Lightweight identity authentication method for power internet of things based on PUF (Physical Unclonable Function) and Chebyshev chaotic mapping

By adopting the identity authentication method of PUF and Chebishev chaotic mapping in power IoT devices, the problem that traditional solutions cannot resist physical attacks and computational overhead is solved, and two-way identity authentication and session key negotiation of resource-constrained devices are realized , ensuring high security and low resource consumption.

CN119070970AActive Publication Date: 2024-12-03HARBIN INST OF TECH

Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411234992.4
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-09-04
Publication Date
2024-12-03
Estimated Expiration
2044-09-04

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Traditional PUF-based identity authentication schemes cannot withstand physical attacks and machine learning modeling attacks. They require passwords or fingerprint information, and have high computing overhead and are not suitable for power IoT devices with limited resources.

Method used

Using lightweight identity authentication method based on PUF and Chebishev chaos mapping, obtain authentication parameters through the registration stage, and use the semi-group nature of Chebishev polynomials to perform bidirectional identity authentication and session key negotiation in the authentication stage to avoid on the device Secret information is stored internally, suitable for resource-constrained power IoT devices.

Benefits of technology

It realizes bidirectional identity authentication and session key negotiation between the gateway and the terminal device without inputting passwords or biological information, which can resist physical and machine learning modeling attacks, reduce resource consumption, and ensure high security.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention discloses a power internet of things lightweight identity authentication method based on PUF (Physical Unclonable Function) and Chebyshev chaotic mapping. The method comprises the following two parts: a registration stage: a device and a gateway carry out registration on an RS (Reference Signal) through a secure channel to obtain required authentication parameters; and an authentication stage: the terminal device and the gateway perform bidirectional identity authentication by using the authentication parameters obtained by registration and negotiate a session key for subsequent use. Compared with a traditional identity authentication scheme, the PUF and Chebyshev chaotic mapping adopted by the invention has high security and lower resource overhead. According to the method, the PUF is utilized to generate challenge response pairs to realize bidirectional identity authentication and key negotiation, and any secret information related to authentication does not need to be stored in an equipment memory. Meanwhile, Chebyshev chaotic mapping is adopted to protect transmission of challenge response peer-to-peer secret information in a non-secure channel, so that attacks such as physics, machine learning modeling and counterfeiting can be resisted, and the security of the authentication process is ensured.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of information security and relates to a lightweight identity authentication method for an electric power Internet of Things, and specifically relates to a lightweight identity authentication method for an electric power Internet of Things based on PUF and Chebyshev chaos mapping. Background Art

[0002] As society transitions toward digitalization and intelligentization, the widespread application of IoT technology across various sectors has become a significant trend. As a crucial component of the energy sector, the Power IoT deeply integrates power systems with IoT technologies, aiming to achieve intelligent and automated power systems and profoundly shape the new landscape of the power energy sector. Through intelligent sensing and real-time data collection, the Power IoT transforms each component of the power system into highly manageable and monitorable intelligent nodes, providing strong support for efficient energy management.

[0003] The Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system in the Power Internet of Things (PoT) monitors, controls, and collects real-time data from power systems, forming the foundation for intelligent management and efficient operation. With the development of IoT technology, the number of devices in the field control layer of PoT SCADA systems has increased exponentially. Most of these devices are resource-constrained, distributed, and difficult to monitor, making them vulnerable to physical, replay, and denial-of-service attacks. Furthermore, with the increasing number of exposed interfaces in SCADA systems, attackers may attempt to capture and tamper with sensitive data in communication channels, posing a threat to the data security of the PoT. To address these threats, the PoT requires an authentication scheme suitable for resource-constrained end devices, ensuring that only authorized users or devices can access sensitive information. Traditional authentication schemes, based on symmetric or asymmetric cryptographic algorithms, are unsuitable for resource-constrained end devices. Furthermore, they store keys and other secret information in plain text within the device. If the device is physically attacked, attackers can access the device memory to obtain keys and secret information, posing a threat to data privacy and security. To overcome the limitations of existing schemes, the lightweight security primitive PUF is being applied to the authentication of resource-constrained devices. PUF generates responses based on process deviations during device manufacturing and is unclonable and unpredictable. Any attempt to tamper with the PUF function will render the PUF unusable, so it can resist physical attacks, cloning attacks, and side-channel attacks.

[0004] Traditional PUF-based identity authentication solutions have the following main problems:

[0005] (1) Unable to resist physical attacks and machine learning modeling attacks. Attackers can obtain secret information such as CRPs stored in the device memory and simulate the original PUF using machine learning algorithms based on known CRPs, which destroys the unclonability and unpredictability of PUF.

[0006] (2) Passwords or fingerprints are required. Most of the devices in the power Internet of Things are deployed in remote areas, where password input and fingerprint information cannot be entered.

[0007] (3) High computational overhead. Traditional PUF-based authentication schemes use elliptic curve cryptography and symmetric encryption algorithms. These algorithms have high computational overhead and are not suitable for resource-constrained power IoT devices. Summary of the Invention

[0008] In response to the above-mentioned problems of traditional PUF-based identity authentication schemes, the present invention provides a lightweight identity authentication method for the power Internet of Things based on PUF and Chebyshev chaos mapping. This method realizes two-way identity authentication and session key negotiation between the gateway and the terminal device, and is suitable for resource-constrained power Internet of Things devices.

[0009] The purpose of the present invention is achieved through the following technical solutions:

[0010] A lightweight identity authentication method for the power Internet of Things based on PUF and Chebyshev chaotic mapping consists of the following two parts:

[0011] (1) Registration stage

[0012] During the registration phase, the device and gateway register with the RS through a secure channel to obtain the required authentication parameters. The specific registration steps are as follows:

[0013] Step 1: Device D i Select your own ID i With temporary identity ID TM And send it to the registration server RS; gateway GW i Choose your own identity and send it to RS;

[0014] Step 2: RS generates a random number C i ,C TM ,r,N u ,s, then calculate D i Pseudo-identity AID i =h(C i ||ID i ), then synchronize the pseudo identity AID TM =h(C TM ||ID TM ), GWi Fake identity Then calculate D i and GW i The shared secret W = h(AID i ||KID i ||s) and And the message {C i ,C TM ,AID i ,AID TM ,K} sent to D i , message {W,KID i}Send to GW i , where: W is the shared secret between the device and the gateway, K is the XOR protection of the shared secret W, K is stored in the device memory, and K and W are used to securely transmit the secret value Nu;

[0015] Step 3: D i Get the message, and i ,AID TM ,K} is stored in the device, and the C i and C TM As input to the PUF function, the response R is calculated i and R TM , and the message {R i ,R TM}Send to RS;GW i Send the message {KID i ,W} is securely stored in the gateway memory;

[0016] Step 4: RS calculation And x,p, Public and stored And {(C i ,R i ,AID i ),(C TM ,R TM ,AID TM )}Send to GW i , where: KID i is the pseudo-identity of the gateway, is a Chebyshev polynomial, x and p are the parameters in the Chebyshev polynomial, ranging from negative infinity to positive infinity;

[0017] Step 5: GW i Update the storage information to {KID i ,W,(C i ,R i ,AID i ),(C TM ,RTM ,AID TM )};

[0018] (2) Certification stage

[0019] During the authentication phase, the terminal device and the gateway use the authentication parameters obtained during registration to perform two-way identity authentication and negotiate a session key for subsequent use. The specific steps are as follows:

[0020] Step 1: D i Generate a random number N d ,calculate Then calculate Generate a request authentication message And send to GW i ,in: The semigroup property of Chebyshev polynomials is used, namely T r (T s (x))=T s·r (x) = T s (T r (x)), K * is the XOR value of K;

[0021] Step 2.1: GW i Upon receiving D i After the identity authentication request is made, the AID is first searched in the database i , if AID i If it is not in the gateway's database, then GW i Reject D i Authentication request, D i Utilizing AID TM Initiate authentication request again, and GW i Will use (C TM ,R TM ,AID TM ) to authenticate the device, otherwise read (C i ,R i ), and generate a random number N s and timestamp T s ;

[0022] Step 2.2: GW i calculate

[0023] and generates a message And send the message to D i , where: Nu is the secret value used for authentication, which is a random number; It is a Chebyshev polynomial. The calculation formula here uses the semigroup property of Chebyshev polynomial. XOR value, the purpose is to protect the secret value C i ,N s ,R i ; V0 is the authentication value, used by the device to identify the gateway;

[0024] Step 3.1: D i Check whether the transmission delay is less than Δt, that is, |TT s |<Δt, if it is greater than or equal to Δt, then the authentication is terminated, where: Δt is the baseline value of the transmission delay;

[0025] Step 3.2: D i calculate Get Then calculate V0', if it is equal to V0, D i Then for GW i Authentication is successful, otherwise D i GW i Authentication failed, where V0' is the authentication value calculated by the device;

[0026] Step 3.3: D i Generate timestamp T u , random number n, calculate C i+1 =h(C i ||N u ), R i+1 =PUF(C i ), V1=h(N s ||SK||T u ), N u '=n, and generates a message And {AID i+1 ,K'} stored in D i , where: C i+1 、R i+1 、AID i+1 , K′, Nu′ are the C i 、R i 、AID i , K, Nu update; SK is the shared key, V1 is used for gateway authentication device;

[0027] Step 4.1: GW i Check whether the transmission delay is less than Δt, that is, |TT u |<Δt, if it is greater than or equal to Δt, then the authentication is terminated;

[0028] Step 4.2: GWi calculate Then calculate V1', if it is equal to V1, then GW i To D i Authentication is successful, otherwise GW i To D i Authentication failed, where V1' is the authentication value calculated by the gateway;

[0029] Step 4.3: GW i Calculate C i+1 =h(C i ||N u ), AID i+1 =h(AID i ||R i ||N s ), and

[0030] {(C i+1 ,R i+1 ,AID i+1 )} is stored in the gateway memory.

[0031] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following advantages:

[0032] (1) The present invention proposes a lightweight anonymous identity authentication method for the power Internet of Things, which can realize two-way identity authentication and session key negotiation between the gateway and the terminal device without entering any password or biometric information.

[0033] (2) The present invention can resist attacks such as physical and machine learning modeling. This method does not require any secret information such as CRPs for authentication to be stored in the device, while using Chebyshev chaotic mapping to protect secret information such as CRPs transmitted in non-secure channels.

[0034] (3) The present invention is applicable to resource-constrained power IoT terminal devices. PUF and Chebyshev chaos mapping technologies are lightweight security primitives that can reduce resource consumption while ensuring high security. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0035] Figure 1 The SCADA system architecture for the power Internet of Things.

[0036] Figure 2 This is the registration phase of a lightweight identity authentication method for the power Internet of Things based on PUF and Chebyshev chaos map.

[0037] Figure 3 This is the authentication stage of the lightweight identity authentication method for the power Internet of Things based on PUF and Chebyshev chaos map. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0038] The technical solution of the present invention is further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings, but is not limited thereto. Any modification or equivalent replacement of the technical solution of the present invention that does not depart from the spirit and scope of the technical solution of the present invention should be included in the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0039] This invention provides a typical power Internet of Things SCADA system architecture, such as Figure 1 As shown, the architecture is divided into a field control layer, a regional monitoring layer, and a central control layer. The field control layer includes terminal devices such as smart meters and RTUs, which are responsible for field data collection and executing control instructions. The regional monitoring layer includes gateways, PLCs, registration servers and other equipment, which are responsible for collecting data and uploading it to the upper-level server, as well as executing instructions issued by the central control layer and adjusting the operating parameters of the system. The central control layer is composed of data servers, monitoring centers and other equipment, which are responsible for monitoring and controlling the operating status of the system, processing and analyzing data in real time, and then performing alarm processing and fault diagnosis. The lightweight identity authentication method for the power Internet of Things based on PUF and Chebyshev chaos mapping provided by the present invention takes the power Internet of Things SCADA system as an example to realize two-way identity authentication between terminal devices and gateways. The method consists of the following three parties:

[0040] (1) Registration server: It is located in the regional monitoring layer of the power Internet of Things SCADA system and is responsible for the registration of gateways and devices. It does not participate in subsequent identity authentication, which is completed by the gateway and terminal devices.

[0041] (2) Gateway: The gateway is located in the regional monitoring layer of the power Internet of Things SCADA system and is responsible for uploading the data collected by the terminal to the data server or monitoring center of the central control layer.

[0042] (3) Terminal equipment: Located at the field control layer of the power Internet of Things SCADA system, it is responsible for collecting data from field equipment and transmitting the collected data to the upper-level gateway.

[0043] The method proposed in the present invention includes a registration phase and a two-way identity authentication phase, and the relevant symbols are shown in Table 1.

[0044] Table 1 Symbols

[0045]

[0046]

[0047] (1) Registration stage

[0048] During the registration phase, the device and gateway register with the RS through a secure channel to obtain the required authentication parameters. The specific registration steps are as follows:

[0049] Step 1: Di Select your own ID i With temporary identity ID TM and send it to RS;GW i Choose your own identity and send it to RS.

[0050] Step 2: RS generates a random number C i ,C TM ,r,N u ,s, then calculate D i Pseudo-identity AID i =h(C i ||ID i ), then synchronize the pseudo identity AID TM =h(C TM ||ID TM ), GW i Pseudo-identity KID i =h(r||ID GWi ), then calculate D i and GW i The shared secret W = h(AID i ||KID i ||s) and And the message {C i ,C TM ,AID i ,AID TM ,K} sent to D i , message {W,KID i}Send to GW i .

[0051] Step 3: D i Get the message, and i ,AID TM ,K} is stored in the device, and the C i and C TM As input to the PUF function, the response R is calculated i and R TM , and the message {R i ,R TM}Send to RS;GW i Send the message {KID i ,W} is securely stored in the gateway memory.

[0052] Step 4: RS calculation And x,p, Public and stored And {(C i ,R i ,AIDi ),(C TM ,R TM ,AID TM )}Send to GW i .

[0053] Step 5: GW i Update the storage information to {KID i ,W,(C i ,R i ,AID i ),(C TM ,R TM ,AID TM )}.

[0054] (2) Certification stage

[0055] During the authentication phase, the terminal device and the gateway use the authentication parameters obtained during registration to perform two-way identity authentication and negotiate a session key for subsequent use. The specific steps are as follows:

[0056] Step 1: D i Generate a random number N d ,calculate Then calculate Generate a request authentication message And send to GW i .

[0057] Step 2.1: GW i Upon receiving D i After the identity authentication request is made, the AID is first searched in the database i , if AID i If it is not in the gateway's database, then GW i Reject D i authentication request, then D i Utilizing AID TM Initiate authentication request again, and GW i Will use (C TM ,R TM ,AID TM ) to authenticate the device, otherwise read (C i ,R i ), and generate a random number N s and timestamp T s .

[0058] Step 2.2: GW i calculate

[0059] and generates a message And send the message to D i .

[0060] Step 3.1: D i Check whether the transmission delay is less than Δt, that is, |TT s |<Δt, if it is greater than or equal to Δt, the authentication is terminated.

[0061] Step 3.2: D i calculate Get Then calculate V0', if it is equal to V0, D i Then for GW i Authentication is successful, otherwise D i GW i Authentication failed.

[0062] Step 3.3: D i Generate timestamp T u , random number n, calculate C i+1 =h(C i ||N u ), R i+1 =PUF(C i ), AID i+1 =h(AID i ||R i ||N s ), V1=h(N s ||SK||T u ), N u '=n, and generates a message And {AID i+1 ,K'} stored in D i .

[0063] Step 4.1: GW i Check whether the transmission delay is less than Δt, that is, |TT u |<Δt, if it is greater than or equal to Δt, the authentication is terminated.

[0064] Step 4.2: GW i calculate Then calculate V1', if it is equal to V1, then GW i To D i Authentication is successful, otherwise GW i To D i Authentication failed.

[0065] Step 4.3: GW i Calculate C i+1 =h(C i||N u ), AID i+1 =h(AID i ||R i ||N s ), and

[0066] {(C i+1 ,R i+1 ,AID i+1 )} is stored in the gateway memory.

[0067] Compared to traditional authentication schemes, the PUF and Chebyshev chaotic mapping employed in this invention offer high security and reduced resource consumption. This method utilizes the PUF to generate challenge-response pairs for bidirectional authentication and key agreement, eliminating the need to store any authentication secrets in device memory. Furthermore, the Chebyshev chaotic mapping is used to protect the transmission of the challenge-response secrets over insecure channels, thereby protecting against attacks such as physical and machine learning modeling, and impersonation, ensuring the security of the authentication process.

Claims

1. A lightweight identity authentication method for power Internet of Things based on PUF and Chebyshev chaos mapping. Features The method comprises the following two parts: (1) Registration stage During the registration phase, the device and gateway register with the RS through a secure channel to obtain the required authentication parameters. The specific registration steps are as follows: Step 1: Equipment D i Choose your own ID i With temporary ID TM And send it to the registration server RS; gateway GW i Choose your own identity and send it to RS; Step 2: RS generates a random number C i ,C TM ,r,N u ,s, then calculate D i Pseudo-identity AID i =h(C i ||ID i ), then synchronize the pseudo identity AID TM =h(C TM ||ID TM ), GW i Pseudo-identity Then calculate D i and GW i The shared secret W = h(AID i ||KID i ||s) and And the message {C i ,C TM ,AID i ,AID TM ,K} sent to D i , message {W,KID i }Send to GW i , where: W is the shared secret between the device and the gateway, K is the XOR protection of the shared secret W; Step 3: D i Get the message and replace {AID i ,AID TM ,K} is stored in the device, and the C in the message is i and C TM As input to the PUF function, the response R is calculated i and R TM , and the message {R i ,R TM }Send to RS; GW i Send the message {KID i ,W} is securely stored in the gateway memory; Step 4: RS calculation And x,p, Public and stored And {(C i ,R i ,AID i ),(C TM ,R TM ,AID TM )}Send to GW i , where: KID i is the pseudo-identity of the gateway, is the Chebyshev polynomial, x and p are the parameters in the Chebyshev polynomial; Step 5: GW i Update the storage information to {KID i ,W,(C i ,R i ,AID i ),(C TM ,R TM ,AID TM )}; (2) Certification stage During the authentication phase, the terminal device and the gateway use the authentication parameters obtained through registration to perform two-way identity authentication and negotiate a session key for subsequent use. The specific steps are as follows: Step 1: D i Generate a random number N d ,calculate Then calculate Generate a request authentication message And send to GW i ; Step 2.1: GW i Upon receiving D i After the authentication request is made, the AID is first searched in the database i , if AID i If it is not in the gateway's database, then GW i Reject D i The authentication request, D i Exploiting AID TM Initiate authentication request again, and GW i Will use (C TM ,R TM ,AID TM ) to authenticate the device, otherwise read (C i ,R i ), and generate a random number N s and timestamp T s ; Step 2.2: GW i calculate and generate the message And send the message to D i , where: Nu is the secret value used for authentication, is a Chebyshev polynomial, is the XOR value; V 0 is the authentication value; Step 3.1: D i Check whether the transmission delay is less than Δt, that is, |TT s |<Δt, if it is greater than or equal to Δt, the authentication is terminated, where: Δt is the reference value of the transmission delay; Step 3.2: D i calculate Get Then calculate V 0 ', if with V 0 Equal D i For GW i Authentication is successful, otherwise D i About GW i Authentication failed, where: V 0 'The authentication value calculated for the device; Step 3.3: D i Generate timestamp T u , random number n, calculate C i+1 =h(C i ||N u ), R i+1 =PUF(C i ), AID i+1 =h(AID i ||R i ||N s ), V 1 =h(N s ||SK||T u ), N u ' = n, and generate the message And {AID i+1 ,K'} stored in D i , where: C i+1 , R i+1 、AID i+1 , K′, Nu′ are the i , R i 、AID i , K, Nu update; SK is the shared key, V 1 Used for gateway authentication devices; Step 4.1: GW i Check whether the transmission delay is less than Δt, that is, |TT u |<Δt, if it is greater than or equal to Δt, then the authentication ends; Step 4.2: GW i calculate Then calculate V 1 ', if with V 1 If equal, GW i Right D i Authentication is successful, otherwise GW i Right D i Authentication failed, where: V 1 'The authentication value calculated by the gateway; Step 4.3: GW i Calculate C i+1 =h(C i ||N u ), AID i+1 =h(AID i ||R i ||N s ), and {(C i+1 ,R i+1 ,AID i+1 )} is stored in the gateway memory.

2. According to claim 1, the lightweight identity authentication method for power Internet of Things based on PUF and Chebyshev chaos mapping, Features The registration server is located at the regional monitoring layer of the power Internet of Things SCADA system and is responsible for the registration of gateways and devices.

3. According to claim 1, the lightweight identity authentication method for power Internet of Things based on PUF and Chebyshev chaos mapping, Features The gateway is located at the regional monitoring layer of the power Internet of Things SCADA system and is responsible for uploading the data collected by the terminal to the data server or monitoring center of the central control layer.

4. According to claim 1, the lightweight identity authentication method for power Internet of Things based on PUF and Chebyshev chaos mapping, Features The terminal device is located at the field control layer of the power Internet of Things SCADA system, and is responsible for collecting data from field devices and transmitting the collected data to the upper-level gateway.

Citation Information

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