Privacy protection distributed digital identity management method based on block chain
Through distributed anonymous identity registration and zero-knowledge proof technology, the problem of behavior link analysis attacks and pseudonym registration fault tolerance in distributed digital identity solutions is solved, efficient privacy protection and unique identity detection are achieved, and system performance and scalability are improved. .
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411063100.9
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-08-05
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-12
AI Technical Summary
The existing distributed digital identity scheme based on blockchain technology is difficult to effectively resist behavioral link analysis attacks, and some linkable pseudonym mechanisms will damage user privacy, and pseudonym registration is often centralized and difficult to tolerate faults.
A distributed anonymous identity registration (DAIR) mechanism was designed. Through verified secret sharing protocols and re-randomization technology, users can complete distributed anonymous registration of identity information without exposing their real identity, and obtain users bound to their real identity. Register a private key and generate an unlinkable one-time display token through zero-knowledge proof technology, reducing the risk of personal information leakage.
It realizes anti-witch attack ability when registering, meets the needs of privacy protection and unique identity detection, improves system efficiency, reduces the risk of personal information leakage, and optimizes the underlying blockchain network architecture through sharding technology, improving system transaction processing Performance and scalability.
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Figure CN118940316A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of information security technology, and specifically relates to a privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain. Background Art
[0002] Digital identity is a digital representation of a physical entity in the real world. It not only concerns personal information security, but also involves the establishment of trust in multiple fields such as online transactions and social interactions. It has extremely high data value and data privacy. With the in-depth development of the digital age, the number of digital identities has increased dramatically, and the risk of identity data leakage and abuse has become increasingly severe. Users' demand for autonomous control of their personal digital identities and protection of privacy has become particularly urgent.
[0003] However, traditional digital identity systems rely on centralized management and are prone to single point failures. Once the centralized entity that controls key data is attacked or fails, the stability and availability of the entire system will be seriously threatened, and the user's privacy data will also be at risk of leakage. In addition, as part of the digital identity system, digital credentials are used to verify the user's identity and attribute information, but traditional digital credentials often over-expose the user's identity information when presented, posing a risk of data leakage.
[0004] Decentralized Identity (DID), also known as distributed digital identity, based on blockchain technology, has been proposed in recent years. With its characteristics of decentralization, privacy, and cryptographic control, it provides a new method to solve the above problems. It aims to enable everyone to own and control their own digital identity from a technical level, which helps to achieve the security protection of personal privacy information. Anonymous credentials are a promising privacy protection solution in user-centric identity management.
[0005] However, existing distributed digital identity schemes based on blockchain technology still face the problem of being unable to effectively resist behavioral link analysis attacks. These schemes mainly rely on pseudonym mechanisms to protect user privacy. Although they avoid the direct use of the user's real identity in the system and protect user privacy to a certain extent, they cannot guarantee that user behaviors under the same pseudonym will not be linked. If an attacker collects enough user behavior data under the same pseudonym, he can reveal the user's profile through link analysis and may then identify the user's real identity. Although the use of an ideal one-time identity pseudonym mechanism can eliminate this potential link relationship and achieve complete anonymity of the user's identity, such systems often face the problem of Sybil attacks, which poses a serious threat to the availability and security of the system. Summary of the invention
[0006] In view of this, the purpose of the present invention is to provide a privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain to meet the need to avoid damage to user privacy.
[0007] In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides the following technical solutions:
[0008] The embodiment of the present invention provides a privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain, which is applied to a system composed of a blockchain committee and users, including: after the blockchain committee obtains a new user identity registration request sent by a user according to a verifiable secret sharing protocol, the identity commitment carried in the new user identity registration request is matched and retrieved with a locally recorded data table, the locally recorded data table is a user's real identity as a secret value according to a sharing algorithm in the verifiable secret sharing protocol, generates a share and commitment of the real identity, and sends it to the blockchain committee for acquisition; when the identity commitment carried in the new user identity registration request does not exist in the data table locally recorded by the blockchain committee, the blockchain committee uses the linear homomorphism of secret sharing to distributely calculate a user registration private key bound to the user's real identity and the blockchain committee's private key, and sends the user registration private key shares to the user respectively; when the user receives the private key share that meets the reconstruction requirement, the registration private key is reconstructed and restored; the user verifies the legitimacy of the restored registration private key according to the verification public key of the blockchain committee, and if the verification is passed, the registration is completed, and the private key and verification public key of the blockchain committee are generated according to the distributed key generation protocol when the system is initialized.
[0009] Optionally, the user is a credential requesting user, the system also includes a credential issuing committee and a credential verifying user, and the method includes: the credential requesting user obtains a complete credential from the credential issuing committee, re-randomizes the complete credential, and generates a knowledge proof of the re-randomized complete credential using the Σ protocol; the credential requesting user generates a zero-knowledge proof that the complete credential satisfies a certain predicate condition according to a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof protocol; the credential requesting user packages the re-randomized complete credential, the knowledge proof of the re-randomized complete credential, and the zero-knowledge proof that the complete credential satisfies a certain predicate condition, generates a one-time display token, and anonymously signs the one-time display token according to a registration private key obtained when the credential requesting user registers, and the registration private key obtained when the credential requesting user registers is distributedly generated by the blockchain committee; the credential requesting user sends the one-time display token and the corresponding anonymous signature to the credential verifying user; the credential verifying user verifies the anonymous signature according to the public key generated by the blockchain committee when the credential requesting user registers, and when the verification passes, verifies the legitimacy of the one-time display token according to the master public key of the credential issuing committee and the re-randomized complete credential.
[0010] Optionally, the credential requesting user obtains a complete credential from the credential issuing committee, including: the credential requesting user generates a commitment to the set of attributes that need to be signed and a proof of the set of attributes that need to be signed; the credential requesting user generates a credential request based on the commitment to the set of attributes that need to be signed and the proof of the set of attributes that need to be signed, and anonymously signs the credential request; the credential requesting user broadcasts the credential request and the anonymous signature to the credential issuing committee; after each node of the credential issuing committee receives the anonymous signature and the credential request, it verifies the legitimacy of the credential request based on the anonymous signature; when the credential request is legitimate, each node of the credential issuing committee generates a partial signature of the commitment to the attribute set, and sends the partial signature to the credential requesting user respectively; the credential requesting user de-blinds the received partial signature to obtain a partial signature of the attribute as a partial credential, and then aggregates multiple partial credentials to obtain a complete credential.
[0011] Optionally, when the identity commitment carried in the new user identity registration request does not exist in the local record data table, the blockchain committee uses the linear homomorphism of secret sharing to distributely calculate a user registration private key that is bound to the user's real identity and the blockchain committee private key, including: determining whether the identity commitment carried in the new user identity registration request is in a preset blacklist; when the identity commitment carried in the new user identity registration request is not in the preset blacklist, the blockchain committee uses the linear homomorphism of secret sharing to distributely calculate a user registration private key that is bound to the user's real identity and the blockchain committee private key, and sends the user registration private key shares to the users respectively.
[0012] Optionally, a privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain includes: the user calculates the target data according to the registered private key to obtain the target transformation data; the user encrypts the registered private key using the target encryption algorithm, and publicly discloses the encrypted private key ciphertext; the user generates a proof of the target transformation data according to the publicly disclosed encrypted private key ciphertext parameters and the user's own secret parameters; based on the target transformation data and its proof, the user generates an anonymous signature of the target data; when the data receiving user receives the anonymous signature data, a non-interactive Σ protocol is used to verify the legitimacy of the anonymous signature.
[0013] Optionally, a privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain includes: when the blockchain committee receives an anonymous credential tracking request, each node of the blockchain committee publicly resolves the anonymous credential requested for tracking; each node of the blockchain committee traverses the identity commitments of registered users stored locally, and uses the node private key share and the user's real identity share corresponding to the identity commitment to locally calculate and transform the resolved anonymous credential, and then broadcasts the calculated data to other nodes of the blockchain committee, so that multiple blockchain committee nodes can jointly verify the user's identity without exposing the user's identity; multiple blockchain committee nodes determine whether the user's registered private key hidden in the one-time display token is consistent with the user's corresponding private key hidden in the broadcast calculation data. When they are consistent, a reconstruction algorithm that verifies secret sharing is used to calculate the real identity of the anonymous credential tracking user.
[0014] Optionally, the system includes multiple blockchain committees, any blockchain committee acts as a separate shard, managing multiple users under the shard, when the user requesting identity authentication is located in the first shard, and the user responding to the identity authentication request is located in the second shard, the method also includes: when the user requesting identity authentication receives the anonymous signature and the shard sent by the user responding to the identity authentication request, initiating a request to the first shard blockchain committee to obtain the second shard blockchain committee data; the first shard blockchain communicates with the second shard blockchain across shards, and the first shard blockchain runs a consensus to upload the verification public key of the second shard blockchain committee to the chain; the user requesting identity authentication obtains the second shard blockchain committee verification public key disclosed on the first shard blockchain, and verifies the legitimacy of the identity of the user responding to the identity authentication request based on the verification public key.
[0015] Optionally, the system includes multiple blockchain committees, any blockchain committee acts as a separate shard to manage multiple users under the shard, when the credential user and the credential issuing committee are located in the first shard, and the credential verification user is located in the second shard, the method also includes: when the first shard blockchain committee receives a request initiated by the credential user to obtain the data of the second shard blockchain committee, it communicates with the second shard blockchain committee across shards; the second shard blockchain runs a consensus chain that synchronizes the master public key of the issuing committee under the management of the first shard and the verification public key of the first shard blockchain committee; the credential user sends the generated one-time display token, the master public key of the issuing committee and the verification public key of the first shard blockchain committee to the credential verification user; the credential verification user determines whether the public key of the issuing committee and the verification public key of the first shard blockchain committee are legal based on the consensus data stored on the second shard chain; if legal, the one-time display token is verified based on the master public key of the issuing committee and the verification public key of the first shard blockchain committee.
[0016] Optionally, before the credential requesting user generates a commitment to the set of attributes to be signed and a proof of the set of attributes to be signed, it includes: setting the bilinear group parameters required for the signature and its bilinear mapping, and the issuance threshold; running the distributed key generation protocol to generate a private key share for each credential issuance committee node, and obtaining the credential issuance committee master public key based on the private key share of each credential issuance committee node.
[0017] The present invention provides a privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain. Aiming at the problem that the existing distributed digital identity scheme adopts a partially linkable pseudonym mechanism which damages user privacy and pseudonym registration is often centralized and difficult to tolerate faults, a distributed anonymous identity registration (DAIR) mechanism is designed. The mechanism allows users to complete distributed anonymous registration of identity information without exposing their real identities, obtain a user registration private key bound to their real identities, reduce dynamic storage of user identity mapping relationships, improve system efficiency, and achieve anti-sybil attack capability through uniqueness detection of registered identity commitments during registration, while meeting the requirements of privacy protection and unique identity detection.
[0018] The present invention provides a privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain. Through re-randomization and zero-knowledge proof technology, users can prove the validity of their credentials or meet specific conditions without revealing the specific content of their personal credentials. Re-randomization makes the one-time display token generated last unlinkable, which can resist potential behavioral analysis attacks, which greatly reduces the risk of personal information leakage. In addition, the registered private key obtained when the user registers is used to anonymously sign the one-time display token of the anonymous credential. When verifying the signatures of different users, the verification public key of the blockchain committee is used. The verifier cannot distinguish the specific identity of the signing user, but only knows that it is a legitimate user authenticated by the blockchain committee, thereby protecting the user's privacy. Since the private key is unique to the user, using the private key for signing can ensure that only the real user can generate a valid signature, thereby preventing forgery and fraud. In addition, the user does not need to perform a complex interaction or identity authentication process every time a transaction or verification is performed, but only needs to use the private key for signing, which simplifies the entire process. At the same time, by adopting sharding technology to optimize the underlying blockchain network architecture, the network parallelism is improved, thereby greatly improving the system transaction processing performance, enhancing the system scalability, and can well meet the large-scale user identity management needs in real applications.
[0019] Other advantages, objectives and features of the present invention will be described in the following description and will be apparent to those skilled in the art to some extent, or those skilled in the art may be taught from the practice of the present invention. The objectives and other advantages of the present invention may be realized and obtained through the following description. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0020] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and beneficial effects of the present invention clearer, the present invention provides the following drawings for illustration:
[0021] Figure 1 A specific example flow chart of a privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain provided by the present invention;
[0022] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the registration process of the distributed anonymous identity registration mechanism provided by the present invention;
[0023] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of a system to which the present invention is applicable;
[0024] Figure 4 A flowchart of the interaction between a credential requesting user and a credential verifying user during the display and verification process of the anonymous credential provided by the present invention;
[0025] Figure 5 A flowchart of the interaction between the credential requesting user and the credential issuing committee in the process of requesting and obtaining the anonymous credential provided by the present invention;
[0026] Figure 6 The flowchart of the interaction between the credential issuing committee, the credential requesting user, and the credential verifying user after the credential requesting and obtaining process and the credential displaying and verifying process provided by the present invention are combined is also the main flowchart of the distributed attribute-based anonymous credential protocol provided by the present invention;
[0027] Figure 7 It is a schematic diagram of a system including multiple shards in an embodiment of the present invention, and is also an overview diagram of an anonymous distributed digital identity management solution based on sharded blockchain provided in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0028] The technical solution of the present invention will be described clearly and completely below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.
[0029] In the description of the present invention, it should be noted that, unless otherwise clearly specified and limited, the terms "installed", "connected", and "connected" should be understood in a broad sense, for example, it can be a fixed connection, a detachable connection, or an integral connection; it can be a mechanical connection or an electrical connection; it can be a direct connection, or it can be indirectly connected through an intermediate medium, it can also be the internal connection of two components, it can be a wireless connection, or it can be a wired connection. For ordinary technicians in this field, the specific meanings of the above terms in the present invention can be understood according to specific circumstances.
[0030] In addition, the technical features involved in the different embodiments of the present invention described below can be combined with each other as long as they do not conflict with each other.
[0031] In order to solve the problems in the background technology and achieve the purpose of reducing user privacy infringement and improving system efficiency, the present invention comprehensively applies a variety of distributed cryptography and blockchain technologies. The mathematical difficulties that the security of the present invention relies on are as follows:
[0032] Definition 1 (Difficult discrete logarithm problem): Assume that the group is a prime p-order multiplicative cyclic group with g as the generator. p For a number x chosen uniformly at random, U = g x , an adversary in probabilistic polynomial time It is difficult to calculate x from U, that is, its output x′ makes g x′ =U has a negligible probability.
[0033] Definition 2 (q-DHI difficulty problem, Diffie-Hellman inversion, DHI): Consider a group with generator g Given a tuple Probabilistic Polynomial Time Adversary It is difficult to calculate That is, when it is known (g, g x , …, g (xq) ) the output is equal to The probability of is negligible.
[0034] Definition 3 (q-DBDHI difficulty problem, Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion, DBDHI): Consider a bilinear mapping in and is a (multiplicative) cyclic group of prime order p, g and They are and Generator of , e: is a bilinear map. Given a tuple (g, g x , …, g (xq) )and Probabilistic Polynomial Time Adversary It is difficult to distinguish and a random number T.
[0035] The system architecture of the present invention is as follows:
[0036] The system mainly includes four parts: the Chain Committee, the Credential Issue Committee (CI), the Credential User (CU) and the Credential Verifier (CV). The Blockchain Committee is composed of a blockchain node cluster, which meets the basic distributed threshold security assumption. It is responsible for the distributed registration of anonymous identities of users within the shard, the audit and accountability of users' real identities, and the tracking of users' anonymous credentials. At the same time, it constitutes a blockchain shard in the sharded blockchain network and is responsible for the management of the identity system. The Credential Issuing Committee is composed of a distributed authoritative node cluster and is responsible for issuing distributed anonymous credentials for user identity attributes. Credential requesting users refer to entities that have certain attributes and hope to obtain credential verification user services by requesting and displaying credentials. They are also credential users, that is, users in the system. Credential verification users refer to entities that need to verify user attribute credentials for access control in Internet services, such as Internet service providers and decentralized applications.
[0037] The anonymous distributed digital identity system architecture designed by the present invention is mainly divided into the following two layers: Figure 3 As shown:
[0038] First, the DID identity management system layer based on sharded blockchain: It is composed of many trusted blockchain shards, each shard is composed of many blockchain committee nodes, and one blockchain committee is a shard. This layer is transparent to users and is mainly responsible for the registration, storage and management of user anonymous identity information.
[0039] Second, user application layer: This layer is mainly for end users and various application services, providing various identity authentication and authorization functions based on anonymous identities and distributed anonymous credentials, and can also implement access control for different services. It can be divided into three categories according to the role, the credential request user (also the credential user) CU, the credential issuance committee CI and the credential verification user CV. The purpose of the credential user CU is to authenticate and prove the attributes (authorization) of the credential verification user CV in order to obtain its services. To this end, it needs to register its identity and obtain a legal credential from the issuance committee CI (i.e. the authority).
[0040] The embodiment of the present invention provides a privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain, which is applied to a system composed of a blockchain committee and users, such as Figure 1 As shown, the method includes:
[0041] S101, after the blockchain committee obtains the new user identity registration request sent by the user according to the verifiable secret sharing protocol, it matches and retrieves the identity commitment carried in the new user identity registration request with the locally recorded data table. The locally recorded data table is the user's real identity as the secret value according to the sharing algorithm in the verifiable secret sharing protocol, generates the real identity share and commitment, and sends them to the blockchain committee;
[0042] S102, when the identity commitment carried in the new user identity registration request does not exist in the data table recorded locally by the blockchain committee, the blockchain committee uses the linear homomorphism of secret sharing to distributely calculate a user registration private key bound to the user's real identity and the blockchain committee's private key, and sends the user registration private key shares to the user respectively;
[0043] S103, when the user receives the private key share that meets the reconstruction requirements, the registered private key is reconstructed and restored;
[0044] S104, the user verifies the legitimacy of the restored registration private key based on the verification public key of the blockchain committee. If the verification passes, the registration is completed. The private key and verification public key of the blockchain committee are generated according to the distributed key generation protocol when the system is initialized.
[0045] For example, the present invention designs a distributed anonymous identity registration mechanism (Distributed Anonymous Identity Registration, DAIR), and the registration process can be mainly divided into three steps, such as Figure 2 As shown, first, users can verify and secretly share their real identities; then, the blockchain committee nodes (registration committee nodes) conduct uniqueness detection and identity accountability, which can be specifically based on the user identity combined with the government's untrustworthy list to monitor the uniqueness of the user identity and conduct regular accountability; finally, the blockchain committee (registration committee) distributes and issues user registration private key pairs. In this mechanism, the blockchain committee is mainly responsible for registration, so it is also called the registration committee. For ease of understanding, the following expressions in this embodiment are all referred to as the registration committee.
[0046] Step 1: Sharing the verifiable secret of the user’s real identity
[0047] (1) Users have limited domains The real identity s (such as the unique ID number in the real world) is used as the secret value and the sharing algorithm ShareGen(s)→({s i},{C i}), generate the share {s i} and the corresponding commitment {C j}, broadcast the commitment publicly to all nodes in the registration committee, and send the share values to the corresponding nodes in the registration committee.
[0048] (2) The nodes in the registration committee use the verification algorithm ShareVerify(s) in the verifiable secret sharing. i ,{C j})→{0,1} Verify the received shares and record the commitment data and legal user shares locally. If the verification fails, the user is required to re-share and send legal shares. After all shares are verified to be legal, the registration committee node will synchronously store the public commitment g in the local database s With each verified legitimate share i .
[0049] Step 2: User identity uniqueness detection and regular accountability
[0050] (1) When a new user registers his / her identity, the registration committee node will commit to his / her public identity g s A matching search is performed in the locally stored data table. Only data that have not appeared in the registered data can pass the test and be effectively registered, ensuring the uniqueness of the user's registered identity.
[0051] (2) As an optional solution, in this embodiment, the registration committee can check the identity of the user to be registered, map the identity blacklist to the corresponding commitment list, and then search and check whether the user's commitment is on the blacklist when registering. Users on the blacklist will have their registration requests rejected. For example, the blacklist is a list of untrustworthy persons from the government. The government's untrustworthy person blacklist may be updated from time to time. During operation, the system can regularly search and check the stored commitment identity data table based on the updated blacklist, which only requires a simple database search and match.
[0052] (3) When a malicious user is found in the system, the registration committee can run the reconstruction algorithm Recon(A, {s i} i∈A )→s, using more than t verified valid shares, the real identity s of the malicious user is restored according to the Lagrange polynomial interpolation.
[0053] Step 3: Distributed issuance of user registration private keys
[0054] The protocol DAIR describes the process in which a user secretly shares his unique real identity s and obtains the registration private key bound to s distributedly issued by the registration committee after passing the above verification test. The main steps are described as follows:
[0055] (1) The registration committee obtains the legitimate share {s i}, the distributed key generation protocol (Distributed Key Generation, DKG) is used to jointly generate the private key {csk i} and a common verification public key cvk. The DGK protocol eliminates the need to introduce additional centralized trusted third parties to distribute keys, and each node only has its own partial private key. The DKG protocol only requires a one-time setup at the initialization of the system.
[0056] (2) The registration committee uses the linear homomorphism of secret sharing to distribute and compute a verifiable random function VRF csk Output of (s) The shares are sent to the users as the share values of the users' registered private keys.
[0057] (3) After the user receives enough private key shares, he can reconstruct and restore his registered private key
[0058] (4) For the received private key pair, the user uses the registration committee's verification public key cvk to verify the legitimacy of the private key issued by the registration committee.
[0059] The complete detailed description is as follows:
[0060]
[0061]
[0062] The invention provides a privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain. In view of the problem that the existing distributed digital identity scheme adopts a partially linkable pseudonym mechanism, which will damage the privacy of users and pseudonym registration is often centralized and difficult to tolerate faults, a distributed anonymous identity registration (DAIR) mechanism is designed. The mechanism allows users to complete the distributed anonymous registration of identity information without exposing their real identities, obtain a user registration private key bound to their real identities, reduce the dynamic storage of user identity mapping relationships, improve system efficiency, and achieve anti-sybil attack capabilities by detecting the uniqueness of the registered identity commitment during registration, while meeting the requirements of privacy protection and unique identity detection. The mechanism can be used as a basis for the design of a distributed attribute-based anonymous credential protocol, and can avoid the adverse effects of centralized pseudonym registration.
[0063] As an optional implementation, when a user requests a credential, such as Figure 3 As shown, the system also includes a credential issuing committee and a credential verification user, and the method includes:
[0064] The credential requesting user obtains the complete credential from the credential issuing committee, re-randomizes the complete credential, and uses the Σ protocol to generate a proof of knowledge of the re-randomized complete credential;
[0065] The credential requesting user generates a zero-knowledge proof that the complete credential satisfies certain predicate conditions according to a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof protocol;
[0066] The credential requesting user packages the re-randomized complete credential, the knowledge proof of the re-randomized complete credential, and the zero-knowledge proof that the complete credential satisfies certain predicate conditions to generate a one-time display token, and anonymously signs the one-time display token based on the registration private key obtained when the credential requesting user registers. The registration private key obtained when the credential requesting user registers is distributedly generated by the blockchain committee;
[0067] The credential requesting user sends a one-time display token and the corresponding anonymous signature to the credential verifying user;
[0068] The credential verification user verifies the anonymous signature based on the public key generated by the blockchain committee when the credential is requested by the user to register. When the verification is successful, the legitimacy of the one-time display token is verified based on the master public key of the credential issuance committee and the re-randomized complete credential.
[0069] Exemplarily, this embodiment describes the display and verification process of credentials in the Distributed Attribute-based Anonymous Credential (DAAC), such as Figure 4 As shown, an interaction takes place between the credential requesting user and the credential verifying user. Credential presentation is implemented by an unlinkable one-time display token stoken, which is based on the complete legal credential σ for the attribute set obtained by the credential requesting user. The main steps are as follows:
[0070] (1) When a credential requesting user who has obtained a legitimate credential presents the credential to a credential verifying user, the obtained complete signature is first re-randomized locally;
[0071] (2) Use the Σ protocol to prove that it has the legal signature of the issuing committee on its attribute set, ensuring that its attributes are authenticated. At the same time, select a suitable non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (NIZK) to prove the validity of a predicate relationship on the signed attribute set.
[0072] (3) Finally, combined with the anonymous signature algorithm, it is proved that the display token does come from the registered legitimate user while maintaining anonymity and unlinkability.
[0073] The complete algorithm description of the credential display and verification process in the distributed attribute-based anonymous credential, that is, the sub-protocol DAAC-Show, is as follows:
[0074]
[0075]
[0076] The present invention provides a privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain. Through re-randomization and zero-knowledge proof technology, users can prove the validity of their credentials or meet specific conditions without revealing the specific content of their personal credentials. Re-randomization makes the one-time display token generated at the end unlinkable and can resist potential behavioral analysis attacks, which greatly reduces the risk of personal information leakage. In addition, the registered private key obtained when the user registers is used to anonymously sign the one-time display token of the anonymous credential. When verifying the signatures of different users, the verification public key of the blockchain committee is used. The verifier cannot distinguish the specific identity of the signing user, but only knows that it is a legitimate user authenticated by the blockchain committee, thereby protecting the user's privacy. Since the private key is unique to the user, using the private key for signing can ensure that only the real user can generate a valid signature, thereby preventing forgery and fraud. In addition, the user does not need to perform a complex interaction or identity authentication process every time a transaction or verification is made, but only needs to use the private key for signing, which simplifies the entire process.
[0077] As an optional implementation, the credential requesting user obtains a complete credential from the credential issuing committee, including:
[0078] The credential requests the user to generate a commitment to the set of attributes to be signed and a proof about the set of attributes to be signed;
[0079] The credential requesting user generates a credential request based on the commitment to the attribute set to be signed and the proof of the attribute set to be signed, and anonymously signs the credential request;
[0080] The credential requesting user broadcasts the credential request and anonymous signature to the credential issuing committee;
[0081] After receiving the anonymous signature and the credential request, each node of the credential issuance committee verifies the legitimacy of the credential request based on the anonymous signature;
[0082] When the credential request is legitimate, each node of the credential issuance committee generates a partial signature of the commitment to the attribute set and sends the partial signature to the credential requesting user;
[0083] The credential requesting user de-blinds the received partial signature to obtain a partial signature on the attribute as a partial credential, and then aggregates multiple partial credentials to obtain a complete credential.
[0084] Exemplarily, this embodiment describes the process of requesting and obtaining credentials in the Distributed Attribute-based Anonymous Credential (DAAC) protocol, and performs interaction between a credential issuing committee and a credential requesting user.
[0085] The main steps are as follows Figure 5 As shown, including:
[0086] (1) The credential requesting user (a user registered with an anonymous identity) requests a credential from the credential issuing committee, which includes a Pedersen commitment to the set of attributes to be signed and a proof about the set of attributes.
[0087] (2) The Credential Issuing Committee verifies the user's identity based on the user's request.
[0088] (3) After verification, the Credential Issuing Committee generates a threshold PS signature on the attribute set of the credential requesting user and issues a partial credential.
[0089] (4) The credential requesting user locally de-blinds part of the signature / credential and then aggregates it to obtain the complete credential. The user can also locally verify the legitimacy of the complete credential.
[0090] The request and acquisition process of the credential in the distributed attribute-based anonymous credential, that is, the complete algorithm of the sub-protocol DAAC-Obtain is described as follows:
[0091]
[0092]
[0093] Will Figure 4 The display and verification process of the credentials is Figure 5 The request and acquisition process of the credential is combined, see Figure 6 , Figure 6 The entire process of requesting, obtaining, displaying and verifying credentials is clearly described.
[0094] The present invention provides a privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain. Through anonymous signature, the user's request is sent and verified without revealing his or her identity information, thereby protecting the user's identity privacy. At the same time, cryptographic commitment and blinding technology are used to hide the user's sensitive attributes from the issuing committee during the credential acquisition process, further improving the user's privacy protection. In the method, the credential issuing committee is composed of multiple nodes, which realizes decentralization, reduces the risk of single point failure, and improves the reliability of the system.
[0095] As an optional implementation method, a privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain includes:
[0096] The user calculates the target data according to the registered private key to obtain the target transformation data;
[0097] The user uses the target encryption algorithm to encrypt the user's registered private key and publishes the encrypted private key ciphertext;
[0098] The user generates proof of the target transformation data based on the public encryption private key ciphertext parameters and the user's own secret parameters;
[0099] Generate the user's anonymous signature on the target data based on the target transformation data and its proof;
[0100] When the data receiving user receives the anonymously signed data, the non-interactive Σ protocol is used to verify the legitimacy of the anonymous signature.
[0101] Exemplarily, this embodiment implements anonymous identity authentication in the Distributed Attribute-based Anonymous Credential (DAAC) protocol, so that other entities do not reveal the identity of the user when authenticating the user's identity. They can only know that the user is a legitimate user registered by the distributed trusted identity management agency (blockchain committee / registration committee) that maintains the sharded blockchain, thereby achieving identity anonymity and efficient trust.
[0102] The detailed algorithm description of the AS subprotocol for anonymous identity authentication in the Distributed Attribute-Based Anonymous Credentials (DAAC) protocol is as follows:
[0103]
[0104]
[0105] It should be noted that the target data may be any data that needs to be signed, such as a one-time display token. This embodiment does not limit the type of the target data, and those skilled in the art may determine it as needed.
[0106] The present invention provides a privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain. The target data is calculated by the user's registered private key, and the corresponding certificate is generated by using a non-interactive ∑ protocol, thereby realizing anonymous signature. Since the verification public key ckv of the same blockchain committee is used to verify the signatures of different users, other entities do not expose the user's identity when authenticating the user's identity. They can only know that the user is a legitimate user registered by a distributed trusted identity management agency (blockchain committee) that maintains the sharded blockchain, thereby realizing anonymous identity authentication and efficient trust, and protecting the user's privacy.
[0107] As an optional implementation method, a privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain includes:
[0108] When the blockchain committee receives an anonymous credential tracking request, each node of the blockchain committee publicly resolves the anonymous credential requested for tracking;
[0109] Each node of the blockchain committee traverses the identity commitments of registered users stored locally, and uses the node private key share and the user's real identity share corresponding to the identity commitment to calculate and transform the parsed anonymous credentials locally, and then broadcasts the calculated data to other nodes of the blockchain committee, so that multiple blockchain committee nodes can jointly verify the user's identity without exposing the user's identity;
[0110] Multiple blockchain committee nodes determine whether the user registration private key hidden in the one-time display token is consistent with the user's corresponding private key hidden in the broadcasted calculation data. If they are consistent, the reconstruction algorithm of verifiable secret sharing is used to calculate the anonymous credential to track the user's true identity.
[0111] Exemplarily, this embodiment is used to implement threshold tracking in the Distributed Attribute-based Anonymous Credential (DAAC) protocol to achieve a better balance between anonymity and supervision to meet the legal and regulatory requirements in practical applications. The method of this embodiment distributes the tracking right to multiple trackers, namely the blockchain committee. The tracking algorithm can only be successfully executed when more than a threshold number of trackers cooperate. The main steps are as follows:
[0112] (1) When anonymous credentials are used maliciously or a post-audit is conducted to track the true identity of the credential owner, the Blockchain Committee will verify its audit authority based on the credential tracking application and perform identity threshold tracking on the submitted one-time display token.
[0113] (2) Using an equation based on bilinear mapping, the blockchain committee performs a distributed computing search to determine whether the user registration private key hidden in the one-time display token is consistent with the user private key (the user's unique real identity) hidden in the registration information.
[0114] (3) Once the match is confirmed, the real identity s of the malicious credential owner can be revealed through the Shamir secret reconstruction algorithm.
[0115] The threshold tracing subprotocol DAAC-TT (DAAC Threshold Trace) in the Distributed Attribute-Based Anonymous Credentials Protocol (DAAC) is described as follows:
[0116]
[0117]
[0118] The present invention provides a privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain, which distributes tracking rights to multiple trackers, can threshold tracking and reveal the real identity of the owner of malicious credentials. Since it does not directly use information related to user privacy (such as the user's complete private key pair and the user's real identity), the real identity of a specific owner is revealed only after confirming a consistent match, thereby not compromising the anonymity and privacy of other legitimate users in the system, and providing a better balance between anonymity and supervision.
[0119] As an optional implementation method, the Distributed Attribute-based Anonymous Credential (DAAC) protocol is constructed by various sub-protocols, including the AS sub-protocol, the DAAC-Obtain sub-protocol, the DAAC-Show sub-protocol, and the DAAC-TT sub-protocol. In addition to the above sub-protocols, the system using the distributed attribute-based anonymous credential also needs to be initialized. The initialization process includes: setting the bilinear group parameters required for the signature and its bilinear mapping, and the issuance threshold; running the distributed key generation protocol to generate a private key share for each credential issuance committee node, and obtaining the credential issuance committee master public key based on the private key share of each credential issuance committee node.
[0120] The system initialization sub-protocol (DAAC-Set) describes the system initialization operations of distributed attribute-based anonymous credentials, as follows:
[0121]
[0122]
[0123] As an optional implementation, Figure 7 As shown, the system includes multiple blockchain committees, any blockchain committee acts as a separate shard, managing multiple users under the shard, when the user requesting identity authentication is located in the first shard, the user responding to the identity authentication request (the user whose identity is verified) is located in the second shard, and the method further includes:
[0124] When the user requesting identity verification receives the anonymous signature and the shard sent by the user responding to the identity verification request, a request is made to the first shard blockchain committee to obtain the data of the second shard blockchain committee;
[0125] The first shard blockchain communicates with the second shard blockchain across shards. The first shard blockchain runs a consensus to put the verification public key of the second shard blockchain committee on the chain.
[0126] The user requesting identity authentication obtains the second shard blockchain committee verification public key disclosed on the first shard blockchain, and verifies the legitimacy of the identity of the user responding to the identity authentication request based on the verification public key.
[0127] For example, the entire system is composed of many trusted blockchain shards, each of which is composed of many blockchain committee nodes. A blockchain committee acts as a shard and manages multiple users under the shard. Based on the sharding architecture of blockchain, different fields in actual application scenarios can be sharded, such as the medical field as a shard and the financial field as a shard. Users can register anonymous identities in shards in different fields according to different needs.
[0128] The algorithm for cross-shard anonymous identity authentication is as follows:
[0129]
[0130] The present invention provides a privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain. In a system with large-scale users, the sharded blockchain framework is used to improve the scalability of the system, while adapting to the needs of domain management in real application scenarios. The above method provides a user identity authentication method between shards, realizes data sharing between different shards, and solves the problem of data islands. At the same time, by using blockchain technology and cryptographic methods, the security and immutability of the entire verification process are increased.
[0131] As an optional implementation, Figure 7 As shown, the system includes multiple blockchain committees, and any blockchain committee acts as a separate shard to manage multiple users under the shard. When the credential user and the credential issuing committee are located in the first shard, and the credential verification user is located in the second shard, the method further includes:
[0132] When the first shard blockchain committee receives a request initiated by the credential user to obtain data of the second shard blockchain committee, it communicates with the second shard blockchain committee across shards;
[0133] The second shard blockchain runs the consensus chain to synchronize the master public key of the issuing committee under the management of the first shard and the verification public key of the first shard blockchain committee;
[0134] The credential user sends the generated one-time display token, the master public key of the issuing committee, and the verification public key of the first shard blockchain committee to the credential verification user;
[0135] The credential verification user determines whether the public key of the issuing committee and the verification public key of the first shard blockchain committee are legitimate based on the consensus data stored on the second shard chain;
[0136] If it is legitimate, the one-time display token is verified based on the master public key of the issuing committee and the verification public key of the first shard blockchain committee.
[0137] Exemplarily, the cross-shard usage and verification algorithm of anonymous credentials is as follows:
[0138]
[0139] The present invention provides a privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain. In a system of large-scale users, the scalability of the system is improved by combining a sharded blockchain framework, while adapting to the needs of domain-specific management in real application scenarios. The method also provides a credential verification method between shards, realizes data sharing and cross-domain management between different shards, and solves the problem of data islands.
[0140] Based on the above description of the distributed anonymous identity registration mechanism (Distributed Anonymous Identity Registration, DAIR) and the distributed attribute-based anonymous credential (Distributed Attribute-based Anonymous Credential, DAAC) protocol, combined with the above-designed DAIR and DAAC protocols and sharded blockchain architecture, an anonymous distributed digital identity (Anonymous Distributed Identity, ADID) scheme based on sharded blockchain is given here. This scheme describes how to implement anonymous digital identity management in the system through the above method, mainly including system initialization, anonymous decentralized identity (DID) registration, intra-shard (cross-shard) anonymous identity authentication, issuance and use of distributed anonymous credentials, cross-shard display verification, and threshold tracking.
[0141]
[0142]
[0143]
[0144] Finally, it should be noted that the above preferred embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention rather than to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail through the above preferred embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that various changes can be made in form and details without departing from the scope defined by the claims of the present invention.
Claims
1. A privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain, characterized in that: Applicable to the system composed of blockchain committees and users, including: After the blockchain committee obtains the new user identity registration request sent by the user according to the verifiable secret sharing protocol, it matches and retrieves the identity commitment carried in the new user identity registration request with the locally recorded data table. The locally recorded data table is the user's real identity as the secret value according to the sharing algorithm in the verifiable secret sharing protocol, generates the real identity share and commitment, and sends it to the blockchain committee; When the identity commitment carried in the new user identity registration request does not exist in the data table recorded locally by the blockchain committee, the blockchain committee uses the linear homomorphism of secret sharing to distribute and calculate a user registration private key that is bound to the user's real identity and the blockchain committee's private key, and sends the user registration private key shares to the user respectively; When the user receives the private key share that meets the reconstruction requirements, the registered private key is restored through reconstruction; The user verifies the legitimacy of the recovered registration private key based on the verification public key of the blockchain committee. If the verification passes, the registration is completed. The private key and verification public key of the blockchain committee are generated according to the distributed key generation protocol when the system is initialized.
2. According to claim 1, a privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain is characterized in that: The user is a credential requesting user, the system further includes a credential issuing committee and a credential verifying user, and the method includes: The credential requesting user obtains the complete credential from the credential issuing committee, re-randomizes the complete credential, and uses the Σ protocol to generate a proof of knowledge of the re-randomized complete credential; The credential requesting user generates a zero-knowledge proof that the complete credential satisfies certain predicate conditions according to a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof protocol; The credential requesting user packages the re-randomized complete credential, the knowledge proof of the re-randomized complete credential, and the zero-knowledge proof that the complete credential satisfies certain predicate conditions to generate a one-time display token, and anonymously signs the one-time display token based on the registration private key obtained when the credential requesting user registers. The registration private key obtained when the credential requesting user registers is distributedly generated by the blockchain committee; The credential requesting user sends a one-time display token and the corresponding anonymous signature to the credential verifying user; The credential verification user verifies the anonymous signature based on the verification public key generated by the blockchain committee when the credential request user registers. When the verification is successful, the legitimacy of the one-time display token is verified based on the master public key of the credential issuance committee and the re-randomized complete credential.
3. According to claim 2, a privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain is characterized in that: The credential requester obtains a complete credential from the credential issuing committee, including: The credential requests the user to generate a commitment to the set of attributes to be signed and a proof about the set of attributes to be signed; The credential requesting user generates a credential request based on the commitment to the attribute set to be signed and the proof of the attribute set to be signed, and anonymously signs the credential request; The credential requesting user broadcasts the credential request and anonymous signature to the credential issuing committee; After receiving the anonymous signature and the credential request, each node of the credential issuance committee verifies the legitimacy of the credential request based on the anonymous signature; When the credential request is legitimate, each node of the credential issuance committee generates a partial signature of the commitment to the attribute set and sends the partial signature to the credential requesting user; The credential requesting user de-blinds the received partial signature to obtain a partial signature on the attribute as a partial credential, and then aggregates multiple partial credentials to obtain a complete credential.
4. A privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain according to any one of claims 2-3, characterized in that: When the identity commitment carried in the new user identity registration request does not exist in the local record data table, the blockchain committee uses the linear homomorphism of secret sharing to distribute and calculate a user registration private key that is bound to the user's real identity and the blockchain committee private key, including: Determine whether the identity commitment carried in the new user identity registration request is in the preset blacklist; When the identity commitment carried in the new user's identity registration request is not in the preset blacklist, the blockchain committee uses the linear homomorphism of secret sharing to distribute and calculate a user registration private key that is bound to the user's real identity and the blockchain committee's private key, and sends the user registration private key shares to the user separately.
5. According to claim 4, a privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain is characterized in that: include: The user calculates the target data according to the registered private key to obtain the target transformation data; The user encrypts the registered private key using the target encryption algorithm and makes the encrypted private key ciphertext public; The user generates proof of the target transformation data based on the public encryption private key ciphertext parameters and the user's own secret parameters; Generate the user's anonymous signature on the target data based on the target transformation data and its proof; When the data receiving user receives the anonymously signed data, the non-interactive Σ protocol is used to verify the legitimacy of the anonymous signature.
6. A privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain according to claim 5, characterized in that: include: When the blockchain committee receives an anonymous credential tracking request, each node of the blockchain committee publicly resolves the anonymous credential requested for tracking; Each node of the blockchain committee traverses the identity commitments of registered users stored locally, and uses the node private key share and the user's real identity share corresponding to the identity commitment to calculate and transform the parsed anonymous credentials locally, and then broadcasts the calculated data to other nodes of the blockchain committee, so that multiple blockchain committee nodes can jointly verify the user's identity without exposing the user's identity; Multiple blockchain committee nodes determine whether the user registration private key hidden in the one-time display token is consistent with the user's corresponding private key hidden in the broadcasted calculation data. If they are consistent, the reconstruction algorithm of verifiable secret sharing is used to calculate the anonymous credential to track the user's true identity.
7. According to claim 5, a privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain is characterized in that: The system includes a plurality of blockchain committees, each of which acts as a separate shard to manage a plurality of users under the shard, and when the user requesting identity authentication is located in a first shard and the user responding to the identity authentication request is located in a second shard, the method further includes: When the user requesting identity verification receives the anonymous signature and the shard sent by the user responding to the identity verification request, a request is made to the first shard blockchain committee to obtain the data of the second shard blockchain committee; The first shard blockchain communicates with the second shard blockchain across shards. The first shard blockchain runs a consensus to put the verification public key of the second shard blockchain committee on the chain. The user requesting identity authentication obtains the second shard blockchain committee verification public key disclosed on the first shard blockchain, and verifies the legitimacy of the identity of the user responding to the identity authentication request based on the verification public key.
8. The privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain according to claim 5 is characterized in that: The system includes a plurality of blockchain committees, each of which is a separate shard and manages a plurality of users under the shard, when the credential user and the credential issuing committee are located in the first shard, and the credential verification user is located in the second shard, the method further includes: When the first shard blockchain committee receives a request initiated by the credential user to obtain data of the second shard blockchain committee, it communicates with the second shard blockchain committee across shards; The second shard blockchain runs the consensus chain to synchronize the master public key of the issuing committee under the management of the first shard and the verification public key of the first shard blockchain committee; The credential user sends the generated one-time display token, the master public key of the issuing committee, and the verification public key of the first shard blockchain committee to the credential verification user; The credential verification user determines whether the public key of the issuing committee and the verification public key of the first shard blockchain committee are legitimate based on the consensus data stored on the second shard chain; If it is legitimate, the one-time display token is verified based on the master public key of the issuing committee and the verification public key of the first shard blockchain committee.
9. The privacy-preserving distributed digital identity management method based on blockchain according to claim 3 is characterized in that: Before the credential requests the user to generate a commitment to the set of attributes to be signed and a proof about the set of attributes to be signed, including: Set the bilinear group parameters and bilinear mapping required for signature, as well as the issuance threshold; Run the distributed key generation protocol to generate private key shares for each certificate issuance committee node, and obtain the master public key of the certificate issuance committee based on the private key shares of each certificate issuance committee node.
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