Network disk system capable of realizing end-to-end encryption communication

Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of encryption communication, and more particularly discloses a network disk system capable of end-to-end encryption communication, which comprises the following steps that: an information sender generates a source chain key, encrypts the source chain key and sends the encrypted source chain key to an information receiver, and the information receiver decrypts to obtain a plaintext of the source chain key; an information sender and an information receiver generate the same session key and sub-chain key through the same encryption algorithm by using the source chain key, by maintaining a set of chain keys between two communication parties, the irrelevance of encryption and decryption of uplink and downlink data is ensured, each message is encrypted by using different keys, one person has one key, one time has one key, and the encryption efficiency is improved. The information is effectively prevented from being intercepted, cracked and tampered, the communication safety is improved, a new session key and a new subchain key are generated, the forward and backward safety of each session is ensured, even if an attacker obtains the key of a certain session, the keys of other sessions cannot be derived, and therefore the reliability and safety of the system are improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of encrypted communications, and more specifically to a network disk system capable of end-to-end encrypted communications. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of mobile Internet, instant messaging tools such as QQ and WeChat have gradually become an indispensable means of communication in daily life. However, most instant messaging software uses plain text transmission or simple encryption, lacks security protection measures, and is easily intercepted, cracked and tampered with.

[0003] End-to-end encryption is the encryption and decryption of the transmitted PDU in the source node and the destination node. Therefore, the security of the message will not be affected by the unreliability of the intermediate node. End-to-end encryption is not only applicable to the Internet environment, but also to broadcast networks. In order to obtain better security, link encryption can be used together with end-to-end encryption.

[0004] In the era of digitalization and rapid network development, cloud storage services have become an indispensable tool for enterprises and individuals. Cloud storage provides enterprises with flexibility and scalability, but also poses a series of security challenges. Information leakage caused by server misconfiguration is just one of the risks that enterprises may face. In addition, attacks and cybercrimes from the outside, as well as from "insiders", whether employees or cloud storage administrators, may become the most dangerous factors.

[0005] In the traditional way, data leakage accidents are inevitable, because professional attackers with sufficient resources can invade any network, and trusted individuals may leak data from within the enterprise. Therefore, enterprises use end-to-end encryption to protect data. End-to-end encryption allows data to always exist in ciphertext form during the transmission from the source to the end point. End-to-end encryption allows data to always exist in ciphertext form during the transmission from the source to the end point. The end-to-end encryption system has better protection, is easier to design and maintain, and the generation, storage and management of keys are one of the core issues of end-to-end encryption technology. If the user's private key is leaked, the encrypted data will be in danger. Common key management problems include insufficient randomness in key generation, insufficient security of storage devices, and the risk of interception during key transmission. Summary of the invention

[0006] In order to overcome the above-mentioned defects of the prior art, the present invention provides a network disk system capable of end-to-end encrypted communication to solve the problems existing in the above-mentioned background technology.

[0007] The present invention provides the following technical solution: a network disk system capable of end-to-end encrypted communication, comprising: S1, an information sender generates a source chain key and encrypts the source chain key and sends it to an information receiver, and the information receiver decrypts and obtains the source chain key plaintext;

[0008] S2. The information sender and the information receiver both use the source chain key to generate the same session key and subchain key through the same encryption algorithm. The information sender uses the session key to encrypt the information and sends it to the information receiver. The information receiver uses the session key to decrypt and obtain the information plaintext.

[0009] S3. Starting from the session when the first subchain key is generated with the source chain key, within the preset number of sessions, the information sender and the information receiver both use the subchain key generated in the previous session to generate the same new session key and new subchain key through the same encryption algorithm. The information sender uses the new session key to encrypt the information and sends it to the information receiver, and the information receiver uses the new session key to decrypt and obtain the information plaintext;

[0010] S4. After the preset number of sessions, the information sender generates a new source chain key and repeats the above process.

[0011] In a preferred embodiment, the method for the information sender in S1 to generate a source chain key includes: checking whether a sub-chain key generated within a preset number of sessions is stored locally; if not, generating a source chain key and setting a key identifier of the source chain key.

[0012] In a preferred embodiment, the method for the information sender in S1 to encrypt the source chain key includes: generating a fixed public-private key pair of its own and exchanging the fixed public key through the server;

[0013] Generate your own temporary public and private key pair and set the key identifier of the temporary public and private key pair;

[0014] Check whether the other party's temporary public key and the key identifier of the temporary public key are stored locally;

[0015] If yes, use your own fixed private key to sign your temporary public key, use the other party's temporary public key to encrypt the source chain key, and record the key identifier of the other party's temporary public key;

[0016] If not, use your own fixed private key to sign your temporary public key, and use the other party's fixed public key to encrypt the source chain key.

[0017] In a preferred embodiment, when the information sender in S1 sends the encrypted source chain key, it also sends the following content at the same time: its own temporary public key and its key identifier, the signed information sender's temporary public key, the key identifier of the source chain key, and when the key identifier of the other party's temporary public key is stored locally, the key identifier of the other party's temporary public key is also sent.

[0018] In a preferred embodiment, the method for the information receiver in S1 to decrypt and obtain the source chain key plaintext includes: using the other party's fixed public key to verify the temporary public key of the information sender after signing to determine the legitimacy of the temporary public key of the information sender;

[0019] When receiving the key identifier of the temporary public key, use the key identifier of the temporary public key to obtain the temporary private key, and then use the temporary private key to decrypt the encrypted source chain key to obtain the plaintext of the source chain key;

[0020] When the key identifier of the temporary public key is not received, the encrypted source chain key is decrypted using the fixed private key to obtain the plaintext of the source chain key;

[0021] Save the source chain key plaintext, the source chain key key identifier, and the other party's temporary public key and its corresponding key identifier.

[0022] In a preferred embodiment, the same encryption algorithm is a KDF key derivation algorithm.

[0023] In a preferred embodiment, the information sender in S2 uses the session key to perform SM4 encryption on the information and sends it to the information receiver; the information sender in S3 uses the new session key to perform SM4 encryption on the information and sends it to the information receiver; the information receiver in S3 uses the new session key to perform SM4 decryption on the encrypted information to obtain the plaintext of the information.

[0024] In a preferred embodiment, the source chain key is a random number with a length of 16 bytes.

[0025] In a preferred embodiment, the temporary public-private key pair used by both parties is an SM2 public-private key pair.

[0026] The technical effects and advantages of the network disk system capable of end-to-end encrypted communication of the present invention are as follows:

[0027] By maintaining a set of chain keys on both sides of the communication, the uncorrelatedness of uplink and downlink data encryption and decryption is ensured. Each message is encrypted with a different key, so that each person has a key and each time has a key, which effectively prevents information from being intercepted, cracked and tampered with, and improves the security of communication. The end-to-end encryption method is adopted to avoid the risk of storing user information on the server. The source chain key is updated by the preset number of sessions, and a new session key and subchain key are generated, which ensures the forward and backward security of each session. Even if an attacker obtains the key of a certain session, the key of other sessions cannot be derived, thereby improving the reliability and security of the system. The system automatically generates and manages temporary public and private key pairs, and exchanges fixed public keys through the server, so that users do not need to manually manage complex key pairs, simplifying the key management process and improving the user experience. By setting different preset number of sessions and encryption algorithms (such as KDF key derivation algorithm), the system can flexibly respond to different application scenarios and user needs. In the financial field with high security requirements or military applications that require frequent key changes, the preset number of sessions can be adjusted to meet specific security requirements. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0028] Figure 1 It is a process system diagram of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0029] The technical solution of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings in the present invention. In addition, the forms of the various structures recorded in the following implementation modes are merely illustrative. The network disk system capable of end-to-end encrypted communication involved in the present invention is not limited to the various structures recorded in the following implementation modes. All other implementation modes obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative work belong to the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0030] The present invention provides a network disk system capable of end-to-end encrypted communication, including: S1, an information sender generates a source chain key and encrypts the source chain key and sends it to an information receiver, and the information receiver decrypts and obtains the source chain key plaintext;

[0031] S2. The information sender and the information receiver both use the source chain key to generate the same session key and subchain key through the same encryption algorithm. The information sender uses the session key to encrypt the information and sends it to the information receiver. The information receiver uses the session key to decrypt and obtain the information plaintext.

[0032] S3. Starting from the session when the first subchain key is generated with the source chain key, within the preset number of sessions, the information sender and the information receiver both use the subchain key generated in the previous session to generate the same new session key and new subchain key through the same encryption algorithm. The information sender uses the new session key to encrypt the information and sends it to the information receiver, and the information receiver uses the new session key to decrypt and obtain the information plaintext;

[0033] S4. After the preset number of sessions, the information sender generates a new source chain key and repeats the above process.

[0034] Furthermore, the method for the information sender in S1 to generate the source chain key includes: checking whether the subchain key generated within the preset number of sessions is stored locally, if not, generating the source chain key, and setting the key identifier of the source chain key. First, the information sender needs to check its local storage device to confirm whether there is a subchain key generated within the preset number of sessions, to ensure that the existing subchain key can continue to be used, thereby avoiding repeated generation of new subchain keys. If no subchain key is found in the local storage, the information sender will generate a new source chain key, which is used for subsequent encryption and decryption processes to ensure the security of communication. At the same time as the source chain key, the information sender also needs to set a unique key identifier for the source chain key. This identifier is used to distinguish different source chain keys and reference the corresponding source chain key during encryption and decryption. Finally, the information sender needs to encrypt the newly generated source chain key and then transmit it to the information receiver. In order to ensure the secure transmission of data, the information sender will also send its temporary public key and its corresponding key identifier, the signed temporary public key of the information sender, and the key identifier of the source chain key. If the other party's temporary public key and its corresponding key identifier are in the local storage, the information sender will also send them to the other party;

[0035] Furthermore, the method for the information sender in S1 to encrypt the source chain key includes: generating a fixed public-private key pair of its own and exchanging the fixed public key through the server;

[0036] Generate your own temporary public and private key pair and set the key identifier of the temporary public and private key pair;

[0037] Check whether the other party's temporary public key and the key identifier of the temporary public key are stored locally;

[0038] If yes, use your own fixed private key to sign your temporary public key, use the other party's temporary public key to encrypt the source chain key, and record the key identifier of the other party's temporary public key;

[0039] If not, use your own fixed private key to sign your temporary public key, and use the other party's fixed public key to encrypt the source chain key; generate a fixed public-private key pair: the sender of the information first generates a fixed public-private key pair on its local device. This fixed public-private key pair is used for secure communication with the server to ensure that sensitive information is not leaked during the exchange process; exchange fixed public keys through the server: the sender of the information uploads the generated fixed public key to the server and the corresponding registered account ID. The server saves this information and keeps the fixed private key on the local device; generate a temporary public-private key pair: the sender of the information generates a new temporary public-private key pair on the local device and sets a unique identifier for each key. These temporary keys are only used in the current session to ensure that each communication has a different key; check the other party's temporary public key and its identifier: the sender of the information checks the local storage device to confirm whether the other party's temporary public key and its corresponding identifier exist. This step is to ensure that the existing historical data can continue to be used to avoid repeated generation of new temporary keys;

[0040] Furthermore, if the other party's temporary public key exists, the following operations are performed: Sign one's own temporary public key: The information sender uses its fixed private key to sign the generated temporary public key to ensure the authenticity and legitimacy of the temporary public key; Encrypt the source chain key: The information sender uses the other party's temporary public key to encrypt the source chain key, and at the same time, records the other party's temporary public key and its corresponding identifier for subsequent decryption; Transmit the encrypted source chain key: The information sender transmits the encrypted source chain key, the signed information sender's temporary public key, and the key identifier of the source chain key to the other party; If the other party's temporary public key and its identifier are in the local storage, they are also sent to the other party;

[0041] Furthermore, if the other party's temporary public key does not exist, the following operations are performed: Sign one's own temporary public key: The sender of the information also uses its fixed private key to sign the generated temporary public key; Encrypt the source chain key: The sender of the information uses the other party's fixed public key to encrypt the source chain key. This step ensures the security of the current session even if there is no historical data; Transmit the encrypted source chain key: The sender of the information transmits the encrypted source chain key, the signed temporary public key of the sender of the information, and the key identifier of the source chain key to the other party, and at the same time, ensures that the other party's fixed public key has been stored on the local device.

[0042] Furthermore, when the information sender in S1 sends the encrypted source chain key, it also sends the following content at the same time: its own temporary public key and its key identifier, the signed information sender's temporary public key, the key identifier of the source chain key, and when the key identifier of the other party's temporary public key is stored locally, the key identifier of the other party's temporary public key is also sent;

[0043] Furthermore, the method for the information receiver in S1 to decrypt and obtain the source chain key plaintext includes: using the other party's fixed public key to verify the temporary public key of the information sender after signing to determine the legitimacy of the temporary public key of the information sender;

[0044] When receiving the key identifier of the temporary public key, use the key identifier of the temporary public key to obtain the temporary private key, and then use the temporary private key to decrypt the encrypted source chain key to obtain the plaintext of the source chain key;

[0045] When the key identifier of the temporary public key is not received, the encrypted source chain key is decrypted using the fixed private key to obtain the plaintext of the source chain key;

[0046] Save the source chain key plaintext, the key identifier of the source chain key, and the other party's temporary public key and its corresponding key identifier;

[0047] The information receiver first needs to use the other party's fixed public key to verify the signature of the received information to ensure that the temporary public key of the information sender is legal and that the data has not been tampered with during transmission. If the information receiver successfully verifies the signature and receives the key identifier of its own temporary public key, the information receiver uses the key identifier of its temporary public key to obtain the corresponding temporary private key, and uses the obtained temporary private key to decrypt the encrypted source chain key to obtain the plaintext of the source chain key. If the information receiver does not receive its own temporary public key identifier, the information receiver uses its fixed private key to decrypt the encrypted source chain key. Through the above decryption operation, the information receiver can obtain the plaintext of the source chain key. Finally, the information receiver needs to save the obtained source chain key plaintext, the key identifier of the source chain key, and the other party's temporary public key and its corresponding key identifier for subsequent use. The storage of this information ensures that the same encryption algorithm and parameters can continue to be used in subsequent sessions.

[0048] Furthermore, the same encryption algorithm is the KDF key derivation algorithm, the source chain key is a random number of 16 bytes, the information sender in S2 uses the session key to perform SM4 encryption on the information and sends it to the information receiver; the information sender in S3 uses the new session key to perform SM4 encryption on the information and sends it to the information receiver; the information receiver in S3 uses the new session key to perform SM4 decryption on the encrypted information to obtain the information plaintext; the information sender and the information receiver both use the source chain key to generate a session key through the KDF key derivation algorithm, and this session key is used for subsequent message encryption and decryption operations; in step S2, the information sender uses the session key to perform SM4 encryption on the message data to generate encrypted data, and then the encrypted data is sent to the receiver. Transmitted to the information receiver through the network; in step S3, starting from the session when the source chain key generates the first subchain key, within the preset number of sessions, the information sender and the information receiver both use the subchain key generated in the previous session to generate a new session key and a new subchain key through the KDF key derivation algorithm. This step ensures that each session has new encryption parameters, further improving the security of communication. In step S3, the information sender uses the newly generated session key to perform SM4 encryption on the message data to generate new encrypted data, and then transmits the new encrypted data to the information receiver; in step S3, the information receiver uses the new session key to decrypt the received encrypted data using the SM4 decryption algorithm, and finally obtains the plaintext of the original message data;

[0049] SM4 encryption: First, you need to prepare a data block to be encrypted. This data block can be text, numbers or other types of data of any length. In the present invention, a 16-byte random number is used. The information sender and the information receiver both use the source chain key to generate the same session key through the KDF key derivation algorithm. This session key is used for subsequent message encryption and decryption operations. The information sender uses the session key to perform SM4 encryption on the message data to generate encrypted data, and then transmits the encrypted data to the information receiver through the network.

[0050] SM4 decryption: It is also necessary to prepare a data block to be decrypted. This data block can be data encrypted by SM4. The information receiver uses the session key received from the information sender to perform the decryption operation. This session key is also generated by the KDF key derivation algorithm. The information receiver uses the session key to decrypt the received encrypted data using the SM4 decryption algorithm, and finally obtains the plaintext of the original message data.

[0051] Furthermore, SM4 initializes the key generation, key derivation process and key confirmation. First, the initialization stage is the starting point of the entire KDF. An initial key (or master key) is set. This key can be randomly generated or based on some secret information. People may need to obtain this initial key through a secure key exchange protocol, or use existing key materials to generate it. The purpose of this stage is to ensure that all parties involved in the derivation have the same starting key material; secondly, enter the key derivation process. This step is the core of KDF and involves converting the initial key into a new key through a series of complex operations. In the case of SM4, this usually includes using a specific pseudo-random function (such as a hash function) to process the initial key and salt value (salt), and repeating multiple rounds of iterations to increase the difficulty of attack. Specifically for the implementation of SM4, the SM3 hash algorithm of the national secret series can be used as its pseudo-random function for multiple iterative calculations to derive the final key. In each iteration, the salt value may be combined with the output of the previous round and then input into the hash function again. This ensures that even if the initial key is the same, different salt values ​​or iteration times can derive different keys. This process is called key extension. Stretching), which helps to enhance the security of weak keys. Finally, a key confirmation step is required. After KDF calculates the final derived key, in order to verify the correctness and integrity of the key, some form of verification mechanism is usually required, which can be a simple checksum comparison or an encrypted challenge response protocol. For example, a known value can be encrypted with the derived key. If the expected result is obtained after decryption, it proves that the key is valid and correct.

[0052] Furthermore, the formula of the hash function is: H(x) = f(g(x)), where H represents the hash function, x is the input data block, g is the compression function, which compresses the input data block into an intermediate value of a fixed length, and f is the hash function, which further processes the intermediate value to generate the final hash value; the specific process is: first, you need to input a data block, which can be text, numbers or other types of data of any length. The hash function (such as the SM3 algorithm) will calculate the input data and generate a hash value of a fixed length. This hash value is usually used for unique identification and verification of data. After hash processing, a hash value of a fixed length is finally generated. This hash value is used for subsequent encryption and decryption operations to ensure the integrity and security of the data;

[0053] Furthermore, the temporary public-private key pairs used by both parties are SM2 public-private key pairs. Generate temporary public-private key pairs: the sender and the receiver of the information both generate their own temporary public-private key pairs locally, and each sets the key identifier of their own temporary public-private key pairs. These temporary public-private key pairs are used for message encryption and decryption operations during the session; exchange fixed public keys: the sender and the receiver of the information both register on the server in advance, and generate their own fixed public-private key pairs locally during registration, and upload the fixed public key and registration account ID to the server for storage, and the private key corresponding to the fixed public key is stored locally; use temporary public keys for signing and encryption: when the sender of the information needs to send encrypted data to the receiver of the information, first check whether the receiver of the information’s temporary public key and the key identifier of the temporary public key are stored locally. If so, use its own fixed public key to sign and encrypt. The sender of the information sends the encrypted source chain key, its temporary public key and the key identifier of the temporary public key to the information receiver. After receiving the data, the information receiver first verifies the data to verify the legitimacy of the chain key data, then saves the other party's temporary public key and its corresponding key identifier, and uses the other party's fixed public key to verify the temporary public key to prevent data tampering, and then uses the other party's temporary public key to decrypt the chain key. After decryption, the chain key and chain key identifier are saved for use when decrypting the message data.

[0054] Finally: The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A network disk system capable of end-to-end encrypted communication, characterized in that: include: S1. The information sender generates a source chain key and encrypts the source chain key and sends it to the information receiver. The information receiver decrypts and obtains the source chain key plaintext; S2. The information sender and the information receiver both use the source chain key to generate the same session key and subchain key through the same encryption algorithm. The information sender uses the session key to encrypt the information and sends it to the information receiver. The information receiver uses the session key to decrypt and obtain the information plaintext. S3. Starting from the session when the first subchain key is generated with the source chain key, within the preset number of sessions, the information sender and the information receiver both use the subchain key generated in the previous session to generate the same new session key and new subchain key through the same encryption algorithm. The information sender uses the new session key to encrypt the information and sends it to the information receiver, and the information receiver uses the new session key to decrypt and obtain the information plaintext; S4. After the preset number of sessions, the information sender generates a new source chain key and repeats the above process.

2. A network disk system capable of end-to-end encrypted communication according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method for the information sender in S1 to generate the source chain key includes: checking whether the sub-chain key generated within a preset number of sessions is stored locally, and if not, generating the source chain key and setting the key identifier of the source chain key.

3. A network disk system capable of end-to-end encrypted communication according to claim 2, characterized in that: The method for the information sender in S1 to encrypt the source chain key includes: generating a fixed public-private key pair of its own and exchanging the fixed public key through the server; Generate your own temporary public and private key pair and set the key identifier of the temporary public and private key pair; Check whether the other party's temporary public key and the key identifier of the temporary public key are stored locally; If yes, use your own fixed private key to sign your temporary public key, use the other party's temporary public key to encrypt the source chain key, and record the key identifier of the other party's temporary public key; If not, use your own fixed private key to sign your temporary public key, and use the other party's fixed public key to encrypt the source chain key.

4. A network disk system capable of end-to-end encrypted communication according to claim 3, characterized in that: When the information sender in S1 sends the encrypted source chain key, it also sends the following content at the same time: its own temporary public key and its key identifier, the signed information sender's temporary public key, the key identifier of the source chain key, and when the key identifier of the other party's temporary public key is stored locally, the key identifier of the other party's temporary public key is also sent.

5. A network disk system capable of end-to-end encrypted communication according to claim 4, characterized in that: The method for the information receiver in S1 to decrypt and obtain the source chain key plaintext includes: using the other party's fixed public key to verify the temporary public key of the information sender after signing to determine the legitimacy of the temporary public key of the information sender; When receiving the key identifier of the temporary public key, use the key identifier of the temporary public key to obtain the temporary private key, and then use the temporary private key to decrypt the encrypted source chain key to obtain the plaintext of the source chain key; When the key identifier of the temporary public key is not received, the encrypted source chain key is decrypted using the fixed private key to obtain the plaintext of the source chain key; Save the source chain key plaintext, the source chain key key identifier, and the other party's temporary public key and its corresponding key identifier.

6. A network disk system capable of end-to-end encrypted communication according to claim 1, characterized in that: The same encryption algorithm is a KDF key derivation algorithm.

7. The network disk system capable of end-to-end encrypted communication according to claim 1, characterized in that: In S2, the information sender uses the session key to SM4 encrypt the information and sends it to the information receiver; in S3, the information sender uses the new session key to SM4 encrypt the information and sends it to the information receiver; in S3, the information receiver uses the new session key to SM4 decrypt the encrypted information to obtain the plaintext of the information.

8. The network disk system capable of end-to-end encrypted communication according to claim 1, characterized in that: The source chain key is a random number with a length of 16 bytes.

9. The network disk system capable of end-to-end encrypted communication according to claim 1, characterized in that: The temporary public-private key pairs used by both parties are SM2 public-private key pairs.

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