Authentication method for avoiding emergency vehicle

Through technologies such as the elliptic curve cryptographic system and physical non-cloneable functions, the problems of identity verification and information security of emergency vehicles in rescue scenarios are solved, and the efficiency and information security of quickly reaching the accident site are achieved.

CN118945657APending Publication Date: 2024-11-12HANGZHOU NORMAL UNIVERSITY
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202410931184.7
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-07-11
Publication Date
2024-11-12

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Emergency vehicles are vulnerable to attack in rescue scenarios, such as an enemy pretending to be an emergency vehicle to communicate to gain road priority, resulting in the security of information transmission being threatened and the rescue efficiency is inefficient.

Method used

Using an authentication protocol based on the elliptic curve cryptography system, public and private keys are generated through trusted centers, and physically non-cloneable functions and biological keys are used for authentication and message encryption to ensure secure communication between emergency vehicles and roadside units. And broadcast evasion information to ordinary vehicles in advance to ensure quick arrival at the accident site.

Benefits of technology

It effectively reduces the risk of impersonation attacks and forgery attacks, ensures the security of information transmission and identity legality, improves the efficiency of emergency vehicles to arrive at the accident site, and reduces rescue delays.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention discloses an authentication method for avoiding an emergency vehicle. The emergency vehicle sends accident information and an authentication message request to the nearest roadside unit in advance, and the roadside unit authenticates the identity legality of the vehicle after receiving the message, generates a shared secret value, encrypts the shared secret value and sends the encrypted shared secret value to the emergency vehicle; transmitting the avoidance message, part of information of the emergency vehicle and the shared secret value to a second roadside unit on the rescue route in advance, sending authentication request information to the second roadside unit when the emergency vehicle arrives at the second roadside unit, generating a new shared secret value after the authentication is successful, encrypting and sending the new shared secret value to the emergency vehicle, and sending the new shared secret value to the emergency vehicle. And transmitting the avoidance message, part of information of the emergency vehicle and the newly generated shared secret value to a next roadside unit on the rescue route, wherein the subsequent authentication mode is the same as the second authentication mode. According to the invention, a physical unclonable function and a biological key are simultaneously designed and adopted to protect privacy information of the roadside unit and the emergency vehicle, so that key leakage is avoided.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The invention belongs to the technical field of information security, and in particular relates to an authentication method for avoiding emergency vehicles. Background Art

[0002] Against the backdrop of rapid socio-economic and technological development, urban population and vehicles are growing rapidly. This rapid growth has led to the continuous occurrence of problems such as traffic congestion, traffic accident rescue and traffic management, which have become a common problem faced by countries around the world. In order to solve these traffic problems, intelligent transportation systems have been proposed and received widespread attention. The Internet of Vehicles is an important part of the intelligent transportation system and has been widely used in smart cities in recent years. The Internet of Vehicles refers to connecting cars to the Internet through wireless communication technology to achieve real-time data exchange and communication between vehicles and the external environment, other vehicles and infrastructure. It uses technologies such as on-board sensors and communication modules to turn cars into intelligent terminals and achieve interconnection between vehicles and between vehicles and infrastructure. Summary of the invention

[0003] The present invention provides an authentication method for avoiding emergency vehicles. The Internet of Vehicles technology is used to solve the problem of emergency lanes being occupied in current emergency vehicle rescue scenarios and improve rescue efficiency. However, the Internet of Vehicles communicating on wireless channels will face a series of security challenges, such as message eavesdropping, forgery and tampering. Especially in emergency vehicle traffic scenarios, it is vulnerable to a series of attacks, such as adversaries pretending to be emergency vehicles to communicate in order to obtain road priority. To ensure the security of information transmission, vehicle-to-infrastructure authentication is crucial. The use of authentication protocols can reduce the risks in the communication process between vehicles and roadside units and block some malicious attacks, such as impersonation attacks, forgery attacks, side channel attacks, etc.

[0004] The protocol is based on the elliptic curve cryptography system and realizes conditional privacy protection and mutual authentication. The proposed protocol allows emergency vehicles to quickly authenticate with subsequent roadside units after completing the first mutual authentication with the nearest roadside unit, avoiding tedious calculation processes. At the same time, each roadside unit will broadcast avoidance information to ordinary vehicles in the jurisdiction in advance, reminding them to open temporary emergency lanes for emergency vehicles. In addition, when the emergency vehicle is started, the protocol also introduces the legitimacy verification of the driver's identity, and the trusted center can hold malicious behavior accountable. At the same time, the design uses physical unclonable functions and biometric keys to protect the privacy information of roadside units and emergency vehicles to avoid key leakage.

[0005] The technical solution of the present invention is:

[0006] A method for authenticating an emergency vehicle avoidance method, the method comprising the following steps:

[0007] S1 During the system initialization phase, the trusted center selects the elliptic curve, generates public and private keys, and processes registration requests from emergency vehicles and roadside units;

[0008] The S2 trusted center is responsible for generating registration information for emergency vehicles and roadside units respectively, and feeding the registration information back to the vehicles and roadside units. After receiving the registration information, the vehicles and roadside units use their own unique physical unclonable functions to calculate the secret parameters, and store the calculated registration information in the vehicle's on-board unit OBU and the roadside unit storage unit respectively;

[0009] After an accident occurs in S3, the emergency vehicle sends the emergency vehicle's driving path information and authentication message request to the nearest roadside unit in advance. After receiving the message, the roadside unit first authenticates the legitimacy of the vehicle's identity. If the authentication is successful, it sends avoidance information to all ordinary vehicles in the jurisdiction in advance to make timely avoidance and clear the emergency lane. At the same time, it generates a shared secret value and encrypts it to the emergency vehicle. The avoidance message and part of the emergency vehicle's information and the shared secret value are transmitted to the next roadside unit on the rescue route in advance through the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman value, hash algorithm and symmetric encryption algorithm.

[0010] When the S4 emergency vehicle arrives at the second roadside unit, it sends a request authentication message to the second roadside unit. The second roadside unit performs authentication. After successful authentication, it generates a new shared secret value, encrypts it and sends it to the emergency vehicle. At the same time, it passes the avoidance message and part of the emergency vehicle's information as well as the newly generated shared secret value to the next roadside unit on the rescue route until the emergency vehicle arrives at the scene of the accident.

[0011] Furthermore, the trusted center selects a large prime number p, the finite field F p , an elliptic curve E:y 2 =x 3 +ax+b(mod p),a,b∈F p , the order of the additive group G is q, and P is the generator. At the same time, choose a secure one-way hash function h(·) and a random number As the private key of the system, and calculate the corresponding public key, that is, the point multiplication result PK based on the elliptic curve algorithm TA =s·P;

[0012] Furthermore, the S2 is specifically:

[0013] S2.1 Roadside Unit Registration: First, the trusted center registers each roadside unit RSU n ={RSU1, RSU2, RSU3,..., RSU n Generate timestamp T Rn ={T R1, T R2 ..., T Rn}, and select private keys for them respectively And calculate the corresponding public key PK based on the elliptic curve point multiplication algorithm RSUn =u n ·P; then, the trusted center sends the private key u n , Public Key PK RSUn and timestamp T Rn Sent to the corresponding roadside unit RSU n , Roadside Unit RSU n Randomly select a challenge value C n , using the physical unclonable function to generate the corresponding response value R n =PUF(C n ),calculate Used to encrypt and store long-term private keys n , and finally <C n ,sk RSUn , PK RSUn , T Rn >Stored in the storage unit, at the same time, the trusted center publishes system parameters params = {G, E, P, p, q, a, b, h (·), PK TA , PK RSUn} for all entities;

[0014] S2.2 Registration of emergency vehicles and their drivers: Emergency Vehicle EV j The driver Dr i Select ID EVj , and to EV j Enter their biometric information i , Emergency Vehicle EV j Generate your own private key Calculate the public key PK based on the elliptic curve algorithm EVj =v j P, using the fuzzy extractor's generating function Gen(BIO i )={α i , β i}, calculate the bio-key α i and the recovery parameter β i , through a secure channel {PK EVj , ID EVj}Sent to the trusted center; the trusted center generates the current timestamp T1 and two random numbers x j and b j , calculate X based on the elliptic curve algorithm j =x j P, uses the system key s to encrypt and generate the emergency vehicle EV j PEVj =E s (ID EVj ||b j ||T1), and the authentication parameter Cert j =h(PEV j ||PK EVj ||X j ||PK TA )·x j +s, then the trusted center will {PEV j , Cert j , X j}Sent to emergency vehicle EV through safety channel j , Emergency Vehicle EV j After receiving the information from the trusted center TA, the authentication parameter Cert is verified based on the elliptic curve algorithm j The dot product result Cert j ·P=h(PEV j ||PK EVj ||X j ||PK TA )·X j +PK TA If the equation is correct, re-initiate the registration request; if the equation is correct, it means that the received message is correct, and the emergency vehicle EV j Randomly select a challenge value C j , the corresponding response value R is generated by the physical unclonable function j =PUF(C j ), calculate the parameter Auth1 = h(ID EVj ||α i )mod n 0 is used for driver login verification. Used to encrypt and store verification parameters X j ((X Xj , Y Xj ) is X j 's horizontal and vertical axes), Used to encrypt and store pseudonymous PEV j , Used to encrypt and store vehicle identity verification parameters Cert j , Used to encrypt and store long-term private keys v j , n0∈(16,256), finally, the vehicle will be <C j ,Rep(·),PK EVj , F j , VX j , V j , βi , VP j , Auth1, n0> is stored in the on-board unit OBU.

[0015] Furthermore, the S3 is specifically:

[0016] S3.1 Emergency Vehicle EV j Before entering the nearest RSU1 domain, the driver Dr i ID EVj and his / her biometric information Enter the vehicle to log in, emergency vehicle EV j Recover the biometric key Calculate and verify login authentication parameters Is it correct? If not, log in again until the login threshold is reached. If correct, the driver's identity authentication is successful, and the emergency vehicle EV j Calculate the response value R j =PUF(C j ), decrypt verification parameters Decrypting Pseudonyms Decrypting authentication parameters Decrypt the vehicle's long-term private key And randomly select two random numbers r1, n j ,in Based on the elliptic curve algorithm, A1=r1·P is calculated, and based on the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman value and the hash algorithm, Used to encrypt and transmit random values, and similarly, Used to encrypt and transmit the planned route M, Used to encrypt transmission verification parameter X j , Used to encrypt and transmit the vehicle public key PK EVj , Used for encrypted transmission of vehicle pseudonym PEV j , calculate the vehicle identity authentication parameter Auth2 = h(X j ||PK EVj ||PEV j ||M||n j ||T2)·v j +Cert j , T2 is the current timestamp, (X PKj , Y PKj ) is PEV j The horizontal and vertical axes of the emergency vehicle EVj Send {Auth2, A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, T2} to the nearest roadside unit RSU1;

[0017] S3.2 When receiving an EV from an emergency vehicle j After receiving the message, the roadside unit RSU1 first checks the timestamp T2, then calculates the response value R1 = PUF (C1) and decrypts the private key Calculate a random value based on the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman value and the hash algorithm Decrypt the planned route Decrypt the verification parameters Decrypt the vehicle public key Decrypt the vehicle pseudonym verify

[0018] If it is incorrect, the authentication will be terminated immediately; otherwise, the roadside unit RSU1 broadcasts the avoidance information to all ordinary vehicles within its jurisdiction. At the same time, the roadside unit RSU1 generates two random numbers And calculate Used to encrypt and transmit random number y j11 and j12 , calculate Auth3 = h(n j ||Z j1 ||y j11 ||y j12 ||A1||X j ||T3) is used for message integrity verification, and then sends {Auth3, Z j1 , T3} to the emergency vehicle EV j , Secondly, the roadside unit RSU1 calculates based on the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman value, hash algorithm and symmetric encryption algorithm Used to encrypt and transmit the planned route M, shared secret value y j11 and j12 And the vehicle pseudonym PEV j , and send {PK RSU1 , Z n1 , T3} to the next roadside unit RSU2;

[0019] S3.3 Emergency Vehicle EV j After receiving the message from the nearest roadside unit RSU1, first check the timestamp T3, and then calculate two shared secret values ​​based on the elliptic curve algorithm and hash algorithm And calculate Used to verify the integrity of secret parameters. If the equation holds, mutual authentication is successful and the two parameters <y are stored. j11 ,y j12 >, otherwise, EV j Resend the authentication request;

[0020] S3.4 After receiving the message from RSU1, the roadside unit RSU2 first checks the timestamp T3, calculates the response value R2 = PUF (C2), and recovers the long-term key Decryption calculate Used to encrypt and store the shared secret value y j12 Finally, the roadside unit RSU2 stores <y j11 , Q j1 , PEV j , M> in the storage unit, and broadcast the avoidance information to all ordinary vehicles in the area in advance, and finally wait for the EV j Reach the domain authentication.

[0021] Furthermore, the S4 is specifically:

[0022] S4.1 When an emergency vehicle EV j When arriving at the second roadside unit RSU2, a random number is first generated Then, based on the elliptic curve algorithm, A7=r2·P is calculated, and Auth4=h(y j11 ||y j12 ||PEV j ||M||A7||T4) is used to verify the integrity of the message and finally send {Auth4, y j11 , A7, T4} to RSU2, when receiving j After receiving the message, RSU2 first checks the timestamp T4. RSU2 j11 When you find <y j11 , Q j1 , PEV j , M>, and calculate the response value R2 = PUF (C2), decrypt the shared secret value Used to verify vehicle identity, check Is it equal to Auth4? If the equation is true, the authentication is successful and two random numbers are generated for RSU2. And calculate Used to encrypt and transmit random number y j21 and j22 , calculate Auth5 = h(Z j2 ||yj21 ||y j22 ||y j12 ||T5) is used to verify the integrity of the message and calculate Used to encrypt and transmit the planned route M, shared secret value y j21 and j22 And the vehicle pseudonym PEV j , then send {Auth5, Z j2 , T5} gives EV j , and send {PK RSU2 , Z n2 , T5} to RSU3, where RSU3 is the subsequent RSU after RSU2 in the planned route M;

[0023] After S4.2 receives the message from RSU2, EV j First, check the timestamp T5, and calculate two shared secret values ​​based on the elliptic curve algorithm and hash algorithm. and verify integrity parameters Then compare and Auth5, if they are equal, mutual authentication is successful; otherwise, the emergency vehicle EV j Resend the authentication request. Similarly, after receiving the message from RSU2, the roadside unit RSU3 first checks the timestamp T5, calculates the response value R3 = PUF (C3), and recovers the long-term key. Decryption calculate Used to encrypt and store the shared secret value y j22 Finally, the roadside unit RSU3 stores <y j21 , Q j2 , PEV j , M> in the storage unit, and broadcast avoidance information to all ordinary vehicles in the area in advance, and finally wait for the emergency vehicle EV j Reach the domain authentication;

[0024] S4.3 The subsequent authentication method is the same as the second authentication method mentioned above until the emergency vehicle arrives at the accident scene.

[0025] Furthermore, the method for verifying the timestamp is specifically as follows:

[0026] |T′ n -T n |≤ΔT,

[0027] Among them, T n is the timestamp contained in the information sent in the previous stage, T′ nIt is the current timestamp obtained by the device when receiving the information. ΔT is the threshold time allowed in the preset communication process. When the time difference is greater than the threshold time, the authentication is terminated; when the time difference is less than the threshold time, the next step is carried out.

[0028] Furthermore, all messages are transmitted in a common channel.

[0029] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following advantages:

[0030] The present invention solves the problem of emergency avoidance of other vehicles when the emergency vehicle arrives at the scene, so that the emergency vehicle can quickly arrive at the accident scene.

[0031] In the present invention, both the communication between the emergency vehicle and the roadside unit and the communication between the roadside units undergo a mutual authentication process, thereby ensuring the legitimacy and traceability of the identities of both parties to the authentication.

[0032] In the face of common attack methods such as message forgery, tampering and malicious tracking, as well as physical attacks, the present invention adopts a method based on physical unclonable functions and biometric keys to design and protect the private keys of roadside units (RSUs) and emergency vehicles (EVs), based on timestamps and pseudonyms and various encryption methods, such as elliptic curve encryption algorithm, elliptic curve Difficulty e -Hellman value, etc., to resist common attacks and physical attacks. Compared with the traditional method, the present invention can provide more avoidance time for ordinary vehicles by broadcasting avoidance information in advance, compared with the traditional sirens and light prompts, thereby improving avoidance efficiency and reducing rescue delays.

[0033] The present invention adopts elliptic curves. The elliptic curve cryptographic system has the advantages of short key, high strength, few parameters, fast digital signature, small amount of calculated data, etc., and is particularly suitable for devices with limited computing resources and storage resources. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0034] The accompanying drawings generally illustrate various embodiments by way of example and not limitation, and together with the description and claims, serve to illustrate the embodiments of the invention. Where appropriate, the same reference numerals are used throughout the drawings to refer to the same or similar parts. Such embodiments are illustrative and are not intended to be exhaustive or exclusive embodiments of the present apparatus or method.

[0035] Figure 1 This is the system architecture diagram;

[0036] Figure 2 Flowchart for the first communication authentication between a vehicle and a roadside unit.

[0037] Figure 3The figure is a flow chart of message transmission between roadside units.

[0038] Figure 4 Flowchart for communication authentication between a vehicle and subsequent roadside units. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0039] It should be noted that, in the absence of conflict, the embodiments and features in the embodiments of the present application can be combined with each other. The present application will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and in combination with the embodiments.

[0040] like Figure 1 As shown in the figure, an authentication method for avoiding emergency vehicles is implemented based on the three-party entities of the vehicle, the trusted center and the roadside unit. The trusted agency TA is responsible for registering other entities (i.e., the emergency vehicle EV and the roadside unit RSU) in the network and distributing keys to them respectively. At the same time, when the emergency vehicle uses the emergency lane when it has no emergency mission, the agency can find the identity of the emergency vehicle and hold the driver accountable. The roadside unit RSU is responsible for anonymously authenticating the emergency vehicle and issuing avoidance information to ordinary vehicles, and passing the emergency vehicle and part of the information to the next roadside unit on the planned route in advance. For the authenticity of the system, it is assumed that the communication channel between RSUs is not completely secure. The emergency vehicle communicates with the roadside unit RSU through an open channel using the dedicated short-range communication (DSRC) protocol.

[0041] like Figure 2 As shown in the figure, the initial communication authentication process between the vehicle and the roadside unit is as follows:

[0042] After an accident occurs, the driver of the emergency vehicle enters the biometric information for login verification. If the verification fails, the biometric information is re-entered until the threshold of the number of logins is reached. If successful, the driver's identity authentication is successful, and the avoidance request message is sent to the nearest roadside unit (RSU1) for the first time. The nearest roadside unit recovers the private key to authenticate the message. If the authentication fails, the message is discarded and the vehicle resends the avoidance request. If the authentication passes, the avoidance information is sent in advance to all ordinary vehicles in the jurisdiction for timely avoidance and clearing the emergency lane. At the same time, a shared secret value is generated and encrypted and sent to the emergency vehicle. The emergency vehicle authenticates the message. If the authentication fails, the avoidance request message is resent. If it passes, the shared secret value is stored and the vehicle quickly goes to the next roadside unit. At the same time, the nearest roadside unit sends a message to the second roadside unit (RSU2) to facilitate fast switching authentication.

[0043] like Figure 3 As shown in Figure 1, the message propagation process between roadside units is as follows:

[0044] The nearest roadside unit (RSU1) transmits the avoidance message, part of the emergency vehicle information and the shared secret value to the second roadside unit (RSU2) on the rescue route. After receiving the message, the second roadside unit performs authentication. If the authentication fails, the nearest roadside unit resends the message. If the authentication passes, the second roadside unit notifies ordinary vehicles in its jurisdiction to avoid in advance, stores the shared secret value and prepares to receive the emergency vehicle. At the same time, if the roadside unit (RSU2) is not the roadside unit where the accident is located, the avoidance message and the shared secret value will be continued to be transmitted to the next roadside unit (RSU3), and the above process will be repeated until the roadside unit (RSU) where the accident is located is reached.

[0045] like Figure 4 As shown, the subsequent message authentication process is as follows:

[0046] When the emergency vehicle (EV) arrives at the jurisdiction of the second roadside unit (RSU2), it sends a request authentication message to the second roadside unit, which authenticates it. After successful authentication, it generates a new shared secret value, encrypts it and sends it to the emergency vehicle, which authenticates the message. If the authentication fails, it resends the avoidance request message; if it passes, it stores the new shared secret value and quickly goes to the next roadside unit. The subsequent authentication method is the same as the second authentication method mentioned above until the emergency vehicle arrives at the scene of the accident. The above is only a preferred specific implementation method of the present invention, but the protection scope of the present invention is not limited to this. Any technician familiar with the technical field within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention, according to the technical solution and inventive concept of the present invention, make equivalent replacement or change, should be covered within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for authenticating an emergency vehicle avoidance, characterized in that: The method comprises the following steps: S1 During the system initialization phase, the trusted center selects the elliptic curve, generates public and private keys, and processes registration requests from emergency vehicles and roadside units; The S2 trusted center is responsible for generating registration information for emergency vehicles and roadside units respectively, and feeding the registration information back to the vehicles and roadside units. After receiving the registration information, the vehicles and roadside units use their own unique physical unclonable functions to calculate the secret parameters, and store the calculated registration information in the vehicle's on-board unit OBU and the roadside unit storage unit respectively; After an accident occurs in S3, the emergency vehicle sends accident information and authentication message request to the nearest roadside unit in advance. After receiving the message, the roadside unit first authenticates the legitimacy of the vehicle's identity. If the authentication is successful, it sends avoidance information to all ordinary vehicles in the jurisdiction in advance to make timely avoidance and clear the emergency lane. At the same time, it generates a shared secret value and encrypts it to the emergency vehicle. The avoidance message and part of the emergency vehicle's information and the shared secret value are transmitted to the next roadside unit on the rescue route in advance through the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman value, hash algorithm and symmetric encryption algorithm. When the S4 emergency vehicle arrives at the second roadside unit, it sends a request authentication message to the second roadside unit. The second roadside unit performs authentication. After successful authentication, it generates a new shared secret value, encrypts it and sends it to the emergency vehicle. At the same time, it passes the avoidance message and part of the emergency vehicle's information as well as the newly generated shared secret value to the next roadside unit on the rescue route until the emergency vehicle arrives at the scene of the accident.

2. The authentication method for avoiding emergency vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that: The random number used in S As the private key, the public key PK is calculated by the point multiplication operation on the elliptic curve TA =s·P, P is the generator.

3. The authentication method for avoiding emergency vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that: The S2 is specifically: S2.1 Roadside Unit Registration: First, the trusted center registers each roadside unit RSU n ={RSU1, RSU2, RSU3,..., RSU n Generate timestamp T Rn ={T R1 , T R2 ..., T Rn }, and select private keys for them respectively And calculate the corresponding public key PK based on the elliptic curve point multiplication algorithm RSUn =u n ·P; The trusted center then sends the private key u n , Public Key PK RSUn and timestamp T Rn Sent to the corresponding roadside unit RSU n , Roadside Unit RSU n Randomly select a challenge value C n , using the physical unclonable function to generate the corresponding response value R n =PUF(C n ),calculate Used to encrypt and store long-term private keys n , and finally <C n ,sk RSUn , PK RSUn , T Rn >Stored in the storage unit, at the same time, the trusted center publishes system parameters params = {G, E, P, p, q, a, b, h (·), PK TA , PK RSUn } for all entities; S2.2 Registration of emergency vehicles and their drivers: Emergency Vehicle EV j The driver Dr i Select ID EVj , and to EV j Enter their biometric information i , Emergency Vehicle EV j Generate your own private key Calculate the public key PK based on the elliptic curve algorithm EVj =v j P, using the fuzzy extractor's generating function Gen(BIO i )={α i , β i }, calculate the bio-key α i and the recovery parameter β i , through a secure channel {PK EVj , ID E V j }Sent to the trusted center; the trusted center generates the current timestamp T1 and two random numbers x j and b j , calculate X based on the elliptic curve algorithm j =x j P, uses the system key s to encrypt and generate the emergency vehicle EV j PEV j =E s (ID EVj ||b j ||T1), and the authentication parameter Cert j =h(PEV j ||PK EVj ||X j ||PK TA )·x j +s, then the trusted center will {PEV j , Cert j , X j }Sent to emergency vehicle EV through safety channel j , Emergency Vehicle EV j After receiving the information from the trusted center TA, the authentication parameter Cert is verified based on the elliptic curve algorithm j The dot product result Cert j ·P=h(PEV j ||PK EVj ||X j ||PK TA )·X j +PK TA If the equation is correct, re-initiate the registration request; if the equation is correct, it means that the received message is correct, and the emergency vehicle EV j Randomly select a challenge value C j , the corresponding response value R is generated by the physical unclonable function j =PUF(C j ), calculate the parameter Auth1 = h(ID EVj ||α i )mod n0 is used for driver login verification, Used to encrypt and store verification parameters X j ((X Xj , Y Xj ) is X j 's horizontal and vertical axes), Used to encrypt and store pseudonymous PEV j , Used to encrypt and store vehicle identity verification parameters Cert j , Used to encrypt and store long-term private keys v j , n0∈(16,256), finally, the vehicle will <C j ,Rep(·),PK EVj , F j , VX j , V j , β i , VP j , Auth1, n0> is stored in the on-board unit OBU.

4. The authentication method for avoiding emergency vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that: The S3 is specifically: S3.1 Emergency Vehicle EV j Before entering the nearest RSU1 domain, the driver Dr i ID EVj and his / her biometric information Enter the vehicle to log in, emergency vehicle EV j Recover the biometric key Calculate and verify login authentication parameters Is it correct? If not, log in again until the login threshold is reached. If correct, the driver's identity authentication is successful, and the emergency vehicle EV j Calculate the response value R j =PUF(C j ), decrypt verification parameters Decrypting Pseudonyms Decrypting authentication parameters Decrypt the vehicle's long-term private key And randomly select two random numbers r1, n j , where r1, Based on the elliptic curve algorithm, A1=r1·P is calculated, and based on the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman value and the hash algorithm, Used to encrypt and transmit random value n j , similarly, Used to encrypt and transmit the planned route M, Used to encrypt the transmission verification parameter X j , Used to encrypt and transmit the vehicle public key PK EVj , Used for encrypted transmission of vehicle pseudonym PEV j , calculate the vehicle identity authentication parameter Auth2 = h(X j ||PK EVj ||PEV j ||M||n j ||T2)·V j +Cert j , T2 is the current timestamp, (X PKj , Y PKj ) is PEV j The horizontal and vertical axes of the emergency vehicle EV j Send {Auth2, A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, T2} to the nearest roadside unit RSU1; S3.2 When receiving an EV from an emergency vehicle j After receiving the message, the roadside unit RSU1 first checks the timestamp T2, then calculates the response value R1 = PUF (C1) and decrypts the private key Calculate a random value based on the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman value and the hash algorithm Decrypt the planned route Decrypt the verification parameters Decrypt the vehicle public key Decrypt the vehicle pseudonym verify If it is incorrect, the authentication will be terminated immediately; otherwise, the roadside unit RSU1 broadcasts the avoidance information to all ordinary vehicles within its jurisdiction. At the same time, the roadside unit RSU1 generates two random numbers y j11 , And calculate Used to encrypt and transmit random number y j11 and j12 , calculate Auth3 = h(n j ||Z j1 ||y j11 ||y j12 ||A1||X j ||T3) is used for message integrity verification, and then sends {Auth3, Z j1 , T3} to the emergency vehicle EV j , Secondly, the roadside unit RSU1 calculates based on the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman value, hash algorithm and symmetric encryption algorithm Used to encrypt and transmit the planned route M, shared secret value y j11 and j12 And the vehicle pseudonym PEV j , and send {PK RSU1 , Z n1 , T3} to the next roadside unit RSU2; S3.3 Emergency Vehicle EV j After receiving the message from the nearest roadside unit RSU1, first check the timestamp T3, and then calculate two shared secret values ​​based on the elliptic curve algorithm and hash algorithm And calculate Used to verify the integrity of secret parameters. If the equation holds, mutual authentication is successful and the two parameters <y are stored. j11 ,y j12 >, otherwise, EV j Resend the authentication request; S3.4 After receiving the message from RSU1, the roadside unit RSU2 first checks the timestamp T3, calculates the response value R2 = PUF (C2), and recovers the long-term key Decryption calculate Used to encrypt and store the shared secret value y j12 , finally, the roadside unit RSU2 stores <y j11 , Q j1 , PEV j , M> in the storage unit, and broadcast the avoidance information to all ordinary vehicles in the area in advance, and finally wait for the EV j Reach the domain authentication.

5. The authentication method for avoiding emergency vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that: The S4 is specifically: S4.1 When an emergency vehicle EV j When arriving at the second roadside unit RSU2, a random number is first generated Then, based on the elliptic curve algorithm, A7=r2·P is calculated, and Auth4=h(y j11 ||y j12 ||PEV j ||M||A7||T4) is used to verify the integrity of the message and finally send {Auth4, y j11 , A7, T4} to RSU2, when receiving j After receiving the message, RSU2 first checks the timestamp T4. RSU2 j11 Found in the database <y j11 , Q j1 , PEV j , M>, and calculate the response value R2 = PUF (C2), decrypt the shared secret value Used to verify vehicle identity, check Is it equal to Auth4? If the equation is true, the authentication is successful and two random numbers are generated for RSU2, y j21 , And calculate Used to encrypt and transmit random number y j21 and j22 , calculate Auth5 = h(Z j2 ||y j21 ||y j22 ||y j12 ||T5) is used to verify the integrity of the message and calculate Used to encrypt and transmit the planned route M, shared secret value y j21 and j22 And the vehicle pseudonym PEV j , then send {Auth5, Z j2 , T5} gives EV j , and send {PK RSU2 , Z n2 , T5} to RSU3, where RSU3 is the subsequent RSU after RSU2 in the planned route M; After S4.2 receives the message from RSU2, EV j First, check the timestamp T5, and calculate two shared secret values ​​based on the elliptic curve algorithm and hash algorithm. and verify integrity parameters Then compare and Auth5, if they are equal, mutual authentication is successful; otherwise, the emergency vehicle EV j Resend the authentication request. Similarly, after receiving the message from RSU2, the roadside unit RSU3 first checks the timestamp T5, calculates the response value R3 = PUF (C3), and recovers the long-term key. Decryption calculate Used to encrypt and store the shared secret value y j22 , finally, the roadside unit RSU3 stores <y j21 , Q j2 , PEV j , M> in the storage unit, and broadcast avoidance information to all ordinary vehicles in the area in advance, and finally wait for the emergency vehicle EV j Reach the domain authentication; S4.3 The subsequent authentication method is the same as the second authentication method mentioned above until the emergency vehicle arrives at the accident scene.

6. The authentication method for avoiding emergency vehicles according to claim 3, characterized in that: The method for verifying the timestamp is specifically as follows: |T′ n -T n |≤ΔT, Among them, T n is the timestamp contained in the information sent in the previous stage, T′ n It is the current timestamp obtained by the device when receiving the information. ΔT is the threshold time allowed in the preset communication process. When the time difference is greater than the threshold time, the authentication is terminated; when the time difference is less than the threshold time, the next step is carried out.

7. The emergency vehicle emergency avoidance authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that: All messages are transmitted in a common channel.

Citation Information

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