Information security test method and device in vehicle charging process
By simulating tampering attacks and fault injections in the information security test of the electric vehicle charging system, it is possible to determine whether the response packets of the charging system meet the standards, and solve the problem of low credibility of the information security test results in the prior art and improve the effectiveness of the test.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411969458.8
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-12-30
- Publication Date
- 2025-03-11
AI Technical Summary
When testing the information security of electric vehicle charging systems, it is difficult to detect whether the charging system meets the response packet standards corresponding to the charging system when it is subject to different types of information security attacks, resulting in low credibility of the test results.
By setting the test environment, the charging system to be tested is triggered to enter the DC charging process, and a tampering attack or replay attack is carried out to obtain the first response message of the charging system; at the same time, the charging system is injected to obtain the second response message; then determine whether the response message in both cases meets the response message standards of the charging system to determine whether the test has passed or failed.
It improves the credibility of the test results and ensures that the charging system responds to standards when facing different information security attacks, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of information security testing.
Smart Images
Figure CN119603070A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present application relates to the field of information security testing, and specifically to a method and device for information security testing of a vehicle charging process. Background Art
[0002] The electric vehicle charging system is an important device on the vehicle side. With the advancement of the electrification and networking of vehicles, it has exposed huge information security risks. Among them, GB / T 41578 "Technical Requirements and Test Methods for Information Security of Electric Vehicle Charging Systems" clearly puts forward the necessity of monitoring the communication response of the charging system and conducting information security testing on the charging system.
[0003] At present, the charging system of electric vehicles is usually tested by using a DC charging pile or by using a CAN (Controller Area Network) device to simulate the charging process data. These two testing methods focus on testing the function of the charging system of electric vehicles, that is, by testing the entire charging process and fault feedback mechanism of the charging system, it is determined whether the charging function of the charging system meets the requirements.
[0004] However, when testing the existing technology, the information security test scenarios involved are relatively few, and it is difficult to test whether the response message of the charging system meets the corresponding response message standard of the charging system when it is subjected to different types of information security attacks. The credibility of the test results is low. Summary of the invention
[0005] The present application provides an information security testing method and device for a vehicle charging process, which can detect whether the response message of the charging system meets the response message standard corresponding to the charging system when the charging system is subjected to different types of information security attacks, thereby improving the credibility of the test results.
[0006] In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides an information security testing method for a vehicle charging process, the method comprising:
[0007] Set up the test environment according to the test documents corresponding to the charging system to be tested;
[0008] In the test environment, triggering the charging system to be tested to enter a DC charging process, and at the same time performing a tampering attack or a replay attack on the charging system to be tested, to obtain a first response message fed back by the charging system to be tested;
[0009] Performing fault injection on the charging system to be tested, then triggering the charging system to be tested to enter a DC charging process, and obtaining a second response message fed back by the charging system to be tested;
[0010] When both the first response message and the second response message meet the response message standard corresponding to the charging system to be tested, the test passes.
[0011] In combination with the first aspect, in one implementation, the test environment includes a whole vehicle environment and a component bench test environment specified by basic parameters; the basic parameters include wake-up parameters and battery cell parameters.
[0012] In combination with the first aspect, in one implementation, performing a tampering attack or a replay attack on the charging system to be tested includes:
[0013] Obtaining a communication process message when the charging system to be tested transmits information;
[0014] Screening out a first communication process message containing personal sensitive information and important security parameters from all communication process messages;
[0015] Based on the first communication process message, a tampering attack or a replay attack is performed on the charging system to be tested.
[0016] In combination with the first aspect, in one implementation, based on the first communication process message, performing a tampering attack or a replay attack on the charging system to be tested includes:
[0017] Randomly modifying a data segment of the first communication process message, and replaying the modified first communication process message to the charging system to be tested;
[0018] Alternatively, the first communication process message is directly replayed to the charging system to be tested.
[0019] In combination with the first aspect, in one implementation, performing fault injection on the charging system to be tested includes:
[0020] Sending an erroneous charging request to the charging system to be tested in a message sending process that complies with the electric vehicle charging standard protocol;
[0021] Alternatively, a correct charging request is sent to the charging system to be tested using a message sending process that does not comply with the electric vehicle charging standard protocol.
[0022] In combination with the first aspect, in one implementation, determining whether the first response message and the second response message meet a response message standard corresponding to the charging system to be tested includes:
[0023] Acquire CAN messages or Ethernet messages when vehicle information loaded with the charging system to be tested is transmitted;
[0024] Determining whether the CAN message is encrypted;
[0025] Determine whether there is a plaintext leak in the Ethernet message;
[0026] When the judgment results are all yes, and both the first response message and the second response message meet the response message standard corresponding to the charging system to be tested, the test passes.
[0027] In combination with the first aspect, in one implementation, determining whether the CAN message is encrypted includes:
[0028] The CAN message is decrypted by a preset decryption algorithm to determine whether the decrypted CAN message conforms to a preset data format. If so, the CAN message is encrypted; if not, the CAN message is not encrypted.
[0029] In combination with the first aspect, in one implementation, determining whether there is plain text leakage in the Ethernet message includes:
[0030] Obtain a data field containing personal sensitive information in the Ethernet message, and determine whether the data field is transmitted in plain text. If so, there is plain text leakage in the Ethernet message; if not, there is no plain text leakage in the Ethernet message.
[0031] In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides an information security testing device for a vehicle charging process based on the method described in any one of the first aspects, the device comprising:
[0032] A setting module, used to set the test environment according to the test document corresponding to the charging system to be tested;
[0033] The test module is used to trigger the charging system to enter a DC charging process in the test environment, and to perform a tampering attack or a replay attack on the charging system to obtain a first response message fed back by the charging system to be tested; and is also used to perform a fault injection on the charging system to be tested, and then trigger the charging system to enter a DC charging process, and obtain a second response message fed back by the charging system to be tested;
[0034] The analysis module is used to determine whether the first response message and the second response message meet the response message standard corresponding to the charging system to be tested. If so, the test passes; if not, the test fails.
[0035] In conjunction with the second aspect, in one implementation, the device further includes:
[0036] A DC power supply module, used to simulate the AC (Alternating Current, alternating current) to DC (direct current, direct current) and DC / DC boost process of the DC charging pile when the test module triggers the charging system to enter the DC charging process;
[0037] A communication module, used to simulate the communication process of the DC charging pile when the test module triggers the charging system to be tested to enter the DC charging process;
[0038] The DC charging simulation control module is used to connect with the fast charging port of the charging system to be tested and simulate the signal of the DC charging port when the test module triggers the charging system to be tested to enter the DC charging process.
[0039] The beneficial effects brought by the technical solution provided in the embodiments of the present application include:
[0040] The present application sets up a test environment according to the test document corresponding to the charging system to be tested, performs fault injection, tampering attack and replay attack on the charging system to be tested, obtains a response message fed back by the charging system to be tested, and determines whether the response message meets the response message standard corresponding to the charging system, so as to determine whether the charging system passes the test, thereby improving the credibility of the test results. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0041] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a flow chart of an information security testing method for a vehicle charging process according to an embodiment of the present application;
[0042] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the application of the information security testing device for the vehicle charging process according to an embodiment of the present application;
[0043] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the whole vehicle environment of the information security testing device for the vehicle charging process according to an embodiment of the present application;
[0044] Figure 4 Schematic diagram of the component bench test environment specified for basic parameters of the information security testing device for the vehicle charging process according to an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0045] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the solution of the present application, the technical solution in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present application, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of this application.
[0046] In order to make the objectives, technical solutions and advantages of the present application clearer, the implementation methods of the present application will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
[0047] First, please refer to Figure 1 , Figure 1The flowchart of the information security testing method of the vehicle charging process of the embodiment of the present application is as follows. The information security testing method of the vehicle charging process provided in the embodiment includes the following steps:
[0048] Step S1: setting a test environment according to a test document corresponding to the charging system to be tested.
[0049] Step S2: in the test environment, triggering the charging system to be tested to enter a DC charging process, and at the same time performing a tampering attack or a replay attack on the charging system to be tested, to obtain a first response message fed back by the charging system to be tested.
[0050] Step S3: injecting a fault into the charging system to be tested, and then triggering the charging system to be tested to enter a DC charging process, and obtaining a second response message fed back by the charging system to be tested.
[0051] Step S4: When both the first response message and the second response message meet the response message standard corresponding to the charging system to be tested, the test passes.
[0052] In the above step S3, the DC charging process is specified in detail in GB / T27930, so it will not be described again here.
[0053] It should be noted that the response message standard corresponding to the charging system under test is determined by the description document of the charging system under test, and during the test process, it can be appropriately adjusted according to the actual use requirements of the charging system under test.
[0054] This method sets up a test environment according to the test document corresponding to the charging system to be tested, performs fault injection, tampering attack and replay attack on the charging system to be tested, obtains a response message fed back by the charging system to be tested, and determines whether the response message meets the response message standard corresponding to the charging system, thereby determining whether the charging system passes the test and meeting the information security testing requirements of the charging system.
[0055] In some embodiments, in the above step S1, the above test environment includes a whole vehicle environment and a component bench test environment specified by basic parameters, wherein the basic parameters include wake-up parameters and battery cell parameters.
[0056] In some embodiments, in the above step S2, performing a tampering attack or a replay attack on the above charging system to be tested includes the following steps:
[0057] S21: Acquire the communication process message when the above-mentioned charging system to be tested information is transmitted.
[0058] S22: Filter out the first communication process message containing personal sensitive information and important security parameters from all communication process messages.
[0059] S23: Based on the first communication process message, a tampering attack or a replay attack is performed on the charging system to be tested.
[0060] In some embodiments, in the above step S22, the important security parameters include but are not limited to secret keys, password authentication data and passwords.
[0061] In some embodiments, in the above step S23, based on the first communication process message, a tampering attack or a replay attack is performed on the above charging system to be tested, including the following steps:
[0062] The data segment of the first communication process message is randomly modified, and the modified first communication process message is replayed to the charging system to be tested.
[0063] Alternatively, the first communication process message is directly replayed to the charging system to be tested.
[0064] In some embodiments, in the above step S3, fault injection is performed on the above charging system to be tested, including the following steps:
[0065] An erroneous charging request is sent to the charging system to be tested using a message sending process that complies with the electric vehicle charging standard protocol.
[0066] Alternatively, a correct charging request is sent to the charging system to be tested using a message sending process that does not comply with the electric vehicle charging standard protocol.
[0067] In some embodiments, the method further comprises the following steps:
[0068] A01: Obtain CAN messages or Ethernet messages when the vehicle equipped with the above-mentioned charging system to be tested is transmitting information.
[0069] A02: Determine whether the above CAN message is encrypted. If so, go to A03; if not, go to A06.
[0070] A03: Determine whether there is any plain text leakage in the above Ethernet message. If so, proceed to A04; if not, proceed to A06.
[0071] A04: Determine whether the first response message and the second response message both meet the response message standard corresponding to the charging system to be tested. If so, proceed to A05; if not, proceed to A06.
[0072] A05: Test passed.
[0073] A06: The test failed.
[0074] In some embodiments, in the above step A02, determining whether the above CAN message is encrypted includes the following steps:
[0075] The above CAN message is decrypted by a preset decryption algorithm to determine whether the decrypted CAN message conforms to a preset data format. If so, the CAN message is encrypted; if not, the CAN message is not encrypted.
[0076] The above-mentioned preset decryption algorithms include but are not limited to symmetric encryption algorithms, asymmetric encryption algorithms and hash algorithms.
[0077] In some embodiments, in the above step A03, determining whether there is a plaintext leak in the above Ethernet message includes the following steps:
[0078] Obtain the data field containing personal sensitive information in the above Ethernet message, and determine whether the data field is transmitted in plain text. If so, there is a plain text leakage in the above Ethernet message; if not, there is no plain text leakage in the above Ethernet message.
[0079] In a second aspect, the information security testing device for the vehicle charging process provided in this embodiment includes the following modules:
[0080] The setting module is used to set the test environment according to the test document corresponding to the charging system to be tested.
[0081] The test module is used to trigger the charging system to enter the DC charging process in the test environment, and to perform a tampering attack or a replay attack on the charging system to obtain a first response message fed back by the charging system to be tested. It is also used to perform a fault injection on the charging system to be tested, and then trigger the charging system to enter the DC charging process, and obtain a second response message fed back by the charging system to be tested.
[0082] The analysis module is used to determine whether the first response message and the second response message meet the response message standard corresponding to the charging system to be tested. If so, the test passes; if not, the test fails.
[0083] In some embodiments, the above device further includes the following modules:
[0084] The DC power supply module is used to simulate the AC-to-DC and DC / DC boost process of the DC charging pile when the test module triggers the above-mentioned charging system to enter the DC charging process.
[0085] The communication module is used to simulate the communication process of the DC charging pile when the test module triggers the above-mentioned charging system to enter the DC charging process.
[0086] The DC charging simulation control module is used to simulate the signal of the DC charging port when the test module triggers the above-mentioned charging system to enter the DC charging process, and connect with the fast charging port of the above-mentioned charging system to be tested.
[0087] In a more specific embodiment, please refer to Figure 2 , Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the application of the information security testing device for the vehicle charging process according to an embodiment of the present application.
[0088] exist Figure 2 In the test environment, after the setting module sets the test environment according to the test document corresponding to the charging system to be tested, the test module triggers the charging system to be tested to enter the DC charging process, the DC power supply module simulates the AC to DC and DC / DC boost process of the DC charging pile, and the communication module simulates the communication process of the DC charging pile, and both send the simulated data to the DC charging simulation control module. The DC charging simulation control module is connected to the fast charging port of the charging system to be tested, simulates the signal of the DC charging port, and sends the signal of the DC charging port to the charging system to be tested through the fast charging port.
[0089] At the same time, the test module sends test data for tampering attack, replay attack and fault injection to the charging system under test, and the charging system under test feeds back the first response message and the second response message to the analysis module. The analysis module determines whether the first response message and the second response message meet the response message standard corresponding to the above-mentioned charging system under test. If so, the test passes; if not, the test fails.
[0090] In a more specific embodiment, please refer to the vehicle environment set by the above setting module. Figure 3 , Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the entire vehicle environment of the information security testing device for the vehicle charging process according to an embodiment of the present application.
[0091] exist Figure 3 In the test, the DC power module sends high-voltage DC to the DC charging simulation control module, and the communication module sends the simulated DC charging pile communication signal to the DC charging simulation control module through the two charging communication lines S+ and S-. The DC charging simulation control module delivers current to the battery pack through the two DC power lines DC+ and DC-, connects the equipment ground wire PE to the vehicle body GND (Ground, ground terminal), and connects to the charging system to be tested through the two charging communication lines S+ and S-, the two charging connection confirmation lines CC1 and CC2, and the two low-voltage auxiliary power lines A+ and A-, to simulate the AC-to-DC and DC / DC boost process of the DC charging pile.
[0092] In a more specific embodiment, the component bench test environment specified by the basic parameters set by the above setting module can be found in Figure 4 , Figure 4 Schematic diagram of the component bench test environment specified for basic parameters of the information security testing device for the vehicle charging process according to an embodiment of the present application.
[0093] exist Figure 4In the test, the communication module sends the simulated DC charging pile communication signal to the DC charging simulation control module through the two charging communication lines S+ and S-. The DC charging simulation control module delivers current to the battery pack through the two DC power lines DC+ and DC-, connects the equipment ground wire PE to the vehicle body GND, connects to the charging system to be tested through the two charging communication lines S+ and S-, the two charging connection confirmation lines CC1 and CC2, and the two low-voltage auxiliary power lines A+ and A-, to simulate the AC-to-DC and DC / DC boost process of the DC charging pile.
[0094] It should be noted that the serial numbers of the above-mentioned embodiments of the present application are only for description and do not represent the advantages or disadvantages of the embodiments.
[0095] The terms "including" and "having" and any variations thereof in the specification and claims of this application and the above-mentioned drawings are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions. For example, a process, method, system, product or device that includes a series of steps or units is not limited to the listed steps or units, but optionally includes steps or units that are not listed, or optionally includes other steps or units inherent to these processes, methods, products or devices. The terms "first", "second" and "third" are used to distinguish different objects, etc., and do not represent a sequence, nor do they limit "first", "second" and "third" to different types.
[0096] In the description of the embodiments of the present application, "exemplary", "for example" or "for example" are used to indicate examples, illustrations or descriptions. Any embodiment or design described as "exemplary", "for example" or "for example" in the embodiments of the present application should not be interpreted as being more preferred or more advantageous than other embodiments or designs. Specifically, the use of words such as "exemplary", "for example" or "for example" is intended to present related concepts in a specific way.
[0097] In the description of the embodiments of the present application, unless otherwise specified, “ / ” means or, for example, A / B can mean A or B; the “and / or” in the text is merely a description of the association relationship of associated objects, indicating that three relationships may exist, for example, A and / or B can mean: A exists alone, A and B exist at the same time, and B exists alone. In addition, in the description of the embodiments of the present application, “multiple” refers to two or more than two.
[0098] In some processes described in the embodiments of the present application, multiple operations or steps that appear in a specific order are included, but it should be understood that these operations or steps may not be executed in the order in which they appear in the embodiments of the present application or in parallel, and the sequence number of the operation is only used to distinguish the different operations, and the sequence number itself does not represent any execution order. In addition, these processes may include more or fewer operations, and these operations or steps may be executed in sequence or in parallel, and these operations or steps may be combined.
[0099] Through the description of the above implementation methods, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that the above-mentioned embodiment methods can be implemented by means of software plus a necessary general hardware platform, and of course by hardware, but in many cases the former is a better implementation method. Based on such an understanding, the technical solution of the present application is essentially or the part that contributes to the prior art can be embodied in the form of a software product, which is stored in a storage medium (such as ROM / RAM, disk, CD) as described above, and includes a number of instructions for a terminal device to execute the methods described in each embodiment of the present application.
[0100] The above are only preferred embodiments of the present application, and are not intended to limit the patent scope of the present application. Any equivalent structure or equivalent process transformation made using the contents of the present application specification and drawings, or directly or indirectly applied in other related technical fields, are also included in the patent protection scope of the present application.
Claims
1. A method for information security testing of a vehicle charging process, characterized in that: The method comprises: Set up the test environment according to the test documents corresponding to the charging system to be tested; In the test environment, triggering the charging system to be tested to enter a DC charging process, and at the same time performing a tampering attack or a replay attack on the charging system to be tested, to obtain a first response message fed back by the charging system to be tested; Performing fault injection on the charging system to be tested, then triggering the charging system to be tested to enter a DC charging process, and obtaining a second response message fed back by the charging system to be tested; When both the first response message and the second response message meet the response message standard corresponding to the charging system to be tested, the test passes.
2. The information security testing method for the vehicle charging process according to claim 1, characterized in that: The test environment includes a complete vehicle environment and a component bench test environment specified by basic parameters; the basic parameters include wake-up parameters and battery cell parameters.
3. The information security testing method for the vehicle charging process according to claim 1, characterized in that: Performing a tampering attack or a replay attack on the charging system to be tested includes: Obtaining a communication process message when the charging system to be tested transmits information; Screening out a first communication process message containing personal sensitive information and important security parameters from all communication process messages; Based on the first communication process message, a tampering attack or a replay attack is performed on the charging system to be tested.
4. The information security testing method for the vehicle charging process as claimed in claim 3, characterized in that: Based on the first communication process message, a tampering attack or a replay attack is performed on the charging system to be tested, including: Randomly modifying a data segment of the first communication process message, and replaying the modified first communication process message to the charging system to be tested; Alternatively, the first communication process message is directly replayed to the charging system to be tested.
5. The information security testing method for the vehicle charging process according to claim 1, characterized in that: Performing fault injection on the charging system to be tested, including: Sending an erroneous charging request to the charging system to be tested in accordance with a message sending process that complies with a standard charging protocol for electric vehicles; Alternatively, a correct charging request is sent to the charging system to be tested using a message sending process that does not comply with the electric vehicle charging standard protocol.
6. The information security testing method for a vehicle charging process according to claim 1, characterized in that: Also includes: Acquire CAN messages or Ethernet messages when vehicle information loaded with the charging system to be tested is transmitted; Determining whether the CAN message is encrypted; Determine whether there is a plaintext leak in the Ethernet message; When the judgment results are all yes, and both the first response message and the second response message meet the response message standard corresponding to the charging system to be tested, the test passes.
7. The information security testing method for a vehicle charging process as claimed in claim 6, characterized in that: Determining whether the CAN message is encrypted includes: The CAN message is decrypted by a preset decryption algorithm to determine whether the decrypted CAN message conforms to a preset data format. If so, the CAN message is encrypted; if not, the CAN message is not encrypted.
8. The information security testing method for a vehicle charging process as claimed in claim 6, characterized in that: Determining whether the Ethernet message has plain text leakage includes: Obtain a data field containing personal sensitive information in the Ethernet message, and determine whether the data field is transmitted in plain text. If so, there is plain text leakage in the Ethernet message; if not, there is no plain text leakage in the Ethernet message.
9. An information security testing device for a vehicle charging process based on the method according to any one of claims 1 to 8, characterized in that: The device comprises: A setting module, used to set the test environment according to the test document corresponding to the charging system to be tested; The test module is used to trigger the charging system to enter a DC charging process in the test environment, and to perform a tampering attack or a replay attack on the charging system to obtain a first response message fed back by the charging system to be tested; and is also used to perform a fault injection on the charging system to be tested, and then trigger the charging system to enter a DC charging process, and obtain a second response message fed back by the charging system to be tested; The analysis module is used to determine whether the first response message and the second response message meet the response message standard corresponding to the charging system to be tested. If so, the test passes; if not, the test fails.
10. The information security testing device for vehicle charging process according to claim 9, characterized in that: The device also includes: A DC power supply module, used to simulate the AC-to-DC and DC / DC boost process of the DC charging pile when the test module triggers the charging system to enter the DC charging process; A communication module, used to simulate the communication process of the DC charging pile when the test module triggers the charging system to be tested to enter the DC charging process; The DC charging simulation control module is used to connect with the fast charging port of the charging system to be tested and simulate the signal of the DC charging port when the test module triggers the charging system to be tested to enter the DC charging process.