Internet of Things security alliance system

Abstract

The invention discloses a security alliance system of the Internet of Things. The security alliance system comprises a main center node MN and edge nodes EN, the main center node MN is used for sending a security information announcement SIA to the edge node EN; and the EN is used for matching the network connection of the EN according to the SIA and determining whether the network connection is released or blocked. According to the invention, a centralized security information management and distribution mechanism is established, so that the edge node can make a decision of releasing or blocking the network connection in time according to the latest security information, thereby effectively reducing the risk of service data leakage faced by the edge node of the Internet of Things.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of Internet of Things communication security, and in particular relates to an Internet of Things security alliance system. Background Art

[0002] 1. IoT edge nodes refer to those communication nodes that work at the edge of the network to process raw data. They are characterized by large number, low performance, poor security, and unattended operation. On the one hand, they are at high risk of being implanted with viruses or malicious codes. On the other hand, the management, labor, and travel costs of dealing with such risks are very high. More importantly, edge nodes with these risks may leak private IoT raw unencrypted data assets to insecure networks. For example, hospital registration machines, water quality sampling machines, and vending machines.

[0003] 2. The system hardware and software of edge nodes in the same application scenario of the Internet of Things are highly similar, and some are even completely identical, such as shared devices. Once the security vulnerabilities of any node are exposed, criminals may use the above characteristics to sniff, control, and hijack more similar nodes, and then launch larger-scale intrusions and extortions on the business, which may eventually cause significant economic losses to the enterprise.

[0004] 3. In some IoT application scenarios, in order to collect and exchange simple data, massive and low-cost deployment of edge nodes is required, taking into account economic benefits. When designing node hardware and software, the proportion of key resources such as computing power, storage space, and communication bandwidth in the investment is always limited, and the security system needs to perform complex logical judgments and calculations, which requires considerable resource overhead. Therefore, the edge nodes in these scenarios can only perform simple actions of releasing or blocking communication connections, and do not have the conditions for independently deploying complex security systems.

[0005] 4. If the security system is not deployed on the node, in order to check the communication connection of the network in order to take further targeted actions, the general network often arranges a firewall on the path where the traffic is forwarded to filter the connected traffic, but this method needs to meet many strict conditions. First, it is necessary to ensure that all traffic passes through the firewall so that the firewall can implement the inspection; second, the performance of the firewall product must be able to meet the efficient processing capabilities of large concurrency and large traffic scenarios. However, in the IoT scenario, if the traffic is forced to be centralized and processed by the firewall, the communication path between the edge node and the target server may have to be changed, which will introduce additional network delays and packet loss, and have a negative impact on the communication quality of the IoT node. In addition, in reality, the value of high-performance firewalls is usually expensive, and IoT nodes generally have the same type of traffic occurring at a high frequency. If each flow and each packet must be checked by the firewall, it will obviously cause a great waste of investment and affect the operating efficiency of the enterprise's IoT products. Summary of the invention

[0006] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide an Internet of Things security alliance system in view of the deficiencies in the above-mentioned prior art. By establishing a centralized security information management and distribution mechanism, edge nodes can make timely decisions on releasing or blocking network connections based on the latest security information, thereby effectively reducing the risk of business data leakage faced by Internet of Things edge nodes.

[0007] To solve the above technical problems, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is: an Internet of Things security alliance system, including a main center node MN and an edge node EN;

[0008] The master central node MN is used to send a security information announcement SIA to the edge node EN;

[0009] The edge node EN is used to match the network connection of the node according to the security information announcement SIA, and decide to release or block the network connection.

[0010] The above technical solution realizes a centralized security information management and distribution mechanism; the main center node MN can send a unified security information announcement SIA to the edge node EN, so that the edge node can match and make decisions on network connections in real time based on the latest security intelligence, thereby improving the security and responsiveness of the entire IoT network.

[0011] In this embodiment, the edge node EN is further used to generate a secure connection route SLR according to the network connection when the network connection of the node cannot be matched according to the security information announcement SIA, and send the secure connection route SLR to the main central node MN;

[0012] The main central node MN is also used to make a security judgment on the security connection route SLR sent by the edge node EN. If the security connection route SLR is secure, the security connection is added to the whitelist of the security information announcement SIA; if the security connection route SLR is not secure, the security connection is added to the blacklist of the security information announcement SIA.

[0013] The above technical solution enhances the system's adaptability and dynamic update capabilities. When the edge node EN encounters an unknown network connection, it can generate a new secure connection route SLR and submit it to the main center node MN for security judgment. This not only improves the ability to identify new threats, but also allows the system to dynamically update security policies through whitelist and blacklist mechanisms.

[0014] In this embodiment, when the edge node EN sends the secure connection route SLR to the main central node MN, the secure connection route SLR is loaded into its own security information announcement SIA, and the security information announcement SIA is sent to the main central node MN to request an update;

[0015] After receiving the security information announcement SIA update request, the main central node MN matches the received security information announcement SIA with its own security information announcement SIA. When a security connection routing SLR is found, a security judgment is made on the security connection routing SLR, and its own security information announcement SIA is updated according to the judgment result. After updating the security information announcement SIA, the security information announcement SIA is sent to the edge node EN.

[0016] The above technical solution ensures the consistency and real-time performance of security policies through the update request and matching mechanism of the security information announcement SIA. After discovering a new secure connection route SLR, the edge node EN can actively request an update, and the main center node MN can respond and update the security information in a timely manner, thus strengthening the coordinated response and consistency of the entire system.

[0017] In this embodiment, a fake central node FN is also included. The fake central node FN is used to serve as a transit node for communication between the edge node EN and the main central node MN.

[0018] The above technical solution introduces a fake central node FN as a communication relay, which improves the communication flexibility and reliability of the system. The existence of the fake central node FN reduces the direct communication MN and improves the security of the main central node MN.

[0019] In this embodiment, a standby central node SN is also included. The standby central node SN is used to replace the main central node MN when the main central node MN loses connection.

[0020] In the above technical solution, the existence of the backup central node SN ensures that when the main central node MN is disconnected or fails, the system can quickly switch to the backup central node and continue to operate normally. This improves the fault tolerance and stability of the system and ensures the continuity of key services.

[0021] In this embodiment, the fake central node FN is also used to monitor the status of the main central node MN. When it is detected that the main central node MN is disconnected, a backup central node SN is replaced as the new main central node MN.

[0022] In the above technical solution, the monitoring and replacement functions of the fake central node FN automate the failover process and reduce the system interruption time. This automation mechanism improves the self-recovery ability of the system and ensures the rapid recovery of key services.

[0023] In this embodiment, the fake central node FN is also used to send the network location of the main central node MN, the connection mode of the main central node MN, the authentication method of the main central node MN, and the authentication information of the main central node MN to the edge node EN.

[0024] In the above technical solution, the MN network location and connection information provided by the fake central node FN simplifies the connection process of the edge node EN and improves the usability and connection efficiency of the system. This reduces the possibility of configuration errors and speeds up network deployment and maintenance.

[0025] In this embodiment, the fake central node FN and the edge node EN communicate through the L2TP protocol, and the communication between the edge node EN and the main central node MN is achieved through the information interaction channel provided by the fake central node FN.

[0026] The above technical solution ensures the security and stability of communication between the edge node EN and the main center node MN through L2TP protocol communication. The L2TP protocol provides a secure data transmission mechanism, reducing the risk of data being intercepted or tampered during transmission.

[0027] In this embodiment, the fake central node FN is also used to elect the main central node MN from the candidate nodes.

[0028] In the above technical solution, the election function of the fake central node FN realizes the dynamic management and optimization of the system. This dynamic election mechanism improves the performance and resource utilization of the entire network and ensures the efficient operation of the network.

[0029] In this embodiment, the fake central node FN provides a static network domain name that is reachable on a public network, and the edge node EN can access the fake central node FN through the static network domain name.

[0030] The above technical solution provides a stable and reliable access point for the edge node EN by accessing the fake central node FN through a static network domain name. This static domain name simplifies network configuration and improves network accessibility and maintainability.

[0031] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following advantages: the system of the present invention utilizes the characteristics of high frequency of similar traffic in the Internet of Things communication connection, organizes the Internet of Things edge nodes in the same scene under the same security alliance for management, and separates the two tasks of complex feature calculation and simple execution action according to the node role. The benefit of role separation is that, on the one hand, it ensures that each external communication connection of the Internet of Things edge node is checked by the security alliance described in the present invention, which can effectively prevent the leakage of data assets. On the other hand, it is not necessary to arrange a complex security system at the edge node of the Internet of Things to release or block the local communication connection, so as to achieve the purpose of lowering the software and hardware threshold of the edge node of the Internet of Things for implementing the method of the present invention. In the system described in the present invention, since the communication connection of the actual business of most of the edge nodes of the Internet of Things does not need to pass through other devices, it can avoid introducing additional delays, packet loss and investment costs. In addition, the system described in the present invention is automatically organized and works, which reduces the management, labor and travel costs of the security risks of the edge nodes of the Internet of Things mentioned in the present invention, and has good economic benefits.

[0032] The technical solution of the present invention is further described in detail below through the accompanying drawings and embodiments. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0033] Figure 1 It is a relationship diagram of various nodes of the system described in the present invention.

[0034] Figure 2 This is a flow chart of the election of the main central node and the backup central node of the security alliance described in the present invention.

[0035] Figure 3 This is a flow chart of the replacement of the main central node and the backup central node of the security alliance described in the present invention.

[0036] Figure 4 This is a flow chart of sending the security connection route SLR of the security alliance of the present invention to the main central node MN for determination after it is generated. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0037] The present invention discloses an Internet of Things security alliance system. The security alliance construction of the present invention is divided into two stages. The specific implementation process is as follows:

[0038] In the first stage, the network location of the primary / backup central node in the security alliance (SA) is determined. The steps are as follows:

[0039] like Figure 1 ,The security association SA is composed of nodes and the virtual network connections between them.

[0040] There are four types of node identities in the security alliance SA: fake central node FN (Fake Node), main central node MN (Main Node), backup central node SN (Slave Node), edge node EN (Edge Node). Among them, the edge node EN is the entity that generates the actual IoT business communication connection in the security alliance of the present invention, and other nodes are the main entities participating in the alliance security management.

[0041] Step 1: The role and function of the fake central node FN in the security alliance SA. The fake central node FN provides a static network domain name that is reachable on the public network, that is, any edge node EN connected to the public network can access the fake central node FN, and each edge node EN is pre-configured with the network configuration of the fake central node FN and the connection method, authentication method, and authentication information with the fake central node FN.

[0042] The fake central node FN starts and waits for the connection request from the edge node EN. After the edge node EN initiates the connection and completes identity mutual recognition with the fake central node FN, the fake central node FN will notify the edge node EN of the network location of the main central node MN (the main central node MN election process and how the fake central node FN determines the main central node MN will be described in detail in the following steps) and the connection method, authentication method, and authentication information of the main central node MN. The edge node EN then initiates a connection request to the main central node MN through these "agreements".

[0043] In the above process, the key role played by the fake central node FN is firstly that it acts as a "medium" working on the public network, allowing the edge node EN to conveniently and quickly locate the position of the main central node MN through it. The key role played by the fake central node FN is also that it can hide the network location of the main central node MN, preventing the latter from being attacked due to direct exposure to the public network, and can improve the security of the main central node MN in the system of the present invention. The fake central node FN is unique in the system of the present invention.

[0044] The fake central node FN provides a static network domain name that is reachable on the public network, that is, any EN connected to the public network can access the fake central node FN. Each edge node EN is pre-configured with: the network location of the fake central node FN, the L2TP (Layer 2 Tunnel Protocol) connection method, the L2TP authentication method, and the L2TP authentication information.

[0045] At this time, the fake central node FN acts as the LNS of L2TP, and the edge node EN acts as the LAC of L2TP. The meaning of LNS and LAC is clearly described in the RFC2661 document on the L2TP protocol released by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), which is a public standard.

[0046] The fake central node FN starts the first listening of the L2TP service and waits for the connection request of the edge node EN. The edge node EN initiates a connection request to the fake central node FN and completes the L2TP negotiation with it, specifically completing the negotiation of the L2TP tunnel and session. Afterwards, according to the L2TP protocol, the edge node EN will obtain a dedicated IP assigned by the fake central node FN (that is, as LNS). This IP is only valid in the negotiated L2TP tunnel and session. It is the address used by the edge node EN to connect with the main central node MN in the future.

[0047] The fake central node FN will also start a second listening service specifically for the edge node EN to query the main central node MN information. This service is only valid for requests from the edge node EN that have completed the above negotiation. When the edge node EN requests this service, it needs to use the IP allocated by the fake central node FN, otherwise the fake central node FN will not process it. This can avoid unnecessary task computing overhead caused by illegal requests.

[0048] Next, the edge node EN first reports its alliance ID to the fake central node FN through the L2TP tunnel as a logical communication channel, and requests to communicate with the main central node MN. After the fake central node FN receives the alliance ID reported by the edge node EN through the second monitoring, it searches its own records to find the information of the main central node MN of the alliance. The fake central node FN packages the network location, connection method, authentication method, and authentication information of the main central node MN found into a message and sends it to the edge node EN. After receiving the message, the edge node EN uses the dedicated address assigned by the fake central node FN to communicate with the main central node MN through the L2TP tunnel. Before the edge node EN and the main central node MN actually communicate, both parties must complete identity authentication. As mentioned above, the information required for authentication is retrieved and provided by the fake central node FN.

[0049] In the following, the communication activities between the edge node EN and the main central node MN are all through the logical communication channel constructed by the tunnel provided by the fake central node FN, which will not be described in detail.

[0050] As the edge node of the Internet of Things (the node that actually generates business communications), the edge node EN actually has two external communication channels. The first is the external business connection released by itself according to the security information announcement SIA. The specific ones that can be connected are determined by the security information announcement SIA; the second is the initial stage, which is a privacy connection established through the L2TP tunnel built with the fake central node FN. The exchange of security information announcement SIA is implemented between the second channel and the main central node MN.

[0051] Step 2, predefine the priority of the candidate nodes and the network position of the false central node FN. In the system described in the present invention, there can only be one main central node MN at any time, while multiple backup central nodes SN are allowed (not exceeding 255). The main central node MN and the backup central node SN are both elected from the candidate central nodes. The nodes preset as candidate central nodes are called "candidate nodes". They all store a candidate priority list, which is a carrier for exchanging information between participating nodes. It contains the network positions of all candidate nodes and priorities ranging from 0 to 255. The lower the latter value, the higher the priority of being selected as the main central node MN. In addition, the candidate nodes also store the preset network position of the false central node FN (also the domain name described in step 1).

[0052] In the initial stage, all candidate nodes are started as the main central node MN by default, so their own priority in the candidate priority list is set to 0, and all other candidate nodes (in the initial stage, the candidate node is allowed to preset the information of other candidate nodes. If there is no preset, the other candidate node information of the node is empty) are set to 255.

[0053] Step 3: Figure 2 , the candidate node starts, and the election process of the main central node MN and the backup central node SN begins. The candidate node periodically sends its candidate priority list to the fake central node FN using the TCP protocol, and before sending, it must complete the identity authentication similar to that described in step 1. Through this process, the fake central node FN will first record the network location of each candidate node, and after receiving the candidate priority list, it will also record their respective TCP packet loss rate and delay. The advantage of using TCP as the transmission protocol is that the protocol is based on the connection status. The success rate and delay of TCP connection establishment can evaluate the node's ability to process the TCP protocol and objectively reflect the node's resource utilization status. It has an indicative significance for evaluating the quality of subsequent communication between the candidate node and the fake central node FN. For this reason, the fake central node FN will open the TCP special port for listening when it starts.

[0054] The fake central node FN sets an election timer. Before the timer expires, the fake central node FN continues to receive the above-mentioned candidate priority list and record the candidate node information. When the timer expires, the fake central node FN will recalculate the election priority of the candidate node currently received, as follows: First, arrange the packet loss rate of each candidate node in numerical order, temporarily set the priority of the packet loss rate of 0% to 0, and temporarily set the priority of the packet loss rate of not 0 to 255; second, re-sort the nodes with a priority of temporarily 0 starting from 0 in the order of delay values; finally, if there is no record that meets the conditions of the first step, the fake central node FN resets the election timer, clears the records in the first round of timer cycle, re-records, and then calculates, repeating this process until the priority of each candidate node is determined.

[0055] Step 4, the fake central node FN recommends the main central node MN and the backup central node SN and publishes them, and then continues the subsequent election. Once the priorities of the candidate nodes are re-determined, the fake central node FN will recommend the candidate node with a priority of 0 as the main central node MN, and the candidate node with a priority of 1 as the backup central node SN, and then publish the election results to all candidate nodes in the form of a candidate priority list (at this time, the candidate priority list is the information set of all candidate nodes that the fake central node FN has perceived). After the release, the fake central node FN will continue to receive the candidate priority list of step 3, first exclude the determined main central node MN and backup central node SN, and then continuously update the priorities of other remaining candidate nodes. It is particularly noted that because priorities 0 and 1 are already occupied at this time, the priority sorting of other candidate nodes starts from 2.

[0056] The first key to this step is that the main central node MN and the backup central node SN can know their identities in the security alliance SA after receiving the priority list published by the fake central node FN, and thus enter the next stage of the workflow based on this; the second key is that the candidate nodes that have not been selected as the main central node MN or the backup central node SN can continue to participate in the election. When the working status of the main central node MN or the backup central node SN changes, the candidate node with the highest priority among them can be immediately replaced without waiting for an election cycle, so as to ensure that the work of the main central node MN and the backup central node SN roles of this system is not interrupted as much as possible.

[0057] Step 5: Figure 3, the roles of the main central node MN and the backup central node SN are replaced. The "replacement" method of the main central node MN or the backup central node SN, specifically, as mentioned above, the candidate priority list of the main central node MN should periodically send its own candidate priority list message to the fake central node FN. When the fake central node FN does not receive the candidate priority list of the main central node MN within the specified time, if it receives the connection request of the edge node EN described in step 1, the fake central node FN will send the network location of the backup central node SN to the edge node EN (under normal circumstances, the fake central node FN only sends the network location of the main central node MN to the edge node EN), to ensure that the edge node EN can obtain the services provided by the security alliance in a timely manner.

[0058] At the same time, the fake central node FN will not immediately change the priority of the main central node MN or the backup central node SN, but wait for N cycles. If the priority list of the main central node MN is received again within N cycles, the fake central node FN believes that the main central node MN has been "resurrected", but there is also the possibility of "losing connection" again. In order to "punish" it and prevent its repeated "losing connection" from negatively affecting the system, the fake central node FN sets the N of the main central node MN to N-1 (N restores the default value after re-election of the main central node MN), until N = 0, which means that the fake central node FN no longer trusts the main central node MN, so it is necessary to re-select the main central node MN immediately. On the contrary, if the priority list of the main central node MN is not received within N cycles, the fake central node FN sets the priority of the backup central node SN to 0, upgrades it to the main central node MN, and then takes the candidate node with a priority of 2 from the most recent election in step 4 above in which the non-main central node MN or the backup central node SN participated, sets its priority to 1, and upgrades it to the backup central node SN. Similarly, the backup central node SN may also encounter the above situation. In order to achieve the "replacement" of the backup central node SN, the fake central node FN uses the same method, and the process will not be repeated. If the main central node MN and the backup central node SN simultaneously encounter the above "disconnection" situation, the fake central node FN will return to step 4 to determine the identities of the new main central node MN and the backup central node SN. As described in step 4, since the election of other candidate nodes is ongoing, in this case, the fake central node FN does not need to wait for an election cycle, but directly selects the main central node MN and the backup central node SN from the results of the previous election, and then publishes all candidate nodes.

[0059] Step 6: The fake central node FN provides the edge node EN with the positioning service of the main central node MN. After the above steps are completed, the fake central node FN can always clearly know the network location of the main central node MN in the alliance. As described in step 1, when the edge node EN visits the fake central node FN, the fake central node FN can quickly return the main central node MN corresponding to the ID according to the alliance ID provided by the edge node EN. Different alliances are distinguished by ID, so that isolation can be achieved.

[0060] In the second stage, the edge node EN synchronizes the security information announcement SIA with the main central node MN and the backup central node SN.

[0061] Security Information Advertisement SIA (Security Information Advertisem) is the carrier of security information exchange between nodes of the security alliance described in the system of the present invention. It contains the alliance's "consensus" on which target network locations are accessible and which are inaccessible. This "consensus" is similar to a common "black and white list" in the field of network security, which is collected, calculated and published by the main center node MN. Security Information Advertisement SIA will play a "switch" role for each connection during the communication process between the edge node EN and the external network, that is, the Security Information Advertisement SIA determines which communications are allowed and which are prohibited.

[0062] The standby central node SN and the edge node EN both synchronize the security information announcement SIA from the main central node MN, but the synchronization methods of the two are different.

[0063] For the backup central node SN, since the role of the backup central node SN determines that it will not generate new communication connections by itself like the edge node EN, the backup central node SN does not need to report its own connection content to the main central node MN. In order to be able to replace the role of the main central node MN in special circumstances and maintain the network connection of the alliance as much as possible after the replacement, the backup central node SN must frequently synchronize the security information announcement SIA of the main central node MN. In this process, the main synchronization subject is the main central node MN. Whenever the main central node MN updates the security information announcement SIA, it will be immediately released to the backup central node SN.

[0064] As for the edge node EN, since the role of the edge node EN is to generate IoT business communications in the alliance, it may generate new connections that are not recorded by the security information announcement SIA. The edge node EN does not need to synchronize the security information announcement SIA as frequently as the backup center node SN. There are two synchronization methods: periodic synchronization and event-triggered synchronization. In this process, the synchronization subject is the edge node EN.

[0065] The premise for the implementation of this phase is the completion of the first phase. The following descriptions are based on this background. The specific steps are described as follows:

[0066] Step 1: Figure 4 , the edge node EN starts and checks its own security information announcement SIA. At this time, the security information announcement SIA only allows access to the preset fake central node FN domain name and the network address of the main central node MN returned by the fake central node FN by default. This ensures that the edge node EN can communicate with the fake central node FN and the main central node MN, but cannot communicate with any other external network address. As can be seen from the description below, the fake central node FN domain name and the network address of the main central node MN returned by the fake central node FN will be saved in the security information announcement SIA in the form of a "white list".

[0067] Step 2, the edge node EN requests the fake central node FN to update the security information announcement SIA and start a periodic security information announcement SIA update timer. The fake central node FN exchanges identity information with the edge node EN. After mutual confirmation of identity through verification, the fake central node FN returns the network location of the corresponding main central node MN according to the ID of the security alliance SA sent by the edge node EN. The edge node EN then initiates the exchange of identity information with the main central node MN. After mutual confirmation of identity through verification, the edge node EN requests the main central node MN to update the security information announcement SIA. During this process, the fake central node FN and the main central node MN will cache the verification information of the edge node EN, and once the verification process is completed, as long as the information of this verification has not expired, the subsequent connection will skip the verification process. To this end, the edge node EN, the fake central node FN, and the main central node MN participating in the verification will each save a verification information validity timer, and re-verification will be performed after the timer ages to improve the reliability of identity authentication between nodes. Furthermore, before the timer ages, the fake central node FN can directly forward the security information announcement SIA synchronization message between the edge node EN and the main central node MN. The purpose of this arrangement is to improve the security information announcement SIA synchronization efficiency.

[0068] Step 3: After receiving the security information advertisement SIA synchronization request from the edge node EN, the master center node MN matches the target network location information in the request with its own security information advertisement SIA. If all are matched, it sends its own security information advertisement SIA to the edge node EN.

[0069] Step 4: The edge node EN updates its own security information announcement SIA to be consistent with the security information announcement SIA of the main central node MN, and when the periodic security information announcement SIA update timer in step 2 ages, it initiates a synchronization request again and resets the timer.

[0070] Step 5: The edge node EN matches the network connection of the node according to the security information announcement SIA. If the target network location in the "white list" in the security information announcement SIA is hit, it is released; if the target network location in the "black list" is hit, it is blocked.

[0071] There is a special case in step 6 and step 5, that is, a new network connection of the edge node EN does not hit any target network location in the security information announcement SIA. At this time, the edge node EN cannot make a decision to release or block the connection based on the security information announcement SIA, so the edge node EN converts the target network location of the connection into a security connection route SLR, loads it in its own security information announcement SIA, forwards it to the fake central node FN and requests an update, and suspends the connection to wait for the security information announcement SIA update. This update belongs to the event-triggered synchronization mentioned above, and it will trigger the reset of the periodic security information announcement SIA update timer. Afterwards, as described in step 2, the fake central node FN will forward it directly to the main central node MN.

[0072] Step 7: After receiving a security information announcement SIA update request, the main center node MN will still operate as in step 3, except that if it is found that there is at least one target network location that does not match its own security information announcement SIA, then the main center node MN will consider that this connection is newly generated by the alliance, especially if the security information announcement SIA request contains a security connection route SLR. Therefore, the main center node MN will trigger the feature recognition process to further determine whether this connection is secure. If the main center node MN believes that the connection is secure, it will load the target network location into the "white list" of its own security information announcement SIA, otherwise it will be added to the "black list" of the security information announcement SIA. After the security information announcement SIA of the main center node MN is updated, it will immediately return the updated security information announcement SIA to the edge node EN.

[0073] Step 8: After receiving the event-triggered synchronized security information announcement SIA, the edge node EN immediately updates its own security information announcement SIA, and then makes a decision on the connection suspended in step 6 and releases its suspended state.

[0074] In summary, the four roles in the security alliance SA are the fake central node FN, the main central node MN, the backup central node SN and the edge node EN. The specific functions and connection relationships are described as follows:

[0075] Fake Node FN (Fake Node):

[0076] The first key function is to serve as the organizer of the election of the alliance's main central node MN and backup central node SN, collect and record the information of the candidate nodes, and calculate, publish and update the alliance's main central node MN and backup central node SN.

[0077] The second key function is to act as an agent between the alliance edge node EN and the main center node MN. On the one hand, it can hide the network location of the main center node MN to improve its security, and on the other hand, it can provide a security information announcement SIA interaction channel for both parties.

[0078] Main Node MN (Main Node):

[0079] The first key function is to provide security information announcement SIA synchronization (or update) for other nodes, and make a decision on whether to release or block the security link routing SLR (Safety Link Routing) of the edge node EN in a specific situation. The security link routing SLR is a special connection that the edge node EN marks in its own security information announcement SIA and sends to the main center node MN for subsequent judgment when it cannot determine whether a new connection is released or blocked. Before receiving the security information announcement SIA update containing this connection, the edge node EN puts the connection in a suspended state.

[0080] The second key function is that it should have a good computing speed, storage space, and communication bandwidth, and be able to support the deployment of a security system. The security system can identify and calculate the characteristics of security events. The security system is not the key to the security alliance construction method and system of the present invention. Its role is to enable the main center node MN to store the characteristics (including IP, port, protocol, domain name and other decipherable information) in the security information announcement SIA. Furthermore, the main center node MN can make a final judgment on whether the secure connection route SLR is safe based on this. The function of the security system identifying characteristics is generally supported by existing network security products.

[0081] The third key function is to save and manage the security information announcement SIA, and to synchronize the security information announcement SIA to the backup central node SN in real time, and to report its own working status to the fake central node FN.

[0082] The fourth key function is to support interactive verification of identity information of other nodes to improve the security of the alliance.

[0083] Slave Node (SN):

[0084] The first key function is to receive the security information announcement SIA synchronized by the main central node MN at a high frequency, and to make the security information announcement SIA stored by itself as new as possible.

[0085] The second key function is to take over the role of the main central node MN when the main central node MN loses connection or leaves the security alliance SA, so as to continue to provide security services for the security alliance SA.

[0086] Edge Node EN (Edge Node):

[0087] The first key function is to initiate periodic security information announcement SIA synchronization to the main central node MN to update the security information announcement SIA of this node.

[0088] The second key function is to suspend the connection that missed the security information announcement SIA, generate a security connection route SLR, and initiate event-triggered security information announcement SIA synchronization to the main central node MN to update the security information announcement SIA of this node.

[0089] The third key function is to serve as the management entity of the network connection of this node, match the network connection of this node according to the security information announcement SIA, and decide whether to release or block the connection, and decide whether to initiate a secure connection routing SLR connection.

[0090] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and does not limit the present invention in any way. Any simple modification, change and equivalent structural change made to the above embodiment based on the technical essence of the present invention still falls within the protection scope of the technical solution of the present invention.

Claims

1. An Internet of Things Security Alliance System, It is characterized in that It includes the main central node MN and the edge node EN; The master central node MN is used to send a security information announcement SIA to the edge node EN; The edge node EN is used to match the network connection of the node according to the security information announcement SIA, and decide to release or block the network connection.

2. An Internet of Things security alliance system according to claim 1, It is characterized in that The edge node EN is further configured to generate a secure connection route SLR according to the network connection when no match is found for the network connection of the node according to the security information announcement SIA, and send the secure connection route SLR to the main central node MN; The master central node MN is also used to make a security judgment on the security connection route SLR sent by the edge node EN. If the security connection route SLR is safe, the security connection is added to the whitelist of the security information announcement SIA; If the secure connection route SLR is non-secure, the secure connection is added to the blacklist of the security information announcement SIA.

3. An Internet of Things security alliance system according to claim 2, It is characterized in that When the edge node EN sends the secure connection route SLR to the main central node MN, the secure connection route SLR is loaded into its own security information announcement SIA, and the security information announcement SIA is sent to the main central node MN to request an update; After receiving the security information announcement SIA update request, the main central node MN matches the received security information announcement SIA with its own security information announcement SIA. When a security connection routing SLR is found, a security judgment is made on the security connection routing SLR, and its own security information announcement SIA is updated according to the judgment result. After updating the security information announcement SIA, the security information announcement SIA is sent to the edge node EN.

4. An Internet of Things security alliance system according to claim 1, 2 or 3, It is characterized in that It also includes a fake central node FN, and the fake central node FN is used to serve as a transit node for communication between the edge node EN and the main central node MN.

5. An Internet of Things security alliance system according to claim 4, It is characterized in that It also includes a standby central node SN, which is used to replace the main central node MN when the main central node MN loses connection.

6. An Internet of Things security alliance system according to claim 5, It is characterized in that The fake central node FN is also used to monitor the status of the main central node MN. When it is detected that the main central node MN is disconnected, a backup central node SN is replaced as the new main central node MN.

7. An Internet of Things security alliance system according to claim 4, It is characterized in that The fake central node FN is also used to send the network location of the main central node MN, the connection mode of the main central node MN, the authentication method of the main central node MN, and the authentication information of the main central node MN to the edge node EN.

8. An Internet of Things security alliance system according to claim 7, It is characterized in that The fake central node FN communicates with the edge node EN via the L2TP protocol, and the communication between the edge node EN and the main central node MN is achieved via the information interaction channel provided by the fake central node FN.

9. An Internet of Things security alliance system according to claim 4, It is characterized in that The fake central node FN is also used to select the main central node MN from the candidate nodes.

10. An Internet of Things security alliance system according to claim 4, It is characterized in that The fake central node FN provides a static network domain name that is reachable on a public network, and the edge node EN can access the fake central node FN through the static network domain name.

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