Nuclear power DCS information encryption system, method and device

Abstract

The invention belongs to the technical field of communication security, and particularly relates to a nuclear power DCS information encryption system, method and device. The system is based on a certificateless SM2 algorithm, and is suitable for nuclear power DCS system safety protection. According to the method, a public and private key generation process of an SM2 algorithm is replaced by SCHNORR signatures twice, a public key of a key generation center is bound to yi, then yi is bound to a public key of a user, complex certificate management overhead is avoided, the security risk of key escrow is avoided, and the security and the performance can be improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of communication security, and in particular relates to a nuclear power DCS information encryption system, method and device. Background Art

[0002] Nuclear power is a national strategic industry in my country's energy industry, and nuclear power DCS systems have more stringent safety requirements. Once an accident occurs, in addition to affecting production operations, it may also cause environmental pollution and personnel radiation hazards, and further affect the global nuclear power industry.

[0003] At present, the defense measures against network attacks on nuclear power DCS systems include anomaly detection, whitelist protection strategy, etc., but these methods cannot guarantee the security of DCS system communication from the bottom. Considering that the bottom code of nuclear power DCS system is not easy to change, the current protection measures for the inherent security of nuclear power DCS system are mainly to add a security gateway and apply the national secret algorithm SM2, SM4 or SM9 algorithm to encrypt and decrypt communication messages to ensure communication confidentiality, and use SM2, SM3 or SM9 algorithm to ensure the integrity of communication messages.

[0004] The domestic commercial encryption SM2 algorithm generates public keys based on the public key infrastructure (PKI), and needs to generate a digital certificate to bind the entity's identity and public key, so as to ensure that the public key cannot be forged or tampered with by the adversary. However, certificate management in this method consumes a lot of resources. The SM9 algorithm of the identity-based public key cryptography system directly associates the public key with the identity, eliminating the complex certificate management overhead, but has the security risk of key escrow. Therefore, it is urgent to improve the protection effectiveness of the key system of the nuclear power DCS system security gateway. Summary of the invention

[0005] In order to overcome the problems existing in the related art, a nuclear power DCS information encryption system, method and device are provided.

[0006] According to one aspect of an embodiment of the present disclosure, a nuclear power DCS secure communication system is provided, the system comprising a key generation center KGC and a plurality of security gateways;

[0007] For each security gateway, KGC generates a private key s and a public key P pub =sG, and select a random number r for the security gateway i1 and i ; Determine R i1 =r i1 G,z i1 =r i1 +sH 0 (ID i , Y i , R i1 ), and (z i1, R i1 , P pub ) is sent to the security gateway through a secure channel and y i Sending to the security gateway via a secure channel;

[0008] The security gateway receives (z i1 , R i1 , P pub ,y i ) and then determine Y i =y i G, through z i1 G=R i1 +P pub H 0 (ID i , Y i , R i1 )Verify y i the legality of

[0009] Verify y on the security gateway i After it is legal; KGC selects a random number r i2 and x i , determine pk i =(x i +y i )G,sk i =x i +y i , R i2 =r i2 G,z i2 =r i2 +y i H 0 (ID i , pk i , R i2 ), and (z i2， R i2 , pk i , Y i ) broadcast to the DCS system;

[0010] Any other security gateway in the system receives (z i2 , R i2 , pk i , Y i ) and then through z i2 =R i2 +Y i H 0 (ID i , pk i , R i2 ) Verify the public key P pub the legitimacy of.

[0011] In a possible implementation, after any pair of security gateways in the system obtain the certificateless public key and private key, they use the SM2 algorithm to perform key negotiation to obtain the symmetric key k;

[0012] The security gateway sending the message encrypts the communication message using the SM4 algorithm through k, and the security gateway receiving the message decrypts the message through k; or

[0013] The security gateway that sends the message applies the SM3 algorithm through k to perform MAC calculation to encrypt the communication message. The security gateway that receives the encrypted message can verify the validity of the MAC value and decrypt the message through k if it has k. The security gateway that receives the encrypted message cannot verify the validity of the MAC value and cannot decrypt the message if it does not have k.

[0014] In a possible implementation, each security gateway in the system is further configured with a Bypass mechanism.

[0015] According to another aspect of an embodiment of the present disclosure, a nuclear power DCS confidential communication method is provided, the method is applied to KGC, and for each security gateway, the method includes:

[0016] Step 11, KGC generates private key s and public key P pub =sG, and select a random number r for the security gateway i1 and i , the address of the security gateway is identified by ID i , G is the generator of the elliptic curve, H 0 () is a hash function;

[0017] Step 12, KGC determines R i1 =r i1 G, Z i1 =r i1 +sH 0 (ID i , Y i , R i1 ), and (z i1 , R i1 , P pub ) is sent to the security gateway through a secure channel and y i Sending to the security gateway via a secure channel;

[0018] Step 13: After confirming that the security gateway verifies y i After it is legal, KGC selects a random number r i2 and x i , determine pk i =(x i +y i )G,sk i =xi +y i , R i2 =r i2 G,z i2 =r i2 +y i H 0 (ID i , pk i , R i2 ), and (z i2 , R i2 , pk i , Y i ) is broadcast to the system.

[0019] According to another aspect of an embodiment of the present disclosure, a nuclear power DCS confidential communication method is provided, the method being applied to a security gateway, the method comprising:

[0020] Step 21, the security gateway receives the (z i1 , R i1 , P pub ,y i ) and then determine Y i =y i G, through z i1 G=R i1 +P pub H 0 (ID i , Y i , R i1 )Verify y i and verify the legitimacy of i If it is legal, notify KGC that it has been verified i To be legal;

[0021] Step 22: The security gateway receives the (z i2 , R i2 , pk i , Y i ) and then through z i2 =R i2 +Y i H 0 (ID i , pk i , R i2 ) Verify the public key P pub the legitimacy of.

[0022] In a possible implementation, after the security gateway obtains the certificateless public key and private key, the method further includes:

[0023] Step 31, the security gateway and another communicating security gateway perform key negotiation using the SM2 algorithm to obtain a symmetric key k;

[0024] Step 32, the security gateway uses the SM4 algorithm to encrypt the communication message through k and sends it to another security gateway for communication;

[0025] Step 33: After receiving the encrypted communication message from another security gateway in communication, the security gateway decrypts the message using k.

[0026] In a possible implementation, after the security gateway obtains the certificateless public key and private key, the method further includes:

[0027] Step 31, the security gateway and another communicating security gateway perform key negotiation using the SM2 algorithm to obtain a symmetric key k;

[0028] Step 32, the security gateway uses the SM3 algorithm to perform MAC calculation to encrypt the communication message and sends it to another security gateway in the communication;

[0029] Step 33, after the security gateway receives an encrypted communication message from another security gateway in the communication, it can verify the validity of the MAC value and decrypt the message through k if it has k. The security gateway that receives the encrypted message cannot verify the validity of the MAC value and cannot decrypt the message if it does not have k.

[0030] In a possible implementation, the security gateway is further configured with a Bypass mechanism.

[0031] According to another aspect of an embodiment of the present disclosure, a nuclear power DCS secure communication device is provided, the device is applied to KGC, and for each security gateway, the device includes:

[0032] Generation module, used to generate private key s and public key P pub =sG, and select a random number r for the security gateway i1 and i , the address of the security gateway is identified by ID i , G is the generator of the elliptic curve, H 0 () is a hash function;

[0033] The first distribution module is used to determine R i1 =r i1 G,z i1 =r i1 +sH 0 (ID i , Y i , R i1 ), and (z i1 , R i1 , Ppub ) is sent to the security gateway through a secure channel and y i Sending to the security gateway via a secure channel;

[0034] The second distribution module is used to determine the security gateway verification y i After it is legal, select a random number r i2 and x i , determine pk i =(x i +y i )G,sk i =x i +y i , R i2 =r i2 G,z i2 =r i2 +y i H 0 (ID i , pk i , R i2 ), and (z i2 , R i2 , pk i , Y i ) is broadcast to the system.

[0035] According to another aspect of an embodiment of the present disclosure, a nuclear power DCS secure communication device is provided, the device being applied to a security gateway, the device comprising:

[0036] The first verification module is used to receive the (z i1 , R i1 , P pub ,y i ) and then determine Y i =y i G, through z i1 G=R i1 +P pub H 0 (ID i , Y i , R i1 )Verify y i and verify the legitimacy of i If it is legal, notify KGC that it has been verified i To be legal;

[0037] The second verification module is used to receive the (z i2 , R i2 , pk i , Y i ) and then through z i2 =R i2+Y i H 0 (ID i , pk i , R i2 ) Verify the public key P pub the legitimacy of.

[0038] According to another aspect of an embodiment of the present disclosure, a KGC is provided, the KGC comprising:

[0039] processor;

[0040] a memory for storing processor-executable instructions;

[0041] Wherein, the processor is configured to execute the above-mentioned method based on KCG implementation.

[0042] According to another aspect of an embodiment of the present disclosure, a security gateway is provided, the security gateway comprising:

[0043] processor;

[0044] a memory for storing processor-executable instructions;

[0045] Wherein, the processor is configured to execute the above-mentioned method based on security gateway implementation.

[0046] According to another aspect of an embodiment of the present disclosure, a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which computer program instructions are stored, and the computer program instructions implement the above method when executed by a processor.

[0047] The beneficial effects of the present disclosure are as follows: the nuclear power DCS information encryption system of the present disclosure adopts the certificate-free SM2 algorithm, which is suitable for the security protection of the nuclear power DCS system. The present disclosure uses two SCHNORR signatures to replace the public and private key generation process of the SM2 algorithm, and binds the public key of the key generation center to the y i , and then y i Bound to the user's public key, there is neither the complicated certificate management overhead nor the security risk of key escrow, and both security and performance can be improved. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0048] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of a nuclear power DCS information encryption system shown in an embodiment of the present disclosure. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0049] The present invention is further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.

[0050] Unless otherwise defined, the technical and scientific terms used in the present disclosure have the same meanings as those generally understood by those skilled in the art to which the present disclosure belongs; the terms used in the present disclosure are only for the purpose of describing specific embodiments and are not intended to limit the present disclosure; the term "including" and any variations thereof in the present disclosure are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions. Obviously, the embodiments described in the present disclosure are only part of the embodiments of the present disclosure, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present disclosure, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in the field without making creative efforts are within the scope of protection of the present disclosure.

[0051] Reference to "embodiments" in this disclosure means that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in conjunction with the embodiments may be included in at least one embodiment of the disclosure. The appearance of the phrase in various places in the specification does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment, nor is it an independent or alternative embodiment that is mutually exclusive with other embodiments. It is explicitly and implicitly understood by those skilled in the art that the embodiments described herein may be combined with other embodiments.

[0052] Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of a nuclear power DCS information encryption system shown in an embodiment of the present disclosure, such as Figure 1 As shown, the system includes a key generation center KGC and multiple security gateways.

[0053] For each security gateway, KGC generates a private key s and a public key P pub =sG, and select a random number r for the security gateway i1 and i ; Determine R i1 =r i1 G,z i1 =r i1 +sH 0 (ID i , Y i , R i1 ), and (z i1 , R i1 , P pub ) is sent to the security gateway through a secure channel and y i Sending to the security gateway via a secure channel;

[0054] The security gateway receives (z i1 , R i1 , P pub ,y i ) and then determine Y i =y i G, through z i1 G=R i1 +P pub H 0(ID i , Y i , R i1 )Verify y i the legality of

[0055] Verify y on the security gateway i After it is legal; KGC selects a random number r i2 and x i , determine pk i =(x i +y i )G,sk i =x i +y i , R i2 =r i2 G,z i2 =r i2 +y i H 0 (ID i , pk i , R i2 ), and (z i2， R i2 , pk i , Y i ) broadcast to the DCS system;

[0056] Any other security gateway in the system receives (z i2 , R i2 , pk i , Y i ) and then through z i2 =R i2 +Y i H 0 (ID i , pk i , R i2 ) Verify the public key P pub the legitimacy of.

[0057] In the related art, the public and private key generation process of the SM2 algorithm is that the gateway generates part of the private key first and then sends the part of the public key to the KGC, and then the KGC sends the part of the private key to the security gateway. This disclosure uses two SCHNORR signatures to replace the public and private key generation process of the SM2 algorithm, binding the public key of the key generation center to the y i , and then y i Bound to the user's public key, this can effectively avoid public key replacement attacks. In addition, it can also effectively reduce the number of communication rounds.

[0058] In a possible implementation, after any pair of security gateways in the system obtain the certificateless public key and private key, they use the SM2 algorithm to perform key negotiation to obtain the symmetric key k;

[0059] The security gateway sending the message encrypts the communication message using the SM4 algorithm through k, and the security gateway receiving the message decrypts the message through k; or

[0060] The security gateway that sends the message applies the SM3 algorithm through k to perform MAC calculation to encrypt the communication message. The security gateway that receives the encrypted message can verify the validity of the MAC value and decrypt the message through k if it has k. The security gateway that receives the encrypted message cannot verify the validity of the MAC value and cannot decrypt the message if it does not have k.

[0061] For example, after a pair of security gateways obtain the public and private keys based on the certificateless, they use the SM2 algorithm to negotiate the key and obtain the symmetric key k. The security gateway that sends the message among the two security gateways applies the SM4 algorithm to encrypt the communication message through k, and the security gateway that receives the message can use k to decrypt the message; thus, the lightweight SM4 symmetric encryption algorithm is used to ensure the confidentiality of the communication message. Alternatively, the security gateway that sends the message applies the SM3 algorithm to perform MAC calculation through k, and the security gateway that receives the message with k can verify the validity of the MAC value, thus using the lightweight SM3 algorithm to ensure the integrity of the communication message.

[0062] In a possible implementation, each security gateway is also configured with a Bypass mechanism to ensure that the normal communication of the DCS system is not affected when the security gateway crashes or loses power, thereby ensuring the robustness of the system.

[0063] According to one aspect of an embodiment of the present disclosure, a nuclear power DCS confidential communication method is provided, the method is applied to KGC, and for each security gateway, the method includes:

[0064] Step 11, KGC generates private key s and public key P pub =sG, and select a random number r for the security gateway i1 and i , the address of the security gateway is identified by ID i , G is the generator of the elliptic curve, H 0 () is a hash function;

[0065] Step 12, KGC determines R i1 =r i1 G,z i1 =r i1 +sH 0 (ID i , Y i , R i1 ), and (z i1 , R i1 , P pub) is sent to the security gateway through a secure channel and y i Sending to the security gateway via a secure channel;

[0066] Step 13: After confirming that the security gateway verifies y i After it is legal, KGC selects a random number r i2 and x i , determine pk i =(x i +y i )G,sk i =x i +y i , R i2 =r i2 G,z i2 =r i2 +y i H 0 (ID i , pk i , R i2 ), and (z i2 , R i2 , pk i , Y i ) is broadcast to the system.

[0067] According to one aspect of an embodiment of the present disclosure, a nuclear power DCS confidential communication method is provided, the method being applied to a security gateway, the method comprising:

[0068] Step 21, the security gateway receives the (z i1 ,Ri 1 , P pub ,y i ) and then determine Y i =y i G, through z i1 G=R i1 +P pub H 0 (ID i , Y i , R i1 )Verify y i and verify the legitimacy of i If it is legal, notify KGC that it has been verified i To be legal;

[0069] Step 22: The security gateway receives the (z i2 , R i2 , pk i , Y i ) and then through z i2 =R i2 +Y iH 0 (ID i , pk i , R i2 ) Verify the public key P pub the legitimacy of.

[0070] In a possible implementation, after the security gateway obtains the certificateless public key and private key, the method further includes:

[0071] Step 31, the security gateway and another communicating security gateway perform key negotiation using the SM2 algorithm to obtain a symmetric key k;

[0072] Step 32, the security gateway uses the SM4 algorithm to encrypt the communication message through k and sends it to another security gateway for communication;

[0073] Step 33: After receiving the encrypted communication message from another security gateway in communication, the security gateway decrypts the message using k.

[0074] In a possible implementation, after the security gateway obtains the certificateless public key and private key, the method further includes:

[0075] Step 31, the security gateway and another communicating security gateway perform key negotiation using the SM2 algorithm to obtain a symmetric key k;

[0076] Step 32, the security gateway uses the SM3 algorithm to perform MAC calculation to encrypt the communication message and sends it to another security gateway in the communication;

[0077] Step 33, after the security gateway receives an encrypted communication message from another security gateway in the communication, it can verify the validity of the MAC value and decrypt the message through k if it has k. The security gateway that receives the encrypted message cannot verify the validity of the MAC value and cannot decrypt the message if it does not have k.

[0078] In a possible implementation, the security gateway is further configured with a Bypass mechanism.

[0079] According to another aspect of an embodiment of the present disclosure, a nuclear power DCS secure communication device is provided, the device is applied to KGC, and for each security gateway, the device includes:

[0080] Generation module, used to generate private key s and public key P pub =sG, and select a random number r for the security gateway i1 and i , the address of the security gateway is identified by ID i , G is the generator of the elliptic curve, H 0 () is a hash function;

[0081] The first distribution module is used to determine R i1 =r i1 G,z i1 =r i1 +sH 0 (ID i , Y i , R i1 ), and (z i1 , R i1 , P pub ) is sent to the security gateway through a secure channel and y i Sending to the security gateway via a secure channel;

[0082] The second distribution module is used to determine the security gateway verification y i After it is legal, select a random number r i2 and x i , determine pk i =(x i +y i )G,sk i =x i +y i , R i2 =r i2 G,z i2 =r i2 +y i H 0 (ID i , pk i , R i2 ), and (z i2， R i2 , pk i , Y i ) is broadcast to the system.

[0083] According to another aspect of an embodiment of the present disclosure, a nuclear power DCS secure communication device is provided, the device being applied to a security gateway, the device comprising:

[0084] The first verification module is used to receive the (z i1 , R i1 , P pub ,y i ) and then determine Y i =y i G, through z i1 G=R i1 +P pub H 0 (ID i , Y i , R i1 )Verify y i and verify the legitimacy ofi If it is legal, notify KGC that it has been verified i To be legal;

[0085] The second verification module is used to receive the (z i2 , R i2 , pk i , Y i ) and then through z i2 =R i2 +Y i H 0 (ID i , pk i , R i2 ) Verify the public key P pub the legitimacy of.

[0086] The description of the above-mentioned device and method has been explained in detail in the description of the above-mentioned system and will not be repeated here.

[0087] The present disclosure may be a system, a method and / or a computer program product. The computer program product may include a computer-readable storage medium carrying computer-readable program instructions for causing a processor to implement various aspects of the present disclosure.

[0088] A computer-readable storage medium may be a tangible device that can hold and store instructions used by an instruction execution device. A computer-readable storage medium may be, for example, but not limited to, an electrical storage device, a magnetic storage device, an optical storage device, an electromagnetic storage device, a semiconductor storage device, or any suitable combination of the above. More specific examples of computer-readable storage media (a non-exhaustive list) include: a portable computer disk, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), a static random access memory (SRAM), a portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), a digital versatile disk (DVD), a memory stick, a floppy disk, a mechanical encoding device, such as a punch card or a raised structure in a groove on which instructions are stored, and any suitable combination of the above. As used herein, a computer-readable storage medium is not to be interpreted as a transient signal per se, such as a radio wave or other freely propagating electromagnetic wave, an electromagnetic wave propagating through a waveguide or other transmission medium (e.g., a light pulse through a fiber optic cable), or an electrical signal transmitted through a wire.

[0089] The computer-readable program instructions described herein can be downloaded from a computer-readable storage medium to each computing / processing device, or downloaded to an external computer or external storage device via a network, such as the Internet, a local area network, a wide area network, and / or a wireless network. The network can include copper transmission cables, optical fiber transmissions, wireless transmissions, routers, firewalls, switches, gateway computers, and / or edge servers. The network adapter card or network interface in each computing / processing device receives the computer-readable program instructions from the network and forwards the computer-readable program instructions for storage in the computer-readable storage medium in each computing / processing device.

[0090] The computer program instructions for performing the operation of the present disclosure may be assembly instructions, instruction set architecture (ISA) instructions, machine instructions, machine-related instructions, microcode, firmware instructions, state setting data, or source code or object code written in any combination of one or more programming languages, including object-oriented programming languages, such as Smalltalk, C++, etc., and conventional procedural programming languages, such as "C" language or similar programming languages. Computer-readable program instructions may be executed completely on a user's computer, partially on a user's computer, as an independent software package, partially on a user's computer, partially on a remote computer, or completely on a remote computer or server. In the case of a remote computer, the remote computer may be connected to the user's computer via any type of network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or may be connected to an external computer (e.g., using an Internet service provider to connect via the Internet). In some embodiments, an electronic circuit, such as a programmable logic circuit, a field programmable gate array (FPGA), or a programmable logic array (PLA), may be customized by utilizing the state information of the computer-readable program instructions, and the electronic circuit may execute the computer-readable program instructions, thereby realizing various aspects of the present disclosure.

[0091] Various aspects of the present disclosure are described herein with reference to the flowcharts and / or block diagrams of the methods, devices (systems) and computer program products according to the embodiments of the present disclosure. It should be understood that each box in the flowchart and / or block diagram and the combination of each box in the flowchart and / or block diagram can be implemented by computer-readable program instructions.

[0092] These computer-readable program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, or other programmable data processing device, thereby producing a machine, so that when these instructions are executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device, a device that implements the functions / actions specified in one or more boxes in the flowchart and / or block diagram is generated. These computer-readable program instructions can also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and these instructions cause the computer, programmable data processing device, and / or other equipment to work in a specific manner, so that the computer-readable medium storing the instructions includes a manufactured product, which includes instructions for implementing various aspects of the functions / actions specified in one or more boxes in the flowchart and / or block diagram.

[0093] Computer-readable program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer, other programmable data processing apparatus, or other device so that a series of operating steps are performed on the computer, other programmable data processing apparatus, or other device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby causing the instructions executed on the computer, other programmable data processing apparatus, or other device to implement the functions / actions specified in one or more boxes in the flowchart and / or block diagram.

[0094] The flow chart and block diagram in the accompanying drawings show the possible architecture, function and operation of the system, method and computer program product according to multiple embodiments of the present disclosure. In this regard, each square box in the flow chart or block diagram can represent a part of a module, program segment or instruction, and a part of the module, program segment or instruction includes one or more executable instructions for realizing the specified logical function. In some alternative implementations, the function marked in the square box can also occur in a sequence different from that marked in the accompanying drawings. For example, two continuous square boxes can actually be executed substantially in parallel, and they can sometimes be executed in reverse order, depending on the functions involved. It should also be noted that each square box in the block diagram and / or flow chart, and the combination of the square boxes in the block diagram and / or flow chart can be implemented with a dedicated hardware-based system that performs the specified function or action, or can be implemented with a combination of special hardware and computer instructions.

[0095] The embodiments of the present disclosure have been described above, and the above description is exemplary, not exhaustive, and is not limited to the disclosed embodiments. Many modifications and changes will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art without departing from the scope and spirit of the described embodiments. The selection of terms used herein is intended to best explain the principles of the embodiments, practical applications, or improvements to the technology in the market, or to enable other persons of ordinary skill in the art to understand the embodiments disclosed herein.

Claims

1. A nuclear power DCS information encryption system, characterized in that: The system includes a key generation center KGC and multiple security gateways; For each security gateway, KGC generates a private key s and a public key P pub =sG, and select a random number r for the security gateway i1 and i ; Determine R i1 =r i1 G,z i1 =r i1 +sH0(ID i ,Y i ,R i1 ), and (z i1 ,R i1 ,P puv ) is sent to the security gateway through a secure channel and y i Send it to the security gateway through a secure channel, where G is a generator of the elliptic curve; The security gateway receives (z i1 ,R i1 ,P pub ,y i ) and determine Y i =y i G, through z i1 G=R i1 +P pub H0(ID i ,Y i ,R i1 )Verify y i the legality of Verify y on the security gateway i After it is legal; KGC selects a random number r i2 and x i , determine pk i =(x i +y i )G,sk i =x i +y i , R i2 =r i2 G,z i2 =r i2 +y i H0(ID i ,pk i ,R i2 ), and (z i2 ,R i2 ,pk i ,Y i ) broadcast to the DCS system; Any other security gateway in the system receives (z i2 ,R i2 ,pk i ,Y i ) and then through z i2 =R i2 +Y i H0(ID i ,pk i ,R i2 ) Verify the public key P pub the legitimacy of.

2. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that After any pair of security gateways in the system obtain the public key and private key based on the certificateless key, they use the SM2 algorithm to perform key negotiation to obtain the symmetric key k; The security gateway sending the message encrypts the communication message using the SM4 algorithm through k, and the security gateway receiving the message decrypts the message through k; or The security gateway that sends the message applies the SM3 algorithm through k to perform MAC calculation to encrypt the communication message. The security gateway that receives the encrypted message can verify the validity of the MAC value and decrypt the message through k if it has k. The security gateway that receives the encrypted message cannot verify the validity of the MAC value and cannot decrypt the message if it does not have k.

3. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that Each security gateway in the system is also configured with a Bypass mechanism.

4. A method for encrypting nuclear power DCS information, characterized in that: The method is applied to KGC, and for each security gateway, the method includes: Step 11, KGC generates private key s and public key P pub =sG, and select a random number r for the security gateway i1 and r i , the address of the security gateway is identified by ID i , H0() is a hash function; Step 12, KGC determines R i1 =r i1 G,z i1 =r i1 +sH0(ID i ,Y i ,R i1 ), and (z i1 ,R i1 ,P pub ) is sent to the security gateway through a secure channel and y i Sending to the security gateway via a secure channel; Step 13: After confirming that the security gateway verifies y i After it is legal, KGC selects a random number r i2 and x i , determine pk i =(x i +y i )G,sk i =x i +y i , R i2 =r i2 G,z i2 =r i2 +y i H0(ID i ,pk i ,R i2 ), and (z i2 ,R i2 ,pk i ,Y i ) is broadcast to the system.

5. A method for encrypting nuclear power DCS information, characterized in that: The method is applied to a security gateway, and the method comprises: Step 21, the security gateway receives the (z i1 ,R i1 ,P puv ,y i ) and determine Y i =y i G, through z i1 G=R i1 +P pub H0(ID i ,Y i ,R i1 )Verify y i and verify the legitimacy of i If it is legal, notify KGC that it has been verified i To be legal; Step 22: The security gateway receives the (z i2 ,R i2 ,pk i ,Y i ) and then through z i2 =R i2 +Y i H0(ID i ,pk i ,R i2 ) Verify the public key P pub the legitimacy of.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that After the security gateway obtains the certificateless public key and private key, the method further includes: Step 31, the security gateway and another communicating security gateway perform key negotiation using the SM2 algorithm to obtain a symmetric key k; Step 32, the security gateway uses the SM4 algorithm to encrypt the communication message through k and sends it to another security gateway for communication; Step 33: After receiving the encrypted communication message from another security gateway in communication, the security gateway decrypts the message using k.

7. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that After the security gateway obtains the certificateless public key and private key, the method further includes: Step 31, the security gateway and another communicating security gateway perform key negotiation using the SM2 algorithm to obtain a symmetric key k; Step 32, the security gateway uses the SM3 algorithm to perform MAC calculation to encrypt the communication message and sends it to another security gateway in the communication; Step 33, after the security gateway receives an encrypted communication message from another security gateway in the communication, it can verify the validity of the MAC value and decrypt the message through k if it has k. The security gateway that receives the encrypted message cannot verify the validity of the MAC value and cannot decrypt the message if it does not have k.

8. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The security gateway is also configured with a Bypass mechanism.

9. A nuclear power DCS information encryption device, characterized in that: The device is applied to KGC, and for each security gateway, the device includes: Generation module, used to generate private key s and public key P pub =sG, and select a random number r for the security gateway i1 and i , the address of the security gateway is identified by ID i , G is the generator of the elliptic curve, H0() is the hash function; The first distribution module is used to determine R i1 =r i1 G,z i1 =r i1 +sH0(ID i ,Y i ,R i1 ), and (z i1 ,R i1 ,P pub ) is sent to the security gateway through a secure channel and y i Sending to the security gateway via a secure channel; The second distribution module is used to determine the security gateway verification y i After it is legal, select a random number r i2 and x i , determine pk i =(x i +y i )G,sk i =x i +y i , R i2 =r i2 G,z i2 =r i2 +y i H0(ID i ,pk i ,R i1 ), and (z i2 ,R i2 ,pk i ,Y i ) is broadcast to the system.

10. A nuclear power DCS information encryption device, characterized in that: The device is applied to a security gateway, and the device comprises: The first verification module is used to receive the (z i1 ,R i1 ,P pub ,y i ) and determine Y i =y i G, through z i1 G=R i1 +P puv H0(ID i ,Y i ,R i1 )Verify y i and verify the legitimacy of i If it is legal, notify KGC that it has been verified i To be legal; The second verification module is used to receive the (z i2 ,R i2 ,pk i ,Y i ) and then through z i2 =R i2 +Y i H0(ID i ,pk i ,R i2 ) Verify the public key P pub the legitimacy of.

11. A KGC, characterized in that: The KGC includes: processor; a memory for storing processor-executable instructions; Wherein, the processor is configured to execute the method of claim 4.

12. A security gateway, characterized in that: The security gateway comprises: processor; a memory for storing processor-executable instructions; The processor is configured to execute the method described in any one of claims 5 to 8.

13. A non-volatile computer-readable storage medium having computer program instructions stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program instructions are executed by a processor, the method according to claim 4 is implemented; or When the computer program instructions are executed by a processor, the method according to any one of claims 5 to 8 is implemented.

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