or an electrical connection; it can be a direct connection, or it can be an indirect connection through an intermediate medium, or it can be the internal communication of two components. For ordinary technicians in this field, the specific meanings of the above terms in this application can be understood according to specific circumstances.

[0063] Example 1

[0064] A method for anti-deception and intrusion of deep-coupled integrated navigation comprises the following steps:

[0065] S1: Capture: Use the results of combined filtering to predict the approximate range of Doppler frequency shift and code phase, reduce the search range of carrier frequency and code phase, and reduce the possibility of capturing intrusion;

[0066] S2: Vector tracking: Since the identification function of the carrier and code is essentially to identify the average frequency and average phase errors within the pre-detection integration interval, the average error of the position, velocity and acceleration prediction is used to calculate the control amount of the local NCO to improve the loop control accuracy. The improvement of the loop control accuracy means that the influence of the decoy signal deviating from the real signal on the integral accumulation result is reduced, thereby suppressing the ability of the decoy tracking loop;

[0067] The deep coupling structure based on CADLL is adopted, and the advantage of CADLL in accurately estimating the parameters of each signal component is utilized to suppress the influence of the IQ correlation values ​​of other signal components, improve the accuracy of the frequency difference and phase difference output by the discrimination function, and improve the robustness of the bias, thus fundamentally suppressing the interference source;

[0068] obtaining a power estimate of the signal through a pre-filter and detecting decoy intrusion by comparing the estimate with a preset power range;

[0069] S3: Message demodulation: After stable tracking, the navigation message can be demodulated, so that the existence of deception and intrusion can be judged by monitoring the navigation message update time interval and the rationality of the message parameters;

[0070] S4: Combined filtering: When CADLL fails to effectively suppress decoy intrusion, the AR-SRCKF algorithm is used to suppress the influence of decoy intrusion on the combined filtering, prevent the loop control from gradually "deteriorating", and provide receiver clock error estimation and position estimation with reference value for the distance comparison method;

[0071] Through distance comparison, it is judged whether there is unreasonable delay in pseudo-range observation, whether there is deception or intrusion, and the receiver clock error and position information with reference value are obtained from combined filtering, and the satellite position information with reference value is obtained from the ephemeris.

[0072] S5: Joint monitoring: The detection results of steps S2, S3 and S4 are integrated, and joint detection is achieved by deceiving the non-existent coefficient to improve the detection probability;

[0073] S6: loop: when the joint monitoring module determines that the signal tracked by the current receiver channel is a decoy, it first quickly re-tracks through the signal parameters estimated by the next unit in CADLL. If the next unit estimated signal is still not a real signal, it reads the next one until the last unit. When there is no real signal in the signal estimated by CADLL, the result of combined filtering is used to assist re-capture outside the range of decoy signal parameters.

[0074] When the joint monitoring module determines that the signal tracked by the current receiver channel is a real signal, on the one hand, the combined filtering result and the ephemeris are used to jointly calculate the local NCO control amount to close the vector tracking loop; on the other hand, the combined filtering result and the ephemeris are used to assist in capturing the visible satellites that are not currently captured.

[0075] Example 2

[0076] A method for anti-deception and intrusion of deep-coupled integrated navigation comprises the following steps:

[0077] S1: Capture: Use the results of combined filtering to predict the approximate range of Doppler frequency shift and code phase, reduce the search range of carrier frequency and code phase, and reduce the possibility of capturing intrusion;

[0078] S2: Vector tracking: Since the identification function of the carrier and code is essentially to identify the average frequency and average phase errors within the pre-detection integration interval, the average error of the position, velocity and acceleration prediction is used to calculate the control amount of the local NCO to improve the loop control accuracy. The improvement of the loop control accuracy means that the influence of the decoy signal deviating from the real signal on the integral accumulation result is reduced, thereby suppressing the ability of the decoy tracking loop;

[0079] The deep coupling structure based on CADLL is adopted, and the advantage of CADLL in accurately estimating the parameters of each signal component is utilized to suppress the influence of the IQ correlation values ​​of other signal components, improve the accuracy of the frequency difference and phase difference output by the discrimination function, and improve the robustness of the bias, thus fundamentally suppressing the interference source;

[0080] obtaining a power estimate of the signal through a pre-filter and detecting decoy intrusion by comparing the estimate with a preset power range;

[0081] S3: Message demodulation: After stable tracking, the navigation message can be demodulated, so that the existence of deception and intrusion can be judged by monitoring the navigation message update time interval and the rationality of the message parameters;

[0082] S4: Combined filtering: When CADLL fails to effectively suppress decoy intrusion, the AR-SRCKF algorithm is used to suppress the influence of decoy intrusion on the combined filtering, prevent the loop control from gradually "deteriorating", and provide receiver clock error estimation and position estimation with reference value for the distance comparison method;

[0083] Through distance comparison, it is judged whether there is unreasonable delay in pseudo-range observation, whether there is deception or intrusion, and the receiver clock error and position information with reference value are obtained from combined filtering, and the satellite position information with reference value is obtained from the ephemeris.

[0084] S5: Joint monitoring: The detection results of steps S2, S3 and S4 are integrated, and joint detection is achieved by deceiving the non-existent coefficient to improve the detection probability;

[0085] S6: loop: when the joint monitoring module determines that the signal tracked by the current receiver channel is a decoy, it first quickly re-tracks through the signal parameters estimated by the next unit in CADLL. If the next unit estimated signal is still not a real signal, it reads the next one until the last unit. When there is no real signal in the signal estimated by CADLL, the result of combined filtering is used to assist re-capture outside the range of decoy signal parameters.

[0086] When the joint monitoring module determines that the signal tracked by the current receiver channel is a real signal, on the one hand, the combined filtering result and the ephemeris are used to jointly calculate the local NCO control amount to close the vector tracking loop; on the other hand, the combined filtering result and the ephemeris are used to assist in capturing the visible satellites that are not currently captured.

[0087] In S2, the power of the signal is estimated and the estimated value is compared with the preset power range to detect the deception intrusion. Specifically,

[0088] In a deeply coupled system, the pre-filter state vector is:

[0089] A eq =Asinc(πf err ΔT)

[0090] In the formula, A eq is the actual signal amplitude caused by the frequency difference, A is the signal amplitude when there is no deviation, and f err is the frequency difference, △T is the time interval.

[0091] Therefore, the power estimate of the signal can be expressed as:

[0092]

[0093] Set the allowed signal power range. The more the signal exceeds the upper limit of the range, the more likely it is to be a decoy intrusion. When the signal power exceeds 20 times the upper limit of the range, the signal is considered to be a decoy intrusion.

[0094] For the C / A component of the L1 channel, the allowed signal power range can be set to -158.5dBW to -153.0dBW. The more it exceeds -153.0dBW, the more likely it is to be a decoy intrusion. The threshold for completely identifying it as a decoy intrusion is set at -153.0+10lg20≈-140dBW. When the signal power exceeds 20 times of -153.0dBW, the signal is considered to be a decoy intrusion.

[0095] In order to conduct joint monitoring, a deception non-existence coefficient is defined here based on the above analysis:

[0096]

[0097] The deception non-existence coefficient will be sent to the joint detection module for identification.

[0098] S3 is implemented by the navigation message monitoring method. The total length of the navigation message is 12.5 minutes and it is updated every two hours. That is to say, the changes in the navigation message caused by the generative deception intrusion may be considered by the receiver as reasonable message updates. At the same time, because of the actual satellite constellation geometry, ionosphere troposphere environment and satellite clock, the parameters in the navigation message have a certain reasonable range. Therefore, the monitoring method of the navigation message can be carried out from the monitoring of the navigation message update time interval, the rationality of the navigation message parameters, the satellite clock error correction parameter monitoring and the ionosphere delay correction parameter monitoring.

[0099] The specific monitoring of the navigation message update time interval is as follows: if the receiver records the time of the last message update, the current message data is different from the navigation message of the previous 12.5 minutes, and the current time is not within the preset range of about two hours from the last message update time, then it can be judged as a deception intrusion.

[0100] The method for estimating the expected range in monitoring the navigation message update interval is as follows:

[0101] The main factors affecting the time difference are the change in the radial relative distance between the satellite and the carrier, the change in the ionosphere and troposphere, the receiver clock error, etc., but only the change in the relative distance has the greatest impact, and the other impacts are very small. Assuming that the radial relative speed of the satellite and the carrier is a constant value of 300m / s, the relative position change caused by 2 hours is 300*2*3600=2160000m. Dividing this distance by the speed of light, the change in the updated time difference can be obtained as:

[0102] Δt=2160000 / 3e8=0.0072s.

[0103] Furthermore, the rationality monitoring of navigation message parameters is as follows: satellite ephemeris is used to calculate satellite coordinates. If the satellite ephemeris parameters are modified by deception, the satellite position will be wrong. It can be identified based on empirical values, such as the square root of the major semi-axis of the satellite orbit. and the satellite orbit inclination i 0The range of variation is very small, among which the square root of the major semi-axis ranges from 5.153600E+003 to 5.153699E+003, so the coarse decision threshold can be set to 5.153000E+003 to 5.153999E+003, and the range of orbital inclination is 3.000000E-001 to 3.099999E-001, so the coarse decision threshold can be set to 3.000000E-001 to 3.999999E-001. If it exceeds this range, it is considered that there is deception intrusion.

[0104] Satellite clock error correction parameter monitoring is as follows: Satellite clock error correction parameter is the clock data reference time t oc and three polynomial coefficients a f0 ,a f1 ,a f2 , satellite clock error δt SV Expressed as

[0105] δt SV =a f0 +a f1 (tt oc )+a f2 (tt oc ) 2 +Δt r

[0106] Where t is the current GPS time, Δt r is the relative correction term, δt SV Less than 3.3ns. If the calculated satellite clock correction value exceeds this range, it is considered that spoofing intrusion exists.

[0107] The specific monitoring of ionospheric delay correction parameters is as follows: the ionospheric delay of the signal mainly depends on the electron concentration in the ionosphere. Since the correction rate of the ionospheric single-frequency delay correction is about 75%, its order of magnitude is between a few meters and tens of meters. If it exceeds this range, it is considered to be deceptive intrusion.

[0108] In order to conduct joint monitoring, the deception absence coefficient is defined according to the empirical value:

[0109]

[0110] In the formula, ξ i is the variable currently being tested, Valuel1 and Value2 are thresholds preset based on empirical values, when ξ i ≤,Valuel1,Λ i =1, it is considered that there is no deception intrusion; when Value1<ξ i ≤Value2, It is believed that there may be interference, and the degree of deviation from the threshold is used to measure the possibility of interference; when ξ i >Value2,Λ i = 0, the current tracking signal is considered to be a deception intrusion, and finally Λ i Multiply cumulatively to obtain the navigation message comprehensive detection result Λ NavM

[0111]

[0112] Where N is the number of navigation message detection parameters.

[0113] The distance in S4 is more specific as follows:

[0114] The satellite position error and ionosphere-troposphere delay error caused by the modification of the ephemeris are small. The distance comparison method can be used to determine whether unreasonable delays are introduced into the pseudorange. ion is the ionospheric delay equivalent distance, ρ trop The distance equivalent to the tropospheric delay, the receiver clock error is estimated to be δt u ,|P 1 P s | is the distance from the satellite position to the corrected inertial navigation position calculated by the ephemeris, and the reference value of the pseudorange is ρ r =|P 1 P 2 |+ρ ion +ρ trop +δt u c, and the pseudorange value ρ measured by the receiver is calculated using the receiving time t j Subtract the launch time t f Multiply it by the speed of light c to get ρ = (t j -t f )c, if ρ r If -ρ is greater than a preset threshold, it can be considered that there is an unreasonable delay in the pseudorange, and the signal of the channel may be deception or multipath.

[0115] Furthermore, in the satellite part, the ephemeris error and model error are 1.5~7.0m; satellite clock error is 6.0m; satellite perturbation is 1.0m; others are 1.4m; signal propagation: ionospheric refraction is about 75% correction rate, that is, 1.25~37.5m; process refraction is about 95% correction rate, that is, 0.114~1.0m; multipath effect is 1.2~10m; others are 0.5m; signal reception: receiver noise is 0.5m; others are 7.5m; AR-SRCKF: receiver clock error is less than 5m; carrier position error is 10m;

[0116] The pseudorange error of the deep coupling system should be less than 86.9m, which is about 0.289chip for the code phase. As long as the error caused by decoy intrusion exceeds this range, the signal tracked by the corresponding channel can be considered as a decoy signal.

[0117] Furthermore, in order to conduct joint monitoring, the deception non-existence coefficient is defined according to the empirical value:

[0118]

[0119] In the formula, ζ d The variable currently being tested.

[0120] The joint detection in S8 is specifically as follows:

[0121] A joint interference detection module is set up in the system to collect detection results, and finally the identification of deception intrusion is obtained through the comprehensive deception non-existence coefficient. The deception non-existence coefficient is not either zero or 1, but a questioning area is reserved. At this time, in order to better take into account the abnormality of each detection result, the comprehensive deception non-existence coefficient is finally used to comprehensively evaluate whether there is deception intrusion in the channel. The comprehensive deception non-existence coefficient is defined as:

[0122] Λ Total =Λ P ·Λ NavM ·Λ d

[0123] If Total If the value is less than the preset threshold, the channel is considered to be disturbed; otherwise, the channel is considered to be normal.

[0124] Example 3

[0125] S1: (Capture) Use the combined filtering results to reduce the search range of carrier frequency and code phase, reducing the possibility of capturing decoy intrusions.

[0126] S2: (Vector tracking) Use the predicted average value to improve loop control accuracy; use CADLL to estimate the parameters of each signal component to suppress the impact of other signal components on IQ correlation values; obtain signal power estimates through pre-filtering to detect interference

[0127] S3: (Message demodulation) Detect the demodulated navigation message to determine whether it has been maliciously modified.

[0128] S4: (Combined filtering) AR-SRCKF is used to suppress the influence of deception intrusion on combined filtering; the existence of deception intrusion is determined by distance comparison.

[0129] S5: Collect the monitoring results of vector tracking, message demodulation and combined filtering through the joint monitor, and make a comprehensive judgment on whether there is deception intrusion in the receiver channel.

Claims

1. A method for anti-deception and intrusion in deep-coupled integrated navigation. It is characterized in that The steps include: S1: Capture: Use the results of combined filtering to predict the approximate range of Doppler frequency shift and code phase, reduce the search range of carrier frequency and code phase, and reduce the possibility of capturing intrusion; S2: Vector tracking: Use the average error of position, velocity and acceleration prediction to calculate the control amount of the local NCO to improve the loop control accuracy; The deep coupling structure based on CADLL is adopted, and the advantage of CADLL in accurately estimating the parameters of each signal component is utilized to suppress the influence of the IQ correlation values ​​of other signal components, thereby improving the accuracy of the frequency difference and phase difference output by the discrimination function and the robustness of the bias induction. obtaining a power estimate of the signal through a pre-filter and detecting decoy intrusion by comparing the estimate with a preset power range; S3: Message demodulation: After stable tracking, the navigation message can be demodulated, so that the existence of deception and intrusion can be judged by monitoring the navigation message update time interval and the rationality of the message parameters; S4: Combined filtering: When CADLL fails to effectively suppress deception intrusion, the AR-SRCKF algorithm is used to suppress the influence of deception intrusion on the combined filtering; By comparing the distance, we can determine whether there is unreasonable delay in the pseudo-range observation and whether there is deception or intrusion. S5: Joint monitoring: The detection results of steps S2, S3 and S4 are integrated and joint detection is achieved by deceiving the non-existent coefficients; S6: loop: when the signal tracked by the current receiver channel is determined to be a decoy, the signal parameters estimated by the next unit in CADLL are first used to quickly re-track. If the signal estimated by the next unit is still not a real signal, the next one is read until the last unit. When there is no real signal in the signal estimated by CADLL, the result of combined filtering is used to assist re-capture outside the range of decoy signal parameters. When the signal tracked by the current receiver channel is determined to be a real signal, on the one hand, the result of combined filtering and ephemeris are used to jointly calculate the local NCO control amount to close the vector tracking loop; on the other hand, the result of combined filtering and ephemeris are used to assist in capturing the visible satellites that are not currently captured.

2. According to claim 1, a method for anti-deception and interference of deep-coupled integrated navigation, It is characterized in that In S2, the power of the signal is estimated and the estimated value is compared with the preset power range to detect the deception intrusion. Specifically, In a deeply coupled system, the pre-filter state vector is: A eq =Asinc(πf err ΔT) In the formula, A eq is the actual signal amplitude caused by the frequency difference, A is the signal amplitude when there is no deviation, and f err is the frequency difference, △T is the time interval; Therefore, the power estimate of the signal can be expressed as:

3. According to claim 2, a method for anti-deception and interference of deep-coupled integrated navigation, It is characterized in that Set the allowed signal power range. The more the signal exceeds the upper limit of the range, the more likely it is to be a decoy intrusion. When the signal power exceeds 20 times the upper limit of the range, the signal is considered to be a decoy intrusion.

4. The anti-deception and interference method of deep-coupled integrated navigation according to claim 3, It is characterized in that For the C / A component of the L1 channel, the allowed signal power range can be set to -158.5dBW to -153.0dBW. The more it exceeds -153.0dBW, the more likely it is to be a decoy intrusion. The threshold for completely identifying it as a decoy intrusion is set at -153.0+10lg20≈-140dBW. When the signal power exceeds 20 times of -153.0dBW, the signal is considered to be a decoy intrusion. In order to conduct joint monitoring, a deception non-existence coefficient is defined: The deception non-existence coefficient will be sent to the joint detection module for identification.

5. The anti-deception and interference method of deep-coupled integrated navigation according to claim 1, It is characterized in that The S3 is implemented by a navigation message monitoring method, and the navigation message monitoring method includes monitoring of the navigation message update time interval, monitoring of the rationality of navigation message parameters, monitoring of satellite clock error correction parameters and monitoring of ionospheric delay correction parameters.

6. The anti-deception and interference method of deep-coupled integrated navigation according to claim 5, It is characterized in that The specific monitoring of the navigation message update time interval is as follows: if the receiver records the time of the last message update, the current message data is different from the navigation message of the previous 12.5 minutes, and the current time is not within the preset range of about two hours from the last message update time, then it can be judged as a deception intrusion.

7. The anti-deception and interference method of deep-coupled integrated navigation according to claim 6, It is characterized in that The method for estimating the expected range in monitoring the navigation message update interval is as follows: The radial relative speed of the satellite and the carrier is a constant value of 300m / s, so the relative position change caused by 2 hours is 300*2*3600=2160000m. Dividing this distance by the speed of light, the change in the update time difference can be obtained as: Δt=2160000 / 3e8=0.0072s.

8. The anti-deception and interference method of deep-coupled integrated navigation according to claim 5, It is characterized in that The rationality monitoring of navigation message parameters is as follows: Satellite ephemeris is used to calculate satellite coordinates. If spoofing intrusion modifies the satellite ephemeris parameters, it will cause errors in the satellite position. It can be identified based on empirical values. If it exceeds the range, it is considered that spoofing intrusion exists.

9. The anti-deception and interference method of deep-coupled integrated navigation according to claim 5, It is characterized in that Satellite clock error correction parameter monitoring is as follows: Satellite clock error correction parameter is the clock data reference time t oc and three polynomial coefficients a f0 ,a f1 ,a f2 , satellite clock error δt SV Expressed as δt SV =a f0 +a f1 (t-t oc )+a f2 (t-t oc ) 2 +Δt r Where t is the current GPS time, Δt r is the relative correction term, δt SV Less than 3.3ns. If the calculated satellite clock correction value exceeds this range, it is considered that spoofing intrusion exists.

10. The anti-deception and interference method of deep-coupled integrated navigation according to claim 5, It is characterized in that The specific monitoring of ionospheric delay correction parameters is as follows: the ionospheric delay of the signal depends on the electron concentration in the ionosphere. Since the correction rate of the ionospheric single-frequency delay correction is 75%, its order of magnitude is between a few meters and tens of meters. If it exceeds this range, it is considered that there is deception intrusion.

11. The anti-deception and interference method of deep-coupled integrated navigation according to claim 10, Features ,,In order to carry out joint monitoring, the deception non-existence coefficient is defined according to the empirical value: In the formula, ξ i is the variable currently being tested, Valuel1 and Value2 are thresholds preset based on empirical values, when ξ i ≤,Valuel1,Λ i =1, it is considered that there is no deception intrusion; when Value1<ξ i ≤Value2, It is believed that there may be interference, and the degree of deviation from the threshold is used to measure the possibility of interference; when ξ i >Value2,Λ i = 0, the current tracking signal is considered to be a deception intrusion, and finally Λ i Multiply cumulatively to obtain the navigation message comprehensive detection result Λ NavM Where N is the number of navigation message detection parameters.

12. The anti-deception and interference method of deep-coupled integrated navigation according to claim 1, It is characterized in that The distance in S4 is more specific as follows: Let ρ ion is the ionospheric delay equivalent distance, ρ trop The distance equivalent to the tropospheric delay, the receiver clock error is estimated to be δt u ,|P 1 P s | is the distance from the satellite position to the corrected inertial navigation position calculated by the ephemeris, and the reference value of the pseudorange is ρ r =|P 1 P 2 |+ρ ion +ρ trop +δt u c, and the pseudorange value ρ measured by the receiver is calculated using the receiving time t j Subtract the launch time t f Multiply it by the speed of light c to get ρ = (t j -t f )c, if ρ r If -ρ is greater than a preset threshold, it can be considered that there is an unreasonable delay in the pseudorange, and the signal of the channel may be deception or multipath.

13. The anti-deception and interference method of deep-coupled integrated navigation according to claim 12, It is characterized in that In the satellite part, ephemeris error and model error are 1.5~7.0m; satellite clock error is 6.0m; satellite perturbation is 1.0m; others are 1.4m; signal propagation: ionospheric refraction has a correction rate of about 75%, that is, 1.25~37.5m; process refraction has a correction rate of about 95%, that is, 0.114~1.0m; multipath effect is 1.2~10m; others are 0.5m; signal reception: receiver noise is 0.5m; others are 7.5m; AR-SRCKF: receiver clock error is less than 5m; carrier position error is 10m; The pseudorange error of the deep coupling system should be less than 86.9m, which is about 0.289chip for the code phase. As long as the error caused by decoy intrusion exceeds this range, the signal tracked by the corresponding channel can be considered as a decoy signal.

14. The anti-deception and interference method of deep-coupled integrated navigation according to claim 13, It is characterized in that Define the deception non-existence coefficient based on empirical values: In the formula, ζ d The variable currently being tested.

15. The anti-deception and interference method of deep-coupled integrated navigation according to claim 1, It is characterized in that The joint detection in S8 is specifically as follows: A joint interference detection module is set up in the system to collect detection results, and finally the identification of deception intrusion is obtained through the comprehensive deception non-existence coefficient; the deception non-existence coefficient reserves a questioning area, and the comprehensive deception non-existence coefficient is used to comprehensively evaluate whether the channel has deception intrusion. The comprehensive deception non-existence coefficient is defined as: L Total =L P ·L NavM ·L d If Total If the value is less than the preset threshold, the channel is considered to be disturbed; otherwise, the channel is considered to be normal.

Citation Information

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