A privacy encryption communication method and system

Abstract

A privacy encryption communication method and system, relating to a communication method and system for vehicle requesting services. In order to solve the problem that the application scope of pseudonym confusion with RSU is limited and the risk of privacy information leakage is increased, the vehicle of the present invention needs to apply for registration in advance, and record the random number r1 used in the encryption process of the encrypted identity of the vehicle generated by the Paillier algorithm, the on-board unit generates a vehicle pseudonym and generates a confusion address, sends an LBS request to the TA with multiple pseudonyms, the TA determines the encrypted identity of the vehicle according to the hash value of the vehicle identity, and then based on the random number r1 and the random number r1 when generating the vehicle pseudonym, the vehicle encrypted identity is generated. 2j , verified by the Paillier algorithm, and then the service results of the location server LBS are used to provide services for the vehicle.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of vehicle communication technology and encryption technology, and in particular relates to a communication method and system for vehicle requesting service. Background Art

[0002] With the development of intelligent driving and intelligent transportation systems, vehicle ad hoc networking technology has also received attention and development. As a new type of mobile self-organizing network, vehicle ad hoc networking is an important part of the application of intelligent transportation systems. Its importance in traffic accident warning, traffic flow control, and providing information services and value-added services to drivers is becoming increasingly prominent.

[0003] With the development of vehicle assisted driving and autonomous driving technologies and the popularization of their practical applications, the demand for location-based services (LBS) is increasing, the frequency and volume of data communications are also increasing, and the corresponding data security issues are becoming more and more important. In particular, security issues involving real location privacy data such as LBS are becoming more and more prominent. Once such privacy data is obtained, it is easy to infer the driver's frequent travel routes, residence, workplace, and personal social behavior, etc., which poses a very high risk of privacy leakage and security risks.

[0004] In response to the security issues of location privacy data, some scholars have proposed to solve the problem based on pseudonym obfuscation technology, and some related solutions use roadside units (RSUs) to help obfuscate to achieve the solution, but this solution has the following problems:

[0005] 1. Due to the additional data forwarding of RSU, the service response delay is increased, which itself will reduce the application service experience. In addition, the increase in response delay has a relatively large impact on the vehicle's location service.

[0006] 2. Based on the current infrastructure construction, the coverage of RSU is still very limited, which severely limits the application scope and applicable scenarios of related solutions, resulting in the inability to provide privacy encrypted communication services in many cases.

[0007] 3. The vehicle OBU can generally only verify the RSU through the digital certificate issued by the trusted center to the RSU. Since the digital certificate can be forged, it increases the risk of malicious RSU (especially fake RSU) defrauding the private data including location information of the vehicle communicating with it, which increases the risk of privacy information leakage to a certain extent. Summary of the invention

[0008] In order to solve the problem of pseudonym confusion by means of RSU in the background technology, the present invention proposes a privacy encryption communication method.

[0009] A privacy encrypted communication method requires the vehicle's on-board unit to register with an application service provider TA in advance before performing privacy encrypted communication. The specific process includes the following steps:

[0010] During the registration process of vehicle Vi, TA records the vehicle registration information, assigns an identity ID_Vi to the vehicle based on the information submitted by vehicle Vi, and calculates the hash value H(ID_Vi) of ID_Vi;

[0011] TA uses the Paillier algorithm to generate the encrypted identity MVi of the vehicle Vi; the random number used in the encryption process of TA using the Paillier algorithm to generate the encrypted identity MVi of the vehicle Vi is recorded as r1; the vehicle stores ID_Vi and the random number r1 used for encryption in the on-board unit;

[0012] Use paillier(·) to represent the paillier algorithm encrypted by TA using the public key PH = {n, g}, and the corresponding private key SH = λ;

[0013] Establish an encrypted identity table of encrypted identity information MVi corresponding to the hash value H(ID_Vi) of the identity identifier;

[0014] TA includes the first database and the second database. The first database is the highest authority, and only the corresponding authority can read the data. All data are stored in the first database; the second database is the ordinary authority, and the corresponding data can be read according to the access of the vehicle Vi. The second data lacks the vehicle registration information and the vehicle assigned identity ID_Vi, and stores the encrypted identity table;

[0015] The registered vehicle communicates with the TA in a private and encrypted manner, including the following steps:

[0016] S100, the vehicle-mounted unit generates a vehicle pseudonym, including:

[0017] Vehicle Vi uses the timestamp of this request as the seed to generate a random number SJ_Vij, and the set corresponding to the random number SJ_Vij is recorded as SJ_Vi;

[0018] Based on the encryption public key PH and parameter n, the Paillier algorithm is used to encrypt the random number in SJ_Vi, P1(SJ_Vij, r 2j ), r 2j The random number used for this encryption process;

[0019] Then based on ID_Vi, SJ_Vij, r1, r 2j , use the encrypted Paillier algorithm to encrypt the vehicle ID_Vi to get:

[0020] jm_Vij=paillier(ID_Vi*SJ_Vij, r1, r 2j )=(g ID_Vi+SJ_Vij *(r1*r 2j ) n )mod n 2

[0021] The vehicle then performs a hash operation on the encrypted result jm_Vij to obtain the pseudonym JM_Vij=hash(jm_Vij);

[0022] A total of J other pseudonyms are generated, and the pseudonym set JM_Vi composed of J pseudonyms is JM_Vi={JM_Vi1, ..., JM_ViJ};

[0023] In the pseudonym generation process, a set of random numbers {r 21 ,…,r 2J}Stored in the on-board unit;

[0024] S200, the vehicle-mounted unit generates a mixed address, including:

[0025] The vehicle determines the real address Loc_Vi0;

[0026] Based on Loc_Vi0, perform random address migration to obtain J1 virtual addresses, and the remaining J2=J-J1 virtual addresses are Loc_Vi0; store the mixed address set Loc_Vi={loc_Vi1, ..., loc_ViJ};

[0027] S300, the vehicle-mounted unit generates an LBS mixed request set:

[0028] In the JM_Vi set, randomly select pseudonymous elements and bind them one by one with the addresses in Loc_Vi, and form an LBS request:

[0029] LBS_Vij=RSA(serv||JM_Vij||Loc_Vij||H(ID_Vi)||SJ_Vij||r 2j )

[0030] Wherein, RSA(·) represents the RSA encryption algorithm, and serv represents the location service content requested by the vehicle;

[0031] The on-board unit records the correspondence between the pseudonym element and each address in Loc_Vi and forms an LBS mixed request set;

[0032] S400, the onboard unit sends LBS requests LBS_Vij to the TA using multiple pseudonyms JM_Vij respectively;

[0033] S500, TA uses the RSA decryption algorithm to decrypt LBS_Vij and obtain the corresponding decrypted information; then, by accessing the encrypted identity table of the second database, the encrypted identity MVi of the vehicle is determined and verified according to H(ID_Vi) in the decrypted information:

[0034] Then based on SJ_Vij, r in the decrypted information 2j , using the Paillier algorithm for encryption:

[0035] P2(SJ_Vij,r 2j )=(g SJ_Vij *r 2j n )mod n 2 ;

[0036] The encrypted identity MVi obtained by the query is compared with the encryption result P2(SJ_Vij, r 2j ) performs homomorphic multiplication and takes the hash value:

[0037] hash(MVi*P2(SJ_Vij,r 2j ))=hash([(g ID_Vi *r1 n )mod n 2 ]*[(g SJ_Vij *r 2j n )mod n 2 ])

[0038] Hash(MVi*P2(SJ_Vij, r 2j )) is compared with JM_Vij. If the two are equal, the legality verification of vehicle Vi succeeds, otherwise it fails. When TA succeeds in authentication, the address Loc_Vij and service serv in the LBS request are forwarded to the location server LBS.

[0039] S600, TA receives the service result of the location server LBS and sends it to the vehicle Vi;

[0040] S700: Vehicle Vi receives the mixed address and the corresponding LBS service result, and then filters out the LBS service result according to the real address information in the mixed address set.

[0041] Furthermore, TA uses the Paillier algorithm to generate the encrypted identity of vehicle Vi MVi = P1 (ID_Vi, r1) = (g ID_Vi *r1 n )mod n 2 .

[0042] Furthermore, the Paillier algorithm is used to encrypt the random number in SJ_Vi P1 (SJ_Vij, r 2j )=(g SJ _Vij *r 2j n )mod n 2 .

[0043] Furthermore, the TA also includes a first database, which is the highest authority. Only those with corresponding authority can read data, and all data are stored in the first database.

[0044] Furthermore, in the process of randomly migrating to obtain J1 virtual addresses, 2-3 groups of virtual addresses are randomly set as the same addresses in J1, the number of the same addresses in each group is 3-5, and 3≤J2≤5 is set.

[0045] A privacy encrypted communication system, the system comprising at least a vehicle-mounted unit and an application service provider unit; the application service provider unit is denoted as TA, the TA comprises at least second data, and privacy encrypted communication is performed between the vehicle-mounted unit and the TA;

[0046] The on-board unit: on the premise that the TA has completed registration, each time the LBS service is needed, first sends an LBS service request containing privacy encryption information to the TA according to the information stored in the on-board unit, and receives the LBS service result fed back by the TA;

[0047] The process of the on-board unit registering with the TA in advance includes the following steps:

[0048] Vehicle Vi applies for registration according to the vehicle registration information, and records the random number used in the encryption process of TA using the Paillier algorithm to generate the encrypted identity MVi of vehicle Vi, which is recorded as r1;

[0049] The process of the on-board unit sending an LBS service request containing privacy encryption information to the TA according to the information stored in the on-board unit includes the following steps:

[0050] S100, the vehicle-mounted unit generates a vehicle pseudonym, including:

[0051] Vehicle Vi uses the timestamp of this request as the seed to generate a random number SJ_Vij, and the set corresponding to the random number SJ_Vij is recorded as SJ_Vi;

[0052] Based on the encryption public key PH and parameter n, the random number in SJ_Vi is encrypted using the Paillier algorithm, P1(SJ_Vij, r 2j ), r 2j The random number used for this encryption process;

[0053] Then based on ID_Vi, SJ_Vij, r1, r 2j , use the encrypted Paillier algorithm to encrypt the vehicle ID_Vi to get:

[0054] jm_Vij=paillier(ID_Vi*SJ_Vij, r1, r 2j )=(g ID_Vi+SJ_Vij *(r1*r 2j ) n )mod n 2

[0055] The vehicle then performs a hash operation on the encrypted result jm_Vij to obtain the pseudonym JM_Vij=hash(jm_Vij);

[0056] A total of J other pseudonyms are generated, and the pseudonym set JM_Vi composed of J pseudonyms is JM_Vi={JM_Vi1, ..., JM_ViJ};

[0057] In the pseudonym generation process, a set of random numbers {r 21 ,…,r 2J}Stored in the on-board unit;

[0058] S200, the vehicle-mounted unit generates a mixed address, including:

[0059] The vehicle determines the real address Loc_Vi0;

[0060] Based on Loc_Vi0, perform random address migration to obtain J1 virtual addresses, and the remaining J2=J-J1 virtual addresses are Loc_Vi0; store the mixed address set Loc_Vi={loc_Vi1, ..., loc_ViJ};

[0061] S300, the on-board unit generates an LBS mixed request set:

[0062] In the JM_Vi set, randomly select pseudonymous elements and bind them one by one with the addresses in Loc_Vi, and form an LBS request:

[0063] LBS_Vij=RSA(serv||JM_Vij||Loc_Vij||H(ID_Vi)||SJ_Vij||r 2j )

[0064] Wherein, RSA(·) represents the RSA encryption algorithm, and serv represents the location service content requested by the vehicle;

[0065] The on-board unit records the correspondence between the pseudonym element and each address in Loc_Vi and forms an LBS mixed request set;

[0066] S400, the onboard unit sends LBS requests LBS_Vij to the TA using multiple pseudonyms JM_Vij respectively;

[0067] The process of the vehicle-mounted unit receiving the LBS service result fed back by the TA includes the following steps:

[0068] Vehicle Vi receives the mixed address and the corresponding LBS service result, and then can filter out the LBS service result according to the real address information in the mixed address set;

[0069] The TA: registers according to the registration application of the vehicle Vi, and verifies according to the LBS service request containing the privacy encrypted information sent by the vehicle-mounted unit, and provides services after the verification is passed;

[0070] The process of TA registering according to the registration application of vehicle Vi includes the following steps:

[0071] During the registration process of vehicle Vi, the vehicle registration information is recorded, and an identity ID_Vi is assigned to the vehicle according to the information submitted by the vehicle Vi, and the hash value H(ID_Vi) of ID_Vi is calculated;

[0072] TA uses the Paillier algorithm to generate the encrypted identity MVi of vehicle Vi; TA uses the Paillier algorithm to generate the encrypted identity MVi of vehicle Vi. The random number used in the encryption process is denoted as r1;

[0073] Use paillier(·) to represent the paillier algorithm encrypted by TA using the public key PH={n,g}, and the corresponding private key SH=λ; establish an encrypted identity table of the encrypted identity information MVi corresponding to the hash value H(ID_Vi) of the identity identifier;

[0074] The second database of TA is a general authority, and the corresponding data can be read according to the access of vehicle Vi. The second data lacks vehicle registration information and vehicle assigned identity ID_Vi, and stores the encrypted identity table;

[0075] TA verifies the LBS service request containing privacy encrypted information sent by the vehicle-mounted unit. The process of providing services after verification includes the following steps:

[0076] S500, TA uses the RSA decryption algorithm to decrypt LBS_Vij and obtain the corresponding decrypted information; then, by accessing the encrypted identity table of the second database, the encrypted identity MVi of the vehicle is determined and verified according to H(ID_Vi) in the decrypted information:

[0077] Then based on SJ_Vij, r in the decrypted information 2j , using the Paillier algorithm for encryption:

[0078] P2(SJ_Vij,r 2j )=(g SJ_Vij *r 2j n )mod n 2 ;

[0079] The encrypted identity MVi obtained by the query is compared with the encryption result P2(SJ_Vij, r 2j ) performs homomorphic multiplication and takes the hash value:

[0080] hash(MVi*P2(SJ_Vij,r 2j ))=hash([(g ID_Vi *r1 n )mod n 2 ]*[(g SJ_Vij *r 2j n )mod n 2 ])

[0081] Hash(MVi*P2(SJ_Vij, r 2j )) is compared with JM_Vij. If the two are equal, the legality verification of vehicle Vi succeeds, otherwise it fails. When TA succeeds in authentication, the address Loc_Vij and service serv in the LBS request are forwarded to the location server LBS.

[0082] S600, TA receives the service result of the location server LBS and sends it to the vehicle Vi; the vehicle Vi receives the mixed address and the corresponding LBS service result, and then can filter out the LBS service result according to the real address information in the mixed address set.

[0083] Furthermore, TA uses the Paillier algorithm to generate the encrypted identity of vehicle Vi MVi = P1 (ID_Vi, r1) = (g ID_Vi *r1 n )mod n 2 .

[0084] Furthermore, the Paillier algorithm is used to encrypt the random number in SJ_Vi P1 (SJ_Vij, r 2j )=(g SJ _Vij *r 2j n )mod n 2 .

[0085] Furthermore, the TA also includes a first database, which is the highest authority. Only those with corresponding authority can read data, and all data are stored in the first database.

[0086] Furthermore, in the process of randomly migrating to obtain J1 virtual addresses, 2-3 groups of virtual addresses are randomly set as the same addresses in J1, the number of the same addresses in each group is 3-5, and 3≤J2≤5 is set.

[0087] Beneficial effects:

[0088] TA uses the Paillier algorithm to generate the encrypted identity MVi of the vehicle Vi, and TA sets up a first database and a second database, where the second database is a general authority, and the corresponding data can be read according to the access of the vehicle Vi. The second data lacks the vehicle registration information and the vehicle assigned identity ID_Vi, and stores the encrypted identity table; later, TA verifies the legitimacy of the vehicle pseudonym without verifying the real identity of the vehicle, which is based on the encrypted identity table of the second database. Therefore, it largely guarantees the trusted stability of the application service provider as a trusted center, and greatly reduces the risk of exposure and leakage of vehicle identity privacy.

[0089] The solution of the present invention is a direct communication method between the vehicle and the application service provider. It does not require data forwarding by RSU, can avoid the delay of service response caused by forwarding, improve the response speed, and enhance the experience. It is also affected by the coverage of RSU, has a wide range of applications, and is not limited to applicable scenarios. At the same time, since there is no need for the participation of RSU, the possibility of malicious RSU defrauding communication is avoided, and the privacy data leakage caused by such a situation is avoided.

[0090] Since the present invention actually utilizes the hash value of the encrypted identity for verification, and obtains the corresponding LBS service result based on the pseudonym and the obfuscated address, even if the communication between the vehicle and the application service provider is illegally obtained by a malicious third party, the real identity information of the vehicle cannot be obtained based on the hash value of the encrypted identity in the intercepted uploaded information, nor can the real information and real address of the vehicle be obtained based on the pseudonym and the obfuscated address in the intercepted return information, which greatly ensures that the privacy information in the communication process is not decrypted and obtained. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0091] Figure 1 Schematic diagram of the system model used in the present invention.

[0092] Figure 2 Schematic diagram of the process in encrypting communication for privacy. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0093] The present invention proposes a privacy encryption communication method that can directly communicate with an application service provider (trusted center) and the location information will not be easily leaked. The present invention is described in detail below in conjunction with a specific implementation method. Before the specific description is given, it should be noted that the vehicle-related location information, identity information and other private information / privacy data collected by this application are collected with the user's consent and authorization, and the collection, use and processing of the relevant privacy information / privacy data must comply with the laws, regulations and standards of relevant countries and regions.

[0094] Specific implementation method 1: Combining 1 and Figure 2 To explain this embodiment,

[0095] This embodiment is a privacy encryption communication method. The system model used in the present invention is as follows: Figure 1 As shown, it includes a user equipment unit and an application service provider. Since the application service provider is a trusted center TA, TA is used to represent the application service provider; at the same time, the application service provider uses its own or a third-party location server LBS. In this embodiment, the user equipment unit is a vehicle-mounted unit, and in other embodiments it can also be a mobile device such as a mobile phone.

[0096] 1. The vehicle's on-board unit needs to be registered with the application service provider in advance. The specific process includes the following steps:

[0097] During the registration process of vehicle Vi, TA records the vehicle registration information, assigns an identity ID_Vi to the vehicle based on the information submitted by vehicle Vi, and calculates the hash value H(ID_Vi) of ID_Vi.

[0098] TA also generates the encrypted identity MVi of vehicle Vi using the Paillier algorithm:

[0099] MVi=paillier(ID_Vi,r1)=(g ID_Vi *r1 n )mod n 2

[0100] Wherein, paillier(·) represents the paillier algorithm encrypted by TA using the public key PH = {n, g}, and the corresponding private key SH = λ; r1 represents the random number used in this encryption process;

[0101] Establish an encrypted identity table of encrypted identity information MVi corresponding to the hash value H(ID_Vi) of the identity identifier;

[0102] TA includes the first database and the second database. The first database is the highest authority, and only the corresponding authority can read the data. All data are stored in the first database; the second database is the ordinary authority, and the corresponding data can be read according to the access of the vehicle Vi. The second data lacks the vehicle registration information and the vehicle assigned identity ID_Vi, and stores the encrypted identity table;

[0103] The vehicle stores ID_Vi and the random number r1 used for encryption in the on-board unit.

[0104] 2. The privacy encrypted communication process includes the following steps:

[0105] S100, the vehicle-mounted unit generates a vehicle pseudonym:

[0106] S101, vehicle Vi uses the timestamp of this request as a seed to generate a random number SJ_Vij, j = 1, 2, ..., J; the set corresponding to the random number SJ_Vij is recorded as SJ_Vi;

[0107] Based on the encryption public key PH and parameter n, the random number in SJ_Vi is encrypted using the Paillier algorithm: P1(SJ_Vij, r 2j ) = paillier(SJ_Vij, r 2j )=(g SJ_Vij *r 2j n )mod n 2 ;

[0108] Among them, r 2j Indicates the random number used in this encryption process;

[0109] S102, based on ID_Vi, SJ_Vij, r1, r 2j , use the encrypted Paillier algorithm to encrypt the vehicle ID_Vi to get:

[0110] jm_Vij=paillier(ID_Vi*SJ_Vij, r1, r 2j )=(g ID_Vi+SJ_Vij *(r1*r 2j ) n )mod n 2

[0111] The vehicle then performs a hash operation on the encryption result jm_Vij to obtain the pseudonym JM_Vij=hash(jm_Vij).

[0112] A total of J other pseudonyms are generated, and the pseudonym set JM_Vi composed of J pseudonyms is JM_Vi={JM_Vi1, ..., JM_ViJ};

[0113] In the pseudonym generation process, a set of random numbers {r 21 ,…,r 2J}Stored in the on-board unit.

[0114] S200, the vehicle-mounted unit generates a mixed address:

[0115] S201, the vehicle determines the current real address Loc_Vi0 according to the positioning data;

[0116] S202, based on Loc_Vi0, perform random address migration to obtain J1 virtual addresses, randomly set 2-3 groups of virtual addresses as the same address in J1, and the number of the same addresses in each group is 3-5; the remaining J2 = J-J1 virtual addresses are Loc_Vi0, 3≤J2≤5;

[0117] The mixed address set Loc_Vi={loc_Vi1, ..., loc_ViJ} is stored.

[0118] S300, the vehicle-mounted unit generates an LBS mixed request set:

[0119] In the JM_Vi set, randomly select pseudonymous elements and bind them one by one with the addresses in Loc_Vi, and form an LBS request:

[0120] LBS_Vij=RSA(serv||JM_Vij||Loc_Vij||H(ID_Vi)||SJ_Vij||r 2j )

[0121] Wherein, RSA(·) represents the RSA encryption algorithm, and serv represents the location service content requested by the vehicle;

[0122] The on-board unit records the correspondence between the pseudonym element and each address in Loc_Vi and forms an LBS mixed request set.

[0123] S400, the onboard unit sends LBS requests LBS_Vij to the TA using multiple pseudonyms JM_Vij respectively;

[0124] S500,TA verifies the legitimacy of the vehicle pseudonym without verifying the real identity of the vehicle:

[0125] S501, TA uses the RSA decryption algorithm to decrypt LBS_Vij and obtain the corresponding decrypted information; then, by accessing the encrypted identity table of the second database, the encrypted identity MVi of the vehicle is determined and verified according to H(ID_Vi) in the decrypted information:

[0126] S502, based on SJ_Vij, r in the decrypted information 2j , using the Paillier algorithm for encryption:

[0127] P2(SJ_Vij,r 2j )=(g SJ_Vij *r 2j n )mod n 2 ;

[0128] The encrypted identity MVi obtained by the query is compared with the encryption result P2(SJ_Vij, r 2j ) performs homomorphic multiplication and takes the hash value:

[0129] hash(MVi*P2(SJ_Vij,r 2j ))=hash([(g ID_Vi *r1 n )mod n 2 ]*[(g SJ_Vij *r 2j n )mod n 2 ])

[0130] S502, compare the calculation result of S502 with JM_Vij, if the two are equal, the legality verification of vehicle Vi succeeds, otherwise fails;

[0131] When the TA is successfully authenticated, the address Loc_Vij and service serv in the LBS request are forwarded to the location server LBS;

[0132] S600, TA receives the service result of the location server LBS and sends it to the vehicle Vi;

[0133] S700: Vehicle Vi receives the mixed address and the corresponding LBS service result, and then filters out the LBS service result according to the real address information in the mixed address set.

[0134] In the present invention, TA uses the Paillier algorithm to generate the encrypted identity MVi of the vehicle Vi, and TA sets a first database and a second database, wherein the second database is a general authority, and the corresponding data can be read according to the access of the vehicle Vi, the second data lacks the vehicle registration information and the vehicle assigned identity ID_Vi, and the encrypted identity table is stored; later, TA verifies the legitimacy of the vehicle pseudonym based on the encrypted identity table of the second database without verifying the real identity of the vehicle, thereby ensuring the trustworthy stability of the application service provider as a trusted center to a great extent, and reducing the risk of contact and leakage of vehicle identity privacy to a great extent.

[0135] More importantly, the solution of the present invention is a direct communication method between the vehicle and the application service provider, which does not require data forwarding by RSU, can avoid the delay of service response caused by forwarding, improve the response speed, and enhance the experience; and is also affected by the coverage of RSU, with a wide range of applications and unlimited applicable scenarios; at the same time, since there is no need for the participation of RSU, the possibility of malicious RSU defrauding communication is avoided, and the privacy data leakage caused by such situation is avoided.

[0136] Since the present invention actually utilizes the hash value of the encrypted identity for verification, and obtains the corresponding LBS service result based on the pseudonym and the obfuscated address, even if the communication between the vehicle and the application service provider is illegally obtained by a malicious third party, the real identity information of the vehicle cannot be obtained based on the hash value of the encrypted identity in the intercepted uploaded information, nor can the real information and real address of the vehicle be obtained based on the pseudonym and the obfuscated address in the intercepted return information, which greatly ensures that the privacy information in the communication process is not decrypted and obtained.

[0137] In addition, the present invention sets 2-3 groups of virtual addresses as the same address when performing address mixing, and the number of identical addresses in each group is 3-5. At the same time, several pseudonyms are set to correspond to the real address Loc_Vi0 at the same time. In this way, it can be ensured that there are multiple groups of pseudonyms and addresses forming a many-to-one mapping relationship, thereby effectively preventing a malicious person from inferring a pseudonym based on a known location result, and then determining the address through the pseudonym, and then continuously and repeatedly tracking to determine the real address frequently used by the real vehicle.

[0138] The above calculation examples of the present invention are only used to explain the calculation model and calculation process of the present invention in detail, and are not intended to limit the implementation methods of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in the relevant field, other different forms of changes or modifications can be made based on the above description. It is impossible to list all the implementation methods here. All obvious changes or modifications derived from the technical solution of the present invention are still within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A privacy encryption communication method, characterized in that: Before conducting privacy encrypted communication, the vehicle's onboard unit needs to register with the application service provider TA in advance. The specific process includes the following steps: During the registration process of vehicle Vi, TA records the vehicle registration information, assigns an identity ID_Vi to the vehicle based on the information submitted by vehicle Vi, and calculates the hash value H(ID_Vi) of ID_Vi; TA uses the Paillier algorithm to generate the encrypted identity MVi of the vehicle Vi; the random number used in the encryption process of TA using the Paillier algorithm to generate the encrypted identity MVi of the vehicle Vi is recorded as r1; the vehicle stores ID_Vi and the random number r1 used for encryption in the on-board unit; Use paillier(·) to represent the paillier algorithm encrypted by TA using the public key PH = {n, g}, and the corresponding private key SH = λ; Establish an encrypted identity table of encrypted identity information MVi corresponding to the hash value H(ID_Vi) of the identity identifier; TA includes the first database and the second database. The first database is the highest authority, and only the corresponding authority can read the data. All data are stored in the first database; the second database is the ordinary authority, and the corresponding data can be read according to the access of the vehicle Vi. The second database lacks the vehicle registration information and the vehicle assigned identity ID_Vi, and stores the encrypted identity table; The registered vehicle communicates with the TA in a private and encrypted manner, including the following steps: S100, the vehicle-mounted unit generates a vehicle pseudonym, including: Vehicle Vi uses the timestamp of this request as the seed to generate a random number SJ_Vij, and the set corresponding to the random number SJ_Vij is recorded as SJ_Vi; Based on the encryption public key PH and parameter n, the random number in SJ_Vi is encrypted using the Paillier algorithm: P1(SJ_Vij, r 2j )=(g SJ_Vij *r 2j n )mod n 2 ; r 2j The random number used for this encryption process; Then based on ID_Vi, SJ_Vij, r1, r 2j , use the encrypted Paillier algorithm to encrypt the vehicle ID_Vi to get: jm_Vij=paillier(ID_Vi*SJ_Vij,r1,r 2j )=(g ID_Vi+SJ_Vij *(r1*r 2j ) n )to n 2 The vehicle then performs a hash operation on the encrypted result jm_Vij to obtain the pseudonym JM_Vij=hash(jm_Vij); A total of J other pseudonyms are generated, and the pseudonym set JM_Vi composed of J pseudonyms is JM_Vi={JM_Vi1, ..., JM_ViJ}; In the pseudonym generation process, a set of random numbers {r 21 ,…,r 2J }Stored in the on-board unit; S200, the vehicle-mounted unit generates a mixed address, including: The vehicle determines the real address Loc_Vi0; Based on Loc_Vi0, perform random address migration to obtain J1 virtual addresses, and the remaining J2=J-J1 virtual addresses are Loc_Vi0; store the mixed address set Loc_Vi={loc_Vi1, ..., loc_ViJ}; S300, the on-board unit generates an LBS mixed request set: In the JM_Vi set, randomly select pseudonymous elements and bind them one by one with the addresses in Loc_Vi, and form an LBS request: LBS_Vij=RSA(serv||JM_Vij||Loc_Vij||H(ID_Vi)||SJ_Vij||r 2j ) Wherein, RSA(·) represents the RSA encryption algorithm, and serv represents the location service content requested by the vehicle; The on-board unit records the correspondence between the pseudonym element and each address in Loc_Vi and forms an LBS mixed request set; S400, the onboard unit sends LBS requests LBS_Vij to the TA using multiple pseudonyms JM_Vij respectively; S500, TA uses the RSA decryption algorithm to decrypt LBS_Vij and obtain the corresponding decrypted information; then, by accessing the encrypted identity table of the second database, the encrypted identity MVi of the vehicle is determined and verified according to H(ID_Vi) in the decrypted information: Then based on SJ_Vij, r in the decrypted information 2j , using the Paillier algorithm for encryption: P2(SJ_Vij,r 2j )=(g SJ_Vij *r 2j n )mod n 2 ; The encrypted identity MVi obtained by the query is compared with the encryption result P2(SJ_Vij, r 2j ) performs homomorphic multiplication and takes the hash value: hash(MVi*P2(SJ_Vij,r 2j ))=hash([(g ID_Vi *r1 n )to n 2 ]*[(g SJ_Vij *r 2j n )to n 2 ]) Hash(MVi*P2(SJ_Vij, r 2j )) is compared with JM_Vij. If the two are equal, the legality verification of vehicle Vi succeeds, otherwise it fails. When TA succeeds in authentication, the address Loc_Vij and service serv in the LBS request are forwarded to the location server LBS. S600, TA receives the service result of the location server LBS and sends it to the vehicle Vi; S700: Vehicle Vi receives the mixed address and the corresponding LBS service result, and then filters out the LBS service result according to the real address information in the mixed address set.

2. A privacy encryption communication method according to claim 1, characterized in that: TA uses the Paillier algorithm to generate the encrypted identity of vehicle Vi MVi = P1 (ID_Vi, r1) = (g ID_Vi *r1 n )mod n 2 .

3. A privacy encryption communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 2, characterized in that: In the process of randomly migrating to obtain J1 virtual addresses, 2-3 groups of virtual addresses are randomly set as the same address in J1, the number of the same addresses in each group is 3-5, and 3≤J2≤5 is set.

4. A privacy encryption communication system, characterized in that: The system at least includes a vehicle-mounted unit and an application service provider; the application service provider is recorded as TA, and TA includes a first database and a second database. The first database is the highest authority, and only corresponding authorities can read data. All data is stored in the first database; privacy encrypted communication is performed between the vehicle-mounted unit and TA; The on-board unit: on the premise that the TA has completed registration, each time the LBS service is needed, first send the LBS service request containing the privacy encryption information to the TA according to the information stored in the on-board unit, and receive the LBS service result fed back by the TA; The process of the on-board unit registering with the TA in advance includes the following steps: Vehicle Vi applies for registration according to the vehicle registration information, and records the random number used in the encryption process of TA using the Paillier algorithm to generate the encrypted identity MVi of vehicle Vi, which is recorded as r1; The process of the on-board unit sending an LBS service request containing privacy encryption information to the TA according to the information stored in the on-board unit includes the following steps: S100, the vehicle-mounted unit generates a vehicle pseudonym, including: Vehicle Vi uses the timestamp of this request as the seed to generate a random number SJ_Vij, and the set corresponding to the random number SJ_Vij is recorded as SJ_Vi; Based on the encryption public key PH and parameter n, the random number in SJ_Vi is encrypted using the Paillier algorithm: P1(SJ_Vij, r 2j )=(g SJ_Vij *r 2j n )mod n 2 , r 2j The random number used for this encryption process; Then based on ID_Vi, SJ_Vij, r1, r 2j , use the encrypted Paillier algorithm to encrypt the vehicle ID_Vi to get: jm_Vij=paillier(ID_Vi*SJ_Vij,r1,r 2j )=(g ID_Vi+SJ_Vij *(r1*r 2j ) n )to n 2 The vehicle then performs a hash operation on the encrypted result jm_Vij to obtain the pseudonym JM_Vij=hash(jm_Vij); A total of J other pseudonyms are generated, and the pseudonym set JM_Vi composed of J pseudonyms is JM_Vi={JM_Vi1, ..., JM_ViJ}; In the pseudonym generation process, a set of random numbers {r 21 ,…,r 2J }Stored in the on-board unit; S200, the vehicle-mounted unit generates a mixed address, including: The vehicle determines the real address Loc_Vi0; Based on Loc_Vi0, perform random address migration to obtain J1 virtual addresses, and the remaining J2=J-J1 virtual addresses are Loc_Vi0; store the mixed address set Loc_Vi={loc_Vi1, ..., loc_ViJ}; S300, the on-board unit generates an LBS mixed request set: In the JM_Vi set, randomly select pseudonymous elements and bind them one by one with the addresses in Loc_Vi, and form an LBS request: LBS_Vij=RSA(serv||JM_Vij||Loc_Vij||H(ID_Vi)||SJ_Vij||r 2j ) Wherein, RSA(·) represents the RSA encryption algorithm, and serv represents the location service content requested by the vehicle; The on-board unit records the correspondence between the pseudonym element and each address in Loc_Vi and forms an LBS mixed request set; S400, the onboard unit sends LBS requests LBS_Vij to the TA using multiple pseudonyms JM_Vij respectively; The process of the vehicle-mounted unit receiving the LBS service result fed back by the TA includes the following steps: Vehicle Vi receives the mixed address and the corresponding LBS service result, and then can filter out the LBS service result according to the real address information in the mixed address set; The TA: registers according to the registration application of the vehicle Vi, and verifies according to the LBS service request containing the privacy encrypted information sent by the vehicle-mounted unit, and provides services after the verification is passed; The process of TA registering according to the registration application of vehicle Vi includes the following steps: During the registration process of vehicle Vi, the vehicle registration information is recorded, and an identity ID_Vi is assigned to the vehicle according to the information submitted by the vehicle Vi, and the hash value H(ID_Vi) of ID_Vi is calculated; TA uses the Paillier algorithm to generate the encrypted identity MVi of vehicle Vi; TA uses the Paillier algorithm to generate the encrypted identity MVi of vehicle Vi. The random number used in the encryption process is denoted as r1; Use paillier(·) to represent the paillier algorithm encrypted by TA using the public key PH={n,g}, and the corresponding private key SH=λ; establish an encrypted identity table of the encrypted identity information MVi corresponding to the hash value H(ID_Vi) of the identity identifier; The second database of TA is a general authority, and the corresponding data can be read according to the access of vehicle Vi. The second database lacks vehicle registration information and vehicle assigned identity ID_Vi, and stores the encrypted identity table; TA verifies the LBS service request containing privacy encrypted information sent by the vehicle-mounted unit. The process of providing services after verification includes the following steps: S500, TA uses the RSA decryption algorithm to decrypt LBS_Vij and obtain the corresponding decrypted information; then, by accessing the encrypted identity table of the second database, the encrypted identity MVi of the vehicle is determined and verified according to H(ID_Vi) in the decrypted information: Then based on SJ_Vij, r in the decrypted information 2j , using the Paillier algorithm for encryption: P2(SJ_Vij,r 2j )=(g SJ_Vij *r 2j n )mod n 2 ; The encrypted identity MVi obtained by the query is compared with the encryption result P2(SJ_Vij, r 2j ) performs homomorphic multiplication and takes the hash value: hash(MVi*P2(SJ_Vij,r 2j ))=hash([(g ID_Vi *r1 n )to n 2 ]*[(g SJ_Vij *r 2j n )to n 2 ]) Hash(MVi*P2(SJ_Vij, r 2j )) is compared with JM_Vij. If the two are equal, the legality verification of vehicle Vi succeeds, otherwise it fails. When TA succeeds in authentication, the address Loc_Vij and service serv in the LBS request are forwarded to the location server LBS. S600, TA receives the service result of the location server LBS and sends it to the vehicle Vi; the vehicle Vi receives the mixed address and the corresponding LBS service result, and then can filter out the LBS service result according to the real address information in the mixed address set.

5. A privacy encryption communication system according to claim 4, characterized in that: TA uses the Paillier algorithm to generate the encrypted identity of vehicle Vi MVi = P1 (ID_Vi, r1) = (g ID_Vi *r1 n )mod n 2 .

6. A privacy encryption communication system according to any one of claims 4 to 5, characterized in that: In the process of randomly migrating to obtain J1 virtual addresses, 2-3 groups of virtual addresses are randomly set as the same address in J1, the number of the same addresses in each group is 3-5, and 3≤J2≤5 is set.

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