Method and system for detecting spoofing interference of GNSS receiver

Abstract

The present application relates to a method and system for detecting spoofing interference of a GNSS receiver, the method comprising: converting a real GNSS signal received by a GNSS antenna into a first GNSS output signal and a second GNSS output signal; transmitting the first GNSS output signal to a GNSS receiver; analyzing the first GNSS output signal to obtain a first time information message of the first GNSS output signal; transmitting a GNSS simulation signal to a GNSS receiver; analyzing the GNSS simulation signal to obtain a second time information message of the GNSS simulation signal; judging whether spoofing interference exists according to the second GNSS output signal, the second time information message and the first time information message. By detecting the time performance of the output of the GNSS receiver, the detection of spoofing interference signals of the GNSS receiver in different application scenarios can be achieved, and whether the GNSS receiver is subjected to spoofing interference can be detected more efficiently.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of satellite navigation technology, for example, to a method and system for detecting deception interference of a GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) receiver. Background Art

[0002] At present, during the transmission of satellite navigation signals, the navigation signals received by the receiver will always be interfered with intentionally or unintentionally, resulting in errors in the receiver's positioning results and timing results. Therefore, the safe application of satellite navigation systems has gradually attracted the attention of the majority of users. The interference against satellite navigation receivers is mainly divided into two categories: suppression interference and deception interference. Deception interference refers to the generation of deceptive satellite signals that are highly similar to real signals or the forwarding of real satellite signals. Its primary goal is to enable the GNSS terminal to obtain false time, position, speed and other information under covert conditions to achieve the purpose of deception. In contrast, deception interference does not require too much power and has good concealment, which also makes the deception interference source have strong survivability. To some extent, the harm caused by deception interference is more serious than suppression interference.

[0003] The general method of detecting deceptive interference signals is mainly based on signal characteristics, including detection based on signal power, noise power, carrier-to-noise ratio, automatic gain control of signal energy, tracking loop-related output anomalies, dual-antenna carrier phase difference, dual-antenna pseudo-range difference and other principles. These detection methods all rely on the characteristics of the received signal itself, and require upgrading the internal program of the receiver and integrating the corresponding detection algorithm. For some algorithms, additional receiving antennas are required to assist in detection. For different application scenarios, the detection performance and detection cost of each algorithm are different, and reasonable selection is required according to the specific application scenario. For different application scenarios, it is necessary to select the corresponding method to have better detection performance, otherwise it is impossible to efficiently detect deceptive interference signals. Therefore, the universality of detecting deceptive interference based on signal characteristics needs further research.

[0004] In the related art, there are the following technical problems: the method of detecting spoofing signals based on interference signal characteristics selects different algorithms according to the needs of receiving signals in different scenarios, and the universality of this detection method for different application scenarios is poor. Summary of the invention

[0005] In order to provide a basic understanding of some aspects of the disclosed embodiments, a brief summary is given below. The summary is not an extensive review, nor is it intended to identify key / critical components or delineate the scope of protection of these embodiments, but rather serves as a prelude to the detailed description that follows.

[0006] The embodiments of the present disclosure provide a method and system for detecting spoofing interference of a GNSS receiver. The detection method can detect spoofing interference signals of a GNSS receiver in different application scenarios and has good universality.

[0007] In some embodiments, a method for detecting spoofing interference of a GNSS receiver disclosed herein includes:

[0008] Converting the GNSS real signal received by the GNSS antenna into a first GNSS output signal and a second GNSS output signal;

[0009] Transmitting the first GNSS output signal to a GNSS receiver;

[0010] Analyze the first GNSS output signal to obtain a first time information message of the first GNSS output signal;

[0011] Transmit GNSS simulation signal to GNSS receiver;

[0012] Analyze the GNSS analog signal to obtain a second time information message of the GNSS analog signal;

[0013] Determine whether there is deception interference based on the second GNSS output signal, the second time information message and the first time information message.

[0014] Optionally, the time information message includes a PTP message or a 1PPS+ToD message; wherein, the PTP message is a precision time protocol message, and the 1PPS+ToD message is a second pulse signal message at the current moment.

[0015] Optionally, judging whether there is deception interference according to the second GNSS output signal, the second time information message and the first time information message includes:

[0016] Determine a first time accuracy according to the first time information message and the second GNSS output signal;

[0017] Determine a second time accuracy according to the second time information message and the second GNSS output signal;

[0018] Determine whether deception interference exists according to the first time accuracy and the second time accuracy.

[0019] Optionally, judging whether deception interference exists according to the first time accuracy and the second time accuracy includes:

[0020] When the difference between the second time accuracy and the first time accuracy is greater than a first threshold, there is deception interference;

[0021] When the difference between the second time accuracy and the first time accuracy is smaller than the first threshold, there is no deceptive interference.

[0022] Optionally, the first time accuracy and the second time accuracy are standard deviation of time accuracy or peak-to-peak value of time accuracy.

[0023] The method for detecting spoofing interference of a GNSS receiver provided in the embodiments of the present disclosure can achieve the following technical effects: by detecting the time performance of the output of the GNSS receiver, it is independent of the characteristics of the received signal, and can not only detect spoofing interference signals of GNSS receivers in different application scenarios with good universality, but also can more efficiently detect whether the GNSS receiver is subject to spoofing interference.

[0024] In some embodiments, the present disclosure provides a system for detecting spoofing interference of a GNSS receiver, the system comprising:

[0025] GNSS antenna, used to receive real GNSS signals;

[0026] A power divider, used for converting a GNSS real signal received by the GNSS antenna into a first GNSS output signal and a second GNSS output signal;

[0027] A GNSS simulation signal source, used for generating and outputting a GNSS simulation signal;

[0028] A GNSS receiver, configured to receive a first GNSS output signal, generate a first time information message according to the first GNSS output signal, and receive the GNSS analog signal, and generate a second time information message according to the GNSS analog signal;

[0029] The test instrument is used to receive the second GNSS output signal, the first time information message and the second time information message, and detect whether there is deception interference based on the second GNSS output signal, the first time information message and the second time information message.

[0030] Optionally, the GNSS simulation signal source includes:

[0031] A satellite simulator for generating and outputting GNSS simulation signals;

[0032] Cesium clock, used to provide reference frequency to satellite simulator;

[0033] A control device is used to control the satellite simulator.

[0034] Optionally, the time information message includes a PTP message or a 1PPS+ToD message; wherein, the PTP message is a precision time protocol message, and the 1PPS+ToD message is a second pulse signal message at the current moment.

[0035] Optionally, judging whether there is deception interference according to the second GNSS output signal, the second time information message and the first time information message includes:

[0036] Determine a first time accuracy according to the first time information message and the second GNSS output signal;

[0037] Determine a second time accuracy according to the second time information message and the second GNSS output signal;

[0038] Determine whether deception interference exists according to the first time accuracy and the second time accuracy.

[0039] Optionally, the first time accuracy and the second time accuracy are standard deviation of time accuracy or peak-to-peak value of time accuracy.

[0040] The system for detecting spoofing interference of a GNSS receiver provided by the embodiments of the present disclosure can achieve the following technical effects: through the spoofing interference detection system of the GNSS receiver, it is not dependent on the characteristics of the received signal, not only can the detection of spoofing interference signals of the GNSS receiver in different application scenarios be realized, with good universality, but also it can more efficiently detect whether the GNSS receiver is subject to spoofing interference.

[0041] The above general description and the following description are exemplary and explanatory only and are not intended to limit the present application. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0042] One or more embodiments are exemplarily described by corresponding drawings, which do not limit the embodiments. Elements with the same reference numerals in the drawings are shown as similar elements, and the drawings do not constitute a scale limitation, and wherein:

[0043] Figure 1 A block diagram of a system for detecting spoofing interference of a GNSS receiver provided by an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown.

[0044] Figure 2 A flow chart of a method for detecting spoofing interference of a GNSS receiver provided by an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown.

[0045] Figure 3 A diagram showing simulation results of the first time accuracy information provided by an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0046] Figure 4 A diagram showing simulation results of the second time accuracy information provided by an embodiment of the present disclosure. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0047] In order to be able to understand the features and technical contents of the embodiments of the present disclosure in more detail, the implementation of the embodiments of the present disclosure is described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. The attached drawings are for reference only and are not used to limit the embodiments of the present disclosure. In the following technical description, for the convenience of explanation, a full understanding of the disclosed embodiments is provided through multiple details. However, one or more embodiments can still be implemented without these details. In other cases, to simplify the drawings, well-known structures and devices can be simplified for display.

[0048] The terms "first", "second", etc. in the specification and claims of the embodiments of the present disclosure and the above-mentioned drawings are used to distinguish similar objects, and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that the terms used in this way can be interchanged where appropriate, so that the embodiments of the embodiments of the present disclosure described herein. In addition, the terms "including" and "having" and any variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions.

[0049] Unless otherwise stated, the term "plurality" means two or more.

[0050] In the embodiment of the present disclosure, the character " / " indicates that the preceding and following objects are in an "or" relationship. For example, A / B indicates: A or B.

[0051] The term "and / or" is a description of the association relationship between objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, A and / or B means: A or B, or, A and B.

[0052] The term "correspondence" may refer to an association relationship or a binding relationship. The correspondence between A and B means that there is an association relationship or a binding relationship between A and B.

[0053] Figure 1 A block diagram of a system for detecting spoofing interference of a GNSS receiver provided by an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown. The system includes a GNSS antenna 1, a power divider 2, a GNSS simulation signal source, a GNSS receiver (ie, a device under test 3) and a test meter 4.

[0054] GNSS antenna 1 is used to receive GNSS real signals. Power divider 2 is used to convert the GNSS real signals received by the GNSS antenna into a first GNSS output signal (i.e., a normal GNSS signal) and a second GNSS output signal (i.e., a normal GNSS signal). GNSS analog signal source is used to generate and output GNSS analog signals. GNSS receiver is used to receive the first GNSS output signal, generate a first time information message according to the first GNSS output signal, and receive the GNSS analog signal, and generate a second time information message according to the GNSS analog signal. Test meter 4 is used to receive the second GNSS output signal, the first time information message and the second time information message, and detect whether there is deception interference according to the second GNSS output signal, the first time information message and the second time information message.

[0055] The time information message is analyzed by the test instrument in the GNSS receiver's deception interference detection system to determine whether the GNSS receiver is interfered by the deception interference signal. The detection system does not rely on the characteristics of the received signal during the detection process. It can not only realize the detection of deception interference signals of GNSS receivers in different application scenarios with good universality, but also can more efficiently detect whether the GNSS receiver is interfered by deception interference.

[0056] Among them, the GNSS antenna tracks the normal GNSS signal, which is a signal from the Beidou satellite or the GPS satellite in the sky, and outputs the same two GNSS output signals through the power divider, namely the first GNSS output signal and the second GNSS output signal. The input insertion loss of the two channels of the power divider is very close or consistent. In this way, the power receiving level of the test instrument and the device under test (GNSS receiver) is consistent. In addition, there is good isolation between the two channels to ensure that there is no crosstalk between the signals of the two channels. The length of the coaxial cable between the power divider and the GNSS receiver (device under test 3) is consistent with the length of the coaxial cable between the power divider and the test instrument, ensuring that the delay of the two signals reaching the GNSS receiver is as consistent as possible, so that the time synchronization performance of the test fully reflects the performance of the GNSS receiver and will not bring additional delay differences.

[0057] Optionally, the test instrument can first track the second GNSS output signal output by the power divider as a time reference, and then respectively receive the first time information and the second time information output by the GNSS receiver, analyze and compare the two output time information, and determine whether the GNSS receiver is interfered by the deceptive interference signal.

[0058] In this way, it can be ensured that the first GNSS output signal and the GNSS simulation signal received by the receiver are referenced to the same reference signal, and the result obtained by the test instrument through comparison during interference detection is more accurate.

[0059] Optionally, before testing, the GNSS receiver and test instrument can be configured to track the GNSS antenna normally to receive GNSS signals for at least 6 hours, the cesium clock can be turned on for at least 2 hours, and a frequency reference signal can be provided for the satellite simulator to ensure that the system can normally receive GNSS signals and generate stable interference signals.

[0060] Therefore, the detection of interference signals is performed only after the GNSS receiver and the satellite simulator have output signals stably, thereby ensuring the accuracy of the test results.

[0061] Optionally, the GNSS receiver receives a first GNSS output signal, parses the signal to obtain a first time information message, outputs the first time information message to a test instrument, and the test instrument analyzes the message to obtain a first time accuracy and saves corresponding data.

[0062] Optionally, before transmitting the GNSS simulation signal to the GNSS receiver, the first GNSS output signal of the normal tracking power divider of the GNSS receiver is disconnected, and the receiver receives the GNSS simulation signal (interference signal) output by the satellite simulator. After the GNSS simulation signal is received normally, the second time information message output by the GNSS receiver is analyzed by a test instrument to obtain the analyzed second time accuracy, and the corresponding data is saved.

[0063] Optional, such as Figure 1 As shown, the GNSS simulation signal source includes: a satellite simulator 5, which can be used to generate and output GNSS simulation signals; a cesium clock 6, which can be used to provide a reference frequency to the satellite simulator; a control device 7, which can be used to control the satellite simulator, and the control device can be a display control device, such as a computer.

[0064] In this way, under the control of the computer and with the cesium clock providing a stable reference frequency, precise control of the satellite simulator is achieved, and the GNSS simulation signal can be dynamically adjusted according to the needs of detection, thereby improving the efficiency of detection.

[0065] For example, the cesium clock in the GNSS simulation signal source provides a stable frequency reference to the satellite simulator, which is controlled by a computer to produce an artificial GNSS simulation signal, namely a deceptive interference signal. There are no restrictions on the location and power parameters of the interference signal, and only the time information is not completely consistent with the current time. The satellite simulator outputs the deceptive interference signal to the GNSS receiver.

[0066] Optionally, the time information message includes a PTP message or a 1PPS+ToD message; wherein the PTP message is a Precision Time Protocol message, and the 1PPS+ToD message is a pulse per second signal message at the current moment. Among them, 1PPS (one pluse per second) represents a pulse per second signal, Tod (Time of Day) represents the current moment, and 1PPS+Tod can represent a time signal. PTP (Precision Time Protocol) is the abbreviation of Precision Time Protocol, and can also represent time information.

[0067] Optionally, judging whether there is deception interference according to the second GNSS output signal, the second time information message and the first time information message includes:

[0068] Determine a first time accuracy according to the first time information message and the second GNSS output signal;

[0069] Determine a second time accuracy according to the second time information message and the second GNSS output signal;

[0070] Determine whether there is deception interference based on the first time accuracy and the second time accuracy.

[0071] Optionally, judging whether there is deception interference according to the first time accuracy and the second time accuracy includes:

[0072] When the difference between the second time accuracy and the first time accuracy is greater than a first threshold, there is deception interference;

[0073] When the difference between the second time accuracy and the first time accuracy is smaller than the first threshold, there is no deceptive interference.

[0074] Optionally, the first time accuracy and the second time accuracy are standard deviation of the time accuracy or peak-to-peak value of the time accuracy. For example, the first time accuracy or the second time accuracy may be an output time error.

[0075] In this way, the method of judging from the perspective of time instead of the perspective of space (position, pseudorange, speed, etc.) is more conducive to the inspection and detection of civil satellite timing receivers. If the interference signal is detected, the GNSS receiving signal can be temporarily turned off to maintain or track other time sources on the ground.

[0076] Figure 2 A method for detecting spoofing interference of a GNSS receiver is shown, the method comprising:

[0077] Step S1, converting a GNSS real signal received by a GNSS antenna into a first GNSS output signal and a second GNSS output signal;

[0078] Step S2, transmitting the first GNSS output signal to a GNSS receiver;

[0079] Step S3, analyzing the first GNSS output signal to obtain a first time information message of the first GNSS output signal;

[0080] Step S4, transmitting the GNSS simulation signal to the GNSS receiver;

[0081] Step S5, analyzing the GNSS simulation signal to obtain a second time information message of the GNSS simulation signal;

[0082] Step S6, judging whether there is deception interference according to the second GNSS output signal, the second time information message and the first time information message.

[0083] By detecting the time performance of the output of the GNSS receiver, it is independent of the characteristics of the received signal, which not only enables the detection of spoofing interference signals of GNSS receivers in different application scenarios with good universality, but also can more efficiently detect whether the GNSS receiver is subject to spoofing interference.

[0084] Among them, the GNSS antenna tracks the normal GNSS signal, which is a signal from the Beidou satellite or the GPS satellite in the sky, and outputs the same two GNSS output signals through the power divider, namely the first GNSS output signal and the second GNSS output signal. The input insertion loss of the two channels of the power divider is very close or consistent. In this way, the power receiving level of the test instrument and the GNSS receiver (device under test 3) is consistent. In addition, there is good isolation between the two channels to ensure that there is no crosstalk between the signals of the two channels. The length of the coaxial cable between the power divider and the GNSS receiver (device under test 3) is consistent with the length of the coaxial cable between the power divider and the test instrument, ensuring that the delay of the two signals reaching the GNSS receiver is as consistent as possible, so that the time synchronization performance of the test fully reflects the performance of the GNSS receiver and will not bring additional delay differences.

[0085] Optionally, the test instrument can first track the second GNSS output signal output by the power divider as a time reference, and then respectively receive the first time information and the second time information output by the GNSS receiver, analyze and compare the two output time information, and determine whether the GNSS receiver is interfered by the deceptive interference signal.

[0086] In this way, it can be ensured that the first GNSS output signal and the GNSS simulation signal received by the receiver use the same reference signal (the second GNSS output signal) as a reference, and the result obtained by the test instrument through comparison during interference detection is more accurate.

[0087] Optionally, before testing, the GNSS receiver and test instrument can be configured to track the GNSS antenna normally to receive GNSS signals for at least 6 hours, the cesium clock can be turned on for at least 2 hours, and a frequency reference signal can be provided for the satellite simulator to ensure that the system can normally receive GNSS signals and generate stable interference signals.

[0088] Therefore, the detection of interference signals is performed only after the GNSS receiver and the satellite simulator have output signals stably, thereby ensuring the accuracy of the test results.

[0089] Optionally, the GNSS receiver receives a first GNSS output signal, parses the signal to obtain a first time information message, outputs the first time information message to a test instrument, and the test instrument analyzes the message to obtain a first time accuracy and saves corresponding data.

[0090] Optionally, before transmitting the GNSS simulation signal to the GNSS receiver, the first GNSS output signal of the normal tracking power divider of the GNSS receiver is disconnected, and the receiver receives the GNSS simulation signal (interference signal) output by the satellite simulator. After the GNSS simulation signal is received normally, the second time information message output by the GNSS receiver is analyzed by a test instrument to obtain the analyzed second time accuracy, and the corresponding data is saved.

[0091] Optionally, the time information message includes a PTP message or a 1PPS+ToD message; wherein the PTP message is a Precision Time Protocol message, and the 1PPS+ToD message is a second pulse signal message at the current moment.

[0092] Optionally, judging whether there is deception interference according to the second GNSS output signal, the second time information message and the first time information message includes:

[0093] Determine a first time accuracy according to the first time information message and the second GNSS output signal;

[0094] Determine a second time accuracy according to the second time information message and the second GNSS output signal;

[0095] Determine whether there is deception interference based on the first time accuracy and the second time accuracy.

[0096] Optionally, judging whether there is deception interference according to the first time accuracy and the second time accuracy includes:

[0097] When the difference between the second time accuracy and the first time accuracy is greater than a first threshold, there is deception interference;

[0098] When the difference between the second time accuracy and the first time accuracy is smaller than the first threshold, there is no deceptive interference.

[0099] Optionally, the first time accuracy and the second time accuracy are standard deviation of the time accuracy or peak-to-peak value of the time accuracy.

[0100] Figure 3 A diagram showing simulation results of the first time accuracy information provided by an embodiment of the present disclosure. Figure 4 The simulation result diagram of the second time accuracy information provided by the embodiment of the present disclosure is shown. Figure 3 From the simulation, it can be seen that the test result obtained by the test instrument after analyzing the first time information message indicates that the test result of detecting the first GNSS output signal (normal GNSS signal) is: test time is 23 minutes and 58 seconds, number of samples is 1438, and the time of the second GNSS output signal is used as the benchmark. The standard deviation of the second pulse deviation of the first GNSS output signal is 1.6596ns (nanoseconds) (first time accuracy). The current TOD of the measured signal is the same as the current TOD of the benchmark signal, which is 2021-11-18 12:15:32, that is, the second deviation of the TOD deviation at the current time is 0 seconds (first time accuracy).

[0101] from Figure 4 It can be seen from the simulation that the test instrument analyzes the second time information message and obtains the test results, which represents the test results of the detection of the simulated GNSS signal (interference signal): the standard deviation of the second pulse deviation is 19619.1747ns (nanoseconds) (first time accuracy), the current time TOD of the simulated GNSS signal is 2021-11-18 09:13:50, and the current time TOD of the reference signal is 2021-11-09 17:37:38, that is, the second deviation of the TOD deviation at the current time is 747372s (seconds) (second time accuracy).

[0102] From the above test results, it can be seen that the first time accuracy of the first GNSS output signal is significantly different from the second time accuracy of the simulated GNSS signal. The test instrument can determine whether the GNSS receiver (device under test) has deception interference.

[0103] For example, if the difference in standard deviation of the second pulse deviation of the output time result of the first GNSS output signal and the simulated GNSS signal is greater than a first threshold value, for example, the first threshold value is 10ns, or if the difference in peak-to-peak value (i.e., deviation range) of the second pulse deviation of the output time result of the first GNSS output signal and the simulated GNSS signal is greater than 150ns (nanoseconds), then it is determined that there is a spoofing interference signal in the GNSS receiver. Alternatively, if the difference in second deviation of the current moment TOD deviation of the output time result of the first GNSS output signal and the simulated GNSS signal is greater than a second threshold value, for example, the second threshold value is 0s, then it is determined that there is a spoofing interference signal in the GNSS receiver.

[0104] In this way, the method of judging from the perspective of time instead of the perspective of space (position, pseudorange, speed, etc.) is more conducive to the inspection and detection of civil satellite timing receivers. If the interference signal is detected, the GNSS receiving signal can be temporarily turned off to maintain or track other time sources on the ground.

[0105] By detecting the time performance of the output of the GNSS receiver, it is independent of the characteristics of the received signal, which not only enables the detection of spoofing interference signals of GNSS receivers in different application scenarios with good universality, but also can more efficiently detect whether the GNSS receiver is subject to spoofing interference.

[0106] The above description and the accompanying drawings fully illustrate the embodiments of the present disclosure so that those skilled in the art can practice them. Other embodiments may include structural, logical, electrical, process and other changes. The embodiments represent only possible changes. Unless explicitly required, separate components and functions are optional, and the order of operation may vary. The parts and features of some embodiments may be included in or replace the parts and features of other embodiments. Moreover, the words used in this application are only used to describe the embodiments and are not used to limit the claims. As used in the description of the embodiments and the claims, unless the context clearly indicates, the singular forms of "a", "an" and "the" are intended to include plural forms as well. Similarly, the term "and / or" as used in this application refers to any and all possible combinations of listings containing one or more associated ones. In addition, when used in the present application, the term "comprise" and its variants "comprises" and / or comprising refer to the presence of stated features, wholes, steps, operations, elements, and / or components, but do not exclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, wholes, steps, operations, elements, components and / or groups thereof. In the absence of further restrictions, the elements defined by the sentence "comprising a ..." do not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method or device comprising the elements. In this article, each embodiment may focus on the differences from other embodiments, and the same and similar parts between the various embodiments may refer to each other. For the methods, products, etc. disclosed in the embodiments, if they correspond to the method part disclosed in the embodiments, then the relevant parts can refer to the description of the method part.

[0107] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the units and algorithm steps of each example described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are performed in hardware or software may depend on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. The technicians may use different methods for each specific application to implement the described functions, but such implementations should not be considered to exceed the scope of the embodiments of the present disclosure. The technicians may clearly understand that, for the convenience and simplicity of description, the specific working processes of the systems, devices and units described above may refer to the corresponding processes in the aforementioned method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

Claims

1. A method for detecting spoofing interference of a GNSS receiver, characterized in that: The method comprises: Converting the GNSS real signal received by the GNSS antenna into a first GNSS output signal and a second GNSS output signal; Transmitting the first GNSS output signal to a GNSS receiver; Analyze the first GNSS output signal to obtain a first time information message of the first GNSS output signal; Transmit GNSS simulation signal to GNSS receiver; Analyze the GNSS analog signal to obtain a second time information message of the GNSS analog signal; Determine a first time accuracy according to the first time information message and the second GNSS output signal; Determine a second time accuracy according to the second time information message and the second GNSS output signal; Determine whether deception interference exists according to the first time accuracy and the second time accuracy.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The time information message includes a PTP message or a 1PPS+ToD message; wherein, the PTP message is a Precision Time Protocol message, and the 1PPS+ToD message is a second pulse signal message at the current moment.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Judging whether there is deception interference according to the first time accuracy and the second time accuracy includes: When the difference between the second time accuracy and the first time accuracy is greater than a first threshold, there is deception interference; When the difference between the second time accuracy and the first time accuracy is smaller than the first threshold, there is no deceptive interference.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The first time accuracy and the second time accuracy are standard deviations of time accuracy or peak-to-peak values ​​of time accuracy.

5. A system for detecting spoofing interference of a GNSS receiver, characterized in that: The system comprises: GNSS antenna, used to receive real GNSS signals; A power divider, used for converting a GNSS real signal received by the GNSS antenna into a first GNSS output signal and a second GNSS output signal; A GNSS simulation signal source, used for generating and outputting a GNSS simulation signal; A GNSS receiver, configured to receive a first GNSS output signal, generate a first time information message according to the first GNSS output signal, and receive the GNSS analog signal, and generate a second time information message according to the GNSS analog signal; A test instrument is used to receive the second GNSS output signal, the first time information message and the second time information message, and determine the first time accuracy according to the first time information message and the second GNSS output signal; determine the second time accuracy according to the second time information message and the second GNSS output signal; and determine whether there is deception interference according to the first time accuracy and the second time accuracy.

6. The system according to claim 5, characterized in that The GNSS simulation signal source comprises: A satellite simulator for generating and outputting GNSS simulation signals; Cesium clock, used to provide reference frequency to satellite simulator; A control device is used to control the satellite simulator.

7. The system according to claim 5, characterized in that The time information message includes a PTP message or a 1PPS+ToD message; wherein, the PTP message is a Precision Time Protocol message, and the 1PPS+ToD message is a second pulse signal message at the current moment.

8. The system according to claim 5, characterized in that The first time accuracy and the second time accuracy are standard deviations of time accuracy or peak-to-peak values ​​of time accuracy.

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