Trusted industrial control system-based trusted transmission method and system

Abstract

The invention discloses a credible transmission method and system based on a credible industrial control system, a sender S generates a random number Ns and a message digest, calculates platform integrity measure Ds through TPMQuote, then signs the platform integrity measure Ds through a private key and sends the platform integrity measure Ds to a receiver R, the receiver R verifies the signature through a public key cetS, calculates own integrity measure Dr after confirming that information is not tampered, and sends the integrity measure Dr to the receiver R; a new asymmetric key pair is generated, and the public key Pbk is signed and then sent to the S; and after the S verifies the signature of the receiver R and confirms that the platform of the receiver R is credible, the Pbk is used for encrypting the symmetric key K1, the K1 is used for encrypting the data T, and meanwhile, the private key of the S is used for signing the data so as to ensure the consistency. And after receiving the encrypted data, the receiver R decrypts the symmetric key K1 by using the private key, decrypts the data T, and verifies the signature to ensure the data consistency. In the whole process, random numbers, asymmetric encryption, TPM secure storage and a signature mechanism are utilized, so that the security of data transmission and the credibility of platforms of both parties are ensured.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to a trusted transmission method and system based on a trusted industrial control system. Background Art

[0002] With the widespread application of industrial control systems, security issues in open network environments have become increasingly prominent. In the process of software-implemented business logic migration, the receiving platform faces the risk of attacks from malicious code, which may disrupt the normal operation of the system or even steal sensitive data. At the same time, the sender also needs to verify the credibility of the receiving platform to ensure the security and reliability of data transmission.

[0003] In order to solve the above problems, a new type of trusted third party (TTP) is proposed in the prior art, namely embedded TTP (trusted software agent). This solution avoids many inherent problems of dedicated TTP servers, such as single point failure, performance bottleneck, etc., by embedding TTP in the receiving platform. However, the embedded TTP solution does not completely solve the security and credibility issues of the receiving platform. Attackers may bypass the protection mechanism of TTP through various means to attack the receiving platform, or disguise themselves as a trusted receiving platform to deceive the sender. Summary of the invention

[0004] In view of the problems existing in the prior art, the present invention provides a trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system.

[0005] The present invention is achieved through the following technical solutions:

[0006] A trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system, applied to a sender S, comprises the following steps:

[0007] Step 1, the sender S uses the SM3 algorithm to encrypt the random number Nr of the receiver R and its own random number Ns, and uses the verification private key Aikis to sign the encrypted summary and the integrity measurement Ds of the trusted platform module to generate signature information, and sends the signature information, encrypted summary and integrity measurement Ds as trusted verification data to the receiver R;

[0008] Step 2: The sender S receives and the receiver R verifies the trusted verification data and sends the signature information Aikir{Dr, Pbk, Ns};

[0009] Where Dr is the integrity measurement of the trusted platform module of the receiver R, Pbk is the asymmetric key public key, and Ns is the random number of the sender S;

[0010] Step 3: The sender S uses the receiver R certificate certR to verify the signature information to confirm that the receiver R is trustworthy, uses the encryption public key Pbk to encrypt the symmetric key, and uses the symmetric key to encrypt the sent data. After signing the encrypted data, the encrypted symmetric key is sent to the receiver.

[0011] Preferably, the method for determining the integrity measurement Ds of the trusted platform module in step 1 is as follows:

[0012] According to the encryption digest and the ID number of the trusted platform module of the sender S, the integrity measurement Ds of the trusted platform module of the sender S is determined.

[0013] Preferably, the signature verification method in step 3 is as follows:

[0014] The receiver certificate certR contains the public key used by the receiver R to decrypt and verify the signature, and the sender S uses the public key to verify the signature information;

[0015] Determine whether the integrity measurement Dr and the random number Ns are consistent with the expected values. When Dr and Ns are not tampered with, the receiver R is trustworthy.

[0016] Preferably, the encryption method of the sender S for sending data in step 3 is as follows:

[0017] The sender S encrypts the symmetric key K1 using the public key Pbk provided by the receiver R;

[0018] The sender S uses the symmetric key K1 to encrypt the sent data T, generating encrypted data K1{T};

[0019] The sender S signs the encrypted data K1{T} using the signature verification private key;

[0020] The sender S sends the encrypted symmetric key, encrypted data K1{T} and signature to the receiver R.

[0021] A trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system, applied to a receiver R, comprises the following steps:

[0022] Step 10: The receiver R receives the trusted verification data sent by the sender S and uses the sender S's certificate certS to perform signature verification. The trusted verification data includes the encrypted summary, the integrity measurement Ds of the receiver R's trusted platform module, and the signature information.

[0023] Step 20: After the receiver R passes the signature verification, the receiver R determines the integrity measurement Dr of the trusted platform module based on the encryption summary;

[0024] The receiver R generates an encryption key, signs the integrity measurement Dr, the encryption key's public key Pbk and the random number Ns, and sends it to the sender S;

[0025] Step 30: The receiver R receives the signature encrypted file generated after the sender verifies the signature information. The receiver R uses the private key Pik of the encryption key to decrypt the encrypted file and verify the signature.

[0026] Preferably, the method for determining the integrity metric Dr of the trusted platform module in step 20 is as follows:

[0027] According to the encryption digest and the ID number of the trusted platform module of the receiver R, the integrity measurement Dr of the trusted platform module of the receiver R is determined.

[0028] Preferably, the receiver R generates an asymmetric encryption key using a trusted platform module, and the private key PiK is stored in the trusted platform module of the receiver R;

[0029] The receiver R uses the private key Aikir of the signature verification key to sign the integrity measurement Dr, the public key Pbk of the encryption key and the random number Ns, and then sends them to the sender S.

[0030] Preferably, the encryption method of the encrypted file in step 30 is as follows:

[0031] The receiver R uses the private key Pik of the encryption key to decrypt the encryption key of the encrypted file, and uses the decrypted key to decrypt the encrypted file.

[0032] Preferably, the receiver R uses a signature verification private key to verify the signature.

[0033] A trusted transmission system based on a trusted industrial control system implements the steps of the trusted transmission method based on the trusted industrial control system when the trusted transmission system is running.

[0034] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial technical effects:

[0035] The present invention provides a trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system. The confidentiality of the migration process is protected by a symmetric encryption algorithm. The symmetric session key is securely transmitted to the recipient under the public encryption key of the asymmetric key pair. The key pair is inseparable from the TPM of the trusted recipient, in which the private session key is securely stored in such a way that only the TPM of the recipient can use it without exposing it to the host platform. Therefore, even if an attacker intercepts the encrypted migration process, the attacker cannot obtain read access to the migration process unless a hardware-based attack is performed on the recipient's TPM, which requires extracting the private decryption key from the TPM. Secondly, data consistency is guaranteed, and the integrity of the migration process in transmission is protected by a signature algorithm. Only the software provider can generate a signature through his (or her) key. Finally, the software provider and the recipient can mutually verify the identity of their respective TPMs and the status of the protected execution environment through a platform certification mechanism. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0036] Figure 1 The figure is a flow chart of a trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0037] The present invention will be further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, which are intended to explain the present invention rather than to limit it.

[0038] Example 1

[0039] A trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system comprises the following steps:

[0040] Step 1: The receiver R uses a trusted chip to generate a string of random numbers Nr and sends it to the sender S.

[0041] Sending a random number Nr: The receiver R first sends a random number Nr to the sender S. The random number Nr refers to an arbitrary or non-repeating random value that is used only once. Since this random number is one-time, it means that it is only used once after it is generated in this communication and will not be used again afterwards, so as to increase the security of communication.

[0042] The receiver and sender have both installed a trusted computing chip TPM on their devices. The TPM contains the platform identity key AIK and AIK certificate, which is issued by a trusted third-party organization. The receiver's pair of secret keys is the public key Aikpr and the private key Aikir, and the sender's pair of secret keys is the public key Aikps and the private key Aikis. The sender S should have an AIK certificate, and the receiver R should have an AIK certificate.

[0043] The private key of the receiver and the sender is only used for entity authentication, which means it is used to prove the identity of the sender or the receiver during the communication process. The sender and the receiver exchange certificates, that is, both the sender S and the receiver R must obtain the AIK certificate of the other party so that they can verify whether the public key of the other party is authentic, thereby ensuring the security of communication.

[0044] Through the above initial settings, both parties can confirm each other's identity and establish a secure foundation. The random number Nr, platform identity key AIK, trusted computing chip TPM and AIK certificate used in this process together constitute a multi-level secure communication mechanism.

[0045] Step 2: The sender S receives the random number Nr and generates a random number Ns. It uses the SM3 algorithm to perform message digest encryption SM3{Nr,Ns}, and then uses TPM_Quote(SM3{Nr,Ns}, Ids), SM3{Nr,Ns}, Ids as input parameters to calculate the integrity measurement Ds of the sender S platform. Use the private key of the signature key of the sender S's TPM to sign Aikis{SM3{Nr,Ns}, Ds}, and send Aikis{SM3{Nr,Ns}, Ds}, DS, SM3{Nr,Ns} to the receiver R, as follows:

[0046] S2.1. Receiving a random number Nr: The sender S first receives a random number Nr from the receiver R. This random number is used to ensure the security of each communication, because the random number Nr is an arbitrary or non-repeating value that is used only once.

[0047] S2.2. Generate random number Ns: The sender S generates its own random number Ns and uses it together with the receiver's random number Nr to increase the security of communication.

[0048] S2.3, message digest encryption: The sender S uses the SM3 algorithm to encrypt the message digest of the two random numbers Nr and Ns, and obtains SM3{Nr,Ns}. SM3 is a cryptographic hash algorithm, similar to the SHA series algorithms widely used internationally, but SM3 is a national standard algorithm used in China.

[0049] The sender S uses the SM3 algorithm to hash the two random numbers Nr and Ns to generate a hash value SM3{Nr,Ns}. Please note that the "message digest encryption" mentioned here actually refers to the hash operation using the SM3 algorithm, not encryption, because hashing is a one-way function, unlike the reversible encryption process.

[0050] S2.4, Calculate integrity metric: The sender S uses the trusted system API, takes SM3{Nr,Ns} and the sender's ID number Ids as input parameters, and calculates the integrity metric Ds of the sender S platform. This metric is a cryptographic representation of the current state of the sender's platform, which can prove the integrity and non-tampering of the platform.

[0051] Compared with SHA-type algorithms, the SM3 hash algorithm only accounts for 31% of the total steps in terms of collisions and only 58% in terms of distinguishing attacks. These analysis results reflect the high security of the SM3 cryptographic hash algorithm. SM3{Nr,Ns} uses the SM3 algorithm to encrypt Nr,Ns.

[0052] S2.5, Signature: The sender S uses the signature key private key Aikis in its TPM to sign the hash value SM3{Nr,Ns} and the integrity measurement Ds, and obtains the signature certificate Aikis{SM3{Nr,Ns},Ds}. This signature proves the identity of the sender S and ensures the integrity and non-repudiation of the message.

[0053] S2.6, Sending certificate: The sender S sends the signed signature certificate Aikis{SM3{Nr,Ns}, Ds}, together with the integrity measurement Ds and the hash value SM3{Nr,Ns} to the receiver R. In this way, the receiver R can verify the signature certificate of the sender S and ensure the credibility of the sender's platform.

[0054] The sender S not only proves his identity, but also ensures the security and integrity of the transmitted data during the transmission process. The receiver R can confirm the credibility of the sender's platform by verifying the sender S's signature credentials and integrity measurement, thereby establishing a secure communication process.

[0055] Step 3: The receiver R uses the certificate certS to verify the signature of the signature certificate {SM3{Nr,Ns},Ds}. After the signature verification, the integrity measurement Ds is compared with the value of the random number Nr to determine whether it has been tampered with, as follows:

[0056] S3.1. The receiver R first receives a series of security information sent by the sender S, including the information Aikis{SM3{Nr,Ns},Ds} signed with the private key of the sender S, as well as the integrity measurement Ds and the hash value SM3{Nr,Ns}.

[0057] The receiver R verifies the signature of Aikis{SM3{Nr,Ns},Ds} using the public key certificate certS of the sender S. This certificate contains the public key of the sender S and the authentication information issued by the certificate authority (CA).

[0058] Verify the validity of the signature and ensure that the signature certificate Aikis{SM3{Nr,Ns},Ds} is indeed a signature generated by the private key of the sender S.

[0059] Confirm the identity of the sender S, because only the sender S who holds the corresponding private key can generate a valid signature.

[0060] S3.2. Comparison of integrity metric Ds and random number Nr: The receiver R compares the integrity metric Ds of the sender S platform in the signature with the Ds value calculated by itself to verify their consistency. At the same time, the receiver R also checks whether the received random number Nr is consistent with the Nr originally sent to S.

[0061] Determine whether the data has been tampered with:

[0062] If the values ​​of the integrity metric Ds and the random number Nr are consistent with those expected by the receiver R, then it can be assumed that the sender S's platform is trustworthy and the data has not been tampered with during transmission. If the values ​​of Ds or Nr are inconsistent, this may indicate that the data has been tampered with during transmission, or that the sender S's platform may have security issues.

[0063] In this way, the receiver R not only verifies the identity of the sender S, but also ensures the integrity and consistency of the transmitted data. This mechanism is used to defend against various potential attacks, such as man-in-the-middle attacks (MITM) or data tampering attacks. Once the validity of the signature and the integrity of the data are verified, the receiver R can safely continue the subsequent communication or data exchange process. This process is a key link in the secure communication protocol, which ensures the security and reliability of data transmission, and provides a guarantee for building trust and preventing unauthorized access.

[0064] Step 4: If the platform of sender S is not tampered with, it is credible. Receiver R calculates the integrity measurement Dr through TPM_Quote{SM3{Nr,Ns},Idr}, where SM3{Nr,Ns},Idr are input parameters, Idr is the ID number of receiver R, and receiver R uses TPM_CreateWrapKey to generate asymmetric public key Pbk and private key PiK, and the private key PiK is stored in the TPM of receiver R. The public key is signed by receiver R using the private key Aikir{Dr,Pbk,Ns} of the signature key of TPM and sent to sender S. The details are as follows:

[0065] S4.1. Confirm the credibility of the sender's platform: If the receiver R confirms that the data provided by the sender S has not been tampered with, then the sender S's platform is credible.

[0066] S4.2. Calculate the integrity metric of the receiver: The receiver R uses the API of the trusted platform module TPM_Quote, and the input parameters include the previously calculated hash value SM3{Nr,Ns} and the ID number Idr of the receiver R to calculate its own integrity metric Dr. This step is similar to the process of calculating the integrity metric Ds by the sender S.

[0067] S4.3, Generate an asymmetric key pair: The receiver R uses the trusted platform module TPM_CreateWrapKey API to generate a pair of asymmetric keys, including a public key Pbk and a private key PiK. This step ensures the security of the key because the private key PiK is stored in the receiver R's TPM, which provides a secure storage environment to prevent unauthorized access to the private key.

[0068] S4.4. Storing the private key: The private key PiK is stored in the TPM of the recipient R, so that only the TPM of the recipient R can use this private key.

[0069] S4.5, Signature public key and integrity measurement: The receiver R uses the signature key private key Aikir in its TPM to sign the data consisting of Dr (the receiver's integrity measurement), Pbk (the newly generated public key) and Ns (the random number generated by the sender) to generate Aikir{Dr, Pbk, Ns}.

[0070] S4.6, Send signed information: The receiver R sends the signed information Aikir{Dr, Pbk, Ns} to the sender S. This step allows the sender S to verify the credibility of the receiver R and ensure that the receiver R has committed its public key Pbk, which will be used for subsequent encrypted communications.

[0071] By verifying each other's signatures and integrity metrics, both the sender S and the receiver R are able to confirm the credibility of the other party's platform. The asymmetric key pair generated by the receiver R, especially the exchange of the public key Pbk, provides the basis for subsequent encrypted communication and ensures the security of data transmission. Once the sender S verifies the signature information of the receiver R, the two parties can use the other party's public key for encrypted communication, thereby ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of the data. This process is a key step in establishing a secure communication channel. It not only verifies the identities of both parties and the integrity of the platform, but also provides a secure way for both parties to exchange information and prevent potential eavesdropping and tampering.

[0072] Step 5. The sender S uses the certificate certR to verify the signature of {Dr, Pbk, Ns} to determine whether Dr and Ns have been tampered with. If they have not been tampered with, it means that the platform of the receiver R is trustworthy. The sender S uses Pbk to encrypt the symmetric key K1, Pbk{K1}, uses K1 data encryption K1{T} for the sent content T, and uses S's private key to sign {T} to ensure data consistency, as follows:

[0073] S5.1. Use certificate to verify signature: The sender S uses the certificate certR provided by the receiver R to verify the signature information Aikir{Dr,Pbk,Ns} generated by the receiver R. This certificate contains the public key of the receiver R, which is used to decrypt and verify the signature.

[0074] S5.2. Verify integrity metric and random number: The sender S checks whether the integrity metric Dr and random number Ns in the signature are consistent with the expected values, so as to determine whether the information has been tampered with during transmission.

[0075] If Dr and Ns have not been tampered with, then the platform of the receiver R can be considered trustworthy.

[0076] S5.3, Encrypted symmetric key: The sender S uses the public key Pbk provided by the receiver R to encrypt a symmetric key K1. This encrypted symmetric key Pbk{K1} is then sent to the receiver R.

[0077] S5.4, Data encryption: The sender S uses the symmetric key K1 to encrypt the data T to be sent, generating encrypted data K1{T}. Symmetric encryption is usually faster than asymmetric encryption, so it is suitable for encrypting large amounts of data.

[0078] S5.5, Signed data: To ensure data consistency and prevent repudiation, the sender S signs the encrypted data K1{T} using its own private key. This signature proves that the data was sent by the sender S and that the data has not been tampered with since the signature.

[0079] S5.6. Sending encrypted and signed data: The sender S sends the encrypted symmetric key Pbk{K1}, the encrypted data K1{T} and the signature to the receiver R.

[0080] S5.7, prepare for receiver decryption: Receiver R first uses its own private key to decrypt the symmetric key K1, and then uses the decrypted symmetric key K1 to decrypt the encrypted data K1{T} to restore the original data T. Finally, receiver R verifies the signature of sender S to ensure the consistency and integrity of the data.

[0081] Through this process, both the sender S and the receiver R can ensure the security of communication and prevent data from being tampered with during transmission. This process is the encryption and authentication link in the secure communication protocol, which not only ensures the security of data transmission, but also ensures the trustworthiness of the identities of both parties in the data transmission. By using asymmetric encryption to exchange symmetric keys, then using symmetric encryption to encrypt data, and finally using digital signatures to ensure data integrity and non-repudiation, this process achieves an efficient and secure communication mechanism.

[0082] Step 6. The receiver R receives the message and uses the private key Pik to decrypt Pbk{K1} to obtain the symmetric key K1. The symmetric key can be used to decrypt K1{T} to obtain T. R verifies the signature of {T} and compares the data consistency of T.

[0083] Receiving an encrypted message: The receiver R receives a series of encrypted and signed information from the sender S, including the symmetric key Pbk{K1} encrypted using the receiver's public key Pbk, the data K1{T} encrypted using the symmetric key K1, and the sender S's signature on the data T.

[0084] Decrypting the symmetric key: The receiver R uses its own private key Aikir to decrypt the encrypted symmetric key Pbk{K1} to obtain the symmetric key K1. This step is necessary because only the private key can decrypt the data encrypted by the public key.

[0085] Decrypting data: Once the symmetric key K1 is obtained, the receiver R then uses this key to decrypt the encrypted data K1{T} and restore the original data T. The symmetric key K1 plays a key role in this process because symmetric encryption algorithms are usually faster than asymmetric encryption algorithms and are suitable for encrypting large amounts of data.

[0086] Verify the signature: To ensure that the data T has not been tampered with during transmission and to verify that the data does come from the sender S, the receiver R verifies the signature of the sender S. This step usually involves using the sender S's public key to decrypt the signature and compare it with the original data T.

[0087] Comparing data consistency: By verifying the signature, the receiver R can confirm the consistency of the data T. If the signature verification is successful, this indicates that the data T has not been changed since the sender S signed it, and the identity of the sender S is credible.

[0088] After completing the above steps, the receiver R can be sure that the received data T is safe and has not been tampered with by unauthorized third parties, and the identity of the sender S has been verified. By verifying the signature and decrypting the data, a trust relationship is established between the receiver R and the sender S. This mechanism is a core part of modern network security protocols, which ensures the security and reliability of data transmission. After confirming the security and integrity of the data, the receiver R can safely continue to communicate with the sender S, or perform subsequent processing on the data.

[0089] This process is a key link in the secure communication protocol, which ensures the security of data transmission, the integrity of the data, and the identity verification of the sender. By using asymmetric encryption to securely exchange symmetric keys, then using symmetric encryption to encrypt the data, and finally using digital signatures to ensure data consistency and non-repudiation, this process achieves an efficient and secure communication mechanism.

[0090] Example 2

[0091] A trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system comprises the following steps:

[0092] Step 1: The sender S encrypts the random number Nr of the receiver R and its own random number Ns through a message digest, and signs the encrypted digest and the integrity measurement Ds of the trusted platform module using the signature verification private key PikS to generate signature information, and sends the signature information, encrypted digest and integrity measurement Ds as trusted verification data to the receiver R;

[0093] The SM3 algorithm is used to encrypt the random number to generate an encrypted summary.

[0094] The method for determining the integrity measurement Ds of the trusted platform module is as follows:

[0095] According to the encryption digest and the ID number of the trusted platform module of the sender S, the integrity measurement Ds of the trusted platform module of the sender S is determined.

[0096] Step 2: The sender S receives and the receiver R verifies the trusted verification data and sends the signature information Aikir{Dr, Pbk, Ns}.

[0097] Where Dr is the integrity measurement of the trusted platform module of the receiver R, Pbk is the encryption public key, and Ns is the random number of the sender S;

[0098] Step 3: The sender S uses the receiver R certificate certR to verify the signature information to confirm that the receiver R is trustworthy, uses the encryption public key Pbk to encrypt the symmetric key, and uses the symmetric key to encrypt the sent data. After signing the encrypted data, the encrypted symmetric key is sent to the receiver.

[0099] The signature verification method of the signature information is as follows:

[0100] The receiver certificate certR contains the public key used by the receiver R to decrypt and verify the signature, and the sender S uses the public key to verify the signature information;

[0101] Determine whether the integrity measurement Dr and the random number Ns are consistent with the expected values. If Dr and Ns are not modified, the receiver R is trustworthy.

[0102] The encryption method of the sender S for sending data is as follows:

[0103] The sender S encrypts the symmetric key K1 using the public key Pbk provided by the receiver R;

[0104] The sender S uses the symmetric key K1 to encrypt the sent data T, generating encrypted data K1{T};

[0105] The sender S signs the encrypted data K1{T} using the signature verification private key;

[0106] The sender S sends the encrypted symmetric key, encrypted data K1{T} and signature to the receiver R.

[0107] Example 3

[0108] A trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system comprises the following steps:

[0109] Step 10: The receiver R receives the trusted verification data sent by the sender S and uses the sender S's certificate certS to perform signature verification. The trusted verification data includes the encrypted summary, the integrity measurement Ds of the receiver R's trusted platform module, and the signature information.

[0110] Step 20: After the receiver R passes the signature verification, the receiver R determines the integrity measurement Dr of the trusted platform module based on the encryption summary;

[0111] The receiver R generates an encryption key, signs the integrity measurement Dr, the encryption key's public key Pbk and the random number Ns, and sends them to the sender S.

[0112] The method for determining the integrity metric Dr of the trusted platform module is as follows:

[0113] According to the encryption digest and the ID number of the trusted platform module of the receiver R, the integrity measurement Ds of the trusted platform module of the receiver R is determined.

[0114] The receiver R uses a trusted platform module to generate an asymmetric encryption key, and the private key PiK is stored in the trusted platform module of the receiver R;

[0115] The receiver R uses the private key Aikir of the signature verification key to sign the integrity measurement Dr, the public key Pbk of the encryption key and the random number Ns, and then sends them to the sender S.

[0116] Step 30: The receiver R receives the signature encrypted file generated after the sender verifies the signature information. The receiver R uses the private key Pik of the encryption key to decrypt the encrypted file and verify the signature.

[0117] The receiver R uses the private key Pik of the encryption key to decrypt the encryption key of the encrypted file, and uses the decrypted key to decrypt the encrypted file. The receiver R uses the signature verification private key to verify the signature.

[0118] The above contents are only for explaining the technical idea of ​​the present invention and cannot be used to limit the protection scope of the present invention. Any changes made on the basis of the technical solution in accordance with the technical idea proposed by the present invention shall fall within the protection scope of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. A trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system, applied to a sender S, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Step 1, the sender S uses the SM3 algorithm to encrypt the random number Nr of the receiver R and its own random number Ns, and uses the verification private key Aikis to sign the encrypted summary and the integrity measurement Ds of the trusted platform module to generate signature information, and sends the signature information, encrypted summary and integrity measurement Ds as trusted verification data to the receiver R; Step 2: The sender S receives and the receiver R verifies the trusted verification data and sends the signature information Aikir{Dr, Pbk, Ns}; Where Dr is the integrity measurement of the trusted platform module of the receiver R, Pbk is the asymmetric key public key, and Ns is the random number of the sender S; Step 3: The sender S uses the receiver R certificate certR to verify the signature information to confirm that the receiver R is trustworthy, uses the encryption public key Pbk to encrypt the symmetric key, and uses the symmetric key to encrypt the sent data. After signing the encrypted data, the encrypted symmetric key is sent to the receiver.

2. A trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method for determining the integrity measurement Ds of the trusted platform module in step 1 is as follows: According to the encryption digest and the ID number of the trusted platform module of the sender S, the integrity measurement Ds of the trusted platform module of the sender S is determined.

3. The trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The signature verification method in step 3 is as follows: The receiver certificate certR contains the public key used by the receiver R to decrypt and verify the signature, and the sender S uses the public key to verify the signature information; Determine whether the integrity measurement Dr and the random number Ns are consistent with the expected values. When Dr and Ns are not tampered with, the receiver R is trustworthy.

4. The trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The encryption method of the sender S for sending data in step 3 is as follows: The sender S encrypts the symmetric key K1 using the public key Pbk provided by the receiver R; The sender S uses the symmetric key K1 to encrypt the sent data T, generating encrypted data K1{T}; The sender S signs the encrypted data K1{T} using the signature verification private key; The sender S sends the encrypted symmetric key, encrypted data K1{T} and signature to the receiver R.

5. A trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system, applied to a receiver R, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Step 10: The receiver R receives the trusted verification data sent by the sender S and uses the sender S's certificate certS to perform signature verification. The trusted verification data includes the encrypted summary, the integrity measurement Ds of the receiver R's trusted platform module, and the signature information. Step 20: After the receiver R passes the signature verification, the receiver R determines the integrity measurement Dr of the trusted platform module based on the encryption summary; The receiver R generates an encryption key, signs the integrity measurement Dr, the encryption key's public key Pbk and the random number Ns, and sends it to the sender S; Step 30: The receiver R receives the signature encrypted file generated after the sender verifies the signature information. The receiver R uses the private key Pik of the encryption key to decrypt the encrypted file and verify the signature.

6. The trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method for determining the integrity measurement Dr of the trusted platform module in step 20 is as follows: According to the encryption digest and the ID number of the trusted platform module of the receiver R, the integrity measurement Dr of the trusted platform module of the receiver R is determined.

7. The trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The receiver R uses a trusted platform module to generate an asymmetric encryption key, and the private key PiK is stored in the trusted platform module of the receiver R; The receiver R uses the private key Aikir of the signature verification key to sign the integrity measurement Dr, the public key Pbk of the encryption key and the random number Ns, and then sends them to the sender S.

8. The trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The encryption method of the encrypted file in step 30 is as follows: The receiver R uses the private key Pik of the encryption key to decrypt the encryption key of the encrypted file, and uses the decrypted key to decrypt the encrypted file.

9. A trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The receiver R uses the signature verification private key to verify the signature.

10. A trusted transmission system based on a trusted industrial control system, characterized in that: When the trusted transmission system is running, the steps of the trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system as described in any one of claims 1 to 9 are implemented.

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