Defense layout optimization method and system for coping with dynamic incoming attacks

Abstract

The invention belongs to the related technical field of battle layout optimization, and discloses a defense layout optimization method and system for coping with dynamic incoming attacks, and the method comprises the steps: obtaining the incoming attack data of an enemy, the incoming attack data comprising the number of attackers projected by the enemy and the incoming attack direction range; according to the incoming attack data, simulating various possible enemy incoming attack scenes, wherein the incoming attack scenes comprise incoming attack trajectories and trajectory probabilities of attacking each target by each attacking object; a series of interception schemes are generated according to the incoming attack data, the interception schemes comprise interception positions of interceptors, and the number of the interceptors is the same as that of the attacking objects; the interception net income of each interception scheme in different attack scenes is calculated, the interception scheme with the maximum interception net income is used as the optimal defense layout scheme, and the method can reduce intelligence collection difficulty and data analysis difficulty, reduce time consumption, quickly correspond to dynamic changes of enemy attack and quickly output the defense layout scheme.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field related to battle layout optimization, and more specifically, relates to a defense layout optimization method and system for coping with dynamic attacks. Background Art

[0002] As the battle scenes become increasingly complex, the variability of enemy attacks has put forward higher requirements on the defender's defense system. The direction and number of enemy attacks often change rapidly, which brings challenges to the traditional defense layout. However, existing defense technologies usually rely on static models, that is, a large amount of intelligence collection and data analysis work is required in advance to accurately estimate the specific enemy attack scene and make defense layout according to the attack trajectory in the enemy attack scene. On the one hand, this approach has difficulties in obtaining enemy information and processing data, and the computational overhead is large, which is difficult to carry out under limited resources. On the other hand, this approach takes a long time because it needs to collect a large amount of enemy information and analyze it. The enemy's attack strategy often changes rapidly. The above methods cannot effectively cope with the dynamic changes of the battlefield, resulting in the difficulty of defense measures to quickly adapt to new threats. Moreover, in the case of multiple defense strategies, there is a lack of corresponding evaluation mechanism to select a more optimal defense strategy. Summary of the invention

[0003] In view of the above defects or improvement needs of the prior art, the present invention provides a defense layout optimization method and system for dealing with dynamic attacks, which aims to reduce the difficulty of information collection and data processing, face the dynamic changes of enemy attacks, reasonably evaluate different layout schemes, and quickly determine the defense layout scheme.

[0004] To achieve the above object, the present invention provides a method for optimizing defense layout for dealing with dynamic attacks, which comprises:

[0005] Acquiring enemy attack data, wherein the attack data includes the number of attack objects launched by the enemy and the attack direction range;

[0006] Simulating multiple possible enemy attack scenarios based on the attack data, wherein the attack scenarios include the attack trajectory and trajectory probability of each attacker attacking each target;

[0007] generating a series of interception schemes according to the incoming attack data, wherein the interception schemes include interception positions of interception objects, and the number of the interception objects is the same as the number of the attacking objects;

[0008] Calculate the interception net benefit of each interception plan under different attack scenarios, and take the interception plan with the largest interception net benefit as the optimal defense layout plan;

[0009] Among them, the interception net benefit of any interception scheme in any incoming scenario includes the sum of the interception net benefits of each interceptor. The interception net benefit of each interceptor is the weighted sum of the interception net benefits of intercepting each trajectory passing through its interception range, and the weighted weight is the corresponding trajectory probability;

[0010] When there is an incoming trajectory G1 that passes through the intersection area of ​​the interception range of interceptor A and interceptor B, the interception net benefit R of interceptor A on the incoming trajectory G1 is A_G1 for:

[0011] R A_G1 =X A_G1 +Y A_G1 -C A

[0012] When there is an incoming trajectory g1 that only passes through the interception range of interceptor A, the interception benefit R of interceptor A on the incoming trajectory g1 is A_g1 for:

[0013] R A_g1 =Z A_g1 -C A

[0014] X A_G1 is the interception benefit of interceptor A without cooperation with interceptor B when the incoming trajectory G1 passes through the intersection area, Z A_g1 Y is the interception benefit of interceptor A when the incoming trajectory g1 only passes through the interception range of interceptor A; A_G1 The allocation of interceptor A from the cooperative interception income obtained by interceptor A and interceptor B; C A is the interception cost of interceptor A; the interception benefit is the loss caused to the enemy when the attacking object is intercepted.

[0015] In an alternative embodiment,

[0016] Single interception benefit X A_G1 Includes: ρ*C T *P A ;

[0017] Single intercept yield Z A_g1 Includes: C T ·P A ;

[0018] Allocation amount Y A_G1 Includes: T ·[1-(1-P A )(1-P B )]-C A -C b}*φ A ;

[0019] ρ is the probability that interceptor A does not cooperate with interceptor B to intercept, C T is the value of the currently intercepted attack object, P A is the probability of successful interception of object A, P B is the probability of successful interception of object B, C B is the interception cost of interceptor B, φ A is the profit distribution proportion of interceptor A in cooperative interception.

[0020] In an optional embodiment, when interceptor A and interceptor B cooperate in interception, the distribution proportions of interceptor A and interceptor B in the obtained cooperative interception income are determined according to the Shapley value method.

[0021] In an optional embodiment, the attack scenario includes a uniformly distributed attack scenario and a randomly distributed attack scenario, wherein the uniform distribution means that all attacking objects are uniformly distributed on the same straight line, and the random distribution means that all attacking objects are randomly distributed on the same straight line.

[0022] In an optional embodiment, the calculation of the interception net benefits of each interception scheme in different attack scenarios and taking the interception scheme with the maximum interception net benefit as the optimal defense layout scheme includes:

[0023] First, compare the interception net benefits of different interception schemes under the same attack scenario and determine the maximum interception net benefit under the corresponding attack scenario;

[0024] Then, the maximum interception net benefits under different attack scenarios are compared, and the interception plan corresponding to the maximum value is taken as the optimal defense layout plan.

[0025] In an optional embodiment, the probability of the same attacker attacking each target is equal, and the trajectory probability of the same attacker attacking each target is 1 / N, where N is the number of targets.

[0026] In an optional embodiment, the attacking object is a missile or an artillery shell, and the intercepting object is a drone or an unmanned boat.

[0027] The present invention also provides a defense layout optimization system for responding to dynamic attacks, including a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, wherein the processor implements the steps of any of the methods described above when executing the computer program.

[0028] The present invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of any of the above methods are implemented.

[0029] The present invention also provides a computer program product, comprising a computer program or instructions, wherein the computer program or instructions implement the steps of any of the above methods when executed by a processor.

[0030] In general, compared with the prior art, the above technical solutions conceived by the present invention mainly have the following beneficial effects:

[0031] 1. The present invention first obtains the number and attack direction range of the enemy attack objects, simulates the enemy attack scene based on this information, and generates a series of interception schemes based on this information, and then uses the designed benefit calculation algorithm to calculate the pure interception benefits of different interception schemes in different attack scenes, and takes the interception scheme with the largest pure interception benefit as the optimal defense layout scheme. The above method can be carried out after collecting the number and attack direction range of the enemy attack objects. It does not need to accurately estimate the attack trajectory of each enemy attack object, which can greatly reduce the difficulty of intelligence collection and data analysis, and reduce time consumption. Therefore, it can quickly respond to the dynamic changes of the enemy attack and quickly output the defense layout plan.

[0032] 2. The benefit calculation algorithm used in the present invention proposes two different benefit calculation methods according to whether the incoming trajectory passes through the intersection area of ​​the two interception ranges. When the incoming trajectory passes through the intersection area, the two interceptors with intersecting ranges may cooperate or may not cooperate. When calculating the benefit of intercepting the trajectory, the cooperation and non-cooperation situations are comprehensively considered and calculated in a unified manner, making the calculation simpler. Through this benefit calculation method, different layout strategies can be reasonably evaluated and the preferred defense layout plan can be quickly output.

[0033] 3. The present invention compares the net benefits of different interception schemes under different attack scenarios. The larger the net benefit, the more comprehensive the protection of the defending target and the stronger the defense. The interception scheme with the largest net benefit is used as the optimal layout, which is conducive to better protection of the defending target. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0034] Figure 1 is a flowchart of the steps of a method for optimizing a defense layout to cope with dynamic attacks in one embodiment of the present invention;

[0035] Figure 2 This is a uniformly distributed attack scenario simulated in one embodiment of the present invention;

[0036] Figure 3 It is a randomly distributed attack scenario simulated in one embodiment of the present invention;

[0037] Figure 4 is a benefit curve of each layout solution in a uniformly distributed attack scenario in one embodiment of the present invention;

[0038] Figure 5 is a benefit curve of each layout scheme in a random distribution attack scenario in one embodiment of the present invention;

[0039] Figure 6 It is the optimal defense layout solution in the evenly distributed attack scenario in one embodiment of the present invention;

[0040] Figure 7 It is the optimal defense layout solution for a randomly distributed attack scenario in one embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0041] In order to make the purpose, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more clearly understood, the present invention is further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention. In addition, the technical features involved in the various embodiments of the present invention described below can be combined with each other as long as they do not conflict with each other.

[0042] Example 1

[0043] like Figure 1 The flowchart is a method for optimizing a defense layout for dealing with dynamic attacks in one embodiment of the present invention, which mainly includes steps S1 to S4. Each step is described in detail below.

[0044] Step S1: Acquire enemy attack data, which includes the number of attack objects launched by the enemy and the attack direction range.

[0045] Taking naval warfare as an example, the attack objects launched by the enemy can be missiles. Before optimizing the layout, it is necessary to collect enemy attack data in advance, including the number of missiles and the direction and range of the missiles.

[0046] Step S2: Simulate multiple possible enemy attack scenarios based on the attack data. The attack scenarios include the attack trajectory and trajectory probability of each attacker attacking each target.

[0047] The present invention does not need to collect the incoming trajectory information of the enemy missile, but simulates the incoming scenes that the enemy may adopt. Although the accurate incoming trajectory information of the enemy cannot be collected, the attack habits of the enemy can be analyzed according to historical data. Based on its attack habits and the current combat environment, multiple possible high incoming scenes can be simulated, and then the interception benefits under different layout strategies of the simulated incoming scenes are compared to achieve layout optimization. In each scene, it is necessary to simulate the position of each attacker and simulate the attack trajectory of the attacker to each target. At the same time, it is also necessary to give the attack probability of the attacker attacking different targets, that is, the trajectory probability of each trajectory. In order to simplify the calculation, the attack probability of the attacker attacking different targets can be set to be the same. For example, if there are N targets, the probability of the attacker attacking each target is 1 / N, that is, the probability of the trajectory of the attacker without a trajectory is 1 / N.

[0048] For example, enemy attack scenarios can be roughly divided into two categories: uniformly distributed attack scenarios and randomly distributed attack scenarios. Figure 2 As shown in , uniform distribution means that all attacking objects are uniformly distributed on the same straight line; as shown in 3, random distribution means that all attacking objects are randomly distributed on the same straight line. It can be understood that the enemy's goal is to attack the defender's target. For example, the enemy launches a missile to hit the defender's unmanned mothership. In addition, in the random distribution, the greater the value of the unmanned mothership, the more likely the enemy missiles are to concentrate on the unmanned mothership with greater value. According to this rule, the enemy's random distribution attack scene can be simulated.

[0049] For example, one of the missile information obtained during the simulated incoming attack scenario is as follows:

[0050] Missile number: 1;

[0051] Missile name: "F-35C-1";

[0052] Longitude: 129.950074;

[0053] Latitude: 23.197266;

[0054] Speed: 1020.8700247098254;

[0055] Missile heading: -93.43850408911673;

[0056] Missile Value: 500.

[0057] This embodiment assumes that the number of missiles is 5. Then, the incoming trajectories of the 5 enemy missiles need to be simulated respectively, and the values ​​of the enemy missiles can also be obtained to evaluate the subsequent interception benefits.

[0058] Step S3: Generate a series of interception plans according to the incoming attack data. The interception plans include interception positions of interception objects. The number of interception objects is the same as the number of attacking objects.

[0059] Specifically, the number of unmanned boats can be determined according to the number of missiles. For example, if the number of missiles is 5, 5 unmanned boats need to be deployed.

[0060] Specifically, the interception layout range of the unmanned boat can be determined according to the range of the incoming direction of the missile. For example, if the interception layout is carried out on the same longitude, the interception layout range on the longitude can be determined according to the range of the incoming direction of the missile.

[0061] After determining the number of unmanned boats and the interception layout range, the step length can be set, and the spacing between adjacent unmanned boats can be changed according to the step length within the range to obtain a series of interception layout plans.

[0062] Step S4: Calculate the interception net benefit of each interception plan under different attack scenarios, and take the interception plan with the largest interception net benefit as the optimal defense layout plan.

[0063] Among them, the interception net benefit of any interception scheme in any incoming scenario includes the sum of the interception net benefits of each interceptor. The interception net benefit of each interceptor is the weighted sum of the interception net benefits of intercepting each trajectory passing through its interception range, and the weighted weight is the corresponding trajectory probability.

[0064] When calculating the interception net benefit of a certain interception object A, different calculation formulas are used depending on whether the incoming trajectory passes through the intersection area:

[0065] When there is an incoming trajectory G1 that passes through the intersection area of ​​the interception range of interceptor A and interceptor B, the interception net benefit R of interceptor A on the incoming trajectory G1 is A_G1 for:

[0066] R A_G1 =X A_G1 +Y A_G1 -C A

[0067] When there is an incoming trajectory g1 that only passes through the interception range of interceptor A, the interception benefit R of interceptor A on the incoming trajectory g1 is A_g1 for:

[0068] R A_g1 =Z A_g1 -C A

[0069] X A_G1 is the interception benefit of interceptor A without cooperation with interceptor B when the incoming trajectory G1 passes through the intersection area, Z A_g1Y is the interception benefit of interceptor A when the incoming trajectory g1 only passes through the interception range of interceptor A; A_G1 The allocation of interceptor A from the cooperative interception income obtained by interceptor A and interceptor B; C A is the interception cost of interceptor A; the interception benefit is the loss caused to the enemy when the attacking object is intercepted.

[0070] For example, the net interception benefit of the Mth interception scheme in the Nth attack scenario is It can be expressed as:

[0071]

[0072] In the formula, R i is the net interception benefit of the i-th interceptor.

[0073] Among them, the interception net benefit R of the i-th interceptor i The weighted sum of the interception net benefits of intercepting each trajectory passing through its interception range can be expressed as:

[0074] R i =∑σ j *R i_j

[0075] In the formula, R i_j is the net interception benefit of intercepting the jth trajectory passing through the interception range of the i-th interceptor, σ j is the trajectory probability of the jth trajectory.

[0076] When calculating the interception net benefit R of intercepting the jth trajectory i_j When , different profit calculation formulas are used according to whether the jth trajectory passes through the interception intersection area of ​​the i-th interceptor and other interceptors. The specific calculation principle is:

[0077] When there is an incoming trajectory G1 that passes through the intersection area of ​​the interception range of interceptor A and interceptor B, the interception net benefit R of interceptor A on the incoming trajectory G1 is A_G1 for:

[0078] R A_G1 =X A_G1 +Y A_G1 -C A

[0079] When there is an incoming trajectory g1 that only passes through the interception range of interceptor A, the interception benefit R of interceptor A on the incoming trajectory g1 is A_g1 for:

[0080] R A_g1 =Z A_g1 -C A

[0081] X A_G1 is the interception benefit of interceptor A without cooperation with interceptor B when the incoming trajectory G1 passes through the intersection area, Z A_g1 Y is the interception benefit of interceptor A when the incoming trajectory g1 only passes through the interception range of interceptor A; A_G1 The allocation of interceptor A from the cooperative interception income obtained by interceptor A and interceptor B; C A is the interception cost of interceptor A.

[0082] In one embodiment, the interception benefit X A_G1 The specific calculation formula can be:

[0083] X A_G1 =ρ*C T *P A

[0084] Where ρ is the probability that interceptor A does not cooperate with interceptor B, C T is the value of the attack object corresponding to the incoming trajectory G1, P A is the probability of successful interception of object A, P A and C T All of them are known parameters, and ρ can be calculated by the following formula:

[0085]

[0086] In the formula, S A , S B and S J They are respectively the interception range area of ​​interception object A, the interception range area of ​​interception object B and the intersection area of ​​the two interception ranges.

[0087] Intersection area S J It can be calculated by the following formula:

[0088]

[0089]

[0090] In the formula, l A and l B are the interception range radius of interceptor A and the interception range radius of interceptor B respectively, and d is the distance between interceptor A and interceptor B.

[0091] In one embodiment, the allocation amount Y A_G1 The specific calculation formula can be:

[0092] Y A_G1 =C AB_G1 *φ A

[0093] In the formula, C AB_G1 is the net benefit of cooperative interception obtained by interceptor A and interceptor B from cooperatively intercepting the incoming trajectory G1, φ A The interception benefit C is AB_G1 The distribution proportion in .

[0094] Cooperative interception benefit C AB_G1 It can be calculated by the following formula:

[0095] C AB_G1 =C T ·[1-(1-P A )(1-P B )]-C A -C B

[0096] Where P B is the probability of successful interception of object B, and C1 is the interception cost of object B.

[0097] Specifically, when interceptor A and interceptor B cooperate in interception, the proportion of their profit distribution can be used to distribute the cooperative benefits according to the Shapley value method.

[0098] The general calculation formula for the Shapley value is:

[0099]

[0100] Where N is the set of all cooperative participants. In this scheme, only the pairwise cooperation between two unmanned boats is considered. Therefore, N is the set containing unmanned boat A and unmanned boat B. i represents the i-th cooperative participant in the set. Set S is all possible subsets after removing participant i from set N.

[0101] In this scheme, when the i-th participant is unmanned boat A, the set S only includes {B}, from which we can derive the Shapley value φ′ A When the i-th participant is unmanned boat B, the set S only contains {A}, from which we can derive the Shapley value φ′ B P(A) and P(B) are both known interception probabilities, P(A) = P A , P(B)=P B , is 0, P(AB) can be calculated by the following formula:

[0102] P(AB)=1-[1-P(A)][1-P(B)]

[0103] Get the Shapley value φ′ A and φ′ B After normalization, we get the Shapley value of the benefit distribution during cooperation. A and φ B :

[0104]

[0105]

[0106] The Shapley value takes into account the marginal contribution of each participant to the cooperation in the distribution of benefits, thereby achieving fair distribution of benefits.

[0107] To illustrate with a specific example, suppose there are two protected targets, five enemy missiles, and five unmanned boats that intercept the enemy missiles;

[0108] First, you need to input the initial enemy attack data, and the defending unmanned boat is located at one end of the attack range;

[0109] Setting the adjustment step length and the unmanned boat interception layout range, generating all possible spacing combinations between unmanned boats within the layout range, that is, generating a series of interception plans;

[0110] Simulate multiple possible enemy attack scenarios based on the attack data, including uniformly distributed attack scenarios and several randomly distributed attack scenarios;

[0111] For each scenario, the net interception benefit is calculated using the benefit calculation method described above to obtain the maximum benefit in that scenario;

[0112] Compare the maximum benefits in all scenarios, and take the interception solution corresponding to the maximum value as the optimal layout solution.

[0113] The above profit calculation formula is used to calculate the interception net profit of each interception scheme in each attack scenario, and the interception scheme with the largest profit is used as the optimal defense layout scheme. Specifically, the interception net profits of different interception schemes in the same attack scenario can be compared first, and the maximum interception net profit in the corresponding attack scenario can be determined; then the maximum interception net profits in different attack scenarios can be compared, and the interception scheme corresponding to the maximum value can be used as the optimal defense layout scheme. Figure 4 The figure shows the benefit curves of various layout schemes in a uniformly distributed attack scenario in an embodiment. It can be concluded that the optimal spacing combination between unmanned boats No. 1 to No. 5 is (30,000 meters, 60,000 meters, 60,000 meters, 60,000 meters). Figure 6 The following figure shows the optimal defense layout solution for this scenario. Figure 5The figure shows the benefit curves of various layout schemes in a randomly distributed attack scenario in one embodiment. It can be concluded that the optimal spacing combination between unmanned boats No. 1 to No. 5 is (120,000 meters, 0 meters, 30,000 meters, 60,000 meters). Figure 7 The optimal defense layout scheme for this scenario is shown in Figure 1. Finally, the maximum interception benefit in each scenario is analyzed, and based on the comparison of the two verified global maxima, the final optimal layout scheme is selected. Using this layout scheme for defense can protect the defending target to a greater extent and reduce the loss of attack.

[0114] Example 2

[0115] The present invention also relates to a defense layout optimization system for coping with dynamic attacks, comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and the processor implements the steps of the above method when executing the computer program.

[0116] The defense layout optimization system for responding to dynamic attacks can be deployed on computing devices such as desktop computers, notebooks, PDAs, and cloud servers. The processor can be a central processing unit (CPU), or other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSP), application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. The memory can be used to store computer programs and / or modules, and the processor can run or execute computer programs and / or modules stored in the memory, and call data stored in the memory, and various functions of the electronic device.

[0117] Example 3

[0118] The present invention also relates to a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, and the computer program implements the steps of the above method when executed by a processor.

[0119] Specifically, the memory may include a high-speed random access memory, and may also include a non-volatile memory, such as a hard disk, an internal memory, a plug-in hard disk, a smart media card (SMC), a secure digital (SD) card, a flash card (Flash Card), at least one disk storage device, a flash memory device, or other volatile solid-state storage devices.

[0120] Example 4

[0121] The embodiment of the present invention provides a computer program product or a computer program, which includes computer instructions stored in a computer-readable storage medium. A processor of a computer device reads the computer instructions from the computer-readable storage medium, and the processor executes the computer instructions, so that the computer device performs the steps of the method of the above embodiment of the present invention.

[0122] The technical features of the above embodiments can be combined arbitrarily. To make the description concise, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this specification. It should be noted that "in one embodiment", "for example", "for example", etc. of the present invention are intended to illustrate the present invention, rather than to limit the present invention.

[0123] The above-mentioned embodiments only express several implementation methods of the present invention, and the description is relatively specific and detailed, but it cannot be understood as limiting the scope of the patent application. It should be pointed out that for ordinary technicians in this field, several modifications and improvements can be made without departing from the concept of the present invention, which all belong to the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for optimizing defense layout to cope with dynamic attacks, characterized in that: include: Acquiring enemy attack data, wherein the attack data includes the number of attack objects launched by the enemy and the attack direction range; Simulating multiple possible enemy attack scenarios based on the attack data, wherein the attack scenarios include the attack trajectory and trajectory probability of each attacker attacking each target; generating a series of interception schemes according to the incoming attack data, wherein the interception schemes include interception positions of interception objects, and the number of the interception objects is the same as the number of the attacking objects; Calculate the interception net benefit of each interception plan under different attack scenarios, and take the interception plan with the largest interception net benefit as the optimal defense layout plan; Among them, the interception net benefit of any interception scheme in any incoming scenario includes the sum of the interception net benefits of each interceptor. The interception net benefit of each interceptor is the weighted sum of the interception net benefits of intercepting each trajectory passing through its interception range, and the weighted weight is the corresponding trajectory probability; When there is an incoming trajectory G1 that passes through the intersection area of ​​the interception range of interceptor A and interceptor B, the interception net benefit R of interceptor A on the incoming trajectory G1 is A_G1 for: R A_G1 =X A_G1 +Y A_G1 -C A When there is an incoming trajectory g1 that only passes through the interception range of interceptor A, the interception benefit R of interceptor A on the incoming trajectory g1 is A_g1 for: R A_g1 =Z A_g1 -C A X A_G1 is the interception benefit of interceptor A without cooperation with interceptor B when the incoming trajectory G1 passes through the intersection area, Z A_g1 Y is the interception benefit of interceptor A when the incoming trajectory g1 only passes through the interception range of interceptor A; A_G1 The allocation of interceptor A from the cooperative interception income obtained by interceptor A and interceptor B; C A is the interception cost of interceptor A; the interception benefit is the loss caused to the enemy when the attacking object is intercepted.

2. The method for optimizing defense layout for dynamic attacks according to claim 1, characterized in that: Single interception benefit X A_G1 Includes: ρ*C T *P A ; Single intercept yield Z A_g1 Includes: C T ·P A ; Allocation amount Y A_G1 Includes: T ·[1-(1-P A )(1-P B )]-C A -C B }*φ A ; ρ is the probability that interceptor A does not cooperate with interceptor B to intercept, C T is the value of the currently intercepted attack object, P A is the probability of successful interception of object A, P B is the probability of successful interception of object B, C B is the interception cost of interceptor B, φ A is the profit distribution proportion of interceptor A in cooperative interception.

3. The method for optimizing defense layout for dealing with dynamic attacks as claimed in claim 2, characterized in that: When interceptor A and interceptor B cooperate in interception, the distribution proportion of interceptor A and interceptor B in the obtained cooperative interception income is determined according to the Shapley value method.

4. The method for optimizing defense layout for dynamic attacks according to claim 1, characterized in that: The attack scenario includes a uniformly distributed attack scenario and a randomly distributed attack scenario. The uniform distribution means that all attacking objects are uniformly distributed on the same straight line, and the random distribution means that all attacking objects are randomly distributed on the same straight line.

5. The method for optimizing defense layout for dealing with dynamic attacks as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: The calculation of the interception net benefit of each interception scheme in different attack scenarios and taking the interception scheme with the largest interception net benefit as the optimal defense layout scheme includes: First, compare the interception net benefits of different interception schemes under the same attack scenario and determine the maximum interception net benefit under the corresponding attack scenario; Then, the maximum interception net benefits under different attack scenarios are compared, and the interception plan corresponding to the maximum value is taken as the optimal defense layout plan.

6. The method for optimizing defense layout for dealing with dynamic attacks as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: The probability of the same attacker attacking each target is equal, and the trajectory probability of the same attacker attacking each target is 1 / N, where N is the number of targets.

7. The method for optimizing defense layout for dealing with dynamic attacks as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: The attacking object is a missile or an artillery shell, and the intercepting object is a drone or an unmanned boat.

8. A defense layout optimization system for dealing with dynamic attacks, comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, characterized in that: When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

9. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

10. A computer program product comprising a computer program or instructions, characterized in that When the computer program or instruction is executed by a processor, the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

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