Redundant transmission of a protected digital and an analog measurement signal

By redundantly transmitting sensor data in analog and protected digital forms, the sensor device ensures secure and reliable data transmission, addressing the vulnerability of analog signals to manipulation and enhancing safety in critical systems.

DE102022107969B4Active Publication Date: 2024-12-05INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES AG
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Patent Information

Application Number
DE102022107969
Authority / Receiving Office
DE · DE
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2022-04-04
Publication Date
2024-12-05
Estimated Expiration
2042-04-04

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing sensor systems face challenges in ensuring the reliability and security of measurement results due to the susceptibility of analog signals to manipulation during transmission, which can compromise safety in critical applications like electric vehicle control.

Method used

A sensor device that transmits measurement results redundantly in both analog and digital forms, with the digital signal being protected through encryption or authentication, allowing for comparison with the analog signal to detect manipulation and ensure authenticity.

Benefits of technology

This approach enhances the security and reliability of sensor data transmission by making it difficult for attackers to manipulate the signals, enabling timely detection and countermeasures, thus improving operational safety in applications like electric vehicle control.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

Sensor device (100) comprising a sensor device (102) designed to measure a measurement parameter to obtain a measurement result, a transmission device (104) for transmitting an analog signal indicative of the measurement result and a digital signal indicative of at least a part of the same measurement result to an evaluation device (120) and a protection device (154) for protecting the digital signal from transmission.
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Description

BackgroundTechnical area

[0001] Various embodiments generally relate to a sensor device, an evaluation device, a system and a method for checking the authenticity of a transmitted measurement result. Description of the state of the art

[0002] A measurement result recorded by a sensor can be transmitted to a receiver in the form of an analog signal. Alternatively, such an electrical signal can be transmitted to a receiver digitally.

[0003] A sensor device is known from DE 10 2010 039 845 A1. Summary

[0004] There may be a need to provide a simple, fast-operating sensor device with high reliability. This need is met by the subject matter of the independent patent claims.

[0005] According to an exemplary embodiment, a sensor device is provided that comprises a sensor device configured to measure a measurement parameter to obtain a measurement result. Furthermore, the sensor device may comprise a transmission device for transmitting an analog signal indicative of the measurement result and a digital signal indicative of at least part of the same measurement result to an evaluation device. Furthermore, the sensor device may comprise a protection device for protecting the digital signal before transmission.

[0006] According to another exemplary embodiment, an evaluation device is provided that has a receiving device for receiving an analog signal indicative of a measurement result of a measured measurement parameter and a protected digital signal indicative of the same measurement result from a sensor device. Furthermore, the evaluation device can have a determination device for determining authenticity information indicative of the authenticity of the measurement result based on the transmitted analog signal and the transmitted protected digital signal.

[0007] According to an exemplary embodiment, a system is provided which comprises a sensor device having the features described above and an evaluation device which is communicatively coupled or can be coupled to the sensor device and has the features described above.

[0008] According to another exemplary embodiment, a method for verifying the authenticity of a transmitted measurement result is provided, the method comprising measuring a measurement parameter to obtain a measurement result, transmitting an analog signal indicative of the measurement result and a protected digital signal indicative of at least a part of the same measurement result, and determining authenticity information indicative of the authenticity of the measurement result based on a comparison between the transmitted analog signal and the transmitted protected digital signal.

[0009] An exemplary embodiment provides a sensor device that provides a measurement result indicative of a measurement parameter both as an analog signal and - redundantly - as a digital signal for transmission to an evaluation device. Said redundant signal transmission in both analog and digital form has advantages: Firstly, the transmission of a sensor-detected measurement result as an analog signal allows the sensor device to be implemented with little effort and a particularly fast signal transmission. The combination of such an analog signal with a digital signal that is at least partially congruent, identical, or corresponding with regard to the transmitted information content advantageously allows for an improvement in the security of the transmission of the sensor signal. This is based on the fact that analog signals are susceptible to manipulation during their transmission to an evaluation device.For example, an unauthorized entity can tap into or intercept an analog signal during its transmission to an evaluation device and transmit it in a manipulated form to the evaluation device. If the evaluation device uses such a manipulated analog signal, for example for control purposes, this can lead to a significant risk to safety. If, for example, an analog current signal detected by a sensor in an electric vehicle is transmitted to a motor control system and is manipulated in the process, the control of the electric vehicle can be deliberately disrupted, thereby endangering the safety of the electric vehicle's passengers. To prevent such manipulation of an analog sensor signal or at least to reliably detect it, the analog sensor signal is transmitted to the evaluation device at least partially redundantly as a digital signal.The evaluation device can then compare whether the information contained in the digital signal matches or is compatible with the information contained in the analog signal. In the case of tampering, this is not the case, whereas if the signal integrity is present, compatibility or agreement is ensured. Exemplary embodiments take advantage of the fact that digital signals can be (fully or at least partially) encrypted or provided with authentication codes (e.g., MAC) and are therefore significantly more difficult to tamper with than analog signals. Tampering is therefore quickly and reliably detected. If necessary, countermeasures can be taken in a timely manner.

[0010] According to one embodiment, not only can the identity or sufficient similarity of the analog signal and the digital signal be verified, but protection can also be introduced, particularly for the digital signal, for example, through a cybersecurity measure. This can be achieved, for example, by encrypting the entire message or adding a signature or a message authentication code (MAC). This makes it extremely difficult for an attacker to manipulate the digital message. Authentication of transmitted measurement signals can be achieved by checking whether the analog signals actually used for the application match the secured digital signals. Description of further embodiments

[0011] For the purposes of this application, the term "measurement parameter" can be understood in particular as a sensor-detectable parameter whose value, time course, and / or properties can be detected by sensors. Examples of measurement parameters include an electric current, a temperature, a pressure, a magnetic field, etc.

[0012] For the purposes of this application, the term "measurement result" can be understood in particular as a value, a time profile, and / or a property of a measurement parameter. For example, a measurement result can be an electric current value, a time profile of a temperature, or information about whether a pressure is above or below a target pressure.

[0013] In the context of this application, the term "sensor device" can be understood in particular as a technical sensor component or a sensor element of a component that is sensitive to a measurement parameter and can qualitatively or quantitatively detect certain physical (e.g., electrical current) or chemical (e.g., pH value) properties and / or the material properties of its environment. These variables can be detected using physical, chemical, and / or biological effects and converted into a further processable—for example, electrical or optical—signal.

[0014] In the context of this application, the term “transmission device” can be understood in particular as a device capable of wireless and / or wired communication, which is designed to transmit a provided signal to an evaluation device that is coupled or can be coupled in a communicative manner.

[0015] In the context of this application, the term "analog signal" can be understood, in particular, as a signal form with a continuous and uninterrupted profile. For example, an analog signal can describe a temporally continuous profile of a measurement parameter. In contrast to a digital signal, an analog signal can exhibit a continuous and / or arbitrarily fine profile. In particular, an analog signal can theoretically assume an infinite number of values ​​within a dynamic range. For example, an analog signal can be provided as an electrical voltage, electrical current, or electromagnetic wave (e.g., a light signal or a radio-frequency signal).

[0016] In the context of this application, the term "digital signal" can be understood in particular as a signal represented by discrete values. For example, the discrete values ​​of a digital signal can be a logical value "1" or a logical value "0." A digital signal can, for example, be formed from an analog signal that describes the continuous temporal progression of a measurement parameter. The conversion of an analog signal into a digital signal can be achieved, for example, by quantization or sampling at specific times. Digital signals can be encoded as binary numbers. The quantization of a digital signal can be specified in bits.

[0017] For the purposes of this application, the term "protected digital signal" can be understood in particular as a digital signal that is protected (in particular privacy protection) against unauthorized manipulation prior to transmission. This protection can, for example, be provided by encryption and / or the addition of authentication data.

[0018] In the context of this application, the term "protection device for protecting the digital signal" can be understood in particular as an entity that provides a digital signal with a security feature to prevent unauthorized manipulation before transmission. Such protection can include, for example, encryption or applying authentication data to the digital signal.

[0019] In the context of this application, the term “evaluation device” can be understood in particular as a device with communication resources and processor resources, which is designed to receive analog and digital signals and to extract from them an information content relating to a measured measurement parameter.

[0020] In the context of this application, the term "receiving device" can be understood, in particular, as an entity of an evaluation device that can be communicatively coupled to a transmitting device of a sensor device in order to be able to receive both an analog signal and a digital signal from the sensor device. The receiving device and the transmitting device can communicate according to a communication protocol for which both the receiving device and the transmitting device can be configured.

[0021] In the context of this application, the term “determination device” can be understood in particular as a processor, a plurality of processors or a part of a processor which is or are designed to evaluate provided analog and digital signals in order to obtain information about a measured measurement parameter and its authenticity.

[0022] In the context of this application, the term "authenticity information" can be understood, in particular, as information determined by the determination device of the evaluation device as to whether the transmitted measurement result can be considered authentic or not. The authenticity information can be derived by evaluating the analog signal and its relationship to the digital signal. Preferably, the digital signal can contain features that allow its authenticity to be verified.

[0023] In the following, additional exemplary embodiments of the sensor device, the evaluation device, the system and the method are described.

[0024] According to one embodiment, the sensor device can have only a single common sensor unit for generating the analog signal and the digital signal. If one and the same sensor unit is used to generate both the analog signal and the digital signal, the sensor device can be designed particularly compactly. Furthermore, the signal content of the analog signal and the signal content of the digital signal can then be identical or partially identical, which leads to particularly good comparability for detecting possible tampering.

[0025] According to another embodiment, the sensor device can comprise a first sensor unit for generating the analog signal and the digital signal, and a separate second sensor unit for generating a further analog signal indicative of a further measurement result and a further digital signal indicative of at least part of the same further measurement result. Thus, the sensor device can contain multiple sensor units, each of which can provide an analog signal and a digital signal containing the same sensor content.

[0026] According to one embodiment, the transmission device can be configured to transmit the analog signal and the additional analog signal via separate signal transmission paths. To manipulate the signal, an attacker would then have to tap into both signal transmission paths. Transmitting different analog signals via different signal transmission paths, which can in particular be physically separated from each other, can therefore further improve security.

[0027] According to one embodiment, the transmission device can be configured to transmit the digital signal and the additional digital signal via a common digital signal transmission path. Since digital signals are considerably more difficult to manipulate than analog signals, said digital signals can be transmitted to the evaluation device via the same signal transmission path without any significant loss of security. This allows for a compact system design.

[0028] According to one embodiment, the transmission device can be configured to transmit data sections of the digital signal and data sections of the further digital signal alternately over the common digital signal transmission path. In order to distinguish the digital signal from the further digital signal at the receiver end and consequently to correctly and precisely extract a measurement result for comparison with a corresponding analog signal, the digital signal and the further digital signal can be transmitted in alternating time slots or transmitted together with the measurement data by transmitting addresses assigned to the sensors. Alternatively or additionally, the digital signal and the further digital signal can also be distinguished by using different frequencies or frequency bands and / or different data rates and / or different protocol variants.Alternatively or additionally, the distinction between digital signals and further digital signals can be achieved by using different codes.

[0029] According to one embodiment, the sensor device can have a first sensor unit for generating the analog signal and a separate second sensor unit for generating the digital signal. In this embodiment, too, the first sensor unit and the second sensor unit can record the same measurement result, for example, detect the same current flowing through a busbar. It is also possible to structurally separate the first sensor unit and the second sensor unit to transmit the analog signal and the digital signal, respectively. This structural separation can further complicate signal manipulation by an unauthorized entity.

[0030] According to one embodiment, the transmission device can be configured to transmit the analog signal and the digital signal to the evaluation device via a single common signal transmission path. The use of a common signal transmission path, for example, a common power line, for an analog signal and a digital signal that is at least partially identical in content results in a compact design.

[0031] According to one embodiment, the transmission device can be configured to transmit data portions of the analog signal and data portions of the digital signal via the single common signal transmission path using frequency division multiplexing. In order to be able to distinguish the analog signal from the digital signal on the receiver side and consequently to be able to correctly and precisely extract a measurement result for comparing the analog signal and the digital signal, the analog signal and the digital signal can be transmitted, for example, using frequency division multiplexing.

[0032] According to one embodiment, the transmission device can be configured to transmit the analog signal to the evaluation device via a first signal transmission path (e.g., via a first power cable) and to transmit the digital signal to the evaluation device via a separate second signal transmission path (e.g., via a second power cable provided separately from the first power cable). To manipulate the signal, an unauthorized entity would then have to tap into two separate, in particular physically separate, signal transmission paths and additionally overcome the challenge that digital signals are difficult to manipulate. Operational reliability can thus be further increased by the described measure.

[0033] According to one embodiment, the transmission device for transmitting the analog signal can be designed as a single-ended analog signal. In the case of asymmetric or single-ended signal transmission, electrical signal transmission can be achieved by an electrical voltage that varies with respect to a reference potential. A shielded cable (coaxial cable) can be used, in particular, for such signal transmission. Transmitting the analog signal as a single-ended analog signal allows for a particularly low-effort design of the sensor device.

[0034] Alternatively, the transmission device for transmitting the analog signal can be designed as a differential analog signal. Differential or symmetrical signal transmission ensures particularly high fault tolerance against interference, even over longer transmission paths. Differential signal transmission can be implemented using a pair of similar signal lines. The actual signal can be transmitted on one signal line, and a reference signal known to the receiving device can be transmitted on the other signal line. The influence of couplings on the signals along the transmission path is essentially the same on both signal lines. By forming the difference between the electrical potentials on both signal lines, interference is then completely or partially canceled out. The use of differential signal transmission can therefore further improve the fault robustness and reliability of the system.

[0035] According to one embodiment, the transmission device can be designed to transmit the digital signal at a lower data rate compared to the analog signal. The data rate can indicate how much information is transmitted in a certain time. For example, the data rate can be specified in Mbit / s. For example, the data rate of the analog signal divided by the data rate of the digital signal can be at least 2, in particular at least 5, for example 10 or more. By reducing the data rate of the digital signal compared to the analog signal, a transmission latency (i.e. a different delay between the analog signal and the digital signal) can be compensated. To compare the analog signal with the digital signal, the analog signal can be sampled less frequently in order to adapt the different data rates to one another on the receiver side.It is also possible for the evaluation device to store the signal curve of the analog signal and the digital signal and to take comparison values ​​from a data memory used for this purpose. The actual transmission of the useful signals can take place using the analog signal. The digital signal can be used to check the integrity of the analog signal. To check whether the analog signal has possibly been manipulated, according to the described embodiment, a digital signal which is reduced in content compared to the analog signal and which only represents a portion of the analog signal can be used. This leads to a lower data rate when transmitting the digital signal. In this way, the effort required for generating (i.e. on the transmitter side) and evaluating (i.e. on the receiver side) the digital signal can be reduced.

[0036] According to one embodiment, the protection device can be designed to at least partially encrypt the digital signal before transmission. If the digital signal is transmitted in fully or partially encrypted form, an attack on the digital signal for the purpose of manipulation is further complicated. Manipulation then requires tapping the analog signal, tapping the digital signal, decrypting the digital signal, and re-encrypting the manipulated digital signal. Implementing all of these measures in combination is extremely difficult or even impossible for an attacker, so operational security can be further increased by cryptographically encrypting the digital signal. A symmetric key or an asymmetric key can be used to encrypt the digital signal before transmission.For example, a key used to encrypt the digital signal may also be known to the evaluation device, which can therefore verify the trustworthiness of the transmitted data using this key. For example, such a key may be stored in a non-volatile memory (preferably in a protected area of ​​such a memory) of the sensor device and in a non-volatile memory (preferably in a protected area of ​​such a memory) of the evaluation device. On the receiver side, the detection device may be configured to decrypt a digital signal protected by encryption.

[0037] Alternatively or additionally, the protection device can be configured to provide the digital signal with authentication data prior to transmission. For example, a hash (e.g., a known date to be calculated) or a signature can be added as authentication data to digital data transmitted in plain text during transmission. Such a hash can be generated using a secure algorithm, for example. Based on authentication data, the receiver can check whether the sensor device can be classified as trustworthy. The detection device on the receiver side can be configured to authenticate a digital signal protected by authentication data.

[0038] According to one embodiment, the transmission device for transmitting the analog signal can be designed as an unprotected, in particular unencrypted, analog signal. For example, the analog signal can be transmitted in plain text without prior encryption or without being provided with authentication data. Due to the receiver-side comparison of the analog signal with the at least partially redundant digital signal, signal manipulation is extremely difficult. Even if an attacker manipulates the analog signal, this circumstance can be detected by comparing the digital signal with the analog signal, so that countermeasures can be taken in a timely manner if necessary. Additional encryption effort regarding the analog signal or additional effort associated with appending authentication data to an analog signal is therefore unnecessary.Thus, a high degree of signal integrity can be ensured with reasonable effort.

[0039] Alternatively, the analog signal can also be encrypted and / or provided with authentication data.

[0040] According to one embodiment, the sensor device can comprise a current measuring device. In particular, the sensor device can comprise an electronic component for measuring current, which can generate sensor signals indicative of an electric current in an adjacent busbar. In particular, such a sensor device can be a Hall sensor, which, in the presence of a magnetic field generated by the electric current to be measured, can detect a Hall voltage that is a measure of the electric current intensity. In particular, such a sensor device can be designed as a semiconductor component, more particularly as a semiconductor chip. As an alternative to a Hall sensor, other electronic components for measuring current are possible, for example, current sensors using magnetoresistive effects, such as giant magnetoresistive effect (GMR), anisotropic magnetoresistive effect (AMR), or tunnel magnetoresistive effect (TMR).

[0041] According to one embodiment, the sensor device can comprise a signal processing device for at least partially processing the analog signal and / or the digital signal prior to transmission by means of the transmission device. The analog signal and / or the digital signal can already be subjected to signal preprocessing on the sensor device side. This can include, for example, calibration, compensation (e.g., temperature compensation and / or mechanical stress compensation), a driver function, and / or signal conversion (e.g., conversion between an analog signal and a digital signal in an analog-to-digital converter or a digital-to-analog converter).

[0042] According to one embodiment, the determination device can be configured to determine the authenticity information based on a comparison of the transmitted analog signal with the transmitted digital signal. To determine the authenticity information, the data content of the analog signal (or a portion thereof) can be compared with the data content of the digital signal. In the absence of manipulation, it can be assumed that the data content of the analog signal and the data content of the digital signal are identical or partially identical. However, if manipulation is present, the analog signal and the digital signal can differ significantly in terms of their data content.

[0043] According to one embodiment, the determination device can be configured to determine whether a deviation between the transmitted analog signal and the transmitted digital signal exceeds a predeterminable tolerance threshold in order to determine the authenticity information. If a data content of the digital signal deviates from a data content of the analog signal by more than a predeterminable threshold (which can, for example, represent manufacturing tolerances, signal interference during transmission, and the like), the transmitted data content and the associated analog signal can be classified as inauthentic. In the latter case, it can be assumed that there has been manipulation or a malfunction of the sensor device.

[0044] According to one embodiment, the determination device can be configured to trigger an event depending on the determined authenticity information. For example, the triggered event can be the output of a warning or an error signal, the triggering of emergency operation with reduced performance, the triggering of operation using only the digital signal without considering the analog signal, the increase of a data rate of the digital signal, and / or the classification of the measurement result as authentic or inauthentic. If the evaluation reveals that the signal content of the analog signal and the digital signal is considered authentic or inauthentic, a user of the system can be informed or alerted accordingly. For example, a driver of an electric vehicle can be informed via a display device that a sensor-based engine control is inauthentic.However, it is also possible to continue operating the technical device (e.g., an electric vehicle) to which the sensor device and the evaluation device are assigned in safe emergency mode if possible tampering or other insufficient signal integrity is detected. For example, if signal tampering is suspected, the electric vehicle can continue operating at a reduced maximum permissible drive power, for example, until it reaches the nearest repair shop. Alternatively or additionally, if possible tampering of the more susceptible analog signal is detected, the technical device (e.g., an electric vehicle) can be controlled exclusively based on the digital signal.In particular, if insufficient signal authenticity is detected, it is possible to increase the data rate of the digital signal in order to be able to use the digital signal as a useful signal with an increased data rate instead of the potentially manipulated or faulty analog signal.

[0045] According to one embodiment, the system can be designed as a motor controller. For example, the sensor device can then be configured to measure an electric current for operating an electric motor, and the evaluation device can be configured as a control device for controlling the electric motor. If a signal is manipulated in such an electric vehicle, this can lead to significant safety problems. For example, if a current signal is manipulated downwards, the motor controller can increase the current, which further accelerates the electric vehicle. Such safety problems can be reliably remedied according to exemplary embodiments.

[0046] According to one embodiment, the evaluation device can be configured to use the (in particular only) analog signal to extract the measurement result and to use the digital signal (in particular only) to verify the integrity of the analog signal. In particular, the evaluation device can be configured to use the measurement result extracted from the analog signal (for example, a sensor-detected value of a drive current) for a system control (for example, for the motor control of an electric motor). Preferably, only the analog signal is used to extract the measurement result, and the digital signal is used only to verify the integrity of the analog signal.

[0047] Examples of digital interfaces that can be used to transmit the digital signal are the SPC (Short Pulse Width Modulation Code) protocol, the PSI5 (Peripheral Sensor Interface 5) protocol, the DSI (Digital Serial Interface) protocol or the SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) protocol. Short description of the characters

[0048] Examples of embodiments are shown in the figures and are explained in more detail below.

[0049] They show: Fig. 1 a system with a sensor device and an evaluation device according to an exemplary embodiment. Fig. 2 a system with a sensor device and an evaluation device according to another exemplary embodiment. Fig. 3 a system with a sensor device and an evaluation device according to yet another exemplary embodiment. Fig. 4 a sensor device according to an exemplary embodiment. Fig. 5 a sensor device according to another exemplary embodiment. Detailed description of implementation examples

[0050] The same or similar components in different figures are provided with the same reference numerals.

[0051] Before describing exemplary embodiments with reference to the figures, some general considerations on the basis of which exemplary embodiments were developed should be explained: According to an exemplary embodiment, in addition to an analog signal from a sensor device for measuring a measurement parameter, a digital signal is generated that is at least partially identical or at least partially redundant in terms of signal content. The analog signal allows information about the measurement parameter to be transmitted to an evaluation device for further use (e.g., for controlling a technical system) with little effort and low transmission latency. The digital signal closes the security gap created by the tamper-prone analog signal. For example, the analog signal can only be classified as authentic if the digital signal and the analog signal are sufficiently similar or congruent in terms of their signal content. This allows the operational reliability of a sensor system to be improved with little effort.Digital signals are significantly less susceptible to manipulation than analog signals. To manipulate a digital signal, it would have to be tapped, manipulated, and fed back. Such manipulation of a digital signal requires a significant manipulation time, so that potential manipulation can be detected even through a time delay between the analog signal and the digital signal. The manipulation time required to manipulate a digital signal can be further increased by transmitting the digital signal in encrypted form, since an attacker would then have to decrypt the digital signal before manipulating the digital signal. Thus, the sensor and protection mechanism according to exemplary embodiments is particularly suitable for time-critical processes, such as the control of an electric motor. According to an exemplary embodiment, a secure sensor device with analog sensor output can be provided.More specifically, such an embodiment provides improved security protection in a system including one or more analog sensor devices.

[0052] Analog interfaces for sensor applications are particularly advantageous when fast measurements are required and the distance between a sensor device (with sensor) and a receiving evaluation device (especially with a processor such as a microcontroller) is not too great. One example of such an application is current measurement for controlling an electric motor. Firstly, analog sensors offer low latency, or signal delay, compared to sensors with serial digital interfaces. Secondly, an analog sensor signal can be easily connected to an input of a microcontroller's analog-to-digital converter, which is readily available and in large numbers compared to dedicated digital sensor interfaces.

[0053] A common disadvantage of analog sensor architectures is their vulnerability to external manipulation. An attacker can relatively easily modify the analog signal without authorization, for example, by dividing the voltage, amplifying it, and filtering it. Such an attacker can even connect a different signal source instead of the actual sensor. An analog signal alone cannot therefore provide reliable protection against this type of manipulation.

[0054] According to an exemplary embodiment, such security problems can be overcome by combining a fast analog sensor architecture with a digital interface. Providing the sensor device with an analog interface ensures compatibility with conventional systems. In addition, a digital interface is added parallel to the analog interface, transmitting the same signal or signal content, but in digital form. The digital signal can advantageously be transmitted at a reduced sampling rate, which may not even be sufficient to meet application bandwidth requirements.Consequently, very simple sensor interfaces such as SENT (Single Edge Nibble Transmission), SPC (Short Pulse Width Modulation Code), PSI (Peripheral Sensor Interface), DSI (Digital Serial Interface), I2C (Inter-Integrated Circuit), SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface), UART (Universal Asynchronous Receiver / Transmitter) are suitable as digital sensor interfaces according to exemplary embodiments. The signal on the digital channel can preferably be encrypted using an encryption method such as SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm) or AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). The receiver decrypts the message and compares whether the received digital signal matches the received analog signal with sufficient accuracy. If this is not the case and the difference persists over an extended period of time, tampering or a permanent failure of the sensor can be identified.

[0055] The sensor signal can be processed inside a sensor chip. At a certain point in the processing chain, the paths to the analog output and the digital interface can be separated. The digital signals can be encrypted. The correspondingly encrypted message can be transmitted via a digital interface. The separation point between the analog signal and the digital signal can be located at any point in the processing chain and can be chosen depending on the architecture of the signal processing path. It may be preferable to place the separation point as close as possible to the analog output. In cases where the internal processing is digital, the processing can advantageously be located upstream of a digital-to-analog converter, which converts the signal back into an analog representation.

[0056] As an alternative to splitting the analog and digital signals at a desired position in the main signal path, it is also possible to design the digital path completely independently of the analog path and measure the same signal with an additional sensor unit. Such an embodiment has the advantage that the two signals are completely redundant, and their comparison serves both cybersecurity and functional reliability. It is also possible to share a digital security channel with multiple sensor units via a sensor bus. If, according to an exemplary embodiment, a system tolerates a data rate on the secure digital channel that is too low for application use, the further reduction achieved by sharing the bus is not a limitation.

[0057] High-frequency transmission can also be implemented for the digital signal. A loss over a longer period of time can then also be used to detect an error or tampering.

[0058] Cybersecurity is particularly important for automotive applications. Therefore, the secure sensor device can advantageously be designed as an automotive sensor. Security solutions for sensors can be advantageously implemented, particularly for ABS (anti-lock braking system) sensors, steering torque sensors, and steering angle sensors. Exemplary embodiments can be configured to be compatible with the Automotive Cyber ​​Security Standard ISO 21434.

[0059] According to one embodiment, in addition to the analog transmission of a sensor signal, redundant digital communication of a corresponding digital signal can be implemented. The digital signal can be decrypted at the receiver end. Furthermore, a comparison of the received analog signal with the received digital signal can be performed at the receiver end, for example, using a microcontroller at the receiver end.

[0060] Fig. 1 shows a system 150 with a sensor device 100 and an evaluation device 120 according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0061] The illustrated system 150 therefore comprises the communicable sensor device 100 and the communicable evaluation device 120 coupled to the sensor device 100 for signal exchange. For example, the sensor device 100 can comprise a current sensor for detecting an operating current for an electric motor. Accordingly, the evaluation device 120 can comprise, for example, a motor control device for controlling the electric motor. An output signal from the evaluation device 120 can therefore be supplied to an electric motor (not shown) via a signal interface 140. However, other applications, in particular other automotive applications, are possible.

[0062] Transmission paths 134, 136 used for signal transmission from the sensor device 100 to the evaluation device 120 can be wired (for example, designed as a power cable) or wireless (for example, as an optical wireless path or radio-frequency wireless path).

[0063] The Fig. The sensor device 100 shown in Figure 1 comprises a sensor device 102 configured to measure a measurement parameter to obtain a measurement result. The measurement parameter may, for example, be an electric current, and the measurement result may be a sensor-detected value of this electric current. According to Fig. 1, the sensor device 102 has only a single common sensor unit 106 for generating the analog signal and the digital signal. For example, the sensor unit 106 can be a single Hall sensor for magnetically detecting a current flowing through a busbar.

[0064] Furthermore, the sensor device 100 includes a transmission device 104 functionally coupled to the sensor device 102 for transmitting an analog signal indicative of the measurement result and a digital signal indicative of the same measurement result to a receiving device 122 of the evaluation device 120. In other words, the transmission device 104 can transmit the detected sensor signal to the receiving device 122 both as an analog signal and as a digital signal redundant thereto. Thus, the analog signal and the digital signal can contain entirely or partially identical signal content, once in analog form and once in digital form.

[0065] As in Fig. As shown in Figure 1, the transmission device 104 can be configured to transmit the analog signal to the evaluation device 120 via a first signal transmission path 134 and to transmit the digital signal to the evaluation device 120 via a separate, physically separated second signal transmission path 136. To manipulate the sensor signals, an attacker would therefore have to attack two physically separate signal transmission paths 134, 136 and correlate the transmitted signals. This is difficult, so the described measure leads to further increased security.

[0066] For example, the transmission device 104 for transmitting the analog signal can be designed as a single-ended analog signal. This allows for a particularly simple configuration of the system 150. Alternatively, the transmission device 104 for transmitting the analog signal can be designed as a differential analog signal. This ensures particularly interference-free signal transmission.

[0067] Particularly advantageously, the transmission device 104 can be designed to transmit the digital signal at a digital data rate that can be reduced compared to an analog data rate of the analog signal. For example, the data rate of the transmission of the digital signal can be lower by a factor of 10 than the data rate of the transmission of the analog signal. A reduced data rate of the digital signal can be sufficient, since the digital signal according to Fig. 1 is used only for comparison with the analog signal to assess its authenticity. The analog signal, on the other hand, can be provided at a higher data rate and used, for example, as the sole source for determining the value of the measurement parameter (e.g., a current detected by a sensor). By transmitting the analog signal with a higher signal bandwidth and the digital signal with a lower data rate, both simple data transmission and high accuracy in measuring the measurement parameter can be ensured.

[0068] The relationship between the signal bandwidth of the analog signal and the data rate of the digital signal is determined, for example, by the sampling rate according to the Nyquist criterion. The data rate of the digital interface can be at least equal to the number of bits per transmission of a protocol (including the start and stop bits) times the sampling rate.

[0069] Furthermore, the sensor device 100 can preferably be configured to encrypt the digital signal and transmit the encrypted digital signal to the receiving device 122. For this purpose, the sensor device 100 has a protection device 154 for protecting the digital signal before transmission. The receiving device 122 or the detection device 124 can then decrypt the encrypted digital signal before comparing it with the analog signal, for example, using a key stored on the receiver side. Due to the encrypted communication of the digital signal, it is therefore necessary to first decrypt the digital signal for unauthorized manipulation of the sensor signals. For this purpose, an unauthorized entity requires a secret key that is not available to it. Thus, data security and error robustness can be further improved by encrypting the digital signal.In contrast, the transmission device 104 for transmitting the analog signal can be configured as an unencrypted analog signal, i.e., without prior encryption by the sensor device 100. This enables rapid transmission of the analog sensor signal. By encrypting the redundant digital signal, a high level of security can be achieved even with an unencrypted analog signal, since the decrypted digital signal is compared with the analog signal at the receiver end to verify the authenticity of the received sensor signals.

[0070] Alternatively or additionally, it is also possible for the protection device 154 to provide the digital signal with authentication data, for example, a hash, before transmitting it. The digital signal can then be transmitted in plain text, whereby the authenticity of the digital signal can be verified on the receiver side using the authentication data.

[0071] The evaluation device 120 has the already mentioned receiving device 122, which is designed to receive the said analog signal and the said digital signal from the transmission device 104 of the sensor device 100.

[0072] A determination device 124 of the evaluation device 120, which is functionally coupled to the receiving device 122, receives the received analog signal and the received digital signal for further processing. More specifically, the determination device 124 determines authenticity information indicative of the authenticity of the measurement result by comparing the analog signal with the digital signal. This information can indicate, for example, whether the analog signal was manipulated or modified by an unauthorized entity during its transmission, or whether sensor integrity is compromised due to a discrepancy between the analog signal and the digital signal. To determine the authenticity information, the determination device 124 can compare the transmitted analog signal with the transmitted digital signal after the digital signal has previously been decrypted in the evaluation device 120.If the digital signal is transmitted at a lower data rate than the analog signal, signal sampling can occur prior to the comparison in order to compare corresponding signal elements of the digital signal with associated signal elements of the analog signal. To determine the authenticity information, the determination device 124 can determine whether a deviation between the transmitted analog signal and the transmitted digital signal exceeds a predeterminable tolerance threshold. For example, the tolerance threshold can be selected such that possible manipulation or other lack of integrity of the sensor data is only assumed if the deviation between the analog signal and the digital signal is more than 5%, in particular more than 10%. To determine a deviation, a predefined number of data points of the analog signal and the digital signal can be compared with one another.During this comparison, a difference between the analog signal and the digital signal can be calculated based on the average of these data points. Smaller deviations compared to the specified tolerance threshold can be attributed to unavoidable and tolerable interference during data transmission, component tolerances, etc. By performing a threshold analysis when determining the authenticity information, false positives due to lack of authenticity can be avoided.

[0073] Furthermore, the determination device 124 can be designed to trigger an event depending on the determined authenticity information. A triggered event can, for example, be the output of a warning to a user, for example the display "Engine control unreliable!". Alternatively or additionally, emergency operation with reduced performance or power can be triggered, for example, a motor control of an electric vehicle can be supplied with less power until the electric vehicle has been transferred to a maintenance location. It is also possible, upon detection of manipulation of the analog signal, to continue operation using only the digital signal (i.e., not the analog signal suspected of manipulation). In this case, it can be advantageous to temporarily increase the data rate of the digital signal while temporarily using only the digital signal as the useful or control signal.The digital signal can then be used not only to check the integrity of the analog signal, but also as a basis for controlling the system.

[0074] In summary, transferred according to Fig. 1, an analog interface and a digital interface of the sensor device 100 transmit the same signal to the evaluation device 120. The digital signal transmission can be at least partially encrypted. The analog interface can be provided either single-ended or differential. In this way, a sensor signal can be transmitted with a bandwidth sufficient for an application. The digital interface can tolerate an insufficient data rate or latency.

[0075] Fig. 2 shows a system 150 with a sensor device 100 and an evaluation device 120 according to another exemplary embodiment.

[0076] In the following, the differences of the embodiment according to Fig. 2 to the embodiment according to Fig. 1. According to Fig. 2, the sensor device 102 does not have just a single sensor unit 106. Instead, according to Fig. 2, a first sensor unit 108 (for example, a first Hall probe) is provided for generating the analog signal and the digital signal, and furthermore, a separate second sensor unit 110 (for example, a second Hall probe) is provided for generating a further analog signal indicative of a further measurement result and a further digital signal indicative of at least a part of the same further measurement result. Furthermore, according to Fig. 2, the transmission device 104 is configured to transmit the analog signal and the further analog signal via separate signal transmission paths 112, 114. The analog signal is thus transmitted via signal transmission path 112, whereas the further analog signal is transmitted via signal transmission path 114. An attacker would then have to attack two physically separate signal transmission paths 112, 114 to manipulate the analog signals. This further increases data security. Fig. 2 further shows that the transmission device 104 is designed to transmit the digital signal and the further digital signal via a common digital signal transmission path 116. Overall, according to Fig. 2, three separate signal transmission paths 112, 114, 116 are provided. Since the (preferably encrypted) digital signals are difficult to manipulate anyway, transmitting the digital signals via a common signal transmission path 116 does not result in any significant reduction in data security, but does reduce the complexity of the system 150. Due to the reduced digital data rate compared to the data rate of the analog signal, a single digital bus may be sufficient, which alternately transmits digital signal packets from the two sensor units 108, 110. In order to make the digital signal distinguishable from the further digital signal on the receiver side, the transmission device 104 can be configured to transmit data sections of the digital signal and data sections of the further digital signal alternately via the common digital signal transmission path 116.

[0077] Fig. 3 shows a system 150 with a sensor device 100 and an evaluation device 120 according to yet another exemplary embodiment.

[0078] The embodiment according to Fig. 3 differs from the embodiment according to Fig. 1 essentially by virtue of the fact that, in accordance with Fig. 3, the transmission device 104 is configured to transmit the analog signal and the digital signal to the evaluation device 120 via a single common signal transmission path 118. The transmission device 104 can be configured to transmit data portions of the analog signal and data portions of the digital signal via the single common signal transmission path 118 using a frequency division multiplexing method to enable the distinction between digital and analog data portions at the receiver end. Advantageously, a combination of analog and digital transmission can be achieved by means of frequency division multiplexing.For example, it is possible to use a baseband up to the bandwidth of the signal and then superimpose digital transmission outside the frequencies of the desired analog signal, for example, by modulating it to a carrier frequency or by using a zero-mean code with a sufficiently high symbol rate. This can be done in such a way that mixing products in the baseband are sufficiently small to be considered negligible in the analog signal.

[0079] Fig. 4 shows a detailed structure of a sensor device 100 according to an exemplary embodiment, as described for example in Fig. 1 to Fig. 3 can be used.

[0080] According to Fig. 4, the sensor device 102 can provide sensor signals to a signal processing device 138. The signal processing device 138 can preprocess the provided sensor signals before transmitting them to the evaluation device 120 via the transmission device 104. This preprocessing can include, for example, calibration, compensation for mechanical stress, temperature compensation, analog-to-digital conversion, digital-to-analog conversion, etc. The exact functionality of the signal processing device 138 depends on the respective application.

[0081] At an output of the signal processing device 138, the sensor signals can be split into an analog main signal 142 (also referred to as analog signal) and a digital comparison signal 144 (also referred to as digital signal). The analog main signal 142 can be sent to an analog interface 146 of the transmission device 104 for transmission to a Fig. 4. The digital comparison signal 144 can first be supplied to a protection device 154, which encrypts the digital comparison signal 144 using a cryptography algorithm before transmitting it to the receiving device 122. The encrypted digital signal is then provided to a digital interface 148 of the transmitting device 104 for transmission to the receiving device 122.

[0082] According to exemplary embodiments, the splitting between the analog signal and the digital signal can occur at any point in the signal path. However, it is preferable to perform the splitting or division in the signal path of the sensor device 100 as late as possible or as shortly as possible before the signal is transmitted to the evaluation device 120. This ensures the greatest possible correspondence between the signal content of the digital signal and the signal content of the analog signal. Furthermore, this measure leads to a compact design of the sensor device 100, since the signal processing device 138 (or at least a part thereof) can then be used for both the analog signal and the digital signal.

[0083] As in Fig. 4 with reference numeral 152, the encrypted digital signal can be assigned a characteristic message authentication code (MAC). This can be used to obtain certainty about the origin of the data and to verify its integrity.

[0084] Fig. 5 shows a sensor device 100 according to another exemplary embodiment, which, in addition to being secure against manipulation, also guarantees functional reliability.

[0085] According to Fig. 5, the sensor device 102 has a first sensor unit 130 (for example, a first Hall probe) for generating the analog signal and a separate second sensor unit 132 (for example, a second Hall probe) for generating the digital signal. The two sensor units 130, 132 can be two identical sensors, one of which provides an analog sensor signal and the other a digital sensor signal. The sensor characteristics of the two identical sensor units 130, 132 can be identical except for manufacturing tolerances. The analog signal provided by the sensor unit 130 is subjected to signal preprocessing in a signal processing device 138. Similarly, the digital signal provided by the sensor unit 132 is subjected to signal preprocessing in another (or the same) signal processing device 138. The digital signal 138 can also be encrypted in a protection device 154.The analog signal is then transmitted via the analog interface 146 or the digital signal via the digital interface 148 to a . Fig. 5 receiving device 122 not shown.

[0086] Full redundancy according to Fig. 5, both the cybersecurity and the functional safety of the sensor device 100 can be improved by a joint measure (namely, the provision of the described sensor units 130, 132). Cybersecurity can be improved by analyzing the digital signal to detect when the analog signal is tampered with. Operational reliability can be improved because the redundant provision of the sensor units 130, 132 allows for detection if one of the sensor units 130, 132 is damaged.

[0087] Additionally, it should be noted that "comprising" does not exclude other elements or steps, and "a" or "an" does not exclude a plurality. Furthermore, it should be noted that features or steps described with reference to one of the above embodiments can also be used in combination with other features or steps of other embodiments described above. Reference signs in the claims are not to be considered as limitations.

Claims

[1] Sensor device (100), comprising: • a sensor device (102) designed to measure a measurement parameter to obtain a measurement result; • a transmission device (104) for transmitting an analog signal indicative of the measurement result and a digital signal indicative of at least part of the same measurement result to an evaluation device (120), wherein the transmission device (104) is designed to transmit the digital signal at a lower data rate compared to the analog signal; and • a protection device (154) for protecting the digital signal before transmission. [2] Sensor device (100) according to claim 1, wherein the sensor device (102) has only a single common sensor unit (106) for generating the analog signal and the digital signal. [3] Sensor device (100) according to claim 1, wherein the sensor device (102) comprises: a first sensor unit (108) for generating the analog signal and the digital signal; and a separate second sensor unit (110) for generating a further analog signal indicative of a further measurement result and a further digital signal indicative of at least part of the same further measurement result. [4] Sensor device (100) according to claim 3, wherein the transmission device (104) is designed to transmit the analog signal and the further analog signal via separate signal transmission paths (112, 114). [5] Sensor device (100) according to claim 3 or 4, wherein the transmission device (104) is designed to transmit the digital signal and the further digital signal via a common digital signal transmission path (116). [6] Sensor device (100) according to claim 5, wherein the transmission device (104) is designed to transmit data sections of the digital signal and data sections of the further digital signal in a time-alternating manner via the common digital signal transmission path (116). [7] Sensor device (100) according to claim 1, wherein the sensor device (102) comprises a first sensor unit (130) for generating the analog signal and a separate second sensor unit (132) for generating the digital signal. [8] Sensor device (100) according to one of claims 1 to 7, wherein the transmission device (104) is designed to transmit the analog signal and the digital signal to the evaluation device (120) via only a single common signal transmission path (118). [9] Sensor device (100) according to claim 8, wherein the transmission device (104) is designed to transmit data portions of the analog signal and data portions of the digital signal via the single common signal transmission path (118) by means of frequency division multiplexing. [10] Sensor device (100) according to one of claims 1 to 7, wherein the transmission device (104) is designed to transmit the analog signal via a first signal transmission path (134) and to transmit the digital signal via a separate second signal transmission path (136) to the evaluation device (120). [11] Sensor device (100) according to one of claims 1 to 10, wherein the transmission device (104) for transmitting the analog signal is designed as a single-ended analog signal. [12] Sensor device (100) according to one of claims 1 to 10, wherein the transmission device (104) is designed to transmit the analog signal as a differential analog signal. [13] Sensor device (100) according to one of claims 1 to 12, comprising at least one of the following features: wherein the protection device (154) is designed to at least partially encrypt the digital signal before transmission; wherein the protection device (154) is designed to provide the digital signal with authentication data before transmission. [14] Sensor device (100) according to one of claims 1 to 13, wherein the transmission device (104) is designed to transmit the analog signal as an unprotected, in particular unencrypted, analog signal. [15] Sensor device (100) according to one of claims 1 to 14, wherein the sensor device (102) comprises a current measuring device. [16] Sensor device (100) according to one of claims 1 to 15, comprising a signal processing device (138) for at least partially processing the analog signal and / or the digital signal before transmission by means of the transmission device (104). [17] Evaluation device (120), comprising: • a receiving device (122) for receiving an analog signal indicative of a measurement result of a measured measurement parameter and a protected digital signal indicative of the same measurement result from a sensor device (100) according to one of claims 1 to 16; and • a determination device (124) for determining authenticity information indicative of the authenticity of the measurement result based on the transmitted analog signal and the transmitted protected digital signal. [18] Evaluation device (120) according to claim 17, wherein the determination device (124) is designed to determine the authenticity information based on a comparison of the transmitted analog signal with the transmitted digital signal. [19] Evaluation device (120) according to claim 18, wherein the determination device (124) is designed to determine, in order to determine the authenticity information, whether a deviation between the transmitted analog signal and the transmitted digital signal exceeds a predeterminable tolerance threshold value. [20] Evaluation device (120) according to one of claims 17 to 19, wherein the determination device (124) is designed to trigger an event depending on the determined authenticity information. [21] Evaluation device (120) according to claim 20, wherein the triggered event is selected from a group comprising issuing a warning or an error signal, triggering an emergency operation with reduced performance, triggering an operation using only the digital signal without taking the analog signal into account, increasing a data rate of the digital signal, and classifying the measurement result as authentic or inauthentic. [22] Evaluation device (120) according to one of claims 17 to 21, wherein the evaluation device (120) is designed to use the analog signal to extract the measurement result and to use the digital signal to check the integrity of the analog signal. [23] Evaluation device (120) according to claim 22, wherein the evaluation device (120) is designed to use the measurement result extracted from the analog signal for a system control. [24] Evaluation device (120) according to one of claims 17 to 23, comprising at least one of the following features: wherein the detection device (124) is designed to decrypt a digital signal protected by means of encryption; wherein the determination device (124) is designed to authenticate a digital signal protected by authentication data. [25] System (150), comprising: • a sensor device (100) according to one of claims 1 to 16; and • an evaluation device (120) according to one of claims 17 to 24, which is communicatively coupled or can be coupled to the sensor device (100). [26] System (150) according to claim 25, designed as an engine control. [27] A method for verifying the authenticity of a transmitted measurement result, comprising: • Measuring a measurement parameter to obtain a measurement result; • Transmitting an analog signal indicative of the measurement result and a protected digital signal indicative of at least part of the same measurement result, wherein the digital signal is transmitted at a lower data rate than the analog signal; • Determining authenticity information indicative of the authenticity of the measurement result based on a comparison between the transmitted analogue signal and the transmitted protected digital signal.

Citation Information

Patent Citations

  • Methods for transmitting sensor data

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