Micro-grid group competition transaction processing method considering blocking allocation and distribution fairness

Through the VCG mechanism design theory and the blocking cost sharing method, the problems of real quotation of production-type microgrids and blockage of transmission lines are solved, and the fairness and efficiency of the power market are achieved, and market efficiency losses and blockage are avoided.

CN118920436APending Publication Date: 2024-11-08STATE GRID SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC POWER CO +1
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202310499918.4
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2023-05-06
Publication Date
2024-11-08

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The marginal electricity price mechanism of nodes is difficult to promote real quotations of production-type microgrids, and it fails to effectively solve the problems of information asymmetry in the power market and transmission line blockage, resulting in market efficiency losses and imbalance in revenue and expenditure.

Method used

Based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism design theory, a value payment method adapted to the power market is proposed, and the blocking cost sharing is performed by analyzing the production microgrid's contribution to blocking, and the system's revenue and expenditure imbalance is dealt with.

Benefits of technology

Promote honest quotations of production-based microgrids, ensure that the microgrid market is orderly, efficient, fair and reasonable, avoid blockage, and ensure safe and reliable operation of the system.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention relates to a micro-grid group competition transaction processing method considering blocking allocation and distribution fairness, and belongs to the field of micro-grid group competition transaction mechanism design, and the method comprises the following steps: a production-type micro-grid offers a price to a system operator; the system operator clears the market based on the power market clearing model, allocates the blocking cost according to the contribution degree of each production-type micro-grid to blocking, and calculates the fairly allocated production-type micro-grid value according to a VCG mechanism; the production type micro-grids obtain system payment according to respective values; and the system operator processes the problem of unbalanced revenue and expenditure of the system according to the payment result, and adjusts the payment obtained by the production-type micro-grid. Compared with the prior art, the method has the advantages that blockage allocation and distribution fairness are considered, and the problem of income and expenditure imbalance is solved.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of microgrid group competition transaction mechanism design, and in particular to a microgrid group competition transaction processing method considering congestion sharing and allocation fairness. Background Art

[0002] With the deepening of my country's power market reform, building a fairer, more orderly, more open and more efficient power market payment mechanism is a key task of power system reform. Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP) is used as a trading mechanism in most domestic and foreign power markets. However, both theory and a large amount of practical experience have proved that there are many problems with locational marginal pricing in the actual power market, such as difficulty in promoting real quotations by market participants and difficulty in solving the problem of information asymmetry in the power market. Therefore, it is necessary to carry out theoretical design based on the VCG mechanism and verify relevant properties. At the same time, the reform of the power industry will also bring more competitors, greatly increasing the amount of power trading, which may cause transmission line congestion. In an idealized microgrid power market, any node's production microgrid can provide power to any consumption microgrid in the network, but the existence of congestion and power loss limits this arbitrariness. The frequent occurrence of congestion requires that congestion factors must be considered in the design of power market mechanisms.

[0003] At present, there are two main payment mechanisms for the value of electricity market designed based on the VCG mechanism: a payment mechanism based on the VCG definition and a payment mechanism based on the substitution benefit of marginal microgrids. The method of using the theory of the VCG mechanism to pay each production microgrid is to define the payment obtained by each production microgrid as the cost change of other production microgrids in the system before and after the production microgrid joins the system. The method of improving the node electricity price of the existing production microgrid based on the VCG mechanism is to only change the electricity price of the marginal production microgrid in the system, and settle the marginal production microgrid according to the quotation of the next microgrid with a higher quotation, without changing the settlement method of the remaining production microgrids in the system except the marginal microgrid. However, neither method explains in detail the impact of the production microgrid on its own payment due to its different contribution to the congestion; and for the imbalance of revenue and expenditure, it only uses the information rent method to apportion it to the consumer microgrid side, without considering that in the case of congestion, the production microgrid also contributes to the imbalance of revenue and expenditure. Summary of the invention

[0004] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a microgrid group competition transaction processing method considering congestion sharing and distribution fairness, solve the problem that the node marginal electricity price mechanism is difficult to ensure the real quotation of the production microgrid, which may lead to market efficiency loss, and consider the congestion of the transmission line at the same time. Based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism design theory, a value payment method adapted to the day-ahead power market is proposed; at the same time, due to the congestion of the system, the payment obtained by the production microgrid is different in the case of congestion and no congestion. In order to reasonably allocate the congestion cost, a congestion cost allocation method considering the contribution of the production microgrid to the congestion is proposed; starting from the contribution of the production microgrid to the congestion, the payment changes of the production microgrids with different contributions in the case of congestion and no congestion are analyzed, and the imbalance of income and expenditure is handled based on the idea of ​​​​equalization of the consumer microgrid.

[0005] This invention is based on the definition of the payment of production-type microgrids based on the VCG mechanism, and elaborates on the different impacts of production-type microgrids on their own payments due to different contributions to congestion. At the same time, considering that the power generation cost on the production-type microgrid side increases due to congestion, the total power generation cost of the system is increased, which is not conducive to meeting the property of minimizing the total cost of the system. Therefore, the production-type microgrid bears part of the imbalance of system revenue and expenditure as an economic signal, which prompts the production-type microgrid to actively avoid congestion.

[0006] The purpose of the present invention can be achieved by the following technical solutions:

[0007] A microgrid group competition transaction processing method considering congestion sharing and allocation fairness includes the following steps:

[0008] The production-oriented microgrids offer prices to the system operator;

[0009] The system operator clears the market based on the electricity market clearing model, apportions the congestion cost according to the contribution of each production microgrid to the congestion, and calculates the fairly distributed production microgrid value according to the VCG mechanism;

[0010] Production-oriented microgrids receive system payments according to their respective values;

[0011] Based on the payment results, the system operator handles the imbalance between system revenue and expenditure and adjusts the payment received by the productive microgrid.

[0012] The power market constructed by the power market clearing model is a day-ahead power market, which satisfies the following assumptions:

[0013] 1) All generators in the system are thermal power units;

[0014] 2) Each node has at most one production microgrid, and the cost function of each generator in the production microgrid has the same form, but with different coefficients;

[0015] 3) Only the unilateral market of production-type microgrids is considered, and consumption-type microgrids do not participate in the market. Consumption-type microgrids still use the LMP mechanism to settle fees;

[0016] 4) The day-ahead market clearing model using DC power flow is used without considering the active power loss and reactive power loss issues.

[0017] In a transmission network with n production microgrids, s consumption microgrids, and L lines, the day-ahead market clearing model is:

[0018]

[0019] satisfy:

[0020]

[0021]

[0022] The power generation of the production microgrid is:

[0023]

[0024] The load of the consumer microgrid is:

[0025]

[0026] The generator cost function and power constraint in the production microgrid are:

[0027]

[0028]

[0029] Among them, P represents active power, T represents the total operation time of the model, X represents the entire power market, F represents the value of the power market objective function, c represents the cost function of a production microgrid, f represents the cost of the generator, x represents the total number of generators in a production microgrid, and y represents the total number of loads in a consumption microgrid; the subscript ij represents that the physical quantity belongs to line ij, the subscript t represents that it is at a certain moment, G represents that the physical quantity belongs to the production microgrid, D represents that the physical quantity belongs to the consumption microgrid, i represents the production microgrid number, j represents the consumption microgrid number, m represents the unit number, and k represents the load number; the superscript TU represents that only thermal power units are considered; Represents a collection relationship. Represents a collection of lines. Represents a collection of thermal power units; the upper and lower horizontal lines of a physical quantity represent the upper and lower limits of the physical quantity.

[0030] The congestion cost adopts the power generation cost F under the constraint C The power generation cost F under unconstrained conditions U Definition of difference:

[0031] ΔF=F C -F U

[0032] Among them, ΔF is the congestion cost of the entire network.

[0033] The allocation of the blocking cost includes the following steps:

[0034] Based on the optimal power allocation result of branch power limit constraint, the whole network congestion cost of production microgrid is allocated to each congested branch.

[0035] Based on the congestion cost allocated to each blocked branch, the congestion cost of each production microgrid is allocated according to the contribution of the production microgrid to the blocked line to obtain the congestion cost of each production microgrid.

[0036] The congestion cost ΔF that should be shared by the blocked branch j Lj for:

[0037] ΔF Lj =ΔF×α j

[0038] Among them, α j It is defined as the allocation factor of branch j to the congestion of the production microgrid:

[0039]

[0040] represents the difference between the transmission power when branch j is unconstrained and when it is constrained; when branch j is blocked, the power limit constraint becomes an effective constraint, μ j The dual multiplier for this effective constraint; the full power network satisfies Where b is the number of blocked branches in the transmission network.

[0041] Congestion cost ΔF that production microgrid i should bear Gi for:

[0042]

[0043] Among them, β ij It is defined as the contribution of production microgrid i to blocked branch j:

[0044]

[0045] Pij P represents the active power flow contribution of production microgrid i to branch j. Based on the principle of proportional distribution, the power flow tracking method is used to track the power inflow and outflow of the same node. No production microgrid or consumption microgrid is treated differently. The part of the total power emitted by production microgrid i that flows into branch j is recorded as P ij ; represents the power of all production microgrids flowing into branch j, where m is the total number of production microgrids in the network; when branch j is blocked, its power upper or lower limit is Each blocked branch satisfies

[0046] The VCG mechanism means that the payment obtained by a production-type microgrid is the change in the cost of other production-type microgrids in the system before and after it joins the system. Its payment function is It is expressed as follows:

[0047]

[0048] in, represents the value of productive microgrid i, i.e., the payment obtained; represents the declared cost function of the production-type microgrid; f represents the total power generation cost of the system; the subscript i represents the situation after the i-th production-type microgrid joins the market, and the subscript -i represents the situation before the i-th production-type microgrid joins the market; P i * represents the optimal power generation plan of production microgrid i, which is expressed as:

[0049]

[0050] The first term on the right side of the equal sign of the payment function represents the power generation cost of all production microgrids in the system before production microgrid i joins the system; the following bracketed term represents the total power generation cost of other production microgrids except production microgrid i after production microgrid i joins the system; the difference between the two terms is the payment obtained by production microgrid i, which is the embodiment of the substitution effect of production microgrid i on other production microgrids.

[0051] The strategies for dealing with the imbalance of system revenue and expenditure include the following two:

[0052] Strategy A: Achieve system balance by reducing the revenue of the production microgrid, that is, deduct a part of the original payment made by the system to the production microgrid, which can be expressed as:

[0053]

[0054] in, To deduct the cost of the system to the production microgrid, δ i To deduct expenses;

[0055] Strategy B: By increasing the sales price of electricity, the charges on the consumer microgrid side are increased to achieve a balance between income and expenditure. That is, a part of the fees is added to the original electricity charges of the consumer microgrid to the system, which can be expressed as:

[0056]

[0057] in, To increase the electricity cost that the consumer microgrid will pay to the system, α i To increase costs.

[0058] The system operator handles the imbalance of system revenue and expenditure according to the payment results and divides it into two situations depending on whether the system is blocked:

[0059] 1) When system congestion is not considered, strategy B is used to solve the problem of imbalance between revenue and expenditure, and the system loss is allocated to the consumer microgrid side:

[0060] The total imbalance of the power system, ΔE, is expressed as the difference between the payment made by the system to the production microgrid under the VCG mechanism and the LMP mechanism under the real quotation of the production microgrid:

[0061]

[0062] Where n represents the total number of production microgrids, E i VCG (c) represents the payment of the system to the production microgrid i under the VCG mechanism when the production microgrid i actually bids, E i LMP (c) represents the payment of the system to the production microgrid i under the LMP mechanism when the production microgrid i makes a real offer;

[0063] The information rent paid by the consumer microgrid side is reflected in the form of additional electricity price:

[0064]

[0065]

[0066] in, represents the additional electricity price of information rent when there is no congestion, D represents the consumer microgrid, and d represents the total number of consumer microgrids in the system;

[0067] 2) When considering system congestion, both Strategy A and Strategy B are used to solve the problem of imbalance between revenue and expenditure. The production microgrid shares the part of the imbalance between revenue and expenditure that is equal to the congestion cost. ΔF is selected as the imbalance between revenue and expenditure that the production microgrid needs to share. The remaining part of the imbalance between revenue and expenditure, ΔE-ΔF, is borne by the consumption microgrid.

[0068] For production-type microgrids, the original payment to them is subtracted based on the congestion cost, and the payment to the production-type microgrid is reduced:

[0069]

[0070] in, represents the payment of production-type microgrid node i when the system is congested, represents the original payment to the production microgrid, ΔF Gi represents the blocking cost;

[0071] The information rent on the consumer microgrid side is reflected in the form of additional electricity price:

[0072]

[0073]

[0074] in, It represents the additional electricity price of information rent when there is congestion.

[0075] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0076] (1) Based on the VCG mechanism design theory, this paper proposes a value-fair payment mechanism that adapts to the day-ahead power market, which can promote honest quotations of production-oriented microgrids and ensure that the microgrid market is orderly, efficient, fair and reasonable;

[0077] (2) The present invention takes into account the contribution of the production microgrid to the system congestion, can fairly share the congestion cost with the production microgrid, and encourage the production microgrid to actively avoid the occurrence of congestion, thereby ensuring the safe and reliable operation of the system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0078] Figure 1 It is a flow chart of the microgrid group competition transaction processing method based on the VCG mechanism of the present invention;

[0079] Figure 2 It is a flow chart of the microgrid group competition transaction processing method based on the LMP mechanism;

[0080] Figure 3 is a topological structure diagram of a six-node system in one embodiment;

[0081] Figure 4 Obtain payment results every hour for the production microgrid G1 when there is congestion and when there is no congestion in one embodiment;

[0082] Figure 5 Obtain payment results every hour for the production microgrid G2 when there is congestion and when there is no congestion in one embodiment;

[0083] Figure 6 Obtain payment results every hour for the production microgrid G3 when there is congestion and when there is no congestion in one embodiment;

[0084] Figure 7 The profit of the production microgrid G1 per hour when there is congestion and when there is no congestion in one embodiment;

[0085] Figure 8 The profit of the production microgrid G2 per hour when there is congestion and when there is no congestion in one embodiment;

[0086] Fig. 9 The profit of the production microgrid G3 per hour when there is congestion and when there is no congestion in one embodiment;

[0087] Fig.10 is the relative net profit of the production microgrid G2 in one embodiment;

[0088] Fig.11 It is the real-time net profit of the production microgrid G2 in one embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0089] The present invention is described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments. This embodiment is implemented based on the technical solution of the present invention, and provides a detailed implementation method and specific operation process, but the protection scope of the present invention is not limited to the following embodiments.

[0090] This embodiment provides a microgrid group competition transaction processing method considering congestion sharing and allocation fairness, such as Figure 1 As shown, the following steps are included:

[0091] S1: The production microgrid offers a quotation to the system operator;

[0092] S2: The system operator clears the market based on the power market clearing model, allocates the congestion cost according to the contribution of each production microgrid to the congestion, and calculates the fairly distributed production microgrid value according to the VCG mechanism;

[0093] S3: Production-type microgrids receive system payments according to their respective values;

[0094] S4: The system operator handles the imbalance of system revenue and expenditure based on the payment results and adjusts the payment received by the production microgrid.

[0095] The flowchart of the microgrid competition transaction processing method based on the LMP mechanism is as follows: Figure 2 As shown, compared with the present invention, this method does not consider congestion cost sharing and fair allocation, and does not handle the imbalance between revenue and expenditure.

[0096] This embodiment specifically introduces the method of the present invention from the following aspects.

[0097] (1) Electricity Market Clearing Model

[0098] This embodiment adopts a direct current power flow model of the day-ahead power market. The day-ahead power market refers to a market where power transactions take place on the day before the operation day.

[0099] The following assumptions are made for the established day-ahead market:

[0100] 1) All generators in the system are thermal power units;

[0101] 2) Each node has at most one production microgrid, and the cost function of each generator in the production microgrid has the same form, but with different coefficients;

[0102] 3) Only the unilateral market of production-type microgrids is considered, and consumption-type microgrids do not participate in the market. Consumption-type microgrids still use the LMP mechanism to settle fees;

[0103] 4) The day-ahead market clearing model using DC power flow is used without considering the active power loss and reactive power loss issues.

[0104] In a transmission network with n production microgrids, s consumption microgrids, and L lines, the day-ahead market clearing model is:

[0105]

[0106] satisfy:

[0107]

[0108]

[0109] The power generation of the production microgrid is:

[0110]

[0111] The load of the consumer microgrid is:

[0112]

[0113] The generator cost function and power constraint in the production microgrid are:

[0114]

[0115]

[0116] Among them, P represents active power, T represents the total operation time of the model, X represents the entire power market, F represents the value of the power market objective function, c represents the cost function of a production microgrid, f represents the cost of the generator, x represents the total number of generators in a production microgrid, and y represents the total number of loads in a consumption microgrid. The subscript ij represents that the physical quantity belongs to line ij, the subscript t represents that it is at a certain moment, G represents that the physical quantity belongs to the production microgrid, D represents that the physical quantity belongs to the consumption microgrid, i represents the production microgrid number, j represents the consumption microgrid number, m represents the unit number, and k represents the load number. The superscript TU represents that only thermal power units are considered. Represents a collection relationship. Represents a collection of lines. Represents a collection of thermal power units. The upper and lower horizontal lines of a physical quantity represent the upper and lower limits of the physical quantity.

[0117] (2) Congestion cost allocation principle

[0118] This embodiment uses the responsibility sharing method to share the congestion cost. This method is divided into two steps. First, the congestion cost of the entire network is shared to the congested line. Then, the cost on the congested line is shared to the production microgrid based on the contribution of the production microgrid, and the payment function of the production microgrid includes the additional cost of the production microgrid caused by congestion. This setting is conducive to the settlement of payment fees for the production microgrid under the VCG mechanism. Since this article mainly studies the payment of production microgrids, this section only involves the study of sharing congestion costs to production microgrids.

[0119] The congestion cost of the entire network adopts the power generation cost F under the constraint C The power generation cost F under unconstrained conditions U The difference is defined as shown in formula (8).

[0120] ΔF=F C -F U (8)

[0121] Among them, ΔF is the congestion cost of the entire network.

[0122] The specific description of the responsibility allocation method is as follows:

[0123] In the first step, based on the optimal power allocation result of the branch power limit constraint, the whole network congestion cost ΔF of the production microgrid is allocated to each congested branch:

[0124] Define α jis the allocation factor of branch j to the production microgrid congestion, and its size is shown in formula (9).

[0125]

[0126] In formula (9), represents the difference between the transmission power when branch j is unconstrained and when it is constrained; when branch j is blocked, the power limit constraint becomes an effective constraint, μ j is the dual multiplier of this effective constraint; and by α j From the definition of Where b is the number of blocked branches in the transmission network.

[0127] Then, the blocking cost ΔF that the blocked branch j should share is Lj for:

[0128] ΔF Lj =ΔF×α j (10)

[0129] In the second step, based on the congestion cost allocated to each blocked branch, the congestion cost of each production microgrid is allocated according to the degree of use (contribution) of the production microgrid to the blocked line, and the congestion cost of each production microgrid is obtained:

[0130] Defining β ij is the contribution of production microgrid i to blocked branch j:

[0131]

[0132] P ij P represents the active power flow contribution of production microgrid i to branch j. Based on the principle of proportional distribution, the power flow tracking method is used to track the power inflow and outflow of the same node. No production microgrid or consumption microgrid is treated differently. The part of the total power emitted by production microgrid i that flows into branch j is recorded as P ij ; represents the power of all production microgrids flowing into branch j, where m is the total number of production microgrids in the network; when branch j is blocked, its power upper or lower limit is And by β ij From the definition of , we know that each blocked branch satisfies

[0133] The congestion cost ΔF that production microgrid i should bear is Gi for:

[0134]

[0135] This is the calculation process of the congestion price of each production microgrid i.

[0136] Since congestion is not conducive to the safe and stable operation of the power system, market managers need to avoid congestion during the actual operation of the power system. They should deduct the congestion cost from the payment to the production microgrid to encourage the production microgrid to actively avoid congestion.

[0137] (3) VCG mechanism in the power market

[0138] The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is applied in the electricity market. It means that the payment obtained by a production-type microgrid is the change in the cost of other production-type microgrids in the system before and after it joins the system. Its payment function It is expressed as follows:

[0139]

[0140] in, represents the value of productive microgrid i, i.e., the payment obtained; represents the declared cost function of the production-type microgrid; f represents the total power generation cost of the system; the subscript i represents the situation after the i-th production-type microgrid joins the market, and the subscript -i represents the situation before the i-th production-type microgrid joins the market; P i * represents the optimal power generation plan of production microgrid i, which is expressed as:

[0141]

[0142] The first term on the right side of the equal sign in formula (13) represents the power generation cost of all production microgrids in the system before production microgrid i joins the system; the following bracketed term represents the total power generation cost of other production microgrids except production microgrid i after production microgrid i joins the system; the difference between the two terms is the payment obtained by production microgrid i, which reflects the substitution effect of production microgrid i on other production microgrids.

[0143] The advantages of the VCG mechanism are that it can achieve the optimal allocation of microgrid resources, improve the efficiency of the microgrid power market, ensure the fairness and rationality of the value distribution of the microgrid power market, and at the same time motivate all participants to provide real bidding information.

[0144] (4) Theoretical proof of mechanism properties

[0145] This section will prove that compared with the LMP mechanism, the VCG mechanism is a more fair and reasonable value payment mechanism, starting from three aspects: incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and system cost minimization, and verify whether it meets the balance strategy.

[0146] (41) Proof of incentive compatibility theory

[0147] The incentive compatibility theory states that the interests of market participants and the entire market are consistent. Each market participant maximizes the collective interests while realizing his own interests. That is, the individual and collective goals are consistent, and there is no situation where the collective is harmed to maximize the individual interests. The dominant strategy incentive compatibility means that only when the market participants make real bids can the participant obtain the maximum profit. Here, the formula is used to derive and verify that the mechanism in this paper meets the dominant strategy incentive compatibility.

[0148] Cost functions reported in other productive microgrids When (it is assumed that the cost functions declared by other production-type microgrids except the production-type microgrid i under study are the same before and after the production-type microgrid i joins), production-type microgrid i can choose whether to make a real offer.

[0149] If the production microgrid i reports false costs The dispatch payment fee is shown in formula (13), that is:

[0150]

[0151] If the production microgrid i reports the true cost c i , then the dispatch payment fee is:

[0152]

[0153] In formula (15), P i ** Indicates the actual cost c reported by production microgrid i i , while other production-type microgrids declare cost functions The optimal power generation output plan at time is:

[0154]

[0155] For a production-type microgrid, its net profit is the fee paid by the system dispatch to the production-type microgrid minus the power generation cost of the production-type microgrid.

[0156] For the case of false quotation of production-type microgrid i, its net profit is:

[0157]

[0158] For the real quotation of production-type microgrid i, its profit is:

[0159]

[0160] Comparing formulas (17) and (18), it can be seen that the first term on the right side of the equal sign has nothing to do with the price quoted by production-type microgrid i. i ** is the real price of production microgrid i, and the cost function reported by other production microgrids For the entire microgrid power system, the power generation cost after removing the production microgrid i is is basically unchanged, while the purpose of false quotation of production-type microgrid i is to obtain more profits, then:

[0161]

[0162] Therefore, it can be concluded that the net profit of the real quotation is not less than the net profit of the false quotation, that is:

[0163]

[0164] From the above, we can see that regardless of whether other production-type microgrids make real bids, production-type microgrid i can obtain more profits by making real bids. This result is consistent with the dominant strategy incentive compatibility theory.

[0165] In the economic meaning of the VCG mechanism, when the false quotation of production microgrid i leads to a high price, the system dispatches less power generation allocated to production microgrid i, and the power of other production microgrids except production microgrid i changes little, so the power generation cost changes less, which is equivalent to a reduction in the system payment fee for production microgrid i. Therefore, false quotation makes production microgrid i less profitable. This mechanism satisfies the dominant strategy incentive compatibility theory.

[0166] (42) Proof of Individual Rationality Theory

[0167] Individual rationality means that the net profit of each production microgrid must be greater than zero, that is, each production microgrid can make a profit without incurring losses. In the case of the real quotation of production microgrid i, its net profit is shown in formula (18), that is:

[0168]

[0169] in This is equivalent to forcing the output of production microgrid i to be set to 0 in the clearing model involving all production microgrids.

[0170] Since the optimization feasible domain of the clearing model is reduced, it can be seen from the set relationship that the objective function value will not be less than the objective function value of all production-type microgrids participating in the market clearing (equivalent to ),Right now:

[0171]

[0172] From the above, it can be seen that the VCG mechanism described in the present invention satisfies the property of individual rationality.

[0173] (43) Theoretical proof of system cost minimization

[0174] The main obstacle to achieving system cost minimization is the problem of false bidding of production-type microgrids. It is proved by the incentive compatibility theory that when the incentive compatibility theory of dominant strategy is satisfied, the interests of production-type microgrids and the interests of the power market are consistent. If the problem of false bidding of production-type microgrids is solved, the system cost minimization problem will be automatically satisfied.

[0175] (5) System revenue and expenditure imbalance processing

[0176] Myerson and Satterthwaite proved based on Hurwicz impossibility theorem that there is no mechanism that satisfies incentive compatibility, individual rationality, social welfare maximization or system cost minimization, and balance of payments at the same time. The VCG mechanism considering congestion proposed in this embodiment does not satisfy the balance of system payments, that is, the electricity fee paid by the consumer microgrid user to the microgrid group power market may be less than the fee paid by the microgrid group power market to the production microgrid, and the microgrid group power market dispatch is in a state of deficit. It is expressed as follows using the mathematical formula:

[0177]

[0178] The left side of the inequality sign in formula (22) represents the fees paid by the power market to all production-type microgrids. The right side of the inequality sign represents the electricity fees paid by the consumption-type microgrid to the power market. If the consumption-type microgrid uses the LMP mechanism for settlement, then S i It can be expressed using formula (23):

[0179]

[0180] There are generally two strategies for solving the problem of balancing income and expenditure.

[0181] Strategy A: Achieve system balance by reducing the revenue of the production microgrid, that is, deduct a part of the original payment made by the system to the production microgrid, which can be expressed as:

[0182]

[0183] in, To deduct the cost of the system to the production microgrid, δ i To deduct expenses.

[0184] Strategy B: By increasing the sales price of electricity, the charges on the consumer microgrid side are increased to achieve a balance between income and expenditure. That is, a part of the fees is added to the original electricity charges of the consumer microgrid to the system, which can be expressed as:

[0185]

[0186] in, To increase the electricity cost that the consumer microgrid will pay to the system, α i To increase the cost. i This can be determined through negotiation between the system and the consumer microgrid side, spontaneous regulation of the power market, or unilateral and reasonable increase in electricity prices by the system.

[0187] When system congestion is not considered, this embodiment adopts the method of increasing charges on the consumer microgrid side (strategy B) to solve the problem of imbalance between income and expenditure; when system congestion is considered, this embodiment adopts the method of reducing payments on the production microgrid and increasing charges on the consumer microgrid side (strategy A + strategy B) to solve the problem of imbalance between income and expenditure.

[0188] (51) Allocation of revenue and expenditure imbalance in the absence of blocking:

[0189] When system congestion is not considered, strategy B is adopted to solve the problem of imbalance between revenue and expenditure, and the system loss is allocated to the consumer microgrid side.

[0190] The loss of market efficiency and the increase in node electricity prices caused by the strategic bidding of individual production microgrids under the LMP mechanism have a worse impact on the consumer microgrid side than the shared market losses. Even if the consumer microgrid only bears all system losses, the electricity fee it pays is still less than the electricity fee paid under the LMP mechanism in an imperfectly competitive market. Since this additional fee on the consumer microgrid side can be interpreted as an incentive for the real bidding of the production microgrid, it can be called information rent.

[0191] The total imbalance of the power system, ΔE, is expressed as the difference between the payment made by the system to the production microgrid under the VCG mechanism and the LMP mechanism under the real quotation of the production microgrid, as shown in formula (26):

[0192]

[0193] Where n represents the total number of production microgrids, E i VCG (c) represents the payment of the system to the production microgrid i under the VCG mechanism when the production microgrid i actually bids, E i LMP (c) represents the payment of the system to the production microgrid i under the LMP mechanism when the production microgrid i makes a real offer.

[0194] The payment information rent on the consumer microgrid side is reflected in the form of additional electricity price, as shown in formulas (27) and (28).

[0195]

[0196]

[0197] in, represents the additional electricity price of information rent when there is no congestion, D represents the consumer microgrid, and d represents the total number of consumer microgrids in the system. It is worth noting that this embodiment adopts the method of evenly allocating all information rent to the power consumption of consumer microgrids. In actual engineering applications, consumer microgrids can be further divided according to their importance, voltage level and other parameters.

[0198] (52) Allocation of revenue and expenditure imbalance in case of obstruction:

[0199] When considering system congestion, both Strategy A and Strategy B are used to solve the problem of imbalance between revenue and expenditure. The production microgrid shares the part of the imbalance between revenue and expenditure that is equal to the value of the congestion cost. ΔF is selected as the imbalance between revenue and expenditure that the production microgrid needs to share because the existence of congestion increases the total power generation cost of the system, which is not conducive to achieving the goal of minimizing system costs. By allowing the production microgrid to share the congestion cost, the economic signal of reducing the payment to the production microgrid can be used to encourage the production microgrid to actively avoid congestion. The remaining part of the imbalance between revenue and expenditure, ΔE-ΔF, is borne by the consumer microgrid side, which can still be explained by the meaning of the above information rent.

[0200] The method of allocating the congestion cost is detailed in the calculation method in (2), which subtracts the original payment to the production microgrid to reduce the payment to the production microgrid, as shown in formula (29).

[0201]

[0202] in, represents the payment of production-type microgrid node i when the system is congested, represents the original payment to the production microgrid, ΔF Gi represents the blocking cost.

[0203] The information rent on the consumer microgrid side can be obtained by analogy with the method of processing the non-blocking revenue and expenditure imbalance.

[0204] As shown in formulas (30) and (31).

[0205]

[0206]

[0207] in, It represents the additional electricity price of information rent when there is congestion.

[0208] The above-mentioned method for handling the imbalance of income and expenditure when there is a blockage is the innovation point of the present invention.

[0209] This embodiment also provides a calculation example to illustrate in detail the feasibility of the method of the present invention and its advantages over the LMP mechanism.

[0210] This embodiment adopts a 6-node system. Figure 3 Simulation analysis is performed. The production microgrid includes three conventional production microgrids (i.e., G1-G3), which are located at nodes 1, 2, and 6 respectively. The production microgrid data is shown in Table 1. There are three consumer microgrids, located at nodes 3, 4, and 5 respectively. The consumer microgrids change over time. The total amount of consumer microgrids for 24 hours a day is shown in Table 2. The three consumer microgrids share the total amount of consumer microgrids. The transmission line resistance is not considered, and the reactive power of the system is not considered.

[0211] Table 1 Production microgrid data

[0212]

[0213] Table 2 Consumer microgrid data (keep two decimal places)

[0214]

[0215]

[0216] The payment comparison between each production microgrid with and without congestion is as follows: Figure 4-Figure 6 As shown. Figure 4 — Figure 6From the analysis, it can be seen that due to the different contributions of the three production microgrids to congestion, the payments obtained by the three production microgrids are affected differently by congestion. The production microgrid G1 contributes less to congestion, and the payment obtained when there is congestion is slightly higher than when there is no congestion. The reason is that the power generation of G1 increases slightly when there is congestion. The increase in power generation can, to a certain extent, indicate that the substitution benefit of G1 to other production microgrids is enhanced, and its payment increases. The payment obtained by the production microgrid G2 when there is congestion is lower than when there is no congestion. The reason is that G2 contributes the most to the congested branch and is most affected by congestion. Its power generation decreases significantly when it is congested, and its substitution benefit to other production microgrids is weakened, and its payment decreases. The payment obtained by the production microgrid G3 when there is congestion is significantly higher than when there is no congestion. The reason is that G3 does not contribute to system congestion, its power generation increases significantly when there is congestion, its substitution benefit is significantly enhanced, and its payment increases.

[0217] The profit comparison of each production microgrid under the condition of congestion and without congestion is as follows: Figure 7-Figure 9 As shown in Table 3. Figure 7 — Fig. 9 From the analysis, it can be seen that due to the different contributions of the three production microgrids to congestion (see the imbalance of revenue and expenditure below for details), the payments obtained by the three production microgrids are affected differently by congestion. Production microgrid G1 contributes less to congestion, and its profit increases slightly. The reason is that the existence of congestion makes the increase in payment obtained by G1 greater than the increase in cost, and the enhancement of G1's substitution benefit is more significant than the increase in cost. Production microgrid G2 contributes more to congestion, and its profit decreases slightly. The reason is that the existence of congestion makes the reduction in payment obtained by G2 greater than the reduction in cost, and the reduction in G1's substitution benefit is more obvious than the reduction in cost. Production microgrid G3 does not contribute to congestion, and its profit increases significantly. The reason is that the existence of congestion makes the increase in payment obtained by G3 greater than the increase in cost, and the enhancement of production microgrid G3's substitution benefit is more obvious than the enhancement of substitution benefit.

[0218] Table 3 Total profits obtained by all production-type microgrids

[0219] Blockage Profit ($) There is obstruction 22420.4 Non-blocking 19139.9

[0220] Combined with the analysis of Table 3, it can be seen that the existence of congestion increases the total profit of all production microgrids. The main reason is that the existence of congestion significantly increases the profit of production microgrids that do not contribute to congestion, such as the profit of production microgrid G3. However, the profit of production microgrid G2, which contributes the most to congestion, decreases. This shows that the designed mechanism can, to a certain extent, encourage production microgrids to actively avoid congestion. The profit of the production microgrid that contributes the most to congestion will decrease, and it will actively avoid congestion. When the congestion situation is alleviated, the profit of production microgrids that do not contribute to congestion will also decrease.

[0221] Since the production-type microgrid G2 is most seriously affected by the congestion, this embodiment takes the production-type microgrid G2 as an example to verify that it satisfies the incentive compatibility property, the individual rationality property and the system cost minimization property.

[0222] ①Example demonstration of incentive compatibility

[0223] This paper adopts the dominant incentive compatibility theory, that is, regardless of whether other production microgrids make real bids, the real bid of production microgrid i is its own dominant strategy. From the definition, when the production microgrid makes a real bid, its profit is the largest, which means that the mechanism satisfies the dominant incentive compatibility theory. To verify this theory, it is assumed that the production microgrid makes a real bid within a certain proportion range, and the declaration coefficients are 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, and 1.6, respectively, for a total of seven sets of data.

[0224] Net profit of production microgrid R i When considering congestion conditions, the payment obtained under the VCG mechanism is deducted from the actual cost of the production microgrid, as shown in formula (32).

[0225]

[0226] During the simulation operation, the objective function, that is, the quotation of the production microgrid G2 in the system minimum total cost, is multiplied by the declaration coefficient for optimization and solution. However, when calculating the net profit of the production microgrid G2, the real cost calculation is still adopted.

[0227] The line graph of the net profit of the production microgrid and different declaration coefficients is as follows: Fig.10 shown. Fig.10 The vertical axis represents the relative net profit obtained by the production microgrid G2, with the net profit at the actual quotation as the base value. Fig.10Analysis shows that the net profit of the production microgrid is the largest only when the production microgrid G2 declares the true cost, that is, when the declaration coefficient of the production microgrid G2 is 1.0. When the declaration coefficient is less than 1.0, due to the lower quotation of the production microgrid G2, the system allocates more electricity to the production microgrid G2, but the payment increment obtained by the production microgrid G2 may not be enough to compensate for the corresponding cost of this part of the system's extra electricity allocation, and the net profit of the production microgrid will decrease. When the declaration coefficient is greater than 1.0, due to the higher quotation of the production microgrid G2, the system allocates less electricity to the production microgrid G2, and the substitution effect of the production microgrid G2 on other units is weakened, which also leads to a decrease in the net profit of the production microgrid.

[0228] Therefore, the mechanism designed by the present invention satisfies the incentive compatibility property, can promote market participants to make real quotations, and ensure the fairness and rationality of the market.

[0229] ②Example proof of individual rationality

[0230] Formula (32) shows the calculation method of the net profit of the power generation production microgrid. The hourly profit of the production microgrid G2 is as follows: Fig.11 shown.

[0231] Depend on Fig.11 It can be seen that the net profit of the production-type microgrid G2 is not less than 0, and the production-type microgrid will voluntarily participate in the market, which satisfies the nature of individual rationality.

[0232] ③Example demonstration of system cost minimization property

[0233] Since the designed mechanism satisfies the incentive compatibility property, it encourages the production microgrid to make real quotations, and the objective function of the clearing model is to minimize the real cost of the production microgrid, so the mechanism satisfies the system cost minimization property.

[0234] This embodiment also verifies the method for handling the imbalance between income and expenditure through calculation examples.

[0235] Ⅰ. Allocation of revenue and expenditure imbalance in the absence of congestion:

[0236] The information rent method is adopted. The economic meaning at this time is that since the consumer microgrid side makes a profit under the condition of the real quotation of the production microgrid, it is necessary to reward the real quotation behavior of the production microgrid.

[0237] The total payments obtained by all production-type microgrids under the VCG mechanism and LMP mechanism are shown in Table 4.

[0238] Table 4 Payments obtained by all production-type microgrids under different mechanisms

[0239] mechanism Cost ($) VCG 84079.4 LMP 78113.9

[0240] From the analysis of formulas (26)-(28), we can see that At this time, the node electricity price on the consumer microgrid side increased by an average of 1.884$ / (MW·h), and the system met the balance of payments property.

[0241] Ⅱ. Allocation of revenue and expenditure imbalance in case of congestion:

[0242] Since the existence of congestion will not only raise the node electricity price on the consumer microgrid side, but also increase the total cost of the system, it is necessary to reflect the increased congestion cost ΔF in the electricity price paid by the production microgrid. The minimum total power generation cost of the system with and without congestion is shown in Table 5.

[0243] Table 5 System minimum power generation cost

[0244] Blockage Cost ($) There is obstruction 65058.5522 Non-blocking 64939.3214

[0245] When there is congestion, the total cost of the system is greater, which is in line with the actual situation. Next, the system congestion cost is allocated. From the analysis of line transmission power, it can be seen that line 4 is only congested in the section of 9-19 o'clock, a total of 11 hours. The congestion cost of the entire network is allocated to this period. From formulas (8)-(12), the results in Tables 6 and 7 can be obtained. Only production microgrids G1 and G2 contribute to system congestion, and production microgrid G3 does not contribute to system congestion. It is considered that the congestion cost allocated to production microgrid G3 is 0.

[0246] Since only line 4 is blocked, its allocation factor α4=1.

[0247] Table 6 Contribution coefficient β size

[0248]

[0249] Table 7 Real-time situation of congestion cost

[0250]

[0251] The production microgrids G1 and G2 obtain payment by reducing the congestion costs listed in Table 7 when congestion exists, and reducing the payment to the production microgrids, so as to achieve the purpose of the production microgrids sharing part of the imbalance between revenue and expenditure.

[0252] On the consumer microgrid side, we can obtain from (30)-(31): At this time, the node electricity price on the consumer microgrid side increased by 1.935$ / (MW·h) to achieve the purpose of allocating the remaining imbalance between income and expenditure on the consumer microgrid side.

[0253] Regardless of whether congestion exists or not, the payment obtained by the production microgrid under the VCG mechanism is more than that paid by the consumer microgrid. The reason is that by adding reasonable payments to the production microgrid, the possibility of its collusion and strategic bidding is reduced, preventing the node electricity price on the consumer microgrid side from being much higher than the normal price level.

[0254] When congestion exists, the production microgrid is not conducive to meeting the minimum total power generation cost of the system due to the increase in congestion costs. Therefore, from the total imbalance of revenue and expenditure, a part equal to the value of the congestion cost is taken out and borne by the production microgrid. By reducing its payment, a part of the imbalance of revenue and expenditure is solved, and the production microgrid can be prompted to actively eliminate the congestion. The remaining imbalance of revenue and expenditure is borne by the consumer microgrid side, which is still called information rent.

[0255] The preferred specific embodiments of the present invention are described in detail above. It should be understood that a person skilled in the art can make many modifications and changes based on the concept of the present invention without creative work. Therefore, any technical solution that can be obtained by a person skilled in the art through logical analysis, reasoning, or limited experiments based on the concept of the present invention on the basis of the prior art should be within the scope of protection determined by the claims.

Claims

1. A microgrid group competition transaction processing method considering congestion sharing and allocation fairness, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: The production-oriented microgrids offer prices to the system operator; The system operator clears the market based on the electricity market clearing model, apportions the congestion costs according to the contribution of each production microgrid to the congestion, and calculates the fairly distributed production microgrid value according to the VCG mechanism; Production-oriented microgrids receive system payments according to their respective values; Based on the payment results, the system operator handles the imbalance between system revenue and expenditure and adjusts the payment received by the productive microgrid.

2. According to claim 1, a microgrid competition transaction processing method considering congestion sharing and allocation fairness is characterized in that: The power market constructed by the power market clearing model is a day-ahead power market, which satisfies the following assumptions: 1) All generators in the system are thermal power units; 2) Each node has at most one production microgrid, and the cost function of each generator in the production microgrid has the same form, but with different coefficients; 3) Only the unilateral market of production-type microgrids is considered, and consumption-type microgrids do not participate in the market. Consumption-type microgrids still use the LMP mechanism to settle fees; 4) The day-ahead market clearing model using DC power flow is used without considering the active power loss and reactive power loss issues.

3. A microgrid competition transaction processing method considering congestion sharing and allocation fairness according to claim 2, characterized in that: In a transmission network with n production microgrids, s consumption microgrids, and L lines, the day-ahead market clearing model is: satisfy: The power generation of the production microgrid is: The load of the consumer microgrid is: The generator cost function and power constraint in the production microgrid are: Among them, P represents active power, T represents the total operation time of the model, X represents the entire power market, F represents the value of the power market objective function, c represents the cost function of a production microgrid, f represents the cost of the generator, x represents the total number of generators in a production microgrid, and y represents the total number of loads in a consumption microgrid; the subscript ij represents that the physical quantity belongs to line ij, the subscript t represents that it is at a certain moment, G represents that the physical quantity belongs to the production microgrid, D represents that the physical quantity belongs to the consumption microgrid, i represents the production microgrid number, j represents the consumption microgrid number, m represents the unit number, and k represents the load number; the superscript TU represents that only thermal power units are considered; Represents a collection relationship. Represents a collection of lines. Represents a collection of thermal power units; the upper and lower horizontal lines of a physical quantity represent the upper and lower limits of the physical quantity.

4. A microgrid competition transaction processing method considering congestion sharing and allocation fairness according to claim 1, characterized in that: The congestion cost adopts the power generation cost F under the constraint C The power generation cost F under unconstrained conditions U Definition of difference: ΔF=F C -F U Among them, ΔF is the congestion cost of the entire network.

5. A microgrid competition transaction processing method considering congestion sharing and allocation fairness according to claim 4, characterized in that: The allocation of the blocking cost includes the following steps: Based on the optimal power allocation result of branch power limit constraint, the whole network congestion cost of production microgrid is allocated to each congested branch. Based on the congestion cost allocated to each blocked branch, the congestion cost of each production microgrid is allocated according to the contribution of the production microgrid to the blocked line to obtain the congestion cost of each production microgrid.

6. A microgrid competition transaction processing method considering congestion sharing and allocation fairness according to claim 5, characterized in that: The congestion cost ΔF that should be shared by the blocked branch j Lj for: ΔF Lj =ΔF×α j Among them, α j It is defined as the allocation factor of branch j to the congestion of the production microgrid: represents the difference between the transmission power when branch j is unconstrained and when it is constrained; when branch j is blocked, the power limit constraint becomes an effective constraint, μ j The dual multiplier for this effective constraint; the full power network satisfies Where b is the number of blocked branches in the transmission network.

7. A microgrid competition transaction processing method considering congestion sharing and allocation fairness according to claim 6, characterized in that: Congestion cost ΔF that production microgrid i should bear Gi for: Among them, β ij It is defined as the contribution of production microgrid i to blocked branch j: P ij P represents the active power flow contribution of production microgrid i to branch j. Based on the principle of proportional distribution, the power flow tracking method is used to track the power inflow and outflow of the same node. No production microgrid or consumption microgrid is treated differently. The part of the total power emitted by production microgrid i that flows into branch j is recorded as P ij ; represents the power of all production microgrids flowing into branch j, where m is the total number of production microgrids in the network; when branch j is blocked, its power upper or lower limit is Each blocked branch satisfies 8. A microgrid competition transaction processing method considering congestion sharing and allocation fairness according to claim 7, characterized in that: The VCG mechanism means that the payment obtained by a production-type microgrid is the change in the cost of other production-type microgrids in the system before and after it joins the system. Its payment function is It is expressed as follows: in, represents the value of productive microgrid i, i.e., the payment obtained; represents the declared cost function of the production-type microgrid; f represents the total power generation cost of the system; the subscript i represents the situation after the i-th production-type microgrid joins the market, and the subscript -i represents the situation before the i-th production-type microgrid joins the market; P i * represents the optimal power generation plan of production microgrid i, which is expressed as: The first term on the right side of the equal sign of the payment function represents the power generation cost of all production microgrids in the system before production microgrid i joins the system; the following bracketed term represents the total power generation cost of other production microgrids except production microgrid i after production microgrid i joins the system; the difference between the two terms is the payment obtained by production microgrid i, which is the embodiment of the substitution effect of production microgrid i on other production microgrids.

9. A microgrid competition transaction processing method considering congestion sharing and allocation fairness according to claim 8, characterized in that: The strategies for dealing with the imbalance of system revenue and expenditure include the following two: Strategy A: Achieve system balance by reducing the revenue of the production microgrid, that is, deduct a part of the original payment made by the system to the production microgrid, which can be expressed as: in, To deduct the cost of the system to the production microgrid, δ i To deduct expenses; Strategy B: By increasing the sales price of electricity, the charges on the consumer microgrid side are increased to achieve a balance between income and expenditure. That is, a part of the fees is added to the original electricity charges of the consumer microgrid to the system, which can be expressed as: in, To increase the electricity cost that the consumer microgrid will pay to the system, α i To increase costs.

10. A microgrid competition transaction processing method considering congestion sharing and allocation fairness according to claim 9, characterized in that: The system operator handles the imbalance of system revenue and expenditure according to the payment results and divides it into two situations depending on whether the system is blocked: 1) When system congestion is not considered, strategy B is used to solve the problem of imbalance between revenue and expenditure, and the system loss is allocated to the consumer microgrid side: The total imbalance of the power system, ΔE, is expressed as the difference between the payment made by the system to the production microgrid under the VCG mechanism and the LMP mechanism under the real quotation of the production microgrid: Where n represents the total number of production microgrids, E i VCG (c) represents the payment of the system to the production microgrid i under the VCG mechanism when the production microgrid i actually bids, E i LMP (c) represents the payment of the system to the production microgrid i under the LMP mechanism when the production microgrid i makes a real offer; The information rent paid by the consumer microgrid side is reflected in the form of additional electricity price: in, represents the additional electricity price of information rent when there is no congestion, D represents the consumer microgrid, and d represents the total number of consumer microgrids in the system; 2) When considering system congestion, both Strategy A and Strategy B are used to solve the problem of imbalance between revenue and expenditure. The production microgrid shares the part of the imbalance between revenue and expenditure that is equal to the congestion cost. ΔF is selected as the imbalance between revenue and expenditure that the production microgrid needs to share. The remaining part of the imbalance between revenue and expenditure, ΔE-ΔF, is borne by the consumption microgrid. For production-type microgrids, the original payment to them is subtracted based on the congestion cost, and the payment to the production-type microgrid is reduced: in, represents the payment of production-type microgrid node i when the system is congested, represents the original payment to the production microgrid, ΔF Gi represents the blocking cost; The information rent on the consumer microgrid side is reflected in the form of additional electricity price: in, It represents the additional electricity price of information rent when there is congestion.

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