Privacy protection authentication method and system for Internet of Vehicles

Abstract

The invention discloses a privacy protection authentication method and system for the Internet of Vehicles, and the method comprises the steps: a trusted party carries out the system initialization, generates a public parameter and a plurality of hash functions, transmits the public parameter and the hash functions to a vehicle-mounted unit and a road side unit of a vehicle, and distributes a real identity for each vehicle; before the vehicles join the system, the trusted party generates a corresponding false identity and a partial private key for each vehicle, and preloads the false identity and the partial private key to the vehicle-mounted unit of the corresponding vehicle; the vehicle verifies a part of the private key, and if the verification is passed, vehicle key generation and message signature are carried out based on a pseudo identity and a hash function; and the vehicle and the road side unit verify and recover the received signed message. According to the message recovery signature method, the anonymity of the identity of a signer, the message integrity and the non-linkability in the signature process are guaranteed, meanwhile, the requirement for tamper-proof equipment is eliminated, and the privacy and the safety are enhanced through the message recovery signature.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of information security technology, and in particular to a privacy protection authentication method and system for an Internet of Vehicles. Background Art

[0002] The Internet of Vehicles is a mobile self-organizing network that can intelligently manage the entire traffic process, thereby improving traffic efficiency and enhancing safety. However, in practical applications, communications between vehicles may be exploited by malicious attackers to track and locate vehicles, so privacy protection is particularly important in the Internet of Vehicles. In addition, malicious vehicles may spread false information, so it is necessary for authorities to reveal the true identity of Internet of Vehicles users when necessary to achieve privacy protection authentication.

[0003] In the prior art, CN105656634A discloses a privacy protection batch authentication method without pairing operation in a vehicle-mounted self-organizing network, which includes a system establishment stage, a virtual identity generation stage, a message signing stage and a message verification stage. No pairing operation is required in message signing and verification, which can improve authentication efficiency. CN106027519A discloses an efficient conditional privacy protection and security authentication method in a vehicle network, including system initialization, pseudonymous identity and signature private key generation, message signing and authentication, and vehicle real identity tracing. However, the existing method also needs to use anti-tampering equipment (anti-interference equipment) to generate an anonymous identity for the vehicle in the initial stage of authentication. Such equipment often requires high costs. In addition, the existing method cannot achieve message recovery. Summary of the invention

[0004] The present invention proposes a privacy protection authentication method and system for the Internet of Vehicles, specifically a privacy protection authentication method and system based on message recovery signature, which does not require the use of anti-tampering equipment and can reduce complexity. In addition, the additional use of message recovery signature technology further enhances the privacy and security of the authentication process.

[0005] The technical solution adopted by the present invention is as follows:

[0006] A first aspect provides a privacy protection authentication method for an Internet of Vehicles, including:

[0007] The trusted party initializes the system, generates public parameters and multiple hash functions, and sends them to the vehicle's onboard unit and roadside unit. The trusted party assigns a real identity to each vehicle.

[0008] Before a vehicle joins the system, the trusted party generates a corresponding pseudo-identity and a partial private key for each vehicle based on the public parameters, the corresponding hash function, and the real identity of the vehicle, and preloads them into the corresponding vehicle's on-board unit;

[0009] The vehicle verifies part of the private key. If the verification is successful, the vehicle key is generated and the message is signed based on the pseudo-identity and hash function.

[0010] The vehicle and the roadside unit verify and recover the received signed message.

[0011] In one embodiment, the public parameters generated by the trusted party are {p, q, P, P pub}, the plurality of hash functions include a first hash function H1, a second hash function H2, a third hash function H3 and a fourth hash function H4, wherein H1: {0, 1} * ×{0, 1} * × H2: {0, 1} n →{0, 1} |q|-n , H3: {0, 1} |q|-n →{0, 1}n, H4: p, q are large prime numbers, P is a generator of the group G, G is a cyclic group of order q, defined on the curve E, P pub is the system's master public key, represents an integer group of order q, |q| is the length of the vehicle's real identity, and n is the message length.

[0012] In one embodiment, before a vehicle joins the system, the trusted party generates a corresponding pseudo identity and a partial private key for each vehicle based on the public parameters, the corresponding hash function, and the real identity of the vehicle, and preloads them to the vehicle-mounted unit of the corresponding vehicle, including:

[0013] Before a vehicle joins the system, the trusted party selects a random And perform the following calculation:

[0014] Ω j，i =a j，i ·P

[0015]

[0016] c j，i =H1(Ω j，i ||PID j，i ||T j，i )

[0017] η j，i =a j，i +c j，i ·s mod q

[0018] Among them, a j，i is a random number, Ω j，i Represents a point on the elliptic curve, PID j，iIndicates vehicle V j The i-th pseudo-identity, T j，i Indicates PID j，i Validity period, RID j Indicates vehicle V j The true identity of c j，i represents the hash value calculated by the trusted party, η j，i Indicates vehicle V j , s is the system's master private key,

[0019] The trusted party will (Ω j，i， PID j，i , T j，i ) preloaded to the vehicle V j in the on-board unit.

[0020] In one implementation, the vehicle verifies the partial private key, including determining whether the results on the left and right sides of the following equation are equal:

[0021] η j，i P=Ω j，i +c′ j，i ·P pub mod q

[0022] Among them, c′ j，i =H1(Ω j，i ||PID j，i ||T j，i ), c′ j，i Indicates that the vehicle V j The calculated hash values, if equal, indicate that the verification is successful.

[0023] In one embodiment, when sharing information between vehicles, if the verification is successful, vehicle key generation and message signing are performed based on the pseudo identity and hash function, including:

[0024] Vehicle V j Select a one-time private key

[0025] Calculate the one-time public key S j，i =-s j，i ·P.

[0026] Perform the following calculations:

[0027]

[0028] d j，i =H4(c′ j，i ||PID j，i ||T j，i ||S j，i ||Θj，i ||t j，i )

[0029] β j，i =η j，i +d j，i ·s j，i mod q

[0030] Among them, M j，i For the message, t j，i is the current timestamp, Θ j，i According to Ω j，i The horizontal coordinate and the point on the elliptic curve calculated by the hash function, (Ω j，i ) X Represents Ω j，i The horizontal axis, d j，i is the vehicle V j The calculated hash value, β j，i It is the intermediate result of the calculation.

[0031] In one embodiment, the method further comprises:

[0032] Vehicle V j (c j，i , PID j，i， Tj ，i , S j，i , Θ j，i , t j，i ) and β j，i Broadcast to other vehicles and roadside units.

[0033] In one implementation, the vehicle and the roadside unit verify and recover the received signed message, including:

[0034] Check j，i Is it the latest and PID j，i Validity period T j，i Whether it has not expired, if not satisfied, then rejected and terminated;

[0035] If satisfied, the following calculation is performed:

[0036] d′ j，i =H4(c′ j，i ||PID j，i ||T j，i ||S j，i ||Θ j，i ||t j，i )

[0037] Ω′ j，i =β j，i ·Pc′ j，i ·P pub +d′j，i ·S j，i

[0038]

[0039] Among them, d′ j，i The hash value calculated for the vehicle or roadside unit, Ω′ j，i is the result calculated by the vehicle or roadside unit, representing a point on the elliptic curve, Ψ j，i is the result of the XOR operation;

[0040] To restore the message:

[0041]

[0042] Among them, M′ j，i The message recovered by the vehicle or roadside unit, Ψ j，i is a string of |q| bits, [Ψ j，i ] |q|-n Indicates Ψ j，i The highest |q|-n bits, [Ψ j，i ] n Indicates the lowest n bits;

[0043] Check j，i ] |q|-n =H2(M′ j，i ) is true, if so, the signature is accepted, otherwise rejected.

[0044] Based on the same inventive concept, the second aspect of the present invention provides a privacy protection authentication system for Internet of Vehicles, including:

[0045] System initialization module, used by the trusted party to initialize the system, generate public parameters and multiple hash functions and send them to the vehicle's on-board unit and roadside unit. The trusted party assigns a real identity to each vehicle;

[0046] A pseudo identity and partial key generation module, which is used for generating a corresponding pseudo identity and partial private key for each vehicle based on public parameters, a corresponding hash function and the real identity of the vehicle before the vehicle joins the system, and pre-loads the pseudo identity and partial private key to the vehicle-mounted unit of the corresponding vehicle;

[0047] The vehicle key generation and message signing module is used for the vehicle to verify part of the private key. If the verification is successful, the vehicle key generation and message signing are performed based on the pseudo-identity and hash function;

[0048] The message recovery and verification module is used by vehicles and roadside units to verify and recover the received signed messages.

[0049] Based on the same inventive concept, the third aspect of the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored. When the program is executed by a processor, the privacy protection authentication method for the Internet of Vehicles described in the first aspect is implemented.

[0050] Based on the same inventive concept, the fourth aspect of the present invention provides a computer device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein when the processor executes the program, the privacy protection authentication method for the Internet of Vehicles described in the first aspect is implemented.

[0051] Compared with the prior art, the advantages and beneficial technical effects of the present invention are as follows:

[0052] The present invention discloses a privacy protection authentication method and system for the Internet of Vehicles. First, a trusted party initializes the system, generates public parameters and hash functions, and before the vehicle joins the system, the trusted party generates a corresponding pseudo identity and partial private key for each vehicle, and preloads them into the corresponding vehicle's on-board unit. Then, the partial private key is checked, and then the vehicle key is generated and the message is signed. Finally, the message is recovered and verified using the message recovery signature technology. Compared with the prior art, which requires the use of tamper-proof equipment to generate an anonymous identity for the vehicle in the initial stage of authentication, the present method can generate a pseudo identity for the vehicle through a trusted party, avoiding the use of tamper-proof equipment, reducing complexity, and also reducing costs. In addition, the present invention additionally uses the message recovery signature technology to further enhance the privacy and security of the authentication process. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0053] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0054] Figure 1 A flowchart of a privacy protection authentication method for Internet of Vehicles provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0055] Figure 2 This is a flowchart of a specific implementation of a privacy protection authentication method for Internet of Vehicles in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0056] Figure 3 A framework diagram of a privacy protection authentication system for the Internet of Vehicles provided in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0057] The present invention solves the problem of high cost caused by the need to use anti-interference equipment in the prior art, as well as the technical problem that communication overhead and privacy need to be improved by providing a privacy protection authentication method for the Internet of Vehicles.

[0058] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solution in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0059] Embodiment 1

[0060] The present invention discloses a privacy protection authentication method for Internet of Vehicles, see Figure 1 ,include:

[0061] S1: The trusted party initializes the system, generates public parameters and multiple hash functions, and sends them to the vehicle's onboard unit and roadside unit. The trusted party assigns a real identity to each vehicle.

[0062] S2: Before a vehicle joins the system, the trusted party generates a corresponding pseudo-identity and a partial private key for each vehicle based on the public parameters, the corresponding hash function, and the real identity of the vehicle, and preloads them into the vehicle-mounted unit of the corresponding vehicle;

[0063] S3: The vehicle verifies part of the private key. If the verification is successful, the vehicle key is generated and the message is signed based on the pseudo-identity and hash function.

[0064] S4: The vehicle and the roadside unit verify and recover the received signed message.

[0065] In one embodiment, the public parameters generated by the trusted party are {p, q, P, P pub}, the plurality of hash functions include a first hash function H1, a second hash function H2, a third hash function H3 and a fourth hash function H4, wherein H1: {0, 1} * ×{0, 1} * × H2: {0, 1} n →{0, 1} |q|-n , H3: {0, 1} |q|-n →{0, 1} n , H4: p, q are large prime numbers, P is a generator of the group G, G is a cyclic group of order q, defined on the curve E, P pubis the system's master public key, represents an integer group of order q, |q| is the length of the vehicle's real identity, and n is the message length.

[0066] Specifically, the relevant parameters involved in the present invention are described as follows:

[0067] Parameter Description

[0068] p,qp,q are large prime numbers. Their length depends on the required security level

[0069] E Elliptic curve E:y 2 =x 3 +ax+b mod p, where a, b∈F p , meeting 4a 3 +27b 2 ≠0

[0070] GG is a cyclic group of order q, defined on the curve E

[0071] PP is a generator of group G

[0072] s,P pub is the system's master private key, P pub =s·P is the master public key of the system

[0073] R, D j ∈Z q Vehicle V j True identity

[0074] PID j，i ∈Z q Vehicle V j The i-th pseudo-identity

[0075] XOR operation

[0076] || Message connection operation

[0077] See also Figure 2 , which is a specific implementation flowchart of the privacy protection authentication method for the Internet of Vehicles.

[0078] The specific implementation process of the system initialization step is:

[0079] Based on the input security parameter λ, the trusted party generates parameters p, q, P, P pub , s and hash function H:G→{0,1} |q| , where |q| is the length of the vehicle's real identity, n is the message length, H2: {0, 1} n →{0, 1}|q|-n , H3: {0, 1} |q|-n →{0, 1} n , H4: The values ​​of these parameters and functions depend on the security parameter λ. Then, the trusted party sets the parameters paras = {p, q, P, P pub} and H1, H2, H3, H4 are sent to other entities in the system (roadside unit RSU and on-board unit OBU on each vehicle). Then, the trusted party sends V j Assigning a Real Identity RID j .

[0080] The specific implementation process of pseudo identity and partial key generation is as follows:

[0081] Vehicle users V in the system j Generating a pseudo-identity requires the participation of a trusted party, who selects a random And perform the following calculation:

[0082] Ω j，i =a j，i ·P

[0083]

[0084] c j，i =H1(Ω j，i ||PID j，i ||T j，i )

[0085] η j，i =a j，i +c j，i ·s mod q

[0086] Among them, a j，i is a random number, Ω j，i Represents a point on the elliptic curve, PID j，i Indicates vehicle V j The i-th pseudo-identity, T j，i Indicates PID j，i Validity period, RID j Indicates vehicle V j The true identity of c j，i represents the hash value calculated by the trusted party, η j，i Indicates vehicle V j , s is the system's master private key, This phase is performed offline, and the vehicle will receive a new pseudo identity assigned by a trusted party. Here, η j，i It will be used as part of the private key and must be kept confidential to ensure security.

[0087] The trusted party thenj，i , PID j，i , T j，i ) preloaded to the vehicle V j in OBU.

[0088] The specific implementation process of vehicle key generation and message signing is as follows:

[0089] Vehicle V j Using c′ j，i =H1(Ω j，i ||PID j，i ||T j，i ) performs the following check on the received {Ω j，i , PID j，i , T j，i}, that is, to determine whether the calculation results on the left and right sides of the following formula are equal.

[0090] η j，i P=Ω j，i +c′ j，i ·P pub mod q

[0091] If passed, continue with the following steps:

[0092] (3a) Select a one-time private key

[0093] (3b) Calculate the one-time public key S j，i =-s j，i ·P.

[0094] (3c) Using message M j，i and the current timestamp t j，i Perform the following calculation

[0095]

[0096] d j，i =H4(c′ j，i ||PID j，i ||T j，i ||S j，i ||Θ j，i ||t j，i )

[0097] β j，i =η j，i +d j，i ·s j，i mod q

[0098] M j，i For the message, t j，i is the current timestamp, Θ j，i According to Ω j，iThe horizontal coordinate and the point on the elliptic curve calculated by the hash function, (Ω j，i ) X Represents Ω j，i The horizontal axis, d j，i is the vehicle V j The calculated hash value, β j，i It is the intermediate result of the calculation.

[0099] (3d) Vehicle V j (c′ j，i , PID j，i , T j，i , S j，i , Θ j，i , t j，i ) is broadcast to other vehicles and roadside units.

[0100] The specific implementation process of message recovery and verification is as follows:

[0101] All vehicles and roadside units can verify the received (c′ j，i , PID j，i , T j，i , S j，i , Θ j，i , t j，i ) and β j，i , perform the following steps:

[0102] (4a) First check t j，i Is it the latest and PID j，i Validity period T j，i Is it not expired? If not, reject and terminate. If satisfied, execute the following steps (4b) to (4d). (Satisfied means t j，i The latest and PID j，i Validity period T j，i Not expired, other conditions are not satisfied)

[0103] (4b) Calculation

[0104] d′ j，i =H4(c′ j，i ||PID j，i ||T j，i ||S j，i ||Θ j，i ||t j，i )

[0105] Ω′ j，i =β j，i ·Pc′ j，i ·P pub +d′ j，i ·S j，i

[0106]

[0107] Among them, d′ j，i The hash value calculated for the vehicle or roadside unit, Ω′ j，i is the result calculated by the vehicle or roadside unit, representing a point on the elliptic curve, Ψ j，i is the result of the XOR operation;

[0108] (4c) Recovery Message

[0109]

[0110] Among them, M′ j，i The message recovered by the vehicle or roadside unit, Ψ j，i is a string of |q| bits, [Ψ j，i ] |q|-n Indicates Ψ j，i The highest |q|-n bits, [Ψ j，i ] n Indicates the lowest n bits;

[0111] (4d) Check [Ψ j，i ] |q|-n =H2(M j，i ). If it passes, the signature is accepted, otherwise it is rejected.

[0112] The key points to be protected by the present invention include:

[0113] 1. Pseudo-identity generation

[0114] The solution of the prior art requires the use of tamper-proof equipment to generate an anonymous identity for the vehicle, while the present application generates a pseudo-identity for the vehicle through a trusted party. When generating a pseudo-identity, the following technical difficulties need to be overcome: First, the balance between security and privacy: When a trusted party generates a pseudo-identity for a vehicle, it must ensure that the association between the pseudo-identity and the real identity is only revealed under specific conditions. At the same time, the encryption algorithm cannot be used directly. Then there is the complexity of key management: the trusted party needs to generate partial private keys for each vehicle and ensure the security and efficiency of information sharing between vehicles. The present invention designs an efficient verification mechanism (see the specific implementation process of message recovery and verification in the previous article) so that the system can respond quickly and verify the legitimacy of the pseudo-identity and signature.

[0115] 2. Message recovery signature

[0116] The solutions of the prior art can only verify the signature, but cannot recover the signature. The present application uses the message recovery signature technology to further enhance the privacy and security of the authentication process. The message recovery signature needs to overcome the following technical difficulties: First, the security of the signature: The core technical difficulty of the message recovery signature is to ensure the unforgeability and tamper resistance of the signature. This requires ensuring that the signature will not be used by attackers during the generation process. Especially in the communication between vehicles, the message recovery signature must ensure the integrity of the message and the anonymity of the signer's identity. Then there is efficiency and resource consumption: message recovery signature technology is usually more complex than traditional signature schemes, and it is necessary to design a suitable way to integrate the message into the signature and optimize the efficiency of the algorithm. Especially in large-scale real-time communication systems such as the Internet of Vehicles, the computational burden of signing and verification must be reduced while maintaining high throughput and low latency. The present invention can achieve this technical effect through the specific implementation process of the above-mentioned message recovery and verification.

[0117] The effects of the present invention are described below through specific experimental data.

[0118] Regarding the correctness of this embodiment and the time required for each step, this embodiment uses Python language and the cypari library therein to fully implement the algorithm, verify the correctness of the algorithm, and measure the time required for each step as shown in Table 1.

[0119] Table 1. Steps and time required

[0120] step Time (ms) Pseudo-identity and partial key generation 1.063 Vehicle key generation and message signing 0.534 Message recovery and verification 1.602

[0121] The throughput of this embodiment (the current bandwidth required for vehicle communication in the communication channel) can be calculated using the following formula:

[0122]

[0123] Among them, TP represents the throughput in bytes per second, N is the number of vehicles within the transmission range (the number of messages received by each beacon), R is the message sending rate of each vehicle (the number of beacons per second), and C is the communication overhead (unit: bytes). Table 2 provides parameter settings in two main vehicle networking scenarios: high-speed mobile scenario and high-density scenario.

[0124] Table 2. Parameter settings for the Internet of Vehicles scenario

[0125] parameter High-speed moving scene High-density scenarios Vehicle speed 60km / h 10km / h Workshop distance 30m 5m Number of lanes 6 lanes 6 lanes Message scope 300 m 15m Number of vehicles within transmission range 120 36 Message sending rate (beacons / second) 3.33 pieces / second 10 pieces / second Maximum tolerable delay 300ms 100ms

[0126] In high-speed mobile scenarios, the maximum processing delay for each message is

[0127]

[0128] In a high-density scenario, the maximum processing delay for each message is

[0129]

[0130] The average verification time of this embodiment is about 1.602ms. This shows that the processing delay is within an acceptable range, providing sufficient reaction time for other vehicles and roadside units to handle traffic emergencies. Therefore, this embodiment shows practical application potential in terms of delay.

[0131] In general, the present invention uses a message recovery signature method to ensure the anonymity of the signer's identity, message integrity and unlinkability during the signing process, while eliminating the need for tamper-proof devices and using message recovery signatures to enhance privacy and security.

[0132] Embodiment 2

[0133] Based on the same inventive concept, this embodiment discloses a privacy protection authentication system for Internet of Vehicles, see Figure 3 ,include:

[0134] System initialization module 101, used by a trusted party to initialize the system, generate public parameters and multiple hash functions and send them to the vehicle's onboard unit and roadside unit, and the trusted party assigns a real identity to each vehicle;

[0135] A pseudo identity and partial key generation module 102 is used for generating a corresponding pseudo identity and partial private key for each vehicle by a trusted party based on public parameters, a corresponding hash function and a real identity of the vehicle before the vehicle joins the system, and pre-loading the pseudo identity and partial private key to the vehicle-mounted unit of the corresponding vehicle;

[0136] The vehicle key generation and message signing module 103 is used for the vehicle to verify the partial private key. If the verification is successful, the vehicle key generation and message signing are performed based on the pseudo identity and hash function;

[0137] The message recovery and verification module 104 is used for the vehicle and the roadside unit to verify and recover the received signed message.

[0138] Specifically, the privacy protection authentication system for the Internet of Vehicles includes a trusted party, a vehicle (on-board unit) and a roadside unit. Among them, the system initialization module, the pseudo-identity and partial key generation module belong to the component modules of the trusted party, the vehicle key generation and message signing module belong to the component modules of the on-board unit, and the message recovery and verification module belongs to the component modules of the vehicle and the roadside unit.

[0139] Since the system introduced in the second embodiment of the present invention is a system used to implement the privacy protection authentication method for the Internet of Vehicles in the first embodiment of the present invention, based on the method introduced in the first embodiment of the present invention, the person skilled in the art can understand the specific structure and deformation of the system, so it is not repeated here. All systems used in the method in the first embodiment of the present invention belong to the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0140] Embodiment 3

[0141] Based on the same inventive concept, the present invention further provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored. When the program is executed by a processor, the method described in the first embodiment is implemented.

[0142] Since the computer-readable storage medium introduced in the third embodiment of the present invention is the computer-readable storage medium used to implement the privacy protection authentication method for the Internet of Vehicles in the first embodiment of the present invention, based on the method introduced in the first embodiment of the present invention, those skilled in the art can understand the specific structure and deformation of the computer-readable storage medium, so it is not repeated here. All computer-readable storage media used in the method of the first embodiment of the present invention belong to the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0143] Embodiment 4

[0144] The present invention also provides a computer device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor implements the method described in Embodiment 1 when executing the program.

[0145] Since the computer device introduced in the fourth embodiment of the present invention is a computer device used to implement the privacy protection authentication method for the Internet of Vehicles in the first embodiment of the present invention, based on the method introduced in the first embodiment of the present invention, the person skilled in the art can understand the specific structure and deformation of the computer device, so it is not repeated here. All computer devices used in the method of the first embodiment of the present invention belong to the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0146] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that embodiments of the present invention may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present invention may take the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware. Moreover, the present invention may take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0147] The present invention is described with reference to flowcharts and / or block diagrams of methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the present invention. It should be understood that each process and / or block in the flowchart and / or block diagram, as well as the combination of processes and / or blocks in the flowchart and / or block diagram, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to produce a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the flowchart and / or block diagram. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in a block or multiple blocks.

[0148] Although preferred embodiments of the present invention have been described, additional changes and modifications may be made to these embodiments by those skilled in the art once the basic creative concepts are known. Therefore, the appended claims are intended to be interpreted as including the preferred embodiments and all changes and modifications that fall within the scope of the present invention. Obviously, those skilled in the art may make various changes and modifications to the embodiments of the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the embodiments of the present invention. Thus, if these modifications and variations of the embodiments of the present invention fall within the scope of the claims of the present invention and their equivalents, the present invention is also intended to include these modifications and variations.

Claims

1. A privacy protection authentication method for Internet of Vehicles, characterized in that: include: The trusted party initializes the system, generates public parameters and multiple hash functions, and sends them to the vehicle's onboard unit and roadside unit. The trusted party assigns a real identity to each vehicle. Before a vehicle joins the system, the trusted party generates a corresponding pseudo-identity and a partial private key for each vehicle based on the public parameters, the corresponding hash function, and the real identity of the vehicle, and preloads them into the corresponding vehicle's on-board unit; The vehicle verifies part of the private key. If the verification is successful, the vehicle key is generated and the message is signed based on the pseudo-identity and hash function. The vehicle and the roadside unit verify and recover the received signed message.

2. The privacy protection authentication method for Internet of Vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that: The public parameters generated by the trusted party are {p,q,P,P pub }, the plurality of hash functions include a first hash function H1, a second hash function H2, a third hash function H3 and a fourth hash function H4, wherein, H2:{0,1} n →{0,1} |q|-n ,H3:{0,1} |q|-n →{0,1} n , p,q are large prime numbers, P is a generator of the group G, G is a cyclic group of order q, defined on the curve E, P pub is the system's master public key, represents an integer group of order q, |q| is the length of the vehicle's real identity, and n is the message length.

3. The privacy protection authentication method for Internet of Vehicles according to claim 2, characterized in that: Before a vehicle joins the system, the trusted party generates a corresponding pseudo-identity and partial private key for each vehicle based on the public parameters, the corresponding hash function, and the real identity of the vehicle, and preloads them into the corresponding vehicle's on-board unit, including: Before a vehicle joins the system, the trusted party selects a random And perform the following calculation: Oh j,i =a j,i ·P c j,i =H1(Ω j,i ||PID j,i ||T j,i ) or j,i =a j,i +c j,i ·s mod q Among them, a j,i is a random number, Ω j,i Represents a point on the elliptic curve, PID j,i Indicates vehicle V j The i-th pseudo-identity, T j,i Indicates PID j,i Validity period, RID j Indicates vehicle V j The true identity of c j,i represents the hash value calculated by the trusted party, η j,i Indicates vehicle V j , s is the system's master private key, The trusted party will (Ω j,i ,PID j,i ,T j,i ) preloaded to the vehicle V j in the on-board unit.

4. The privacy protection authentication method for Internet of Vehicles according to claim 3, characterized in that: The vehicle verifies part of the private key, including determining whether the results on the left and right sides of the following equation are equal: or j,i ·P=Ω j,i +c′ j,i ·P pub mod q Among them, c′ j,i =H1(Ω j,i ||PID j,i ||T j,i ), c′ j,i Indicates that the vehicle V j The calculated hash values, if equal, indicate that the verification is successful.

5. The privacy protection authentication method for Internet of Vehicles as claimed in claim 3, characterized in that: When sharing information between vehicles, if the verification is successful, vehicle key generation and message signing are performed based on pseudo-identity and hash function, including: Vehicle V j Select a one-time private key Calculate the one-time public key S j,i =-s j,i ·P; Perform the following calculations: d j,i =H4(c j ′ ,i ||PID j,i ||T j,i ||S j,i ||Θ j,i ||t j,i ) b j,i =the j,i +d j,i ·s j,i mod q Among them, M j,i For the message, t j,i is the current timestamp, Θ j,i According to Ω j,i The horizontal coordinate and the point on the elliptic curve calculated by the hash function, (Ω j,i ) X Represents Ω j,i The horizontal axis, d j,i is the vehicle V j The calculated hash value, β j,i It is the intermediate result of the calculation.

6. The privacy protection authentication method for Internet of Vehicles as claimed in claim 5, characterized in that: The method further comprises: Vehicle V j (c′ j,i ,PID j,i ,T j,i ,S j,i ,Θ j,i ,t j,i ) and β j,i Broadcast to other vehicles and roadside units.

7. The privacy protection authentication method for Internet of Vehicles according to claim 6, characterized in that: The vehicle and the roadside unit verify and recover the received signed message, including: Check j,i Is it the latest and PID j,i Validity period T j,i Whether it has not expired, if not satisfied, then rejected and terminated; If satisfied, the following calculation is performed: d′ j,i =H4(c′ j,i ||PID j,i ||T j,i ||S j,i ||Θ j,i ||t j,i ) Oh' j,i =b j,i ·Pc′ j,i ·P pub +d′ j,i ·S j,i Among them, d′ j,i The hash value calculated for the vehicle or roadside unit, Ω′ j,i is the result calculated by the vehicle or roadside unit, representing a point on the elliptic curve, Ψ j,i is the result of the XOR operation; To restore the message: Among them, M′ j,i The message recovered by the vehicle or roadside unit, Ψ j,i is a string of |q| bits, [Ψ j,i ] |q|-n Indicates Ψ j,i The highest |q|-n bits, [Ψ j,i ] n Indicates the lowest n bits; Check j,i ] |q|-n =H2(M′ j,i ) is true, if so, the signature is accepted, otherwise rejected.

8. A privacy protection authentication system for Internet of Vehicles, characterized in that: include: System initialization module, used by the trusted party to initialize the system, generate public parameters and multiple hash functions and send them to the vehicle's on-board unit and roadside unit. The trusted party assigns a real identity to each vehicle; A pseudo identity and partial key generation module, which is used for generating a corresponding pseudo identity and partial private key for each vehicle based on public parameters, a corresponding hash function and the real identity of the vehicle before the vehicle joins the system, and pre-loads the pseudo identity and partial private key to the vehicle-mounted unit of the corresponding vehicle; The vehicle key generation and message signing module is used for the vehicle to verify part of the private key. If the verification is successful, the vehicle key generation and message signing are performed based on the pseudo-identity and hash function; The message recovery and verification module is used by vehicles and roadside units to verify and recover the received signed messages.

9. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the program is executed by a processor, the privacy protection authentication method for the Internet of Vehicles as described in any one of claims 1 to 7 is implemented.

10. A computer device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that: When the processor executes the program, the privacy protection authentication method for the Internet of Vehicles as described in any one of claims 1 to 7 is implemented.

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