A data analysis method and system applied to e-commerce platform
By building a profit function model for e-commerce platforms and manufacturers and screening the optimal investment strategy, the problem of equity investment decisions of e-commerce platforms after introducing their own brands is solved, and more efficient market share and profit growth is achieved.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202311055366.4
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2023-08-21
- Publication Date
- 2024-12-06
- Estimated Expiration
- 2043-08-21
AI Technical Summary
After e-commerce platforms introduce their own brands, how to comprehensively consider the losses of equity investment and the reduction of market share of their own brands and make optimal decisions, and lack research on the relationship between the introduction strategy of private brands and equity investment strategies.
Build a supply chain composed of manufacturers and e-commerce platforms, formulate four investment strategies (NN, NY, YN, YY strategies), filter the optimal strategies based on the profit function model, and implement the introduction of private brands and equity investments.
By analyzing the relationship between the introduction strategy of private brands and equity investment strategies, more efficient decisions are generated, and e-commerce platforms can obtain greater profits and bargaining power in market competition.
Smart Images

Figure CN117217786B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of brand analysis in e-commerce platforms, and in particular to a data analysis method and system applied to e-commerce platforms. Background Art
[0002] Equity investment is an important way for the supply chain to achieve in-depth internal cooperation, and has gradually become an important way for e-commerce platforms to quickly integrate into the supply chain and gain the right to speak in the chain. In recent years, the rise of private brands has provided a new option for e-commerce platforms to enter the retail market. Many platforms have begun to seize the market by introducing private brands. However, the introduction of private brands will gradually change the relationship between manufacturers and e-commerce platforms from a cooperative relationship to a competitive relationship. Whether e-commerce platforms still need to make equity investments in manufacturers is worth discussing. On the one hand, e-commerce platforms' equity investment in manufacturers to expand the market can bring them excess returns and gain greater bargaining power. Therefore, equity investment seems to be beneficial. On the other hand, equity investment will disperse the resources of e-commerce platforms, leading to intensified competition between manufacturer brands and private brands. E-commerce platforms need to comprehensively consider the benefits of equity investment and the losses caused by the reduction of private brand market share due to intensified competition, which has also caused some platforms to give up equity investment in manufacturers. Therefore, whether to continue to invest in upstream manufacturers after introducing private brands is an important decision for e-commerce platforms. At present, most of the research is done from the perspective of manufacturers on the impact of retailers introducing private brands, as well as the impact of equity investment on supply chain pricing and profit decisions. There is a lack of research on the relationship between private brand introduction strategies and equity investment strategies. How e-commerce platforms should make final decisions based on the relationship between private brand introduction strategies and equity investment strategies has become an urgent problem that needs to be solved. Summary of the invention
[0003] The present invention provides a data analysis method and system applied to an e-commerce platform to fully analyze the correlation between a private brand introduction strategy and an equity investment strategy, so as to facilitate the generation of more cost-effective decisions.
[0004] In order to achieve the above object, the present invention is implemented by the following technical solutions:
[0005] In a first aspect, the present invention provides a data analysis method applied to an e-commerce platform, comprising:
[0006] Build a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and an e-commerce platform, and formulate N investment strategies based on whether the e-commerce platform introduces its own brand and whether it makes equity investment;
[0007] Based on the N investment strategies, a profit function model of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform under each investment strategy is constructed;
[0008] Determine the profit corresponding to each investment strategy based on the profit function model of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform, and select the optimal investment strategy from the N investment strategies;
[0009] Based on the optimal investment strategy, introduce private brands and make equity investments.
[0010] Optionally, the N investment strategies include NN strategy, NY strategy, YN strategy and YY strategy, the NN strategy indicates not introducing the e-commerce platform's own brands and not making equity investments, the NY strategy indicates not introducing the e-commerce platform's own brands but making equity investments, the YN strategy indicates introducing the e-commerce platform's own brands but not making equity investments, and the YY strategy indicates introducing the e-commerce platform's own brands and making equity investments.
[0011] Optionally, the profit function model of the manufacturer under the NN strategy as follows:
[0012]
[0013] In the formula, represents the wholesale price of the manufacturer’s brand under the NN strategy, represents the product demand function of the manufacturer brand under the NN strategy;
[0014] Profit function model of e-commerce platform as follows:
[0015]
[0016] In the formula, It represents the retail price of the manufacturer's brand products decided by the e-commerce platform under the NN strategy.
[0017] Alternatively, the profit function model of the manufacturer under the NY strategy as follows:
[0018]
[0019] In the formula, represents the equilibrium solution of the wholesale price of the manufacturer's brand products under the NN strategy, represents the equilibrium solution of the market demand for the manufacturer's brand products, φ represents the shareholding ratio, represents the wholesale price of its branded products decided by the manufacturer under the NY strategy, represents the market demand function of the manufacturer's brand products under the NY strategy;
[0020] Profit function model of e-commerce platform as follows:
[0021]
[0022] In the formula, represents the retail price of the manufacturer's brand products decided by the e-commerce platform under the NY strategy, s represents the cost coefficient of the e-commerce platform's market development efforts, and e m Indicates the level of investment effort made by the e-commerce platform.
[0023] Alternatively, the profit function model of the manufacturer under the YN strategy as follows:
[0024]
[0025] In the formula, represents the wholesale price of the manufacturer's brand products under the YN strategy, represents the market demand function of the manufacturer's brand products under the YN strategy;
[0026] Profit function model of e-commerce platform as follows:
[0027]
[0028] In the formula, represents the retail price of private label products decided by the e-commerce platform under the YN strategy, represents the market demand function of the e-commerce platform’s own-brand products under the YN strategy, represents the retail price of the manufacturer's brand products decided by the e-commerce platform under the YN strategy, represents the wholesale price of the manufacturer's brand products under the YN strategy, Represents the market demand function of the manufacturer’s brand products under the YN strategy.
[0029] Alternatively, the profit function model of the manufacturer under the YY strategy is as follows:
[0030]
[0031] In the formula, represents the equilibrium solution of the retail price of the manufacturer's brand products under the YN strategy, represents the equilibrium solution of the market demand function of the manufacturer’s branded products under the YN strategy, represents the wholesale price of the manufacturer’s brand under the YY strategy, represents the product demand function of the manufacturer's brand under the YY strategy;
[0032] Profit function model of e-commerce platform as follows:
[0033]
[0034] In the formula, represents the retail price of the private label products decided by the e-commerce platform under the YY strategy, represents the market demand function of the e-commerce platform’s own-brand products under the YY strategy, represents the retail price of the manufacturer's brand products decided by the e-commerce platform under the YY strategy, s represents the cost coefficient of the e-commerce platform's market development efforts, and e m Indicates the level of investment effort made by the e-commerce platform.
[0035] In a second aspect, the present application also provides a data analysis system applied to an e-commerce platform, comprising:
[0036] The strategy formulation module is used to build a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and an e-commerce platform, and formulate N investment strategies based on whether the e-commerce platform introduces its own brand and whether it makes equity investment;
[0037] A model building module, used to build a profit function model of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform under each investment strategy based on the N investment strategies;
[0038] An analysis module, used to determine the profit corresponding to each investment strategy based on the profit function model of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform, and select the optimal investment strategy from the N investment strategies;
[0039] An execution module is used to introduce private brands and make equity investments based on the optimal investment strategy.
[0040] Optionally, the N investment strategies formulated by the strategy formulation module include NN strategy, NY strategy, YN strategy and YY strategy, the NN strategy indicates not introducing the e-commerce platform's own brands and not making equity investments, the NY strategy indicates not introducing the e-commerce platform's own brands but making equity investments, the YN strategy indicates introducing the e-commerce platform's own brands but not making equity investments, and the YY strategy indicates introducing the e-commerce platform's own brands and making equity investments.
[0041] Optionally, the analysis module includes:
[0042] The parameter calculation module is used to calculate the parameter range of investment efficiency, shareholding ratio, brand advantage and competition intensity, and calculate the profit corresponding to each investment strategy within the parameter range;
[0043] An analysis submodule is used to determine an optimal investment strategy based on the profit.
[0044] Beneficial effects:
[0045] The data analysis method applied to the e-commerce platform provided by the present invention formulates N investment strategies according to whether the e-commerce platform introduces its own brand and whether it makes equity investment, adopts a model construction module to construct a profit function model of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform under each investment strategy, and screens out the optimal investment strategy from the N investment strategies based on the analysis module. The correlation between the own brand introduction strategy and the equity investment strategy can be fully analyzed, so as to facilitate the generation of more cost-effective decisions. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0046] Figure 1 This is a flow chart of a data analysis method applied to an e-commerce platform according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention;
[0047] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of an e-commerce platform equity investment strategy according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention;
[0048] Figure 3 A schematic diagram showing the effect of the shareholding ratio on the investment effort level according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention;
[0049] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the effect of the shareholding ratio on the wholesale price in a preferred embodiment of the present invention;
[0050] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the effect of the shareholding ratio on the retail price in a preferred embodiment of the present invention;
[0051] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the effect of shareholding ratio on market demand in a preferred embodiment of the present invention;
[0052] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of the effect of the shareholding ratio on the manufacturer's profit according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention;
[0053] Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of the effect of the shareholding ratio on the profit of the e-commerce platform according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention;
[0054] Fig. 9 The effect of the shareholding ratio and the cost coefficient of the e-commerce platform's market development efforts on the e-commerce platform's investment decision when the PB product is not introduced in the preferred embodiment of the present invention, wherein (a) is a schematic diagram when the brand advantage is 0.5; (b) is a schematic diagram when the brand advantage is 1.5;
[0055] Fig.10 The influence of the shareholding ratio and the cost coefficient of the e-commerce platform's market development efforts on the investment decision of the e-commerce platform when introducing PB products in the preferred embodiment of the present invention, wherein (a) is a schematic diagram when the brand advantage is 0.5 and the competition intensity is 0.1, and (b) is a schematic diagram when the brand advantage is 0.5 and the competition intensity is 0.5;
[0056] Fig.11 This figure shows the influence of the shareholding ratio and the cost coefficient of the e-commerce platform's market development efforts on the investment decision of the e-commerce platform when introducing PB products in the preferred embodiment of the present invention, wherein (a) is a schematic diagram when the brand advantage is 1.5 and the competition intensity is 0.1, and (b) is a schematic diagram when the brand advantage is 1.5 and the competition intensity is 0.5. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0057] The technical solution of the present invention is described clearly and completely below. Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.
[0058] Unless otherwise defined, the technical terms or scientific terms used in the present invention shall have the usual meanings understood by persons with ordinary skills in the field to which the present invention belongs. The words "first", "second" and similar words used in the present invention do not indicate any order, quantity or importance, but are only used to distinguish different components. Similarly, words such as "one" or "one" do not indicate quantity restrictions, but indicate the existence of at least one. Words such as "connect" or "connected" are not limited to physical or mechanical connections, but may include electrical connections, whether direct or indirect. "Up", "down", "left", "right" and the like are only used to indicate relative positional relationships. When the absolute position of the object being described changes, the relative positional relationship also changes accordingly.
[0059] This application constructs a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer (m) and an e-commerce platform (r), where the manufacturer sells goods at a wholesale price w m Sell products to e-commerce platforms, which sell them at retail prices. m Sell to consumers. One of the decisions of the e-commerce platform is whether to introduce its own brand and if so, at what price. r Sold to consumers. To simplify the description, NB is used below to represent the manufacturer's brand and PB is used to represent the e-commerce platform's own brand.
[0060] E-commerce platforms pay a certain amount of effort to make equity investments to help manufacturers develop the NB product market, such as purchasing new equipment for NB product upgrades, expanding sales channels, and increasing marketing activities. At the same time, they share part of the manufacturer's profits according to their shareholding ratio φ. To ensure that manufacturers still have independent business decision-making power after equity investment, the shareholding ratio of e-commerce platforms cannot exceed 50%, that is, 0<φ<50%. The market development efforts of e-commerce platforms can bring γe to NB products. mThe growth of demand, γ represents the market growth potential. The larger γ is, the better the market growth potential and the greater the potential for market development. Without considering the fixed costs in equity investment, only the variable costs generated by the market development of NB products are considered. where e m represents the level of market development effort exerted by the e-commerce platform. s (s > 0) is the cost coefficient of the e-commerce platform's market development effort, representing the investment efficiency of the e-commerce platform's market development. The smaller s is, the higher the investment efficiency of the e-commerce platform.
[0061] This application assumes that the market demand is a linear function of the product price pi and the investment effort level e m After the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform conduct equity cooperation to develop the market for NB products, the two products still affect each other through price competition. Therefore, the market demand functions for NB products and PB products are respectively: D m = a - p m + bp r + γe m 、D r = λa - p r + bp m . Among them, the market base scale is a. λ represents the brand advantage of PB products. 0 < λ < 1 indicates that NB products have more advantages, and the smaller λ is, the more obvious the brand advantage of NB products; on the contrary, λ > 1 indicates that PB products have more advantages, and the larger λ is, the more obvious the brand advantage of PB products. 0 < b < 1 represents the competition intensity between the two brand products. The larger b is, the higher the homogeneity of the two brand products and the more intense the market competition.
[0062] First, the parameters involved in the application are interpreted as shown in Table 1 below:
[0063] Table 1 Model Parameter Symbols and Meanings
[0064]
[0065] Please refer to Figure 1 , this application provides a data analysis method applied to an e-commerce platform, including:
[0066] Construct a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and an e-commerce platform, and formulate N investment strategies according to whether the e-commerce platform introduces its own brand and whether it conducts equity investment;
[0067] Based on the N investment strategies, construct the profit function models of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform under each investment strategy;
[0068] Based on the profit function models of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform, determine the profit corresponding to each investment strategy, and select the optimal investment strategy from the N investment strategies;
[0069] Based on the optimal investment strategy, introduce private brands and make equity investments.
[0070] The above-mentioned data analysis method applied to the e-commerce platform formulates N investment strategies according to whether the e-commerce platform introduces its own brand and whether it makes equity investment. The model construction module is used to construct the profit function model of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform under each investment strategy, and the optimal investment strategy is screened out from the N investment strategies based on the analysis module. The correlation between the own brand introduction strategy and the equity investment strategy can be fully analyzed, so as to facilitate the generation of more efficient decisions.
[0071] In the specific implementation, four strategies are considered depending on whether the e-commerce brand introduces its own brand and whether it makes equity investment, such as Figure 2 As shown. The first is the NN strategy, that is, neither introducing PB nor making equity investment. At this time, the manufacturer sells NB products to the e-commerce platform, and the e-commerce platform sells them to consumers. This is a baseline strategy. The second is the NY strategy, that is, not introducing PB but making equity investment. At this time, the e-commerce platform will invest in manufacturers and sell NB products for manufacturers. The third is the YN strategy, that is, introducing PB but not making equity investment. The e-commerce platform develops PB and sells two types of products at the same time. The fourth is the YY strategy, that is, introducing PB and making equity investment. At this time, the e-commerce platform and the manufacturer are in a competitive relationship. The e-commerce platform not only invests in manufacturers and sells NB products for them, but also sells PB products. By comparing the four strategies, the e-commerce platform's own brand introduction decision and equity investment decision are explored. The game order in this application is: First, the e-commerce platform decides the level of investment efforts for market development. Then, the manufacturer decides the wholesale price of NB products. Finally, the e-commerce platform decides the wholesale price of NB products. m If a private brand is introduced, the retail price of the private brand product p is also determined r In addition, the subscripts i = m and r represent the manufacturer and e-commerce platform, respectively, and the superscripts j = NN, NY, YN, and YY represent the four strategies, respectively.
[0072] Optionally, the N investment strategies formulated by the strategy formulation module include NN strategy, NY strategy, YN strategy and YY strategy, the NN strategy indicates not introducing the e-commerce platform's own brands and not making equity investments, the NY strategy indicates not introducing the e-commerce platform's own brands but making equity investments, the YN strategy indicates introducing the e-commerce platform's own brands but not making equity investments, and the YY strategy indicates introducing the e-commerce platform's own brands and making equity investments.
[0073] Furthermore, the inferences for each strategy are supplemented as follows:
[0074] NN Strategy:
[0075] The e-commerce platform does not invest in manufacturers. At this time, the manufacturers do not have sufficient funds to develop the market independently. The market demand function of NB products is D m =ap m +bp r When the e-commerce platform does not introduce PB products, let D r =λa-p r +bp m = 0, we get p r =λa+bp m , substitute it into D m ,but The profit functions of manufacturers and e-commerce platforms are shown in equations (1) and (2) respectively.
[0076]
[0077]
[0078] Proposition 1: Under the NN strategy, the optimal decision of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform is:
[0079]
[0080] Substituting the result of Proposition 1 into the demand and profit function, we can obtain:
[0081]
[0082] NY Strategy:
[0083] Under the NY strategy, the market demand for NB products will grow to γe m , at this time the market demand function of NB products is D m =ap m +bp r +γe m Similar to the NN strategy, let the market demand for PB products be 0, that is, D r =λa-p r +bp m = 0, we get p r =λa+bp m , substitute it into D m , then the market demand for NB products can be calculated, that is Assuming that the e-commerce platform and the manufacturer only distribute dividends on the incremental profits brought by market development according to the shareholding ratio φ, the manufacturer's profit sources include two parts: the basic profit when there is no market development, and the remaining profit after the dividends on the incremental profits brought by market development.
[0084] The profit functions of manufacturers and e-commerce platforms are shown in Equations (3) and (4) respectively.
[0085]
[0086]
[0087] Proposition 2: Under the NY strategy, the optimal decision of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform is:
[0088]
[0089] Substituting the result of Proposition 2 into the demand and profit functions, we can obtain:
[0090]
[0091]
[0092]
[0093] To ensure that all equilibrium solutions in Proposition 2 are greater than 0, the constraint condition 8s(1-b 2 )-γ 2 >0, that is, s>s0=γ 2 / 8(1-b 2 ). Analyzing Proposition 2, we can draw the following inferences.
[0094] Corollary 1: The impact of shareholding ratio on equilibrium solution:
[0095]
[0096] It means partial derivative of the numerator.
[0097] Corollary 1 shows that when PB products are not introduced, the investment effort level of e-commerce platforms in NB products is unrelated to the shareholding ratio and is only affected by market conditions. Therefore, the market demand for NB products will not change with changes in the shareholding ratio. This is because when PB products are not introduced, the purpose of e-commerce platform equity investment is to expand the market share of NB products as much as possible to increase sales revenue, rather than to obtain more equity dividend income from manufacturers. Therefore, even when the shareholding ratio is low, e-commerce platforms are willing to invest more investment efforts. The wholesale price of NB products is positively correlated with the shareholding ratio. A high shareholding ratio means that the e-commerce platform will take away most of the manufacturer's profits. In order to maximize profits, manufacturers choose to increase the wholesale price of NB products. Although the increase in wholesale prices will reduce the profits of e-commerce platforms, the increase in manufacturers' profits will also increase the equity dividend income obtained by e-commerce platforms, which to a certain extent makes up for the loss of revenue of e-commerce platforms. At the same time, in order to attract more consumers, e-commerce platforms choose to maintain the retail price of NB products.
[0098] YN Strategy:
[0099] Under the YN strategy, the manufacturer has no extra funds to develop the market independently. The market demand functions of NB products and PB products are The profit functions of manufacturers and e-commerce platforms are shown in Equations (5) and (6) respectively.
[0100]
[0101]
[0102] Proposition 3: Under the YN strategy, the optimal decision of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform is:
[0103]
[0104] Substituting the result of Proposition 3 into the demand and profit functions, we can obtain:
[0105]
[0106] Inference 2: The impact of the brand advantage of PB products on the equilibrium solution:
[0107] (1) (2) (3)
[0108] From Corollary 2, we can see that under the non-equity cooperation model, the wholesale price and market demand of NB products will not change with the changes in the brand advantages of PB products. Since the e-commerce platform has the decision-making power over the retail prices of the two products, it will use the brand advantages of PB products to increase the retail prices of NB products and PB products at the same time. As the brand advantages of PB products increase, the market demand for NB products will not change, while the market demand for PB products will gradually increase. This is because improving the brand advantages of PB products will help improve consumers' brand loyalty, enhance consumers' willingness to purchase PB products, and thus expand the market demand for PB products.
[0109] YY Strategy
[0110] Under the YY strategy, the market demand functions of NB products and PB products are Therefore, the profit functions of manufacturers and e-commerce platforms are shown in Equations (7) and (8), respectively.
[0111]
[0112]
[0113] Proposition 4: Under the YY strategy, the optimal decision of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform is:
[0114]
[0115]
[0116]
[0117]
[0118] Substituting the result of Proposition 4 into the demand and profit functions, we can obtain:
[0119]
[0120]
[0121]
[0122]
[0123] Similarly, in order to make all equilibrium solutions under the YY strategy greater than 0 and the second-order derivative condition less than 0, the following constraints must be met:
[0124]
[0125] The solution is:
[0126]
[0127] Right now or Under this strategy, only when the shareholding ratio is greater than the threshold φ0, or the e-commerce platform investment cost coefficient is greater than the threshold Equity cooperation will only take place when
[0128] Corollary 3: The impact of shareholding ratio on equilibrium solution:
[0129] (1)
[0130] (2) If and and on the contrary
[0131] (3)
[0132] (4)
[0133] Corollary 3 shows that after the introduction of PB products, as the shareholding ratio increases, the e-commerce platform will reduce the investment effort level for NB products. The higher the shareholding ratio means the deeper the equity cooperation between the e-commerce platform and the manufacturer, and the closer the cooperative relationship, which requires the e-commerce platform to invest more resources in NB products. Under the market competition, the adverse impact on PB products will be greater. It is not bad to regard the introduction of PB products as a behavior of e-commerce platforms to develop the market alone. As "rational people", e-commerce platforms will inevitably give priority to the development of PB products, invest more resources in PB products and ignore NB products, thereby reducing the investment effort level for NB products. In addition, as the shareholding ratio increases, the wholesale price of NB products decreases first and then increases. When the shareholding ratio is low, the investment effort level decreases, resulting in a decrease in wholesale prices; when the shareholding ratio is high, the manufacturer's profit is damaged and it has to increase the wholesale price. In order to make up for the decline in demand caused by the decline in investment effort, the e-commerce platform aims to increase market demand by reducing the retail prices of NB products and PB products at the same time. Therefore, the retail prices of both products will decrease with the increase in shareholding ratio. However, the increase in demand brought about by lower retail prices cannot make up for the decrease in demand caused by the level of investment efforts, and market demand still shows a downward trend, which shows that investing in manufacturers with a higher shareholding ratio will eventually lead to the loss of interests of both NB products and PB products.
[0134] Inference 4: The impact of the brand advantage of PB products on the equilibrium solution:
[0135] (1) (2) (3) (4)
[0136] Corollary 4 shows that under the equity cooperation model, as the brand advantage of PB products increases, e-commerce platforms will increase their investment efforts in NB products. This is because when the brand advantage of PB products is large, PB products are relatively mature and their market potential is limited. At this time, e-commerce platforms will increase their investment efforts in NB products to gain a larger market share. As the investment effort level of NB products increases, the cost of market development efforts increases, manufacturers will increase the wholesale price of NB products, and e-commerce platforms will increase the retail prices of NB products and PB products accordingly. In addition, the increase in investment effort increases the market demand for NB products, and PB products attract more consumers by expanding their brand advantages, which can also increase market demand.
[0137] In this application, the above steps are used to solve the optimal equilibrium solution under four strategies: before and after the introduction of PB products, and whether or not to adopt equity investment. Furthermore, the optimal equilibrium solutions under different strategies are compared to analyze the introduction of private brands and equity investment strategies of e-commerce platforms. On this basis, the impact of introducing private brands on the equity investment decisions of e-commerce platforms is analyzed, and the following proposition is obtained.
[0138] Proposition 5: The impact of equity investment on the optimal decision-making of supply chain members:
[0139] (1) When PB products are not introduced,
[0140] (2) When introducing PB products,
[0141] From Proposition 5, we can know that regardless of whether PB products are introduced or not, the wholesale price, retail price and market demand of products under the equity investment model will increase compared with no equity cooperation. Since manufacturers must share part of their profits with e-commerce platforms under the equity investment model, manufacturers always choose to increase the wholesale price of NB products in order to maximize their own profits, and e-commerce platforms will increase the retail price of NB products accordingly. After the introduction of PB products, as the retail price of NB products increases, e-commerce platforms will also increase the retail price of PB products. It is worth noting that while e-commerce platforms invest in NB products to develop the market, the market demand for PB products will also increase, indicating that equity investment will have a spillover effect that benefits both e-commerce platform PB products.
[0142] Proposition 6(1) When PB products are not introduced, if any of the following conditions is met: ①s0<s≤s1;②s> When s1 and 0<φ<φ2, The e-commerce platform adopts equity investment; otherwise, no investment is made.
[0143] in
[0144] s0, s1, and φ2 are all calculation process parameters. s0 is specifically s1 is specifically φ2 is specifically
[0145] (2) When introducing PB products, if any of the following conditions is met: ① ② When φ0<φ<φ3, E-commerce platforms adopt equity investment; otherwise, no investment is made; among them,
[0146] φ0, φ2 and φ3 are calculation process parameters. Specifically Specifically φ0 is specifically φ2 is specifically φ3 is specifically
[0147] Proposition 6 shows that whether or not PB products are introduced, when investment efficiency is high, or when investment efficiency is low and the shareholding ratio is small, e-commerce platforms will adopt equity investment strategies. This is consistent with the behavior of enterprises in reality that often evaluate investment returns before investment. High investment efficiency means that e-commerce platforms can obtain excess returns, which is beneficial for enterprises pursuing profit maximization. On the contrary, when investment efficiency is low and the shareholding ratio is large, e-commerce platforms will not adopt equity investment strategies. To a certain extent, the more equity proportion of manufacturers held by e-commerce platforms, the more equity dividend income they will obtain and the higher the profit. But in fact, when investment efficiency is low, the increase in shareholding ratio is disadvantageous to e-commerce platforms. This is because after equity investment, manufacturers still have the priority and independent decision-making power to set wholesale prices. A high shareholding ratio means that most of the manufacturer's profits will flow to the e-commerce platform, so the manufacturer will choose to increase the wholesale price to make up for its own profit loss, which indirectly reduces the profit of the e-commerce platform. Therefore, in the equity cooperation between upstream and downstream of the supply chain, for investors, the higher the shareholding ratio is not the better. A higher shareholding ratio will lead to a premium in the upstream wholesale price. A reasonable setting of the shareholding ratio can achieve a win-win situation.
[0148] Combining Corollary 1 and Corollary 3, we can see that the mechanism of the shareholding ratio before and after the introduction of PB products is different. When PB products are not introduced, the shareholding ratio directly affects the investment decision of the e-commerce platform by increasing the wholesale price. As the shareholding ratio increases, the wholesale price of NB products increases while the retail price and market demand remain unchanged, and the marginal profit of the e-commerce platform from selling NB products decreases. Therefore, increasing the shareholding ratio will reduce the willingness of the e-commerce platform to invest in equity.
[0149] However, after the introduction of PB products, the shareholding ratio indirectly affects the investment decision of the e-commerce platform by reducing the investment effort level. For NB products, the increase in the shareholding ratio prompts the e-commerce platform to reduce the investment effort level of NB products, and the retail price and market demand of NB products will both decline. For PB products, due to the decline in market demand for NB products, the spillover effect generated is weakened, and the market demand for PB products will also decline. A higher shareholding ratio is not only unfavorable to NB products, but also to PB products. On the surface, the increase in the shareholding ratio increases the equity dividend income of the e-commerce platform, but in fact it will intensify the competition between NB products and PB products, causing the profits of NB products and PB products to be damaged at the same time. In short, in the market competition environment, e-commerce platforms are more inclined to implement equity investment strategies with a smaller shareholding ratio, so as to use more resources to cultivate PB products to obtain greater competitive advantages. As mentioned earlier, Taobao has participated in four rounds of equity financing of Yiguo Fresh and has held a relatively high equity ratio of the latter. With the successful incubation of Hema Fresh and the gradual similarity of the functional businesses of the two, Taobao did not choose to continue investing in Yiguo Fresh, but focused on cultivating its own brand Hema Fresh.
[0150] Proposition 7: When PB products are introduced: (1) If NB products are dominant, that is, 0<λ<1, when any of the following conditions is met: ① ② And λ2<λ<1, E-commerce platforms adopt equity investment; otherwise, no equity investment is made.
[0151] s2, are all calculation process parameters, s2 is Specifically
[0152]
[0153] (2) If PB products are dominant, that is, λ>1, when any of the following conditions is met: ① ② And λ2<λ, E-commerce platforms adopt equity investment; otherwise, no equity investment is made.
[0154]
[0155] Proposition 7 only considers the strategy of introducing PB products to analyze the impact of brand advantages on the equity investment strategy of e-commerce platforms. When the investment efficiency is high, regardless of whether the NB advantage is large or the PB advantage is large, the e-commerce platform will choose to adopt an equity investment strategy. When the investment efficiency is low, if the NB advantage is large, the e-commerce platform will choose to invest when the gap between the two brand advantages is small; if the PB advantage is large, the e-commerce platform will choose to invest when the difference between the two brand advantages is large. In addition, increasing the brand advantage of PB products can increase the willingness of e-commerce platforms to invest in equity.
[0156] When NB products have an advantage but the gap between them and PB products is small, although equity investment in NB products will squeeze out the resources of PB products, the resulting demand spillover effect can make up for the losses caused by competition. At this time, e-commerce platforms will still prefer equity investment. However, when NB products have an advantage and the gap between the brand advantages of the two products is large, e-commerce platforms will not adopt equity investment strategies to develop the market for NB products, because this is extremely detrimental to the long-term development of PB products. At this time, e-commerce platforms will choose to use more resources to cultivate PB products.
[0157] When PB products are dominant and their advantages are obvious, the market development of PB products is relatively mature and stable. At this time, the space for profit growth of PB products is limited. In order to seek new profit growth points, e-commerce platforms tend to choose equity investment in manufacturers to obtain more profits. And because PB products have a large brand advantage, at this time, the equity investment of e-commerce platforms in NB products will not only not harm the interests of PB products, but will bring excess returns. For example, JD.com chose to invest in Five Star Appliances on the basis that JD.com Jingzao has accumulated certain brand advantages. Surprisingly, when PB products are dominant but the gap between the advantages of the two products is small, e-commerce platforms will not take equity investment. The reason is that although PB products are dominant, the brand advantage is not obvious. If the equity investment of e-commerce platforms in NB products helps them expand the market and improve the brand advantage of NB products, then the brand advantage gap between the two products will gradually narrow, and the competition intensity will gradually increase, which will damage the profits of e-commerce platforms.
[0158] Proposition 8: The impact of introducing PB products on the optimal investment effort level and optimal profit of e-commerce platforms:
[0159] (1) When there is no equity cooperation,
[0160] (2) In the case of equity cooperation,
[0161] Proposition 8 further analyzes the impact of introducing PB products on the profits of e-commerce platforms. Regardless of whether equity investment is adopted, the introduction of PB products can bring more profit growth to e-commerce platforms, that is, the introduction of PB products is always beneficial to e-commerce platforms, so e-commerce platforms always prefer to introduce PB products. In addition, although the investment effort level will decrease with the increase of shareholding ratio under the strategy of introducing PB products, e-commerce platforms will still pay a higher level of investment effort. Combined with Proposition 5, it can be seen that the market development of NB products by e-commerce platform equity investment manufacturers has a spillover effect, which has also increased the demand for PB products. Therefore, e-commerce platforms have the motivation to increase the level of investment effort in NB products.
[0162] Furthermore, the analysis module is used to analyze the impact of shareholding ratio on the optimal decision and profit of manufacturers and e-commerce platforms through numerical simulation, and then mainly analyzes the impact of factors such as shareholding ratio φ, investment efficiency s, brand advantage λ and competition intensity b on the equity investment decision of e-commerce platforms. Assume a=50; γ=0.5; b=0.1; λ=0.5; s=0.5. As can be seen from the above, the equity investment of e-commerce platforms after the introduction of PB products is conditional. Equity cooperation will only occur when the shareholding ratio is greater than the threshold φ0. After substituting the numerical value, φ0=0.065 is obtained. Therefore, this application selects the interval of φ∈(0.1,0.5) for analysis.
[0163] The impact of shareholding ratio on optimal decision-making:
[0164] See also Figure 3 , as the shareholding ratio increases, the investment effort level of e-commerce platforms in NB products gradually decreases after the introduction of PB products, and the investment effort level of e-commerce platforms is always higher in the market competition environment. As stated in Proposition 5, the investment of e-commerce platforms in manufacturers to develop the market for NB products has a spillover effect, giving PB products the opportunity to benefit from it. In order to better cultivate PB products, e-commerce platforms will increase their investment efforts in NB products to some extent. Figure 4-6 It can be seen that when PB products are not introduced, the increase in shareholding ratio will increase the wholesale price, but equity investment can maintain the retail price unchanged and expand the market demand for NB products. After the introduction of PB products, without equity cooperation, the wholesale price, retail price and market demand of NB products, as well as the retail price and market demand of PB products are at the lowest level. At this time, the market is in the worst situation. Even if the e-commerce platform reduces the retail price of both products at the same time, it cannot increase the market demand. However, under the equity cooperation model, the situation is completely opposite. While the retail prices of the two products rise, the market demand does not decrease but increases. That is, the equity investment of the e-commerce platform has played a cooperative effect, which has alleviated the adverse effects of competition to a certain extent.
[0165] The impact of shareholding ratio on optimal profit:
[0166] from Figure 7 It can be found that, first, if equity cooperation is not considered, the introduction of PB products will damage the manufacturer's profits. At this time, the manufacturer's profits under the YN strategy are the lowest. Second, when PB products are not introduced, the manufacturer's profits are positively correlated with the shareholding ratio, while after the introduction of PB products, the manufacturer's profits are negatively correlated with the shareholding ratio, and the manufacturer's profits under equity cooperation are always greater than those without equity cooperation. Therefore, manufacturers will prefer equity cooperation. Third, equity cooperation is more beneficial to manufacturers when introducing PB products. Figure 7 It can be seen that the manufacturer's profit is the smallest under the YN strategy and the largest under the YY strategy, which shows that the equity cooperation brings greater profit increment to the manufacturer when introducing PB products. Although the introduction of PB products by e-commerce platforms is not good for manufacturers, equity cooperation not only compensates for the manufacturer's profit loss, but also brings it higher profit growth. Figure 8 This shows that regardless of whether PB products are introduced or not, the profit of the e-commerce platform always decreases as the shareholding ratio increases. And regardless of whether the equity investment strategy is adopted or not, the profit of the e-commerce platform under the introduction of PB products is always higher than the strategy of not introducing PB products, that is, the introduction of PB products is always beneficial to the e-commerce platform.
[0167] Equity investment preferences of e-commerce platforms:
[0168] Fig. 9 The figure shows the equity investment strategy of e-commerce platforms when PB products are not introduced. E-commerce platforms are more inclined to choose to invest in manufacturers when investment efficiency is higher or the shareholding ratio is smaller, which is consistent with the conclusion of Proposition 6. In addition, Fig. 9 The two figures on the left and right show that the brand advantage of PB products has no obvious impact on the investment preference of e-commerce platforms, which shows that it is reasonable to set its market demand to 0 when PB products are not introduced. Fig.10 and Fig.11 This paper analyzes the equity investment strategy of e-commerce platforms when introducing PB products. When the investment efficiency is high, or when the investment efficiency is low and the shareholding ratio is low, it is optimal for e-commerce platforms to adopt an equity investment strategy. It is worth noting that the intensity of competition can significantly increase the equity investment willingness of e-commerce platforms. In a market environment with high competition intensity, the cooperative effect of equity investment is more obvious, and e-commerce platforms can obtain higher profits by effectively adopting equity investment. In addition, the brand advantage of PB products can also promote the equity investment of e-commerce platforms, and when the market competition intensity is high, the brand advantage of PB products has a more obvious promoting effect. In other words, when the market competition is very fierce and PB products are more advantageous, it is difficult for e-commerce platforms to refuse equity cooperation. Fig.11 shown.
[0169] In summary, this application targets a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and an e-commerce platform, and considers whether the e-commerce platform introduces its own brand and whether to make equity investment. The model construction module is used to construct four game models of no introduction and no investment, no introduction but investment, introduction but no investment, and introduction and investment, to study the e-commerce platform's own brand introduction and equity investment strategy, and further use the analysis module to analyze the impact of parameters such as investment efficiency, shareholding ratio, brand advantage and competition intensity on the investment decision of the e-commerce platform. The main conclusions are as follows.
[0170] First, the introduction of private brands can always enable e-commerce platforms to obtain higher profits, while manufacturers do not always want e-commerce platforms to introduce private brands. When e-commerce platforms make equity investments in manufacturers, the introduction of private brands is beneficial to both parties, that is, equity investment alleviates the adverse effects of brand competition. Second, there are significant differences in the market development efforts of e-commerce platforms before and after the introduction of private brands. Before the introduction, the market development efforts of e-commerce platforms were unrelated to the shareholding ratio. After the introduction, increasing the shareholding ratio will reduce the market development efforts of e-commerce platforms, but it is still higher than the market development efforts without the introduction of private brands. Third, regardless of whether private brands are introduced, e-commerce platforms will adopt equity investment strategies when investment efficiency is high. When investment efficiency is not high, it is the best strategy for e-commerce platforms to invest in manufacturers with a smaller shareholding ratio. After the introduction of private brands, when the manufacturer has a large brand advantage but the gap between the brand advantages of the two products is small, or when the private brand advantage is large and the gap between the brand advantages of the two products is large, it is the best strategy for e-commerce platforms to adopt equity investment strategies. In addition, equity cooperation helps to alleviate product competition, so in a market environment with high competition intensity, e-commerce platforms will be more inclined to adopt equity investment strategies.
[0171] The present application also provides a data analysis system applied to an e-commerce platform, including:
[0172] The strategy formulation module is used to build a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and an e-commerce platform, and formulate N investment strategies based on whether the e-commerce platform introduces its own brand and whether it makes equity investment;
[0173] A model building module, used to build a profit function model of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform under each investment strategy based on the N investment strategies;
[0174] An analysis module, used to determine the profit corresponding to each investment strategy based on the profit function model of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform, and select the optimal investment strategy from the N investment strategies;
[0175] An execution module is used to introduce private brands and make equity investments based on the optimal investment strategy.
[0176] Optionally, the N investment strategies formulated by the strategy formulation module include NN strategy, NY strategy, YN strategy and YY strategy, the NN strategy indicates not introducing the e-commerce platform's own brands and not making equity investments, the NY strategy indicates not introducing the e-commerce platform's own brands but making equity investments, the YN strategy indicates introducing the e-commerce platform's own brands but not making equity investments, and the YY strategy indicates introducing the e-commerce platform's own brands and making equity investments.
[0177] Optionally, the analysis module includes:
[0178] The parameter calculation module is used to calculate the parameter range of investment efficiency, shareholding ratio, brand advantage and competition intensity, and calculate the profit corresponding to each investment strategy within the parameter range;
[0179] An analysis submodule is used to determine an optimal investment strategy based on the profit.
[0180] The data analysis system applied to the e-commerce platform can be applied to various embodiments of the above-mentioned data analysis method applied to the e-commerce platform, and can achieve the same beneficial effects, which will not be elaborated here.
[0181] The preferred specific embodiments of the present invention are described in detail above. It should be understood that a person skilled in the art can make many modifications and changes based on the concept of the present invention without creative work. Therefore, any technical solution that can be obtained by a person skilled in the art through logical analysis, reasoning or limited experiments based on the concept of the present invention on the basis of the prior art should be within the scope of protection determined by the claims.
Claims
1. A data analysis method applied to an e-commerce platform, characterized in that: include: Build a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and an e-commerce platform, and formulate N investment strategies based on whether the e-commerce platform introduces its own brand and whether it makes equity investment; Based on the N investment strategies, a profit function model of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform under each investment strategy is constructed; Determine the profit corresponding to each investment strategy based on the profit function model of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform, and select the optimal investment strategy from the N investment strategies; Introducing private brands and making equity investments based on the optimal investment strategy; The N investment strategies include NN strategy, NY strategy, YN strategy and YY strategy, wherein the NN strategy indicates not introducing the e-commerce platform's own brands and not making equity investments, the NY strategy indicates not introducing the e-commerce platform's own brands but making equity investments, the YN strategy indicates introducing the e-commerce platform's own brands but not making equity investments, and the YY strategy indicates introducing the e-commerce platform's own brands and making equity investments; Profit function model of manufacturers under NY strategy as follows: In the formula, represents the equilibrium solution of the wholesale price of the manufacturer's brand products under the NN strategy, represents the equilibrium solution of the market demand for the manufacturer's brand products, φ represents the shareholding ratio, represents the wholesale price of its branded products decided by the manufacturer under the NY strategy, represents the market demand function of the manufacturer's brand products under the NY strategy; Profit function model of e-commerce platform as follows: In the formula, represents the retail price of the manufacturer's brand products decided by the e-commerce platform under the NY strategy, s represents the cost coefficient of the e-commerce platform's market development efforts, and e m Indicates the level of investment effort made by the e-commerce platform.
2. The data analysis method applied to an e-commerce platform according to claim 1, characterized in that: Profit function model of manufacturers under NN strategy as follows: In the formula, represents the wholesale price of the manufacturer’s brand under the NN strategy, represents the product demand function of the manufacturer brand under the NN strategy; Profit function model of e-commerce platform as follows: In the formula, It represents the retail price of the manufacturer's brand products decided by the e-commerce platform under the NN strategy.
3. The data analysis method applied to an e-commerce platform according to claim 1, characterized in that: Profit function model of manufacturers under YN strategy as follows: In the formula, represents the wholesale price of the manufacturer's brand products under the YN strategy, represents the market demand function of the manufacturer's brand products under the YN strategy; Profit function model of e-commerce platform as follows: In the formula, represents the retail price of the private label products decided by the e-commerce platform under the YN strategy, represents the market demand function of the e-commerce platform’s own-brand products under the YN strategy, represents the retail price of the manufacturer's brand products decided by the e-commerce platform under the YN strategy, represents the wholesale price of the manufacturer's brand products under the YN strategy, Represents the market demand function of the manufacturer’s brand products under the YN strategy.
4. The data analysis method applied to an e-commerce platform according to claim 1, characterized in that: The profit function model of the manufacturer under the YY strategy as follows: In the formula, represents the equilibrium solution of the retail price of the manufacturer's brand products under the YN strategy, represents the equilibrium solution of the market demand function of the manufacturer’s branded products under the YN strategy, represents the wholesale price of the manufacturer’s brand under the YY strategy, represents the product demand function of the manufacturer's brand under the YY strategy; Profit function model of e-commerce platform as follows: In the formula, represents the retail price of the private label products decided by the e-commerce platform under the YY strategy, represents the market demand function of the e-commerce platform’s own-brand products under the YY strategy, represents the retail price of the manufacturer's brand products decided by the e-commerce platform under the YY strategy, s represents the cost coefficient of the e-commerce platform's market development efforts, and e m Indicates the level of investment effort made by the e-commerce platform.
5. A data analysis system applied to an e-commerce platform, characterized in that: include: The strategy formulation module is used to build a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and an e-commerce platform, and formulate N investment strategies based on whether the e-commerce platform introduces its own brand and whether it makes equity investment; A model building module, used to build a profit function model of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform under each investment strategy based on the N investment strategies; An analysis module, used to determine the profit corresponding to each investment strategy based on the profit function model of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform, and select the optimal investment strategy from the N investment strategies; An execution module, used for introducing private brands and making equity investments based on the optimal investment strategy; The N investment strategies include NN strategy, NY strategy, YN strategy and YY strategy, wherein the NN strategy indicates not introducing the e-commerce platform's own brands and not making equity investments, the NY strategy indicates not introducing the e-commerce platform's own brands but making equity investments, the YN strategy indicates introducing the e-commerce platform's own brands but not making equity investments, and the YY strategy indicates introducing the e-commerce platform's own brands and making equity investments; Profit function model of manufacturers under NY strategy as follows: In the formula, represents the equilibrium solution of the wholesale price of the manufacturer's brand products under the NN strategy, represents the equilibrium solution of the market demand for the manufacturer's brand products, φ represents the shareholding ratio, represents the wholesale price of its branded products decided by the manufacturer under the NY strategy, represents the market demand function of the manufacturer's brand products under the NY strategy; Profit function model of e-commerce platform as follows: In the formula, represents the retail price of the manufacturer's brand products decided by the e-commerce platform under the NY strategy, s represents the cost coefficient of the e-commerce platform's market development efforts, and e m Indicates the level of investment effort made by the e-commerce platform.
6. The data analysis system applied to an e-commerce platform according to claim 5, characterized in that: The analysis module comprises: The parameter calculation module is used to calculate the parameter range of investment efficiency, shareholding ratio, brand advantage and competition intensity, and calculate the profit corresponding to each investment strategy within the parameter range; An analysis submodule is used to determine an optimal investment strategy based on the profit.
