Internet of Things device security management method, system, device and medium based on the trusted innovation environment

Abstract

The present invention discloses a method, system, device and medium for secure management of IoT devices based on a trusted innovation environment, and relates to the technical field of IoT device management, including: in a trusted innovation environment, initial registration of devices is performed, a unique identity identifier is generated, and security policies are configured; dynamic identity authentication is performed, and the device obtains operation authority and enters the network; a trust chain is established through distributed authentication with other devices, and the trust level of the device is updated; the security policy of the device is updated, and data transmission is performed; based on the trust chain verification result, a collaborative defense mechanism is triggered, and peripheral devices take over functions and perform fault-tolerant processing; it is determined whether an abnormal or authentication-failed device has reached the end of its life cycle, and data clearing and identity cancellation operations are performed on the device that has reached the end. The method for secure management of IoT devices based on a trusted innovation environment provided by the present invention improves the accuracy of device authentication, timely identifies abnormal behavior and authentication failure, and prevents unauthorized devices from accessing the network.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of Internet of Things device management technology, and specifically to an Internet of Things device security management method, system, equipment and medium based on a trusted computing environment. Background Art

[0002] The data exchange between various IoT devices is frequent and complex. Traditional IoT device security management relies heavily on centralized identity authentication and security policies. However, this approach has limitations when dealing with distributed, large-scale device networks. In particular, when a device fails or requires lifecycle management, its response mechanism is often not flexible and effective enough.

[0003] In the IoT system, device authentication is the first step to ensure the security and legitimacy of the device. However, with the increase in the number of IoT devices, how to effectively manage device registration, authentication, and trust relationships between devices has become increasingly complex. Existing technologies are usually based on static authentication and fixed security policies, which are difficult to meet the dynamic needs of IoT devices.

[0004] In addition, IoT devices often need to be safely decommissioned at the end of their life cycle due to their service life. However, traditional device management solutions usually lack effective management of the device life cycle, especially when the device is about to exit the network. How to ensure the safe deletion of data, the legal deregistration of the identity, and prevent the device from re-entering the network after the end of its life cycle are challenges that are not fully addressed in existing IoT device management solutions. Summary of the invention

[0005] In view of the above-mentioned problems, the present invention is proposed.

[0006] Therefore, the technical problem solved by the present invention is: the existing IoT device security management method is unable to effectively deal with the identification and processing of authentication failure and abnormal status of the device, and lacks a secure data clearing and identity cancellation mechanism at the end of the device life cycle, as well as how to achieve collaborative defense optimization based on trust chain verification when the device is abnormal.

[0007] In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention provides the following technical solutions: a method for security management of IoT devices based on a trusted computing environment, comprising:

[0008] In the trusted innovation environment, perform initial registration of the device based on the device's hardware identification and digital certificate, generate a unique identity identifier, and configure security policies;

[0009] Dynamic identity authentication is performed based on the device's registration information and real-time behavior data. After passing the authentication, the device obtains operation permissions and enters the network;

[0010] After the device passes dynamic identity authentication, it performs trust chain verification, establishes a trust chain through distributed verification with other devices, and updates the trust level of the device;

[0011] Based on the trust chain verification results, update the device's security policy, encrypt the device's data, and transmit data;

[0012] When a device anomaly or authentication failure is detected, the collaborative defense mechanism is triggered based on the trust chain verification results, and the surrounding devices take over the function and perform fault-tolerant processing;

[0013] When the collaborative defense mechanism is triggered, it is determined whether the abnormal or authentication-invalidated device has reached the end of its life cycle, and data clearing and identity deregistration operations are performed on the device that has reached the end.

[0014] As a preferred solution of the IoT device security management method based on the trust innovation environment described in the present invention, wherein: the initial registration of the device includes generating a key pair of the device based on the hardware identification of the device using a national secret algorithm, and the key pair includes a public key and a private key;

[0015] The public key and hardware identifier of the device are encrypted using a national encryption algorithm to generate a digital certificate, which includes the public key, hardware identifier and information of the issuing authority of the device;

[0016] When a digital certificate is generated, the device uses the private key to digitally sign its own hardware identifier to generate a unique identity identifier;

[0017] After receiving the device's unique identifier, the device's initial security policy is configured based on the device's registration information. After the configuration is completed, the device enters the trusted network.

[0018] As a preferred solution of the IoT device security management method based on the trust innovation environment described in the present invention, wherein: the initial security policy includes network access rights, data encryption level and device behavior constraints;

[0019] The dynamic identity authentication includes encrypting the unique identity identifier of the device through a national encryption algorithm and transmitting it to the authentication server together with the real-time behavior data of the device;

[0020] After receiving the encrypted unique identifier, the authentication server identifies the device through the unique identifier and enters the dynamic identity authentication process;

[0021] Match the real-time behavior data with the initial security policy of the device to determine whether the current behavior of the device complies with the initial security policy;

[0022] If it complies, the device is judged to be in a normal state, and the device obtains network operation permissions according to the initial security policy; if it does not comply, the device's operation permissions are denied, the device is blocked from accessing network resources, and the device's abnormal behavior is recorded.

[0023] As a preferred solution of the IoT device security management method based on the trust creation environment described in the present invention, wherein: the establishment of the trust chain includes when the device passes the dynamic identity authentication, the device encrypts its authentication result and unique identity identifier through the national secret algorithm, sends it to a predefined number of distributed nodes in the trust creation network, and initiates a trust chain verification request;

[0024] After receiving the verification request, the distributed node identifies the device through the unique identifier and queries the device’s historical authentication status, interaction records, and historical trust level in the distributed ledger;

[0025] Distributed nodes compare the current authentication results with historical data to confirm whether the device's behavior meets the network's trust standards. Each distributed node independently verifies and generates verification results.

[0026] The distributed node feeds back the verification result to the device, encrypting its verification result with a digital signature;

[0027] The device receives feedback from distributed nodes that reach the preset verification threshold, forming a trust chain;

[0028] Based on the verification results of the trust chain, the trust level of the device is dynamically updated, and the updated trust level is stored in the distributed ledger.

[0029] As a preferred solution of the IoT device security management method based on the trust creation environment described in the present invention, wherein: the security policy of the updated device includes determining the device as a first-level trusted device, a second-level trusted device or a third-level trusted device according to the trust chain verification result;

[0030] If it is determined to be a first-level trusted device, the network access permission allows access to network resources pre-authorized by the device, data encryption uses the national secret algorithm, and the key update period is the preset first period;

[0031] If it is determined to be a Level 2 trusted device, the device's network access rights are only allowed to access designated network resources, data encryption uses the national secret algorithm, and the key update period is the preset second period;

[0032] If it is determined to be a third-level trusted device, the device's network access rights are restricted to basic network resources, data encryption uses the national secret algorithm, the key update period is the preset third period, and an integrity check is performed before data transmission.

[0033] As a preferred solution of the method for secure management of Internet of Things devices based on a trusted computing environment described in the present invention, the data transmission includes analyzing the transmission status based on the device transmission parameters. When the device transmission parameters are less than the transmission threshold, it is judged that the device is abnormal; when the digital certificate or key status is abnormal, it is judged that the authentication is invalid.

[0034] As a preferred solution of the IoT device security management method based on the trust innovation environment described in the present invention, wherein: the data clearing and identity cancellation operations for the device that has reached the end point include determining whether the device has reached the end of its life cycle by cross-analyzing the device's usage time, status record, and authentication information status;

[0035] When the device is determined to have reached the end of its life cycle, the data clearing operation is initiated and the national encryption algorithm is used to perform data clearing;

[0036] When the data is cleared, the device's identity cancellation operation is executed, a digital certificate revocation request is sent to the device's issuing agency, the device's unique identity identifier is deleted from the distributed ledger, and the cancellation status is synchronized to all nodes in the trusted innovation network through the distributed ledger, generating and storing an operation record of the end of the device's life cycle.

[0037] Another object of the present invention is to provide an Internet of Things device security management system based on a trusted computing environment. By constructing an Internet of Things device management system that combines dynamic identity authentication and trust chain verification, it solves the security risks in existing methods such as the inability to timely discover the invalidation of device authentication information, the inability to trigger an efficient collaborative defense mechanism for device anomalies, and the residual data and non-cancellation of identity after the end of the device life cycle.

[0038] In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention provides the following technical solutions: a security management system for Internet of Things devices based on a trusted innovation environment, comprising: a device registration module, a device authentication module, a trust verification module, a policy update module, a collaborative defense module and a data clearing module; the device registration module is used to perform initial registration of the device based on the hardware identification and digital certificate of the device in the trusted innovation environment, generate a unique identity identifier, and configure a security policy; the device authentication module is used to perform dynamic identity authentication based on the registration information and real-time behavior data of the device. After the authentication is passed, the device obtains operation authority and enters the network; the trust verification module is used to perform trust chain verification after the device passes the dynamic identity authentication, establish a trust chain through distributed authentication with other devices, and update the trust level of the device; the policy update module is used to update the security policy of the device according to the trust chain verification result, encrypt the data of the device, and transmit data; the collaborative defense module is used to trigger the collaborative defense mechanism based on the trust chain verification result when a device abnormality or authentication failure is detected, and the peripheral devices take over the function and perform fault-tolerant processing; the data clearing module is used to determine whether the abnormal or authentication-failed device has reached the end of its life cycle when the collaborative defense mechanism is triggered, and perform data clearing and identity cancellation operations on the device that has reached the end.

[0039] A computer device includes a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and when the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the method for secure management of Internet of Things devices based on a trusted computing environment are implemented as described above.

[0040] A computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the method for secure management of Internet of Things devices based on a trusted computing environment as described above.

[0041] Beneficial effects of the present invention: The IoT device security management method based on the trusted innovation environment provided by the present invention improves the accuracy of device authentication through dynamic identity authentication and real-time behavior data matching, and can timely identify abnormal behavior and authentication failures to prevent unauthorized devices from accessing the network. Trust chain verification can dynamically adjust the trust level according to the historical behavior and authentication results of the device, making the trust management of the device more flexible and secure. When an abnormality occurs in the device or the authentication fails, the collaborative defense mechanism will trigger the takeover task of a high-trust-level device to ensure uninterrupted data transmission and improve fault tolerance. At the end of the device life cycle, the data is cleared through the national secret algorithm, and the device identity is deregistered through the distributed ledger to ensure that the device cannot re-access the network. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0042] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the accompanying drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the accompanying drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other accompanying drawings can be obtained based on these accompanying drawings without paying creative work.

[0043] Figure 1 An overall flow chart of a method for secure management of Internet of Things devices in a trusted computing environment is provided for one embodiment of the present invention.

[0044] Figure 2 An overall structural diagram of an Internet of Things device security management system based on a trusted computing environment is provided for one embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0045] In order to make the above-mentioned purposes, features and advantages of the present invention more obvious and easy to understand, the specific implementation methods of the present invention are described in detail below in conjunction with the drawings of the specification. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, but not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary persons in the art without creative work should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0046] In the following description, many specific details are set forth to facilitate a full understanding of the present invention, but the present invention may also be implemented in other ways different from those described herein, and those skilled in the art may make similar generalizations without violating the connotation of the present invention. Therefore, the present invention is not limited to the specific embodiments disclosed below.

[0047] Example 1, reference Figure 1 , is an embodiment of the present invention, and provides a method for security management of IoT devices based on a trusted innovation environment, including:

[0048] In the trusted innovation environment, perform initial registration of the device based on the device's hardware identification and digital certificate, generate a unique identity identifier, and configure security policies;

[0049] Dynamic identity authentication is performed based on the device's registration information and real-time behavior data. After passing the authentication, the device obtains operation permissions and enters the network;

[0050] After the device passes dynamic identity authentication, it performs trust chain verification, establishes a trust chain through distributed verification with other devices, and updates the trust level of the device;

[0051] Based on the trust chain verification results, update the device's security policy, encrypt the device's data, and transmit data;

[0052] When a device anomaly or authentication failure is detected, the collaborative defense mechanism is triggered based on the trust chain verification results, and the surrounding devices take over the function and perform fault-tolerant processing;

[0053] When the collaborative defense mechanism is triggered, it is determined whether the abnormal or authentication-invalidated device has reached the end of its life cycle, and data clearing and identity deregistration operations are performed on the device that has reached the end.

[0054] The initial registration of the device includes generating a key pair of the device based on the hardware identification of the device using a national secret algorithm, wherein the key pair includes a public key and a private key;

[0055] The public key and hardware identifier of the device are encrypted using a national encryption algorithm to generate a digital certificate, which includes the public key, hardware identifier and information of the issuing authority of the device;

[0056] When a digital certificate is generated, the device uses the private key to digitally sign its own hardware identifier to generate a unique identity identifier;

[0057] After receiving the device's unique identifier, the device's initial security policy is configured based on the device's registration information. After the configuration is completed, the device enters the trusted network.

[0058] The initial security policy includes network access rights, data encryption levels, and device behavior constraints;

[0059] Network access rights include: The registration information of the device, such as its purpose, type and location, determines its access rights in the network. Based on the functional attributes of the device, the scope of network resources, nodes and services that the device can access is determined.

[0060] The digital certificate of a device is used to verify the legitimacy of its identity, and the network access rights of the device are granted based on the authentication results and trust level in the certificate. The information in the digital certificate ensures that only legally authenticated devices can obtain the corresponding access rights.

[0061] The unique identifier of a device ensures its uniqueness within the network, assigns specific access rights to the device based on the identifier, and ensures that the device cannot impersonate another device to obtain network resources beyond its authority.

[0062] Data encryption level includes: Based on the device's registration information, assessing the type and sensitivity of the data processed by the device, thereby determining the encryption level required for the device. The encryption level of the device depends on the tasks it performs in the network and the sensitivity of the data it involves.

[0063] After the device's digital certificate is authenticated, the strength of its data encryption is determined based on the device's trust level. Higher-level devices may require higher encryption standards to ensure data confidentiality and security.

[0064] The device's unique identifier is used to determine the device's role and operating context. Based on the device's identity and behavior trajectory in the network, its data encryption requirements are determined to ensure that data is protected throughout the entire transmission and storage process.

[0065] Device behavior constraints include: setting the scope and limits of its operation behavior based on the device's registration information. The function and purpose of the device determine the operations it can perform in the network. Specific behavior rules are configured for the device to avoid unauthorized operations.

[0066] The digital certificate of a device is used to confirm the legal identity of the device, and the device's behavior permissions are determined based on the certificate verification results. Only devices that have passed the certificate authentication are allowed to perform specific operations and are subject to behavioral constraints.

[0067] The unique identifier of a device is used to track the behavior of the device in the network, determine its operation mode based on the identifier of the device, and implement dynamic constraints on the behavior of the device to ensure that the device behavior is consistent with its identity and role.

[0068] The dynamic identity authentication includes encrypting the unique identity identifier of the device through a national encryption algorithm and transmitting it to the authentication server together with the real-time behavior data of the device;

[0069] After receiving the encrypted unique identifier, the authentication server identifies the device through the unique identifier and enters the dynamic identity authentication process;

[0070] Match the real-time behavior data with the initial security policy of the device to determine whether the current behavior of the device complies with the initial security policy;

[0071] If it complies, the device is judged to be in a normal state, and the device obtains network operation permissions according to the initial security policy; if it does not comply, the device's operation permissions are denied, the device is blocked from accessing network resources, and the device's abnormal behavior is recorded, further triggering the security defense mechanism, notifying the administrator or taking additional security measures.

[0072] Before the device enters the network operation, it first collects the device's real-time behavior data, including the device's network access request, data transmission content, operation log, etc. These data are compared with the device's initial security policy in multiple dimensions. The initial security policy covers network access rights, data encryption level, and device behavior constraints. The device's network access request is matched with the access rights in the initial policy to check whether it attempts to access restricted network nodes or resources; the data transmission content is verified according to the encryption level in the policy to ensure that the data transmitted by the device meets the specified encryption standards; the device's operation log is matched with the behavior constraints to determine whether the operations it performs exceed the preset operation range and frequency.

[0073] During the matching process, each behavioral data is comprehensively analyzed, and the overall matching degree is calculated through a weighted scoring mechanism. If the device's behavior complies with the initial security policy in all dimensions, its behavior is judged to be normal, and the device obtains network operation permissions. If the behavior is partially inconsistent with the initial security policy, it is decided whether to reduce its operation permissions or impose partial restrictions based on the device's current trust level; if the device's behavior seriously deviates from the preset policy, the device's operation permissions will be immediately denied, preventing it from continuing to access network resources. At this time, the abnormal behavior of the device is recorded and the security defense mechanism is triggered, and the abnormal status is reported to the administrator, or corresponding security measures are taken according to the automation rules, such as isolating the device or re-authenticating.

[0074] The establishment of the trust chain includes that after the device passes the dynamic identity authentication, the device encrypts its authentication result and unique identity identifier through the national encryption algorithm, sends it to a predefined number of distributed nodes in the Xinchuang network, and initiates a trust chain verification request;

[0075] After receiving the verification request, the distributed node identifies the device through the unique identifier and queries the device’s historical authentication status, interaction records, and historical trust level in the distributed ledger;

[0076] Distributed nodes compare the current authentication results with historical data to confirm whether the device's behavior meets the network's trust standards. Each distributed node independently verifies and generates verification results.

[0077] The distributed node feeds back the verification result to the device, encrypting its verification result with a digital signature;

[0078] The device receives feedback from distributed nodes that reach the preset verification threshold, forming a trust chain;

[0079] Based on the verification results of the trust chain, the trust level of the device is dynamically updated, and the updated trust level is stored in the distributed ledger.

[0080] The updating of the security policy of the device includes determining the device as a first-level trusted device, a second-level trusted device, or a third-level trusted device according to the trust chain verification result;

[0081] If it is determined to be a first-level trusted device, the network access permission allows access to network resources pre-authorized by the device, data encryption uses the national secret algorithm, and the key update period is the preset first period;

[0082] If it is determined to be a Level 2 trusted device, the device's network access rights are only allowed to access designated network resources, data encryption uses the national secret algorithm, and the key update period is the preset second period;

[0083] If it is determined to be a third-level trusted device, the device's network access rights are restricted to basic network resources, data encryption uses the national secret algorithm, the key update period is the preset third period, and an integrity check is performed before data transmission.

[0084] After the device passes the dynamic identity authentication, its authentication result and unique identity identifier are encrypted using the national encryption algorithm SM2 and sent to 10 predefined distributed nodes in the Xinchuang network to initiate a trust chain verification request. After receiving the verification request, the distributed node queries the device's historical authentication status, interaction records, and historical trust level in the distributed ledger through the device's unique identity identifier, and conducts a comprehensive analysis. The verification process combines the device's current authentication status, historical interaction records, data transmission mode, and the complexity of the participating tasks. Set a fixed multi-dimensional scoring standard for each node, give a comprehensive score based on the device's behavior performance, and feedback the trust verification results.

[0085] The trust model scoring criteria consists of the following five dimensions:

[0086] Operation frequency: Compare the number of times the device is operated with the set standard frequency. If the device operation frequency exceeds 100 times per hour, the node will be deducted 5 points; if the device operation frequency is below the frequency, 20 points will be awarded.

[0087] Network access request: Whether the network access request issued by the device is within the scope of authorized resources. If the device accesses an unauthorized network node, 10 points will be deducted; 20 points will be awarded for compliant access to the node.

[0088] Encryption standard: The encryption algorithm used by the device must comply with the requirements of the national encryption algorithm SM4. If the device uses an encryption method that complies with the standard, 20 points will be awarded; if the encryption strength does not meet the requirements, 10 points will be deducted.

[0089] Task Completion Rate: Records the number of tasks performed by the device in the past 24 hours and the success rate. If all tasks are successfully completed, 20 points will be awarded; 2 points will be deducted for each failed task.

[0090] High-trust device interaction: records the interaction between the device and other high-trust level devices. If the device interacts frequently with the first-level trust device and the data transmission is error-free, 20 points will be awarded; 5 points will be deducted for each incorrect interaction with a low-trust device.

[0091] After completing the scoring, the distributed node generates a verification result through SM2 algorithm signature encryption and feeds it back to the device. After receiving feedback from 10 distributed nodes, the scoring results are calculated. If the total score of the device is 90 points or above, the device is classified as a first-level trusted device, allowing access to all pre-authorized resources in the network. Data transmission must be encrypted using the national secret algorithm SM4, and the key update cycle is set to 30 days. If the device score is between 70 and 89 points, the device is classified as a second-level trusted device, and network access rights are limited to specific resources such as node A and node B. Data encryption uses the national secret algorithm SM3, and the key update cycle is 15 days. If the device score is between 50 and 69 points, the device is judged as a third-level trusted device, only allowing access to basic network resources, data transmission must be encrypted using the national secret algorithm SM4, and integrity verification is performed before each transmission. The key update cycle is 7 days.

[0092] The data transmission includes analyzing the transmission status based on the device transmission parameter. When the device transmission parameter is less than the transmission threshold, it is determined that the device is abnormal; when the digital certificate or key status is abnormal, it is determined that the authentication is invalid.

[0093] The monitoring module of the device collects four parameters in real time, including network communication status, transmission failure rate, packet loss rate and transmission delay. First, these parameters are analyzed. If a single parameter exceeds a specific threshold and is accompanied by fluctuations in other parameters, the device is marked as potentially abnormal. Through dynamic threshold adjustment, the multi-dimensional behavior of the device is cross-analyzed to calculate the correlation between parameters. If two or more parameters continue to deviate from the normal range within the set time range, the device is judged to be in an abnormal state.

[0094] At the same time, the digital certificate and key status of the device are regularly verified to check whether they are still valid. During the data transmission process, if it is detected that the digital certificate of the device has expired, revoked, or the key is invalid, the authentication information of the device is determined to be invalid and its status is marked as invalid.

[0095] Triggering the collaborative defense mechanism includes temporarily reducing the network access rights of the first-level trusted device and entering a further monitoring state if the first-level trusted device is judged to be abnormal or the authentication fails. Such devices will not immediately trigger the collaborative defense mechanism and allow them to continue to perform low-risk tasks, but will notify the administrator for manual inspection.

[0096] If a second-level trusted device is judged to be abnormal or authentication failure, the collaborative defense mechanism is directly triggered to immediately suspend the key tasks of the device and cut off its network access rights. The tasks are transferred to high-trust level devices for processing to prevent the second-level trusted device from affecting key resources.

[0097] If a level 3 trusted device is judged to be abnormal or authentication fails, the highest level of defense measures will be immediately executed to completely isolate the device, stop all its network and data operations, and notify high-trust level devices to take over the task.

[0098] In the collaborative defense mechanism, the best high-trust level device is selected to take over the task through the distributed ledger in the trusted environment. This process selects the most suitable device to take over the task based on the current status and remaining resources of the device.

[0099] The real-time status data of each device is stored in the distributed ledger, allowing high-trust level devices to instantly synchronize the task status of abnormal devices and quickly take over their operations to avoid data loss or task interruption.

[0100] The takeover device in the collaborative defense mechanism is not only responsible for continuing to complete the task, but also needs to perform real-time security policy adjustments to ensure that there are no further security risks during the takeover process.

[0101] When a high-trust level device takes over a task, it first reads the historical operation records of the abnormal device in the ledger to ensure that the takeover operation is consistent with the original task.

[0102] The takeover device uses the national secret algorithm to encrypt all data transmission and performs encryption verification after the data transmission is completed to ensure the integrity and security of the data.

[0103] After the task is completed, the takeover device updates the task status in the account book and notifies the task processing result.

[0104] If abnormal data (data packet damage or loss) is found during the task takeover process, the takeover device will start the fault tolerance mechanism to repair or retransmit the damaged data. The preferred method of fault tolerance processing includes reading the backup data in the distributed ledger or obtaining redundant data from neighboring devices for repair.

[0105] When data retransmission cannot fix the problem, the data repair task is marked as failed and the administrator is notified for manual intervention.

[0106] After the task is completed, the takeover device will synchronize the final status of the task and the data integrity verification results to the distributed ledger, and re-evaluate the trust level of the abnormal device based on the task execution situation.

[0107] Further analysis will be conducted on abnormal or authentication-expired devices. If the device is still in an abnormal state and cannot be restored to normal operation, it will enter the lifecycle end determination process and perform data clearing and identity deregistration operations.

[0108] The data clearing and identity deregistration operations for devices that have reached the end point include determining whether the device has reached the end of its life cycle by cross-analyzing the device's usage time, status records, and authentication information status; continuously monitoring the device's usage time and comparing it with a preset maximum available period. When the device's usage time reaches or exceeds the preset period, the system marks the device as having reached the end of its life cycle.

[0109] In addition, multiple abnormal records and unrecoverable situations of the device status are also the basis for judgment. If the device continues to have unrecoverable abnormalities in multiple operation cycles, it will further confirm that the device can no longer continue to perform safe operations. In addition, the digital certificate and key status of the device are verified. When the authentication information expires and cannot be reactivated or restored, combined with the trust chain verification results, it is finally determined that the device has reached the end of its life cycle.

[0110] When the device is determined to have reached the end of its life cycle, the data clearing operation is initiated, and the national secret algorithm is used to perform data clearing. The data in the storage medium is completely erased by random data overwriting. After the initial overwriting, at least three or more cyclic overwritings are performed to ensure that the original data in the storage medium is completely destroyed and cannot be recovered. After each data overwriting is completed, the data integrity check is performed through the verification algorithm to ensure that the data is effectively cleared and the operation record is generated. After the data clearing process is completed, the clearing operation record is automatically stored in the distributed ledger for subsequent steps;

[0111] When the data is cleared, the device's identity cancellation operation is executed. First, a digital certificate revocation request is sent to the device's issuing authority to ensure that the device can no longer participate in the trust chain verification. Next, the system deletes the device's unique identity identifier from the distributed ledger to prevent the device from regaining network access rights in any future authentication or operation. After all cancellation operations are completed, the system synchronizes the cancellation status to all nodes in the trusted network through the distributed ledger to ensure that devices in the entire network can recognize the device's identity cancellation status. Finally, the system generates and stores operation records at the end of the device's life cycle to ensure that all operations are traceable.

[0112] Example 2, reference Figure 2 , is an embodiment of the present invention, and provides an Internet of Things device security management system based on a trusted innovation environment, including:

[0113] Device registration module 100, device authentication module 200, trust verification module 300, policy update module 400, collaborative defense module 500 and data clearing module 600;

[0114] The device registration module 100 is used to perform initial registration of the device based on the hardware identification and digital certificate of the device in the trusted innovation environment, generate a unique identity identifier, and configure security policies;

[0115] The device authentication module 200 is used to perform dynamic identity authentication based on the device's registration information and real-time behavior data. After the authentication is passed, the device obtains operation authority and enters the network;

[0116] The trust verification module 300 is used to perform trust chain verification after the device passes dynamic identity authentication, establish a trust chain through distributed verification with other devices, and update the trust level of the device;

[0117] The policy update module 400 is used to update the security policy of the device according to the trust chain verification result, encrypt the data of the device, and transmit the data;

[0118] The collaborative defense module 500 is used to trigger the collaborative defense mechanism based on the trust chain verification result when a device abnormality or authentication failure is detected, and the peripheral devices take over the function and perform fault tolerance processing;

[0119] The data clearing module 600 is used to determine whether an abnormal or authentication-invalidated device has reached the end of its life cycle when the collaborative defense mechanism is triggered, and to perform data clearing and identity deregistration operations on the device that has reached the end.

[0120] Embodiment 3, an embodiment of the present invention, is different from the first two embodiments in that:

[0121] If the functions are implemented in the form of software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or the part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. The computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including several instructions to enable a computer device (which can be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the methods described in various embodiments of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory), random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), disk or optical disk, etc., which can store program codes.

[0122] The logic and / or steps represented in the flowchart or otherwise described herein, for example, can be considered as an ordered list of executable instructions for implementing logical functions, and can be embodied in any computer-readable medium for use by an instruction execution system, device or apparatus (such as a computer-based system, a system including a processor, or other system that can fetch instructions from an instruction execution system, device or apparatus and execute instructions), or in conjunction with such instruction execution systems, devices or apparatuses. For the purposes of this specification, "computer-readable medium" can be any device that can contain, store, communicate, propagate or transmit a program for use by an instruction execution system, device or apparatus, or in conjunction with such instruction execution systems, devices or apparatuses.

[0123] More specific examples of computer-readable media (a non-exhaustive list) include the following: an electrical connection with one or more wires (electronic device), a portable computer disk case (magnetic device), a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable and programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), an optical fiber device, and a portable compact disk read-only memory (CDROM). In addition, the computer-readable medium may even be a paper or other suitable medium on which the program is printed, since the program may be obtained electronically, for example, by optically scanning the paper or other medium, followed by editing, deciphering or, if necessary, processing in another suitable manner, and then stored in a computer memory.

[0124] It should be understood that the various parts of the present invention can be implemented by hardware, software, firmware or a combination thereof. In the above-mentioned embodiments, multiple steps or methods can be implemented by software or firmware stored in a memory and executed by a suitable instruction execution system. For example, if implemented by hardware, as in another embodiment, it can be implemented by any one of the following technologies known in the art or their combination: a discrete logic circuit having a logic gate circuit for implementing a logic function for a data signal, a dedicated integrated circuit having a suitable combination of logic gate circuits, a programmable gate array (PGA), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), etc.

[0125] Example 4 is an embodiment of the present invention, which provides a security management method for Internet of Things devices based on a trusted computing environment. In order to verify the beneficial effects of the present invention, scientific demonstration is carried out through simulation experiments, aiming to verify the performance difference between the security management method for Internet of Things devices based on a trusted computing environment and the traditional centralized device management method.

[0126] The experimental equipment includes 100 IoT devices, which are divided into 40 common devices, 30 medium-trust devices, and 30 high-trust devices. The devices will be connected to a multi-node IoT test network.

[0127] The test network is a distributed ledger system in a trusted computing environment that supports national encryption algorithms. It also simulates traditional centralized networks for comparison.

[0128] The experimental settings include device registration and authentication, device exception handling, trust chain verification, and device lifecycle end management. Each device performs real device-to-device interaction, data transmission, and exception handling in a specific scenario to capture performance in different scenarios.

[0129] The method of the present invention registers the device and verifies the real-time behavior data through dynamic identity authentication. Each device first generates a key pair based on the national secret algorithm to complete the generation and authentication of a unique identity identifier. The real-time behavior data of the device is continuously matched with the registration information. If the behavior data matches the initial security policy, the device obtains network access rights. During the abnormal device processing process, the collaborative defense mechanism of the present invention triggers the high-trust level device in the distributed ledger to take over the task to prevent task interruption or data loss. The trust chain verification is performed through a multi-node distributed ledger system, and the trust level of the device is updated in real time based on its authentication results and historical behavior data. At the end of the device life cycle, multiple data overwrites and erasures are performed through the national secret algorithm, and the device identity is deregistered through the distributed ledger. The entire process is carried out in a trusted innovation environment, and devices can collaborate seamlessly to ensure the security of the network and the flexibility of device management.

[0130] In traditional methods, device authentication is completed through a static centralized authentication system. A key pair is generated when the device is registered, but the device's behavior data is not matched in real time. Device authentication is performed according to fixed rules. After authentication, the device is granted access rights, but when authentication fails or an exception occurs, the system relies on a single point processing mechanism. When handling device exceptions, the system needs to intervene manually or restore the normal operation of the device through a single node, and it is impossible to achieve automated task takeover. Trust verification usually relies on fixed trust relationships or simple device history records, and it is impossible to dynamically adjust the trust level. At the end of the device life cycle, the traditional method only performs a simple data clearing operation, and the identity cancellation process may not be thorough enough. The device may reconnect to the network when the data is restored. The experimental results are shown in Table 1.

[0131] Table 1 Comparison of experimental results

[0132] ,

[0133] The present invention reflects the current status of the device through the real-time data of the device, rather than relying solely on fixed identity information. This dynamic matching can detect abnormal situations in a timely manner and prevent unauthorized devices from accessing the network. In contrast, the traditional static identity authentication method relies only on the registration information of the device, which makes it difficult to detect abnormalities in the device during operation, resulting in low authentication accuracy. The method of the present invention ensures the flexibility of the authentication process, and the operation of the device at any stage can be judged based on the behavioral data.

[0134] In terms of exception handling, the present invention significantly improves the response speed and fault-tolerant processing capabilities through a collaborative defense mechanism. High-trust level devices in the distributed ledger immediately take over the task when an exception is detected. This collaborative mechanism relies on the real-time data synchronization technology of the distributed ledger to ensure that high-trust level devices can quickly obtain the task status and take over. In contrast, traditional methods rely on single-point processing, and abnormal device processing is often delayed and prone to task interruptions. The present invention uses collaborative processing between devices to enable tasks to be seamlessly transferred when an exception occurs, reducing the risk of data loss and task failure.

[0135] The dynamic adjustment mechanism of trust chain verification also provides higher security and flexibility for trust management of devices. The distributed ledger records the historical behavior and authentication results of the device, so that the trust chain can be updated in real time when the device status changes. The fixed trust relationship in the traditional method cannot reflect the behavior changes of the device in real time, resulting in the lag of trust management. The present invention adjusts the trust level of the device in real time, so that high-risk devices can be quickly identified and their network access rights can be restricted, thereby improving the security of the overall network.

[0136] In the end-of-life management of devices, the national secret algorithm of the present invention ensures the thoroughness of data clearing and avoids the possibility of data recovery. Compared with traditional simple data clearing, the multiple overwrite erasure mechanism of the present invention combined with the data verification step ensures data security when the device exits the network. By canceling the device identity through the distributed ledger, it not only prevents the device from reconnecting to the network, but also ensures that the identity information cancellation record is synchronized in the entire network after the device exits.

[0137] It should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention rather than to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the preferred embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that the technical solutions of the present invention may be modified or replaced by equivalents without departing from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the present invention, which should all be included in the scope of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for security management of IoT devices based on a trusted computing environment, characterized in that: include: In the trusted innovation environment, perform initial registration of the device based on the device's hardware identification and digital certificate, generate a unique identity identifier, and configure security policies; Dynamic identity authentication is performed based on the device's registration information and real-time behavior data. After passing the authentication, the device obtains operation permissions and enters the network; After the device passes dynamic identity authentication, it performs trust chain verification, establishes a trust chain through distributed verification with other devices, and updates the trust level of the device; Based on the trust chain verification results, update the device's security policy, encrypt the device's data, and transmit data; When a device anomaly or authentication failure is detected, the collaborative defense mechanism is triggered based on the trust chain verification results, and the surrounding devices take over the function and perform fault-tolerant processing; When the collaborative defense mechanism is triggered, it determines whether the abnormal or authentication-invalidated device has reached the end of its life cycle, and performs data clearing and identity deregistration operations on the device that has reached the end; The initial registration of the device includes generating a key pair of the device based on the hardware identification of the device using a national secret algorithm, wherein the key pair includes a public key and a private key; The public key and hardware identifier of the device are encrypted using a national encryption algorithm to generate a digital certificate, which includes the public key, hardware identifier and information of the issuing authority of the device; When a digital certificate is generated, the device uses the private key to digitally sign its own hardware identifier to generate a unique identity identifier; After receiving the unique identifier of the device, the security policy of the device is configured based on the registration information of the device. After the configuration is completed, the device enters the trusted network. The establishment of the trust chain includes that after the device passes the dynamic identity authentication, the device encrypts its authentication result and unique identity identifier through the national encryption algorithm, sends it to a predefined number of distributed nodes in the Xinchuang network, and initiates a trust chain verification request; After receiving the verification request, the distributed node identifies the device through the unique identifier and queries the device’s historical authentication status, interaction records, and historical trust level in the distributed ledger; Distributed nodes compare the current authentication results with historical data to confirm whether the device's behavior meets the network's trust standards. Each distributed node independently verifies and generates verification results. The distributed node feeds back the verification result to the device, encrypting its verification result with a digital signature; The device receives feedback from distributed nodes that reach the preset verification threshold, forming a trust chain; Based on the verification results of the trust chain, the trust level of the device is dynamically updated, and the updated trust level is stored in the distributed ledger; The updating of the security policy of the device includes determining the device as a first-level trusted device, a second-level trusted device, or a third-level trusted device according to the trust chain verification result; If it is determined to be a first-level trusted device, the network access permission allows access to network resources pre-authorized by the device, data encryption uses the national secret algorithm, and the key update period is the preset first period; If it is determined to be a Level 2 trusted device, the device's network access rights are only allowed to access designated network resources, data encryption uses the national secret algorithm, and the key update period is the preset second period; If it is determined to be a third-level trusted device, the device's network access rights are restricted to basic network resources, data encryption uses the national secret algorithm, the key update period is the preset third period, and an integrity check is performed before data transmission.

2. The method for security management of IoT devices based on a trusted computing environment as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: The security policy includes network access rights, data encryption levels, and device behavior constraints; The dynamic identity authentication includes encrypting the unique identity identifier of the device through a national encryption algorithm and transmitting it to the authentication server together with the real-time behavior data of the device; After receiving the encrypted unique identifier, the authentication server identifies the device through the unique identifier and enters the dynamic identity authentication process; Match the real-time behavior data with the device's security policy to determine whether the device's current behavior complies with the security policy; If it complies, the device is judged to be in a normal state, and the device obtains network operation permissions according to the security policy; if it does not comply, the device's operation permissions are denied, the device is blocked from accessing network resources, and the device's abnormal behavior is recorded.

3. The method for security management of IoT devices based on a trusted computing environment as claimed in claim 2 is characterized in that: The data transmission includes analyzing the transmission status based on the device transmission parameter, and determining that the device is abnormal when the device transmission parameter is less than the transmission threshold; When the digital certificate or key status is abnormal, it is judged that the authentication is invalid.

4. The method for security management of IoT devices based on a trusted computing environment as claimed in claim 3 is characterized in that: The performing of data clearing and identity deregistration operations on the device that has reached the end point includes determining whether the device has reached the end point of its life cycle by cross-analyzing the device's usage time, status records, and authentication information status; When the device is determined to have reached the end of its life cycle, the data clearing operation is initiated and the national encryption algorithm is used to perform data clearing; When the data is cleared, the device's identity cancellation operation is executed, a digital certificate revocation request is sent to the device's issuing agency, the device's unique identity identifier is deleted from the distributed ledger, and the cancellation status is synchronized to all nodes in the trusted innovation network through the distributed ledger, generating and storing an operation record of the end of the device's life cycle.

5. A system using the method for secure management of IoT devices based on a trusted computing environment as described in any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that: include: A device registration module (100), a device authentication module (200), a trust verification module (300), a policy update module (400), a collaborative defense module (500), and a data clearing module (600); The device registration module (100) is used to perform initial registration of the device based on the hardware identification and digital certificate of the device in the information innovation environment, generate a unique identity identifier, and configure a security policy; The device authentication module (200) is used to perform dynamic identity authentication based on the device's registration information and real-time behavior data. After the authentication is passed, the device obtains operation authority and enters the network; The trust verification module (300) is used to perform trust chain verification after the device passes dynamic identity authentication, establish a trust chain through distributed verification with other devices, and update the trust level of the device; The policy update module (400) is used to update the security policy of the device according to the trust chain verification result, encrypt the data of the device, and perform data transmission; The collaborative defense module (500) is used to trigger the collaborative defense mechanism based on the trust chain verification result when a device abnormality or authentication failure is detected, and the peripheral devices take over the function and perform fault tolerance processing; The data clearing module (600) is used to determine whether an abnormal or authentication-invalidated device has reached the end of its life cycle when the collaborative defense mechanism is triggered, and to perform data clearing and identity deregistration operations on the device that has reached the end.

6. A computer device comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, characterized in that: When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the method for secure management of Internet of Things devices based on a trusted computing environment as described in any one of claims 1 to 4 are implemented.

7. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the method for secure management of Internet of Things devices based on a trusted computing environment as described in any one of claims 1 to 4 are implemented.

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