Anti-quantum-attack unmanned aerial vehicle group identity authentication key negotiation method

Abstract

The invention provides an anti-quantum-attack unmanned aerial vehicle group identity authentication key negotiation method, which comprises the following steps that S1, 2k unmanned aerial vehicles are built into an unmanned aerial vehicle group, authentication information is initialized for each unmanned aerial vehicle in the unmanned aerial vehicle group, and k represents the number of authentication rounds; s2, performing k rounds of authentication based on Latin square design; in each round of authentication, two-way identity authentication between the two unmanned aerial vehicle nodes is carried out based on PUF and NTRU algorithms, and after the two-way identity authentication, key negotiation between the unmanned aerial vehicle nodes is carried out based on an ECDH algorithm; and S3, obtaining a negotiation key of the unmanned aerial vehicle group after k rounds of authentication. And meanwhile, the capability of resisting quantum attacks and relatively low calculation overhead are ensured.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of drone communication technology, and in particular to a quantum attack-resistant drone group identity authentication key negotiation method. Background Art

[0002] Drones are widely used in military, logistics, agriculture, film and television shooting and other fields, and are gradually entering key infrastructure such as public safety, disaster relief and intelligent transportation. Cyber ​​attacks related to drones are increasing rapidly, the means of attack are becoming more complex, and security issues are becoming increasingly prominent. Identity authentication and key negotiation protocols play an important role in ensuring the security of communications between drones.

[0003] However, due to the particularity of UAV systems, such as limited computing resources, limited storage capacity, and short battery life, traditional authentication and key negotiation methods are difficult to apply directly. To this end, a variety of lightweight schemes have been proposed that can reduce resource consumption while ensuring security. At present, most of these schemes are based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), which is very suitable for resource-constrained devices because of its short keys and high computational efficiency. However, with the development of quantum computing, traditional encryption algorithms such as ECC are facing threats, especially the Shor algorithm, which may crack elliptic curve encryption in polynomial time, which means that the authentication key negotiation method designed entirely based on the ECC algorithm may not be able to effectively resist quantum computing attacks in the future.

[0004] In the field of post-quantum cryptography, encryption algorithms based on lattice theory have received widespread attention in recent years. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has selected a variety of lattice-based encryption algorithms as possible future cryptographic standards through its quantum-resistant cryptographic standardization project. These algorithms have strong resistance to quantum attacks. Among these algorithms, Kyber, NTRU (NTRUEncrypt), etc. are highly respected candidates. The identity authentication and key agreement protocols derived from these algorithms, such as Kyber.AKE, can perform well in resisting the threat of quantum computing.

[0005] However, although these schemes are forward-looking in terms of security, they still have high computational overhead and communication costs, especially performing poorly in resource-constrained environments. Drone clusters usually have the characteristics of a large number of nodes, limited computing resources, and limited storage capacity, and cannot use identity authentication key negotiation schemes with high computational overhead. Summary of the invention

[0006] The present invention proposes a quantum-attack-resistant drone swarm identity authentication key negotiation method to solve the technical problem that in the prior art, it is difficult to simultaneously ensure effective resistance to quantum attacks and low computational overhead when performing identity authentication key negotiation on a drone swarm.

[0007] In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention provides a method for identity authentication key negotiation of drone groups resistant to quantum attacks, comprising the following steps:

[0008] Step S1: k The drones are formed into a drone swarm, and the authentication information is initialized for each drone in the drone swarm, where k represents the number of authentication rounds;

[0009] Step S2: Perform k rounds of authentication based on Latin square design; in each round of authentication, perform two-way authentication between two drone nodes based on PUF and NTRU algorithms, and after two-way authentication, perform key negotiation between drone nodes based on ECDH algorithm;

[0010] Step S3: After k rounds of authentication, the negotiation key of the drone group is obtained.

[0011] Preferably, in step S1, when the number of drones in the drone group is less than 2 k When 2 k -n rack as a virtual node.

[0012] Preferably, in step S1, the authentication information includes:

[0013] {f i , g i , ID i ,N,q,p,G,C i};

[0014]

[0015] Where i represents the drone number; ID i represents the identity sequence number; N represents the polynomial ring The order of i and g i represents the private key polynomial, f i and g i are defined over a polynomial ring of order N q represents the modulus of the coefficient; p represents the modulus of the NTRU algorithm private key polynomial; G represents the base point on the elliptic curve; C i represents the challenge value of drone i; h i represents the public key polynomial of the i-th drone; R i Indicates that the i-th drone receives the challenge value C of drone i i Finally, the result is output by the PUF algorithm.

[0016] Preferably, in step S2, the Latin square designs a method for performing k rounds of authentication, including: in each round of authentication, the UAV numbered x xSend the authentication information to the UAV numbered y y ; When x>2 j-1 When y=x-2 j-1 , when x≤2 j-1 When y=2 k +x-2 j-1 , j represents the current authentication round number.

[0017] Preferably, step S2 comprises:

[0018] Step S21: UAV x Generate a random number r and calculate r·G to get

[0019] Step S22: UAV x MR is calculated according to the following formula x :

[0020]

[0021] Step S23: UAV x According to the following formula, we can first calculate Then calculate MK x , and then splice the data to get Mes x =MK x ||MR x :

[0022]

[0023] Where H1 and H2 represent mapping functions;

[0024] Step S24: UAV x Generate a random polynomial r x After that, use h y and r x Mes x According to the following formula, e x :

[0025] e x =p×r x ·h y +Me s xmod q;

[0026] h y =Hash(R y );

[0027] Step S25: UAV x First calculate HM according to the following formula xy , and then pack the data into M(x, y) = {e x , IDx , H.M. xy}Send to UAV y :

[0028] HM xy =Hmac(hr y , e x ||ID x );

[0029] In the formula, Hmac represents the message authentication code algorithm based on hash function;

[0030] Step S26: UAV y Receive M(x, y) = {e x , ID x , H.M. xy} then check the ID first x Whether it corresponds, then use the challenge value C stored by itself y Through PUF y () function to get R y Calculate hr later y =Hash(R y ), and calculate HM xy , if HM xy and HM in M(x, y) xy If they are the same, the authentication passes, otherwise the authentication fails;

[0031] Step S27: UAV y Based on the received ID x Find the corresponding hr x =Hash(R x ), then use f y , g y According to the following algorithm, we can get a y andmes x ;

[0032] a y =f y ·e x mod q;

[0033]

[0034] Step S28: mes x Split into mk x With mr x Post-inspection Is it related to hr x If they are the same, the identity verification is passed, otherwise the data packet is discarded. After passing the verification, the UAV y The same ID will no longer be accepted during the authentication process xmessage package;

[0035] Step S29: UAV y calculate Post Storage Use it as K for the next round y ;

[0036] Step S210: Repeat steps S22 to S29 until k rounds of authentication are completed.

[0037] Preferably, the expression of the negotiated key obtained in step S3 is:

[0038]

[0039] In the formula, S represents the number of drones, It indicates the value obtained by calculating r·G using the random number r during the first round of authentication for the drone numbered i.

[0040] The present invention also provides an electronic device, comprising: a memory, a processor and a computer program, wherein the computer program is stored in the memory and is configured to be executed by the processor to implement the above method.

[0041] The present invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium, in which a computer program is stored. The computer program is executed by a processor to implement the above method.

[0042] The beneficial effects of the present invention include at least: the present invention proposes a lightweight drone swarm identity authentication key negotiation method with quantum attack resistance by combining the lattice cryptography algorithm NTRU, the physical unclonable function PUF, the elliptic curve cryptography ECC and the ECDH algorithm.

[0043] By integrating the quantum-resistant lattice cryptographic algorithm NTRU and the PUF physical unclonable function, the vulnerability of traditional protocols such as DTLS, which rely on ECC or RSA, to quantum threats is eliminated. This design ensures that the drone network can maintain secure communications even in a quantum attack environment, especially in terms of identity authentication and key negotiation to resist quantum attacks. The Latin square design is used to significantly reduce the number of large-scale node authentications in the drone swarm. At the same time, the ability to resist quantum attacks and low computational overhead are guaranteed. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0044] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a method flow of an embodiment of the present invention;

[0045] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the first round of authentication process of an embodiment of the present invention;

[0046] Figure 3 Schematic diagram of the j-th round of authentication process according to an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0047] The following is a clear and complete description of the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention in conjunction with the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work belong to the protection scope of the present invention.

[0048] The present invention realizes two-way identity authentication between drone nodes based on PUF and NTRU algorithms, uses ECDH algorithm to realize key negotiation between nodes, and uses Latin square design to greatly reduce the number of times required for large-scale node authentication in drone swarms.

[0049] Specifically, Figure 1 As shown, an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for identity authentication key negotiation of a drone group resistant to quantum attacks, comprising the following steps:

[0050] Step S1: k The drones are formed into a drone swarm, and the authentication information is initialized for each drone in the drone swarm, where k represents the number of authentication rounds;

[0051] Step S2: Perform k rounds of authentication based on Latin square design; in each round of authentication, perform two-way authentication between two drone nodes based on PUF and NTRU algorithms, and after two-way authentication, perform key negotiation between drone nodes based on ECDH algorithm;

[0052] Step S3: After k rounds of authentication, the negotiation key of the drone group is obtained.

[0053] Step S1 is mainly completed before the drone group takes off. The specific steps are as follows:

[0054] 1) All UAVs that need to participate in the network will be given relevant parameters during the initialization phase. The total number of UAVs participating in the network is recorded as S, and the UAV numbered i is i Take this as an example, the ground station will generate all f i , g i and h i , where f and g are both polynomial rings of order N Up, f i and g i represents the private key polynomial, h i Represents the public key polynomial of the i-th drone.

[0055] The parameters {fi , g i , ID i , N, q, p, G, C i},parameter Specific functions H1 and H2 are passed to the drone, and the specific meanings of the parameters are shown in Table 1;

[0056] Table 1

[0057]

[0058]

[0059] 2) UAV i Calculate f separately i Inverse elements modulo q and p and make sure and Satisfy the following formula;

[0060]

[0061] 3) UAV i Calculate using Hash function So the hash value of R

[0062] In step S2, after each independent UAV completes parameter initialization with the help of the ground station / control station, the UAVs then perform k rounds of authentication and key negotiation based on the Latin square design. k is the number of rounds required for authentication, which is related to the total number of UAVs. In an ideal state, the total number of UAVs is 2. k In the embodiment of the present invention, if the number of drones is less than 2 k Supplement 2 k -n rack as a virtual node.

[0063] In the k-round identity authentication process, the first-round authentication and the j-round authentication are as follows: Figure 2 and Figure 3 As shown, specifically, in round j, UAV x Send M (x，y ) to UAV y , where x>2 j-1 When y=x-2 j-1 , when x≤2 j-1 When y=2 k +x-2 j-1 .

[0064] Based on the PUF and NTRU algorithms, two-way authentication is performed between two drone nodes. After the two-way authentication, key negotiation between the drone nodes is performed based on the ECDH algorithm, which includes the following steps.

[0065] 1) UAV x After temporarily generating a random number r, calculate r·G to obtain Then use C x As a challenge value through PUF x ( ) function to get R x .

[0066] 2) UAV x Calculate MR according to the following formula x , where the value of P should be

[0067] MR x =R x +P.

[0068] 3) UAV x According to the following formula, we can first calculate Then calculate MK x , and then splice the data to get Mes x =MK x ||MR x ;

[0069]

[0070] 4) UAV x Generate a random polynomial r x After that, use h y and r x Mes x According to the following formula, e x ;

[0071] e x =p×r x ·h y +Mes x mod q.

[0072] 5) UAV x HM is calculated according to the following formula xy , which will then need to be sent to the UAV y The data is packaged into M(x, y) = {e x , ID x , H.M. xy}send;

[0073] HM xy =Hmac(hr y , ex ||ID x ).

[0074] 6) UAV y Received M (x，y) = {x1, x2, x3}, then check x2 first; use the challenge value C stored in itself y Through PUF y () function to get R y Calculate hr later y =Hash(R y ), and calculate HM according to the following formula xy , if HM xy With UAV x If x3 in the transmitted information is the same, the data integrity check passes, otherwise the data packet is discarded;

[0075] HM xy =Hmac(hr y , x1||x2);

[0076] It should be noted that UAV y Upon receiving M (x，y) Before needing to be a UAV x generate r x And other parameters, that is to say, UAV y Upon receiving M (x，y) Already have r y And other parameters.

[0077] 7) UAV y According to x2, the ID of the sender's drone is determined x And find the corresponding hr x , then use f y , g y According to the following algorithm, we first get a y , and then get mes x ;

[0078] a y =f y ·x1mod q;

[0079]

[0080] After that, mes x Split into mk x With mr x Post-inspection Is it related to hr xIf they are the same, the identity verification is passed, otherwise the data packet is discarded. After passing the verification, the drone will no longer accept message packets with the same ID during the authentication process.

[0081] 8) UAV y calculate Post Storage As the new K y Go to the next round;

[0082] It should be noted that only in the first round of certification, UAV i K needs to be generated, and the subsequent authentication process uses the K generated in the previous round i .

[0083] After k rounds, each drone gets As the negotiation key, take UAV1 when S=8 as an example, a total of 3 rounds are required. After the first round, the negotiation key of UAV1 is:

[0084]

[0085] After the second round, the negotiated key of UAV1 is

[0086]

[0087] After the third round, the negotiated key of UAV1 is

[0088]

[0089] Compared with widely used identity authentication key negotiation schemes such as DTLS, the embodiments of the present invention reduce the total computational overhead of the identity authentication key negotiation method and improve efficiency by drawing on efficient lattice cryptographic algorithms (NTRU algorithms), PUF technology, and ECC algorithms, and using algorithms with extremely low computational overhead such as polynomial multiplication, elliptic curve point addition, PUF functions, and message authentication codes (HMAC algorithms). In addition, the method also reduces the number of communications by combining Latin square design and elliptic curve cryptography. Usually, the number of communications required for S drones to authenticate and negotiate a key is S×(S-1)×0.5, while this scheme only requires S×log2S. For example, 8 drones only require 24 communications, which significantly reduces the number of communications. It should be noted that the number of communications here refers to at least one communication between two drones. If broadcasting is performed, it is S. 2 .

[0090] At the same time, the solution of the embodiment of the present invention has extremely high scalability. In addition to being applied to drone systems, it can also meet the needs of other Internet of Things (IoT) devices and applications with lightweight requirements. The architecture of the protocol is flexible, which is easy to integrate into different types of lightweight terminals, and the protocol parameters can be adjusted according to specific application scenarios to adapt to different performance requirements. Especially in resource-constrained environments, such as sensor networks, smart homes, wearable devices, etc., this method can not only provide efficient identity authentication and key negotiation, but also ensure its high security and low communication overhead, making it an ideal solution for IoT applications. This scalability gives the protocol a strong adaptability in a wide range of application scenarios.

[0091] The present invention also provides an electronic device, comprising: a memory, a processor and a computer program, wherein the computer program is stored in the memory and is configured to be executed by the processor to implement the above method.

[0092] The present invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium, in which a computer program is stored. The computer program is executed by a processor to implement the above method.

[0093] The technical features of the above embodiments can be combined arbitrarily. To make the description concise, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are described. Only the preferred embodiments of the present invention are expressed. The description is more specific and detailed, but it cannot be understood as limiting the scope of the patent of the present invention. As long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered as the scope recorded in this specification.

[0094] It should be noted that, for those skilled in the art, several modifications and improvements can be made without departing from the concept of the present invention, and these modifications and improvements all belong to the protection scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the patent of the present invention shall be subject to the attached claims.

Claims

1. A quantum attack-resistant drone swarm identity authentication key negotiation method, characterized by: The following steps are involved: Step S1: k The drones are formed into a drone swarm, and the authentication information is initialized for each drone in the drone swarm, where k represents the number of authentication rounds; Step S2: Perform k rounds of authentication based on Latin square design; in each round of authentication, perform two-way authentication between two drone nodes based on PUF and NTRU algorithms, and after two-way authentication, perform key negotiation between drone nodes based on ECDH algorithm; Step S3: After k rounds of authentication, the negotiation key of the drone group is obtained.

2. According to the quantum attack-resistant drone swarm identity authentication key negotiation method of claim 1, it is characterized by: In step S1, when the number of drones in the drone group is less than 2 k When 2 k -n rack as a virtual node.

3. According to the quantum attack-resistant drone swarm identity authentication key negotiation method of claim 1, it is characterized by: In step S1, the authentication information includes: {f i ,g i ,ID i ,N,q,p,G,C i }; Where i represents the drone number; ID i Indicates the identity serial number; N indicates a multi-top ring The order of i and g i represents the private key polynomial, f i and g i are defined over a polynomial ring of order N q represents the modulus of the coefficient; p represents the modulus of the NTRU algorithm private key polynomial; G represents the base point on the elliptic curve; C i represents the challenge value of drone i; h i represents the public key polynomial of the i-th drone; R i Indicates that the i-th drone receives the challenge value C of drone i i Finally, the result is output by the PUF algorithm.

4. According to the quantum attack-resistant drone swarm identity authentication key negotiation method of claim 3, it is characterized by: In step S2, the Latin square designs a method for performing k rounds of authentication, including: in each round of authentication, the UAV numbered x x Send the authentication information to the UAV numbered y y ; When x>2 j-1 When y=x-2 j-1 , when x≤2 j-1 When y=2 k +x-2 j-1 , j represents the current authentication round number.

5. According to the quantum attack-resistant drone swarm identity authentication key negotiation method of claim 4, it is characterized by: Step S2 include: Step S21: UAV x Generate a random number r and calculate r·G to get Step S22: UAV x MR is calculated according to the following formula x : Step S23: UAV x According to the following formula, we can first calculate Then calculate MK x , and then splice the data to get Mes x =MK x ||MR x : Where H1 and H2 represent mapping functions; Step S24: UAV x Generate a random polynomial r x After that, use h y and r x Mes x According to the following formula, e x : e x =p×r x ·h y +Mes x mod q; h y =Hash(R y ); Step S25: UAV x First calculate HM according to the following formula xy , and then pack the data into M(x, y) = {e x , ID x , H.M. xy }Send to UAV y : HM xy =Hmac(hr y ,e x ||ID x ); In the formula, Hmac represents the message authentication code algorithm based on hash function; Step S26: UAV y Receive M(x, y) = {e x , ID x , H.M. xy } then check the ID first x Whether it corresponds, then use the challenge value C stored by itself y Through PUF y () function to get R y Calculate hr later y =Hash(R y ), and calculate HM xy , if HM xy and HM in M(x, y) xy If they are the same, the authentication passes, otherwise the authentication fails; Step S27: UAV y Based on the received ID x Find the corresponding hr x =Hash(R x ), then use f y , g y According to the following algorithm, we can get a y andmes x ; a y =f y ·and x mod q; Step S28: mes x Split into mk x With mr x Post-inspection Is it related to hr x If they are the same, the identity verification is passed, otherwise the data packet is discarded. After passing the verification, the UAV y The same ID will no longer be accepted during the authentication process x message package; Step S29: UAV y calculate Post Storage Use it as K for the next round y ; Step S210: Repeat steps S22 to S29 until k rounds of authentication are completed.

6. The method for quantum attack-resistant drone group identity authentication key negotiation according to claim 5 is characterized by: The expression of the negotiated key obtained in step S3 is: In the formula, S represents the number of drones, It indicates the value obtained by calculating r·G using the random number r during the first round of authentication for the drone numbered i.

7. An electronic device comprising: A memory, a processor and a computer program, characterized in that the computer program is stored in the memory and is configured to be executed by the processor to implement the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.

8. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and the computer program is executed by a processor to implement the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.

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