Output tracking control performance analysis method of cyber-physical system under hybrid attack
Through Bernoulli random distribution and Youla parameterization methods, the optimal output tracking performance of information physics system under mixed attacks is calculated, which solves the problem that the existing technology cannot analyze the performance limit of information physics system, and achieves optimization of system performance and stability improvement .
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411211337.7
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-08-30
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-26
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-08-30
AI Technical Summary
When facing hybrid attacks (DoS attacks and spoofing attacks), existing network cascading control systems cannot effectively analyze and describe the output tracking performance limits of information physics systems, resulting in the inability to obtain specific expression results, affecting the performance of the information system. .
Bernoulli random distribution is used to model DoS attacks and spoof attacks. Based on the single-degree of freedom controller, using mutual decomposition, internal and external factor decomposition and Youla parameterization methods in the frequency domain, information physics is calculated through all-pass decomposition and spatial decomposition technology. An explicit expression for optimal output tracking performance of the system under hybrid attacks.
Detailed analysis and optimization of the output tracking performance of information physics system is realized, the intrinsic connection between the system's own characteristics and hybrid attacks is revealed, and the optimal controller is designed to improve system stability and performance.
Smart Images

Figure CN119024816A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present application relates to the field of information-physical system performance analysis, and in particular to a method for analyzing the output tracking control performance of an information-physical system under hybrid attacks. Background Art
[0002] Two existing networked cascade control systems (NCCSs) with different event-triggered mechanisms (ETMs) are considered in a combined approach of random denial of service (DoS) attacks and spoofing attacks on the communication network. The control design conditions are derived and established using linear matrix inequalities (LMIs).
[0003] Although the system takes into account the hybrid attack constraints combining DoS attacks and deception attacks, this method cannot produce specific expression results. In order to study the impact of the above-mentioned network attacks on the performance limits of the information system, it is necessary to analyze the output tracking performance limits of the information-physical system with the above-mentioned constraints through frequency domain analysis. Summary of the invention
[0004] The purpose of the present invention is to provide an output tracking control performance analysis method for an information-physical system under hybrid attacks in order to fill the technical gap in the research on the performance limit of a network cascade control system.
[0005] The above-mentioned purpose of the present application is achieved through the following technical solutions: S1: Use Bernoulli random distribution to model DoS attacks and deception attacks, and construct cyber-physical systems under hybrid attacks; S2: Based on the single degree of freedom controller of the cyber-physical system, the output tracking performance index of the cyber-physical system is defined by using coprime decomposition, internal and external factor decomposition, and Youla parameterization method in the frequency domain; S3: Through full-pass decomposition, Spatial decomposition techniques and Youla parameterization of controllers are used to compute explicit expressions for optimal output tracking performance of cyber-physical systems subject to hybrid attacks. S4: Through the explicit expression of the optimal output tracking performance, the output tracking performance of the information-physical system is analyzed to obtain the optimal tracking performance of the information-physical system.
[0006] Optionally, step S1 includes: S11: Cyber-physical systems include: Reference input , information output of the physical system , the input of the single degree of freedom controller , the accused , Single degree of freedom controller , the output of the noise channel ; represents the reference input, , represents the direction vector of the reference input; let is a unit vector, that is , of Transformed to , the variance is ; S12: Set Represents a stable, regular, real rational transfer function or set of matrices; single degree of freedom controller The Youla parameterized form of , represents a single degree of freedom controller; represents a matrix that satisfies the double Bezout equation; Parameters representing the free design of the controller; represents the factor about zero; represents a matrix that satisfies the double Bezout equation; represents the factor about the pole; S13: Use Bernoulli random distribution to describe DoS attacks and spoofing attacks respectively; DoS attack represented as parameters , and its probability distribution function is , Indicates the probability of data loss; The spoofing attack is represented by , and its probability distribution function is ; represents the probability of occurrence of a spoofing attack; Assume that the error signal of the cyber-physical system is ; Set the tracking performance index of the cyber-physical system ,in They represent the variance of tracking error and the variance of system output respectively; Since the control energy input to the communication channel is limited, there is , so that , is the expectation operator, is the trade-off parameter between tracking error and control energy input, where .
[0007] Optionally, step S2 includes: Output of the noise channel ,in Denotes the parameters of the spoofing attack modeled by the Bernoulli random distribution; represents the data injected into the cyber-physical system during the attack, and ; and The transfer function between according to , , , let coprime decomposition , and for After right coprime decomposition, the factors about zeros and poles are: and for After left coprime decomposition, the factors about zeros and poles are obtained; Assume coprime decomposition , and for After right coprime decomposition, the factors about zeros and poles are: and for After left coprime decomposition, the factors about zeros and poles are obtained; Combining the double Bezout equation and the Youla parameterization of the single-degree-of-freedom controller, where represents the matrix that satisfies the Bezout equation; represents the matrix that satisfies the Bezout equation; represents the matrix that satisfies the Bezout equation; represents the matrix that satisfies the Bezout equation; represents the factor about zero; represents the factor about zero; represents the factor about the pole; represents the factor about the pole; is the unit matrix, and the output tracking performance index of the cyber-physical system is defined as follows:
[0008] in , represents the matrix that satisfies the Bezout equation; represents the matrix that satisfies the Bezout equation; Preset parameters for the controller; express The variance of .
[0009] Optionally, step S3 includes: The output tracking performance indicators are broken down into the following four parts:
[0010]
[0011] .
[0012] Optionally, step S3 further includes: calculate ,as follows: For the accused Full-pass decomposition , ; is the minimum phase factor; and is the all-pass factor, including the non-minimum phase zero of the controlled object and unstable poles ; and Represents the total number of non-minimum phase zeros and unstable poles; express The conjugate and conjugation of; definition , ,So
[0013] in represents the all-pass factor; ; express represents a subspace of Hilbert; ; represents another subspace of Hilbert, and mutually orthogonal; Will Decompose into
[0014]
[0015]
[0016] Lemma 1: For any matrix , there exists a matrix , so that the following equation holds
[0017]
[0018] in , , , All-pass factor The product of All-pass factor The product of represents the total number of unstable poles, All-pass factor The product of All-pass factor The product of represents the unstable point, Represents the reciprocal of the all-pass factor; all-pass factor , Symbols in express or ; have
[0019] in , ; for The partial product of for The partial product of get
[0020] in, ; represents an expression containing z, represents an expression containing z; Determined in Youla expression , so that and ; rewrite as follows:
[0021] according to and ,get as follows: .
[0022] Optionally, step S3 includes: By definition , , ,in , combined with Lemma 1, we get:
[0023]
[0024]
[0025] in express The partial product of express The partial product of express The partial product of express The partial product of express The partial product of express The partial product of express The conjugate transpose of express The conjugate transpose of ; The unstable pole is When the calculation starts, For non-minimum phase zeros, The situation when the calculation starts; The explicit expression for the optimal output tracking performance is .
[0026] An electronic device includes a processor, a memory, a user interface and a network interface, wherein the memory is used to store instructions, the user interface and the network interface are used to communicate with other devices, and the processor is used to execute the instructions stored in the memory so that the electronic device executes a method for analyzing the output tracking control performance of an information-physical system under a hybrid attack.
[0027] A computer-readable storage medium stores instructions, which, when executed, execute a method for analyzing the output tracking control performance of an information-physical system under a hybrid attack.
[0028] The beneficial effects of the technical solution provided by this application are: Bernoulli random distribution is used to model DoS attacks and deception attacks, and to construct a cyber-physical system under hybrid attacks. The specific form of deception attacks with deception signals is described using transfer functions. Based on a single degree of freedom controller, the optimal controller is designed in the frequency domain using coprime decomposition, internal and external factor decomposition, and Youla parameterization of the controller. While ensuring system stability, the output tracking performance of a single-input single-output discrete cyber-physical system under hybrid attacks is improved.
[0029] Through the frequency domain The optimal control method derives the infimum of the tracking performance of a single-input and single-output discrete information-physical system (i.e., describing the impact of hybrid attacks on the information-physical system with an explicit expression), reveals the intrinsic connection between the output tracking performance of the information-physical system and the system's own characteristics and hybrid attacks, and better designs the optimal controller for the system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0030] The present application will be further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments, in which: Figure 1 is a discrete-time cyber-physical system diagram in an embodiment of the present application; Figure 2 Schematic diagram of output tracking control performance limit of the cyber-physical system under hybrid attack in an embodiment of the present application; Figure 3 is a schematic diagram comparing the output tracking control performance limits of the cyber-physical system under different hybrid attacks in the embodiments of the present application; Figure 4 It is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0031] In order to have a clearer understanding of the technical features, purposes and effects of the present application, the specific implementation methods of the present application are now described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.
[0032] An embodiment of the present application provides a method for analyzing the output tracking control performance of an information-physical system under hybrid attacks.
[0033] Please refer to Figure 1 , Figure 1 It is a discrete-time cyber-physical system diagram of an output tracking control performance analysis method of a cyber-physical system under a hybrid attack in an embodiment of the present application, including: S1: Use Bernoulli random distribution to model DoS attacks and deception attacks, and construct cyber-physical systems under hybrid attacks; Specifically, information-physical systems include: communication information-physical systems, intelligent transportation systems, and intelligent medical systems.
[0034] Step S1 includes: S11: Cyber-physical systems include: Reference input , information output of the physical system , the input of the single degree of freedom controller , the accused , Single degree of freedom controller , the output of the noise channel ; represents the reference input, , represents the direction vector of the reference input; let is a unit vector, that is , of Transformed to , the variance is ; S12: Set Represents a stable, regular, real rational transfer function or set of matrices; single degree of freedom controller The Youla parameterized form of , represents a single degree of freedom controller; represents a matrix that satisfies the double Bezout equation; Parameters representing the free design of the controller; represents the factor about zero; represents a matrix that satisfies the double Bezout equation; represents the factor about the pole; S13: Use Bernoulli random distribution to describe DoS attacks and spoofing attacks respectively; DoS attack represented as parameters , and its probability distribution function is , Indicates the probability of data loss; The spoofing attack is represented by , and its probability distribution function is ; represents the probability of occurrence of a spoofing attack; Assume that the error signal of the cyber-physical system is ; Set the tracking performance index of the cyber-physical system ,in They represent the variance of tracking error and the variance of system output respectively; Since the control energy input to the communication channel is limited, there is , so that , is the expectation operator, is the trade-off parameter between tracking error and control energy input, where .
[0035] Specifically, the present invention discloses an output tracking performance limit analysis method for a single-input single-output discrete-time cyber-physical system based on a single-degree-of-freedom controller under hybrid attacks. The structure of the cyber-physical system is as follows: Figure 1 shown.
[0036] S2: Based on the single degree of freedom controller of the cyber-physical system, the output tracking performance index of the cyber-physical system is defined by using coprime decomposition, internal and external factor decomposition, and Youla parameterization method in the frequency domain; Step S2 includes: Output of the noise channel ,in Denotes the parameters of the spoofing attack modeled by the Bernoulli random distribution; represents the data injected into the cyber-physical system during the attack, and ; and The transfer function between according to , , , let coprime decomposition , and for After right coprime decomposition, the factors about zeros and poles are: and for After left coprime decomposition, the factors about zeros and poles are obtained; Assume coprime decomposition , and for After right coprime decomposition, the factors about zeros and poles are: and for After left coprime decomposition, the factors about zeros and poles are obtained; Combining the double Bezout equation and the Youla parameterization of the single-degree-of-freedom controller, where represents the matrix that satisfies the Bezout equation; represents the matrix that satisfies the Bezout equation; represents the matrix that satisfies the Bezout equation; represents the matrix that satisfies the Bezout equation; represents the factor about zero; represents the factor about zero; represents the factor about the pole; represents the factor about the pole; is the unit matrix, and the output tracking performance index of the cyber-physical system is defined as follows:
[0037] in , represents the matrix that satisfies the Bezout equation; represents the matrix that satisfies the Bezout equation; Preset parameters for the controller; express The variance of .
[0038] S3: Through full-pass decomposition, Spatial decomposition techniques and Youla parameterization of controllers are used to compute explicit expressions for optimal output tracking performance of cyber-physical systems subject to hybrid attacks. Step S3 includes: The output tracking performance indicators are broken down into the following four parts:
[0039]
[0040] .
[0041] Step S3 also includes: calculate ,as follows: For the accused Full-pass decomposition , ; is the minimum phase factor; and is the all-pass factor, including the non-minimum phase zero of the controlled object and unstable poles ; and Represents the total number of non-minimum phase zeros and unstable poles; express The conjugate and conjugation of; definition , ,So
[0042] in represents the all-pass factor; ; express represents a subspace of Hilbert; ; represents another subspace of Hilbert, and mutually orthogonal; Will Decompose into
[0043]
[0044]
[0045] Lemma 1: For any matrix , there exists a matrix , so that the following equation holds
[0046]
[0047] in , , , All-pass factor The product of All-pass factor The product of represents the total number of unstable poles, All-pass factor The product of All-pass factor The product of represents the unstable point, Represents the reciprocal of the all-pass factor; all-pass factor , Symbols in express or ; have
[0048] in , ; for The partial product of for The partial product of get
[0049] in, ; represents an expression containing z, represents an expression containing z; Determined in Youla expression , so that and ; rewrite as follows:
[0050] according to and ,get as follows: .
[0051] Step S3 includes: By definition , , ,in , combined with Lemma 1, we get:
[0052]
[0053]
[0054] in express The partial product of express The partial product of express The partial product of express The partial product of express The partial product of express The partial product of express The conjugate transpose of express The conjugate transpose of ; The unstable pole is When the calculation starts, For non-minimum phase zeros, The situation when the calculation starts; The explicit expression for the optimal output tracking performance is .
[0055] S4: Through the explicit expression of the optimal output tracking performance, the output tracking performance of the information-physical system is analyzed to obtain the optimal tracking performance of the information-physical system.
[0056] Experimental data and conclusions: Consider a discrete single-input single-output controlled object, whose transfer function model is:
[0057] From the transfer function matrix, we can see that the model contains a non-minimum phase zero , contains an unstable pole . Trade-off Parameters is 0.5, select , channel input power . For mixed attacks, Figure 2 As shown in Figure 2, as the probability of hybrid attack increases, the output tracking control performance of the cyber-physical system becomes worse. When the probability of hybrid attack is close to zero, the performance of output tracking control is improved. In addition, Figure 3 The two types of attacks are compared. When the non-minimum phase zero and the unstable pole are close, the output tracking control limit of the system tends to infinity, resulting in a sharp deterioration in the output tracking control performance. As the probability of controlling the DoS attack remains unchanged, the output tracking control performance of the cyber-physical system deteriorates with the increase in the probability of the deception attack. On the contrary, when the hybrid attack does not occur, the system performance is better.
[0058] The present application also discloses an electronic device. Figure 4 , Figure 4 The electronic device 500 may include: at least one processor 501 , at least one network interface 504 , a user interface 503 , a memory 505 , and at least one communication bus 502 .
[0059] The communication bus 502 is used to realize the connection and communication between these components.
[0060] The user interface 503 may include a display screen, and the optional user interface 503 may also include a standard wired interface or a wireless interface.
[0061] The network interface 504 may optionally include a standard wired interface or a wireless interface (such as a WI-FI interface).
[0062] The present application also discloses a computer-readable storage medium storing a plurality of instructions suitable for loading by a processor to execute the above-mentioned method for analyzing the output tracking control performance of an information-physical system under a hybrid attack.
[0063] The above are only exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure and cannot be used to limit the scope of the present disclosure. That is, any equivalent changes and modifications made according to the teachings of the present disclosure are still within the scope of the present disclosure. After considering the disclosure of the specification and the truth of practice, those skilled in the art will easily think of other embodiments of the present disclosure.
[0064] This application is intended to cover any variation, use or adaptation of the present disclosure, which follows the general principles of the present disclosure and includes common knowledge or customary technical means in the art not described in the present disclosure. The description and examples are to be regarded as exemplary only, and the scope and spirit of the present disclosure are defined by the claims.
Claims
1. A method for analyzing the output tracking control performance of a cyber-physical system under hybrid attacks, characterized in that: The method comprises the following steps: S1: Use Bernoulli random distribution to model DoS attacks and deception attacks, and construct cyber-physical systems under hybrid attacks; S2: Based on the single degree of freedom controller of the cyber-physical system, the output tracking performance index of the cyber-physical system is defined by using coprime decomposition, internal and external factor decomposition, and Youla parameterization method in the frequency domain; S3: Through full-pass decomposition, Spatial decomposition techniques and Youla parameterization of controllers are used to compute explicit expressions for optimal output tracking performance of cyber-physical systems subject to hybrid attacks. S4: Through the explicit expression of the optimal output tracking performance, the output tracking performance of the information-physical system is analyzed to obtain the optimal tracking performance of the information-physical system.
2. The method for analyzing the output tracking control performance of a cyber-physical system under a hybrid attack according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step S1 includes: S11: Cyber-physical systems include: Reference input , information output of the physical system , the input of the single degree of freedom controller , the accused , Single degree of freedom controller , the output of the noise channel ; represents the reference input, , represents the direction vector of the reference input; let is a unit vector, that is , of Transformed to , the variance is ; S12: Set Represents a stable, regular, real rational transfer function or set of matrices; single degree of freedom controller The Youla parameterized form of , represents a single degree of freedom controller; represents a matrix that satisfies the double Bezout equation; Parameters representing the free design of the controller; represents the factor about zero; represents a matrix that satisfies the double Bezout equation; represents the factor about the pole; S13: Use Bernoulli random distribution to describe DoS attacks and spoofing attacks respectively; DoS attack represented as parameters , and its probability distribution function is , Indicates the probability of data loss; The spoofing attack is represented by , and its probability distribution function is ; represents the probability of occurrence of a spoofing attack; Assume that the error signal of the cyber-physical system is ; Set the tracking performance index of the cyber-physical system ,in They represent the variance of tracking error and the variance of system output respectively; Since the control energy input to the communication channel is limited, there is , so that , is the expectation operator, is the trade-off parameter between tracking error and control energy input, where .
3. The method for analyzing the output tracking control performance of a cyber-physical system under a hybrid attack as claimed in claim 2, characterized in that: Step S2 includes: Output of the noise channel ,in Denotes the parameters of the spoofing attack modeled by the Bernoulli random distribution; represents the data injected into the cyber-physical system during the attack, and ; and The transfer function between according to , , , let coprime decomposition , and for After right coprime decomposition, the factors about zeros and poles are: and for After left coprime decomposition, the factors about zeros and poles are obtained; Assume coprime decomposition , and for After right coprime decomposition, the factors about zeros and poles are: and for After left coprime decomposition, the factors about zeros and poles are obtained; Combining the double Bezout equation and the Youla parameterization of the single-degree-of-freedom controller, where represents the matrix that satisfies the Bezout equation; represents the matrix that satisfies the Bezout equation; represents the matrix that satisfies the Bezout equation; represents the matrix that satisfies the Bezout equation; represents the factor about zero; represents the factor about zero; represents the factor about the pole; represents the factor about the pole; is the unit matrix, and the output tracking performance index of the cyber-physical system is defined as follows: in , represents the matrix that satisfies the Bezout equation; represents the matrix that satisfies the Bezout equation; Preset parameters for the controller; express The variance of .
4. The method for analyzing the output tracking control performance of a cyber-physical system under a hybrid attack as claimed in claim 3, characterized in that: Step S3 includes: The output tracking performance indicators are broken down into the following four parts: 。 5. The method for analyzing the output tracking control performance of a cyber-physical system under a hybrid attack as claimed in claim 4, characterized in that: Step S3 also includes: calculate ,as follows: For the accused Full-pass decomposition , ; is the minimum phase factor; and is the all-pass factor, including the non-minimum phase zero of the controlled object and unstable poles ; and Represents the total number of non-minimum phase zeros and unstable poles; express The conjugate and conjugation of; definition , ,So in represents the all-pass factor; ; express represents a subspace of Hilbert; ; represents another subspace of Hilbert, and mutually orthogonal; Will Decompose into Lemma 1: For any matrix , there exists a matrix , so that the following equation holds in , , , All-pass factor The product of All-pass factor The product of represents the total number of unstable poles, All-pass factor The product of All-pass factor The product of represents the unstable point, Represents the reciprocal of the all-pass factor; all-pass factor , Symbols in express or ; have in , ; for The partial product of for The partial product of get in, ; represents an expression containing z, represents an expression containing z; Determined in Youla expression , so that and ; rewrite as follows: according to and ,get as follows: 。 6. The method for analyzing the output tracking control performance of a cyber-physical system under a hybrid attack as claimed in claim 5, characterized in that: Step S3 includes: By definition , , ,in , combined with Lemma 1, we get: in express The partial product of express The partial product of express The partial product of express The partial product of express The partial product of express The partial product of express The conjugate transpose of express The conjugate transpose of ; For the unstable pole When the calculation starts, For non-minimum phase zeros, The situation when the calculation starts; The explicit expression for the optimal output tracking performance is .
7. An electronic device, characterized in that: The electronic device comprises a processor (501), a memory (505), a user interface (503) and a network interface (504), wherein the memory (505) is used to store instructions, the user interface (503) and the network interface (504) are used to communicate with other devices, and the processor (501) is used to execute the instructions stored in the memory (505) so that the electronic device executes the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.
8. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores instructions, and when the instructions are executed by a computer, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6 is executed.
Citation Information
Patent Citations
Network control system controller design method based on event triggering
CN109814381A
Signal tracking control method and system for communication-limited networked system
CN113589691A
Performance optimization method of multichannel discrete network control system
CN113655715A
Security tracking control method based on dynamic event triggering mechanism under multi-network attack
CN114415633A
Network control system performance limit analysis method considering non-zero mean noise
CN114895645A
Cited By
Actuator vulnerability analysis method for non-unique identifiable information physical system
CN121486057A
An actuator vulnerability analysis method for non-unique identifiable information physical systems
CN121486057B
