Method and device for analyzing expected function safety of laser radar and laser radar

CN118941085APending Publication Date: 2024-11-12SUTENG INNOVATION TECHNOLOGY CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411001615.6
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-07-24
Publication Date
2024-11-12

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Abstract

The embodiment of the invention discloses a safety analysis method and device for an expected function of a laser radar and the laser radar, and the method comprises the steps: determining the application function of the laser radar according to the product definition of the laser radar, carrying out the safety analysis of the laser radar based on a fault tree analysis method, and obtaining a dangerous triggering event causing the failure of the application function, the method comprises the steps that firstly, a danger triggering event is obtained, then risk assessment is conducted on the danger triggering event, a threat event is obtained, an optimization target is determined according to the threat event, the optimization target is decomposed to obtain expected function safety requirements, and finally laser radar product design, laser radar point cloud perception and automobile automatic driving are optimized based on the expected function safety requirements. The method can comprehensively analyze the expected function safety and effectively relieve the safety risk.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] Embodiments of the present invention relate to the field of laser radar technology, and in particular, to a method and device for analyzing the expected functional safety of a laser radar, and a laser radar. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of LiDAR technology, LiDAR products are widely used in the fields of autonomous driving, industrial control, etc. LiDAR products and LiDAR point cloud information need to meet functional safety requirements. However, in the process of complex autonomous driving scenarios, the functions of LiDAR systems will be limited to varying degrees by factors, which may lead to dangerous scenarios. Therefore, in the field of autonomous driving, as a supplement to the limitations of functional safety, expected functional safety is proposed to reduce the corresponding risks and ensure the safe application of autonomous driving.

[0003] The current expected functional safety analysis is all aimed at the intelligent driving level or the whole vehicle level. It does not start from the product characteristics and application perspective of the lidar itself to conduct the expected functional safety analysis, or it only focuses on the collection, quality evaluation and construction of scene data sets of the lidar point cloud. The analysis of the impact on the expected functional safety of the lidar is not comprehensive and complete, resulting in a higher safety risk of the lidar. Summary of the invention

[0004] In view of this, some embodiments of the present invention provide a method and device for analyzing the expected functional safety of a laser radar, and a laser radar, which can comprehensively analyze the expected functional safety of the laser radar and effectively alleviate safety risks.

[0005] In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for analyzing the expected functional safety of a laser radar, the method comprising:

[0006] Determining the application function of the laser radar according to the product definition of the laser radar;

[0007] Performing a safety analysis on the laser radar based on a fault tree analysis method to obtain a dangerous triggering event that causes the application function to fail;

[0008] Performing risk assessment on the danger triggering event to obtain a threat event, wherein the threat event is the danger triggering event with an unacceptable risk;

[0009] Determining an optimization target based on the threat event;

[0010] Decomposing the optimization target to obtain expected functional safety requirements;

[0011] Optimize LiDAR product design, LiDAR point cloud perception and vehicle autonomous driving based on the expected functional safety requirements.

[0012] In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides an electronic device, including:

[0013] at least one processor;

[0014] A memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein the memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor, the instructions being executed by the at least one processor so as to enable the at least one processor to perform the intended functional safety analysis method of the lidar as described above.

[0015] In a third aspect, a computer-readable storage medium is provided in an embodiment of the present invention, wherein the computer-readable storage medium stores computer-executable instructions, and the computer-executable instructions are used to enable a computer device to execute the expected functional safety analysis method of the laser radar as described above.

[0016] Beneficial effects of the embodiments of the present invention: Different from the prior art, the expected functional safety analysis method of the laser radar provided by the embodiments of the present invention first determines the application function of the laser radar according to the product definition of the laser radar, and then performs a safety analysis on the laser radar based on the fault tree analysis method to obtain the dangerous triggering events that cause the failure of the application function, and then performs a risk assessment on the dangerous triggering events to obtain threat events, wherein the threat event is a dangerous triggering event with unacceptable risk, and determines the optimization target based on the threat event, decomposes the optimization target to obtain the expected functional safety requirements, and finally optimizes the laser radar product design, laser radar point cloud perception and vehicle autonomous driving based on the expected functional safety requirements.

[0017] This expected functional safety analysis method conducts safety analysis on LiDAR based on the fault tree analysis method, and closely follows the product definition and principle of LiDAR, making the expected functional safety analysis more comprehensive and the optimization goals obtained more comprehensive. It also completes the optimization of LiDAR at all levels based on the expected functional safety requirements, effectively alleviating safety risks. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0018] One or more embodiments are exemplarily described by pictures in the corresponding drawings, and these exemplified descriptions do not constitute limitations on the embodiments. Elements with the same reference numerals in the drawings represent similar elements, and unless otherwise stated, the figures in the drawings do not constitute proportional limitations.

[0019] Figure 1 It is a flowchart of a method for analyzing the expected functional safety of a laser radar provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0020] Figure 2 yes Figure 1 Schematic diagram of the process of step S12;

[0021] Figure 3 It is a structural schematic diagram of a fault tree provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0022] Figure 4 yes Figure 1 Schematic diagram of the process of step S13;

[0023] Figure 5 is a flow chart of an expected functional safety analysis method of a laser radar provided by another embodiment of the present invention;

[0024] Figure 6 yes Figure 1 Schematic diagram of the process of step S16;

[0025] Figure 7 yes Figure 5 Schematic diagram of the process of step S17;

[0026] Figure 8 is a schematic diagram of an expected functional safety analysis device for a laser radar provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0027] Fig. 9 It is a schematic diagram of the hardware structure of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0028] The present invention is described in detail below in conjunction with specific embodiments. The following embodiments will help those skilled in the art to further understand the present invention, but are not intended to limit the present invention in any form. It should be noted that, for those of ordinary skill in the art, several variations and improvements may be made without departing from the concept of the present invention. These all belong to the protection scope of the present invention.

[0029] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the present invention more clearly understood, the present invention is further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the present invention and are not used to limit the present invention.

[0030] It should be noted that, if there is no conflict, the various features in the embodiments of the present invention can be combined with each other, all within the scope of protection of the present invention. In addition, although the functional modules are divided in the device schematic diagram and the logical order is shown in the flow chart, in some cases, the steps shown or described can be performed in a different order from the module division in the device or the flow chart. In addition, the words "first", "second", "third", etc. used herein do not limit the data and execution order, but only distinguish the same items or similar items with basically the same functions and effects.

[0031] Unless otherwise defined, all technical and scientific terms used in this specification have the same meaning as those commonly understood by those skilled in the art of the present invention. The terms used in this specification and in the specification of the present invention are only for the purpose of describing specific embodiments and are not intended to limit the present invention. The term "and / or" used in this specification includes any and all combinations of one or more of the related listed items.

[0032] In addition, the technical features involved in the various embodiments of the present invention described below can be combined with each other as long as they do not conflict with each other.

[0033] LiDAR is used in various fields, such as the field of intelligent automobile driving or industrial control. Specifically, LiDAR can be installed on various devices that need to detect the surrounding environment, such as robots, or various means of transportation. Robots can be mobile devices that can provide functional services, such as cleaning robots, pet robots, handling robots, nursing robots, remote monitoring robots, sweeping robots and other robots. The means of transportation can be vehicles, ships, aircraft, etc. Optionally, when the means of transportation is a vehicle, the LiDAR can be installed on the front, rear, roof, side of the vehicle or any other body position where the LiDAR can be fixed. It can be understood that the LiDAR can also be fixed on other device structure platforms that are externally connected to the vehicle. Among them, it can be understood that the external device structure platform can keep synchronized with the vehicle when the vehicle is running. The following embodiment takes the application of LiDAR to a vehicle so that the vehicle can achieve automatic driving as an example to describe the expected functional safety analysis method of LiDAR.

[0034] LiDAR products and their point cloud information need to meet functional safety requirements in order for the vehicle's autonomous driving to meet safety requirements. According to the HARA analysis of the automotive industry's OEMs, the functional safety level of LiDAR is defined as AS I LB. However, in the process of handling complex autonomous driving scenarios, the functions of LiDAR systems will be limited to varying degrees by factors that may lead to dangerous scenarios. These factors include insufficient sensor specifications, performance limitations, severe and complex weather, human misoperation, unexpected operating scenarios, etc. Therefore, in the field of autonomous driving, as a supplement to the limitations of functional safety, Safety of the INTENDED FUNCTIONALITY (SOT IF) is proposed to reduce the corresponding risks and ensure the safe application of autonomous driving.

[0035] Intended functional safety is used to reduce some unacceptable risks caused by unknown or uncertain non-system failures or human misoperation. It is characterized by unknown and uncertain. Its main sources of risk include system function limitations, environmental factors and human misuse.

[0036] An embodiment of the present invention proposes an expected functional safety analysis method. The method first determines the application function of the laser radar according to the product definition of the laser radar, and then performs a safety analysis on the laser radar based on the fault tree analysis method to obtain dangerous triggering events that cause failure of the application function. Then, a risk assessment is performed on the dangerous triggering events to obtain threat events, wherein the threat event is a dangerous triggering event with unacceptable risk. An optimization target is determined based on the threat event, and the optimization target is decomposed to obtain the expected functional safety requirements. Finally, the laser radar product design, laser radar point cloud perception and automobile autonomous driving are optimized based on the expected functional safety requirements.

[0037] This expected functional safety analysis method conducts safety analysis on the lidar based on the fault tree analysis method, and closely follows the product definition and principle of the lidar, making the expected functional safety analysis more comprehensive and the obtained optimization targets more comprehensive. It also completes the optimization of the lidar at all levels based on the expected functional safety requirements, realizes the complete practice of the SOTIF process V model, and effectively mitigates safety risks.

[0038] See also Figure 1 , Figure 1 1 is a flow chart of an expected functional safety analysis method for a laser radar provided in an embodiment of the present invention. The expected functional safety analysis method can be used for a computing server with processing functions, etc.

[0039] like Figure 1 As shown, the method S100 may specifically include the following steps:

[0040] S11: Determine the application function of the laser radar according to the product definition of the laser radar.

[0041] The application function of LiDAR refers to the specific functions that LiDAR implements in certain scenarios. The functions and application scenarios of LiDAR can be determined based on the application functions of LiDAR. For example, in the application scenario of autonomous driving, the functions of LiDAR are distance measurement, obstacle identification, and 3D environment mapping. In the application scenario of unmanned aircraft, the functions of LiDAR are distance measurement, cockpit tracking, positioning, or remote control of cockpit. In the application scenario of 3D printing, the functions of LiDAR are measurement and monitoring. In the application scenario of VR / AR, the functions of LiDAR are spatial perception and positioning through SLAM technology. In the application scenario of smart transportation, the functions of LiDAR are accurate lane detection. In the application scenario of ocean exploration and fishery resource monitoring, the functions of LiDAR are identification of fish species.

[0042] After determining the application functions of the LiDAR, a safety analysis of the LiDAR is performed for each application function to obtain the corresponding optimization goals.

[0043] S12: Performing a safety analysis on the laser radar based on a fault tree analysis method to obtain a dangerous triggering event that causes the application function to fail.

[0044] The fault tree analysis method is used to conduct safety analysis on the lidar. The fault tree analysis (FTA) method is a top-down deductive failure analysis method that uses Boolean logic to combine low-order events and analyze undesirable states in the system. It is used to understand the causes of system failure or functional failure to reduce risks, or to confirm the occurrence rate of a safety accident or specific system failure.

[0045] Therefore, the embodiment of the present invention uses a fault tree analysis method to perform safety analysis on the laser radar to obtain dangerous triggering events that cause application function failure. If an event occurs and may cause application function failure, the event is used as a dangerous triggering event that causes the application function failure.

[0046] Specifically, Figure 2 As shown, step S12 includes:

[0047] S121: Obtaining the function and application scenario of the laser radar according to the application function.

[0048] From the above, we can understand that the functions of LiDAR may be different in different application scenarios. For example, if the application scenario is vehicle autonomous driving, the functions of LiDAR may be distance measurement, obstacle identification, or 3D environment mapping, etc.; if the application scenario is 3D printing, the functions of LiDAR are measurement, monitoring, etc. Therefore, the application scenarios and corresponding functions of LiDAR can be obtained according to the application functions.

[0049] S122: Based on the fault tree analysis method, in combination with the function and application scenario of the laser radar, a safety analysis is performed on the laser radar to obtain the top event, intermediate events and basic events of the fault tree; wherein the top event is the failure function of the laser radar, the intermediate event is the abnormality type, and the basic event is the dangerous triggering event corresponding to each abnormality type that causes the failure of the function of the laser radar;

[0050] The abnormality type includes at least one of abnormal installation, weather impact, unexpected operation scenario, performance limitation, environmental condition impact, interference impact, occlusion impact, insufficient specifications and misuse.

[0051] Among the above abnormal types, the dimension of abnormal installation refers to all situations where the actual position of the LiDAR does not match the theoretical design, such as abnormal installation. The dimension of weather impact refers to the impact of weather factors on the LiDAR and its detection, such as rainy days, snowy days, etc. The dimension of unexpected operating scenarios refers to the impact of non-ideal operating scenarios on the LiDAR, such as the impact of direct sunlight. The dimension of performance limitation refers to the performance limitation caused by the LiDAR product's own principles or objective facts, such as high reflectivity expansion. The dimension of environmental condition impact refers to the impact of other external environmental factors on the LiDAR in addition to weather factors, such as temperature. The dimension of interference impact refers to the interference effect of other lasers on the LiDAR. The dimension of occlusion impact refers to the impact on the LiDAR when there are obstructions on the LiDAR window. Insufficient specifications means that the characterization range of the LiDAR product specification parameters needs to be improved. Misuse refers to reasonably foreseeable user misuse.

[0052] The above nine abnormality type dimensions are refined and divided based on the characteristics and principles of LiDAR products, covering almost all hazard triggering events that affect the expected functional safety of LiDAR.

[0053] Take the function of LiDAR to identify obstacles and the scenario of vehicle autonomous driving as an example. The fault tree is as follows: Figure 3 As shown in the figure, the top event is that the laser radar fails to identify obstacles, and the middle event is the abnormal type that causes the laser radar to fail to identify obstacles. It can be that one abnormal dimension causes the laser radar to fail to identify obstacles, or it can be that multiple abnormal dimensions cause the laser radar to fail to identify obstacles. For example, abnormal installation of the laser radar and weather influences may cause the laser radar to fail to identify obstacles, and occlusion or misuse may also cause the laser radar to fail to identify obstacles.

[0054] Under each abnormality type, a basic event is further determined. The basic event is a dangerous triggering event that causes the laser radar to fail. The basic event is an event belonging to the corresponding abnormality type, and the basic event is all events that may cause the corresponding laser radar to fail. Generally, the basic event is an event that cannot be decomposed.

[0055] For example, under the abnormal installation type, the dangerous trigger event that causes the laser radar to fail to recognize obstacles may be the installation position restriction or the incorrect installation. The installation position restriction can be a basic event under the abnormal installation type, and the incorrect installation can also be a basic event under the abnormal installation type.

[0056] For another example, under the performance limitation type, a dangerous triggering event that causes the laser radar to fail to recognize obstacles may be that a high-reflectivity object in the environment may cause a ghost image. Then, the high-reflectivity object in the environment may cause a ghost image is a basic event under the performance limitation type.

[0057] For another example, under the occlusion impact type, the dangerous trigger event that causes the laser radar to fail to recognize obstacles may be dirt on the window panel, or other obstructions blocking the window panel. In this case, dirt on the window panel is a basic event under the occlusion impact type, and strange obstructions blocking the window panel is also a basic event under the occlusion impact type.

[0058] For another example, under the weather impact type, the dangerous triggering event that causes the laser radar to fail to identify obstacles may be cloudy weather or rainy and snowy weather. In this case, cloudy weather is a basic event under the weather impact type, and rainy and snowy weather is also a basic event under the weather impact type.

[0059] Therefore, the fault tree analysis method can be used to conduct a safety analysis of the laser radar. The failure function of the laser radar is taken as the first level, and the causes of the laser radar failure are decomposed to obtain various abnormal types that cause the failure, forming the second level. For each abnormal type, the corresponding dangerous triggering event of the abnormal type is analyzed to obtain various basic events to form the third level.

[0060] Each basic event is a dangerous trigger event that causes the laser radar to fail, but not all dangerous trigger events will lead to safety accidents or cause adverse effects. It is necessary to conduct a risk assessment of dangerous trigger events. Dangerous trigger events with risk assessment results that are controllable can be left unprocessed. Dangerous trigger events with risk assessment results that are uncontrollable will be subject to relevant optimization processing until the risk assessment results are controllable, thereby alleviating the risk of the laser radar.

[0061] S13: Perform risk assessment on the danger triggering event to obtain a threat event, wherein the threat event is the danger triggering event with an unacceptable risk.

[0062] For each abnormal type of dangerous triggering event (basic event), risk assessment can be performed from multiple dimensions to obtain assessment results, including acceptable and unacceptable. Dangerous triggering events with unacceptable assessment results are regarded as threat events, that is, some events that threaten the safety of people or vehicles and may cause harm.

[0063] Specifically, Figure 4 As shown, step S13 includes:

[0064] S131: Perform risk assessment on the hazard triggering event based on exposure, hazard level and controllability to obtain assessment results, wherein the assessment results include acceptable and unacceptable.

[0065] Taking the application scenario of autonomous driving as an example, based on the ISO 21448 standard, the dangerous triggering events are analyzed and evaluated from the perspective of the entire vehicle in three dimensions: severity S (severity), exposure E (exposure) in the operating scenario, and controllability C (controllability).

[0066] Among them, the hazard level, exposure level and controllability of the hazard triggering event may be different in different operation scenarios. In the same operation scenario, the hazard level, exposure level and controllability of different hazard triggering events may also be different. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the hazard level, exposure level and controllability of the hazard triggering event in combination with the operation scenario where the hazard triggering event is located.

[0067] Specifically, Figure 5 As shown, before step S131, step S13 also includes:

[0068] S133: Obtain an operation scenario corresponding to the danger triggering event, wherein the operation scenario is determined according to an application scenario in the application function.

[0069] The operation scenario is a subset of the application scenario, and the operation scenario can be obtained based on the application scenario analysis. For example, if the application scenario is vehicle autonomous driving, the operation scenario can be normal road operation, operation in places such as ports and docks, or operation on roads with many obstacles.

[0070] S134: Analyze the harmful impact caused by the dangerous triggering event and the harmful cause of the harmful impact in the operating scenario.

[0071] In different operation scenarios, the harmful effects brought by the dangerous triggering events and the harmful causes of the harmful effects are different. In the same operation scenario, the harmful effects brought by different dangerous triggering events and the harmful causes of the harmful effects are also different.

[0072] For example, if the danger triggering event is installation location restriction and the operating scenario is normal road operation, the harmful impact caused by the danger triggering event may be that the limited perception field of view causes the lidar to miss or misidentify obstacles, leading to the formulation of incorrect car driving strategies. The cause of the harm may be the limited installation of the lidar.

[0073] For another example: if the danger triggering event is a high-reflectivity object in the environment that may cause ghosting, and the operating scenario is normal road operation, then the harmful impact caused by the danger triggering event may be that the ghosting causes the wrong identification of obstacles, causing the vehicle to turn incorrectly or slow down, etc., and the cause of the harm may be a normal optical phenomenon caused by the surrounding high-reflectivity objects.

[0074] For another example: if the danger triggering event is dirt on the window piece, and the operating scenario is normal road operation, the harmful impact brought by the danger triggering event may be that the dirt on the sensor window piece affects the detection function, which may cause missed detection and lead to the formulation of wrong car driving strategies, such as unexpected acceleration, deceleration, steering, collision, etc. The cause of the harm may be that the dirty part of the window piece blocks the entry and exit of the laser.

[0075] For another example: if the danger triggering event is rainy and snowy weather, and the operating scenario is normal road operation, the harmful impact caused by the danger triggering event may be that the rain and snow affect the laser transmission and reception, affecting the recognition of obstacles. The cause of the harm is that the rain and snow will partially block the laser entry and exit, resulting in incorrect recognition of obstacles.

[0076] If the danger triggering event is cloudy weather and the operating scenario is normal road operation, the harmful impact caused by the danger triggering event may be that the clouds have no effect on laser transmission and reception, and do not affect the identification of obstacles. Since it will not cause the failure of obstacle identification, it can be considered that there is no harm, and the cause of the harm may be none.

[0077] For each hazard triggering event, combined with the corresponding operation scenario, the hazard impact caused by the hazard triggering event and the hazard cause of the hazard impact can be obtained through analysis. Different hazard impacts and hazard causes will result in different exposure E, hazard S and controllability C, which will lead to different risk assessment results.

[0078] S135: Determine the exposure degree, the hazard degree, and the controllability based on the operation scenario, the hazard impact, and the hazard cause.

[0079] The exposure degree E refers to the frequency of occurrence of the hazard triggering event in the corresponding operating scenario, the hazard degree S refers to the degree of hazard caused by the hazard impact corresponding to the hazard triggering event, and the controllability C refers to whether the hazard impact and hazard cause corresponding to the hazard triggering event are controllable.

[0080] Exposure E, hazard S and controllability C can all be expressed in terms of severity. For example, exposure E is divided into exposure E0, exposure E1, exposure E2, exposure E3 and exposure E4, where exposure E0 means no occurrence, exposure E1 means very low probability of occurrence, exposure E2 means low probability of occurrence, exposure E3 means medium probability of occurrence and exposure E4 means high probability of occurrence.

[0081] The hazard level S is divided into hazard level S0, hazard level S1, hazard level S2 and hazard level S3, among which hazard level S0 indicates no hazard, hazard level S1 indicates relatively light hazard, hazard level S2 indicates relatively severe hazard, and hazard level S3 indicates particularly severe hazard (injury to people or vehicles).

[0082] The controllability C is divided into controllability C0, controllability C1, controllability C2 and controllability C3, among which controllability C0 means full controllability, controllability C1 means partial controllability, controllability C2 means partial uncontrollability, and controllability C3 means uncontrollability.

[0083] Therefore, the exposure E, hazard S and controllability C corresponding to the dangerous triggering event are determined based on the operating scenario, hazard impact and hazard cause.

[0084] For example: if the hazard triggering event is the installation location restriction and the operating scenario is normal road operation, then based on its hazard impact and hazard cause, it can be obtained that the installation location restriction often occurs, and the limited perception field of view leads to the misidentification of obstacles, which may cause damage to the vehicle or personnel. Then its corresponding exposure level may be exposure level E2, its corresponding hazard level may be hazard level S2, and its corresponding controllability may be controllability C3, that is, uncontrollable.

[0085] For another example: if the danger triggering event is that a high-reflectivity object in the environment may cause a ghost image, and the operating scenario is normal road operation, then based on its hazard impact and hazard cause, it can be obtained that high-reflectivity objects are prone to occur in urban areas, and ghost images lead to errors and identification of obstacles. The vehicle judges that there is an obstacle and responds incorrectly. Then its corresponding exposure degree can be exposure degree E1, its corresponding hazard degree is hazard degree S1, and its corresponding controllability is controllability C3, that is, uncontrollable.

[0086] For another example: if the danger triggering event is dirt on the window piece, and the operating scenario is normal road operation, then based on its hazardous impact and hazard cause, it can be concluded that dirt often occurs, and due to the limited detection function, obstacles are missed, which may cause damage to the vehicle or personnel. The corresponding exposure level may be exposure level E2, the corresponding hazard level may be hazard level S2, and the corresponding controllability may be controllability C3, that is, uncontrollable.

[0087] For another example: if the danger triggering event is rainy and snowy weather, and the operating scenario is normal road operation, then based on its hazard impact and hazard cause, it can be obtained that rainy and snowy weather does not occur often, and rain and snow will partially affect the lidar's recognition of obstacles, then its corresponding exposure degree can be exposure degree E1, its corresponding hazard degree is hazard degree S1, and its corresponding controllability is controllability C3, that is, uncontrollable.

[0088] For another example: if the danger triggering event is cloudy weather and the operating scenario is normal road operation, then based on its hazard impact and hazard cause, it can be obtained that cloudy weather often occurs and clouds will not affect the lidar's identification of obstacles. Then its corresponding exposure degree can be exposure degree E2, its corresponding hazard degree is hazard degree S0, and its corresponding controllability is controllability C0, which means it is controllable.

[0089] Combined with the operation scenario, the exposure, hazard and controllability of the hazard trigger event can be determined based on the hazard impact and hazard cause. Then, a risk assessment of the hazard trigger event is performed based on the exposure, hazard and controllability to obtain the corresponding assessment results. Among them, the assessment results include acceptable and unacceptable; acceptable means that it does not affect driving safety and the risk is acceptable; unacceptable means that it affects driving safety and the risk is unacceptable.

[0090] For example: If the exposure is E2, the hazard is S3, and the controllability is C3, the assessment result is unacceptable. If the exposure is E1, the hazard is S1, and the controllability is C3, the assessment result is unacceptable. If the exposure is E2, the hazard is S2, and the controllability is C3, the assessment result is unacceptable. If the exposure is E2, the hazard is S0, and the controllability is C0, the assessment result is acceptable.

[0091] Therefore, for each hazard triggering event, a risk assessment can be conducted on the hazard triggering event based on its corresponding exposure, hazard level and controllability to obtain the corresponding assessment results for the next step of processing and analysis.

[0092] S132: Determine the danger triggering event whose evaluation result is unacceptable as the threat event.

[0093] For hazard triggering events with acceptable evaluation results, no processing is required. However, for hazard triggering events with unacceptable evaluation results, corresponding expected functional safety requirements need to be generated for optimization based on the expected functional safety requirements until the evaluation results become acceptable, converting some unknown hazardous events into known or solvable events, thereby mitigating the danger.

[0094] S14: Determine an optimization target according to the threat event.

[0095] Determine the corresponding optimization target for each threat event. For example, if the danger triggering event is the installation position restriction and the corresponding evaluation result is unacceptable, then the danger triggering event is a threat event. According to the threat event, determine the corresponding optimization target, which may be the need to correctly install the LiDAR.

[0096] For another example: if the danger triggering event is that a high-reflectivity object in the environment may cause ghosting, the corresponding evaluation result is unacceptable. The danger triggering event is a threat event. The corresponding optimization target is determined based on the threat event. The corresponding optimization target may be the need to remove point cloud ghost information.

[0097] Similarly, if the threat event is dirt on the window sheet, the corresponding optimization goal may be to detect the dirt and process it.

[0098] Taking the application scenario of vehicle autonomous driving and the function of LiDAR as an example, the analysis of various danger triggering events, evaluation results and optimization goals can be shown in Table 1:

[0099] Table 1 Analysis of hazardous triggering events, evaluation results and optimization goals

[0100]

[0101] The danger triggering events and corresponding safety analysis in Table 1 are similar to the examples in the above embodiments and will not be described in detail here.

[0102] S15: Decomposing the optimization target to obtain expected functional safety requirements.

[0103] S16: Optimize LiDAR product design, LiDAR point cloud perception and vehicle autonomous driving devices based on the expected functional safety requirements.

[0104] The expected functional safety requirements are the execution levels and solutions required to achieve the optimization goals. In the embodiment of the present application, the execution levels may include three levels: lidar product design layer, lidar point cloud perception layer and car autonomous driving layer. Among them, the lidar product design layer refers to the product design or production of the lidar itself, the lidar point cloud perception layer refers to the point cloud perception algorithm for processing the point cloud data output by the lidar, and the car autonomous driving layer refers to some application devices that use lidar, such as vehicle autonomous driving layer, robot layer, etc.

[0105] Furthermore, the required execution level may be one level or a combination of multiple levels to achieve the corresponding optimization goal.

[0106] Specifically, Figure 6 As shown, step S16 includes:

[0107] S161: Allocate the expected functional safety requirements to corresponding execution levels, and determine an execution plan based on the expected functional safety requirements, wherein the execution levels include at least one of a lidar product design layer, a lidar point cloud perception layer, and a vehicle autonomous driving layer.

[0108] Taking the car autonomous driving layer as an example, if the optimization goal is to correctly install the lidar, the expected functional safety requirement can be that in the car autonomous driving, the installation position of the lidar needs to be effectively designed and verified. The expected functional safety requirement is allocated to the car autonomous driving layer, and the determined execution plan is to effectively design and verify the installation position of the lidar.

[0109] If the optimization goal is to remove ghost information from the point cloud, the expected functional safety requirement can be that in lidar point cloud perception, ghost information needs to be removed. The expected functional requirement is assigned to the lidar point cloud perception layer, and the determined execution plan is to use a point cloud perception algorithm to remove ghost information.

[0110] If the optimization goal is to detect dirt and handle it, the expected functional safety requirement can be that in the lidar product design, dirt can be detected, and in the automatic driving of the car, dirt can be handled. The expected functional safety requirement is allocated to the lidar product design layer, and the determined execution plan is to design dirt detection and alarm functions. In addition, the expected functional safety requirement is allocated to the automatic driving layer of the car, and the determined execution plan is to respond to the dirt alarm of the lidar.

[0111] S162: Each execution level optimizes LiDAR product design, LiDAR point cloud perception, and vehicle autonomous driving based on the execution plan.

[0112] At the LiDAR product design layer, the LiDAR is optimized based on the corresponding implementation plan, such as designing dirt detection and alarm functions when designing products. At the LiDAR point cloud perception layer, the LiDAR is optimized based on the corresponding implementation plan, such as using point cloud perception algorithms to remove ghost information. At the car autonomous driving layer, the LiDAR is optimized based on the corresponding implementation plan, such as effectively designing and verifying the installation position of the LiDAR or responding to the dirt alarm of the LiDAR.

[0113] The optimization is based on the three levels of LiDAR product design, LiDAR point cloud perception and car autonomous driving. The three-layer system is divided and constructed according to the depth of LiDAR point cloud data processing and the diversity of processing strategies. The corresponding safety requirements are achieved at a reasonable level and safety risks are effectively mitigated.

[0114] In some embodiments, for the implementation and application of the expected functional safety requirements, a chain of evidence is formed through the verification process to complete the closed-loop evaluation. Therefore, the method S100 also includes:

[0115] S17: Test and verify the optimized LiDAR product design, LiDAR point cloud perception and vehicle autonomous driving.

[0116] Build real test scenarios and virtual test scenarios, test and verify the optimized LiDAR product design, LiDAR point cloud perception, and vehicle autonomous driving, obtain corresponding verification results, and complete closed-loop evaluation based on the verification results.

[0117] The expected functional requirements implementation and closed-loop evaluation are shown in Table 2:

[0118] Table 2 Expected functional requirements implementation and closed-loop evaluation

[0119]

[0120] As shown in Table 2, after the expected functional requirements of the LiDAR were implemented, the product design, point cloud perception, and vehicle autonomous driving of the LiDAR were optimized, and then relevant tests and verifications were carried out, risk assessments were conducted, risk assessment results were obtained, and finally a closed-loop evaluation was completed.

[0121] Among them, the relevant test verification is to conduct test verification by constructing various real test scenarios and virtual test scenarios to obtain corresponding test results and risk assessment results. Figure 7 As shown, step S17 includes:

[0122] S171: Construct a first real test scenario based on a known dangerous scenario.

[0123] S172: Verify the optimized LiDAR product design, LiDAR point cloud perception, and vehicle autonomous driving in the first real test scenario, and obtain a first verification result.

[0124] Taking the case of car autonomous driving as an example, the first real test scenario can be a driving scenario, which can be constructed from the perspectives of weather, roads, obstacles, etc. For example: driving scenarios in cloudy weather, normal roads, and obstacles on the roadside, or driving scenarios in cloudy weather, curved roads, and guardrails on the roadside, or driving scenarios in rainy and snowy weather, on highways, and other vehicles are set up next to the vehicle, or driving scenarios in normal weather, normal roads, and high-reflectivity materials are set up.

[0125] In the first real test scenario, the optimized lidar product design, lidar point cloud perception and vehicle autonomous driving are verified to obtain the first verification result, wherein verification means testing the optimized lidar product design, lidar point cloud perception and vehicle autonomous driving in the first real test scenario, and conducting a risk assessment to obtain corresponding test results and risk assessment results.

[0126] The first verification result indicates whether the verification has passed or whether the executor provides the correct solution to the requirement, or the risk assessment result after optimization. For example: if the expected functional safety requirement is the car autonomous driving layer, the installation position of the laser radar is effectively designed and verified. After optimization, the first verification result obtained provides the correct laser radar installation position information for the car autonomous driving solution, and the risk assessment result is that the risk is acceptable. Alternatively, if the expected functional safety requirement is the laser radar point cloud perception layer, the ghost information is removed from the point cloud perception algorithm. After optimization, the first verification result obtained is that the ghost test verification in the high reflectivity operation scenario is passed, and the risk assessment result is that the risk is acceptable. Alternatively, if the expected functional safety requirement is the laser radar product design layer, the dirt detection and alarm function is designed, and the car autonomous driving layer, the laser radar's dirt alarm function is responded to and processed. After optimization, the first verification result obtained is that the dirt detection function design and verification are passed, and the risk assessment result is that the risk is acceptable.

[0127] S173: Construct a second real test scenario and a virtual test scenario, wherein the virtual test scenario is constructed through simulation.

[0128] The above embodiment establishes a first real test scenario based on known dangerous scenarios, such as rainy and snowy weather, highly reflective materials or obstacles, etc. In some other operating scenarios, there are some unknown dangers, which are unpredictable dangers, such as some dangers caused by the performance limitations of the laser radar in some extreme scenarios. Therefore, a second real test scenario and a virtual test scenario can be constructed to identify some potential dangerous scenarios, wherein the second real test scenario can be a real road test scenario, and the virtual test scenario can be an extreme application scenario, or a scenario that cannot be constructed in the real world.

[0129] S174: In the second real test scenario and the virtual test scenario, the optimized lidar product design, lidar point cloud perception and vehicle autonomous driving are verified, and a second verification result is obtained.

[0130] In the second real test scenario and the virtual test scenario, the optimized LiDAR, point cloud perception and car autonomous driving are tested to obtain the corresponding second verification results. The second verification results also indicate whether the verification is passed or whether the executor provides the correct demand solution, or the optimized risk assessment results.

[0131] In some embodiments, after obtaining the first verification result and the second verification result, potential dangerous scenarios are identified based on the first verification result and the second verification result, and corresponding test cases are formed.

[0132] Analyze the test scenarios that failed the test in the first verification results and the second verification results, analyze the reasons for failure, discover potential dangerous scenarios, and form corresponding test cases based on the dangerous scenarios. You can also build corresponding test scenarios and test again. Then, adjust the lidar product design, lidar point cloud perception, and car autonomous driving based on the test results to reduce the unknown operating domain as much as possible and effectively improve the safety level of the expected functions of the lidar.

[0133] Therefore, this expected functional safety analysis method covers the full life cycle management of LiDAR SOT IF analysis and verification. In meeting the requirements of standard ISO 21448, the complete closed-loop practice of the expected functional safety process of LiDAR is completed, providing a powerful case illustration.

[0134] As can be seen from the above, the current expected functional safety analysis is all aimed at the intelligent driving level or the whole vehicle level. There is no expected functional safety analysis based on the product characteristics and application perspective of the laser radar itself, or it only focuses on the collection, quality evaluation and construction of scene data sets of the laser radar point cloud. There is no complete analysis of events that affect the expected functional safety of the laser radar. The analysis is not comprehensive, and there is no optimization verification for the expected functional safety analysis of the laser radar. There is no complete practice of the SOTIF process V model. The expected functional safety analysis method of the laser radar in the embodiment of the present invention analyzes the dangerous triggering events under each abnormal type based on the product definition and application perspective of the laser radar, making the expected functional safety analysis more comprehensive, and the obtained optimization target is also more comprehensive. It also completes the optimization of each level of the laser radar based on the expected functional safety requirements, effectively alleviating safety risks.

[0135] In summary, the expected functional safety analysis method conducts safety analysis on the LiDAR based on the fault tree analysis method, and closely follows the product definition and principle of the LiDAR, making the expected functional safety analysis more comprehensive and the optimization goals obtained more comprehensive. It also completes the optimization of all levels of the LiDAR based on the expected functional safety requirements, effectively alleviating safety risks.

[0136] See also Figure 8 , Figure 8 Schematic diagram of the structure of a device for analyzing the expected functional safety of a laser radar provided by an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 8 As shown, the expected functional safety analysis device 200 of the laser radar includes: a first determination module 201, a first obtaining module 202, a second obtaining module 203, a second determination module 204, a third obtaining module 205 and an optimization module 206.

[0137] Among them, the first determination module 201 is used to determine the application function of the laser radar according to the product definition of the laser radar, the first obtaining module 202 is used to perform a safety analysis on the laser radar based on the fault tree analysis method to obtain the dangerous triggering event that causes the failure of the application function, the second obtaining module 203 is used to perform a risk assessment on the dangerous triggering event to obtain a threat event, wherein the threat event is the dangerous triggering event with an unacceptable risk, the second determination module 204 is used to determine the optimization target according to the threat event, the third obtaining module 205 is used to decompose the optimization target to obtain the expected functional safety requirements, and the optimization module 206 is used to optimize the laser radar product design, laser radar point cloud perception and automobile autonomous driving based on the expected functional safety requirements.

[0138] In the embodiment of the present invention, the expected functional safety analysis device of the laser radar can also be constructed by hardware devices. For example, the expected functional safety analysis device of the laser radar can be constructed by one or more chips, and each chip can work in coordination with each other to complete the expected functional safety analysis method of the laser radar described in the above embodiments. For another example, the expected functional safety analysis device of the laser radar can also be constructed by various logic devices, such as a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor (DSP), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), a single-chip microcomputer, an ARM (Acorn RISC Machine) or other programmable logic devices, discrete gates or transistor logic, discrete hardware components, or any combination of these components.

[0139] The expected functional safety analysis device of the laser radar provided in the embodiment of the present invention can implement each process that can be implemented by the expected functional safety analysis method of the laser radar mentioned above. To avoid repetition, they will not be described here.

[0140] It should be noted that the above-mentioned laser radar expected functional safety analysis device can execute the laser radar expected functional safety analysis method provided in the embodiment of the present invention, and has the corresponding functional modules and beneficial effects of the execution method. For technical details not fully described in the embodiment of the laser radar expected functional safety analysis device, please refer to the laser radar expected functional safety analysis method provided in the embodiment of the present invention.

[0141] In summary, the expected functional safety analysis device of the laser radar performs safety analysis on the laser radar based on the fault tree analysis method, and closely follows the product definition and principle of the laser radar, making the expected functional safety analysis more comprehensive and the obtained optimization goals more comprehensive. It also completes the optimization of all levels of the laser radar based on the expected functional safety requirements, effectively alleviating safety risks.

[0142] The present invention also provides an electronic device. Fig. 9 , Fig. 9 It is a schematic diagram of the hardware structure of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0143] like Fig. 9 As shown, the electronic device 300 includes at least one processor 301 and a memory 302 ( Fig. 9 (a bus connection and a processor are used as an example).

[0144] Among them, the processor 301 is used to provide computing and control capabilities to control the electronic device 300 to perform corresponding tasks, for example, to control the electronic device 300 to execute the expected functional safety analysis method of the laser radar in any of the above-mentioned method embodiments, the method comprising first determining the application function of the laser radar according to the product definition of the laser radar, and then performing a safety analysis on the laser radar based on the fault tree analysis method to obtain a dangerous triggering event that causes the failure of the application function, and then performing a risk assessment on the dangerous triggering event to obtain a threat event, wherein the threat event is a dangerous triggering event with an unacceptable risk, and determining an optimization target based on the threat event, decomposing the optimization target to obtain the expected functional safety requirement, and finally optimizing the laser radar product design, laser radar point cloud perception and vehicle autonomous driving based on the expected functional safety requirement.

[0145] In this embodiment, the electronic device performs a safety analysis on the LiDAR based on the fault tree analysis method, and closely follows the product definition and principle of the LiDAR, so that the expected functional safety analysis is more comprehensive, the obtained optimization goals are also more comprehensive, and the LiDAR is optimized at all levels based on the expected functional safety requirements, effectively alleviating safety risks.

[0146] The processor 301 may be a general-purpose processor, including a central processing unit (CPU), a network processor (NP), a hardware chip or any combination thereof; it may also be a digital signal processor (DSP), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a programmable logic device (PLD) or a combination thereof. The above-mentioned PLD may be a complex programmable logic device (CPLD), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), a general array logic (GAL) or any combination thereof.

[0147] The memory 302 is a non-transient computer-readable storage medium that can be used to store non-transient software programs, non-transient computer executable programs and modules, such as program instructions / modules corresponding to the method for analyzing the expected functional safety of electronic devices in the embodiment of the present invention. The processor 301 can implement the method for analyzing the expected functional safety of electronic devices in any of the above-mentioned method embodiments by running the non-transient software programs, instructions and modules stored in the memory 302. To avoid repetition, it will not be repeated here.

[0148] Specifically, the memory 302 may include a volatile memory (VM), such as a random access memory (RAM); the memory 302 may also include a non-volatile memory (NVM), such as a read-only memory (ROM), a flash memory, a hard disk (HDD) or a solid-state drive (SSD) or other non-transitory solid-state storage device; the memory 302 may also include a combination of the above types of memory.

[0149] In an embodiment of the present invention, the memory 302 may also include a memory remotely arranged relative to the processor, and these remote memories may be connected to the processor via a network. Examples of the above network include but are not limited to the Internet, an intranet, a local area network, a mobile communication network, and combinations thereof.

[0150] In the embodiment of the present invention, the electronic device 300 may further include other components for implementing the functions of the device, which will not be described in detail here.

[0151] The embodiment of the present invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium, such as a memory including a program code, and the program code can be executed by a processor to complete the expected functional safety analysis method of the electronic device in the above embodiment. For example, the computer-readable storage medium can be a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a compact disc (CDROM), a magnetic tape, a floppy disk, an optical data storage device, etc.

[0152] The embodiment of the present invention also provides a computer program product, which includes one or more program codes, and the program codes are stored in a computer-readable storage medium. The processor of the electronic device reads the program code from the computer-readable storage medium, and the processor executes the program code to complete the method steps of the expected functional safety analysis method of the electronic device provided in the above embodiment.

[0153] It should be noted that the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative, wherein the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place, or may be distributed on multiple network units. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.

[0154] Through the description of the above implementation methods, ordinary technicians in this field can clearly understand that each implementation method can be implemented by means of software plus a general hardware platform, and of course, it can also be implemented by hardware. Ordinary technicians in this field can understand that all or part of the processes in the above-mentioned embodiment method can be completed by instructing related hardware through a computer program, and the program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. When the program is executed, it can include the processes of the embodiments of the above-mentioned methods. Among them, the storage medium can be a disk, an optical disk, a read-only memory (ROM) or a random access memory (RAM), etc.

[0155] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than to limit them. Under the concept of the present invention, the technical features in the above embodiments or different embodiments may also be combined, the steps may be implemented in any order, and there are many other changes in different aspects of the present invention as described above, which are not provided in detail for the sake of simplicity. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that they may still modify the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments, or make equivalent replacements for some of the technical features therein. However, these modifications or replacements do not deviate the essence of the corresponding technical solutions from the scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for analyzing the expected functional safety of a laser radar, characterized in that: The method comprises: Determining the application function of the laser radar according to the product definition of the laser radar; Performing a safety analysis on the laser radar based on a fault tree analysis method to obtain a dangerous triggering event that causes the application function to fail; Performing risk assessment on the danger triggering event to obtain a threat event, wherein the threat event is the danger triggering event with an unacceptable risk; Determining an optimization target based on the threat event; Decomposing the optimization target to obtain expected functional safety requirements; Optimize LiDAR product design, LiDAR point cloud perception and vehicle autonomous driving based on the expected functional safety requirements.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The safety analysis of the laser radar based on the fault tree analysis method to obtain the dangerous triggering event that causes the failure of the application function includes: Obtaining the function and application scenario of the laser radar according to the application function; Based on the fault tree analysis method, combined with the functions and application scenarios of the laser radar, the laser radar is subjected to a safety analysis to obtain the top event, intermediate events and basic events of the fault tree, wherein the top event is the failure function of the laser radar, the intermediate event is the abnormal type, and the basic event is the dangerous triggering event corresponding to each abnormal type that causes the failure of the laser radar function; The abnormality type includes at least one of abnormal installation, weather impact, unexpected operation scenario, performance limitation, environmental condition impact, interference impact, occlusion impact, insufficient specifications and misuse.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The risk assessment of the danger triggering event to obtain the threat event includes: Performing a risk assessment on the hazard triggering event based on the exposure, hazard and controllability to obtain an assessment result, wherein the assessment result includes acceptable and unacceptable; The danger triggering event whose evaluation result is unacceptable is determined as the threat event.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that Before performing risk assessment on the hazard triggering event based on exposure, hazard and controllability, the method further includes: Obtaining an operation scenario corresponding to the danger triggering event, wherein the operation scenario is determined according to an application scenario in the application function; Analyze the harmful effects brought about by the dangerous triggering event and the harmful causes of the harmful effects in the operating scenario; The exposure degree, the hazard degree, and the controllability degree are determined based on the operation scenario, the hazard impact, and the hazard cause.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The optimization of LiDAR product design, LiDAR point cloud perception and vehicle autonomous driving based on the expected functional safety requirements includes: Allocate the expected functional safety requirements to corresponding execution levels, and determine an execution plan based on the expected functional safety requirements, wherein the execution level includes at least one of a laser radar product design layer, a laser radar point cloud perception layer, and an automobile autonomous driving layer; Each execution level optimizes LiDAR product design, LiDAR point cloud perception, and vehicle autonomous driving based on the execution scheme.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The method further comprises: Test and verify the optimized LiDAR product design, LiDAR point cloud perception and vehicle autonomous driving.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that The test and verification of optimized LiDAR product design, LiDAR point cloud perception and vehicle autonomous driving include: Build the first real test scenario based on known hazardous scenarios; Verify the optimized LiDAR product design, LiDAR point cloud perception, and vehicle autonomous driving in the first real test scenario, and obtain a first verification result; Constructing a second real test scenario and a virtual test scenario, wherein the virtual test scenario is constructed by simulation; In the second real test scenario and the virtual test scenario, the optimized lidar product design, lidar point cloud perception and vehicle autonomous driving are verified, and a second verification result is obtained.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that The method further comprises: Based on the first verification result and the second verification result, potential dangerous scenarios are identified and corresponding test cases are formed.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that: include: at least one processor; A memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein the memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor, and the instructions are executed by the at least one processor so that the at least one processor can execute the expected functional safety analysis method of the laser radar as described in any one of claims 1-8.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores computer-executable instructions, and the computer-executable instructions are used to enable a computer device to execute the expected functional safety analysis method of the laser radar as described in any one of claims 1-8.