Anonymous authentication and key distribution protocol extension method based on PUF-Kerberos
By introducing the anonymous authentication and key allocation protocol of PUF-Kerberos in the Kerberos protocol, using the PUF structure and public key encryption algorithm, the problem of insufficient confidentiality of device id and key in traditional Kerberos authentication is solved, and the device and authentication server are realized Secure two-way authentication and key allocation between the two-ways prevent various attacks.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411148705.8
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-08-20
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-12
AI Technical Summary
During the traditional Kerberos authentication process, the confidentiality of the device id and key is insufficient, and it is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, forgery attacks and replay attacks, resulting in security problems.
Using anonymous authentication and key allocation protocol based on PUF-Kerberos, the physical non-clone function (PUF) and public key encryption and decryption algorithm are installed by the client, random numbers are generated as incentive input PUF structure, and two-way authentication and key allocation are performed. The PUF structure replaces the master key storage of devices in the traditional Kerberos protocol to realize anonymous authentication and key allocation.
It effectively prevents forgery attacks, counterfeit attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks and replay attacks, ensures the security of two-way authentication between the device and the authentication server, and prevents the key leakage caused by attackers through intrusion or side channel attacks.
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Figure CN118944892A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the fields of information security and cryptographic protocols, and in particular to an anonymous authentication and key distribution protocol extension method based on PUF-Kerberos. Background Art
[0002] Kerberos is a network security protocol developed by MIT, which is mainly used to achieve reliable authentication in an insecure network environment. It centrally manages the authentication of users and services by using symmetric encryption and ticket mechanisms. The workflow of Kerberos includes the user requesting authentication from the authentication server, obtaining a ticket granting ticket (TGT), and then using the TGT to request a service ticket (SGT) from the ticket granting server, and finally accessing the target service. However, there are still great challenges in the security and confidentiality of the traditional Kerberos authentication process. The existing Kerberos application technology in authentication mainly improves the confidentiality of user device authentication by improving the Kerberos password encryption algorithm, such as adding a random number or timestamp to the authentication password or using a digital certificate. However, once the authentication system encounters malicious attacks such as man-in-the-middle attacks, the real ID of the user's device will be leaked, resulting in a series of security issues, including the risk of privacy leakage, identity fraud and targeted attacks. Attackers can use the leaked ID to track device activities and impersonate device identities to perform malicious operations. Therefore, how to improve the confidentiality of device IDs and keys in the Kerberos protocol authentication process is a problem that needs to be solved today. Summary of the invention
[0003] Purpose of the invention: The purpose of the present invention is to provide an anonymous authentication and key distribution protocol extension method based on PUF-Kerberos.
[0004] Technical solution: The present invention comprises the following steps:
[0005] (1) Register the client and server with the KDC;
[0006] (2) The client requests a pseudonym and a ticket granting ticket (TGT) from the AS;
[0007] (3) The client obtains and verifies the pseudonym and the ticket granting ticket TGT;
[0008] (4) The client requests a service authorization ticket (SGT) from TGS using a pseudonym;
[0009] (5) The client obtains and verifies the service authorization ticket SGT;
[0010] (6) The client requests communication services from the server.
[0011] Furthermore, the step (1) comprises:
[0012] (1.1) The client installs PUF, i.e., the physical unclonable function structure, PUF A , public key encryption and decryption algorithms, symmetric encryption and decryption algorithms;
[0013] (1.2) The client generates several random numbers as incentive C A Set, each stimulus input PUF structure generates the corresponding response R A ; The KDC authentication server AS generates its own public-private key pair PK-SK and stores it securely in the KDC database DB;
[0014] (1.3) The client sends the incentive response pair CRP set and the real ID to the KDC for registration. The KDC indexes the client incentive response pair CRP set according to the client's real ID and stores it securely in the KDC database DB. The KDC returns the AS's public key PK to the client.
[0015] (1.4) The server sends the real ID to KDC for registration. KDC generates the session key K between the server and the ticket authorization server TGS based on the real ID of the server. B,TGS , KDC saves the real ID and K B,TGS Go to the database DB and write K B,TGS Returned to the server, the authentication server AS and the ticket authorization server TGS in KDC have access permissions to the database DB.
[0016] Furthermore, the step (2) comprises:
[0017] (2.1) The client uses PK to encrypt the client's real ID to send a pseudonym and TGT application to AS. pk (A_id);
[0018] (2.2) AS receives the message and decrypts E with SK pk (A_id) Get the client's real id, retrieve the client's real id from the database, and retrieve the client's incentive response to the CRP set successfully <C A , R A > i=1,...,n Take any stimulus response pair <C A ,R A >, generate the client's temporary key K A =Hash(R A ) and MAC = Hash (C A ||R A ), if the search is unsuccessful, exit;
[0019] (2.3) AS generates the client pseudonym A_fid and the session key K between the client and the ticket granting server TGS A,TGS , save the client pseudonym A_fid to the database DB, and use K A Encrypt A_fid and K A,TGS get:
[0020]
[0021] (2.4) AS accesses the master key K of TGS from the database TGS , use K TGS Encrypt and generate a ticket-granting ticket TGT:
[0022]
[0023] (2.5) AS will C A , The MAC and TGT are sent to the client.
[0024] Furthermore, the step (3) comprises:
[0025] (3.1) The client receives the C sent by the AS A , MAC and TGT;
[0026] (3.2) The client uses its own physical unclonable function structure PUF A , generating the incentive value C A The corresponding response R A , calculate MAC A =Hash(C A ||R A ) is consistent with the received MAC value, then the AS and the message sent by the AS are trusted;
[0027] (3.3) The client generates a temporary key K A =Hash(R A ), and use K A Decryption Get the pseudonyms A_fid and K A,TGS .
[0028] Furthermore, the step (4) comprises:
[0029] (4.1) Client uses K A,TGS Encrypt B_id and A_fid to get:
[0030] (4.2) The client will and TGT to TGS;
[0031] (4.3) TGS uses the master key K TGS Decrypting TGT yields: {A_fid, AS_id, TGS_id, t, lifetime, K A,TGS}, TGS uses K A,TGS Decryption Verify whether A_fid is consistent with TGT. If the verification is successful, proceed to the next step; otherwise, exit.
[0032] (4.4) TGS generates a random session key K between the client and the server A,B ;
[0033] (4.5) TGS uses K A,TGS Encrypt A_fid, B_id, K A,B get:
[0034] (4.6) TGS retrieves the session key K between the server and the ticket granting server TGS from the database DB according to the server identifier B_id B,TGS , and generate K B,TGS Encrypted service authorization ticket SGT:
[0035]
[0036] (4.7) TGS will and SGT to the client.
[0037] Furthermore, the step (5) comprises:
[0038] (5.1) The client receives the TGS and SGT;
[0039] (5.2) The client uses the random session key K shared with TGS A,TGS Decrypt to get A_fid, B_id and session key K A,B ;
[0040] (5.3) Verify that A_fid and B_id are consistent with those sent to TGS. If they are consistent, the SGT sent by TGS and the session key K with the server are trusted. A,B , otherwise exit.
[0041] Furthermore, the step (6) comprises:
[0042] (6.1) Client uses K A,B Encrypt B_id and A_fid to get:
[0043] (6.2) The client will and SGT to the server;
[0044] (6.3) Use the session key K between the server and the ticket authorization server TGS B,TGS Decrypt SGT to get {A_fid, B_id, TGS_id, t, lifetime, K A,B};
[0045] (6.4) Using the decrypted K A,B Further decryption Get A_fid and B_id, verify whether A_fid is consistent with the client pseudonym in SGT, if they are consistent, the client is trusted, and then the client and server use K A,B Communicate and exit if there is any inconsistency.
[0046] Furthermore, the encryption and decryption in step (2) adopt an ECC public key algorithm.
[0047] Furthermore, the encryption and decryption in steps (1), (3), (4), (5) and (6) all adopt a symmetric encryption algorithm.
[0048] Furthermore, the symmetric encryption algorithm includes AES, DES, national encryption SM1 and Hash algorithm, and the output value length of the Hash function is adjusted according to the encryption algorithm.
[0049] Beneficial effects: Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following significant advantages: anonymous two-way authentication and key distribution between a device and other devices are realized by completing the pseudonym and ticket authorization application through a public key algorithm and replacing the master key stored in the device in the traditional Kerberos protocol with a PUF structure; it ensures that the device will not cause counterfeit attacks, impersonation attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, etc. due to ID leakage; and the use of a physical unclonable key instead of the master key pre-stored in the device in the traditional Kerberos protocol to perform two-way authentication between the device and the authentication server can prevent key leakage caused by physical attacks such as intrusion, semi-intrusion and side-channel attacks. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0050] Figure 1 It is a framework diagram of the present invention;
[0051] Figure 2 This is a framework diagram of the anonymous authentication and key agreement protocol between vehicles and application servers in the Internet of Vehicles. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0052] The technical solution of the present invention is further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.
[0053] like Figure 1As shown, the specific process of the present invention is divided into 6 stages: the client and the server register with the KDC, the client requests a pseudonym and a ticket granting ticket (TGT) from the AS, the client obtains and verifies the pseudonym and the ticket granting ticket (TGT), the client requests a service granting ticket (SGT) from the TGS using the pseudonym, the client obtains and verifies the service granting ticket (SGT), and the client requests communication services from the server.
[0054] (1) Register the client and server with the KDC;
[0055] The client installs PUF, i.e., Physical Unclonable Function Structure, PUF A , public key encryption and decryption algorithms, symmetric encryption and decryption algorithms;
[0056] The client generates several random numbers as incentive C A Set, each stimulus input PUF structure generates the corresponding response R A ; The KDC authentication server AS generates its own public-private key pair PK-SK and stores it securely in the KDC database DB;
[0057] The client sends the incentive response pair CRP set and the real ID to KDC for registration. KDC indexes the client incentive response pair CRP set according to the client's real ID and stores it securely in the KDC database DB. KDC returns the AS's public key PK to the client.
[0058] The server sends the real ID to KDC for registration. KDC generates the session key K between the server and the ticket authorization server TGS based on the real ID of the server. B,TGS , KDC saves the real ID and K B,TGS Go to the database DB and write K B,TGS Returned to the server, the authentication server AS and the ticket authorization server TGS in KDC have access permissions to the database DB.
[0059] (2) The client requests a pseudonym and a ticket granting ticket (TGT) from the AS;
[0060] The client uses PK to encrypt the client's real ID and sends the pseudonym and TGT application to AS. pk (A_id);
[0061] After receiving the message, AS decrypts E with SK pk (A_id) Get the client's real id, retrieve the client's real id from the database, and retrieve the client's incentive response to the CRP set successfully <C A ,R A > i=1,...,n Take any stimulus response pair <CA ,R A >, generate the client's temporary key K A =Hash(R A ) and MAC = Hash (C A ||R A ), if the search is unsuccessful, exit;
[0062] AS generates the client pseudonym A_fid and the session key K between the client and the ticket granting server TGS A,TGS , save the client pseudonym A_fid to the database DB, and use K A Encrypt A_fid and K A,TGS get:
[0063]
[0064] AS accesses the master key K of TGS from the database TGS , use K TGS Encrypt and generate a ticket-granting ticket TGT:
[0065]
[0066] AS will C A , The MAC and TGT are sent to the client.
[0067] (3) The client obtains and verifies the pseudonym and the ticket granting ticket TGT;
[0068] The client receives the C sent by the AS A , MAC and TGT;
[0069] The client uses its own physical unclonable function structure PUF A , generating the incentive value C A The corresponding response R A , calculate MAC A =Hash(C A ||R A ) is consistent with the received MAC value, then the AS and the message sent by the AS are trusted;
[0070] The client generates a temporary key K A =Hash(R A ), and use K A Decryption Get the pseudonyms A_fid and K A,TGS .
[0071] (4) The client requests a service authorization ticket (SGT) from TGS using a pseudonym;
[0072] Client uses K A,TGS Encrypt B_id and A_fid to get:
[0073] The client will and TGT to TGS;
[0074] TGS uses the master key K TGS Decrypting TGT yields: {A_fid, AS_id, TGS_id, t, lifetime, K A,TGS}, TGS uses K A,TGS Decryption Verify whether A_fid is consistent with TGT. If the verification is successful, proceed to the next step; otherwise, exit.
[0075] TGS generates a random session key K between the client and the server A,B ;
[0076] TGS with K A,TGS Encrypt A_fid, B_id, K A,B get:
[0077] TGS retrieves the session key K between the server and the ticket granting server TGS from the database DB according to the server's identifier B_id. B,TGS , and generate K B,TGS Encrypted service authorization ticket SGT:
[0078]
[0079] TGS will and SGT to the client.
[0080] (5) The client obtains and verifies the service authorization ticket SGT;
[0081] The client receives the TGS and SGT;
[0082] The client uses the random session key K shared with the TGS A,TGS Decrypt to get A_fid, B_id and session key K A,B ;
[0083] Verify that A_fid and B_id are consistent with those sent to TGS. If they are consistent, trust the SGT sent by TGS and the session key K with the server. A,B , otherwise exit.
[0084] (6) The client requests communication services from the server:
[0085] Client uses K A,B Encrypt B_id and A_fid to get:
[0086] The client will and SGT to the server;
[0087] Use the session key K between the server and the ticket granting server TGS B,TGS Decrypt SGT to get {A_fid, B_id, TGS_id, t, lifetime, K A,B};
[0088] Use the decrypted K A,B Further decryption Get A_fid and B_id, verify whether A_fid is consistent with the client pseudonym in SGT, if they are consistent, the client is trusted, and then the client and server use K A,B Communicate and exit if there is any inconsistency.
[0089] Example:
[0090] The typical topology of the vehicle-to-vehicle (V2N) network includes three types of devices: application server (APP), vehicle (Vehicle), and key generation center (KDC). Among them, there is only one key generation center (KDC), which includes an authentication server (AS), a ticket authorization server (TGS), and a database (DB). It is mainly responsible for the generation and distribution of keys and pseudonyms in the vehicle network, as well as the distribution of tickets applied for by legitimate vehicles; several vehicles (Vehicles), mainly perform two-way authentication and pseudonym application with KDC, and initiate anonymous communication service application to the application server (APP); several application servers (APP) are mainly responsible for establishing communication with legitimate vehicles. The application server (APP) only communicates with the key generation center (KDC) when it is registered with the KDC. When the vehicle initiates an anonymous communication service request to the application server, the KDC needs to assist in two-way authentication and establishment of session keys.
[0091] like Figure 2 As shown in the figure, the anonymous authentication and session key establishment of vehicles and application servers in the Internet of Vehicles is divided into six stages: the vehicle and application server register with the key distribution center KDC, the vehicle requests a pseudonym and a ticket authorization ticket (TGT) from the authentication server AS, and the vehicle obtains a pseudonym and a ticket authorization ticket (TGT); the vehicle anonymously requests an application server service authorization ticket (SGT) from the ticket authorization server TGS, the vehicle obtains the application server service authorization ticket SGT, and the vehicle establishes communication with the application server.
[0092] (1) Vehicles and application servers register with KDC
[0093] Vehicle-installed Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) structure: PUF V , public key encryption and decryption algorithm, symmetric encryption and decryption algorithm.
[0094] The vehicle generates several random numbers as incentives (C V ) set, each stimulus is input into the PUF structure to generate the corresponding response (R V ). The KDC authentication server AS generates its own public-private key pair (PK-SK) and stores it securely in the KDC database (DB).
[0095] The vehicle sends the stimulus response pair (CRP) set and the real ID to KDC for registration. KDC indexes the vehicle stimulus response pair (CRP) set according to the vehicle's real ID and stores it securely in the KDC database (DB). KDC returns the AS's public key PK to the vehicle.
[0096] The application server sends the real ID to the authentication server AS of KDC for registration. AS generates the session key K between the application server and the ticket authorization server TGS based on the real ID of the application server. V,TGS , AS saves the real ID and K of the application server V,TGS Go to the database DB and write K V,TGS Return to the application server. The authentication server (AS) and ticket granting server (TGS) in the KDC have access rights to the database (DB).
[0097] (2) The vehicle requests a pseudonym and a ticket granting ticket (TGT) from the AS
[0098] The vehicle uses PK to encrypt the vehicle's real ID to send a pseudonym and TGT application to AS: E pk (V_id).
[0099] After receiving the message, AS decrypts E with SK pk (V_id) gets the real id of the vehicle, retrieves the real id of the vehicle from the database, and retrieves the stimulus response pair (CRP) set of the vehicle successfully. <C V , R V > i=1,...,n Take any stimulus response pair <C V ,R V >, generate the temporary key K of the vehicle V =Hash(R V ) and MAC = Hash (C V ||R V ), if the search is unsuccessful, exit.
[0100] AS generates the vehicle pseudonym V_fid and the session key K between the vehicle and the ticket authorization server TGS V,TGS , save the vehicle pseudonym V_fid to the database DB, and use K V Encrypt V_fid and K V,TGS get:
[0101] AS accesses the master key K of TGS TGS , use K TGS Encryption generates a Ticket Grant Ticket (TGT):
[0102]
[0103] AS will C V , MAC and TGT are sent to the vehicle.
[0104] (3) The vehicle obtains and verifies the pseudonym and ticket granting ticket (TGT)
[0105] The vehicle receives the C from AS V , MAC and TGT.
[0106] The vehicle uses its own physical unclonable function structure PUF V , generating the incentive value C V The corresponding response R V , calculate MAC V =Hash(C V ||R V ) value is consistent with the received MAC value, then the AS and the messages sent by the AS are trusted.
[0107] The vehicle generates a temporary key K V =Hash(R V ), and use K V Decryption Get pseudonyms V_fid and K V,TGS .
[0108] (4) The vehicle requests a service authorization ticket (SGT) from TGS using a pseudonym
[0109] Vehicle K V,TGS Encrypt APP_id, V_fid to get:
[0110] The vehicle will and TGT is sent to TGS.
[0111] TGS uses the master key K TGSDecrypt TGT to get: {V_fid, AS_id, TGS_id, t, lifetime, K V,TGS}, TGS uses K V,TGS Decryption And verify whether V_fid is consistent with TGT. If the verification is successful, proceed to the next step; otherwise exit.
[0112] TGS generates a random session key K between the vehicle and the application server V,APP
[0113] TGS with K V,TGS Encrypt V_fid, APP_id, K V,APP get:
[0114] TGS retrieves the session key K between the application server and the ticket authorization server TGS from the database DB according to the application server's identifier APP_id APP,TGS , and generate K APP,TGS Encrypted Service Grant Ticket (SGT):
[0115]
[0116] TGS will and SGT sent to the vehicle.
[0117] (5) The vehicle obtains a service authorization ticket SGT
[0118] The vehicle received a message from TGS and Sgt.
[0119] The vehicle uses a random session key K shared with the TGS V,TGS Decrypt to get V_fid, APP_id and session key K V,APP .
[0120] Verify that V_fid and APP_id are consistent with those sent to TGS. If they are consistent, trust the SGT sent by TGS and the session key K with the application server. V,APP , otherwise exit.
[0121] (6) The vehicle requests communication services from the application server
[0122] Vehicle K V,APP Encrypt APP_id, V_fid to get:
[0123] The vehicle will and SGT are sent to the application server.
[0124] The application server uses the session key K between the application server and the ticket granting server TGS APP,TGS Decrypt SGT to get {V_fid, APP_id, TGS_id, t, lifetime, K V,APP}.
[0125] Use the decrypted K V,APP Further decryption Get V_fid and APP_id, verify whether V_fid is consistent with the vehicle pseudonym in SGT, if they are consistent, the vehicle is trusted, and then the vehicle and the application server use K V,APP Communicate and exit if there is any inconsistency.
Claims
1. A method for extending an anonymous authentication and key distribution protocol based on PUF-Kerberos, characterized in that: The steps include: (1) Register the client and server with the KDC; (2) The client requests a pseudonym and a ticket granting ticket (TGT) from the AS; (3) The client obtains and verifies the pseudonym and the ticket granting ticket TGT; (4) The client requests a service authorization ticket (SGT) from TGS using a pseudonym; (5) The client obtains and verifies the service authorization ticket SGT; (6) The client requests communication services from the server.
2. The anonymous authentication and key distribution protocol extension method based on PUF-Kerberos according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step (1) comprises: (1.1) The client installs PUF, i.e., the physical unclonable function structure, PUF A , public key encryption and decryption algorithms, symmetric encryption and decryption algorithms; (1.2) The client generates several random numbers as incentive C A Set, each stimulus input PUF structure generates the corresponding response R A ; The KDC authentication server AS generates its own public-private key pair PK-SK and stores it securely in the KDC database DB; (1.3) The client sends the incentive response pair CRP set and the real ID to the KDC for registration. The KDC indexes the client incentive response pair CRP set according to the client's real ID and stores it securely in the KDC database DB. The KDC returns the AS's public key PK to the client. (1.4) The server sends the real ID to KDC for registration. KDC generates the session key K between the server and the ticket authorization server TGS based on the real ID of the server. B,TGS , KDC saves the real ID and K B,TGS Go to the database DB and write K B,TGS Returned to the server, the authentication server AS and the ticket authorization server TGS in KDC have access permissions to the database DB.
3. The anonymous authentication and key distribution protocol extension method based on PUF-Kerberos according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step (2) comprises: (2.1) The client uses PK to encrypt the client's real ID to send a pseudonym and TGT application to AS. pk (A_id); (2.2) AS receives the message and decrypts E with SK pk (A_id) Get the client's real id, retrieve the client's real id from the database, and retrieve the client's incentive response to the CRP set successfully <C A , R A > i=1,…,n Take any stimulus response pair <C A ,R A >, generate the client's temporary key K A =Hash(R A ) and MAC = Hash (C A ||R A ), if the search is unsuccessful, exit; (2.3) AS generates the client pseudonym A_fid and the session key K between the client and the ticket granting server TGS A,TGS , save the client pseudonym A_fid to the database DB, and use K A Encrypt A_fid and K A,TGS get: (2.4) AS accesses the master key K of TGS from the database TGS , use K TGS Encrypt and generate a ticket-granting ticket TGT: (2.5) AS will C A , The MAC and TGT are sent to the client.
4. The anonymous authentication and key distribution protocol extension method based on PUF-Kerberos according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step (3) comprises: (3.1) The client receives the C sent by the AS A , MAC and TGT; (3.2) The client uses its own physical unclonable function structure PUF A , generating the incentive value C A The corresponding response R A , calculate MAC A =Hash(C A ||R A ) is consistent with the received MAC value, then the AS and the message sent by the AS are trusted; (3.3) The client generates a temporary key K A =Hash(R A ), and use K A Decryption Get the pseudonyms A_fid and K A,T GS.
5. The anonymous authentication and key distribution protocol extension method based on PUF-Kerberos according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step (4) comprises: (4.1) Client uses K A,TGS Encrypt B_id and A_fid to get: (4.2) The client will and TGT to TGS; (4.3) TGS uses the master key K TGS Decrypting TGT yields: {A_fid, AS_id, TGS_id, t, lifetime, K A,TGS }, TGS uses K A,TGS Decryption Verify whether A_fid is consistent with TGT. If the verification is successful, proceed to the next step; otherwise, exit. (4.4) TGS generates a random session key K between the client and the server A,B ; (4.5) TGS uses K A,TGS Encrypt A_fid, B_id, K A,B get: (4.6) TGS retrieves the session key K between the server and the ticket granting server TGS from the database DB according to the server identifier B_id B,TGS , and generate K B,TGS Encrypted service authorization ticket SGT: (4.7) TGS will and SGT to the client.
6. The anonymous authentication and key distribution protocol extension method based on PUF-Kerberos according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step (5) comprises: (5.1) The client receives the TGS and SGT; (5.2) The client uses the random session key K shared with TGS A,TGS Decrypt to get A_fid, B_id and session key K A , B ; (5.3) Verify whether A fid and B id are consistent with those sent to TGS. If they are consistent, the SGT sent by TGS and the session key K with the server are trusted. A,B , otherwise exit.
7. The anonymous authentication and key distribution protocol extension method based on PUF-Kerberos according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step (6) comprises: (6.1) Client uses K A,B Encrypt B_id and A_fid to get: (6.2) The client will and SGT to the server; (6.3) Use the session key K between the server and the ticket granting server TGS B,TGS Decrypt SGT to get {A_fid, B_id, TGS_id, t, lifetime, K A,B }; (6.4) Using the decrypted K A,B Further decryption Get A_fid and B_id, verify whether A_fid is consistent with the client pseudonym in SGT, if they are consistent, the client is trusted, and then the client and server use K A,B Communicate and exit if there is any inconsistency.
8. The anonymous authentication and key distribution protocol extension method based on PUF-Kerberos according to claim 3, characterized in that: The encryption and decryption adopt the ECC public key algorithm.
9. The anonymous authentication and key distribution protocol extension method based on PUF-Kerberos according to any one of claims 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7, characterized in that: The encryption and decryption both adopt symmetric encryption algorithms.
10. The anonymous authentication and key distribution protocol extension method based on PUF-Kerberos according to claim 1, characterized in that: The symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, SM1 and Hash algorithm, and the output value length of the Hash function is adjusted according to the encryption algorithm.
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